



# New Trends in Cyber Threats, Recognizing and Fighting Persistent Threats

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


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# No target too big, no target too small, No sector immune

- Retail – from mega-online retailers(i.e. ebay) to Mom & Pop websites
- Medical/Pharmaceutical
- Banks/financial institutions
- Industry
- Government

Threats take MANY forms, so you need to understand what kind(s) you are likely to attract.



# Where's your vulnerability?

- **Your endpoints**
- Your data center - **servers**
- Your workstations/laptops
- Your smartphone/blackberry
- Your VOIP phone(!)
- Your websites
- Your applications
- **YOUR PEOPLE!**



# Some scary 2011 Stats

**58%** successful hacks involved groups

**40%** involved individuals - it's easier to buy automated attack tools (making hacks more repeatable)

**41%** of health care officials don't understand the impact of changes until AFTER implemented

**75%** security professionals believe hackers have the upper hand

\*surveys from Black Hat and Cisco conferences, [privacyrights.org](http://privacyrights.org)

# More scary 2011 Stats



42 - against financial/insurance (DISC, HACK, CARD, INSD, PHYS, PORT, STAT, UNKN)

68 – against retail/merchant (DISC, HACK, CARD, INSD, PHYS, PORT, STAT, UNKN)

50 – against educational institutions (DISC, HACK, CARD, INSD, PHYS, PORT, STAT, UNKN)

58 – against government (DISC, HACK, CARD, INSD, PHYS, PORT, STAT, UNKN)

151 – against medical (DISC, HACK, CARD, INSD, PHYS, PORT, STAT, UNKN)

6 - against nonprofits (DISC, HACK, CARD, INSD, PHYS, PORT, STAT, UNKN)


Disclosed, hacked, card fraud, insiders, physical loss, portable device, stationary device, unknown.

\*[privacyrights.org](http://privacyrights.org)

# Geohot vs Sony April 2011

George Hotz, known as 'Geohot' hacked Sony PS3 and posted the jailbreaks online.

Sony answered by filing a lawsuit, citing Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DCMA) and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.




The result? **MILLIONS** in losses(\$171), damaged reputation, customer backlash, stock prices in the gutter.



# HB GARY vs. Anonymous

Aaron Barr, CEO of an IT security firm HBGary, boasts he can name the scoundrels who comprise Anonymous, responsible for bringing carnage to MC/ VISA/ Paypal in the wake of Wikileaks case, and he will NAME NAMES!

He became?



# HBGary vs Anonymous

So what happened?

Servers broken into, emails published, including evidence of criminal activity, website defaced and databases destroyed.

Bonus round: second site of owner Greg Hoglund taken offline and registered user accounts published.





## How? The nitty gritty

A webserver with a common SQL injection vulnerability(patch available- unpatched)

A custom Content Management System (little support)

using MD5 hashes... badly (easily cracked)

Easy passwords & repeat passwords! CEO and COO - Just 6 digits, all lowercase, and 2 numbers, same passwords across multiple systems.

## Nitty gritty 2

Elevated privileges via unpatched linux

Hackers free to deface website, grab data, dump emails.

Socially engineered admin to open firewall and reset password.


BOTTOM LINE? Best practice is not always standard practice! Standard advice is GOOD advice!

# A shift to *DIFFERENT* targets


2010 and earlier  
Credit card numbers



2011 - Hackers now prefer  
**USER CREDENTIALS**



# The latest? A shift to smaller targets



Boston restaurant group Briar

A small target ... fewer defenses

DEFAULT userid/passwords on point of sale

Employees shared same userid/password

No secured wireless or remote access

Continued to accept payments AFTER the malware was discovered.

The company admitted no wrongdoing. Cheaper for them than litigation. Their defense? We're not IT – we're restauranteurs!

Result? \$110,000 fine and a list of actions to take.



# Why smaller targets?

- Typically fewer defenses
- Longer to discover a breach – avg is 6 months
- Limited to no logging for forensics – they can't help if they want to!
- No intrusion detection or prevention
- Systems run out-of-the-box – default settings, default credentials
- No one in charge of security
- Nearly 89% NOT in compliance with PCI/DSS at time of breach.

# How much are YOU worth?\*

## Prices for data in the underground

Utility bill, scanned: \$10

Full identity: \$6 - \$80

Gmail username and password: \$80

Facebook (userID and password) : \$300

Passport, scanned: \$20 FREE with an RFID scanner!

Driver's license, scanned:\$20

Bank-account credentials: \$15 to \$850

Credit card with \$1,000 available: \$25

Credit card with personal information: \$80

# How much are YOU worth?\*

## Prices for programs in the underground


DDOS attack: \$100 a day

Standard crimeware  
toolkit: \$100 to \$1,000

Single bot  
(purchased in bulk):  
3 CENTS

Botnet with up to 10,000 bots  
for rent: \$200 an hour

\* Sources: Kaspersky Lab, Symantec, Trend Micro



# Economies of Scale

Hackers have been able to create:

STANDARDIZED  
AUTOMATED  
REPEATABLE



attacks against REPEAT targets!

Can you say the same thing for YOUR IT Security practices?



# What do you have to protect?

Money? Online Presence?

Intellectual property? Contracts?  
Inventions?

Technology?

Medical records (and insurance information)?



# A few words about users

- 60% will insert a found thumbdrive into their desktop/laptop
- 90% if it has a company logo on it!
- More than 50% will give up their passwords in exchange for a token gift!

# Vulnerability Assessments

If you don't have in-house expertise, HIRE IT.

Any number of tools available, (some free)

- STAT (Security Threat Avoidance Technology)

Scanner by Harris Corp. <http://www.statonline.com/index.asp>

- Internet Scanner by ISS Internet Security Systems <http://www.iss.net>

- Nessus Security Scanner <http://www.nessus.org/>

You can't fix what you can't see!




# Vulnerabilities vs Remedies

- Identify main vulnerabilities
  - Endpoints (web, perimeter, remote access)
  - Servers (applications)
  - Users
- COUNTER WITH:
  - Secure configurations & monitoring
  - Patching & VERIFICATION
  - Maintaining a baseline configuration
  - Account management (user accounts not business accounts)
  - User awareness training!! (again and again)

# Is there NOWHERE SAFE?



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**2008 - - - NASA Discovers Computer Virus  
Aboard the International Space Station**

Source: NASA.GOV



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# Hacked!

## 2011 - NASA, Stanford Hacked by Software Scammers

source: Fox News



# A CISO's Bad Day



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**“NASA computer hacked, satellite data accessed “**

Romanian claims responsibility; space agency says 'necessary steps taken'

Goddard Space Flight Center May 2011

The hacker, who calls himself TinKode, took to Twitter shortly before noon May 17 to boast of his feat.


Source: MSNBC




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# Defense in Depth @ KSC

