Investigation of Spiral Bevel Gear Condition Indicator Validation via AC-29-2C Using Fielded Rotorcraft HUMS Data

This report presents the analysis of gear condition indicator data collected on a helicopter when damage occurred in spiral bevel gears. The purpose of the data analysis was to use existing in-service helicopter HUMS flight data from faulted spiral bevel gears as a Case Study, to better understand the differences between HUMS data response in a helicopter and a component test rig, the NASA Glenn Spiral Bevel Gear Fatigue Rig. The reason spiral bevel gear sets were chosen to demonstrate differences in response between both systems was the availability of the helicopter data and the availability of a test rig that was capable of testing spiral bevel gear sets to failure. The objective of the analysis presented in this paper was to re-process helicopter HUMS data with the same analysis techniques applied to the spiral bevel rig test data. The damage modes experienced in the field were mapped to the failure modes created in the test rig. A total of forty helicopters were evaluated. Twenty helicopters, or tails, experienced damage to the spiral bevel gears in the nose gearbox. Vibration based gear condition indicators data was available before and after replacement. The other twenty tails had no known anomalies in the nose gearbox within the time frame of the datasets. These twenty tails were considered the baseline dataset. The HUMS gear condition indicators evaluated included gear condition indicators (CI) Figure of Merit 4 (FM4), Root Mean Square (RMS) or Diagnostic Algorithm 1 (DA1) and +/- 3 Sideband Index (SI3). Three additional condition indicators, not currently calculated on-board, were calculated from the archived data. These three indicators were +/- 1 Sideband Index (SI1), the DA1 of the difference signal (DiffDA1) and the peak-to-peak of the difference signal (DP2P). Results found the CI DP2P, not currently available in the on-board HUMS, performed the best, responding to varying levels of damage on thirteen of the fourteen helicopters evaluated. Two additional CIs also not in the on-board system, DiffDA1and SI1, also performed well responding to twelve and ten of the fourteen helicopters evaluated respectively. Of the three CIs currently available in the MSPU, DA1, FM4 and SI3, SI3, responded to eight, DA1 responded to six and FM4 responded to four of the fourteen helicopters evaluated. FM4, the poorest performing CI, was not as responsive to damage as the other five CIs. Conversely, when compared to the other two, it was the only CI that responded to damage on two helicopters. CI response could not be correlated to specific failure modes due to limited pictures and subjective descriptions found within the TDA. Flight regime did affect CI response to some gear faults. Due to the range of operating conditions for each regime, more studies are required to determine their sensitivity to regimes.