Hubble Space Telescope Crew Rescue Analysis

In the aftermath of the 2003 Columbia accident NASA removed the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Servicing Mission 4 (SM4) from the Space Shuttle manifest. Reasons cited included concerns that the risk of flying the mission would be too high. There was at the time no viable technique to repair the orbiter s thermal protection system if it were to be damaged by debris during ascent. Furthermore in the event of damage, since the mission was not to the International Space Station, there was no safe haven for the crew to wait for an extended period of time for a rescue. The HST servicing mission was reconsidered because of improvements in the ascent debris environment, the development of techniques for the astronauts to perform on orbit repairs to damage thermal protection, and the development of a strategy to provide a crew rescue capability. However, leading up to the launch of servicing mission, the HST crew rescue capability was a recurring topic. For HST there was a limited amount of time available to perform a crew rescue because of the limited consumables available on the Orbiter. The success of crew rescue depends upon several factors including when a problem is identified, when and to what extent power down procedures are begun, and where the rescue vehicle is in its ground processing cycle. Severe power downs maximize crew rescue success but would eliminate the option for the orbiter servicing the HST to attempt a landing. Therefore, crew rescue success needed to be weighed against preserving the ability of the orbiter to have landing option in case there was a problem with the rescue vehicle. This paper focuses on quantification of the HST mission loss of crew rescue capability using Shuttle historical data and various power down capabilities. That work supported NASA s decision to proceed with the HST service mission, which was successfully completed on May 24th 2009.