SHELL INSTABILITY PROBLEMS AS RELATED TO DESIGN

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SUMMARY

A presentation is made which highlights several current shell stability problems. A searching reappraisal of shell stability research is advocated in the light of the current rapidly mounting intensity of shell research which in many cases is disproportionately academic and non-design orientated.

INTRODUCTION

In scanning the list of participants in this symposium one can **only** marvel to see that so many serious investigators in the field **of** elastic stability can be gathered at any one time. Likewise, the papers presented cover a cross section of the important recent works being accomplished in the field of shell stability. At such a distinguished gathering, however, the responsibility of pointing out areas which are not receiving sufficient emphasis, is of equal importance to the task of reporting **accomplishments.** It is the hope of the authors that in pointing out specific problem areas and, where possible, indicating their relative importance in the design process, that interest will be aroused **and** solutions **be expedited. Contrary** to what **has** quite **often** become the expected plea, this paper will not ask for more effort in the **discipline of shell instability,** rather a diyersion of the **serious** worker to the problem areas offering a maximum return potential. Even a **casual** glance at **Figure 1 would indicate** the widespread **interest** in **shell stability as evidenced by** the increase **in** the **quantity of litera**ture **being published on shell analysis. Unfortunately much of** it **is concerned** with peripheral problems and much **deals** with trivia. **Perhaps it was** this inundation **of mediocre** and **inconsequential** papers that **prc_pted** the **editorial** board **of** the Journal **of Applied** Mechanics to adopt **a policy** which excludes from **consideration,** without **review,** papers in the field **of** shell **stability** which employ **small deflection** theory **or otherwise** apply **established** techniques to the **solutions,** "no **matter how** interesting," (reference 3). While not a deterrant to all, at least **such** a policy will **discourage waste** effort involving trivial refinements **and mathematical** gymnastics. **In** the face **of a limited and in-** **expandable** supply **of competent** talent **we** must **turn our attention from the** inconsequential **problems** to **those where** increased **knowledge and analytical** techniques **hold promise of** increased **structural** reliability and **efficiency.**

DESIGNING FCR STABILITY

A missile or spacecraft is **primarily** a **pressure** sustaining structure. Perhaps in excess **of 90%** of the structure **may be sustaining pressure loads. In the early missile designs most shells** were pressure critical **and stabilization** *was* **not necessary except for** certain _n_111ng conditions. **However, as material** applications **and properties** have advanced, *wall* thicknesses have **diminished** *until* today **many** shells **which** have been **previously designed by pressure** vessel criteria **are now at** or beyond the threshold **of the** instability **problem. Figure 2 represents** a design problem involving a solid propellant motor case which illustrates this situation. The case, a second stage sustainer, is subject**ed** to axial **compression and** bending **loads durl_ the initial** boost **stage.** After first stage booster cut-ofT the **sustainer** is **fired and** the case is subjected to an internal **pressure** condition. **Figure 2** shows the re**qttlred** wall thickness **of** this **18-inch** radius, **steel cylindrical shell** versus the tensile **stress of** the material considered. **For** the **condition** of internal **pressure** the typical **hyperbolic** relationship is **obtained. However,** consideration of the **condition** which induces compression in the **shell** establishes **a lower limit of** wall thickness which **canbe drawn** as **a** horizontal cut-ofT **line.** _h_s cUt-OfT **line, when derived** for an unsupported shell by the method of reference 4 intersects the **hyperbola at** an **ultimate** tensile **stress** of **251,000 psi. This** approaches **very closely** the ultimate **strength** of the **material selected for** the **motor** case. _hus it can be **seen** that **additional** improvmnents in the strength of case materials would be pointless without something being **done about** the **shell** stabilization **problem.**

Where previously it **was** conservative to **neglect** core stabilizing **effects they now are a** first order consideration. **Figure 2 shows** two additional cut-ofT **lines.** _he intemediate **one** is **based** *upon* **the** work **of Seide on** cylinders **stabilized** by **elastic** cores **(reference** 5 **) and** the **lower one** is **based upon a** value **obtained** in **a** full-scale compression **test** of **a motor** case filled with inert **propellant. If** the case **were designed to** the **lowest** cut-ofT **value a** weight **saving** of approximately 40% would result. These particular values of the limitations due to compressive **instability are cited merely to illustrate** the **problems** rather than **define actual allowables. Methods** of predicting **stabilizing-efTects of** viscoelastic **cores are** rather **difficult** to apply in **practice. For example, in applying Seide's** theory **it was necessary** to assume **a value** for the modulus of elasticity of the core. This is difficult to obtain,

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as it **is well** known that core materials behave in **a** viscoelastic manner and any test program must realistically account for the actual temperature **and strain** rate if it is to be an **acceptable** analog of the opera**tlonal problem. Here** then **is a fertile field** of **investigation.**

STIFFENED SHELLS

The designer, faced with the problem of shell instability must ask,
"why monocoque?" It is well known that, except for the limiting cases "why **monocoque?" It** is well known that, except for the **limiting** cases of minlmum-gage handling **problems** and thlck-walled shells the monocoque is **structurally** the **least efficient** mode of material disposition for **non-stabilized shells** in **compression.**

In general, then, it behooves the designer to **either** avoid monocoque **or** stabilize it wherever possible. Sume methods of **avoiding monocoque** include the following construction:

- **(a) Conventional** frame and/or stringer cumblnations
	- (b) Integral stiffening
	- **(C) Sandwich construction**
		- (1) **I_otroplc**core (e.g. foem)
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			- (2) Orthotropic core **(e.g.** honeycamb) **3)** Unidirectional core **(e.g.** corrugations)

_he integrally **stiffened** shell is illustrated in **Figure 3 which** shows a machined **waffle** pattern that has **been** successfully used for **de**sign of several cryogenic fuel tanks. This simple configuration at first represented a fabrication challenge. Now that it **has** been successfully produced for several **designs, attention** has been given to opti**mizing** the stiffener configuration. **Interestingly enough,** the **most** difficult problems here are **not** those **concerned with optimizing** the shell for strength only, but rather optimization consistant with the conditions imposed by **manufacturing** limitations and other design considerations.

Figure 4 shows a **weight** cumparison of several systems of construction for cylinders as a function of **loading** intensity for an actual **de**sign case involving combined **axial** compression and bending. Similar **consideration** is given to **spherical caps** under **external pressure** in Figure 5. **Here** the treatment **is** more **general** in that weight, **or** gage, has been normalized as **has** the **loading. There** are several items **worthy of note** in this figure. First, we find **a substantial difference between classical** theory for **monocoque and** the empirical **curve based** on test data. The **empirical curve** shown **is based upon a constant coefficient of 0.2 in** the **classical** formula. **This agrees** within **10% with** the **avail**able experimental data. Further examination of Figures 4 and 5 shows that there is a much larger potential pay-off **in** attempting to apply

sandwich construction to the **design problem** than there is in **operating** on the monocoque **theory. One problem** which **looms** large in **designing** for sandwich construction --- especially in cryogenic tankage, is that of thermal stress and the **technique of** combining thermal **stresses** with **load**induced stresses. **A** rigorous **address** to this **problem** should **provide** useful information to the **deslgner.** An even more pertinent observation is that the weight advantages **shown** for sandwich construction are often lost in the reduction to design practice, especially in the design of Joints and att_hments. _tts the **question must be** raised whether **a** portion of funds spent on **shell** research and **development** could **not,** in **many** cases show greater returns, even for the long term, if spent **on** development of **design** and fabrication **techniques** rather than analytical methods, be problems **of** the stability **of stiffened shells** afford a propitious interface for the interests of the researcher and the **design**er and the contributions of both are essential.

SCATTER AND RELIABILITY

One **problem of** the **designer** which is **even difficult** to **state,** let alone **operate** upon, concerns the relationship among shell instability solutious_ **product** testing and **design** factor-of-safety **philosophy, in** the **design** and construction **of** large boosters and **space** vehicles time and econanlc considerations **dictate** that full **scale** test specimens be few in **n_ber; yet** the reliability of the vehicle **must be** close to 100%. Under the circumstances the large scatter in test **and** performance **data experienced** under **present** test techniques **and** the large deviations frca predictions cannot be accepted without unwarranted **design** weight penalties or reduction in vehicle reliability.

It might be argued that **many** reliable aircraft were **designed** with limited full **scale** testing. It can also **be** argued **however** that there were many compensating factors in aircraft **design** that are not found in missiles. Among these were the sometimes meaningless corrections such as **material** and coupon correction factors, none of which had much direct bearing on shell instability. Nevertheless these corrections inadvertently provided reliability **due** to a high induced safety factor. Figure 6 reflects the design **of** a typical thin shell structure. If **only** specimen No. 1 had been tested and the **design based on** this value (e.g. the **normal** 1.5 safety factor applied to this value) the structure produc- **-** ed would have ayparently **operated** satisfactorily and would still **not** have failed under limit **stress** even if an actual **strength** value as low as specimen No. 6 had been realized. Missile and spacecraft designers how**ever, under** pressure to produce more and more efficient structures have been forced to reduce this so called ultimate factor of safety from the standard value of 1.5 to 1.25 and even less. Using this criteria the allowable working stress for the illustrative **example** would have been raised and the reliability of the production structure, based on this

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limited test data, would have been reduced to an unacceptable level.

Certainly, there must be **^a** reason for this scatter. Does the observed scatter of test data reflect a variation from specimen to specimen or does the prime variational influence lie in the testing? If the former, **perhaps** we can control variations by design techniques. If the latter, can we **expect** similar variations in actual operations? **These** problems **must** be answered if the designer is to apply rational reliability criteria to **his** products. **If** some of the parameters **affecting** scatter were known, these data could be reduced to a much narrower scatter band --- even to a reasonably accurate standard value. If this were possible, data from a few tests could be used with greater assurance. Work to reconcile and explain the observed scatter would be most welcome by those of us in the design effort. **In** any event more rigor must be observed in the reporting of new test data.

OTHER PROBLEMS

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Dynamic loading of shells, although not necessarily, or even predominately, a structural stability problem, is another area of great concern **to** the **designer.** For the large **boosters** now in study phases the effects **of** ground winds, wind shears and gusts, transient thrust and release **loads,** fuel **sloshing** and structural cross-coupling and blast exposure loom as first order problems. We feel that these problems are **not** receiving their proportionate share of attention.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

At the risk of **making** a presentation - and a short one at that of perhaps considerably different context than most of those here, we have attempted to **expound** a **philosophy** based **upon** the inenediate **needs** of the **design engineer.** Certainly we have **not** covered all important areas. The tremendous increase in the tempo of shell instability re**search** in recent years **would** indicate such appraisals **are periodically necessary** if our **precious** research resources are to be used intelligent**ly.** The temptation to work on a problem because it yields **a more** tract**able mathematical** model or is **academically** interesting must be **seriously** weighed **against** the gains to be **expected.** Quite **often a less elegant attack** on a more abstruse **problem** will **show a** greater return **in** terms **of advancement of** the **state-of-the-art of structural** design. Most agen**cies charged with expenditure of** the structural research **dollars are** forced **into continuing** reappraisal **of** the **emphases and** aims **of contract**supported shell **instability** investigations **in** the **light of** the **near** and **far** term **mission requirements.** The **point of** philosophy we **wish** to reiterate **is** that things **now** appear **out** of balance. Perhaps **some of** the research dollars **now spent on shell instability might** be given **up and spent in** more **lucrative endeavors.**

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ARTICLES ON SHELLS & SHELL-LIKE STRUCTURE

STRENGTH AS A FUNCTION OF CASE THICKNESS FOR AN ACTUAL MOTOR CASE

Figure 2

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SEGMENT OF AN INTEGRALLY STIFFENED SHELL

Figure 3

Figure 4

Figure 5

INFLUENCE OF SAFETY FACTOR AND
SCATTER ON STRUCTURAL RELIABILITY

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