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CONTEXTUAL PLANNING FOR NASA:
A SECOND WORKBOOK OF
ALTERNATIVE FUTURE ENVIRONMENTS
FOR MISSION ANALYSIS

VOLUME TWO: APPENDIX
AN OUTLINE OF A NATIONAL PROFILE
by
FRANK ARMBRUSTER
with contributions by
DORIS YOKELSON

Prepared for:
Advanced Concepts and Mission Division
Office of Advanced Research and Technology
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, California

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I N T E R I M R E P O R T I I

CONTEXTUAL PLANNING FOR NASA:

A SECOND WORKBOOK OF
ALTERNATIVE FUTURE ENVIRONMENTS
FOR MISSION ANALYSIS .

by

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AN OUTLINE OF A NATIONAL PROFILE

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to attempt to determine just what the national attitudes are, and how, or if, they are changing. This is not as simple as it might seem, particularly these days, when issues are sometimes clouded by such things as tendency to categorize people and ideas and attribute certain ideas to certain groups sometimes on very questionable or scanty evidence. From what we have found there is apparently more homogeneity in the nation than many seem to believe, despite the heavy emphasis on "polarization," a country "torn apart," etc. Furthermore, many ideas about "changes" taking place are apparently not recent changes at all, but may seem to be because of our image of the traditional "man in the street" as narrow-minded, intolerant and greatly resistant to change. For example, we sometimes think of ourselves as outwardly, ignorantly, puritanical on any issues dealing with sexual matters. We also sometimes think of ourselves as basically selfish, exploiters of others, racist, etc. This could all be true to some degree; but, any characteristics that are overemphasized distort the image of the personality we are describing. Today some of us actually seem to have created a "caricature" of ourselves.

Unfortunately or fortunately (depending on one's point of view), great emphasis has been recently placed on our "shortcomings." We also suddenly see people as, for example, "hard-hats," with a set of ideas to match; "youth," with its own set of ideas; "conservative," with an

unvarying set of ideas (often looked on as "bad," if not "evil"); "liberal," with another set of ideas (conservatives think of them as "bad," and "evil"); "well-informed" people, which often means they think the way the one writing does.* Oftentimes these categories were set up with the intention of implementing the analysis of our current situation. Like all simplified "models," however, this one has many pitfalls, which often appear to go unnoticed and could lead to difficulties, including problems in decision-making; it already has led to problems in analysis. A great deal of secondary source material exists on these issues; but with some notable exceptions, the majority of the "body of knowledge" until 1970 appears inadequate or perhaps leans farther in a particular direction than the available primary data may warrant. This study, based almost entirely on primary data, comes up with few answers, but does introduce some caveats regarding several rather widely held assumptions.

The study is broken down into three sections. All three cover basic attitudes, particularly those which in our judgment have received inadequate attention recently. The first two sections of the study are based on very rough and broad categories: (1) the population as a whole and (2) Youth.

*Even the terms often are next to meaningless unless one keeps up with ever-changing definitions.. Traditional liberals, for example, particularly trade-union members, are now thought of as "reactionaries" by many of the new liberals, even though the old liberals hold the same views they always have on social legislation, etc., which still makes them an anathema to conservatives. On the other hand, certain elements of the new liberals show somewhat less-than-liberal tendencies towards such basics as freedom of speech and recognition of the right of speakers to have opposition points of view in such citadels of liberalism as our college campuses and town meeting-type gatherings.

The third section is another look at a small minority of the population--the Negroes--again because they are the target of so much attention today. In some ways this, as with "youth," is an unfair way to look at any one group within our society. The very idea of singling a group out is categorizing people in a way which is always an oversimplification. Negroes are also artisans, white collar workers, parents, "youth," middle-class, poor; some are rich; and they certainly are not represented by one point of view or type of spokesman. But as with the singling out of a cohort and youth, and even the subgroup, students, Negroes, received special attention in order to follow a familiar format on social problems so often used in the media and in so many studies in recent years. Actually all categories contain information on almost all other categories. There is information on adults in the youth section and information on youth and Negroes in all sections, etc.

We have placed a good deal of emphasis on youth--this much-discussed new generation--both praised and maligned to a degree not equalled since the 1920's, and perhaps not even then. According to a good deal of current wisdom, young people are conditioned by their environment, and perhaps even by heredity, to deviate from the path followed by adults in earlier generations to reach maturity as we know it. They, too, are mercilessly categorized into groups and subgroups and apparently, in the minds of some, are almost preordained by subgroup to be successful or unsuccessful in the battle for influence. Much secondary information in this area, in our judgment, has proved less than conclusive; but since this effort was designed to provide a base to assist predictions up to 1985, and since "these are the citizens of the future," we felt some

extensive work on this group was called for. We did not assume they would necessarily think in 1985 as they think now; but we did attempt to see what their lives were like, particularly in relation to anything that might change their development along lines analogous to their parents. We also looked for new ideas and trends among the young, particularly those that might, and perhaps should, have an impact on the system, and we also tried to do some thinking on how one determines what should have the impact.

One of the main thrusts of the study, however, is an attempt to bring some balance to the popular caricature of the average American, and his subgroups, which so many of us have. Of necessity this calls for somewhat heavy emphasis on those factors which have been underemphasized and less emphasis on those which have been overemphasized. Such a balanced basis is necessary for understanding problems, attitudes and any trends in thinking which have been developing over time and are with us today. Without this basis the difficulties of predicting, which are always grave, can become almost insurmountable.

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CHAPTER ONE

UNEXPLORED POPULAR PERCEPTIONS AND ISSUES

1. UNEXPLORED POPULAR PERCEPTIONS AND ISSUES

By the late 1960s the American citizen seemed to have almost become a stranger, not only to many of those who disseminated information in his own country, but apparently even to some elected and nonelected government officials. This seemingly impossible situation came about through a series of events which cannot be analyzed here. Suffice it to say, what the "average" man feels about his country, freedom, human dignity, the American dream, would not exactly fit the model some writers, commentators and academicians seem to have of the world and the country, although they often use the same terms. The "average" American still believes strongly in our system of government and society; he is also action- and solution-oriented, at the same time being a charitable citizen. Perhaps in the enthusiasm over the "new" social awareness, many writers, commentators and academicians forgot how deeply he feels some things. When the average man acted as he always had in response to some things which he felt were contrary to his ideals and dangerous to feasible political and economic activity, these writers, commentators and academicians seemed to draw to a sharp halt, turn and look at this person as though he were a foreigner. The result was a rush of articles and media programs on the majority of our own citizens (the "average," "middle," "forgotten," Americans); sometimes almost as though they were inhabitants of a remote, exotic island. This in itself is a surprising reflection on the people who wrote the articles and put on the programs. They were spreading "information" through the means of the mass media about the same people who were their audience. These were interesting efforts in many cases because it became apparent that a number of the critics had

somewhat of a misconception of the average citizen. This, in turn, gave rise to the feeling among some average Americans that perhaps this small minority of writers and commentators should begin to explain themselves to the American public. As late as mid-1970, one TV program was entitled in TV Guide: "The Silent Majority...Housewives, Hardhats, Hardliners who shout, 'Spiro is our hero.'"* Actually, categories such as the "silent majority" and "middle Americans" do not describe economic classes, ethnic groups, or levels of education. They describe a state of mind which, as we shall see later on most key issues, normally cuts across most or all groups in the country. (One should note in passing, that more people in the population and in survey samples have some college education--24%-- than only grade school education--19%--and those who graduated or had some high school make up 57% of the sample. Among voters in 1968, the figures were 26%, 22% and 52% respectively.)**

In the meantime, the anti-lower middle class film Joe was produced and it seemed that perhaps there were in print, and now on film, as many caricatures as reasonable likenesses of--of all things--the "silent majority" of our fellow citizens. By 1970, however, the image had begun to come into better focus through many articles and books.*** But, good as these works were, ignorance still remains in some circles of the country about many of the values, thoughts, hopes and aspirations of most of our population.

*A description of Channel 5's David Susskind Show, June 14, 1970.

**Gallup Opinion Index, April 1968, p. 33. Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, The Real Majority (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1970), p. 59 (U.S. Census Bureau figures).

***Works by Lipset, Rabb, Ladd, Greeley, Scammon and Wattenberg, Dennis Strong, Eric Hoffer, etc., many of which are referenced in this study.

A. Values

Probably one of the most interesting and most worthwhile things to look at over a long period of years is the basic value system, how it has changed and how it is perceived by the population as a whole. This, of course, determines to a great extent how concerned people are about what they see happening around them; and the degree and kind of concern determine their support for or opposition to events, "movements" and "programs." It is important to look at the priorities ascribed to these values because leaders in and out of government who do not subscribe to certain of these values that are thought to be of high priority by the average man, may find it difficult to function, even though any one or all of their own value priorities may be more valid than that of the average American.

Of course, not only the threat of the consequences to personal careers should arouse in those in positions of responsibility an interest in the popular will. In issues regarding fundamental aspects of our society and government, the effect of change on the population can be crucial. We live in a very complex environment, and changes in one area can have drastic, unforeseen effects in others, particularly if those initiating the changes are unfamiliar with the multifarious causes of these effects. The population as a whole speaks with a voice that often reflects these potential costs. This does not mean that the "voice of the people" is necessarily right; the "reforms" might have to be carried out anyway. But we must know the costs, for they can be greater than the benefits of the reforms. Often the costs have proved overwhelming: this is surely the case if, in the end, the effort really does not reform anything, or is even counterproductive. Many extremely expensive educational programs seem to fall into this category.

Much difficulty might have been avoided if somewhat more attention had been paid to what requisite values were being endangered for what benefits. These values are based on a system which, though none of us would agree with it in all details, is the operative system in this country and is essential for us to know.

1. "Private" Morality


Every value system is always more or less in a state of change. The gradual change that has occurred in this country over the past decades, generally in the direction of "liberalization" of social and economic attitudes, is apparent simply by looking around one; but normally the changes have not been radical, have been slow in taking place, and have not drastically affected the attitudes toward basic values on the part of the majority of the population. Perhaps this is as it should be. Yet, one gets the distinct feeling that, possibly because they lack contact with the "man in the street," influential people, functioning only from the viewpoint of the immediate present, sometimes think that changes are occurring that really are not. This may be happening for many reasons, but perhaps the most interesting one may stem from a lack of real information on the public value system and attitudes. Even people of influence may be basing their opinion on a caricature of the public; and when they are shown evidence of public opinion, if this reality does not fit the caricature, they think they see a change taking place.

a. The New Sexual Morality

An area that has been subject to this caricaturing is that of sexual morality. Much light has to be shed on what the public has felt about this matter in the past in order to understand the present. Today we are inundated by reports of a "new sexual morality." But let us look at the history of attitudes on some issues concerned with sexual morality.

FIGURE 1*

AVAILABILITY AND DISTRIBUTION OF BIRTH CONTROL INFORMATION



*Compiled from Gallup and Roper polls. In all the charts and footnotes AIPO stands for the Gallup organization, the American Institute of Public Opinion.

It is, of course, always difficult to put together a "fever chart" covering many years, mainly because there is such a variation of questions asked about the topic that comparisons are sometimes doubtful. That is why the chart shows double lines where there are drastic changes between the questions asked, and each of the questions is written out above the points on the chart. Identical questions were asked over a period of years, however, so there are sections of this graph which in this respect are valid comparisons. I also believe that even if one takes into account the changes in the questions, one can get a general idea of what the attitudes were and are. How a question is asked, of course, really makes a difference in how the answers come out. For example, the question asked in May 1936 was, "Should information on birth control be made legal?" In July of the same year, the question was, "Do you believe in the teaching and practice of birth control?"


The interesting thing about the two points on the chart left of the first double line, is that there is no change--no matter how the question was asked. Both those for and against are only a point apart. Variations resulting from statistical error in the polls are approximately four percentage points. What is interesting is that, throughout the years, no matter how the question was asked, those who are in favor of the distribution and the use of birth control always vary by more than 30% from those who oppose it. This creates bands of opinion at various levels. Those with no opinion are much closer to those who oppose it. In the lower register we find a band not exceeding 30% of people who are more or less opposed to it.

From 1938 to 1947, two questions were asked. The first, for 1938-1939, questions the wisdom of setting up a federal agency to furnish

birth control information; and the second question, 1939-1947, had to do with government clinics being set up to distribute this information to people who want it. This, of course, means the use of tax money, which might affect the number of those who approve and disapprove of them. There was also a drop in the war years of the number of those who were interested in birth control. Perhaps people then were thinking about families and the importance of having the families brought back together again, rather than reducing the probability of having children. Nonetheless, there was always a spread of 35 to 50 percentage points between those in favor and those opposed, and the percentage of those in favor remained within a band of about 10 points, from 60-70%; roughly from 20 to 25% were in opposition; and some 10 to 15% had no opinion.

The questions asked from 1960-65 were different again, and involved, as the reader can see, the idea of the justice of laws in certain states preventing people from getting this information when they wanted it. That was a different approach; and, furthermore, there was nothing involved in the questions which had to do with spending government money and perhaps increasing taxes for such things as new agencies and clinics. This could account for the jump of a few points between 1960 and 1963, when people were asked this new question. You will notice here that the support for it was still about 72%, and went up to 74%. The jump from 1963 to 1965 was even more interesting, because there is a seven-percentage change during this period; and, of course, there is a similar reduction in the opposition to repealing these laws. The significant change that took place during these years, however, as reflected in the following chart, was among the Catholics.

FIGURE 11
AVAILABILITY OF BIRTH CONTROL INFORMATION*
Asked of Catholics



*Compiled from Gallup polls.

The Catholic opposition to laws prohibiting the distribution of birth control information jumped 26 percentage points from 1963 to 1965. Since the Catholics now make up somewhat less than one quarter of the population, a 26% jump in Catholic opposition to such laws would account for almost all of the 7% jump in national opinion. We have to keep in mind the possible statistical error of 3 to 4%; but, again, the band of approval versus disapproval continued to have a spread of 40%. Once again it is important to note that the way the question was asked might have made a big difference in the responses of Catholics. You will see from the following bar chart that a poll taken in June 1965 showed that, in answer to the question, "Do you favor or oppose distribution of birth control information?", Catholics approved it only 60%; whereas in the case of favoring a law to prevent people from getting the information, 78% of Catholics opposed such a law. The same thing, of course, was true in the opposition to the distribution of this information: 28% opposed distributing it in June 1965, and 12% had no opinion. But, as far as wanting a law to prevent people from getting it, in January only 14% wanted it, and only 8% had any doubts in their minds about how to answer that question.


In 1963, in answer to the question, "Do you believe in the teaching and practice of birth control?", 45% of the Catholics said no, only 42% said yes and 12% had no opinion. It might be interesting to speculate on the amount of "approval" that would have been experienced if the question had been, "Should laws that prevent people from getting this information be repealed?"

FIGURE III

RESPONSES BY RELIGION TO THE DISTRIBUTION
OF BIRTH CONTROL INFORMATION*
Catholics

In some places in the United States it is not legal to supply birth control information. How do you feel about this--do you think birth control information should be available to any one who wants it, or not?

Do you favor or oppose the distribution of birth control information?



*Compiled from Gallup polls.

Leaving aside the right and wrong of the issues, what is interesting in these graphs is that the band of the numbers of people who are for, who approve, who think there should be distribution of information, who are against laws that will not allow things to be distributed or who are in favor of clinics and agencies always hovers around 60-75%. The switch (after Vatican II?) among the Catholics apparently made the difference in shifting the national opinion above that band. Those who oppose it, disapprove, do not want agencies and so forth are always below 30%--roughly around 15-25%. So the bands of opinion for and against have always had a spread of 30 or 40 percentage points between them, although one might argue that there is a slight increase in the spread between those favoring distribution of information and those opposing it. Making birth control information available is not a new phenomenon; and had the earlier question been less harsh, with the exception of the Catholics, we might have had nearly the same percentages that we have now. In any event the change, if any, has been relatively small, and with the exception of the Catholics, slow. It hardly shows effects of a "new morality."


What seems clear, moreover, is that this attitude applies primarily to married people, and certainly only to adults. This is an important "detail" which should not be forgotten by those who see a new sexual morality. There is, for example, continued, strong opposition to making contraceptives--such as birth control pills--available to young, unmarried girls. Figure IV indicates this opposition. Men were least opposed to making these pills available to college girls through the health officer of the university; but even then, 70% of the men disapproved and only 18% approved. Seventy-seven percent of the women disapproved.

FIGURE IV*

OPPOSITION TO THE USE OF BIRTH CONTROL PILLS

The health officer of a university recently gave prescriptions for birth control pills to two unmarried students. How do you feel about giving birth control pills to girls in college - do you approve or disapprove of this?

Do you think birth control pills should be made available to teenagers?




In the case of the question, "Should these birth control pills be made available to teenagers?", 79% said not and 14% said yes in 1967. Lest we think we have primarily a "hardhat" issue, it is of interest to look at the breakdown of this poll by the education of the respondents.

*Compiled from Gallup polls.

FIGURE V*

AVAILABILITY OF BIRTH CONTROL PILLS
BY EDUCATION

Do you think they should be made available to teenage girls?



You will note that, in the case of making pills available to teenagers, 76% of the college people objected and 19% approved; 80% of those who had gone to high school disapproved and 14% approved; 78% of people with only grade school education disapproved, and only 10% approved. A greater number of people who had a grade school education, however (12%),

*Compiled from Gallup polls.

had no opinion. Generally those who have had a lower level of education respond with a higher "don't know" or "no opinion" in all polls.

Conclusions, even narrow ones, reached on some issues described above and those we shall mention hereafter may be debatable; but what is significant is that attitudes on some highly sensitive personal problems, which receive so much publicity today, probably would not have been looked on with Victorian horror thirty years ago, either as something to be hypocritically "swept under the rug" or not mentioned in public. Polls from 1936 through 1946 show overwhelming approval for efforts to detect and fight venereal disease. In 1936, 90% of those polled were in favor of setting up a "government bureau that would distribute information concerning venereal disease"; only two districts of seven in the country--the West Central (84%) and the Pacific Coast (89%)--fell below 90% in favor of this proposal. Eighty-eight percent were in favor of this bureau setting up clinics to fight the disease. In 1937, 70% were in favor (with only 20% against) of "providing treatment for all persons afflicted regardless of their circumstances," and 79% favored the appropriation by Congress of "twenty-five million dollars to help control venereal disease."^{*} In 1938, 87% were in favor of Congress appropriating money "to aid states in fighting venereal disease." Sixty-nine percent said they would be "willing to pay higher taxes" to fight venereal disease. So "broad-minded" was the public in 1937 that 50% of those polled said they would favor "legally controlled prostitution" as a means of control of venereal disease; 31% opposed this suggestion and 18% had no opinion (presumably prostitutes were thought to be a prime source of venereal


*Gallup polls, December 1936 and May 1937.

disease and government control would mean mandatory medical examinations, licensing, etc.). But, 61% also favored "fine or imprisonment of all persons afflicted who do not get treated." In the same year, 87% were in favor of a confidential blood test for syphilis for all. In 1939, 79% believed that newspapers and magazines "should be allowed to describe methods of fighting syphilis," and in 1938, 98% voted for a law requiring doctors to give every expectant mother a test for syphilis. In 1946, 85% were in favor of keeping such laws on the books where they then existed and only 7% opposed.*

The approval of sex education in the high schools has also not increased due to a recent sexual enlightenment; in fact, particularly if we take into account the 12% increase in "disapproval," the public attitude was more liberal thirty years ago.

*Gallup polls, January, May and August 1937, January and May 1938, February 1946; Roper poll for Fortune, August 1939. Despite the overwhelming public support over the years for the propagation of public means to fight syphilis, today we are still told that we fear to "talk about venereal disease." This is cited as one of the reasons for its spread; perhaps more should be said about the pill and promiscuity being the cause of the spectacular spread of VD among teenagers. On the radio program "Medicine" (WHN-1050), on January 24, 1971, it was reported that there were an estimated 200,000 cases of gonorrhea in New York City in 1970 compared to 36,000 in the last "peak" year prior to the current epidemic.

FIGURE VI
SEX EDUCATION IN HIGH SCHOOLS*



Apparently the general tendency has not been to recoil from the very thought of all sensitive problems, but rather to favor programs directed toward them if they were handled by qualified people in a way that would solve problems, with the least dangers of making new ones, and the least danger of disturbing vital, delicate components of the society such as the family and children. In the case of sex education, one might ascribe the increasing opposition to it to the less-than-expected value of the program once it was implemented, or, on the other hand, to a general


*Compiled from Gallup polls.

disapproval of loose sexual morality. Parents of students voted 71-72% in favor of it in 1970. Presumably in 1943 and 1965, the parents also were more in favor of it than the people without children in the schools who are normally less willing to vote money for any school program.

There is no implication here that the majority are always right morally and politically, or even that the programs they approve are always feasible. The disappointment with the implication of a sex education program, as may have been evidenced by the increased negative reaction in 1970, is likely to have also been the reaction in the thirties had way-out programs such as legally controlled prostitution been implemented. Nonetheless, from the data such as that shown in Figure VI above, one might conclude that in the 1930's and early 1940's, the population may have been more "liberal" about some sexual matters than they are today. This liberalism could have been more apparent than real because different questions may be being asked today. We must also consider that the liberalism of the 1930's and early 1940's existed in an era in which there was less fear of danger to the morals of children and adolescents and threat to the family, than there seems to be today. The fear of these dangers may be the reasons why today in areas in which the popular concept is that the values are becoming more liberal, the change has been in the opposite direction; i.e., beliefs in the old value system have increased. On the matter of premarital sexual relations (an area of vital concern about the young today) the polls for 1937, 1959, 1965 and 1969 show such a trend.

FIGURE VII

PREMARRITAL SEX RELATIONS:




*Compiled from Roper and Gallup Opinion polls.

The usually strong opposition to premarital sexual relations increased in the 1960's. The 1968 survey showed 68% of the adults polled opposing it. This was so even though the media, the colleges and even the high schools, showed much weaker objection to it than they did in the past, and even though, as is apparent in Figure VII, the questions asked in 1965 and 1969 did not deal with promiscuity. The 1965 question even mentioned people "in love" and "engaged to be married" and asked whether they should wait until after the ceremony. Nonetheless, the objection was much stronger than in 1954. One can see here again, the spread of 30% between those who feel (and felt) it is wrong and those who don't. The lower band, showing those who have no opinion and the ones who approve has always remained roughly 30% and opposition has always run 55% or greater. If there were more data, a graph covering these many years could show many peaks and valleys; but spotty though the data are, they at least belie a significant shift in favor of the new liberal sexual morals so widely publicized in the current media.

The following chart shows a similarly interesting situation, with different questions, revolving around the theme of nudity in magazines and newspapers. The question asked in 1939 dealt with paintings, which are quite different from a photograph. However, the magazines of that era sold across the counter did not have nude photos in them, at least not (with the exception of National Geographic) respectable magazines. There was disapproval for the type of nudity shown in 1939 and there is disapproval for the type of nudity shown today.

FIGURE VIII

NUDITY IN PUBLICATIONS*




The question in 1965 dealt not only with pictures but with the content of paperbacks; and, again, a larger percentage found them objectionable than not. The great jump of 25 percentage points between 1965 and 1969 can not be attributed to statistical error. It could easily be caused, however, by the change in question between "have you [actually] seen or

*Compiled from information in Gallup and Roper polls.

read" and "would you object to?" It also, however, might be a result of people now realizing the full extent of the consequences of this question. So many of the magazines now on the market do carry pictures of nudes and sexually descriptive texts. As recently as fifteen, ten and even five years ago many people had to speculate in answering such questions. The same thing can be said for the other answers indicated in the following bar charts on the question of nudity on the stage and in restaurants, given according to the education of the respondents.

FIGURE IX*

NUDITY ON STAGE AND IN RESTAURANTS



*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 49, July 1969, pp. 22, 23, 24.

It is interesting to note that though there is a significant difference of opinion according to education, each group showed strong opposition. Even clearer is that there is a great concern about the easy accessibility of pornographic information, possibly caused by fear of its availability to minors. This is a point that cannot be ignored. It is simply not wise to ignore the concern of parents. They know, collectively, very much about children. It is not sufficient to put down the objection to such literature as old-fashioned "puritanism," when those objecting are parents. Their worry is often primarily for those below "the age of consent"; and this is a timeless, valid concern.

The following graphs indicate quite clearly that this fear of the dissemination of pornography is increasing. Any increase in support for stricter laws to prevent the sale of such material is highly significant because normally a large number of those who object to the literature would not favor stricter laws because of Constitutional qualms.


27, 28
missing

Furthermore, as the second graph indicates, the increase in concern over a lack of legal protection against such literature is, again, not just a phenomenon among the "hard hats." The slopes in the curves of this increase in objection are almost parallel, even though the objection itself is strongest among those with a high school education, followed by those with a grade school education. Nonetheless, even 65% of the college-educated wanted stricter laws up from 48% in 1965. There was a slight increase in satisfaction with the laws among people with college education, but the spread between the college people who wanted stricter laws and those who did not, increased much more. All other groups show a decrease in those who feel the laws are at least adequate. It is interesting to note that, by 1969, there were very few people with no opinion on this issue. The strength of the objection to such material is indicated by the following two charts on willingness to join a neighborhood group to protest the sale of such literature.

FIGURE XII

WILLINGNESS TO PROTEST THE SALE OF PORNOGRAPHY*

Would you be willing to join a neighborhood group to protest the sale of such literature on newsstands?




*Compiled from information in the Gallup Opinion Index, No. 49, July 1969, p. 21.

FIGURE XIII

WILLINGNESS TO PROTEST THE SALE OF PORNOGRAPHY*
By Education

Would you be willing to join a neighborhood group to protest the sale of such literature on newsstands?



Willingness to join groups is usually a reliable indicator of concern, and it is interesting to note here the closeness of opinion among all categories of education. Those who are college-educated are somewhat more liberal on this issue as they usually are in most matters but their opinion is closer to that of the less-educated than it was on the previous question; the college-educated split just about even on whether or not they would join a group. Again, this is not a "hard hat" issue; it is an issue of the general public. This is even more evident in the answers to a May 1969 question regarding obscene literature which is sent through the mail: "...would you like to see stricter state and local laws dealing with such literature, or not?" Of all adults 85% said yes, 8% answered no

*Ibid.

and 7% had no opinion. According to the education of the respondents, 79% of those with a college education said yes, 15% said no and 6% had no opinion; 87% of those who were high-school educated said yes, 7%, no, and 6%, no opinion; 84% of those with a grade school education answered yes, 7%, no, and 9%, no opinion.* All segments of the population object to this material and they may be reflecting the basic values which have altered little over the past thirty years. Nor have there apparently been many drastic changes away from the value system in sexual morality in the last five or ten years --on the contrary; and this despite some of the more "broadminded" attitudes of many writers, publishers, producers, educators, etc.

2. Religious Practices

Attitudes on some other fundamental issues might also be worth noting. More people said they believed in God in 1968 (98%) than in 1944 (96%).** In 1964, 63% said they prayed "frequently."*** Church attendance among adults has declined almost constantly, but gradually, over the past 15 years from 49% who attended church during the week polled in 1955, to 42% in 1969 and 1970.

TABLE I
CHURCH ATTENDANCE ****
NATIONAL TREND, 1955-1970

1955	49%	1963	46
1956	46	1964	45
1957	47	1965	44
1958	49	1966	44
1959	47	1967	45
1960	47	1968	43
1961	47	1969	42
1962	46	1970	42

* Ibid., p. 18.

** Gallup Polls in the Gallup Opinion Index, No. 44, February 1969, p. 15, 1944.

*** Gallup Poll, February 7, 1964.

**** Gallup Opinion Index, No. 55, January 1970, p. 5; the 1970 figure is from a Gallup Poll reported in the Philadelphia Inquirer, December 25, 1970, p. 14.

FIGURE XIV
CHURCH ATTENDANCE - NATIONAL





FIGURE XV
INFLUENCE ON RELIGION - NATIONAL



The feeling about the drop in influence of religion, however, showed a much more spectacular change over this time period.

TABLE II
CHURCH ATTENDANCE
CHANGE BETWEEN 1958 AND 1969 AND 1970*

	<u>1958</u> %	<u>1969</u> %	<u>1970</u> %	Point Change <u>1958-1969</u>	Point Change <u>1958-1970</u>
National.....	49	42	42	- 7	- 7
Protestant.....	43	37	38	- 6	- 5
Catholic.....	74	63	60	-11	-14
Jewish.....	30	22	19	- 8	-11
21-29 years.....	48	33	32	-15	-16
30-49 years.....	51	45	45	- 6	- 6
50 and over.....	48	44	45	- 4	- 3

Table III gives a more detailed picture of those attending church by age, religious preference, education, income, region, etc.:

TABLE III
CHURCH ATTENDANCE 1969 and 1970

"Did you, yourself, happen to attend church in the last seven days?"

	<u>1969**</u> %	<u>1970***</u> %
NATIONAL.	42	42
REGIONAL		
Catholic.	63	60
Protestant.	37	38
Jewish.	22	19
MAJOR PROTESTANT DENOMINATIONS		
Lutheran.	38	43
Baptist	37	39
Presbyterian.	34	34
Methodist	34	38
Episcopalian.	29	29

*Ibid.

**Gallup Opinion Index, Poll No. 55, January 1970, p. 5.

***Philadelphia Inquirer, December 25, 1970, p. 14.

TABLE III, contd.

SEX		
Men	38	38
Women	46	46
RACE		
White	42	42
Non-white	41	43
EDUCATION		
College	46	46
High School	42	41
Grade School	41	41
College Students	47*	43**
AGE		
21-29 Years	33	32
30-49 Years	45	45
50 & Over	44	45
REGION		
East	45	43
Midwest	46	47
South	40	44
West	35	33
INCOME		
\$10,000 & Over	43	44
\$7,000 - \$9,999	43	42
\$5,000 - \$6,999	43	40
\$3,000 - \$4,999	42	41
Under \$3,000	41	41
COMMUNITY SIZE		
1,000,000 & Over	43	39
500,000 - 999,999	44	42
50,000 - 499,999	42	41
2,500 - 49,999	40	44
Under 2,500 Rural	43	44

The falloff in church attendance, particularly in recent years, is interesting to analyze, not only for the amount of the drop but because of who was attending church and which religions were experiencing the greatest drop. In 1970, more college-educated people were attending than any other education category; (46%); an equal percentage of high school-educated and grade school-educated people were attending church; (41%). The West had the lowest attendance (33%); the Midwest the highest (47%); the East showed (43%); the South (44%).

*Gallup Opinion Index, Poll No. 44, February 1970, p. 9.

**Harris Poll, Life Magazine, January 18, 1971, p. 26.

The drop in the adult Catholic church attendance from 1964 through 1970 has been large (from 71% to 60%) and constant. The probability of statistical error accounting for the downward trend is small. During this period of great liberalism in the American Catholic church, (some feel that it has even become secularized liberalism), the greatest drop, according to Gallup polls, has occurred among the 21 to 29 year-olds.* We can infer that the new, sociological approach of "relevancy" tried by some in the Catholic church has not reached many of these youth. Of the 21-29 year olds, the percentage drop among Catholics could have been very large. Catholics make up more than a quarter of that age bracket, and the drop of 1% in that group as a whole from 1969 to 1970 could be accounted for almost entirely by the average Catholic drop-off for all age groups of 3%. A 1970 Louis Harris poll indicated that 69% of the 15 to 21 year-old group he interviewed found "liberalized attitudes and new forms of worship make church more interesting to young people"*** (those two things need not mean the same thing). But, attendance among college students fell off 4% from 1969 and high school students showed about a 7-8% drop from 1965 to 1970.

As can be seen in Table III, in 1970 the more fundamentalist religions-- Baptist, Methodist, Lutheran--all showed an increase in church attendance; and the South (where the first two religions flourish) showed the greatest regional increase (4%). The 1% increase in the Midwest no doubt reflects to a significant degree the 5% increase in church attendance among Lutherans. Lutherans make up only about 7% of the population as a whole; but approximately 56% of them are in the Midwest.

*The Philadelphia Inquirer, report on Gallup poll, December 25, 1970, p. 14.

**Life, January 18, 1971, p. 26.

Presbyterian and Episcopalian attendance stayed the same; Judaism and Catholicism suffered all the loss. The 2% drop in church attendance in the East no doubt reflects to a large degree the 3% drop in both Judaism and Catholicism. Catholics make up about 25% and Jews 3% of the national population; but 84% of the Jews and 48% of the Catholics live in the East. This becomes therefore a regional phenomenon; but trying to decide whether it is basically regional or religious creates a chicken and egg problem. Although it might appear to be a religious difference, it could be regional because the environments differ anyway without regard to the religions that happen to be grouped there. On the other hand, although there may be a great regional difference between the South and the East, for example, how great is that difference and why the sudden change between the two regions in the numbers of people attending church? All things considered (including the possibility that this change is merely a small perturbation in a trend which will soon return to "normal"), one must still note that the two religions making the greatest strides toward "sociological" and even somewhat "secularized" churches suffered all the loss last year. Furthermore, since the Catholics and Jews probably accounted for almost all the loss in the 21-29 year-old group, the strength of the fundamentalist religions must have remained about the same in that age bracket or even increased.

The question must be asked at this point: Is the drop in church attendance among this country's young really due to insufficient speed in developing the liberal, sociological approach in religion? Certainly, if the fundamentalists hold their own or even increase the numbers of

21-29 year-olds and minors in their congregations and the more liberal, sociologically-oriented churches lose them, this question will have to be carefully examined.

To recapitulate: there has been no drastic change in the slow rate of decrease of church attendance over the past 15 years, and no change over the past two years in the national percentage of churchgoers. From this one year of no change, we cannot of course say this decreasing trend has bottomed out. The most interesting things to look at will probably revolve around the religions that have increased their church attendance despite the decreasing trend.


B. Overall Feelings on Morals and Basic Values
and Public Enforcement of Standards

There are other factors besides the feeling that organized religion is losing its influence that seem to indicate that the general public is convinced that today morals are getting worse. The following table shows a trend in opinion with very few points; but it shows nonetheless, a general direction of movement of opinion between 1949 and 1968. The double lines indicate that the questions are quite different, but they have to do basically with the idea of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the direction in which the country is going with regard to morals and standards of behavior. The third question, asked in 1968, was divided in two, between morals and honesty; so one has to pick out a point between the two questions. It is interesting that the question was split in 1968, for it may indicate that there is a stronger feeling in the country about morals than about honesty. Here morals, one suspects, refers to a significant

degree to sexual morality. The gap between those who feel that things are getting better, are satisfied, or think there is no difference and those who are dissatisfied and think things are getting worse, is widening. There are relatively few who have no opinion on this issue and the numbers seem to be decreasing. (Fewer than 10% at any time, and, as of July 1968, approximately 5%). On the specific question of morals alone in 1968 only 2% had no opinion.

FIGURE XVI

IS LIFE GETTING BETTER IN TERMS OF MORALS?*




*Compiled from information in Gallup polls.

On the questions of morals and honesty, this feeling of deterioration was strong and cut across all levels of education.

FIGURE XVII

IS LIFE BETTER OR WORSE IN TERMS OF MORALS, HONESTY?*
By Education




*Gallup Opinion Index, Poll No. 39, September 1968, pp. 27, 28.

The next graph covers a somewhat longer period with, again, too few points; but, nonetheless, there is some indication of how people felt about public morals over the years. Again, the questions differ quite a bit, and the double lines indicate a great change in the type of question. This graph stresses questions about young people and is important from the point of view of considering whether young people have always been thought to be "irresponsible" by the older generation. One can see that, if one adds up the total of those who said the standards were the same or better, one gets a total which is greater than the percentage of those who said that things were worse. In fact, after the war, one finds that those who felt that teenagers behaved better than they (adults) did when they were teenagers, exceeded those who thought they behaved worse by over 10%. Questions about young people in 1948 and 1949 showed anything but a lack of appreciation for them by the older people. This may have reflected a feeling about the World War II veterans who had come home and were trying to catch up for the years the war had cost them in schools, on jobs, etc.; but, nonetheless, it showed that the older people were far from hostile to them. In fact, in the 1949 poll, those who felt that the youth of that period were better, as far as common sense was concerned, than the people 25 years before, were almost 15 points in excess of those who felt they were worse. When those who felt they were the same were added to those who felt they were better, 66% of the population felt that these young people were better, or at least equal to those 25 years before; only 28% thought they were worse.

ADULT ATTITUDES TOWARDS MORAL STANDARDS OF THE YOUNG*

FIGURE XVIII



*Compiled from information in Roper and Gallup opinion polls.


There undoubtedly were many peaks and valleys between 1949 and 1965, when the question was asked about the sexual attitudes of teenagers. The question was, "are their attitudes much different today than yours were?" rather than "were they better or worse?" Some 62% felt they were different and only 29% thought they were the same. The only line that one can continue here, of course, is the line indicating "same." Those who feel that the teenagers are different could mean different "better" or different "worse." One has a feeling, however, when taking into account previous charts, that "different" is not necessarily approved of by most of the people who responded that way.

The value of this graph lies in its crossing and scattering of lines (as compared to those earlier graphs that had distinct and widely separated bands of pro and con opinion over the years). This indicates that there is apparently no traditional disapproval of young people by adults. It might further point out that today, unlike earlier times, the behavioral patterns of some younger people alarm adults considerably. It can be argued that some of the great discrepancies between the 1940's and 1960 in the polls in Figure XVI reflect public reaction to so much exposure given by the media to the behavior of the young and not to their actual morals. If this were so, the reaction could be to the publicity given to the morals of a small minority of youth rather than to an actual strong difference of opinion between age groups. Other polls seem to indicate that in regard to some of the basic moral issues, the opinions of age groups differ only in terms of degree. This may be a legitimate

hypothesis, except perhaps for attitudes on premarital sexual relations, and parents do not only depend on TV or the movies to find out what children think.*

There is some evidence to indicate that the decisions of the Federal and State courts in recent years dealing with pornography have been very unpopular. Decisions, not only in the area of pornography, but in other matters affecting the family and children, have probably made substantial contributions to increased opposition to "liberal" judges. Even the tremendous campaign against the conservative Judge Haynesworth failed to significantly reduce the large number of people who wanted conservative judges on the bench. According to the graph which follows, the percentage of people who wanted conservative judges was 51% in 1968 and 51% in 1969; with all the controversy, it dropped only to 49% in 1970. Conversely, those who wanted a liberal judge dropped from 30% in 1968 to 25% in 1969; and again, with all the publicity given to the nomination of Haynesworth, the desire for a liberal judge only climbed to 27%.

*There is some indication, however, that some of these movies strike a responsive chord among a minority of young people: 24% of young people 15 to 21 said they had seen a movie that reflected their own outlook on life, and of these twice as many named Easy Rider as any other; Getting Straight and M*A*S*H followed. (Harris poll in Life, January 8, 1971, p. 30).



This "First Amendment issue" is interesting, for it is somewhat typical of the kind of problem which faces parents again and again these days, and despite vast majority opposition the smut apparently can't be stopped. Interest in the opposite sex among young people and, for that matter, middle-aged people has not decreased over the years. It has been and always will be a sure-fire urge that, if appealed to, can be profitable for a small minority of people playing on the baser side of emotions.

*Compiled from information in Gallup polls.


The difficulty today is that the restrictions that have been known heretofore, even in supposedly "loose" countries such as France, have disappeared in the United States in many cases. Difficulties arise among the younger set which do not so adversely affect adults, primarily because of the typical inability of adolescents to differentiate between "fact and fiction" in these stories, movies, etc.

The net result is that the parents responsible for the morals and mental health of their children are naturally reacting against the license enjoyed by so many of the producers of such material.

The concern over the court system is not confined to the legitimatizing of pornography, however. The issue of crime and disorders has caused concern among the majority of the population. Most of the reforms brought about by the Supreme Court on the treatment of those apprehended by the police have resulted from the vital democratic principle of protection of individual rights. These moves were accepted by the public, but this can neither be assumed to indicate that it feels that the criminal is receiving a "raw deal" nor that it is satisfied with the protection now afforded people from the criminal element. A tiny minority (2%) feels that our courts deal too harshly with criminals. In fact, there has been a significant trend of opinion in the last five years toward the idea that they are too lenient.

FIGURE XX

Do courts in this area deal with criminals: too harshly, not harshly enough, about right?*




Age and education do not significantly affect the percentage who feel that the courts are too harsh; it never exceeds 4% in any category. There is some variation in the feeling that they are not harsh enough, but opinion is uniformly overwhelming for this premise.

*Compiled from information in Gallup polls.

FIGURE XXI

COURTS AND CRIMINALS*
By Age and Education



*Compiled from information in the Gallup Opinion Index, No. 45, March 1969, p. 12.

Much of our current drama and literature however, is more likely to reflect the point of view of the 2% who feel the courts are too harsh. These days one seldom sees a story based on the idea that our law enforcement agencies and courts are too lenient on the criminal element. On the contrary, particularly if the criminal is of certain sociological or ethnic groups, the victim is often not the "victim" of the story--the criminal is; and the police, courts and "society" are the villains.

To the average citizen, this is not an objective picture. Furthermore, he knows that in real life the victim of the criminal act is most often also of the same ethnic group as the criminal or at least living in or near the locale of high violence. He also knows that the connection between poverty and other social problems is not a universal one. He may have come from a "tough" neighborhood himself and to have lived in an era when poverty (but not crime) was much more rampant than today and the difference in living standards between the well-off and poor was much more pronounced: the great depression of the 1930's. He is more likely to know about not being too eager to encounter a policeman but he also understands the difference between boyish pranks and viciousness. He also recognizes the terror, particularly on the part of women, in these areas today. As the following chart shows, the truly forgotten citizen is the Negro woman, particularly when one recognizes that many rapes go unreported in the South and in our Northern, urban, Negro areas. Her lot is little better, if at all, in the North than in the South. The overwhelming majority of Negro men, the husbands, fathers, sons, and brothers of the terrified women, are themselves victims of the high crime rate and probably runners-up for the most neglected citizen award.

TABLE IV
CRIME AND ITS VICTIMS, BY RACE, 1970*

<u>Race of Offender & Victim</u>	<u>Criminal Homicide</u> %	<u>Aggravated Assault</u> %	<u>Forcible Rape</u> %	<u>Armed Robbery</u> %
Both Same Race	90	90	90	51
Black vs. Black	66	66	60	38
White vs. White	24	24	30	13
Black vs. White	6	8	10	47
White vs. Black	4	2	--	2

"Urban blacks are arrested eight to twenty times more often than whites for homicide, rape, aggravated assault and robbery."

Source: Victim-offender survey made by task force on individual crimes of violence, an agency of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, 1969-70.

When a society allows violence and lawlessness to increase, the non-affluent usually suffer most. All this is "known" by the man in the street. Although racism is still by no means just a historic memory in this country, he does not take kindly to sympathetic depictions of criminals as victims with little sympathy for the real victims, no matter who they are. Some say the reason for the greater concern about crime really comes from the increasing amount of crime spilling over into white neighborhoods. This may be true; but in 1970 whites in at least one city (Louisville, Kentucky) rated crime sixth (13% voting for it) on the list of neighborhood problems, although three times as many Negroes voted it third (39%). Significantly, juvenile delinquency, a quasi-lawlessness behavioral problem, was rated second by Negroes (41%) and fifth by whites (14%). The lesser degree of concern about crime among whites in Louisville may or may not reflect a nationwide outlook, but a breakdown

*The New York Times, September 8, 1970, p. 1. The same data show that a black woman is six times more likely to be raped than a white woman.

of the types of crime for Louisville shows a distinctly higher level of risk and violence for Negroes than whites.*

TABLE V

A REAL PROBLEM IN THIS NEIGHBORHOOD--CRIME**

	<u>Negroes</u>	<u>Whites</u>
Breaking into houses	59%	48%
Drunkenness	54	21
Gambling	52	3
Drug use among youths	38	14
Purse snatchings	36	13
Prostitution	33	4
Knifings & Shootings	32	4
Muggings	17	4
Loan sharking	6	2
None or don't know	14	34

"Each crime was more troubling to upper-level Negroes than poor whites."

The average person seems to be aware of the important matter of degree of transgression, and apparently realizes that this changes somewhat with circumstances. Public reaction to shoplifting, for instance, by the underprivileged (that accounts for a considerable amount of money, which is made up by higher prices for customers) is nothing like the reaction to violence, lawlessness, and rowdyism by those whom the public apparently considers irresponsible university students. The public has the same reaction to "hippie" students from upper middle-class background. Too many people have come from real poverty. Today they must even "moonlight" and send their wives to work to keep a home

*Roper research poll, Louisville, Kentucky, early 1970. Another section of this study, concerned with Negroes, covers this in greater detail.

**Roper research poll, Louisville, Kentucky, early 1970, as reported in Jean Keinig, "A Tale of Two Cities," The Public Pulse, April 1970.

for their children and pay ever increasing taxes. The fact that these taxes subsidize college students by keeping tuitions down, and even subsidize the "street people" offspring of the affluent through various welfare programs, may not have been overlooked by them. They also look on education as a vital method of upward mobility which must run smoothly. At all levels of income and education and in every region, they have been against modern student disorders. At least one conclusion which might be drawn from this last point, however, is apparently contested by some. One group states that prior to 1970 "dissident students" were looked on not unfavorably by the public. "The year 1970 was different...suddenly the climate changed. No longer were dissident students identified by the public as young idealists..."* An interesting question might be: Didn't the public prior to 1970 connect the "dissident students with campus disorders? In the first half of 1969--incidentally, long before Vice President Agnew made his first speech on the subject--a Gallup survey came up with the following results:

*Youth and the Establishment, Daniel Yankelovich, Inc., the JDR 3rd Fund, New York, N.Y., p. 71.

TABLE VI
STUDENT DISORDERS*

"In general, would you like to see college administrations take a stronger stand on student disorders, or not?"

	EARLY JUNE		
	Yes %	No %	No Opinion %
NATIONAL	94	3	3
SEX			
Men	94	4	2
Women	93	2	5
RACE			
White	95	2	3
Non-white	X	X	X
EDUCATION			
College	91	7	2
High School	95	2	3
Grade School	93	1	6
OCCUPATION			
Prof. & Bus.	94	4	2
White Collar	94	4	2
Farmers	97	2	1
Manual	94	2	4
AGE**			
21-29 Years	89	7	4
30-49 Years	95	1	4
50 & Over	94	3	3
RELIGION			
Protestant	96	1	3
Catholic	94	2	4
Jewish	X	X	X
POLITICS			
Republican	96	2	2
Democrat	93	3	4
Independent	93	4	3
REGION			
East	90	6	4
Midwest	95	1	4
South	96	2	2
West	96	2	2
INCOME			
\$10,000 & Over	94	5	1
\$ 7,000 & Over	95	4	1
\$ 5,000 - \$6,999	94	2	4
\$ 3,000 - \$4,999	93	3	4
Under \$3,000	90	2	8
COMMUNITY SIZE			
1,000,000 & Over	92	3	5
500,000 & Over	91	5	4
50,000 - 499,999	93	4	3
2,500 - 49,999	96	1	3
Under 2,500, Rural	96	2	2

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 49, July 1969, p. 26.

**In late 1970 a poll was published in the February issue of Seventeen Magazine (p. 127) which covered this subject. This survey was not patterned in the same way as the Gallup poll and there are some discrepancies between it and another poll taken at the same time covering the same age group, which will be discussed later; but it did ask the above question of minors. Of the 15-21 year-olds (students and nonstudents) polled 43% said the college administrations had not been strict enough, 28% felt they had acted about right and 29% said they had been too repressive.

There is considerable evidence that seems to indicate that the average man is little affected by the publicity given to the "New Left" activists. The way he felt about the disturbances at the Democratic Convention in Chicago in 1968 might be a good example of this. At the time of the convention almost every national TV network commentator was sympathetic to the "children" who "were being beaten by police," unfriendly to Mayor Daley of Chicago and no booster of either the police or the National Guard. Injured police (49 were hospitalized, and 192 "injured,"--122 by "thrown objects;" 13 had their "eyes burned by unknown chemicals") were seldom if ever shown on television (the author watched four TV channels that night, flipping back and forth between them, and did not see a single injured policeman). One hundred and one demonstrators were hospitalized, about twice as many as were police, and an "unknown number" were injured; but we can surmise that many more than the 192 police were "injured."* Despite the injuries of the demonstrators and the unceasing TV coverage depicting them fallen and bleeding, the average American apparently felt he knew "right from wrong"--that he could tell that many of the rioters were "children" older than the apprentices and young journeymen "on the job" with him. He also had to keep his priorities straight; for the convention was an essential part of the process in electing a President; it had to be done.

*Rights in Conflict, A report submitted by Daniel Walker to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), pp. 351-354.

TABLE VII

NATIONWIDE POLL ON CHICAGO POLICE ACTIVITIES
DURING CONVENTION*

71.4% said security measures were justified.

48.3% said that demonstrations were "organized to disrupt the convention and creat riot conditions."

"Chicago police and national guardsmen are using excessive force in suppressing these demonstra-tions."

<u>AGREE</u>	<u>DISAGREE</u>	<u>NO OPINION</u>
21.3%	65.8%	21.9%

"What kind of a job is Mayor Daley doing?"

<u>GOOD JOB</u>	<u>POOR JOB</u>	<u>NO OPINION</u>
61.7%	18.3%	20%


93.5% of those polled had seen some Chicago demonstrations on television, or had read or heard about them.

Recently, the trend toward the abolishment of the death penalty, which was increasing in this country throughout the 1950's and early 1960's, seems to have been reversed. Whether this is a significant reversal remains to be seen; but it is difficult to ignore this indicator in light of the previous ones we have shown in which the public seems to have stiffened in its attitudes towards those things affecting its basic way of life.

*The New York Times, August 31, 1968.

FIGURE XXII

DEATH PENALTY FOR PERSONS CONVICTED OF MURDER*
National



Among other things, the seeming reversal of feeling about the death penalty appears to reflect public reaction to the rising crime rate. Americans, however, have maintained the concept of degrees of things: This applies to justice and also to security; for absolute justice without mercy is brutal and internal security without freedom is death to the spirit.

*Compiled from information in Gallup polls.

The average American may not like excesses in any direction--he was even repelled by the rhetoric of Goldwater, to say nothing of George Wallace. On the other hand, we are aware of surveys in which the public was asked questions that directly or indirectly referred to guarantees of the Bill of Rights, and many were found opposed to instituting such practices. However, when he is asked in other polls about specific rights of individuals in concrete cases, regardless of how wrong he thinks these people (including suspected criminals) may be, and even if the system must pay a considerable price, he is likely to come out strongly in favor of individuals' rights.

In a Harris survey on the fairness of the "Chicago 7" trial of the defendants arrested in connection with the convention disturbances in 1968, "Overall, 51% of the public said that it had followed the trial. This included higher proportions of the better-educated and more affluent who are usually more tolerant of non-conformist behavior than the rank-and-file Americans. These people were then asked: 'Taking everything into consideration, do you think the defendants in the "Chicago 7" case received a fair trial or not?'"

	<u>Informed Public</u>
	%
Received a fair trial	71
Not a fair trial	19
Not sure	10

But perhaps even more significant: "Although public opinion clearly disfavored the way the 'Chicago 7' defendants and their lawyers conducted themselves in court, a sizeable majority or better than seven in ten reject the proposition that 'protestors such as the "Chicago 7" are

revolutionaries who want to destroy the system and shouldn't be given the right to a trial."^{***}

In table VIII, the concept of degrees of justice fitting the crime is well-illustrated. The respondents, a standard sample of all the population, were given several fixed choices and asked to choose among them. Because of this, even though there is room for "other responses," respondents could not give their exact opinions. They could choose no punishment other than the choice given.

TABLE VIII

PUNISHMENT FOR HIJACKING, BOMBING AND STARTING A RIOT**

	<u>National</u>		
	<u>HIJACKING</u>	<u>BOMBING</u>	<u>STARTING RIOT.</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
Less than 10 years	26	12	43
10 years or more	39	43	34
Life	16	29	6
Death	4	6	2
Other Responses	5	4	5
No opinion	10	6	10
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

On issues of laws and law enforcement which have a significant and direct effect on family life, feeling is particularly strong. In late 1970, 86% of the population over 21 did not want to see marijuana legalized.^{***} In 1969, the opposition to legalizing it was overwhelming regardless of education, age, or income. Those with a college education were 72% against, 23% for; a high school education, 86% against, 10% for; a grade school education, 91% against, and 6% for. Those with no opinion on this issue were significantly small: 5% for college, 4% for high school

*The Philadelphia Inquirer, April 27, 1970, p. 10.

**Gallup poll of March 13-15, 1970, reported in The New York Times, April 23, 1970, p. 26.

***Gallup Opinion Index, No. 65, November 1970, p. 25.

and 3% for grade school-educated persons. In the same survey, 9% of the college-educated, 3% of the high school educated and 1% of the grade school educated said they had "happened to try" marijuana. Further, in answer to the question, would they try a marijuana cigarette, 8% of those who had gone to college, 4% of those who were high-school educated and 2% of those who had been to grade school said they would.* The greater objection to the use of marijuana by the less well-educated might be construed to be the "fear of the unknown;" but a poll on outlawing liquor in 1966 showed a similar pattern: a law "forbidding the sale of all beer, wine and liquor throughout the nation" was favored by 14% and opposed by 83% of all college-educated adults; favored by 19% and opposed by 76% of those with a high school education; favored by 28% and opposed by 69% of those with a grade school education. The last group had the highest number of "teetotalers": almost $\frac{1}{2}$ compared to almost $\frac{1}{3}$ of the high school people and $\frac{1}{4}$ of those with a college education.**

The reasons for the last figures are not obvious. Regional differences may be making themselves felt here to some degree; in the South, where the fundamentalist Protestant denominations are more prevalent, there may be a higher percentage of teetotalers. Coincidentally, there may also be more people with a lower level of education in the South. But this is not an adequate explanation: most people with a grade school education are older, even in the South; and there are just not enough Southerners to account for all the teetotalers. It is also difficult to make the argument that the greater abstinence stems from the fear of drunkenness as "the curse of

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 53, November 1969, pp. 8-11.

**Gallup Opinion Index, No. 9, February 1966, pp. 18-20.


the lower classes." In the same survey the highest percentage of those who had "trouble in the family" due to liquor was among college people-- 14%.

The outlook on the use of marijuana in high schools showed college people, traditionally the most liberal, having the highest perception of marijuana use.

FIGURE XXIII

USE OF MARIJUANA IN LOCAL HIGH SCHOOL*
By Education

"Here is a question about the use of marijuana by high school students in your community: would you say it is used by most high school students in your community, some, just a few, or none?"



*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 53, November 1969, p. 120.


The better-educated might simply be better informed as to how extensive marijuana use is, although it would be surprising if they had a better feel for this than people in central city slums. On the other hand college people are generally more likely to be concentrated in suburbs near big cities, where the problem is severe; those in the other education categories are more apt to be evenly distributed across the country. This does not explain the slightly more liberal attitude of the better-educated on the use of drugs, and alcohol. The slightly greater problem they have with alcohol, however, could stem from the fact that there are fewer abstainers among this group.

What might be reflected here is fear for the family by the less secure groups. Those with a better education normally make more money, live in better neighborhoods, can take more chances and have more to fall back on if something goes wrong. This is perhaps best illustrated by the answer to a question on "law and order" asked in 1965:* "Suppose an innocent person is killed by a criminal--do you think the state should make financial provisions for the victim's family?" Less than a majority (40%) of the college-educated adults voted yes; compared to this 61% of the high school people and 77% of those with a grade school education responded yes. This vote could of course, be due to the less well-educated being more likely to live in areas of higher violence; but one continues to find opinions on adequacy of laws (and other issues) which seem to indicate concern for the family, particularly among the less well-educated and less affluent groups, rather than just opposition to liberalization and progress.

*Gallup Political Index; No. 5, October 1965, p. 21.

Most people continue to feel that divorce laws make getting one too easy, and the numbers who feel this way are actually increasing. But the size of the minority that thinks that a divorce should be easier to get is also increasing.

FIGURE XXIV
DIVORCE LAWS - NATIONAL



— More difficult
 - - - As is*
 - · - · Easier
 - · · · No opinion


*1968: Should divorce in this country be easier or more difficult to obtain than it is now?

*1960: Should divorce be made more difficult to get, easier to get, or should things be left as they are now?

*Gallup Opinion Index No. 5, October 1965, p. 21.

Today, the generally held idea is that because of the legal fees involved, divorce laws discriminate against the less affluent (the less well-educated). Recently, there has also been an increase in the number of grade school-educated adults who feel a divorce should be easier to get. Nevertheless, the greatest opposition to easier divorces in 1968 still came from the less well-educated.

FIGURE XXV
DIVORCE LAWS
By Education



*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 41, November 1968, p. 11.

C. The Availability and Importance of the Majority Opinion

There are always problems in discussing public opinion and a major one is how not to give the impression that what the majority wants is automatically correct. There is also the question of whose opinion we should listen to. If we take only one group's record on being right as a criteria, then, in implementing a program, we must listen to the one that "guessed" correctly most often in the past. If this happens to be a minority of the population, we may have to buck the majority in implementing the program and this can be very difficult; but if this minority were again right (and assuming we have not overlooked side effects that sometimes cause greater damage than the problem we are solving) in retrospect we look good and public support will swing over to the decision. If we choose to ignore the "right" minority opinion and go along with the "wrong" majority opinion, we may be in trouble later; but the "implementation" phase will be much easier.

If, on the other hand, the majority itself has a "track record" not outlandishly inferior to any given minority "advisory" group, it is very unwise to summarily dismiss its desires. One should at least be able to understand its position; for here we not only have all the problems of implementing programs in the face of majority opposition, but we may also be wrong, or at least not demonstrably right.

This latter problem is the one that will be addressed. As has been emphasized, many people in recent years have apparently overlooked the long-held views of most Americans on certain issues; and may have misinterpreted the latest trends because of this oversight. They also seem

to have ignored--or at least given inadequate attention to--arguments against programs that affect large portions of the population. This is not good for many reasons, not all of them having to do with the merits of the programs in question. It is not good for prestigious men to look bad on public issues. It is not good for the news media to look too uninformed, particularly on things that the average citizen thinks he can check. This leads to a "credibility gap" between the media and the people and this, in turn, tends to reduce the chances for maintaining the well-informed public that is the basis for a working democracy. It is also not good for proponents of legislation and programs not to know arguments that differ from their own (particularly rather logical arguments) and are held by a majority of the population or well-known people trusted by the majority. The majority will not be convinced that programs are right or should be supported if their points are ignored. Finally, of course, the majority might really be right and, if these arguments are listened to, the minority might even change its mind.

The problem is not solved by simple lip-service to majority opinions or one-sided presentations of them. The accuracy and amount of attention given to issues and point of view the majority thinks are important, as well as the format of articles and programs in the media, can make a significant difference. More of this has been done in 1970 and 1971, but apparently not enough: as will be pointed out by examples later in this paper, in which opposition arguments are not accessible. The following sections do not pretend to even scratch the surface of the still largely unpublished story of the "majority opposition." The specific issues and points of view cited are meant (as the foregoing data) only to be examples of the kind of thing

that can make a great deal of difference in policy decisions. Hopefully, these examples will stimulate further research for such viewpoints when policy decisions come up in the future. Almost no effort has been made in this section of the paper to portray points of view that differ from those of this "majority opposition." The intent of this effort is to present the position of a "majority opposition" that, in our judgment, may still be too little considered when policies are made.

D. Issues, Policies and Laws vs. Real Issues, "Code Words" and Motivations

One great question has been, and to some extent still is, the difference of opinion on what motivates this majority. For example, there is the belief, held to varying degrees by some in this country, that many policy desires voiced by the majority are based on rather undesirable and, indirectly, dangerous habits that probably should be discouraged; or, even worse, they are primarily based on bigotry and prejudice. Both charges have some basis in fact, certainly among the minority of the majority who will be affected by the laws and policies under discussion. One could submit; however, that there is excessive emphasis being put on these charges in the national press and the electronic media, and there is too little attention being given to other valid points of view and positions.

In the late 1960's, for example, there was some feeling that the emphasis on law enforcement, discussed earlier, was not straightforward; in fact some asserted that the words "law and order" were really primarily "code words" for the suppression of Negroes. On other issues equally broad, incriminating statements were made. Perhaps the best way to examine this problem is to pick out and discuss several of the most

controversial recent laws, proposed legislation and regulations which affect vast numbers of the population and to which opposition was often largely attributed, in the national media, to everything from bigotry and inbred violence to even somewhat unhealthy sexual drives. Were there other contributing factors, points of view and possible recommendations that seemed reasonable, even on these most controversial issues? If so, let us see if these points were also adequately considered at the times of the controversies; and how many of these positions, directly concerned with the desires and sometimes peace of mind of many people, are generally known today.

1. The 1968 Gun Law

Reams of articles and editorials were written on the 1968 gun law and most that appeared in the national press, TV and radio seemed to fail to give sufficient coverage to possible valid objections to the law. All citizens are against the criminal use of guns, and most gun owners are probably willing to register their guns if this ownership is looked on as a right (as is the ownership of an automobile), which registration does not hamper or endanger.*

Regardless of how one feels about this particular legislation, the somewhat cavalier treatment of the wishes of what might be a majority of

*Some gun owners fear registration of guns can be the first step in confiscation, or taxing guns out of existence, as has occurred in Europe. It was hard to convince them that proponents of the legislation had their best interests at heart when some of these proponents clearly stated on TV that there was no need for guns in the possession of any citizen, and the public should be disarmed.

the population is interesting to look at as perhaps an unhappy, but not completely atypical, treatment of the population on "ideological" issues.*

Hunters (over 20 million of them) and their families do not look on their sporting arms as weapons to kill people with and do not like to be treated as what might appear to them to be potential criminals. The twenty-odd million other gun owners (target shooters and just plain "plinkers" with 22-caliber rifles) and their families may feel the same.

As indicated above, most gun owners apparently do not object to the simple registration of their firearms with the local police if for no other reason than to identify them if they are stolen or lost and recovered. Nor do most object to giving their name, address and description upon purchase of a firearm. This has long been standard practice for those purchasing hunting licenses, just as with driving licenses. These activities are "reasonable" and are done in conjunction with their right to own and (under very restricted, but generally accepted, circumstances) bear arms. Some feared the eventual loss of their guns and of the right to own them, and others did not like the excessive difficulty involved in owning arms under the new law. Some questioned the effectiveness of the law in fighting crime. Hunters (who are concentrated primarily in rural and suburban areas, away from the TV and radio antennae, the large newspaper offices and those who produce and disseminate their material) apparently look on hunting not

*The Attorney General estimates there are 50 million gun owners in the country who, with their families, would make up over half the population. A Louis Harris survey reported that "the number of homes in which occupants said they owned guns had reached 51 percent." (Note the loaded phrasing "had reached," implying it was growing; in fact there is no historical data on this subject.) The highest percentage of gun owners were found in rural areas (78%). (The New York Times, April 23, 1968, p. 30).

only as an activity with men but a family sport. Adolescent boys can and do act like men, with all the responsibilities of adult hunters, in the company of their fathers and older brothers. Here is a sign of growing up with real actions (hunters could point out that a boy can't be "subjective" about an exploding grouse, the whereabouts of his partners or even a valuable hunting dog in the deep woods), done under the eyes of experienced, "loving, concerned adults"--family men.

Hunters claim they are great conservationists, and they point out that they alone pay (through license fees) for much of the public land available to all, as well as for the cover and feed for game and nongame birds and animals alike. These fees pay for the restoration of wildlife gone for decades, such as the wild turkey and elk in the East, for the benefit of all. They annually pay for the right to "harvest" the excess animals (supposedly an essential job which, if undertaken by paid government hunters, would cost the taxpayers many millions of dollars); they thus, hunters claim, help maintain healthy animal populations, some of which (such as the deer) match or exceed that of the colonial days, despite the increased human population.

Assuming that only part of the above is true and assuming that some gun control could be proven essential, any logical objections to the law by such a large percentage of the population would seem worth considering. But what actually happened lent some credence to those hunters who fear for their sport. Hardly any informed, reasonable consideration of their point of view was given in the national press and the network TV and radio. Gun owners were generally depicted as members of a "powerful lobby" (by the powerful TV networks and powerful newspapers); they were seen as violent

and even fanatic. "Intellectuals" and media people discussed the psychological aspects of the identification with and the "need" for a gun. This must have sounded strange to hunters who seem to put very little stress on guns, per se.^{*} For example, they know reams about "game cycles," breeds of dogs, the best weather and places in which to hunt, etc., but they are usually much less well-informed on guns and ballistics. They seem likely to be able to tell you all about their partner's dog, but many apparently cannot even tell you what make of gun he carries.

What is more surprising, however, there were respectable arguments for the liberal intellectual to have made, that, while recognizing the almost universal desire to reduce accidents and the criminal use of guns, could have indicated caution in supporting this legislation. These arguments were largely overlooked or ignored by the national media.

There is some hard-to-ignore evidence that, while and after this legislation was under consideration by Congress and being discussed by the media, mature, intelligent, generally well-informed people had not considered the following argument: the gun law provided opportunities for inequities above and beyond the problem of gun ownership.**

^{*}Nor has this attitude completely disappeared. As late as mid-February 1971, on the "Today Show," Hugh Downs and Roger Caras had a discussion on the "sexual" significance of the gun to gun owners. Another TV program, "The American Sportsman," which was formerly a show about hunting, gave some balance to the picture by depicting hunters as normal men who did not brutally mow down herds, flocks and gaggles of cowering game. Of all the mail the show received, only 8% of the people protested against the "slaughter" on the show. However, despite the fact that it was "one of the favorite winter sports shows on television," it was turned from largely a hunting show into one largely about ecology. Although fishing is still seen on it, hunting is rarely depicted. The likes of 92% of those who wrote in were ignored. (TV Guide, February 20-26, 1971, pp. 17 and 18.)

** Besides the virtual absence of such arguments in the national press and media, there were other indications; e.g., I polled audience after audience of intelligent, mature and sometimes quite influential people on this issue during this time; and, although they knew most pro-gun legislation arguments and some anti points, none was aware of this problem, but quickly recognized it as an important one when it was pointed out.

When the National Crime Information Center had been established, J. Edgar Hoover felt constrained to say,

Most importantly, it will mean no intrusion whatsoever upon the right to privacy.

The NCIC (National Crime Information Center) will have no other purpose than to bring criminals to justice--persons who have violated federal statutes or against whom there is a felony warrant outstanding, and whom the state is willing to extradite...*

Yet,

Under the President's proposal all firearms would have to be registered within 180 days after enactment of the law....The registration records would be maintained in the National Crime Information Center by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. To obtain a federal firearms license, an individual would be required to submit, among other requirements, a statement from a licensed physician attesting to his mental and physical capability for possessing and using a firearm safely and responsibly; a statement from the chief law enforcement officer of his locality attesting to his eligibility for a license; a complete set of his fingerprints certified by a law enforcement officer; and an identification photograph. Licenses would have to be renewed every three years.**

Here was a possible invasion of privacy of the type viewed with suspicion by all classes of Americans. A Harvard University study, which used a small, "highly random" sample of 200 persons "representing different ages, social classes and races in the suburban Boston cities of Belmont, Cambridge and Maynard," (and therefore may be suspect compared to the usual nationwide sample of about 1,500 persons) specifically asked about a "computerized

*J. Edgar Hoover, "Now: Instant Crime Control in Your Town," reprinted by courtesy of Popular Science Monthly, (C) 1966 by Popular Science Publishing Co., Inc.

**Form letter from Senator Henry M. Jackson, United States Senate, Chairman of Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 1968.

data bank on all Americans." The majority (55%) opposed it "on the ground that it would threaten privacy."^{*} But there is other evidence of this feeling. About one in five (19%) in a large nationwide sample (1,362 people) felt in mid-1970 that their privacy was already being violated by "computers which collect a lot of information about you." And better than one in three (34%) felt that "his privacy was being invaded" by people who were trying to find out things about him that "are none of their business." The objections to the invasions of privacy are more likely to come from "those with the most education," men, those who live in small towns and the South.^{**}

Also, despite the desire for stricter enforcement of the laws and the high sensitivity to the recent increase in crime, the weight of opinion is against wiretapping by police. There is some evidence to show that the public does not even like wiretapping done to specific groups of people. In an unscientifically designed telephone survey in Philadelphia, the majority (59.7%) said the government should not tap the phones of "radicals."^{***}

As the following charts show, high school and particularly grade school-educated people were likely to be less familiar with wiretapping and therefore, presumably, could feel more personally threatened by it. Closer knowledge might have changed their attitude. Although a significant percentage of the less-educated did not know what is meant by wiretapping, only a small percentage had no opinion on whether they


^{*}The New York Times, December 15, 1970, p. 57.

^{**}Article by Louis Harris, in The Philadelphia Inquirer, August 3, 1970, p. 5, based on one of his polls.

^{***}The Philadelphia Inquirer, March 19, 1971, p. 39.

approved or disapproved of it. This "instinctive" suspicion of it would presumably still hold in the case of invasion of privacy through gun laws that affected the majority of the people.

FIGURE XXVI
WIRETAPPING*
By Education



*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 51, September 1969, pp. 13 and 14.

Despite such feelings among the public, however, there was vast support among intellectual liberals and the national media to put detailed personal information on 50 million Americans (including every rabbit hunter) into a computerized system---1984! Furthermore, in New York State, under the Sullivan Law, a system has resulted that shows great amounts of information on file, not only about the gun owner, but about those who vouch for his character. If this took place under a revised national law, conceivably 75 to 100 million citizens would be on file at local and national police centers. But even if this did not occur, since most of these 50 million gun owners are family men, if one includes their families, the number of citizens affected by the law might be a majority of the population.*

The following questions are taken from a local New York police department questionnaire concerning the personal history of a character witness. This must be filled out by the character witness before he can vouch for a person filling out a pistol permit application (section 400.00 of the Penal Law). Under the Sullivan Law, local police departments vary widely in their interpretation of the amount of information they need about applicants and character witnesses.

2. Give any variation you have used in spelling your name

3. Give any other names you have ever used or been known by and give the reason for using same _____

*Such laws require that great amounts of personal information be on file in local and national police files. This can, of course, hamper gun ownership, at least of the new resident in a community. The New York State Sullivan gun law, governing handgun ownership (of little consequence to hunters and other primarily "long" gun users), requires three citizens in the municipality in which the gun owner lives (even if he just moved in and is a stranger; a Supreme Court judge from a town ten miles away does not qualify as a character witness) to sign affidavits before the man can even apply for a permit to bring the gun into the state. If he brings it with him when he moves in, he is in violation of the law. Of course, the same procedure applies to the purchase of a handgun.

17. Have you ever received disciplinary action of any type while in the armed forces of the U.S. _____
If so, give details _____
37. Has applicant ever had or been examined for or been treated or confined for a nervous or mental disorder by a private physician or at a clinic, hospital, sanitarium or other institution? _____

These forms are presumably available to anyone in the local police department.* Regardless of one's point of view on gun laws, most thinking men would probably ponder the consequences to personal privacy of something like this also occurring under the proposed federal law on all guns (shotguns, rifles and pistols), which, as described by Senator Jackson's letter, would have required a local law enforcement officer's recommendation to get a permit. Much as all citizens wish to reduce crime, such activities as the filing of the fingerprints and detailed personal information of approximately half the adult males in the country (and, if character witnesses are included, many more than that) in a central government system and perhaps in innumerable local police stations, should give any prudent man pause.

We know most murders are crimes of rage or passions of the moment, committed by people who are well-known to one another, and that the presence of a gun might lead to a death which otherwise might not have occurred if it were not present. This criticism in no way invalidates the basic objectives

*Even members of at least one large city police force are alleged to have illegally released confidential information on people in their files. (See The New York Times of February 21, 1971, p. 33 on the alleged sale of confidential information from police files in New York City to private companies.) The information requested of character witnesses about themselves on the long police forms listed above, could be used to affect the reputation of men and women about personal things many care about: veterans do not necessarily mention the few days they spent in the guardhouse due to an offense related to a brawl, etc.; and some people would be delighted to tear down the local "war hero"; a woman with a short, unhappy marriage in her past may prefer not to give that "other name" and the "reason for using same," to local or national police files.

of attempting to reduce crime and the several thousand intentional and accidental gunshot deaths each year, nor does it condemn any and all gun laws as such; but it does say there might be aspects of this law to which any man, even its supporters, might have wished to give closer scrutiny. To make matters worse, the people drawing up the bill freely admitted that, because of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, criminals probably could not be penalized for not filling out the forms and therefore would not be affected by them. Of course, a potential criminal without a record would be treated as a law-abiding citizen at the time he applied for a gun; so potential criminals would in effect be immune from this law. In other words, as far as "professional" criminals are concerned, the enactment of a simple law making it unlawful for a man with a felony record to possess a gun would have just about the same effect on the criminal* without creating the problems for the noncriminal gun owner and the fantastic costs (perhaps multibillion dollar initial costs), which administering the law would place on the gun owners and/or government and taxpayers.

To repeat, this issue is discussed not because of the opposition to the commendable objectives of reducing crime and loss of life of the gun law per se, but because it was a law which so many people of good will thought was a clear cut case in which one could take a constitutionally and morally incontrovertible stand against a vast number of their fellow

* Firearms and Violence in American Life, a Staff Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, prepared by George D. Newton and Franklin E. Zimring, pp. 114-118.

The fifth amendment, however, could be invoked against enforcement of such laws. Fifth amendment problems might be minimized by exempting from licensing, registration, or transfer notice requirements all persons in those categories prohibited by law from possessing firearms [criminals].

citizens. Furthermore, these people managed to push their ideas about a subject, on which the vast majority of them apparently had no personal experience and little "in depth" detailed information, to a high-decibel level.

2. Open Housing Laws

Another issue on which many took a moral stand, but on which they should perhaps have had more firsthand information, was the open housing law. The basic idea behind these laws is, in my judgment, indisputably good. But, in their haste to push this law, and, one suspects, their tendency to attribute opposition to bigotry, they may have caused many of its most avid supporters to overlook some stipulations which may have helped to implement the function which the law was supposed to further. Open housing laws with no provision for compensation to poor, working people (both Negro and white) for the loss of their down payments leave much to be desired. Furthermore, such action may help to convince many people that the issue is being decided by "decoupled" elitists, both in and out of government, who don't know, or (worse still) perhaps don't even care enough about details of the problem for the average man. Twenty percent of the population moves every year, many for reasons of employment; they all, white and Negro, fear for property values. If, however, these families who must move find that their house has depreciated in a "changed" neighborhood, others will start to flee. If a man has no ready money if he must move, other than that in the down payment and paid-up portion of his mortgage, he becomes sensitive to the value of his house. If the price goes down, the bank does not take the loss; he does. He is responsible to the bank for the full amount of the mortgage; what is left

is his. If nothing is left, that is what he has for a down payment on the house he must buy for his family at his new location. This may cause "panic"-selling, even by non bigots, and at the same time it might reinforce some people's prejudice.

A provision that might have at least reduced some of the problem (as only an example), might be something like the provisions made by corporations when their employees are forced to move at times when their properties draw less than a normal price; e.g., the middle of winter. A provision in the law guaranteeing (within limits) against a drop in the value of homes because of a "change" in the neighborhood due to the law, might have calmed the fears of many home owners, reduced opposition to the law and perhaps even prevented some "panic"-moving.* We cannot be sure how much effect it would have on "panic"-moving or how long this effect would last, because other things cause people (black and white) to move from neighborhoods: increased noise, crime, juvenile delinquency, etc.** But it might slow it down and tend to slow or prevent a drop in property values. At the very least, it would have indicated a concern for the father, Negro or white, who was one of the 20% who would move anyway, but was now faced with the prospect of losing some or all of his down payment, because his neighborhood was "changing" due to the open housing law. This provision might have caused a bureaucratic mess (perhaps even as bad as the one

*There is mixed evidence on whether or not property values drop when Negroes first move into a neighborhood; if they do drop, then the fears of the residents are justified and insurance would be helpful; if they do not drop, then insurance would counter "irrational" fears and cost nothing.

**"As the Blacks Move In, the Ethnics Move Out," by Paul Wilkes, The New York Times Magazine, January 24, 1971, Also see pp. 335-339 for white and Negro sentiments on homes and neighborhoods.

the gun control law was almost certain to make) but it also might not have. If it had been successful, it might have decreased the moving (nobody likes to move), and, like a bank without a run on it, it would have cost little. Be that as it may, somebody would have been concerned that if a man loses his down payment he has no money with which to put a roof over his family's head when he arrives at his new place of residence.

Misguided actions (e.g., insufficient attention to such problems) are not only ineffective in carrying out important and necessary programs, but are counterproductive to the very programs they hope to further. Furthermore, the average man feels put upon by the media and the government.

3. School Busing and Crossbusing and Other New School Programs

School busing is another example of such a program. For a long period of time, anyone against busing was likely to be dismissed in some circles as consciously or unconsciously racist; and many no doubt were; but it was again a simplistic analysis of real issues for the average man. As the following table shows, the objection to having white children attend schools with Negroes has apparently decreased drastically:

TABLE IX
SCHOOL INTEGRATION*

Any objection to sending your children to a school where there are a few Negroes, half are Negroes, or more than half are Negroes?

	Northern white parents (% objecting)				Southern white parents (% objecting)			
	1963	1965	1966	1970	1963	1965	1966	1970
Where a few are Negroes	10	7	6	6	61	37	24	16
Where half are Negroes	33	28	32	24	78	68	49	43
Where more than half are Negroes	53	52	60	51	86	78	62	69

On the question of busing, however, in 1970 the weight of opinion of everyone, including Negroes, opposed it. Nationally, 81% opposed and only 14% favored it. Over 70% of every region in the country was against busing.

TABLE X
BUSING OF SCHOOL CHILDREN*

In general, do you favor or oppose the busing of Negro and white school children from one school district to another?

	March, 1970		
	Favor %	Oppose %	No Opinion %
National	14	81	5
Sex			
Men	13	83	4
Women	15	79	6
Race			
White	11	85	4
Non-white	37	48	5

*Gallup polls (1970 poll conducted March to April).

**Gallup Opinion Index, No. 58, April 1970, p. 9.

TABLE X, cont.

Education			
College	13	84	3
High School	14	81	5
Grade School	16	77	7
Occupation			
Professional & Business	11	86	3
White collar	13	81	6
Farmers	14	83	3
Manual	16	78	6
Age			
21-29 years	17	80	3
30-49 years	16	79	5
50 and over	10	84	6
Religion			
Protestant	14	81	5
Catholic	15	82	3
Jewish	x	x	x
Politics			
Republican	10	87	3
Democrat	18	75	7
Independent	13	83	4
Region			
East	19	73	8
Midwest	15	81	4
South	8	87	5
West	13	84	3
Income			
\$15,000 and over	8	88	4
\$10,000-\$14,999	10	88	2
\$ 7,000-\$ 9,999	17	77	6
\$ 5,000-\$ 6,999	20	75	5
\$ 3,000-\$ 4,999	17	76	7
Under \$3,000	14	76	10
Community Size			
1,000,000 and over	14	83	3
500,000 - 999,999	16	75	5
50,000 - 499,999	15	82	3
2,500 - 49,999	11	83	6
Under 2,500, Rural	14	81	5

All educational, income and age levels and people living in all community sizes opposed it; and many districts, which were traditionally liberal, showed opposition equal to the national level. But Negroes were less strongly opposed to busing.

TABLE XI

DO YOU FAVOR?*

(Write-in Poll to State Senator Constituents of
Nassau County, Long Island, New York)

The regents-proposed repeal of the Lent-Kunzeman Neighborhood School Law which prohibits forced assignment of pupils to schools out of their neighborhoods on the basis of race, color or creed?

<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
(1216)	(4798)
20.2%	79.8%

Once more, however, what many "intellectuals" and much of the media seldom stressed, or were very slow to learn, was what every average citizen facing the problem knew: there was a crisis threatening a vital part of the community--the neighborhood school system. It was not just a question of racism; the neighborhood schools were about to be (or were being) deliberately broken up. It was based on a theory of improvement developed by some well-meaning, but, apparently to the average man, less than completely logical "educators" and politicians. The results are that, after many parents have gone into fantastic debt to buy a home near a good school, small children are being bused and "cross-bused" miles from home into strange neighborhoods. Others are being forced to walk, in all weather, past their former neighborhood school (now occupied by others) to a new school, perhaps a mile away, over suburban roads with no sidewalks; and in these same areas, school taxes are skyrocketing. This last development can also result from a program based on the idea that two schools, one kindergarten through

*From the Legislative Report from State Senator Norman F. Lent, Nassau County, Long Island, New York (part of former U.S. Representative Allard Lowenstein's district) 1970.

fourth grade, and another of the fifth and sixth grades, is so much better than a "K through 6" that it is worth all this trouble. In some areas, cross-busing for racial balance and the new "two-school" (or even "three-school") system were introduced at the same time, compounding the problems. At the same time, obvious improvements in the educational system as a whole are generally not forthcoming. Reading and math scores have not improved significantly, and in many critical areas they generally continue to fall.

It also appears that even in the areas where many new, extremely expensive educational programs have been undertaken, the educational accomplishments continue to decrease. For example, compared to 1965, despite the expanding, new progressive, expensive programs instituted in New York City, the reading ability of students has decreased. Reading scores of ninth grade students in this school system, once one of the finest in the country, now average a year and two months behind the national average.* We may doubt that this phenomenon is unique to New

*The New York Times, Sunday, December 20, 1970, p. 1. In 1970, the second grade showed an improvement over 1969, but it was far below 1965. This may be a hopeful sign, but second grade is "easy"; and it remains to be seen whether this is the beginning of a better knowledge of the basics, which will show up in later years, or not. A more disquieting fact is that all the average scores look better as one goes down the grades; i.e., 3rd is better than 4th, 4th better than 5th, etc., on a national average comparison basis. Or, in other words, as one goes up the grade levels, and the demands get greater, the students fall farther and farther behind. This is partly due to the fact that the bright students, who might read several years ahead of the others, tend to pull the averages up; as one gets near the 12th grade (the top of the reading score grades) it is impossible for any student to have a greater effect on the average score. This is, however, a problem for all schools across the country. In fact, because of this, the upper grade scores may be a better measure of what the mass of students is receiving from these expensive programs. Perhaps the most tragic aspect of this problem in New York City is that an ever larger number of the students are from low-income families (many are Negroes and Puerto Ricans), who desperately need this basic education for "upward mobility" in the modern, economic and social environment.

York or even large cities. Similar results can probably be found in suburban, higher SEL (socio-economic level) areas as well.*

This whole educational problem, linked with the spiraling taxes, has caught the average American in a squeeze. He holds education as the most important means of bettering one's position. He is having trouble paying these taxes and he knows something is wrong, but he does not want to give up on this road to success.** This is particularly true of the Negroes; but both whites and non-whites are becoming more dissatisfied with schools, a reversal of the trend of the early and mid-sixties.

TABLE XII

NEGRO AND WHITE SATISFACTION AND DISSATISFACTION
WITH THEIR CHILDREN'S EDUCATION***

	Satisfaction		Dissatisfaction	
	Negro %	White %	Negro %	White %
1963-1965	43	73	45	21
1965	44	77	46	19
1966	64	76	23	16
1969	53	65	34	25

*An examination of 1966-1970 data on one New York suburban school district in which the per pupil expenditure was \$1,600 annually (it is now \$1,800), and many "new" programs, including cross-busing for racial balance to new K through 4, and 5th and 6th grade "middle" schools, which replaced K through 6 neighborhood schools, had been instituted (the latter had been in operation for two years), showed the reading and math scores continuing to fall. In fact, the scores of "cohorts" (roughly the same groups of students traced through succeeding grades) showed a continuing drop in comparative ability of classes made up of largely the same students as they moved up through the grades. It was possible to trace them in this district as it was quite stable--it had varied in size by only about 200 students over several years and the I.Q. scores apparently had not varied greatly.

There are now some indications that these trends may have altered somewhat; perhaps even the years examined were only a "perturbation" in the progress curve. What was stable right through the whole period, however, was the trend in the per pupil expenditure curve--up; and the slope was not slight! It is interesting to note in passing that in this same district, private, nonendowed, nonsectarian schools, with classes of six to twelve students, and the teaching of foreign languages in the grades, were charging \$1,100 to \$1,500 per student.

**The importance of education as a means of upward mobility for Negroes according to Negroes and whites is discussed later in this section.

***Gallup polls.

All income, educational, racial and regional groups feel discipline is inadequate, but Negroes the most of all racial groups.

TABLE XIII
DISCIPLINE IN THE LOCAL PUBLIC SCHOOLS*
(In Percent)

How do you feel about the discipline in the local public schools--
is it too strict, not strict enough, or just about right?

	<u>Too Strict</u>	<u>Not Strict Enough</u>	<u>Just About Right</u>	<u>Don't Know/ No Answer</u>
NATIONAL		1		
SEX				
Men	2	54	31	13
Women	2	52	31	15
RACE				
White	2	52	32	14
Non-white	4	62	21	13
EDUCATION				
Elementary Grades	1	55	28	16
High School In- complete	2	56	32	10
High School Complete	2	50	35	13
Technical, Trade or Business School	1	62	16	21
College Incomplete	3	55	26	16
College Graduate	2	47	39	12
OCCUPATION				
Business & Prof.	1	52	32	15
Clerical & Sales	3	52	34	11
Farm	3	42	51	4
Skilled Labor	2	54	31	13
Unskilled Labor	3	57	30	10
Non-Labor Force	**	53	24	23
AGE				
29 to 29 Years	4	41	35	20
30 to 49 Years	2	51	38	9
50 Years and Over	**	61	24	15
RELIGION				
Protestant	2	53	33	12
Roman Catholic	2	56	27	15
Jewish	-	54	25	21
All Others	3	44	31	22
REGION				
East	2	54	28	16
Midwest	**	58	31	11
South	3	48	36	13
West	1	52	29	18
INCOME				
\$15,000 and Over	**	47	40	13
\$10,000 to 14,999	2	58	27	13
\$ 7,000 to 9,999	2	52	34	12
\$ 5,000 to 6,999	1	56	30	13
\$ 4,000 to 4,999	3	47	36	14
\$ 3,000 to 3,999	-	54	37	9
Under \$2,999	3	51	21	25
COMMUNITY SIZE				
500,000 and Over	1	61	23	15
50,000 to 499,999	1	58	26	15
25,000 to 49,999	-	70	22	8
Under 25,000	3	44	40	13

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 66, December 1970, p. 17.

**Less than 1%.

Also, age, racial, regional and educational groups (except college graduates), who always supported school budgets, now reject more taxes for schools.

TABLE XIV
VOTE FOR SCHOOL TAXES?*
(In Percent)

"Suppose the local public schools said they needed much more money. As you feel at this time, would you vote to raise taxes for this purpose, or would you vote against raising taxes for this purpose?"

	<u>For</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Don't Know/ No Answer</u>
<u>NATIONAL</u>			
<u>SEX</u>			
Men	38	56	6
Women	37	56	7
<u>RACE</u>			
White	38	56	6
Non-white	35	58	7
<u>EDUCATION</u>			
Elementary grades	28	63	9
High school incomplete	33	60	7
High school complete	33	61	6
Technical, trade, or business school	48	48	4
College incomplete	47	48	5
College graduate	61	33	6
<u>OCCUPATION</u>			
Business and professional	54	40	6
Clerical and sales	38	58	4
Farm	32	65	3
Skilled labor	34	61	5
Unskilled labor	29	63	8
Non-labor force	32	59	9
<u>AGE</u>			
21 to 29 years	45	48	7
30 to 49 years	40	56	4
50 years and over	32	60	8
<u>RELIGION</u>			
Protestant	36	57	7
Roman Catholic	36	59	5
Jewish	59	41	--
All others	45	43	12
<u>REGION</u>			
East	41	54	5
Midwest	34	58	8
South	36	57	7
West	39	55	6
<u>INCOME</u>			
\$15,000 and over	49	47	4
\$10,000 to \$14,999	41	55	4
\$ 7,000 to \$ 9,999	40	55	5
\$ 5,000 to \$ 6,999	31	59	10
\$ 4,000 to \$ 4,999	33	56	11
\$ 3,000 to \$ 3,999	27	66	7
Under \$2,999	27	64	9
<u>COMMUNITY SIZE</u>			
500,000 and over	38	56	6
50,000 to 499,999	36	57	7
25,000 to 49,999	49	49	2
Under 25,000	37	57	6

*Ibid., p. 19.

There has been a real money crisis for years, but it was a long time in being recognized; and educators still object to the questioning of their fundamental premises and programs, which simply do not always seem valid or feasible. There is now evidently a growing questioning on the part of people about the work and programs of the decision-makers in education. Recent polls seem to indicate that there is a demand for ways to get educators to evaluate and account for their "programs."

TABLE XV
NATIONAL TESTS IN LOCAL SCHOOLS?*

Would you like to see the students in the local schools be given national tests so that their educational achievement could be compared with students in other communities?

	<u>National Totals</u> %	<u>No Children In School</u> %	<u>Public School Parents</u> %	<u>Parochial School Parents</u> %	<u>High School Juniors & Seniors</u> %
Yes	75	74	75	80	76
No	16	14	19	15	23
No opinion	9	12	6	5	1
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

The public also apparently is in the mood to make the comparative results of such tests mean something.

TABLE XVI
THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE SCHOOL FOR STUDENTS' PROGRESS**

Would you favor or oppose a system that would hold teachers and administrators more accountable for the progress of students?

	<u>National Totals</u> %	<u>No Children In School</u> %	<u>Public School Parents</u> %	<u>Parochial School Parents</u> %	<u>High School Juniors & Seniors</u> %
Favor	67	66	68	71	65
Oppose	21	21	21	19	29
No opinion	12	13	11	10	6
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

* Ibid., p. 18.

** Ibid.

Furthermore, the public also seems in the mood to put teeth in its demand for productivity of teachers.

TABLE XVII
HOW SHOULD TEACHERS BE PAID?*

Should each teacher be paid on the basis of the quality of his work or should all teachers be paid on a standard scale basis?

	<u>National Totals</u>	<u>No Children In School</u>	<u>Public School Parents</u>	<u>Parochial School Parents</u>	<u>High School Juniors & Seniors</u>
	%	%	%	%	%
Quality of work	58	57	61	52	59
Standard scale basis	36	36	35	43	39
No opinion	6	7	4	5	2
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

The parents as well as the adult public as a whole, however, still show a majority (or very close to it, in the case of nonparents) opposing the premise that teachers unions have "gained too much power." But better than one in four feel they have.

TABLE XVIII
POWER OF TEACHER ORGANIZATIONS**

Have teacher organizations gained too much power over their own salaries and working conditions?

	<u>National Totals</u>	<u>No Children In School</u>	<u>Public School Parents</u>	<u>Parochial School Parents</u>	<u>High School Juniors & Seniors</u>
	%	%	%	%	%
Yes	26	27	25	24	17
No	53	49	58	57	72
No opinion	21	24	17	19	11
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

Clearly the mood is not one of blind trust; and the growing trend among educators over recent years to downgrade the value of comparative tests

* Ibid.

** Ibid.

(teaching the "whole child" rather than emphasizing testable "subjects") and the increased emphasis on the tenure system, may be in for trouble. On this last issue, the parents and students particularly show opposition.

TABLE XIX

TENURE FOR TEACHERS?*

Many states have 'tenure' laws which means that a teacher cannot be fired except by some sort of court procedure. Are you for giving teachers tenure or are you against tenure?

	National Totals %	No Children In School %	Public School Parents %	Parochial School Parents %	High School Juniors & Seniors %
For	35	38	29	28	30
Against	53	48	60	62	61
No opinion	12	14	11	10	9
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

The "satisfaction" chart shown earlier shows a change in the trend between 1966 and 1969 toward dissatisfaction of the parents with the education of their children.

4. Construction Workers Unions

One of the areas in which "racism" was most likely assumed to be the reason for a lack of integration, was in the building trade unions. Here again, there were grounds for some charges of racism. No man in his right senses would say that racism did not exist in construction or other trade unions, as it does to some degree in most other sectors of our society. But there were many other factors involved which were, and perhaps still are, misunderstood or ignored by many people who write and comment on this issue. These factors, again, are known to a large portion of the population which

*Ibid.

is also sympathetic to the charges of racism. The results of pushing a purely racist interpretation, however, were annoying to many of the 25 million union men in the country, both white and Negro (in some quarters, unions as a whole began to be condemned); and it was perhaps in the end embarrassing to Negroes as a group. This could be excused in the 1950's, when Negroes were faring so badly economically compared to whites;* and perhaps even in the early sixties; but it should not have continued to the degree that it did after so much had happened in the mid- and late-sixties. By this time there was a great deal of evidence on this issue that showed that this problem was not simple. There was, for example, a comprehensive study of the race problem in the apprentice system (as compared to the direct "helper" journeyman route) in the construction unions. This work was done under contract to the Office of Manpower Automation and Training--OMAT-- the Federal predecessor to the Office of Manpower Policy, Evaluation and Research of the U.S. Department of Labor, by the Department of Economics of the University of Texas in 1965-66. The two men who ran the project, Professors F. Ray Marshall and Vernon M. Briggs, Jr., were known in the field of labor economics and apparently were sympathetic with the Negroes. Their work was published in 1967 in a book entitled The Negro and Apprenticeship.** This study found much to support the claim of racial discrimination in the unions; and almost the entire book is directed at uncovering these, and other factors, that tend to limit Negro membership in construction unions and to devising public and private policies to change them. But the book also

*They were doing relatively worse in the 1950's than in the 1940's.

** (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press).

brought out much other evidence that largely never saw the light of day in the mass media.

Detailed surveys of ten cities--New York, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Detroit, Washington, D.C., Cincinnati, Houston, Atlanta, Pittsburgh, and San Francisco-Oakland--besides pointing out that the situation varied from construction union to construction union and from city to city, clearly indicated several other things:

1) There were not enough Negroes who wanted such jobs, particularly by means of initially low-paying, apprenticeship programs.*

2) There were signs of real ills (in New York, for instance) that had nothing to do with the unions except that incidentally these ills made it difficult for minority youths to qualify under the requirements of the employers' and unions' apprenticeship systems. The [bi-racial] Rogers Committee reported in 1964:

One of the greatest eye openers to this Committee was the apparent abandoning of many youths in our school system. Most of the Committee was shocked that boys who were graduates of our vocational high schools....could not spell such words as "brick," "carpenter," "building," etc. or could not add inches and feet....It is quite apparent that they are a product of a social system that pushed them

*"Civil rights and union leaders have been surprised at the apathy shown by Negro youngsters toward apprenticeship programs even when they had a chance to get in." Most wanted white collar jobs, professional or quasi-professional. Only 3.2 per cent of the seniors aspired to skilled trades in fourteen Negro and two all-white high schools.

In the great "drive" to get Negroes and Puerto Ricans into unions in 1963, 1,624 apprenticeship and 494 journeyman applications were turned in; of the potential apprentices, 528 were disqualified (129 were nonresidents, 202 were either too old or too young, 197 lacked minimal education); of the 1,096 remaining, 426 (39%) did not show up for an interview. Of those who were interviewed, passed the next screening, and were "referred" and accepted by the unions, many "decided not to avail themselves of the opportunity once it was offered to them." Marshall and Briggs, pp. 39, 55-57.

through the earlier grades of school without insuring that they had the basic tools necessary for a minimal academic education....We call attention to this problem because the apprentice in any trade must come equipped with these tools:

Summing up its work, the Committee stated:

We had been led to believe that there were thousands who couldn't gain admittance into the building trades unions. As a committee we felt that the numbers who came forward were small and those qualified were even smaller in number

When an intensive preexamination "boning up" program--similar to bar review school for lawyers--was made available exclusively for Negroes, their numbers passing the apprenticeship exams rose spectacularly. In fact, they scored higher than many whites.

3) Many things, such as nepotism in the unions, were not directed at minorities, but at nonrelatives of craftsmen. (The arguments for skilled workers of one craft following in the same family, father to son, are too well-known to outline here.) Seasonal layoffs among construction workers (white construction workers have a lower employment time-rate than nonwhite workers in other fields) makes them sensitive to their numbers, so they tend to keep them down.

4) It isn't necessarily because the life on the job is hard for the Negro, either.

Although racial prejudice continues to be an important factor in apprenticeship, little overt racial hostility seems to be expressed against Negro apprentices once they get in the programs. Indeed, there are many cases in which employers or union leaders have gone out of their way to see that Negroes "made it."⁴

⁴ Ibid., pp. 35-36, 58-59.

The report concludes:

Since it was assumed that the absence of Negroes from these programs was due mainly to discrimination, much of the early public policy sought to combat discrimination, especially by unions. However, as time went by and apprenticeship sponsors adjusted their policies to comply with these civil rights regulations, and as surprisingly few Negroes either filed charges...or applied for apprenticeship openings when they became available, it became increasingly clear that anti-discrimination policies would have to be supplemented with other policies to recruit, counsel, and sometimes supply remedial tutoring programs, if progress was to be made in this area.*

This is a somewhat different picture from that often portrayed and still apparently held by some of those influential people who write, comment and even make decisions on such matters.

To repeat, this is by no means meant to say that there are no problems of racism in the construction unions. On the contrary, if men are denied any opportunities solely because of their race, creed or color, such barriers absolutely must be eliminated, in unions as elsewhere. It must be remembered, however, that increasing the numbers of any specific group (ethnic or otherwise) into any new area may be a more complex problem than some may think,

*Ibid., p. 191. Another study, of the aerospace industry in the Los Angeles area, where 60% of all nonwhite applicants and only 6% of white applicants were hired recently, also has an interesting appraisal of some of the Negro's "problems" in this area, which aren't generally discussed in the media. (Herbert K. Northrup, "The Negro in the Aerospace Industry," in Herbert K. Northrup and Richard L. Rowan, et al., Negro Employment in Basic Industry Vol. I: Studies of Negro Employment] University of Pennsylvania: Industrial Research Unit, Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, 1970 , p. 169.

The few Negroes in foreman positions, for example, may stem from the fact that many don't want to be foremen, for the same reasons that many whites don't want to be. The pay differential (if any, because overtime for the craftsman can easily put him over the foreman's rate) isn't worth the headaches.

and often for reasons that are not simply racist.* Overlooking such issues as those mentioned above can be counterproductive, and embarrassing to all. Being wrong in this case, again, can be very bad, and not only because a large segment of the people in the street may get the feeling that someone doesn't know what he is talking about and "their side of the argument" is being ignored.

E. A Message from the 1968 and 1970 Elections?

In the past two elections (1968 and 1970), the average man found some odd interpretations of what the key issues were, what solutions were acceptable, what motivated him and what, if anything, the elections showed. In 1968, for example, because Vietnam was at the top of the list of things that bothered an increasing number of people, many jumped to the conclusion that anti-Vietnam candidates would poll a large vote:

TABLE XX
MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES - 1968**

	<u>July</u>	<u>May</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
Vietnam war	52	42
Crime and lawlessness (including riots, looting, juvenile delinquency)	29	15
Race relations	13	25
High cost of living; taxes	9	8
Poverty	3	4
General unrest in nation	2	3

*Nor is it a dead issue in the building trades. Negro membership in building trades unions actually declined from 7.4% in 1968 to 6.8% in 1969, and new apprenticeship rules put in the Federal Register in 1971 call for "affirmative action plans" by all federally registered apprenticeship programs to take on more nonwhites. The unions say the rules would "substitute quotas for quality" and the programs would be "inundated...with unqualified short-term dropouts at the expense of dedicated future craftsmen." (The New York Times, February 14, 1971, p. E3). Hopefully, this new federal effort will be successful. As more and more white collar jobs and college educations are offered to the qualified Negro students from our urban slum schools,

**Gallup Opinion Index, No. 38, August 1968, p. 15.

This was a gross oversimplification of the functioning of the electorate and a lack of knowledge of the record of American opinion on such issues for the last half century. In the area of foreign policy the one issue that dominated and so often overrode all others, domestic and foreign, was the threat or actual involvement in war. In over 60 Gallup polls taken from 1935 through February 1970 (but not counting those during World War II, when the question apparently was not asked), "keeping out of war," "danger of war," and "possibility of war" was rated 40 times as one of the three most important issues of the day, and 32 times as the most important issue. Not surprisingly, in polls taken in 1935 and 1937, "keeping out of war" and "neutrality" were in the top three and in two polls taken in 1939, "keeping out of war" was listed as the most important issue. By 1947 it was again one of the top three; in 1948 (Berlin Blockade?) it was number one and again in October 1949 and May 1950. The Korean War broke out the following month and it remained one of the top three (mostly number one) throughout the war. "Keeping out of war" was number one in April 1954, July 1955, October 1956, September 1957, February 1958, November 1958 (Taiwan Straits crisis?), February 1959, October 1959, March 1961 (Bay of Pigs crisis?) and March 1964. The Vietnam war became number one in November 1964 and again in August 1965 and stayed there, with the exception of a poll in October 1967, throughout 13 polls up through February 1970. In May 1970, it was in second place with campus

however, the number of Negro youths who can meet the qualifications (without lowering standards), and who want to go through the low pay, grueling apprenticeship years, may in itself cause problems in meeting "quotas." Similarly, since any new group is always low on "seniority," if larger numbers of Negroes are in any starting group when layoffs come, more Negroes are likely to be laid off (though generally Negroes apparently did not fare worse than whites in the 1970 recession). This whole question is far from answered.

unrest first. Wars also apparently are always very hard on a President's popularity:

TABLE XXI

PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY--HARRY S. TRUMAN*

	<u>Approve</u>	<u>Disapprove</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
<u>1950</u>			
February	45	40	15
April	37	44	19
May	40	45	15
June	37	45	18
Korean invasion			
July	46	37	17
August	40	40	20
September	43	32	25
October	39	42	19
<u>1951</u>			
Communist Chinese invade Korea			
January	36	49	15
March	26	57	17
April	28	57	15
General MacArthur recalled			
June	24	61	15
July (mid)	25	59	16
Truce talks begin			
July (late)	29	54	17
September	31	57	12
Communists terminate truce talks			
October	32	54	14
November (early)	29	55	16
November (late)	23	58	19
December	23	58	19
<u>1952</u>			
February	25	62	13
May	28	59	13
June	32	58	10
November	32	55	13

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 12, May 1966, p. 24.

TABLE XXII

PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY--LYNDON B. JOHNSON*

	<u>Approve</u>	<u>Disapprove</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
<u>1967</u>			
January	47	37	16
February	46	37	17
March	45	42	13
April (early)	45	41	14
April (late)	46	38	16
May (early)	48	37	15
May (late)	45	39	16
June (early)	44	40	16
Glassboro Summit talks			
June (late)	52	35	13
August	39	47	14
September	39	47	14
October	38	50	12
November	41	49	10
December	46	41	13
<u>1968</u>			
January	48	39	13
February	48	39	13
TET offensive			
March (early)	41	48	11
March (late)	36	52	12
LBJ announces plan not to seek re-election			
April	49	40	11
May (early)	46	43	11
May (late)	41	45	14
June	42	45	13
July	40	48	12
August	35	52	13
October	42	51	7
November	43	44	13
1968 Presidential election			
December	44	43	13
<u>1969</u>			
January	49	34	14

President Nixon's popularity seems to hold up better (it rose from 53% to 59%, right through the Cambodian operation and students "strike" of the spring of 1970) but he is "disengaging" us "honorably" from Vietnam (see p. 114-115).

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 56, February 1970, pp. 15-16.

It seems not to make that much difference who is the enemy, or what the cause. Furthermore, short of our being attacked, sentiment about any recent war has been slow to change, despite "pro" or "anti" attitudes of much of the media, or even the government. In 1940, during the "battle of Britain," people were dead set against sending even food to Britain in American ships for fear of becoming involved in that war against the Nazis. In June of 1941, the extension of the draft passed the House of Representatives by one vote, and it had a proviso that no U.S. soldiers could be sent overseas. This doesn't mean that Americans won't or can't fight wars. On the contrary, over the last hundred years, our armies made up primarily of citizen soldiers, as in the Civil War and World Wars I and II, proved in time to be second to none in the world. We are traditionally a warrior nation, but only reluctantly and it is not counted among our assets: We do not like wars--any wars--particularly when there are, or are likely to be, United States casualties. That was true fifty years ago and it is true today.

Those who thought, however, that because the American voter disliked this war, he would back a "dove" candidate, were misjudging him again; for, though he knows a bad thing when he sees it, he also knows that the world is full of bad deals, much of which cannot be avoided. (Here is perhaps his greatest point of difference with some of the young New Leftists who seem to believe that doing unpleasant things isn't considered sensible under almost any circumstances regardless of the consequences. (see pp. 119-120). This apparent irresponsible self-indulgence is foreign to the average citizen.) The man in the street knows it can often cost more to avoid unpleasant things than to confront them. The "dove" candidates appeared to the common man to be recommending that we act just

as if the Communists weren't there; or "negotiate"; or leave the Vietnamese to settle their own affairs; or that the Communists really wouldn't be so bad if they took over. In 1968 the public morale was still high enough that such "solutions" just didn't make sense to the average man who lived in a real world where dogs bite, people with armed might really do subjugate others and freedom is cherished because it does make a difference if a totalitarian power conquers a people. He therefore rejected the "doves" and tended to favor the more "hawkish" (but far from belicose) candidates. Eugene McCarthy didn't win in the New Hampshire primary in 1968, he lost; President Johnson won without campaigning. Furthermore, many who voted for him did not know McCarthy was a "dove," so it is hard to tell whether this position helped or hurt him. In any event, without a charismatic leader on either side (and Robert Kennedy's death eliminated the one candidate who might have played such a role), the issues made a difference; and it was clear that the "dove" candidates didn't have what it took to make Vietnam a viable campaign issue:

TABLE XXIII*

CANDIDATE WHO CAN HANDLE THE WAR BEST
(In Percent)

Nixon	52
McCarthy	29
No Opinion	19
Nixon	54
Humphrey	27
No Opinion	19

DID WE MAKE A MISTAKE IN SENDING TROOPS TO VIETNAM?

<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
53	35	12

"The public, as many public opinion studies show, seeks an honorable way out of the Vietnam war." McCarthy's "Problem has been to find a solution to the war that is favored by a substantial majority of voters."

*From The New York Times, August 25, 1968, p. 74, report on a Gallup poll.

It was clear from the beginning that, because few reacted to pure "dovish" alternatives to the Vietnam War, the other issues, though some considered them to be less important than Vietnam, were going to weigh heavily. It was also clear that these issues were not going to sway conventions or the electorate in a different direction from the attitudes shown towards the Vietnam issue. Perhaps coincidentally, those who held "dovish" attitudes towards the Vietnam war also were likely to hold less popular attitudes on domestic issues such as law and order and education, and this was critical.

The average voter felt he knew more about these domestic issues than about Vietnam and had a better idea of what should be done. The 1967 statewide election in New Jersey had brought to light, for example, a vast hostility to busing, which, because of a statement by the Democratic State Director of Education supporting the suburban-to-urban busing of school children, cost the Democrats dearly. Furthermore, school budgets were being voted down across the country at the highest rate ever known by people who are so conscious of the value of education. A money crisis was developing, and the new, expensive programs pushed by the educators were not showing the results they were supposed to produce. The lack of discipline in high schools and colleges was also having a bad effect. But, "dove" candidates were hardly likely to come out against the new, expensive school programs, the lack of discipline or busing or to be strong on law and order, an expression considered, as mentioned earlier, by many ultra-liberals to be nothing but a code word for anti-Negro sentiment.

In the spring of 1968, those who pointed out that the data did not support an expected swing to the Left were roundly criticized by many pundits. Apparently many local Democratic committees split and conducted

"purges" of dissenters who would not recant their belief that the country was going toward the Center. One cannot be too hard on local people during this period, however, for national Democratic leaders and almost everyone else in politics (except George Wallace). were shying away from the "centerist" domestic issues.* It was these issues (rather than Vietnam) that were at the root of the election and had they been understood, the fate of the Democratic party might have been different. McCarthy's victory in Oregon had received very much attention (he had put one million dollars and 6,000 extra workers in this huge campaign for the votes of some 200,000-250,000 Democrats), more attention, in fact, than Nixon's victory over Reagan, which was as significant. This had highlighted the "Center" position of the electorate; the extremities of the Right and Left couldn't make it. Polls began to show the trend; it was to be a tough fight for the Democrats, regardless of who ran, and things didn't get any better as the summer wore on:

TABLE XXIV

WHO CAN HANDLE EACH OF THESE PROBLEMS BEST**
(In Percent)

	1968	
	July	May
Republicans	31	30
Democrats	27	28
No opinion	42	42

*In a TV interview in February 1969, Eric Hoffer said what had probably occurred to many: "The clash is between the intimidated the 'silent majority' and the arrogant [New Left]. In such cases the intimidated always lose--it's a shame that we have to wait for that cracker [Wallace] to say what everybody is thinking and no one has the courage to say."

** Report in The New York Times, August 4, 1968, p. 45, on a Gallup poll.

It was also clear that if the Democratic convention followed the mood of the Democratic voters, McCarthy didn't have a prayer. He continued to lose ground until only 30% of the Democrats were for him, which was approximately the percentage of delegates he drew. More Independents, given a choice of Democratic candidates, favored McCarthy, but the majority of today's Independents usually vote Republican:

TABLE XXV*

POLL OF DEMOCRATS (49% OF ELECTORATE)
(in percent)

	<u>Humphrey</u>	<u>McCarthy</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>
August 24	56	38	6
July 26-29	46	40	14
June 11-15	48	40	12

POLL OF INDEPENDENTS (16% OF ELECTORATE)

	<u>Humphrey</u>	<u>McCarthy</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>
August 24	29	56	15
July 26-29	32	48	20
June 11-15	30	54	16

TABLE XXVI**

PRE-CONVENTION TRIAL HEAT (ALL CANDIDATES)
(in percent)

	<u>Total Democrats</u>	<u>Total Independents</u>
Humphrey	54	25
McCarthy	30	50
Maddox	6	8
McGovern	3	3
Not sure	7	14

*Louis Harris poll reported in The Washington Post, August 29, 1968, p. 10.

**Ibid.

The above survey is of interest primarily because of the claim of the militants at Chicago that they did not get their fair share of representation in the Convention. They were represented to the degree the polls showed they would be. They did not get a majority of the delegates, it is true, but there was no reason they should have.

But, more important, the polls at the time indicated that the trend was away from any Democratic candidate after the end of August and hopes of reversing the situation appeared to be dim:

TABLE XXVII*

PRESIDENTIAL CHOICE (ALL VOTERS)

	<u>August 24</u>	<u>July 26-29</u>	<u>July 8-14</u>
Nixon	40%	36%	35%
Humphrey	34	41	37
Wallace	17	16	17
Not sure	9	7	11
Nixon	41	35	34
McCarthy	35	43	42
Wallace	8	7	8
Not sure	8	7	8
Nixon	42	X	35
Johnson	36	X	41
Wallace	16	X	17
Not sure	6	X	7

TABLE XXVIII**

POST-DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION POLL

"Whom would you vote for today?"

<u>Nixon</u>	<u>Humphrey</u>	<u>Wallace</u>	<u>No opinion</u>	<u>None of the three</u>
33.7%	28.5%	15.7%	12.6%	9.5%

"Who do you think will win November 5th?"

<u>Nixon</u>	<u>Humphrey</u>	<u>Wallace</u>	<u>No opinion</u>
45.3%	33.6%	3.9%	17.2%

*Louis Harris poll reported in The New York Times, August 28 1968, p. 1.

**Survey in a UPI report in The Washington Evening Star, September 4 1968, p. 10. This was a nationwide telephone survey of 1,844 registered voters conducted by Albert E. Sindlinger.

It is unlikely, after the violence at Chicago, which, as we have seen, did not sit well with the voters,* that a candidate with a closer identification with the rioters would have done better than Vice-President Humphrey, who was not that closely identified with them. Perhaps Humphrey could have made more headway with the average voter if he had condemned the rioters in no uncertain terms. But the fact that after the Democratic convention, the nominee did not, at least temporarily, pass the Republican candidate or pull up even with him--a common occurrence after all the publicity of a convention--was an ominous sign for the Democrats.

Perhaps we should pause here a moment to examine just how deep the electorate's annoyance might have been and why and how they might have objected to circumstances that resulted in disturbances such as the one at the Chicago Democratic convention of 1968. What really might be at issue here is the fundamental one of "participatory democracy," by a vocal minority versus "representative democracy" by majority opinion. No one suggests that the opinion of the majority of the population necessarily has in it an inherent wisdom that always makes it more reliable than that of any given minority. But on some issues, this popular opinion is based on very strong feelings. These, in turn, might be based on presumed danger to something important to them (such as choosing a major party presidential candidate) or on long and serious consideration or on much personal experience in a very complex and sensitive society.

Nonetheless, it appeared to many that more and more attention was being paid in the late 1960's (and this may hold for early 1970), to the opinions of

*See p. 54.

some very young, inexperienced, "decoupled" and quite atypical people-- young, activist college students and instructors.* The public apparently strongly objects to this approach; they believe in our traditional form of representative democracy. The data seems to indicate that it is probably highly misleading to attribute the absence of crowds representing the majority opposition to apathy on the part of the public, or even agreement with the demonstrators. A verbal minority talks about "participatory democracy," but the average man may think this now really means mobs in the street and minority influence by pressure and even blackmail tactics.

The very busy adult population feel their duty is to vote--and on the average they do so to a much greater degree than do the young students. They do not like to, or think they should have to, spend their overcommitted time countermarching or battling in the streets. This doesn't mean they can't do it; many are very good at it, at any level of violence. The biggest mistake some young, intellectual, "pseudo-revolutionaries" might make is confusing the reluctance of the general population to take to the streets with a lack of ability to do so.**

* In 1970, the President's Commission on Campus Violence spent much time trying to find out what was disturbing a very verbal, somewhat militant, student and instructor minority. The vast majority of people (94%) had already indicated in a 1969 poll that they felt administrators should curb the activities of the students. No commission was established to study the foundations of "unrest among the overwhelming majority of the population." The old adage about the squeaky wheel getting all the grease is obviously a contender as an explanation for these actions.

**Their ability was demonstrated on Wall Street in 1970, when a relatively few blue-collar (and even some white-collar) workers scattered, in a matter of a few minutes, about 1,500 anti-war demonstrators, under a shower of tickertape from the other cheering white-collar workers.

After the "hard-hat" actions in New York in 1970, some observers feared a wave of violence, but they didn't know average citizens. It is a heady experience to take temporary control by action; but they don't get foolish feelings of power when they do. (Besides it is hard to give "power to the people" when they feel they already have it legally.) They are practical people who know about what it takes to really "take over" even if one wants to, and they don't want to; furthermore, they know about violence and the overwhelming majority of them don't like it.*

The probability of "participatory democracy" becoming a pattern for the average man, even as a way to draw attention to his woes, is practically nonexistent. This causes problems for him, however, because even though his "track record" of "hunches" recently on such issues as education, poverty, crime--or even the current negotiations in Paris--is not worse than the "involved" people who get the publicity; he is basically a "dull" fellow who seldom makes "news."

Again, a few days later, the reaction of some dozen or so apprentices and/or artisans, demonstrating with a crowd of workmen in front of New York's City Hall, to a shower of invective, stones and bottles reportedly from Left-wing students on the roof of nearby Pace College, was simply to run up through the building, chase the instigators off the roof, and take down an offensive banner displayed there, all in about a minute's time.

*Only 11% of Negroes said they would join a riot, and only 5% of whites felt a counterriot is in order if Negroes riot. The results are apparently age-sensitive. Twelve percent of white adolescents between the ages of 16 and 19 said they felt a counterriot was in order. (Angus Cambell and Howard Schuman, Racial Attitudes in Fifteen American Cities [University of Michigan, Survey Research Center, 1968].)

All the resentment over the students and over "participatory democracy" in recent years, therefore, probably drew many of the rank-and-file toward the tougher-sounding Nixon; and Vice-President Humphrey's failure to condemn the Chicago rioters probably drove more in that direction. Nevertheless, the organizations that normally support the Democratic candidate came out for Humphrey in a way it might have been hard for them to do for McCarthy. The unions are one example of this support:

There were hundreds of radio and television broadcasts. Mr. Labor himself, George Meany, hit a network of 330 stations five times....Thousands of locals hit the airwaves with their own appeals.*

Almost two-thirds (64%) of northern trade union members who had backed Wallace initially did not vote for him... Wallace retained more backing among the better-educated and more affluent of his northern supporters, while in the South these groups were much more likely to have defected by Election Day than those less educated and less privileged.**

The final tally was 43% for Humphrey and Nixon, 13% for Wallace.***

The closeness of the election is somewhat deceiving, however, for there was a much stronger swing toward the center than may seem apparent from the

*New York Daily Column, November 8, 1968.

**According to Gallup poll data, the number of voters for Wallace among nonsouthern "skilled laborers" was the same (7%) as among nonsouthern "white-collar workers" (6% of "business," 3% of "professionals" and 13% of "unskilled labor from the same regions voted for him). (Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, The Politics of Unreason: Right-Wing Extremism in America, 1790-1970 [New York: Harper and Row, 1970], pp. 384, 385 and 395.

***Except, reportedly, among the faculty of one of our "better" universities: "Faculty preference at Princeton in the 1968 elections were: Humphrey, 80%, Nixon and Dick Gregory [the Negro comedian-politician] 10% each." (National Review, February 25, 1969, p. 156.)

neck-and-neck finish. For example, the Wall Street Journal reported:

In balloting reported yesterday on issues totaling \$7.8 billion, voters rejected proposals for \$3.8 billion, or about half of the reported dollar total. It was the largest dollar amount on bonds ever defeated on an election day.*

The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco reported \$4 billion of \$9 billion in bond issues were rejected.** Eleven out of 17 school bonds (about 65%) were defeated; this was a reversal of a three-year trend. From 1964 through 1967, 73 to 77% of bond issue dollars were approved. A Los Angeles secretary may have voiced the opinion of many when she said, "Until they clean up those damn colleges I'm not going to vote them any more money." A draftsman reflected the feeling of lack of results: "...I'm sick and tired of shoveling money out to politicians who never get anything good done with it.***

According to the polls, the decrease in satisfaction with the schools had begun about this time; this was so among both Negroes and whites.**** But, there were other indications that the swing was away from the Left. The people who voted for Wallace were not likely to be liberals. The overwhelming number of them were from the South, which is normally Democratic, it is true; but not many of them were likely to vote for this Democratic platform. They might, of course, have not voted; but it is hard to conceive of a majority of those who did vote not choosing the more "hawkish," conservative Nixon and voting for the more "dovish," liberal Humphrey. The normally Democratic Wallace voters in the North who had not been wooed back by George Meany and

*Wall Street Journal, November 7, 1968, p. 3.

**Newsweek, February 24, 1969, p. 66.

***Wall Street Journal, November 7, 1968, p. 3.

**** See p. 83 .

others, were hardly likely to vote for Humphrey if Wallace had not run. One might have thought, therefore, that the popular vote for Nixon should have been somewhat greater if Wallace had not run. In any event, one might have felt that the voters had indicated a mandate to pursue a more conservative course.

This apparently was by no means the conclusion of all those in the press. There were statements in articles and editorials by newsmen on first-rate newspapers that interpreted the election results differently:

Since many potential Wallace supporters shifted to Mr. Nixon to enable him to carry Kentucky, Tennessee, and the Carolinas while others shifted to Mr. Humphrey and helped him win Pennsylvania and Michigan, it is impossible to calculate how the election would have gone if Mr. Wallace had not been a candidate...*

The election gave him [Nixon] no clear sense of direction. He won with only 43.4 per cent of the vote--some 300,000 more votes than Hubert Humphrey--and one may reach back to 1912 and Woodrow Wilson, who won with 41.9 per cent, to find a more obscure and less convincing mandate.**

The periodic between-campaign polls...have shown that no more than about 10 per cent of Americans could be counted as bigots.

Wallace got the bigot vote and only a bit more by working hard to paper over and make respectable the appeals to segregationists that were really his only stock in trade.***

One could even find some confusing headlines, probably placed over articles by editors, which did not seem to accurately describe the contents of the article:

*The New York Times, Sunday, November 10, 1968, p. 12E.

**The New York Times, Sunday, November 17, 1968, Sec. IV, p. 1

***The New York Times, November 10, 1968, p. 2E..

NEW HOUSE SHOWS
A LIBERAL LEANING
ON DOMESTIC BILLS

G.O.P. GAIN OF 4 SEATS IS
OFFSET BY THE DECLINE IN
BEDROCK CONSERVATIVES*

the house is expected to remain predominantly conservative in fiscal and social policies. It has been following public opinion in a swing to the right for some time. But some of its members believe the measure of its performance rests largely on the kind of legislation forthcoming from the White House.**

All the above quotes were taken from two Sunday editions of The New York Times. The Sunday Times is undoubtedly more widely read than the daily; and the average citizen was much more likely, therefore, to see these remarks than the complete coverage of the election analysis by the prestigious Gallup poll organization headed, "Gallup Election Analysis Finds Gain by Conservative Forces," on page 84 of the daily New York Times, about three weeks later, giving comprehensive tables of data on presidential elections from 1952 through 1968.

*The New York Times, November 17, 1968, p. 1.

**Same article, p. 47.

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TABLE XXIX

GALLUP ELECTION ANALYSIS FINDS GAIN BY CONSERVATIVE FORCES^{**}

	(Figures in Percent)						(Figures in Percent)				Wal- lace
	1952		1956		1960		1964		1968		
	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	<u>Dem.</u>	<u>Rep.</u>	
NATIONAL	44.6	55.4	42.2	57.8	50.1	49.9	61.3	38.7	43.0	43.4	13.6
Men	47	53	45	55	52	48	60	40	41	43	16
Women	42	53	39	61	49	51	62	38	45	43	12
White	43	57	41	59	49	51	49	41	38	47	15
Non-white	79	21	61	39	68	32	94	6	85	12	3
College	34	66	31	69	39	61	52	48	37	54	9
High School	45	55	42	58	52	48	62	38	42	43	15
Grade School	52	48	50	50	55	45	66	34	52	33	15
Professional & Business	36	64	32	68	42	58	54	46	34	56	10
White Collar	40	60	37	63	48	52	57	43	41	47	12
Manual	55	45	50	50	60	40	71	29	50	35	15
Farmers	33	67	46	54	48	52	53	47	29	51	20
Under 30	51	49	43	57	54	46	64	36	47	38	15
30-49 Years	47	53	45	55	54	46	63	37	44	41	15
50 Years and Older	39	61	39	61	46	54	59	41	41	47	12
Protestant	37	63	37	63	38	62	55	45	35	49	16
Catholic	56	44	51	49	78	22	76	24	59	33	8
Republicans	8	92	4	96	5	95	20	80	9	86	5
Democrats	77	23	85	15	84	16	87	13	74	12	14
Independents	35	65	30	70	43	57	56	44	31	44	25

*As reported in The New York Times, December 8, 1968, page 84. The underlining is ours.

It is interesting to note the falloff of Democratic votes--in comparison to the 1960 election--among "manual" workers, people under 30 and the college-educated; in fact, among all categories (including registered Democrats) except for the "nonwhites." Those with a grade school education defected the least; but this group contained a relatively high percentage of Negroes who went 85% Democratic compared to 68% in 1960. Both Democrats and Republicans lost Independent voters to Wallace.

Was the man in the street trying to vote a protest or give a mandate to the new Nixon administration? A post-election analysis done by the prestigious Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan, which has been studying the American voter for decades, stated:

...the survey data make it clear that Nixon would have won the election if Wallace had not become a national candidate. For after the election most of the Wallace voters rated Nixon considerably higher than Humphrey on a 0-100 scale and presumably would have given Nixon a considerably greater margin of victory if Wallace had not been on the ballot. For example, Nixon's median rating among Wallace voters was 60 compared to only 46 for Humphrey (Wallace's own median rating was 87 among his voters). Apparently most of those Democratic identifiers who chose Wallace because they were dissatisfied with the Democratic candidate would have defected to Nixon instead if Wallace had not been a candidate.*

Oddly, as the following headline shows, not everyone drew the same conclusions, even from the same analysis:**

WALLACE RACE DIDN'T CHANGE A THING IN 1968
THE EVIDENCE IS IN

*Arthur C. Wolfe, "Challenge from the Right: the Basis of Voter Support for Wallace in 1968," prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association, Washington, D.C., September 1, 1969. Arthur C. Wolfe ran the 1968 national election study for the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan.

** Reported by Philip Meyer in The Chicago Daily News, May 7, 1969.

This article is reporting on the University of Michigan post-election study, and, as in the New York Times article mentioned earlier, the headline writer did not reflect the body of the article. For example, the article included the following statements:

There is strong evidence that their choice, had Wallace not been on the ballot, would have been Mr. Nixon.

Fully half of the Wallace voters said they felt cold toward Humphrey, but only 26 per cent were cold toward Mr. Nixon.

"In other words...Nixon was more palatable than Humphrey was to them."

Certainly Nixon would have won anyway (which might be what the headline writer had in mind); but the change that would have occurred had Wallace not run, would have been significant. The mandate would have been clearer--at least it is likely we would not have had "to reach back to 1912 and Woodrow Wilson," or perhaps even past 1960, "to find a man with a more obscure and less convincing mandate."

In 1969 and 1970 the average man gave all kinds of signals that he was still basically in the position he was in 1968. How "conservative" did he feel? As stated earlier, these terms mean different things to different people; but it is important to note certain things about who felt that way, or at least who was reluctant to say he was a "liberal." Conservative was "fast becoming a dirty word on the college campus," for example.* Not so for the average person: in April 1970 he felt much more conservative than liberal. Furthermore, not only farmers considered themselves conservative;

*Gallup Opinion Index; No. 60, June 1970, p. 14.

white-collar workers matched them; and professional and business people exceeded them in this feeling. The manual workers, "hardhats," had the lowest number describing themselves as conservative. The college-educated contained the greatest percentage feeling conservative, the grade school-educated the lowest. People in big cities, as well as in the nonmetropolitan areas, and of all income levels, felt that way quite strongly. Even the weight of Democratic opinion was conservative.

TABLE XXX *

LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE

Suppose you had to classify yourself as either a Liberal or a Conservative, which would you say you are?

April 1970

	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Conservative</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
National	27	45	28
Sex			
Men	29	48	23
Women	26	43	31
Race			
White	27	48	25
Nonwhite	30	29	41
Education			
College	39	49	12
High School	26	48	26
Grade School	20	36	44
Occupation			
Prof. and business	32	52	16
White Collar	30	46	24
Farmers	19	46	35
Manual	27	42	31
Age			
21-29 years	41	43	16
30-49 years	27	47	26
50 and over	23	45	32
Religion			
Protestant	24	48	28
Catholic	33	39	28
Jewish	x	x	x

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 59, May 1970, p. 8.

TABLE XXX cont.

Politics			
Republican	18	6	20
Democrat	33	3	32
Independent	30	45	25
Region			
East	30	43	27
Midwest	33	44	23
South	18	48	34
West	27	50	23
Income			
\$15,000 and over	39	47	14
\$10,000-14,999	29	50	21
\$ 7,000- 9,999	29	47	24
\$ 5,000- 6,999	25	45	30
\$ 3,000- 4,999	27	39	34
Under \$3,000	14	37	49
Community Size			
1,000,000 and over	32	44	24
500,000-999,999	34	40	26
50,000-499,999	32	43	25
2,500-49,999	22	50	28
Under 2,500, Rural	20	49	31

Furthermore, the President's popularity had continued to maintain its general level in 1969 and 1970, and, in fact, rose right through the Cambodian operation.

TABLE XXXI
PRESIDENT NIXON'S POPULARITY SINCE JANUARY 1970
Gallup polls

	<u>Approve</u>	<u>Disapprove</u>	<u>No opinion</u>
	%	%	%
Feb. 19-21, 1971	50	36	14
Jan. 9-10	56	33	11
Dec. 5-7, 1970	52	34	14
Nov. 14-16	57	30	13
Oct. 9-13	58	27	15
Aug. 28-Sept. 1	56	30	14
July 31-Aug. 2	55	32	13
July 10-12	61	28	11
June 19-21	55	31	14
May 22-25*	59	29	12
May 2-5*	57	31	12
April 17-19	56	31	13
March 20-22	53	30	17

*Post-Cambodian operation and North Vietnamese bombing.

TABLE XXXI cont.

Feb. 28-Mar. 2	56	27	17
Jan. 30-Feb. 2	66	23	11
Jan. 16-19	63	23	24
Jan. 2-5	61	22	17

is support, too, came from all areas, levels of education, ages and income brackets.

TABLE XXXII
PRESIDENT NIXON'S POPULARITY

Do you approve or disapprove of the way Nixon is handling his job as president?

	Approve			Disapprove			No opinion		
	Oct. * 1970 %	Dec. *** 1970 %	Feb. *** 1971 %	Oct. 1970 %	Dec. 1970 %	Feb. 1971 %	Oct. 1970 %	Dec. 1970 %	Feb. 1971 %
National	58	52	50	27	34	36	15	14	14
Sex									
Men	61	56	53	27	35	38	12	9	9
Women	55	47	47	28	34	35	17	19	18
Race									
White	61	53	52	25	33	35	14	14	13
Nonwhite	25	33	33	56	48	48	19	19	19
Education									
College	59	54	59	31	40	34	10	6	7
High school	60	53	48	27	32	37	13	15	15
Grade school	53	46	43	26	33	39	21	21	18
Occupation									
Prof. & bus.	64	54	56	27	36	37	9	10	7
White collar	64	59	41	22	34	38	14	7	21
Farmers	64	57	53	19	30	35	17	13	12
Manual	53	49	50	31	35	35	16	16	15
Age									
21-29 years	52	50	49	35	41	40	13	9	11
30-49 years	60	52	50	28	33	36	12	15	14
50 and over	59	53	48	24	31	36	17	16	16
Religion									
Protestant	59	55	54	35	41	40	13	9	11
Catholic	59	50	46	27	35	40	14	15	14
Jewish	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Politics									
Republican	82	79	76	10	12	15	8	9	9
Democrat	44	34	36	39	50	50	17	16	14
Independent	57	51	50	27	33	35	16	16	15

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 64, October 1970, p.

**Gallup Opinion Index, No. 69, March 1971, p. 1.

***Ibid.

TABLE XXXII cont.

Region									
East	59	52	50	29	33	35	12	15	15
Midwest	53	45	48	33	43	38	14	12	14
South	64	59	52	20	25	33	16	16	15
West	54	50	47	29	35	43	17	15	10
Income									
\$15,000 & over	71	49	54	23	45	39	6	6	7
\$10,000-14,999	60	59	55	26	29	32	14	12	13
\$ 7,000- 9,999	57	56	50	31	34	36	12	10	14
\$ 5,000- 6,999	54	48	48	26	30	38	20	22	14
\$ 3,000- 4,999	49	42	45	31	39	38	20	19	17
Under \$3,000	52	49	38	27	32	44	21	19	18
Community size									
1,000,000 & over	50	44	47	39	39	37	11	17	16
500,000-999,999	52	50	43	30	40	44	18	10	13
50,000-499,999	58	51	46	31	38	40	11	11	14
2,500-49,999	67	49	50	17	36	40	16	15	10
Under 2,500, rural	61	59	57	22	25	29	17	16	14

There was no question where the average man stood particularly when one considers that the country was going through the worst recession in 9 years. There was also little question why. He was still concerned with the things he had been concerned with in 1968. He didn't like the war in Vietnam but he still saw no viable alternative to the President's policy. He was after "peace with honor" and didn't want to abandon the South Vietnamese to Communism. Events in Southeast Asia as well as in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the Middle East in 1969 and 1970 did little to cause him to think his estimate of Communists was wrong. Much as he disliked the Vietnam war, therefore, in late May, after Cambodia became a theater of battle, he voted for the most difficult choice in Vietnamization except to escalate, i.e., not to dump the Vietnamese government, even if it took years for them to get ready to take over the war.

TABLE XXXIII
VIETNAM PEACE PLAN*

"Here are four different plans the U.S. could follow in dealing with the war in Vietnam. Which one do you prefer?"

- A. Withdraw all troops from Vietnam immediately
- B. Withdraw all troops by July 1971--that is, a year from this coming July
- C. Withdraw troops but take as many years to do this as are needed to turn the war over to the South Vietnamese
- D. Send more troops to Vietnam and step up the fighting

	May 22-24, 1970				
	A	B	C	D	No Opinion
	%	%	%	%	%
NATIONAL	23	25	31	13	8
SEX					
Men	21	26	32	14	7
Women	27	26	26	13	8
RACE					
White	20	26	32	14	8
Non-white	48	20	18	7	7
EDUCATION					
College	18	30	34	12	6
High School	21	26	31	15	7
Grade School	31	19	25	11	14
OCCUPATION					
Prof. & Bus.	21	27	34	12	6
White Collar	22	23	32	18	5
Farmers	22	22	32	11	13
Manual	26	25	30	13	6
AGE					
21-29 years	23	29	32	11	5
30-49 years	22	25	31	16	6
50 & over	25	23	30	11	11
RELIGION					
Protestant	20	25	33	13	9
Catholic	29	26	26	13	6
Jewish	x	x	x	x	x
POLITICS					
Republican	17	27	37	14	5
Democrat	27	23	29	12	9
Independent	23	28	26	13	10
REGION					
East	27	26	28	12	7
Midwest	24	28	32	10	6
South	22	21	30	14	13
West	15	26	32	20	7
COMMUNITY SIZE					
1,000,000 & over	35	21	22	17	5
500,000-999,999	32	24	24	15	5
50,000-499,999	16	28	36	11	9
2,500-49,999	24	23	32	10	11
Under 2,500-Rural	19	26	33	13	9

He still was far from enthusiastic on the issue of the war, however, and when faced in the same time period with an either/or question on withdrawal (rather than several alternatives), the weight of opinion came out for withdrawal:

TABLE XXXIV
WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM BY THE END OF 1971?*

"It has been proposed that Congress pass a resolution that all U.S. troops be withdrawn from Vietnam by the end of 1971. Opponents say such a resolution would tie the hands of the President. Would you favor or oppose a resolution in Congress which would require all U.S. troops to be withdrawn from Vietnam by the end of 1971?"

	<u>Favor</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>Not sure</u>
	%	%	%
Nationwide	44	35	21
By Region			
East	54	26	20
Midwest	45	37	18
South	38	39	23
West	36	40	24
Border states	41	39	20
By Politics			
Republicans	37	42	21
Democrats	46	32	22
Independent	51	38	11
By Sex			
Men	39	45	16
Women	49	26	25
By Age			
Under 30	43	38	19
30-49	55	31	14
50 and over	36	36	28

Several months later, in a Louis Harris "real-time" polling show put on by ABC TV on January 13, 1971, when the part of the question about

*Louis Harris Poll as reported in the Philadelphia Inquirer, August 17, 1970, p. 3.

"tying the President's hands" was left out the percentage of those in favor of the Hatfield-McGovern proposed Senate Resolution to withdraw all troops in 1971 was 61%. Furthermore, a Gallup poll showed 55% in favor of such a bill in the same month and approval had greatly increased by January of 1971. As in the May poll on "Vietnamization," listed just prior to the one above, those with more education, greater affluence and more professional employment tended to be less "dovish" than the rest of the population.

TABLE XXXV
VIETNAM WITHDRAWAL PROPOSAL*

"A proposal has been made in Congress to require the U.S. government to bring home all U.S. troops from Vietnam before the end of this year. Would you like to have your congressman vote for or against this proposal?"

	January 9-10, 1971		
	<u>Vote For</u>	<u>Vote Against</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
	%	%	%
NATIONAL	72	20	8
SEX			
Male	72	20	8
Female	78	14	8
RACE			
White	71	21	8
Non-white	81	12	7
EDUCATION			
College	60	34	6
High Sch	75	18	7
Grade School	80	10	10
OCCUPATION			
Prof. & Bus.	62	32	6
White Collar	71	21	8
Farmers	74	16	10
Manual	77	16	7
AGE			
21-29 years	76	20	4
30-49 years	75	21	4
50 & over	68	20	12

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 69, March 1971, p. 11.

TABLE XXXV, cont.

	January 9-10, 1971		
	<u>Vote For</u> %	<u>Vote Against</u> %	<u>No Opinion</u> %
RELIGION			
Protestant	68	23	9
Catholic	80	16	4
Jewish	x	x	x
POLITICS			
Republican	64	28	8
Democrat	78	15	7
Independent	71	21	8
REGION			
East	77	18	5
Midwest	75	17	8
South	65	24	11
West	69	23	8
INCOME			
\$15,000 & over	62	31	7
\$10,000-\$14,999	75	21	4
\$ 7,000-\$ 9,999	74	22	4
\$ 5,000-\$ 6,999	67	20	13
\$ 3,000-\$ 4,999	69	17	14
Under \$3,000	87	5	8
COMMUNITY SIZE			
1,000,000 & over	77	15	8
500,000-999,999	72	23	5
50,000-499,999	67	24	9
2,500- 49,999	74	21	5

Up to the time of the late May 1970 Gallup poll, the average person might have looked on the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War as a terrible job that must be done. Or, perhaps, when there was doubt about complicated matters of foreign policy, he tended to give the benefit of the doubt to the President. In any event he is no more happy about this war than the other wars of this century, and he may be getting tired of the lack of obvious success here, as well he might.

The attitude toward those who dodge the draft was also interesting, particularly in regard to which groups of people felt strongest about the different proposed sanctions.

TABLE XXXVI
PENALTIES FOR DRAFT EVADERS*

If a young man refuses to be drafted, which one of these things do you think should be done?

- A. Make him serve in the army in a non-combat unit
- B. Make him serve on special civilian projects here at home
- C. Send him to jail for a term
- D. No penalty--let him go back to his usual work

	April 1970				No Opinion %
	A %	B %	C %	D %	
National	39	27	16	8	10
Sex					
Men	40	21	22	8	9
Women	38	32	11	9	10
Race					
White	40	27	17	7	9
Nonwhite	23	34	10	24	9
Education					
College	35	35	14	7	9
High School	42	25	19	6	8
Grade School	35	25	14	14	12
Occupation					
Prof. and business	39	29	17	6	9
White Collar	40	29	16	6	9
Farmers	44	25	13	6	12
Manual	37	28	18	9	8
Age					
21-29 years	30	30	22	11	7
30-49 years	42	28	16	6	8
50 and over	41	25	16	9	12
Religion					
Protestant	38	26	17	9	10
Catholic	43	28	16	6	7
Jewish	x	x	x	x	x
Politics					
Republican	47	27	13	5	8
Democrat	37	28	16	9	10
Independent	35	27	19	11	8
Region					
East	41	26	15	9	9
Midwest	39	30	14	9	8
South	36	22	19	9	14
West	36	33	17	5	9
Community Size					
1,000,000 and over	38	27	19	10	6
500,000-999,999	42	26	16	10	6
50,000-499,999	38	28	20	6	8
2,500-49,999	38	23	18	9	12
Under 2,500, Rural	37	30	13	8	12

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 59, May 1970, p. 9.

By the beginning of the election campaign of 1970, the President was outdistancing all comers, despite the recession, the action in Cambodia and the tragedy at Kent State University. The offensive into Cambodia had begun to look like a success, so it had lost much of its "tragic-blunder" aura; this was not true of Kent State. It appeared once more that as of mid-1970 there were no easy alternatives to the President's foreign policies that appealed to the public, and his harder stance on such domestic issues as crime and campus disorders apparently offset for the public his bad image on economic issues. The President's lead over his potential opponents was dwindling however, according to the Harris polls. By the November 1970 election, he had fallen behind Senator Edmund Muskie. As of March 1971, Louis Harris reported that Nixon was even further behind the Senator from Maine.

TABLE XXXVII

THREE-WAY PRESIDENTIAL RACE--NIXON, MUSKIE, WALLACE--HARRIS SURVEY*

	<u>Nixon</u>	<u>Muskie</u>	<u>Wallace</u>	<u>Not</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Sure</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
Latest	39	44	12	5
January 1971	40	43	11	6
November 1970	40	46	10	4
September	43	43	10	4
May	42	38	12	8
April	47	36	10	7
February	49	35	11	5
November 1969	49	35	11	5
October	51	35	9	5
May	51	33	11	5

TWO-WAY PRESIDENTIAL RACE--NIXON, MUSKIE--HARRIS SURVEY

	<u>Nixon</u>	<u>Muskie</u>	<u>Not</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Sure</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
Latest	42	48	10
January 1970	46	49	5

*Louis Harris survey reported in the Philadelphia Inquirer, March 19, 1971, p. 12.

The very latest Gallup poll, taken in February 1971, differs considerably from the Harris survey shown above; in fact, the percentages are just the reverse: Gallup shows Nixon again leading Muskie 43 to 39%. These latest figures on the national level may be similar to those in 1970.

Despite the lack of clarity on this issue at present, it is interesting to note with which groups the greatest support for the President lay in July 1970 and how they changed by January 1971.

TABLE XXXVIII
NIXON-MUSKIE-WALLACE TEST ELECTION

"To get some idea of the national political situation at this early stage, suppose the presidential election were to be held today. If Richard Nixon were the Republican candidate and Edmund Muskie were the Democratic candidate and George Wallace ran again as third party candidate, which would you like to see win?"

	<u>Based on Registered Voters</u>									
	<u>Nixon</u>		<u>Muskie</u>		<u>Wallace</u>		<u>Other</u>		<u>Undecided</u>	
	<u>July</u> <u>1970</u> %	<u>Jan.</u> <u>1971</u> %	<u>July</u> <u>1970</u> %	<u>Jan.</u> <u>1971</u> %	<u>July</u> <u>1970</u> %	<u>Jan.</u> <u>1971</u> %	<u>July</u> <u>1970</u> %	<u>Jan.</u> <u>1971</u> %	<u>July</u> <u>1970</u> %	<u>Jan.</u> <u>1971</u> %
NATIONAL	43	44	36	44	13	9	2	NA	6	3
SEX										
Men	43	46	34	40	15	11	2		6	3
Women	43	43	37	48	11	6	2		7	3
RACE										
White	45	47	34	41	14	9	1		6	3
Non-white	22	15	58	82	2	2	8		10	1
EDUCATION										
College	53	51	36	42	6	5	2		3	2
High School	41	44	39	43	14	10	1		5	3
Grade School	39	37	27	48	20	11	2		12	4
OCCUPATION										
Prof. & Bus.	52	53	35	41	6	4	1		6	2
White Collar	51	42	30	49	9	7	1		9	2
Farmers	46	54	29	33	17	6	3		5	7
Manual	36	36	39	46	17	14	2		6	4

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 62, August 1970, p. 6.

**Gallup Opinion Index, No. 69, March 1971, p. 6.

TABLE XXXVIII cont.

Based on Registered Voters

	Nixon		Muskie		Wallace		Other		Undecided	
	July 1970	Jan. 1971	July 1970	Jan. 1971	July 1970	Jan. 1971	July 1970	Jan. 1971	July 1970	Jan. 1971
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
AGE										
21-29 years	38	38	44	50	5	8	4	NA	9	4
30-49 years	42	42	37	43	15	11	1		5	4
50 & over	45	49	32	42	14	7	2		7	2
RELIGION										
Protestant	47	51	31	37	15	10	2		5	2
Catholic	40	38	42	52	10	6	1		7	4
Jewish	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x
POLITICS										
Republican	82	77	7	17	7	5	-		4	1
Democrat	19	22	56	67	15	7	2		8	4
Independent	36	41	38	41	17	15	3		6	3
REGION										
East	45	45	41	48	6	4	1		7	3
Midwest	44	44	39	48	9	7	1		7	1
South	39	42	24	33	28	20	3		6	5
West	43	45	40	46	10	6	2		5	3
INCOME										
\$15,000 & over	50	50	38	45	5	4	2		5	1
\$10,000-\$14,999	48	45	33	45	14	8	2		3	2
\$ 7,000-\$ 9,999	41	38	41	43	12	14	1		5	5
\$ 5,000-\$ 6,999	44	52	31	39	15	5	1		9	4
\$ 3,000-\$ 4,999	36	45	35	43	15	8	2		12	4
Under \$3,000	35	27	34	52	22	16	2		7	5
COMMUNITY SIZE										
1,000,000 & over	42	39	41	55	7	3	2		8	3
500,000-999,999	40	40	49	52	7	3	-		4	5
50,000-499,999	43	46	39	44	12	10	1		5	-
2,500- 49,999	41	46	32	42	17	10	3		7	2
Under 2,500, Rural	47	48	26	33	18	14	3		6	5

TABLE XXXIX

NIXON-LINDSAY-WALLACE TEST ELECTION

"If Richard Nixon were the Republican candidate and John Lindsay were the Democratic candidate and George Wallace ran again as a third party candidate, which would you like to see win?"

Based on Registered Voters

	<u>Nixon</u>		<u>Lindsay</u>		<u>Wallace</u>		<u>Other</u>		<u>Undecided</u>	
	July 1970 %	Dec. 1970 %**	July 1970 %	Dec. 1970 %	July 1970 %	Dec. 1970 %	July 1970 %	Dec. 1970 %	July 1970 %	Dec. 1970 %
NATIONAL	46	48	29	35	15	12	1	1	9	4
SEX										
Men	47	48	28	34	18	14	-	1	7	3
Women	46	47	31	37	11	9	2	2	10	5
RACE										
White	49	51	25	31	16	12	1	2	9	4
Non-white	16	7	71	90	4	-	2	2	7	1
EDUCATION										
College	56	49	32	42	6	5	1	2	5	2
High School	46	51	29	30	15	13	1	1	9	5
Grade School	38	39	27	40	22	16	1	1	12	4
OCCUPATION										
Prof. & Bus.	59	48	26	40	5	8	1	1	9	3
White Collar	53	58	26	33	10	8	1	1	10	-
Farmers	44	49	27	21	18	29	2	-	9	1
Manual	39	47	31	34	20	13	1	1	9	5
AGE										
21-29 years	49	45	34	35	8	15	1	-	8	5
30-49 years	44	47	32	37	16	11	1	2	7	3
50 & over	48	49	25	34	16	11	1	2	10	4
RELIGION										
Protestant	49	53	27	31	15	12	1	1	8	3
Catholic	45	45	32	40	14	10	-	1	9	4
Jewish	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
POLITICS										
Republican	80	84	9	12	8	2	-	-	3	2
Democrat	25	22	45	57	18	15	1	1	11	5
Independent	43	44	27	32	18	17	2	2	10	5
REGION										
East	51	49	29	38	9	5	2	4	9	4
Midwest	44	46	36	41	11	10	1	-	8	3
South	41	45	20	23	29	26	1	-	9	6
West	49	53	32	36	11	9	1	-	7	2

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 62, August 1970, p. 7.

**Gallup Opinion Index, No. 67, January 1971, p. 4.

NIXON-LINDSAY-WALLACE TEST ELECTION cont.Based on Registered Voters

	Nixon		Lindsay		Wallace		Other		Undecided	
	July	Dec. **	July	Dec.	July	Dec.	July	Dec.	July	Dec.
	1970	1970	1970	1970	1970	1970	1970	1970	1970	1970
INCOME	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
\$15,000 & over	50	51	32	39	7	8	2	2	9	-
\$10,000-\$14,999	53	57	30	28	13	10	-	2	4	3
\$ 7,000-\$ 9,999	52	48	25	38	15	13	2	-	6	1
\$ 5,000-\$ 6,999	41	40	26	39	18	15	-	1	15	5
\$ 3,000-\$ 4,999	39	39	33	34	15	16	1	2	12	9
Under \$3,000	34	37	32	40	23	10	-	1	11	12
COMMUNITY SIZE										
1,000,000 & over	48	46	30	37	12	7	-	4	10	6
500,000-999,999	39	41	47	50	9	7	1	-	4	2
50,000-499,999	45	47	35	35	13	11	-	1	7	6
2,500- 49,999	47	52	25	35	17	10	2	-	9	3
Under 2,500, Rural	49	51	20	27	19	18	2	-	10	4

(One thing shown by these polls which has received little attention but is quite interesting is the significant fading of Wallace strength between July 1970 and January 1971.)

Something, noted by many earlier, had finally become obvious by 1970. Whether the delay was due to a failure in the proper coverage of issues, such as those mentioned earlier, is not here important. What is important is that in December 1969, the weight of opinion was that the media was biased. Apparently there was something of a "credibility gap"--not between the government and the people, but between the media and the people. One must wonder how long this "gap" had existed, and if it had continued throughout 1970.

TABLE XXXX
T.V. IMPARTIALITY*

There has been much talk about whether the TV networks deal fairly with all sides in presenting the news dealing with political and social issues. How do you feel about this... do they deal fairly with all sides or do they tend to favor one side?

<u>DECEMBER, 1969</u>			
	<u>Deal Fairly</u>	<u>Favor One Side</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
	%	%	%
NATIONAL	40	42	18
Sex			
Men	39	46	15
Women	41	38	21
RACE			
White	40	43	17
Non-white	40	38	22
EDUCATION			
College	38	53	9
High School	44	41	15
Grade School	34	34	32
OCCUPATION			
Prof. & Bus.	43	46	11
White Collar	41	48	11
Farmers	33	40	27
Manual	38	42	20
AGE			
21-29 Years	46	43	11
30-49 Years	38	44	18
50 & over	38	40	22
RELIGION			
Protestant	39	43	18
Catholic	42	41	17
Jewish	X	X	X
POLITICS			
Republican	37	48	15
Democrat	46	38	16
Independent	36	44	20
REGION			
East	43	39	18
Midwest	39	42	19
South	35	44	21
West	45	44	11
INCOME			
\$15,000 & Over	37	50	13
\$10,000-\$14,999	40	51	9
\$7,000-\$9,999	42	44	14
\$5,000-\$6,999	38	45	17
\$3,000-\$4,999	43	38	19
Under \$3,000	39	24	37
COMMUNITY SIZE			
1,000,000 & Over	41	44	15
500,000-999,999	37	50	13
50,000-499,999	43	42	15
2,500-49,999	46	37	17
Under 2,500, Rural	34	41	25

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 55, January 1970, p. 9.

TABLE XXXXI
NEWSPAPER IMPARTIALITY*

What about the newspapers--in presenting the news dealing with political and social issues--do they deal fairly with all sides or do they tend to favor one side?

	DECEMBER, 1969		
	Deal Fairly	Favor One Side	No Opinion
	%	%	%
NATIONAL	37	45	18
Sex			
Men	37	49	14
Women	36	42	22
RACE			
White	36	46	18
Non-white	39	41	20
EDUCATION			
College	32	60	8
High School	41	42	17
Grade School	30	40	30
OCCUPATION			
Prof. & Bus.	37	52	11
White Collar	41	51	8
Farmers	28	48	24
Manual	36	42	22
AGE			
21-29 Years	37	48	15
30-49 Years	38	45	17
50 & over	35	44	21
RELIGION			
Protestant	37	45	18
Catholic	35	47	18
Jewish	X	X	X
POLITICS			
Republican	34	50	16
Democrat	40	43	17
Independent	35	48	17
REGION			
East	39	46	15
Midwest	36	47	17
South	34	42	24
West	38	46	16
INCOME			
\$15,000 & Over	35	53	12
\$10,000-\$14,999	44	48	8
\$7,000-\$9,999	34	50	16
\$5,000-\$6,999	42	41	17
\$3,000-\$4,999	31	46	23
Under \$3,000	34	32	34
COMMUNITY SIZE			
1,000,000 & Over	40	45	15
500,000-999,999	35	52	13
50,000-499,999	35	48	17
2,500-49,999	39	46	15
Under 2,500, Rural	35	40	25

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 55, January 1970, p. 9.

Again, of great interest in these polls is who was it who felt the media was biased and what this might indicate. The feeling was generally strongest among college-educated people. A majority of the better-educated and the weight of opinion of all types of work and professions came out on the side of thinking the media biased. Republicans and Independents (who today are more conservative than liberal) felt the bias more strongly than Democrats; so one can assume that those who thought there was a bias felt it was generally toward the "left."

This feeling may have existed during the 1968 campaign, but in 1970 events had brought about changes. By the second half of 1970 and into January 1971, the media had taken notice of the great "silent majority" and reporters tried to find out what it thought. Also, in the 1970 campaign, instead of having to wait for "that cracker" to say what everyone was thinking, but no one had "the courage to say," a surprise spokesman had, come from nowhere and was on the scene by late 1969. Spiro Agnew was a hard man to ignore, not only because he was the Vice-President of the United States, but because he was a "sleeper." The media had misjudged him; and before they realized that he could not be written off as a clown, he was making everyone from newsmen to David Frost to student groups look less brilliant than usual. He obviously had clever speechwriters, and he picked the right topics. Here was a counterattack from some of the majority's positions that were received as "respectable" and at least as logical, if not more so, as many of those of the highly publicized minority. He was no Harry Truman, but he was someone who struck a responsive chord among millions of Americans, despite the widespread attempts to discredit him by personal attacks and ridicule.

Evidence at the time indicated that the public was not rejecting him. In 1969, for the first time in recent history, a Vice-President was third on the "most admired man" list (behind the perennial number one and two men, the President of the United States and Billy Graham).^{*} In a nationwide Gallup survey, taken in May 1970, 49% of the population said they had a favorable impression of Spiro Agnew; and this feeling was strongest among the more affluent and better-educated. But no one thought of him as presidential material: in the same poll, only 19% thought of him as a potential candidate.^{**} Nonetheless, he immediately came under varying degrees of attack from most of the national media and became an anathema to academia. Seldom in recent history has a politician been so widely maligned. Many university students, who may never have actually heard what he said, followed the lead in condemning him and were then quoted by the media as evidence that he was dividing the country.^{***} Even The New York Times, the newspaper of record, made vitriolic comments about him. In an editorial on October 26, 1970, the Times wrote about the decision of its choice in the New York senatorial race, liberal Republican Senator Charles Goodell, to remain a candidate. (In the race between Senator Charles Goodell, Congressman Richard Ottinger--liberal Democrat --and James Buckley--Conservative--Agnew campaigned for Buckley and against Senator Goodell):

^{*}Gallup Opinion Index, No. 55, January 1970, p. 6. He was fourth, behind President Nixon, Billy Graham and Senator Edward Kennedy, in 1970. (Gallup Opinion Index, No. 67, January 1971, p. 8.)

^{**}Gallup Opinion Index, No. 61, July 1970, pp. 8 and 9.

^{***}Actually 94% of the population opposed college demonstrators before he made his first speech about them (see p. 52) and only 80% opposed them after he made his speeches (The New York Times, June 7, 1970, p. 49). Obviously something other than the Vice-President's speeches was affecting public opinion on these issues.

A nation starved for political leadership heard last night the moving voice of a public official [Goodel] determined to keep freedom from being assassinated by the ruthless night riders of the political right.

There is no question that the Vice-President was a rough, sometimes dirty campaigner, and his tactics at this time may have even caused his image to fade somewhat. Furthermore, statements attributed to him since would be very likely to "turn off" the average man. The average person saw a tough, rough, even dirty campaign; there were some indications that many understood that when certain "self-righteous liberals" cried "foul" they were talking about a dual standard of behavior--and some liberal columnists said as much.

Despite the hard campaigning in 1970, however, the number of people who even knew the name of the incumbent candidate for the House of Representatives did not break the majority mark among the young (21-29), women, Negroes, those with only grade school education and residents of large cities. Apparently there was going to be the usually high percentage of straight party-line voting (or perhaps what they felt the national party stood for) and/or lack of interest in the House races among these groups in this off-year election.

TABLE XXXXII
CONGRESSIONAL QUIZ*

Do you happen to know the name of the present Representative
in Congress from your district?

	<u>March, 1970</u>		<u>September, 1970</u>	
	Yes %	No %	Yes %	No %
National	53	47	53	47
Sex				
Men	59	41	60	40
Women	47	53	46	54
Race				
White	56	44	54	46
Nonwhite	27	73	38	62
Education				
College	64	36	65	35
High School	54	46	54	46
Grade School	40	60	38	62
Occupation				
Professional & Business	61	39	61	39
White collar	59	41	57	43
Farmers	66	34	62	38
Manual	44	56	43	57
Age				
21-29 years	42	58	44	56
30-49 years	54	46	55	45
50 and over	56	44	54	46
Religion				
Protestant	53	47	53	47
Catholic	52	48	56	44
Jewish	x	x	x	x
Politics				
Republican	60	40	56	44
Democrat	47	53	51	49
Independent	55	45	52	48
Income				
\$15,000 and over	64	36	68	32
\$10,000-\$14,999	60	40	59	41
\$ 7,000-\$ 9,999	55	45	54	45
\$ 5,000-\$ 6,999	46	54	43	57
\$ 3,000-\$ 4,999	46	54	47	53
Under \$3,000	36	64	36	64
Community size				
1,000,000 and over	46	54	44	56
500,000-999,999	51	49	57	43
50,000-499,999	56	44	55	45
2,500-49,000	61	39	60	40
Under 2,500, Rural	50	50	51	49

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 58, April 1970, p. 20.

One has the feeling that the individual senatorial candidates, for many of whom the "national" figures from both sides did most of their campaigning, were much more likely to be known, and perhaps even their positions on issues understood, by many who did not know their congressman.

It will probably be a while yet before the significance of the 1970 election will be adequately analyzed; but, as in 1968 (and as correctly noted in 1970 by Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg in The Real Majority,* a primer on how Democrats could avoid a bad setback in 1970) there was a "Left-Right" problem and the candidate who stressed issues so dear to the New Left would be in trouble. Some "new politics" liberals running for the Senate were washed out in primaries (people such as Yarborough of Texas); others burned the midnight oil reading Scammon's statistics and talking to hard-nosed politicians like Mayor Daley, and emerged in the morning either reformed or quiescent on the New-Left issues. Very few name candidates campaigned on the slogans some of them had employed a year earlier. Police were not longer "storm troopers in blue," but the good guys; "revolutionaries" were no longer described as merely "misguided" and to a large degree justified, but as bad--period. There were 180° turns on gun control laws. Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania stated flatly that he was wrong in backing President Johnson's gun law and was now against such laws. Hubert Humphrey, who on November 12, 1969, had sent a curt, four-line reply to a query on his views on gun laws, stating that, "...I think it is sufficient to say that I supported the firearm legislation that was submitted to Congress by President Johnson," replied to the same group on August 20, 1970 with a two-page letter stating, among other things, that he had now "come to other conclusions" on this issue; that he was an "avid sportsman," a hunter from way back; his

wife was a hunter; his three sons were hunters, etc.* Senators with "charisma" and/or states with small hunter populations could afford to hold their ground** but most of the others ran for cover. Senator Tydings of Maryland did not and lost in a "surprise" upset. There was little talk of the blame for crime resting on all of us for our failure to do enough to root out the causes of it: poverty, bad housing, etc. --and hardly a mention of Vietnam.

Television commentators stated that liberal candidates had managed to defuse the "law and order" issue. What they meant was that they had altered their position or had turned around entirely on it. They were clearly on the defensive, and this in a time when a Republican administration was experiencing the worst recession in nine years. Furthermore, this administration had admitted it had been making efforts to "cool down" the economy, as well as shift from a wartime to a peacetime economy, and that this was expected to result in some unemployment. The opposition tried to make use of the recession issue, but at this time of high and rising unemployment and a continually spiraling inflation, they could not seem to cash in as much as they should have been able to on the national level. The liberals actually lost ground in the Senate and their gains in the House were minimal. The fact that more Democratic Senate seats were at risk than Republican, does not tell the whole story (besides, Southern Democrats don't fit the normal "Left" pattern). Nor does the fact that Nixon (like John Kennedy) took so few House members in with him that he was bound to lose less, account entirely for the minimal loss in this off-year election. People out of work or with their jobs in jeopardy, without overtime work, facing

* American Rifleman, November 1970, pp. 44 and 45.

** Ibid., p. 45. See Edward Kennedy's letter in this issue.

increasing inflation and increasing debts, were voting in the national elections for the administration that "caused it." And this in the face of an intensive attempt by the Democrats to exploit the situation among an electorate which was 44% Democrats vs. 29% Republicans (27% Independents) in July 1970.*

How much of this can be attributed to the Vice-President's identification and discussion of issues which the average citizen considered important, and how much was built-in regardless of whether these problems were discussed or not, is hard to decide. It may be even more difficult, however, to make the argument that he was ineffective or even counter-productive to the Republican cause, which so many in the media now claim. Even if his personal influence slipped in late 1970, he helped to keep the issues which would help the Republicans before the public. People did not blindly hold their opinions solely because he held them; he was in the main simply articulating publicly opinions already held privately. One point is very hard to disprove: during the time when people were demanding that the President "unite the country," the Vice-President (during his period of high popularity) did much to help "unite" the country behind the administration; i.e., attract normally Democratic votes in a time when the economic policies of the administration looked bad. He may have sensed that, contrary to "New Left" rhetoric, the average citizen cared for something besides materialistic well-being; and that many would sacrifice such well-being for what they considered the good of their children, the country, the society.

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 62, August 1970, p. 3.

F. The "Middle American" and His Feelings About His Society

This aspect of the average man is normally well disguised, but polls show that he is truly concerned with the welfare of others. He continually prefers to have his taxes spent on education and welfare-type programs than on space, defense, or even things that might benefit himself personally more, such as a highway program.

TABLE XXXXIII
FEDERAL SPENDING PRIORITIES*
(After the moon landing)

Which 3 or 4 (of 1-11 areas) would you least like to see cut in federal spending?

Aid to education	60
Pollution control	38
Federal poverty program	34
Federal aid to cities	26
Federal highway financing	24

Which 3 or 4 on this list (1-11) would you like to see cut first in federal spending?

Foreign aid	69
Vietnam	64
Space program	51
Federal welfare	37
Other defense spending	26
Farm subsidies	24
Poverty program	19
Aid to cities	12
Highways	11
Anti-pollution	5
Aid to education	4

The adult citizens of average age (age 47 in 1970) belong to that large group which was the product of post-World War I "baby boom." They grew up in the Great Depression, and, after leaving their jobs to fight in the fiercest of all our wars, they returned as young adults to again take responsibilities as workers, employers, students (the G.I. Bill college people were one

*Harris poll in Life, August 15, 1969, p. 23.

of the most serious and talented, large groups of students in modern times*), parents and taxpayers. They helped to further expand our economy, reduce poverty and illiteracy, save Europe economically through the Marshall Plan, eradicate disease, and put men on the moon. In fact, the last crew to go to the moon in January 1971, was led by the 47-year-old Alan B. Shepard, Jr.


The vast majority of their children are much like their parents and the one thing the parents want is that life for their children not be as hard as they had it. In most cases, almost any effort or sacrifice is not considered too great for this goal. Ironically, this last desire might be counterproductive in some instances; and many an average citizen is concerned about perhaps having fallen down in this most important of all jobs-- giving their children the guidance and training they need.

*One author, stressing the value of experience in college students, says the following about the G.I. Bill students who "flooded" American campuses: "Every educator then 'knew' that these large masses of students would inevitably 'debase' academic standards. Instead, every teacher found out that the real problem was that these students were so incredibly superior that they made demands the faculty could not satisfy." (Peter F. Drucker, The Age of Discontinuity New York: Harper and Row, 1969 p. 324.

FIGURE XXVII

PREPARING CHILDREN FOR THEIR FUTURE*

Do you think parents generally do a good job or a poor job of preparing their children for their future?




By May of 1970, there was concern about our colleges, to which 50% of our high school graduates were headed. Again, the parents of college background had the greatest fears; but the difference between categories seemed to occur in relation to how much each was likely to know about college. There was less "instinctive" feeling on this issue--as the large percentage of "no opinions" shows--among those of less education.

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 26, August 1967, p. 24.

FIGURE XXVIII

DO COLLEGES GIVE STUDENTS A BALANCED VIEW*
By Education

"Some people say that colleges do not give students a balanced view of the nation's problems--that is, they don't give the same importance to the views of right wing or conservative leaders as they do to left wing or liberal leaders. Do you agree with this statement?"




If there was any instinct, it was against this premise; and this is logical if one considers the degree of respect which, according to earlier polls, college students commanded among the population as a whole. At that time, however, there was also an "instinctive" feeling against greater student control of our campuses; this was evident despite the "instinctive" respect. College-educated people who better understood the situation came out on the same side.

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 61, July 1970, p. 23.

FIGURE XXIX
FEELINGS TOWARD COLLEGE STUDENTS
By Education

In general, how much respect would you say you have for today's college students as a whole--a great deal, some, or hardly any? *

Do you think college students should or should not have a greater say concerning the academic side of colleges--that is, the courses, examinations, and so forth? **



*Gallup Opinion Index Poll 35, May 1968, p. 24.

**Gallup Opinion Index Poll 43, January 1969, p. 10.

Apparently that for which so many parents worked so hard--particularly those who had come up by dint of much effort and perseverance from the lower socio-economic levels (and this is the vast majority)--a better life for their children through education was felt to be in jeopardy. Both blacks and whites were becoming less satisfied with the primary schools, and with good reason (see pp. 82-88). The colleges were costing more and more of their tax money but dropping in effectiveness and they were becoming less accessible to any but the very rich or the very poor.*

Despite the somewhat better recent coverage in the media, the average man's basically good qualities and efforts to eliminate his admitted faults had not greatly reduced the flak from many of his critics. He was still under heavy attack for being a bigot** despite his record of increasing support for integration, on-the-job training, and welfare programs. In other cases, if he tried to say something in favor of Negroes, he was a "hypocrite." At the same time, derogatory "Polish jokes" continued to circulate among the very groups of "intellectuals" who accused the average man of bigotry.

*The new "programs" were harmful to both white and nonwhite qualified students. See Thomas Sowell, "A Black Professor Says Colleges are Skipping Over Competent Blacks to Admit 'Authentic' Ghetto Types," The New York Times Magazine, December 13, 1970, p. 36, for a description of the alleged effects of the new open administration programs of many well-qualified Negroes.

**Extremely offensive advertising on television accused him of insensibility to the plight of the Negro or of training his children to be racists. One, sponsored by the New York City Human Rights Commission spoke of bigotry being poured into the "dear little ears" of very small children, presumably by the family. Another program gives a tour of a neighborhood, showing a vacant lot as a "playground" and the street as stickball "diamond." The viewers are then supposed to be shocked and feel guilty about these conditions. The fact that many people played ball in the streets and roamed vacant lots in our youth (and felt lucky if someone didn't complain to the police) seems to have escaped the programmers. The average man cannot see as shocking his not unhappy boyhood spent in similar areas in a much harder economic period:

Nevertheless, the average American indicated that he understood the responsibility of society for some of our critical domestic problems. Even in the area of law and order, of such high priority from his point of view, the average American felt that the crime rate was more the fault of society than the individual. This, of course, can cut both ways: some can think that society is too permissive; others can feel that its lack of opportunity and its oppressiveness drives people to extremes; both show up as blaming society. Unfortunately, the following chart does not distinguish between the two viewpoints, but the numbers are close for all educational and income levels, with no great swing in the "no opinion" column. This fact, coupled with the continuous support for welfare-type programs over other government programs (see p.136), makes one reluctant to come to the conclusion that there is an exactly opposite reason for the same opinion between one income or education level and another.

TABLE XXXXIV
CAUSE OF CRIME¹

Which in your opinion is more to blame for crime and lawlessness in this country--the individual or society?

October 9-13, 1970

	<u>Individual</u>	<u>Society</u>	<u>No Opin</u>
	%	%	%
National	35	58	7
Sex			
Men	35	58	7
Women	36	58	6
Race			
White	35	58	7
Nonwhite	37	53	10
Education			
College	30	63	7
High School	36	58	6
Grade School	39	51	10

¹Gallup Opinion Index, November 1970, p. 15.

TABLE XXXIV contd.

Occupation			
Professional and Business	29	63	8
White Collar	37	59	4
Farmers	35	58	7
Manual	36	56	8
Age			
21-29 years	29	66	5
30-49 years	35	57	8
50 and over	38	55	7
Religion			
Protestant	36	57	7
Catholic	36	58	6
Jewish	x	x	x
Politics			
Republican	37	57	6
Democrat	42	49	9
Independent	32	60	8
Region			
East	32	61	7
Midwest	32	63	5
South	42	50	8
West	37	55	8
Income			
\$15,000 and over	28	67	5
\$10,000-14,999	34	60	6
\$ 7,000- 9,999	35	59	6
\$ 5,000- 6,999	38	54	8
\$ 3,000- 4,999	39	51	10
Under \$3,000	40	50	10
Community Size			
1,000,000 and over	33	61	6
500,000-999,999	37	57	6
50,000-499,999	37	55	8
2,500-49,999	33	60	7
Under 2,500, Rural	35	57	8

But, as indicated earlier, it was very hard to shake the vast, solid, 'middle' majority's faith in the system and in the society. In the same poll, despite their grave qualms, 58% refused to describe the society as 'sick,' although 36% felt that it was, and 6% had no opinion.

Perhaps the most interesting, and--if one only bases his impressions on the national media--surprising, insights into the feelings of the average man are the results of a poll taken at the very end of 1970 on December

5-6. This was at the end of the year of recession, turmoil, "general strike: and "revolution" on our campuses; and a year of "a nation torn apart," an "endless," "immoral," "insane," "useless," "costly," "most unpopular," "counterproductive" war, etc. In answer to the simple question, "In general, how happy would you say you are?" the results were as follows:

TABLE XXXXV
ARE YOU HAPPY?*

In general, how happy would you say you are--very happy, fairly happy, or not happy?

Here are the national results and those by key groups:

	<u>Very</u> <u>%</u>	<u>Fairly</u> <u>%</u>	<u>Not</u> <u>Happy</u> <u>%</u>	<u>No</u> <u>Ans.</u> <u>%</u>
National	43	48	6	3
Men	42	49	6	3
Women	44	46	7	3
Whites	46	46	5	3
Non-whites	20	63	12	5
21-29 years	55	39	5	1
30-49 years	42	51	4	3
50 and over	38	50	8	4
College	44	49	4	3
High school	44	49	4	3
Grade school	35	50	11	4
\$15,000 and over	56	37	4	3
\$10,000-15,000	49	46	3	2
\$7-10,000	47	46	5	2
\$5-7,000	38	52	7	3
\$3-5,000	33	54	7	6
Under \$3,000	29	55	13	3
Married	47	46	4	3
Single	47	46	6	3
Divorced/widowed	25	56	15	4

*The Philadelphia Inquirer, January 14, 1971, p.1.

A comparison to a poll taken in 1947 asking the same question brings out some interesting points. In 1947, only 49% were satisfied with their family income and in 1970 65% were; 69% were satisfied with their housing in 1947, 78% in 1970. Overall, 38% said they were "very happy" in 1947 and 43% felt that way in 1970. Not surprisingly, the person with the highest income is more likely to be "very happy" than a man in the income bracket below his; and so on down the line, to the poorest interviewed. Negroes, divorced or widowed people, and those with the least education rated low on the "happiness" scale. What is interesting, however, is that, in 1947, only 23% of the 21-29 year olds (including the World War II veterans) were "very happy;" but no one pointed to a crisis among youth, and rightly so.* Today, 55% of that group declare themselves "very happy," 39% "fairly happy" and only 5% "not happy." In a Harris poll covering "a national cross section of the 26 million Americans who are between the ages of 15 and 21, "taken at the same time and appearing in Life magazine on January 8, 1971, the results were as follows:

Has your life been happy so far? Yes--90%
(no percentages given for "no" and "no comment")

Why do you say that?

- 1) I've had a good home and good family.
- 2) I've had and done about everything I wanted.

Do you expect your future to be as happy or even happier?

Yes--93%
(no percentages given for "no" and "no comment")

Yet, we are told that we now have a "grave crisis" among youth. Furthermore, many seem to feel that youth (or at least a large segment of it) is

* A report on the Gallup poll in the Philadelphia Inquirer, January 14, 1971, p. 1. There were some "Sunday Supplement"-type articles in 1946 on the problems of the readjustment of veterans, which made good copy, but turned out to be far from applicable to the vast majority of veterans.

so disenchanted and unhappy, and so certain to remain that way as the young people grow into their thirties and forties, that we must particularly harken, say some, to those "unhappy" youth who want to change and jettison parts of this sensitive, free, democratic system. The reasons for this opinion will be examined in detail in the following chapter on youth.

Meanwhile, though the average American is "happy," partly because of his traditional and continuing respect for, and sometimes awe of, "professionals," educators and even the educated, he can still come to grief. A vast majority of our population know all about artisans, and even supervisors being incompetent, but one of this society's traditional weaknesses may be that many Americans still have trouble convincing themselves that it is possible to have many "professional," "educated" people who are incompetent; many military, foreign and domestic policy experts and decision-makers with less insight and shrewdness than many men in the street possess; and many top administrators without the skill of many lowly union "local" presidents. Average citizens are often in a quandary, therefore, since they want problems solved rather than just talked about. They want things "fixed" if they are wrong. This may be somewhat naive for some things simply may not be "fixable," but on the other hand Americans, through good fortune or skill, or both, have made great progress in many areas. Furthermore, they really don't expect everything to be fixed, and are used to putting up with troubles. But today Americans pour out their taxes, their support, to solve problems; and apparently few of those important to them get solved, even though they are told the "finest minds" are at work on them. Instead they are

often given excuses, or conclusions that nothing can be done about anything in foreign policy; and that if we try to solve such problems they will just get worse; or conclusions that theories about solutions of domestic problems, many of which, compared to the "old" systems they replaced, apparently are everything from relatively ineffective to utterly disastrous when applied to actual social problems, really are apropos and what we need is even larger, more expensive programs based on these same theories.

This whole process, particularly in light of many an average man's feeling of loss of traditional influence in political party structures, etc., could cause a crisis in morale, that vague but vital ingredient to any successful society.

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CHAPTER 2

THE ROLE OF YOUTH IN TODAY'S SOCIETY

THE ROLE OF YOUTH IN TODAY'S SOCIETY

INTRODUCTION

Probably one of the most difficult-to-define segments of any national profile is that of youth. Young people are always likely to be unpredictable and today, because of the attention and support given to some young people by influential adults, the "self fulfilling prophecy" may be involved. There is also the basic difficulty of discovering trends for any segment of the population: this has to do with the snapshot quality of one's evidence. Changes that one sees over a short period of time might be significant perturbations in the short run; but, over a long period, they may not be indicative of any true shift of opinion or change in value systems.

Perhaps the only way that someone could get a feel for trends is to look at historical data. Here, we run into the idea that "the past is prologue"; and although we cannot predict that something going in one direction will continue to go that way, we can at least protect ourselves from reinventing the wheel--that is, from being unduly influenced by a phenomenon which we can get some feel for by examining a similar occurrence in the past. Conversely, of course, we can be on the lookout for things that were highly significant when they occurred in the past; although we cannot guarantee that they will be that significant again, we can at least not miss them.

When we are analyzing youth as a segment--as when examining the population as a whole--we have to build up a data base from which to do an analysis of historical trends. The base from which we operate for predicting is of necessity influenced by our analysis of things that have happened in the past. This calls for careful examination of all the "evidence." This

is particularly true when one deals with youth in the recent past and the present. The "youth cult" among adults, so widely written about in this country, apparently does exist and has apparently also permeated some of the areas that normally produce valuable and hard data. Secondary sources so often become highly suspect when one compares the conclusions with some of the primary source data available. This primary source data can, of course, also be wrong, even when some cross checking appears to substantiate it. Obviously, the more one can do to corroborate such "evidence," the more confident one becomes in one's data. However, the extent of this study does not allow anything but a cursory examination of primary data, particularly in this highly controversial subject of youth.

This does not mean that work cannot be done on the subject; in fact it might be one that needs the most effort, if for no other reason than to insert some caveats into the available secondary source data. It is also an area where primary source information can outline certain trends that were there in the past. This does not mean that there are no significant changes occurring today among the thinking and value systems of youth. It merely means that radical changes must be documented, particularly if the action and reaction theory of history is not to be ignored. One of the ways to determine whether one can expect an action or reaction is to determine whether the value system of any group has changed. One is, of course, aware that changes normally take place slowly as societies progress, and ours is no different. Today our society is not the society of the Victorian era, and our youth are different. The real questions are, how are they different? And what significance will the difference have for the future?

Equally important in all analysis--but particularly where people's opinion provides much of the basis for it--is that the issues involved

must be clearly identified. Such things as semantic differences, identification problems and changes of identity of apparent sources of responsibility, etc., particularly in dealing with minors, can make trends extremely hard to describe and might defy correlation with other data.

What we will look at first in this study is: what is "youth" really like today in this country; what are the characteristics of the segments of youth; how are they acting today; are they different from years ago, and if so, how; and what are they likely to do in the future. The thrust of this study is to predict, as best as we can, what the country will be like in the future. The whole emphasis will be on that aspect; and everything done as far as historical evidence is concerned will be for the purpose of prediction. Our first effort, then, is to find out what youth is really like today, and how today's youth relate to their predecessors.

A. Overview of High School Students: 1923-1970

Traditionally, the young people in this country have generally subscribed to the value systems of their parents. This is reflected in the voting patterns of the 21-25 and the 21-29 year-olds. It is also apparent in the student response to polls, which I will refer to later. This general trend of subscribing to the value systems of the parents is perhaps more discernible in high school than in any other place. The interesting question, of course, is how much change takes place between the period when people show so much similarity to their parents' thinking on values and politics and when they grow older. We will attempt to trace some "cohorts" through the age brackets of the teens through the twenties up to their late twenties and early thirties. This is extremely difficult to do, of course, because the segment of those in their twenties includes not only the cohort group but the people both

older and younger than this group. In effect, what one gets most often in the public opinion polls are the results of questioning of people from 21 to 29; and if one were to take any group, say the 28 and 29 year-olds, one would have to somehow break them out of the other seven years of opinion in the same bracket. This is generally impossible. However, for the purpose of trends, if one can trace the cohort that is now 28-29 years old back to the time when they were in their teens, one might be able to assume that if the trend were continuous, and if they reflected certain changes, those below them should also reflect these changes. In other words, if the things that were causing the changes were a permanent influence on younger people, presumably the rest of the 21-29 year-olds would show the same trend.

1. Pre-1968

High school students' basic values on behavior and most moral issues apparently not only generally coincide with those of their parents, but have, at least up to the mid-sixties--and according to the following tables--been more or less constant over the years.

TABLE I

HIGH SCHOOL STUDENT RANKINGS OF "BEST" PRACTICES: 1954, 1965*

<u>RANK</u>	<u>POLL 38</u> <u>1954</u>	<u>POLL 74</u> <u>1965</u>
1	- Being courteous and friendly	Being dependable
2	- Being religious	Being courteous and friendly
3	- Showing sportsmanship	Being religious
4	- Being ambitious	Being ambitious
5	- Being dependable	Being healthful
6	- Keeping healthful	Being helpful and courteous
7	- Being helpful and courteous	Being patriotic
8	- Being patriotic	Being cheerful
9	- Being cheerful	Showing sportsmanship
10	- Driving safely	Driving safely
11	- Being industrious	Being industrious
12	- Seeking pleasure	Seeking pleasure

*Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 74, March 1965, p. 5.

TABLE 11

HIGH SCHOOL STUDENT RANKINGS OF "WORST" PRACTICES: 1923, 1954 AND 1965*

<u>RANK</u>	<u>BROGAN</u> <u>1923</u>	<u>POLL 38</u> <u>1954</u>	<u>POLL 74</u> <u>1965</u>
1	Killing or murdering	Killing or murdering	Killing or murdering
2	Sexual misbehaving	Using or selling narcotics	Using or selling narcotics
3	Stealing	Sexual misbehaving	Stealing
4	Cheating	Stealing	Sexual misbehaving
5	Lying	Drinking (alcohol)	Cheating
6	Drinking (alcohol)	Cheating	Drinking (alcohol)
7	Gambling	Lying	Lying
8	Swearing, vulgarity	Being cruel	Being cruel
9	Not being religious	Not being religious	Not being religious
10	Being selfish	Reckless driving	Reckless driving
11	Gossiping	Swearing	Swearing
12	Idleness	Being undependable	Being inconsiderate
13	Snobbishness	Gossiping	Being undependable
14	Extravagance	Being inconsiderate	Gossiping
15	Smoking	Smoking	Being conceited
16	Being conceited	Being conceited	Smoking

There have been some shifts in the "best" practices list: "showing sportsmanship" slipped from third to ninth; "being dependable" jumped from fifth to first place; "seeking pleasure" remained in the last place. On the whole, the rankings in both "worst" and "best" practices differ little between the 1954 and 1965 columns--or, for that matter, the 1923 column. For the items high on the list of "worst" actions, there is near-unanimity of opinion: for instance, 89% chose "killing or murdering" in the worst four. But among "best" actions there is more variation. "Being dependable" on the other hand, drew a 52% rating in the first three in 1965, but, about 1/5 rated it in the last three. "Sexual misbehavior" had fallen below "stealing" by 1965; but it was still in the top three if the use and sale of narcotics, which was not emphasized as a youthful problem in 1923, is

*Ibid, p.3.

not considered. This rating in the mid-"swinging sixties" is interesting since it compares favorably to the "silent fifties" and the almost mid-"roaring twenties," over forty years earlier. This does not imply that there has been no change over the years. As the following comparison shows, the attitude towards those who are sexually promiscuous has changed.

TABLE III*

ATTITUDE TOWARD BEHAVIOR OF UNMARRIED PEOPLE
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS


If I learned that some friends of mine had not followed the morals or rules relating to the behavior of unmarried people:

		Total Sample	Boys	Girls
		%	%	%
I would not consider them good friends anymore	1952	57	46	67
	1965	30	22	38
	Difference	27	24	29
I would not make any difference in our friend- ship	1952	43	54	33
	1965	69	77	60
	Difference	26	23	27

Nevertheless, polls taken indicate that the basic value system of students has held rather constant in most issues. Attitudes toward such traditional elements of our society as the government, the nation, and even the flag and patriotism (which--similar to the adult population--does not mean to them chauvinism or bellicosity), appear to be slow to change. Church attendance has traditionally been a stable element in their behavior, but a recent poll may indicate a change

*Ibid, p.4.

FIGURE 1
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS



The drop in 1970 (to 58%) below the 1951-1965 average (66-67%) is perhaps slightly exaggerated because this sample eliminated sophomores under 15 years of age (the 1951-1965 sample included all 10th, 11th and 12th graders) and the students in 10th grade traditionally have a higher attendance than the 11th and 12th graders. Nevertheless, assuming this

*Purdue Opinion Panel polls.

**Louis Harris poll in Life, January 8, 1971.

sample is of equal validity--which I do--and, despite the slightly different question (which always makes some difference), the probability of a drop below the 1951-1965 level for all high school students must be assumed, but it might still be a bit above 60%. This is not a drastic change, but is of some significance when one considers the stability of this percentage between 1951 and 1965.

In 1967, students were answering questions on our American system in the following manner:

TABLE IV*

FEELINGS TOWARD THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS

	<u>Total</u>
	%
In these times, patriotism and loyalty to established American ways are the <u>MOST</u> important requirements of a good citizen..	
Agree	58
Undecided	15
Disagree	25
We should firmly resist any attempts to change the American way of life.	
Agree	19
Undecided	13
Disagree	67
The American way of life is superior in nearly all respects to any other.	
Agree	57
Undecided	17
Disagree	26
The average citizen does not show enough respect for the United States flag.	
Agree	63
Undecided	11
Disagree	24

The response to the question, "resist any attempts," apparently reflects the normal, constant, and perhaps essential young person's attitude toward the world. Some emphasis must be placed on this issue if one is to

*Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No.81, November 1967, p. 5a.

view youth at any period, in a normal perspective. The feeling that things can be changed for the better is essential for those with the future before them and no direct responsibility for the past. Without this feeling, there would be far less enthusiasm among the young. This enthusiasm and energy are apparent among the young today, as they have always been. Also, as always, the younger the person looking at the problem, the more he is likely to believe that large, immediate changes are desirable, if not essential, and the less likely he is to understand the difficulty or even the contraproductivity of quickly implementing certain changes. He is also more likely to show energy and flamboyance in defending traditions. And this is as it should be; for traditionally--if for no other reasons than those of health and stamina--younger people have provided the energy to move the nation forward economically, politically and even militarily, when this was called for. All people take their turn at these tasks, as apprentice soldiers, and students, and learn about the difficulties of implementing programs. They generally gain the experience that is necessary to take their places as responsible guides for the next generation. And this is also as it should be; for though there are many glaring exceptions, the normal concept of a more mature, experienced man (rather than a boy or a very young man as one having better judgment--and as the task becomes more complex, greater productivity in most lines of work--is more likely to be right than wrong. The very experiences of living, learning to get along with a wife, raising children, "meeting a payroll," etc., have their sobering effects just when they are needed--when a man's decisions can have grave effects. But these feelings are usually not so necessary or even desirable for the young with a zest for life and adventure to have.

society. And, as mentioned earlier, youth generally followed their elders in value choices.

But, the 1967 polls of high school students also indicate some apparent contradictions or uncertainties which cannot be ignored. One also gets the feeling that the 1968-1970 data, which I will discuss later, also show some deviations, which might be explained by the way the questions were asked or it might indicate some recent, and therefore interesting, changes in attitude. Answers to the last two questions below, for example, seem to indicate that the very foundation of democracy is in question and even that the left-and right-wing "vanguard-of-the-revolution"-approach to political thought might be making inroads into the thinking of our youth.

TABLE V*

FEELINGS TOWARD DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES
High School Students

Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues that children should learn	%	%
Agree	75	76
Undecided	9	9
Disagree	16	15
Whatever serves the interests of government best is generally right		
Agree	22	20
Undecided	27	25
Disagree	51	53
What this country needs most is a few strong, courageous, tireless leaders in whom the people can put their faith		
Agree	64	56
Undecided	12	14
Disagree	24	26
A large mass of the people are not capable of determining what is and what is not good for them		
Agree	49	42
Undecided	19	16
Disagree	33	40

*Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 81, November 1967, p. 3a; No. November 1951, p. 2a, 6a, 8a.

This would appear to be a hasty judgment, however, for not only are we probably running into the "enthusiasm" of youth for rather simplistic solutions, but a further analysis seems to indicate that when the adolescents are asked about more familiar fundamentals, again, they haven't changed much since 1951. These adolescents got along well with parents during this period, as they still do.

The youth of today also seem to parallel their parents on their outlook towards the future of the country. This does not mean that their satisfaction or dissatisfaction about the way things are going is identical with their parents'. They may not be so alarmed as their parents about the direction things are going; but one gets the feeling that only a small minority of them would be shouting "right on" if they were told that the events they are questioned about were predictions rather than speculations. The following seven questions span the period from 1967 to 1970 and make an interesting comparison with adult feelings in this same time period (see tables VI-XII). Although the opinions of the students in most cases do not differ enough between groups to reverse a trend, the opinions of the different groups may be worth noting. The largest number of students in any category according to their future plans are, of course, in the college-bound group (50%). This group is (a) almost identical with the average total sample on all issues; and (b) as a distinct group it varies from the others in being on the whole less pessimistic about the fate of dignity and love of fellow man, value of religion, etc., in the future; and (c) its degree of pessimism about church attendance in the future is surpassed by all other groups save one. It is, on the other hand, by no means made up of Pollyannas: it appears to be aware of the problems (note their answers to the probability of a high degree of nervousness and

anxiety in the future), but it seems somewhat more sold on the system than the other groups. It appears to be more in the center and less troubled by "right" or "left" defeatism.

TABLE VI*

FUTURE--PERSONAL DIGNITY AND LOVE OF FELLOW MAN
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
(In Percent)

Some people feel that personal dignity and love of fellow man will tend to decrease in the coming years. Do you agree that this will happen?

	TOTAL SAMPLE	SEX		MOTHER'S EDUCATION			INCOME			POLITICAL PREFERENCE				GRADE		
		BOY	GIRL	GRD.	HIGH	COL.	LOW	MID.	HIGH	DEM.	REP.	OTH.	UND.	10	11	12
Agree	36	36	36	37	35	36	37	36	36	34	37	46	38	37	34	37
Indecided; probably agree	20	20	20	20	21	17	18	20	20	19	22	17	19	18	22	20
Indecided; probably disagree	16	17	15	15	16	19	15	15	18	16	16	6	18	16	15	17
Disagree	26	25	28	26	27	26	26	27	25	29	24	23	24	28	27	24
		COURSE GRADES				FUTURE PLANS					REGION					
		V. LOW	LOW	AVG.	HIGH	EXCEL.	COL.	SPEC. TRNG.	WORK	MIL.	OTH. PLAN	EAST	MID-WEST	SOUTH	WEST	
Agree	39	37	36	36	38	35	37	39	33	39	34	35	36	40		
Indecided; probably agree	22	19	18	24	19	21	21	18	20	16	16	22	20	21		
Indecided; probably disagree	4	18	18	13	16	15	16	19	18	19	20	17	12	16		
Disagree	30	26	26	27	25	28	26	21	28	23	29	24	30	27		

*Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 80, April 1967, pp. 9a and 10a. (See p. 41 for a description of the way the course grades were determined and what percentage of students fell into each category in the 1970 polls.)

TABLE VII*

FUTURE--ANXIETY AND NERVOUSNESS
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
(In Percent)

Some people think that in the future Americans will probably experience more anxiety and nervousness than they do now. Do you agree that this will happen?

	TOTAL SAMPLE	SEX		MOTHER'S EDUCATION			INCOME			POLITICAL PREFERENCE				GRADE		
		BOY	GIRL	GRD.	HIGH	COL.	LOW	MID.	HIGH	DEM.	REP.	OTH.	UND.	10	11	12
Agree	52	49	56	48	55	55	39	53	55	49	56	65	54	51	50	57
Uncertain; probably agree	25	25	26	29	24	21	32	24	26	26	23	15	28	27	27	22
Uncertain; probably disagree	9	10	8	10	10	7	11	10	8	10	9	4	8	10	9	9
Disagree	12	14	10	13	11	15	16	12	11	14	11	10	9	11	14	11

	TOTAL SAMPLE	COURSE GRADES				FUTURE PLANS					REGION			
		V.LOW	LOW	AVG.	HIGH	EXCEL.	SPEC. COL.	TRNG.	WORK	MIL.	OTH. PLAN	EAST	WEST	SOUTH
Agree	48	49	50	56	61	54	54	50	44	51	53	54	46	61
Uncertain; probably agree	22	27	27	25	16	24	27	29	25	27	25	26	27	23
Uncertain; probably disagree	4	14	10	7	9	8	7	12	14	9	9	8	10	10
Disagree	22	10	13	11	14	13	12	8	16	11	12	12	15	6

TABLE VIII*

FUTURE--EFFECTIVENESS OF RELIGION
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
(In Percent)

In the world in which you will live as an adult, do you think a church (or synagogue) will be successful or unsuccessful in helping you to solve such problems as "Why should I live?" or "What is my purpose in life?"

	TOTAL SAMPLE	SEX		MOTHER'S EDUCATION			INCOME			POLITICAL PREFERENCE				GRADE		
		BOY	GIRL	GRD.	HIGH	COL.	LOW	MID.	HIGH	DEM.	REP.	OTH.	UND.	10	11	12
Successful	59	54	64	63	58	53	58	59	57	62	59	38	54	59	59	58
Undecided; probably successful	20	21	19	21	19	20	26	20	18	21	18	15	20	21	19	19
Undecided; probably unsuccessful	9	11	7	7	10	12	4	9	11	8	10	15	11	9	9	10
Unsuccessful	11	13	10	9	12	15	9	11	14	8	12	29	15	10	12	12

*Ibid.

TABLE VIII cont.

	COURSE GRADES					FUTURE PLANS					REGION			
	V.LOW	LOW	AVG.	HIGH	EXCEL.	COL.	SPEC. TRNG.	WORK	MIL.	OTH. PLAN	EAST	MID- WEST	SOUTH	WEST
Successful	43	44	58	63	60	61	60	60	53	48	55	54	68	56
Undecided; probably successful	17	28	22	16	14	18	21	20	23	26	18	22	19	21
Undecided; probably unsuccessful	17	16	9	8	8	8	9	10	14	12	13	11	5	9
Unsuccessful	17	9	10	12	19	12	10	10	11	12	14	12	7	15

TABLE IX*

CHURCH ATTENDANCE--1980
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
(In Percent)

As compared to today, I expect that church attendance, in 1980, will have

	TOTAL SAMPLE	SEX		MOTHER'S EDUCATION			INCOME			POLITICAL PREFERENCE				GRADE		
		BOY	GIRL	GRD.	HIGH	COL.	LOW	MID.	HIGH	DEM.	REP.	OTH.	UND.	10	11	12
Increased greatly	13	15	12	16	12	11	24	12	12	17	11	12	9	17	12	10
Increased somewhat	23	24	21	24	23	19	20	24	22	25	22	15	21	24	23	21
Remained about the same as today	24	21	27	20	27	26	20	24	26	22	25	23	27	21	23	28
Decreased somewhat	28	26	29	27	27	34	23	27	30	27	31	17	28	25	29	29
Decreased greatly	11	13	10	11	12	10	14	11	11	9	11	31	14	11	11	11

	COURSE GRADES					FUTURE PLANS					REGION			
	V.LOW	LOW	AVG.	HIGH	EXCEL.	COL.	SPEC. TRNG.	WORK	MIL.	OTH. PLAN	EAST	MID- WEST	SOUTH	WEST
Increased greatly	35	12	15	10	11	13	13	12	17	14	8	9	22	11
Increased somewhat	17	23	24	23	15	23	23	20	25	22	23	24	23	18
Remained about the same as today	17	28	22	27	25	25	22	32	18	15	27	24	21	25
Decreased somewhat	4	23	27	31	33	28	31	22	25	31	30	31	22	32
Decreased greatly	13	16	11	9	14	10	11	13	14	15	11	10	11	13

*Ibid.

TABLE X*

FUTURE--STRICTNESS OF MORAL STANDARDS
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
(In Percent)

In the future, do you think that moral standards in this country will be more strict, about the same, or less strict than they are today?

	TOTAL SAMPLE	SEX		MOTHER'S EDUCATION			INCOME			POLITICAL PREFERENCE				GRADE		
		BOY	GIRL	GRD.	HIGH	COL.	LOW	MID.	HIGH	DEM.	REP.	OTH.	UND.	10	11	12
More strict	20	20	19	25	17	13	31	19	17	24	18	13	15	24	20	14
About the same	26	28	25	31	24	21	31	28	23	29	23	13	25	29	26	24
Less strict	52	49	55	42	57	63	33	51	59	45	58	69	58	46	52	59

	TOTAL SAMPLE	COURSE GRADES				FUTURE PLANS					REGION			
		V. LOW	LOW	AVG. HIGH	EXCEL.	COL.	SPEC. TRNG.	WORK	MIL.	OTH. PLAN	EAST	MID-WEST	SOUTH	WEST
More strict	30	29	24	12	14	16	25	23	24	19	14	16	30	15
About the same	26	19	28	23	21	24	27	34	30	26	28	27	28	20
Less strict	30	36	46	64	64	58	44	40	44	54	57	55	39	63

TABLE XI*

FUTURE--CONCERN WITH MATERIAL WEALTH
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
(In Percent)

Try to imagine how much Americans, on the average, are concerned with getting more and more material wealth (better cars, more home appliances, etc). In the future Americans will tend to want:

	TOTAL SAMPLE	SEX		MOTHER'S EDUCATION			INCOME			POLITICAL PREFERENCE				GRADE		
		BOY	GIRL	GRD.	HIGH	COL.	LOW	MID.	HIGH	DEM.	REP.	OTH.	UND.	10	11	12
More material possessions	85	84	86	84	86	84	83	86	84	88	83	67	85	86	84	85
Fewer material possessions	4	5	3	4	3	5	5	4	4	3	5	13	3	5	4	3
About as many material possessions as they do today	10	10	11	11	9	10	9	9	11	8	12	18	11	8	11	11

	TOTAL SAMPLE	COURSE GRADES				FUTURE PLANS					REGION			
		V. LOW	LOW	AVG. HIGH	EXCEL.	COL.	SPEC. TRNG.	WORK	MIL.	OTH. PLAN	EAST	MID-WEST	SOUTH	WEST
More material possessions	52	77	86	88	82	87	86	81	85	82	87	85	85	83
Fewer material possessions	9	8	4	2	4	3	3	6	3	7	3	4	5	4
About as many material possessions as they do today	22	13	9	10	14	10	11	11	9	9	10	9	9	14

*Ibid., pp. 11a and 12a.

TABLE XII*
DIVORCE RATE--1980
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
(In Percent)

The divorce rate in 1980, compared to that of today, will be

	TOTAL SAMPLE	SEX		MOTHER'S EDUCATION			INCOME			POLITICAL PREFERENCE				GRADE		
		BOY	GIRL	GRD.	HIGH	COL.	LOW	MID.	HIGH	DEM.	REP.	OTH.	UND.	10	11	12
Greater	70	70	70	69	70	69	61	70	71	66	76	75	70	71	68	70
About as it is today	20	18	21	20	19	21	27	19	20	22	16	8	20	18	22	19
Less	7	8	6	8	7	6	8	7	6	8	5	10	7	7	6	7

	COURSE GRADES					FUTURE PLANS					REGION			
	V. LOW	LOW	AVG.	HIGH	EXCEL.	SPEC. COL.	TRNG.	WORK	MIL.	OTH. PLAN	EAST	MID-WEST	SOUTH	WEST
Greater	57	63	69	73	76	72	67	68	66	65	70	73	66	71
About as it is today	17	21	20	20	12	18	23	21	20	19	22	18	20	18
Less	13	13	7	4	9	7	4	7	11	10	5	5	10	8

In surveying these results it is of interest to note that the very-low and below-average grade-point categories of students (about 10% of the students) are likely to produce the highest numbers of those who, one suspects, feel they do not understand what is going on in the world. This is borne out by an examination of responses to the following questions in which, as one would expect, the lower-grade-score groups have a considerably higher percentage of "I don't know" answers. As one would also expect, as one goes down the scale of scholastic standing, there is much more dissatisfaction with achievement ("When I look at what I have achieved in life so far, etc."), and with effort ("Do you think you have done the best you could have with your life so far, considering the circumstances"?).

*Ibid.

TABLE XIII*
ACHIEVEMENT
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
(In Percent)

Do you think you have done the best you could have with your life so far, considering the circumstances?	TOTAL SAMPLE	SEX		MOTHER'S EDUCATION			GRADE			COURSE GRADES				
		BOY	GIRL	GRD.	HIGH	COL.	10	11	12	V. LOW	LOW	AVG.	HIGH	EXCEL
Yes	20	17	23	22	19	18	22	18	20	28	11	19	19	31
Undecided; probably yes	18	18	18	18	19	17	18	18	19	9	11	19	19	17
Undecided; probably no	21	23	18	19	22	20	20	22	20	13	29	21	21	15
No	41	42	39	40	39	45	40	41	42	55	48	40	39	36

When I look at what I have achieved in life so far, I feel	TOTAL SAMPLE	SEX	MOTHER'S EDUCATION	GRADE	COURSE GRADES
Very satisfied	12	12 11	12 12 10	14 11 10	13 8 11 10 21
Fairly well satisfied	53	52 54	48 56 53	49 54 56	25 39 51 60 54
Not very satisfied	28	27 28	32 25 26	28 28 26	40 38 30 24 16
Not at all satisfied	7	9 6	8 6 10	7 7 7	23 15 7 5 7

Do you think you have done the best you could have with your life so far, considering the circumstances?	FUTURE PLANS				
	SPEC. COL.	TRNG.	WORK MIL.	OTHER PLANS	
Yes	19	19	29	16	17
Undecided; probably yes	20	18	16	14	14
Undecided; probably no	20	23	17	21	24
No	40	39	39	49	45

When I look at what I have achieved in life so far, I feel	SPEC. COL.	TRNG.	WORK MIL.	OTHER PLANS
Very satisfied	11	9	15	13 12
Fairly well satisfied	57	50	48	43 49
Not very satisfied	25	33	28	32 28
Not at all satisfied	5	6	9	13 11

The highest percentage of students who were worried and confused about moral questions and values and "not living up to my ideal" were the "excellent" students; but in other polls they also show that they have a low degree of problems in relations with their parents and other adults. "Below average" students are the next in line for the problems with moral questions, but, of all categories of scholastic standings, they also have the gravest problems in their relations with adults. In fact, as one would expect, as one goes down the levels of scholastic standing, the level of intensity of problems with adults goes up. Regarding their behavior and self-control, the students were better satisfied:

*Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 83, May 1968, pp. 5a and 6a.

TABLE XIV*

VALUES
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
(In Percent)

Values (wondering how to tell right from wrong; confused on some moral questions; doubting the value of worship and prayer; not living up to my ideal; etc.)

	TOTAL SAMPLE	SEX		GRADE			FATHER'S EDUCATION			MOTHER'S EDUCATION		
		BOY	GIRL	10	11	12	GRD.	HIGH	COL.	GRD.	HIGH	COL.
Very much	14	11	17	12	15	15	12	16	15	14	14	15
Quite a bit	17	16	18	17	16	18	18	16	17	17	18	15
Some	23	24	21	22	23	23	23	24	22	24	23	22
A little	17	18	16	18	17	15	16	18	16	16	18	16
Not very much	27	28	25	27	27	27	29	25	27	26	27	28

	COURSE GRADES					REGION			
	VERY LOW	BEL. AVG.	AVG.	ABV. AVG.	EXCEL.	EAST	MID WEST	SOUTH	WEST
Very much	18	18	12	14	23	14	15	14	12
Quite a bit	3	19	16	18	21	18	16	17	17
Some	35	24	24	20	19	21	23	22	26
A little	18	10	17	18	17	15	16	19	17
Not very much	23	28	27	28	21	29	27	25	27

TABLE XV**

RELATIONSHIPS WITH ADULTS
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
(In Percent)

Relationships with parents and other adults (having too many decisions made for me; being too easily led by them; getting into arguments; hurting their feelings; being different; being talked about or made fun of; etc.)

	TOTAL SAMPLE	SEX		GRADE			FATHER'S EDUCATION			MOTHER'S EDUCATION		
		BOY	GIRL	10	11	12	GRD.	HIGH	COL.	GRD.	HIGH	COL.
Very much	14	13	15	15	12	14	17	13	12	17	13	13
Quite a bit	16	15	18	17	16	16	18	16	15	17	17	14
Some	23	25	20	22	24	21	22	23	23	21	23	25
A little	16	15	17	15	17	16	14	17	16	13	17	18
Not very much	29	30	27	26	28	31	26	29	30	28	29	27

	COURSE GRADES					REGION			
	VERY LOW	BEL. AVG.	AVG.	ABV. AVG.	EXCEL.	EAST	MID WEST	SOUTH	WEST
Very much	28	20	13	13	12	15	15	13	12
Quite a bit	13	15	17	16	15	15	15	16	23
Some	20	28	21	24	23	22	23	23	23
A little	13	10	17	16	20	15	17	16	16
Not very much	18	24	28	31	30	31	28	29	24

*Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 88, April 1970, pp. 19a and 20a.

**Ibid., pp. 15a and 16a.

TABLE XVI*
BEHAVIOR
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
(In Percent)

My behavior (being tempted to cheat in school; sometimes lying without meaning to; lacking self-control; getting into trouble; deliberately hurting people's feelings; etc.)

	TOTAL SAMPLE	SEX		GRADE			FATHER'S EDUCATION			MOTHER'S EDUCATION		
		BOY	GIRL	10	11	12	GRD.	HIGH	COL.	GRD.	HIGH	COL.
Very much	6	7	6	7	6	7	7	6	7	7	6	7
Quite a bit	12	12	12	13	12	11	13	12	10	12	11	14
Some	20	21	18	19	18	22	19	20	20	19	20	18
A little	19	19	19	18	19	18	19	19	19	17	20	19
Not very much	39	37	40	38	40	39	38	38	40	39	39	37

	COURSE GRADES					REGION			
	VERY LOW	BEL. AVG.	AVG.	ABV. AVG.	EXCEL.	MID		SOUTH	WEST
					EAST	WEST			
Very much	15	11	5	6	12	6	5	8	6
Quite a bit	15	13	14	10	9	9	11	14	14
Some	15	25	19	19	19	20	20	18	21
A little	15	17	18	20	23	20	19	18	19
Not very much	33	28	39	42	31	41	38	38	38

The following table shows some "summaries" of attitudes at the end of 1967 as reflected in the form of answers to questions on some "basics." It shows concern for domestic and international problems but a strong belief in the "basics" of the system: "religion, democracy and the free enterprise system." It shows a high degree of skepticism, but the weight of opinion falls on the side of the feeling that "people are basically honest."

*ibid., pp. 19a and 20a.

TABLE XVII.*
ATTITUDES TOWARD BASICS OF THE SYSTEM
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
(In Percent)

	TOTAL SAMPLE	SEX	
		BOY	GIRL
I get tired of people constantly questioning governmental policies.			
Disagree	38	41	36
Unsure; but probably disagree	12	11	12
Unsure; but probably agree	12	12	12
Agree	36	36	38
Disobedience to any government is never justified.			
Disagree		54	42
Unsure; but probably disagree		10	14
Unsure; but probably agree		10	15
Agree		24	28
I am very worried about what is going on in national politics			
Disagree		33	31
Unsure; but probably disagree		10	11
Unsure; but probably agree	17	16	18
Agree	40	41	40
I am very concerned with world problems.			
Disagree	21	20	22
Unsure; but probably disagree	8	8	8
Unsure; but probably agree	21	20	21
Agree	49	52	47

*Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 82, January 1968.

TABLE XVII cont.

	TOTAL SAMPLE	SEX	
		BOY	GIRL
People should have more belief in religion, democracy, and the free enterprise system.			
Disagree	7	9	6
Unsure; but probably disagree	3	3	4
Unsure; but probably agree	15	16	14
Agree	73	71	75
Usually both sides of an issue are distorting the truth.			
Disagree	23	23	23
Unsure; but probably disagree	13	11	14
Unsure; but probably agree	18	16	19
Agree	45	49	42
The individual himself is the best judge of what is a moral act.			
Disagree	13	15	11
Unsure; but probably disagree	6	8	5
Unsure; but probably agree	11	11	10
Agree	69	65	72
People are basically honest			
Disagree	29	28	28
Unsure; but probably disagree	12	13	11
Unsure; but probably agree	21	22	21
Agree	36	36	37
Most people would tell a lie if they could gain by it.			
Disagree	13	12	13
Unsure; but probably disagree	10	9	11
Unsure; but probably agree	16	15	16
Agree	60	62	59

The answers listed above would not always coincide with those that might be given by the parents of the students, but one cannot be sure. The heavy agreement on support of the basics ("religion, democracy and the free enterprise system") sounds like the results of an adult poll. Considerable cynicism is displayed by these adolescents in supporting the thesis that "Usually both sides of an issue are distorting the truth" and their even heavier support of the proposition that "Most people would tell a lie if they could gain by it" (while at the same time subscribing to the idea that "People are basically honest"). This cynicism, however, may or may not run counter to parents' attitude (or at least to their attitudes in cautioning children). It could reflect the far-from-sinister caveats drummed into children: "There are two sides to every story"; "Never buy anything expensive just because someone tells you it is a bargain"; "Don't believe everything you hear," etc., etc. Or it could reflect much more than that. Much depends upon how much influence the parents have on children.

2. Youth: 1968-1970

a. The Similarity and Dissimilarity Between High School Students and Adults

Answers limited to questions asked from 1968 to the present, shown in the following table, reflect the attitudes of high school students towards their families, school, race relations, environment and politics. Generally speaking, these attitudes also show a marked similarity to those of their parents, including, for example, such fundamental and, from a youngster's point of view, "pertinent" subjects (particularly if he intends to go to college) as feelings on law and order and discipline in high schools. But there are some points where significant differences exist. These differences might arise for many reasons, including such mundane ones as confusion among the people

polled or the way the questions were asked. On basic issues, such as their relationships with their family, there has been no significant change over the past two years.

TABLE XVIII
INFLUENCE IN FAMILY DECISIONS
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS

How much influence do you feel you have in family decisions that affect you?

	December 1968*	May 1970**	All %	December 1970***		
				College- bound students %	Above average students %	Excel- lent students %
A great deal of influence	22	25	24	25	29	28
Considerable influence	30	28	33	38	35	45
Moderate influence	23	23	21	21	23	14
Some influence	15	15	15	11	9	9
Little or no influence	9	8	7	5	4	4

Another poll showed 66% of youngsters between 15 and 21 having no trouble "communicating" with their parents and 80% of those who did, admitting to at least part of the fault in the breakdown. Of the same group 73% said they accepted and agreed with their parents' values and ideals.**** With this kind of relationship one would expect students to continue to be influenced by their parents on many basic issues.

The following chart shows the interesting similarity of ranking of political parties over the years by high school students and the adult group that would include their parents, the 30-49 year olds. The students'

*Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 85, December 1968, p. 7a.


**Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 89, June 1970, p. 3a.

***Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 90, January 1971, pp. 1a and 2a.

****Poll in Life Magazine, January 8, 1971, conducted by Louis Harris Associates, covering young people between the ages of 15 and 21.

opinions produce a sort of rough "shadow" of their parents' opinion; the lower position on the graph of the youngsters' choices results, as one would expect, from a higher percentage of them being "undecided." The dates of the polls do not coincide exactly, but when they do, the choices are rather consistent. When parents change preference, students do, too; and they do to a degree that a pattern of preferences that resemble each other is formed over the years.

FIGURE 11*
 HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
 AND 30-49 YEAR OLD GROUP
 "THE POLITICAL PARTY WHICH I PREFER IS:"




*Compiled from Purdue Opinion Panel polls and Gallup polls.

Bar charts for the year 1970 show again the similarity of patterns of high school students' and adults' political party choice.

FIGURE III

POLITICAL PARTY CHOICE



The 30-49 year old group (which includes most parents of the high school students) is not included in this source; but this median-age group of adults

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 64, October 1970, p.

**Purdue Opinion Panel Poll No. 89, June 1970, p.

is likely to average within a couple of percentage points of the overall voters' opinion, so the pattern is still valid. As may be expected, the youngsters, again, are more likely to have no opinion on political issues than adults; and had the adults been given a choice of the American Independent Party, as were the youngsters, the "no difference" column for the adults might fit the "pattern" better. Nonetheless, the low "shadow" is still there.

The opinions of the young do not always coincide with their parents; some feelings are not even similar to the degree indicated by the "shadow" curve on the political choice chart. There have been some changes in such attitudes as the disapproval of sexual misbehavior. If restraints are removed and young people are told (or, for that matter, old people are convince that the instant fulfillment of these very strong, normal desires is not out of line, then they may be less likely to reject their friends when they do these things (indicated in Table III, p. 6). As far as their own behavior is concerned, however, they are still close to their parents on most points.

A late 1970 poll of high school children over 15 years of age indicated that 78% felt that people "dating casually" should not have sexual relations; nor should those going steady (69%); nor should even those planning to marry (57%). A large minority (45%), however, felt it was all right if people were "formally engaged." On the last issue, their approval is 15% higher than all adults as of 1965; but their opposition to promiscuity in general is similar to their parents', down to the percentage of disapproval of other forms of promiscuity. Recent increased opposition on the part of adults to permissive attitudes toward sexual behavior and pornographic

material may reflect some shift, or the fear of a shift, in the thinking of children.

Other issues in which high school students apparently deviate from the opinions of their parents are in areas that the young do not have very close contact with and have difficulty in evaluating by themselves. Most of what they learn about these issues comes from what they see on television or from what they are told by people who feel it important to inform them about these issues. As one would expect, therefore, views on foreign policy (not only Vietnam, but on the Middle East and elsewhere), economic policy, and even racial problems (if students are not in the affected areas) may deviate more from their parents' views than those on issues closer to home. The following tables are some examples of such thinking.

TABLE XIX*

VIEWS ON MIDDLE EAST DISPUTE
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS

(IN PERCENT)

In the dispute in the Middle East, do your sympathies lie more with the Israelis or the Arabs?	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>POOR GRADES</u>	<u>ABOVE AVERAGE</u>	<u>EXCELLENT GRADES</u>
Definitely with the Israelis	25	14	31	39
Undecided; probably with the Israelis	50	36	52	38
Undecided; probably with the Arabs	13	12	8	12
Definitely with the Arabs	5	19	3	7

*Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 89, June 1970, p. 7a.

TABLE XIX* (cont'd)
(In Percent)

Should Great Britain, France, Russia, and the U.S. sell airplanes, guns and ammunition to Israel and the Arab countries?

	TOTAL SAMPLE	SEX B.G.	GRADE			MOTHER'S EDUCATION			FATHER'S EDUCATION			REGION		
			10	11	12	GRD. HIGH	COL.	GRD. HIGH	GRD. HIGH	COL.	GRD. HIGH	EAST	MID-WEST	SOUTH
Definitely yes, to both	12	11	12	12	13	11	13	11	13	13	11			
Yes, to the Israelis only	9	11	7	9	9	8	8	9	11	7	10			
Yes, to the Arabs only	2	3	2	3	2	2	3	2	3	2	2			
Definitely no, to both	72	71	73	70	71	74	71	74	68	72	73			
			FUTURE PLANS			COURSE GRADES					REGION			
			SPEC. COL.	TRNG. WORK	MIL. PLANS	OTHER	V. LOW	LOW	AVG.	HIGH	EXCEL.	EAST	MID-WEST	SOUTH
Definitely yes, to both	11	10	13	19	12	21	13	11	11	16		11	11	15
Yes, to the Israelis only	10	9	6	13	6	12	9	8	9	10		9	9	9
Yes, to the Arabs only	2	2	5	1	2	7	3	2	1	3		3	2	2
Definitely no, to both	73	74	70	62	73	50	68	72	74	69		73	74	67

Adults**

"In this trouble, are your sympathies more with Israel or the Arab States?"

	<u>Israel</u>	<u>Arabs</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
All	44	3	32	21
30-49 years of age (most parents of high school students)	41	4	33	22
<u>Region</u>				
East	48	5	32	22
Midwest	37	3	34	26
South	42	2	30	26
West	50	2	31	17

*Ibid, pp. 7a, 8a, 9a, 10a..

**Gallup Opinion Index, Report No. 58, April 1970, p. 13.

TABLE XX*
VIEWS ON VIETNAM
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
(In Percent)

How do you feel about the U.S. military involvement in the Vietnam war?	Total Sample	Course Grades					Future Plans					Region			
		V. low	Low	Avg.	High	Excel.	Col.	Spec. Trng.	Work	Mil.	Other Plans	E.	MW.	S.	W.
The U.S. should increase the military action there	42	39	47	40	43	48	40	41	44	53	44	40	38	46	45
The U.S. should decrease the military action there	35	33	27	35	37	40	38	34	36	19	34	34	39	33	33
The U.S. should maintain military action at its present level	22	22	24	24	20	10	21	26	17	26	22	24	22	21	21

Adults**

People are called hawks if they want to step up our military effort in Vietnam. They are called doves if they want to reduce our military effort in Vietnam. How would you describe yourself, as a hawk or a dove?

	<u>April 1968</u>			<u>March 1968</u>		
	<u>Hawk</u> %	<u>Dove</u> %	<u>No Opinion</u> %	<u>Hawk</u> %	<u>Dove</u> %	<u>No Opinion</u> %
All	41	41	18	41	42	17
30-49 yr. olds (most parents of high school students)	44	38	18			
<u>Region</u>						
East	34	47	19			
Midwest	43	40	17			
South	43	38	19			
West	46	37	17			

*Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 84, November 1968, pp. 3a and 4a.

**Gallup Opinion Index, Report No. 35, May 1968, p. 20.

TABLE XX cont'd

VIETNAM--HUMPHREY'S POSITION
ADULTS

"If Humphrey were to take a stronger peace position on Vietnam, would this make you more likely to vote for him, or not?"

Late September, 1968

	<u>Yes, would</u>	<u>No, would not</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
National	31	60	9

VIETNAM--NIXON'S POSITION**
ADULTS

"If Nixon were to take a stronger peace position on Vietnam, would this make you more likely to vote for him, or not?"

Late September, 1968

	<u>Yes, would</u>	<u>No, would not</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
National	35	57	8

In December 1970 high school students were split on interventions to stop communist takeovers in Asia, with a slight edge on the intervention side.***

"The U.S. should intervene when the communists attempt to take over an Asian country."

	ALL	FUTURE PLANS COLLEGE	COURSE GRADES			
			BEL. AVG.	ABV. AVG.	EXCEL.	
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
Definitely agree	25	26	23	24	27	20
Undecided, probably agree	28	28	23	28	29	23
Undecided; probably disagree	22	21	31	23	19	25
Definitely disagree	21	20	20	20	21	25

*Gallup Opinion Index, Report No. 40; October 1968, p. 17.

**Ibid., p. 16

***Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 90, January 1971, pp. 15a and 16a.

But a response to a question asked in a poll for Seventeen magazine (February 1971) indicated that in the 14-17 year-old bracket, 69% felt too much money was spent on the Vietnam war, 26% felt it was the right amount and 5% not enough. This question was asked differently than earlier ones; and another sampling group and even a different technique might have been used in taking the poll. It may or may not give an accurate feeling for the attitude of youth in 1970*. Similarly, the question was asked of adults in late 1970 differently in two different polls, which resulted in first, 44%, then, 61%, supporting the McGovern Amendment to withdraw all troops by July 1971. In May 1970, given four choices, the McGovern Amendment came out second, losing to a more "hawkish" choice. The parents of the high schoolers split: 47% "hawkish," and "rather hawkish"; 47% "dovish" and "rather dovish."** The gap between parental thinking and that of their children, therefore, may or may not have widened.

*There are areas of agreement in these polls, such as the general idea of the undue emphasis on sex and even the position to the legalization of marijuana (but with somewhat of a discrepancy in the amount of opposition: in a 1970 Harris poll in Life, 70% of high school students were opposed vs. about 63% for, of the same age group in a 1970 poll in Seventeen; in other areas there are great discrepancies. Under religion, both polls asked similar questions at the same time of about the same age groups (Life-Harris 15-21, Seventeen 14-22) with the following results:

Harris Poll in Life, January 8, 1971: "Would it upset your parents if you married someone of a different religion?"

No - 82%

Poll in Seventeen, February 1971: "Parents really don't care if their children date people of other faiths."

Agree - 41%

Disagree - 55% (equivalent to Yes above!)

The discrepancy could have resulted from the way the questions were asked or from any number of other causes; but problems there are in determining complete accuracy.

**In the first poll, the parents of these children (30-49 year-olds) registered 55% in favor of the McGovern Amendment vs. 43% for 21-29 year olds in favor. Harris Poll, reported August 1970. Gallup Poll, July 1970.

It is interesting to note where the difference in opinion between adults (particularly the adults who include most parents of the high school students) and youth occurs. When the adolescents were asked direct questions on Vietnam that more or less coincided with the "hawk" or "dove" point-of-view question asked of their parents, we see some differences, but not significant ones. And, as of 1968, when differences occurred, they were somewhat unexpected; i.e., students with excellent grades were slightly more hawkish; boys were more hawkish than girls; students from the East more hawkish than adults in the East. But when adults were queried about their desires for a more peace-oriented platform for presidential candidates in 1968, they came out strongly against it, so they may actually have held opinions closer to their children's. On the issue of Israel, as of 1970, the students seemed to be more "neutral" than their parents.

Another interesting area of comparison of opinions on key issues is that of race relations.

TABLE XXI
RACE RELATIONS*
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
(In Percent)

As a solution for race problems in public schools, which of the following would you strongly support: (Answer only one)	<u>TOTAL SAMPLE</u>	<u>SEX</u>		<u>GRADE</u>		
		<u>BOY</u>	<u>GIRL</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>12</u>
Complete elimination of racial segregation in all regions of the country	20	21	19	17	20	23
Separate but completely equal schools	8	11	5	11	8	6
Freedom of choice to attend public school, integrated or segregated	57	51	62	58	57	55
No strong feelings; some other	12	13	11	12	11	13

*Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 89, June 1970, pp. 15a and 16a.

Table XXI

High School Students* cont'd

	MOTHER'S EDUCATION			FATHER'S EDUCATION			FUTURE PLANS				
	GRD.	HIGH	COL.	GRD.	HIGH	COL.	SPEC.			OTHER PLANS	
							COL.	TRNG.	WORK		MIL.
Complete elimination of racial segregation in all regions of the country	% 17	% 21	% 22	% 19	% 20	% 22	% 22	% 18	% 17	% 20	% 16
Separate but completely equal schools	10	8	6	10	7	8	7	10	12	8	8
Freedom of choice to attend public school, integrated or segregated	55	58	59	55	60	56	59	59	53	51	53
No strong feelings; some other	15	11	10	14	10	11	10	10	15	15	17

	COURSE GRADES					REGION			
	VERY LOW	BELOW AVG.	ABOVE AVG.	EXCEL- LENT		EAST	MID- WEST	SOUTH	WEST
Complete elimination of racial segregation in all regions of the country	% 24	% 20	% 18	% 22	% 23	% 29	% 17	% 18	% 17
Separate but completely equal schools	12	11	9	6	11	6	7	13	5
Freedom of choice to attend public school, integrated or segregated	29	47	58	61	51	51	60	56	60
No strong feelings; some other	31	19	12	8	12	10	14	12	13

*ibid., pp. 15a and 16a.

TABLE XXI -cont'd
SCHOOL INTEGRATION*
ADULTS

"Would you, yourself, have any objection to sending your children to a school where a few of the children are Negroes"?	<u>July 1969</u>		
	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No.</u>	
	%	%	
National	11	89	
Age			
21-29 years	9	91	
30-49 years	11	89	
50 and over	8	92	
"Would you, yourself, have any objection to sending your children to a school where half of the children are Negroes"?	<u>July 1969</u>		
	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
	%	%	%
National	32	64	4
Age			
21-29 years	25	70	5
30-49 years	32	64	4
50 and over	36	61	3
"Would you, yourself, have any objection to sending your children to a school where more than half of the children are Negroes"?	<u>July 1969</u>		
	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
National	55	36	9
Age			
21-29 years	44	47	9
30-49 years	59	33	8
50 and over	52	40	8

*Gallup Opinion Index, Report No. 51; September 1969, pp. 5-7.

TABLE XXI cont'd
BUSING OF SCHOOL CHILDREN *
ADULTS

"In general, do you favor or oppose the busing of Negro and White school children from one school district to another"?

	<u>March 1970</u>		
	<u>Favor</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
National	14	81	5
Race			
White	11	85	4
Non-white	37	48	15
Age			
21-29 years	17	80	3
30-49 years	16	79	5
50 and over	10	84	6
Region			
East	19	73	8
Midwest	15	81	4
South	8	87	5
West	13	84	3

In the same year--1970--on the question of race relations the students came out only 1/5 for "complete elimination of racial segregation in all regions of the country." At first this appears low compared to the adult answers as to whether or not they objected to sending their children to integrated schools: 89% of the adults in their parents' age bracket had no objection to schools with "a few" Negroes; 64% had no objection where "half of the children" were Negroes; and 33% had no objection where "more than half" were Negroes.** The reason, however, appears to be because of the nature of the other choices with which high school students could respond

*Gallup Opinion Index, Report No. 58, April 1970, p. 9.

**Gallup Opinion Index, Report No. 51, September 1969, pp. 5-7.

to this question. In the context of these choices this response could easily be viewed as one regarding enforced busing to get integration; and this was objected to by the 65% of the students who preferred other racial arrangements* (compared to 79% of adults in their parents' age bracket, 30-49, who were opposed to busing) and favored by 20% of the students (compared to 16% of the adults in that bracket favoring busing). On the other hand, as some students might find it hard not to subscribe to the "elimination of racial segregation," the question might have attracted more than a straight busing response.

In answer to a straightforward question on whether they approved of a law aimed at "achieving racial balance in schools by busing," 66% of the 15-to-21-year olds in the late 1970 Harris poll said no.** But here again, this poll differs to a significant extent from the Seventeen poll.*** The latter, taken at the same time and covering a 14-to-22-year age group, shows only 53% against "compulsory busing to end school segregation." Furthermore, it shows the oppositon of the 14-to-17-year olds as 51% and the 18 to 22 year olds as 55%. The Purdue Opinion Panel poll given in Table XXI, showed the answers getting more "liberal" as the grade level went up: the 11th grade was more "liberal" than the 10th, the 12th more "liberal" than the 11th. This is usually the case in most issues, so this would indicate if the 14 year olds (most freshmen) were added the objection would be higher.

In the following table, in which a more direct question dealing with specific, well-understood situations, is asked of the high school students, the student opinion is clear, as was that of the adults when they were asked if they would send their children to schools that had Negroes. The 70% of

**"Separate but completely equal schools" plus "Freedom of choice to attend public school, integrated or segregated."

**Harris poll in Life, January 8, 1971, p. 25.

***Seventeen poll, February 1971, p. 125.

the students with no strong objections closely resembles the 64% of "no objection" to the 50-50 level of integration with which their parents responded. The somewhat greater liberalism (73-74%) of the students with college educated parents coincides with the greater "tolerance" of college-educated adults in their poll (67% compared to 64% overall). As indicated earlier, however, many things are not easily predictable with these children. For example, one would expect the increase in tolerance with an increase in grade scores; which consistently occurs-- until one reaches those with "excellent" grades, when it suddenly drops nine points from the "above average" group. This could, of course, be the result of statistical variations; but it is only one of so many such occurrences that one gets the feeling that, as with the adults, one must be constantly on the alert for deviations from what we have come to "expect" from our population.

TABLE XXII* :

RACE RELATIONS
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
(IN PERCENT)

If you do have strong objections to working closely in school with a student of some other race or color than you, check any of the following activities in which you would object to work closely with this student. (You may answer more than one).

	TOTAL SAMPLE	SEX		GRADE			MOTHER'S EDUCATION			FATHER'S EDUCATION		
		BOY	GIRL	10	11	12	GRD.	HIGH	COL.	GRD.	HIGH	COL.
In classroom work	5	6	3	6	5	4	5	4	6	5	4	5
Riding the school bus	5	7	3	6	5	4	6	4	4	5	4	4
Sharing the same locker	12	15	10	14	12	12	14	13	9	14	11	12
Attending school assemblies	4	6	3	5	5	3	4	4	3	5	4	4
Participating in phys. ed.	5	7	4	6	5	4	5	5	5	6	5	5
Participating in extra-curricular activities	5	7	2	5	4	4	4	4	6	5	3	5
Attending school affairs (dances, etc.)	11	12	9	13	11	8	10	11	9	10	11	9
Eating in school cafeteria	7	8	5	8	6	5	7	6	5	8	5	5
Making friends, sharing friendships	7	7	6	7	7	5	7	6	5	7	6	6
No strong objections	70	66	74	68	69	73	67	72	73	68	71	74

* Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 89, June 1970, pp. 15a and 16a.

TABLE XXII* cont'd
(In Percent)

	FUTURE PLANS					REGION				COURSE GRADES				
	SPEC.	OTHER				MID-								
	COL.	TRNG.	WORK	MIL.	PLANS	EAST	WEST	SOUTH	WEST	V. LOW	LOW	AVG.	HIGH	EXCEL.
In classroom work	4	5	5	10	4	5	3	6	5	19	8	4	4	10
Riding the school bus	3	7	8	6	7	3	4	8	3	24	8	4	4	6
Sharing the same locker	9	13	19	17	15	11	11	18	7	26	14	12	12	14
Attending school assemblies	3	5	5	8	5	3	3	6	4	26	5	4	3	6
Participating in phys. ed.	4	5	8	10	5	6	4	7	5	26	9	4	5	9
Participating in extra-curricular activities	3	4	6	8	6	5	4	5	3	24	6	4	3	6
Attending school affairs (dances, etc.)	9	12	12	12	10	9	9	16	4	24	7	10	10	16
Eating in school cafeteria	4	7	11	10	8	6	5	10	4	21	11	5	5	10
Making friends, sharing friendships	5	8	8	12	7	6	7	8	4	24	10	6	5	7
No strong objections	76	65	63	67	65	75	74	58	76	57	63	70	75	66

b. A New Set of Categories

In June of 1970, the Purdue group began to record high school student responses from the point of view of their political "philosophy," in addition to their family background, grade, level of competence, etc. From here on these categories will be occasionally referred to; and since their makeup is not as obvious as others, some effort should be made to describe them and give a sample of which other students' categories they fall within, and vice versa.

The political "philosophy" of the students was based on their choice of responses to the question, "Which of the following do you believe most strongly?" The students who responded that, "There are serious flaws in our society today, but the system is flexible enough to solve them" were labeled the Middle Group; those that reported, "the American way of life is

*Ibid.

superior to that of any other country" were labeled the Conservative Right; and those that chose "The American system is not flexible enough; radical change is needed" were labeled the Radical Left.*

This categorization may well have flaws in it (and I feel there are some large ones); but if we accept it as a rough guide, it is interesting and perhaps helpful for the later portions of this work to see how the students fall into these categories. The following table gives the total and the breakdown for each category:

TABLE XXIII**

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS--APRIL AND NOVEMBER, 1970
(In Percent)

TOTAL SAMPLE	SEX		GRADE			MOTHER'S EDUCATION			FATHER'S EDUCATION		
	BOY	GIRL	10	11	12	GRD.	HIGH	COL.	GRD.	HIGH	COL.
19 [*] 18 [*]	23 20	15 16	20 21	20 16	18 17	20 20	19 18	18 15	19	20	19
46 46	45 46	47 46	43 42	47 46	48 49	40 39	49 46	48 53	44	45	52
18 15	16 15	19 15	19 14	15 16	18 15	20 16	16 14	18 17	18	19	15
17 20	15 18	19 23	17 22	18 21	16 18	20 24	16 21	13 15	20	16	14

FUTURE PLANS					COURSE GRADES***					REGION				
COL.	SPEC. TRNG.	WORK	MIL.	OTHER PLANS	V. LOW	LOW	BEL. AVG.	HIGH AVG.	EXCEL.	EAST	MID-WEST	SOUTH	WEST	
20 17	15 11	20 26	27 28	15 19	33	19	13	19 19	18 18	21 17	17 12	20 19	23 23	14 17
52 51	44 48	36 32	41 38	36 34	17	37	31	42 42	54 53	51 59	46 52	48 48	40 39	49 43
16 13	21 19	21 13	11 14	18 19	21	24	25	18 15	16 12	11 15	18 17	15 13	18 14	20 18
11 18	20	22 26	19 18	29 28	29	18	30	20 23	12 17	15 9	18 18	16 19	17 23	16 22

*Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 89, June 1970, p. 9.

**The first column of figures under each category was taken from the June 1970 Purdue Opinion Panel Poll, pp. 5a and 6a and the second was reported seven months later in the Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 90, January 1971, pp. 3a and 4a. The categories "father's education" and "very low" course grades were not reported in January 1971.

***See the tables on the following pages for the percentage of the student body included in each "future plans" and "course grades" group, and how these figures were arrived at.

A word of explanation must be inserted here about these polls and the 1970 polls in particular. Approximately "9,000 students in public and private schools" participated in the Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll 89.* The percentage of students in each category may be of interest--the students classified themselves as to the grade scores they "usually get in high school" and it came out like this:**

Very low grades	2%
Below average grades	8%
Average grades	51%
Above average grades	31%
Excellent grades	7%

This apparently is the normal distribution of responses to this question in these polls; but, as can be seen, the distribution is skewed toward the above-average area. This makes it a far from even distribution.*** The last figure of 7% excellent grades may be accurate if it were based on being on honor rolls, etc. Those professing to get average grades were closer to what one would expect: 51 percent.

*June 1970, p. 2.

**Ibid, p. 1a.

***This high "self-esteem" apparently is not unusual in all the Purdue polls. Trent and Medsker cite their own findings and those of several other studies over the years indicating that many youngsters also over-estimate their abilities in vocational preferences. (James W. Trent and Leland L. Medsker, Beyond High School [San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., 1968] pp. 41 and 42.)

Bachman, in Youth in Transition - a study of tenth grade boys, isolates those groups with the higher self-esteem. He found his results "surprising: black males score noticeably higher than whites on our self-esteem scale, and when adjustments are made for other background factors the difference becomes larger." Jewish boys, from another minority with a history of discrimination, also score much higher in "self-esteem" than other students. (Jerald G. Bachman, Youth in Transition, Vol. II [Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute for Social Research, The University of Michigan, 1970], pp. 129, 130.)

The percentage breakdown for post-high school careers as designated by the students are as follows:*

Go to college	50%
Special training other than college	15%
Go to work	12%
Enter military service	8%
Other plans or don't know	15%

A comparison of high school students with their parents according to this method is not possible because adults are not categorized by their answers to philosophical questions but are merely asked to categorize themselves. Furthermore, the categories for adults (they were only given two choices) do not match those used for the students; but, for what it is worth, this is the breakdown on adults for the same time periods:**

Conservative	52%
Liberal	34%
No opinion	14%

Normally this national average equates roughly to the "center" group of 30-49 year olds, which incorporates the parents of the high school students (e.g., in May 1970: National: 27% Liberal; 47% Conservative; 26% No opinion).***

Of perhaps more interest are the grades of the students in the various "ideological" categories. The excellent students have the fewest in the Radical Left (11% and 15%); the second largest group of excellent students are Conservative Right (21% and 17%) and the largest number (51% and 59%) are in the Middle Group. The above average (high) students broke down the same way: Radical Left, smallest (16% and 12%); Conservative Right

*Ibid. Note on Table XXIII p. 40 the similarity of college-bound students to the excellent and high students in their political orientation. Of the 50% of high school students bound for college, 20% are Conservative Right, 52% Middle Group, and only 16% Radical Left.


**Gallup Opinion Index, Report No. 60, June 1970, p. 15.

***Gallup Opinion Index, Report No. 59, May 1970, p. 8.

next (18%); Middle Group (54% and 53%): so did the average students (18% and 15%; 42%; 19%). In fact, as table XXIII and the graph below show, as one goes down the grade scores, the Middle Group percentages decrease. At the Below Average level we run into a scattering of results with a drop in the Conservative Right and the Middle Group percentages and the largest increase in the no opinion category (from 18% to 30%). The relatively high reading (25% and 24%) for the Radical Left in the below average category remained the same.

FIGURE IV

COURSE GRADES BY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS



Normally there is likely to be a recognizable comparison between intelligence and the mean scores in primary and even secondary schools of selected groups of students; that is, a higher average I.Q. score is more likely to be found in an excellent group than in a low one, or even in a truly above-average group rather than in an average one. Assuming that the relative standing which the students picked for themselves bears some relationship to their real relative standing, the overwhelming majority (72%) of the students in the excellent and above average categories fall into the Middle Group and Conservative Right; and only a small minority of these high achievers (11% excellent, 16% above average) fit into the Radical Left. Although the relationships between intelligence and high school grades hold in most cases, there are some intelligent students whose grades do not reflect their intelligence because they cannot, or will not, adjust to the structured curriculum and regulations of the school. These students may well be found within the Radical Left. Nevertheless, the intelligence/grades relationship is probably the best measure readily available.

This evidence, as well as the trends indicated by the slopes of the curves mentioned earlier, cannot be completely ignored when we begin to evaluate "ideological" groups of high school students or even college students. And these high school groupings apparently have some significance. For example, they seem to think somewhat differently about basic educational issues.

TABLE XXIV*

THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE AND NEED FOR DISCIPLINE
(In Percent)

<u>Need for discipline</u>	<u>Conservative Right</u>	<u>Middle Group</u>	<u>Radical Left</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
From parents & school	36	32	22	33
From parents only	30	26	22	20
From schools only	2	1	2	2
From themselves only	21	30	36	27
Have enough now	10	9	17	17

c. The "Generation Gap" and Anti-Establishmentism

Since the vast majority of students fall under the categories of Conservative Right, Middle Group and Undecided, the above chart gives some indication that the students are not that adverse to advice, or even "discipline," from the two groups of adult "authority figures" in their lives--their parents and teachers. Furthermore, a study group from Purdue Opinion Panel, who analyzed volumes of such data in late 1969, said of the fruits of this research, published in January 1970, that "no evidence of a generation gap was revealed by these results."** They substantiate their position by the following table, which shows the results of asking students what their gripes about young people were, having them rank them and then having the students rank what they thought their parents' gripes were.

*Ibid., p. 13.

**Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 87, January 1970, p. 4.

TABLE XXV*

BIGGEST GRIPE ABOUT YOUNG PEOPLE TODAY

Rank	<u>Students</u>		<u>Parents</u>	
	Gripe	Percent	Gripe	Percent
1	use of drugs	50	use of drugs	43
2	lack of respect for authority	29	lack of respect for authority	37
3	undisciplined behavior	25	irresponsible	35
4	irresponsible	14	manner of dress, appearance	30
5	manner of dress, appearance	11	undisciplined behavior	24
6	overindulged	7	overindulged	15
7	impatience	6	impatience	9
8	no complaints	11	no complaints	3

The above vote probably reflects, to a large degree, the "perceptions" of the parents' "value system."

"Parents may communicate their value systems to their children; children may or may not perceive this communication. If values have been communicated in some way by parents, and have been perceived by their children, then children should be able to report these perceptions. Children may acquire their parents' value system to some degree, ignore it, or reject it."**

With similar value systems and apparent respect for parents and teachers (the recognition for the need for their discipline as well as those other indicators mentioned earlier are examples of such respect), it is difficult for students to fit into an extreme rebel mold. However, a new "indicator," which may create a way for some students to bypass the commonly-held value systems, has gained currency in recent times. This new twist is the idea of something other than the family and the country--and all the economic, governmental and social things that make it up--being identified as part of the environment, and perhaps an evil part of it. This is the idea of "the establishment." As indicated before,

*Ibid., p. 3.

**Ibid., p. 4.

the majority of students thought this country was the best that one could find or that the country was flexible enough to change and to correct any wrongs that existed in it. On this issue, 6 to 8% of the students appear to be very anti-establishment and another 12 to 15% are "probables" on the anti-establishment scale. An even larger percentage (41-45%) are undecided whether or not they will ever "hold the same beliefs" or "work within" the establishment ("maybe and maybe not; I don't know"). Only 13% identify strongly with this vague thing called the establishment, and another 21% are "probables" for the pro-establishment scale.* This is a smaller percentage than those shown in favor of the country, the home, business, etc., in other charts.


There is apparently, however, some confusion about exactly what this establishment is (41-45% are undecided), as well as apparent opposition to it for being both too far right and too far left. One also gets the feeling that the idea is abroad that this is somehow or other a dirty word. The following bar chart, made up from data from the Purdue Opinion Panel, poll No. 89, referenced above, shows that even those students who, in the period after school, intend to become part of some of the most important segments of the establishment say they will never have anything to do with it or that they doubt they will have anything to do with it. For example, those who are taking specialized training, much of it in such things as computer programming, and so forth--which means they are going to work for the government or for a far from tiny corporation--say they are not going along with the establishment. Those who say they intend to enter the military after

*Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 87, January 1970, pp. 5a and 6a, and No. 89, June 1970, pp. 9a and 10a.

school have the highest percentage--14%--of those who say they will never have anything to do with the establishment. They apparently feel that the "establishment" is too far left, since this group had a stronger preference for Wallace in 1968 and was largely from the South. Those who intend to go on to college show only 6% who say they will never have anything to do with the establishment and a somewhat larger percentage saying they doubt they will have anything to do with it. For purposes of this chart, as well as the graph that follows it, we have lumped the "certains" and "probables" both "pro" and "anti" together.

FIGURE V*

JOIN THE ESTABLISHMENT
High School Students




*Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 89, June 1970, pp. 9a and 10a.

There are some groups that may have a better idea as to what the establishment is, and why they oppose it. One of these groups, the Negroes, has a strong bias toward the "Radical Left" and also is anti-establishment. Perhaps many Negroes feel that the white upper middle class is the establishment and they are not part of it. Nevertheless, we are left with the feeling that there may be some confusion on the part of many other students as to exactly what it is they are opposing and why.

As indicated in the following graph, as the grade scores--and presumably the intelligence of the students--go up, the support for the establishment goes up. In fact, when one reaches the students with excellent grade scores, support for the establishment touches 49 to 50%. Conversely, as the grade scores of the students goes down, the acceptance of the establishment goes down. There is a slight exception to this among the excellent students, where there is a variation of 2% of this 7% of the student body. The following graph shows the results of two surveys in January and June 1970.

FIGURE VI*



- 1 - - - - - JANUARY 1970 } MAYBE, MAYBE NOT; DON'T KNOW
- 2 - · - · - · JUNE 1970 } MAYBE, MAYBE NOT; DON'T KNOW
- 3 - · - · - · JUNE 1970 } I MIGHT, IT'S DOUBTFUL;
- 4 - - - - - JANUARY 1970 } I NEVER WILL
- 5 - - - - - JUNE 1970 } I SUPPOSE I WILL SOMEDAY;
- 6 - - - - - JANUARY 1970 } I KNOW I WILL

*Purdue Opinion Panel, Polls No. 87 and 89, January and June, 1970. Note the similarity to the graph on page 43, in the comparison of the degree of "radicalism" with grade scores.

d. Drugs

If the establishment is a vague, perhaps relatively nonthreatening phenomenon, other things do seem to concern the young considerably. Their feelings about the use of drugs, including marijuana, and their attitude toward those who use drugs, is a case in point. The assumption of relatively high use, apparently a worry to their parents, seems also to be reflected by the opinion of the students:

TABLE XXVI*

USE OF DRUGS IN HIGH SCHOOL
High School Students
(In Percent)

Among all high school students everywhere, how many do you think have tried using marijuana or another drug, as much as once?

	TOTAL SAMPLE	SEX		GRADE			MOTHER'S EDUCATION			FAMILY INCOME		
		BOY	GIRL	10	11	12	GRD.	HIGH	COL.	LOW	AVG.	HIGH
Very few (about 1 in a hundred)	16	21	11	18	15	14	20	15	9	19	16	12
Few of them (less than 10 percent)	31	35	27	31	30	33	29	33	30	33	31	31
Several of them (more than 10 percent)	38	33	43	35	38	40	36	37	44	33	38	41
Approximately half	15	11	19	15	16	13	15	15	17	14	14	16

	TOTAL	COURSE GRADES				REGION				INFLUENCE			
		BEL. AVG.	AVG.	HIGH	EXCEL.	EAST	MID-WEST	SOUTH	WEST	GREAT	CON-SIDER.	MODE-RATE	LITTLE/SOME
Very few (about 1 in a hundred)	18	17	13	15	14	17	20	8	15	12	16	19	20
Few of them (less than 10 percent)	31	33	31	20	30	38	31	21	27	34	33	30	25
Several of them (more than 10 percent)	30	33	43	55	39	34	36	45	41	42	36	33	31
Approximately half	18	16	13	9	17	11	11	26	16	11	15	17	21

Yet when they were asked about the use of marijuana in their own school, they gave quite different answers:

*Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 86, March 1969, pp. 13a and 14a.

TABLE XXVII*

USE OF DRUGS IN OWN SCHOOL
High School Students
(In Percent)

In your own school, how many students do you think have tried out marijuana or another drug?

	TOTAL SAMPLE	BOY	GIRL	10	11	12	GRD.	HIGH	COL.	LOW	AVG.	HIGH	INFLUENCE					
													BEL. AVG.	HIGH	EXCEL.	MID-EAST	WEST	SOUTH WEST
Very few (less than one percent)	50	55	45	51	51	47	55	50	37	55	54	40						
Few of them (less than 10 percent)	28	25	30	29	28	26	26	28	32	26	26	31						
Several of them (more than ten percent)	14	13	16	12	13	19	11	16	16	11	13	20						
Approximately half	6	5	7	6	7	7	5	5	13	5	5	8						

A later poll, in late 1970, indicated a similar lack of concern, compared to their parents, over the problem in their own public schools.**

Marijuana and other drugs are increasingly being used by students. Do you think it is a serious problem in your public schools?

	Public School Parents	Parochial School Parents	High School Juniors and Seniors
Yes	56%	69%	39%
No	31%	18%	59%
Don't know	13%	13%	2%

The phenomenon of the "under-use" of drugs among high school students was also evident in an October 1969 survey of all 45 high schools in Montgomery County, Maryland (a county bordering Washington, D.C.). Almost half of the students polled believed "that more than one of their closest friends used marijuana." The study's sponsors considered that this "constitutes a dramatic

*Ibid., pp. 17a and 18a.

**Gallup Opinion Index, Report No. 66, December 1970, p. 17.

overestimate," which they interpreted to indicate a trend toward more drug use and abuse. The study showed that actually about 1/5 of high school students and 7% of junior high school students had tried marijuana. A summary of the study's findings follows:

TABLE XXVIII*

SELF-REPORT ON USE OF DRUGS, ALCOHOLIC DRINKS, AND CIGARETTES
IN MONTGOMERY COUNTY SCHOOLS

USE OF PRODUCT	MARIJUANA			HEROIN			AMPHETAMINES			LSD		
	JUNIOR HIGH	SENIOR HIGH	TOTAL	JUNIOR HIGH	SENIOR HIGH	TOTAL	JUNIOR HIGH	SENIOR HIGH	TOTAL	JUNIOR HIGH	SENIOR HIGH	TOTAL
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
I've never tried it	93.28	79.67	86.63	96.57	95.10	95.86	96.38	90.28	93.41	96.71	91.06	94.45
I've tried but quit	2.73	7.27	4.93	0.42	1.19	0.79	1.12	4.53	2.77	0.70	2.15	1.40
I use it almost once a month	1.54	4.30	2.68	0.07	0.15	0.11	0.42	2.08	1.22	0.28	2.08	1.15
I use it almost once a week	0.68	4.30	2.41	0.0	0.22	0.11	0.07	0.82	0.43	0.07	1.19	0.61
I use it almost every day	0.0	2.82	1.37	0.0	0.37	0.18	0.0	0.37	0.18	0.07	0.37	0.22
No response	1.82	1.63	1.73	2.94	2.97	2.95	2.03	1.93	1.98	2.17	2.15	2.16
USE OF PRODUCT	BARBITURATES			GLUE			ALCOHOLIC DRINKS			CIGARETTES		
	JUNIOR HIGH	SENIOR HIGH	TOTAL	JUNIOR HIGH	SENIOR HIGH	TOTAL	JUNIOR HIGH	SENIOR HIGH	TOTAL	JUNIOR HIGH	SENIOR HIGH	TOTAL
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
I've never tried it	96.71	90.80	93.84	91.74	90.73	91.25	67.81	35.01	51.89	55.42	33.16	44.62
I've tried it but quit	0.77	4.82	2.74	5.25	6.38	5.80	15.82	19.44	17.57	29.39	39.24	34.17
I use it almost once a month	0.28	1.85	1.04	0.77	0.59	0.68	9.03	26.85	17.68	3.71	3.41	3.56
I use it almost once a week	0.07	0.22	0.14	0.35	0.22	0.29	4.48	14.47	9.33	2.31	2.82	2.56
I use it almost every day	0.0	0.30	0.14	0.21	0.22	0.22	1.05	2.52	1.76	8.05	20.25	3.97
No response	2.17	2.00	2.09	1.68	1.85	1.76	1.82	1.71	1.76	1.12	1.11	1.12

Between "a third and one half of the junior high and between one-fourth and one-third of high school students said they did not know" what factors lead to drug use. Those who did know rated "the desire to be 'turned on'"

*"Use of Drugs in Montgomery County Found Less Than Predicted," The Washington Post, March 11, 1970, p. 70.

first; "factors such as 'being bored in school,' 'preparing for exams,' and 'worries about war and riots' received little support."^{*}

Perhaps more interesting in the Purdue data is how the students feel about the "drug environment"; for example, their attitude towards others who use drugs. The weight of opinion is that their friendship would be affected if they discovered that a friend used marijuana. Using those who are sure it would change their relationship as a measure, with a 2% exception for those in the "excellent" category, the feeling of "tolerance" tends to decrease as the grade scores go up. In the "probable" areas, the "probably would" follows this pattern without the 2% exception, but the "probably would not" shows more "tolerance" at the upper end of the scale. But more significant is the tolerance of the children of higher income families, from which a higher percentage of excellent students come, than in the lower grade levels. This tendency toward tolerance may be due to liberal ideas, but it may also be due to a relative lack of experience with drug users among the children in this category. When listing pet gripes about young people, for example (see p. 46), although they too had drug use at the top of the list, it was by a smaller percentage than any group except the 2% of students in the "very poor" grade category, which may contain a relatively high number of the drug users. In fact, with the exception of the "very poor" students, as the grade score category decreases, the percentage of students supporting drug use as the top gripe increases.^{**} This may also reflect a greater

^{*}This desire to be turned on was also given for the reason for the increasing switch to hard drugs on the college campuses... "It's the greatest high there is." The New York Times, Sunday, January 17, 1971, p. 52.

^{**}Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 87, January 1970, pp. 1a and 2a.

amount of experience with drug users by students in less affluent neighborhoods, who are less likely to be found in the upper grade score categories than affluent students. It may also reflect a different attitude by parents according to the grade scores of their children and the level of their own education (college graduates are the most lenient; grade school graduates the least);* but this also reflects their income and, in turn, their neighborhoods. There is even more striking evidence of this regional dependency and its relationship to the number of drug users in the area. Parents in the East and West show the highest percentages (45% and 51% respectively) naming drug use by children as their top gripe; the Midwest has it rated second (37%) after "irresponsibility" (38%).** Also, the probability of "tolerance" is greatest among the children with the lowest rapport with their parents.***

TABLE XXIX****

If you discovered that a person with whom you had associated was using marijuana or drugs, would it change the relationship between you?	TOLERANCE TOWARDS THOSE USING DRUGS												
	HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS												
	(In Percent)												
	TOTAL SAMPLE	SEX		GRADE			MOTHER'S EDUCATION			FAMILY INCOME			
		BOY	GIRL	10	11	12	GRD.	HIGH	COL.	LOW	AVG.	HIGH	
Yes, it would	43	43	44	47	45	39	49	42	35	49	44	39	
Undecided; probably would	22	21	22	22	20	23	20	22	24	21	22	33	
Undecided; probably would not	13	13	14	11	13	16	11	14	17	11	13	14	
No, it would not	20	21	19	19	20	21	19	20	22	18	19	23	
	COURSE GRADES				REGION				INFLUENCE				
	BEL.				MID-				CON-			LITTLE	
	AVG.	AVG.	HIGH	EXCEL.	EAST	WEST	SOUTH	WEST	GREAT	SIDER.	MODE-	SOME	NO
Yes, it would	39	44	44	42	35	41	56	39	49	41	43	47	35
Undecided; probably would	16	21	23	23	22	23	21	21	16	24	26	21	13
Undecided; probably would not	13	12	14	18	17	15	9	14	12	15	12	12	17
No, it would not	30	21	17	17	25	20	12	25	22	18	17	19	33

*Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 87, January 1970, pp. 1a and 2a.

**Ibid., pp. 7a and 8a.

***Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 86, March 1969, pp. 13a and 14a.

****Ibid., pp. 13a and 14a.

On the other hand, the percentage of those students who feel "social pressure" is likely to influence young people to try drugs increases as their grades improve, although there is no obvious pattern relating to rapport with their parents.

TABLE XXX*

SOCIAL PRESSURE TO USE DRUGS

HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS

(In Percent)

How many high school students do you think would try using a drug or a narcotic if they knew they would be called "chicken" or "baby" for refusing?

	TOTAL SAMPLE	SEX		GRADE			MOTHER'S EDUCATION			FAMILY INCOME		
		BOY	GIRL	10	11	12	GRD.	HIGH	COL.	LOW	AVG.	HIGH
Very few of them	36	44	28	35	34	38	35	38	31	35	36	35
Some, but not very many	40	38	41	37	42	40	38	39	44	40	40	41
Not more than half	14	9	19	14	14	14	15	14	15	13	15	15
At least half, maybe more	6	4	8	8	6	4	7	6	4	8	5	5
Most of them	4	4	4	5	3	3	5	3	4	4	4	3

	COURSE GRADES				REGION				INFLUENCE				
	BEL. AVG.	AVG.	HIGH	EXCEL.	EAST	WEST	SOUTH	WEST	GREAT	SIDER.	MODE- RATE	SOME	LITTLE/ NO
Very few of them	40	37	35	22	35	35	40	32	36	33	36	39	38
Some, but not very many	38	39	41	44	41	44	35	40	36	45	42	33	35
Not more than half	9	14	15	21	14	13	13	18	16	12	14	16	13
At least half, maybe more	5	6	7	4	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	6	8
Most of them	8	4	2	7	3	2	6	3	4	2	2	6	6

Hard data on the students' attitudes toward drugs and even on the numbers of high school students who have tried marijuana at least once, are somewhat less than satisfactory. Surveys made--the Purdue polls, the Montgomery County study, several 1967 and 1968 studies of San Francisco area high schools, two high schools in the suburbs of New York City and high schools in the state of Michigan--range from 0% to as much as 33% having tried it in some urban San Francisco area schools.** There may be many schools with much higher numbers of users; and the Purdue Panel Poll estimates by the students of the number of

*Ibid., pp. 13a and 14a.

**Extent of Illicit Drug Use: A Compilation of Studies, Surveys and Polls, by Dorothy F. Berg, Division of Drug Sciences, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, United States Department of Justice.

drug users in the same schools as the students polled--shown previously in Table XXVII--shows a distinct difference between the East and the West compared to the rest of the country. In 1969, however, very heavy experimentation and/or use apparently was going on in a relatively small number of schools; only 10% of the Eastern students and 12% of the Western students estimated that half the student population had tried "marijuana or another drug." Overall, 50% of the students estimated less than 1% of the students in their school had tried "marijuana or another drug," and another 28% estimated that less than 10% had done so. Nevertheless, the high levels of drug use in some schools and the dangers from drugs seem to have made an impression on the students.

The fear of drugs, including marijuana, which was indicated by rating their use as top on their "worst habits" list in 1970, had been reflected in their overwhelming disapproval of the legalization of the possession and sale of marijuana in an early 1969 poll. The tendency to disapprove (including "undecided; probably disapprove") is about 80% across all grade categories except below average students, who show more approval. There is also a break in the pattern of absolute disapproval--which goes up as the grade scores go up--when the excellent grade score group is reached. Here it drops to 64% compared to 71% for "above average" students, 66% for "average" students, and 56% for "below average." Here again, the neighborhood (income level) may be a more important barometer and probably affects the attitudes of the better students. At least 75% across all districts and about 80% across all levels of rapport with their parents--except the very poor level (who again show more approval)--disapproved and "probably" disapproved.

TABLE XXXI*

LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
(In Percent)

Some people urge that the sale and possession of marijuana, which is now illegal, should be legalized. How do you feel about this?

	TOTAL SAMPLE	SEX		GRADE			MOTHER'S EDUCATION			FAMILY INCOME		
		BOY	GIRL	10	11	12	GRD.	HIGH	COL.	LOW	AVG.	HIGH
Approve	11	14	8	10	11	13	10	11	15	12	9	15
Undecided; probably approve	7	7	7	6	7	9	7	7	9	6	7	8
Undecided; probably disapprove	13	14	12	13	13	14	12	14	14	12	13	15
Disapprove	66	62	71	69	67	63	69	66	60	68	70	61

	COURSE GRADES				REGION				INFLUENCE				
	BEL. AVG.	AVG.	HIGH	EXCEL.	EAST	MID- WEST	SOUTH	WEST	GREAT	CON- SIDER.	MODE- RATE	SOME	LITTLE/ NO
Approve	24	11	9	10	13	12	7	15	13	8	8	13	23
Undecided; probably approve	11	7	6	7	10	7	4	7	6	6	8	7	8
Undecided; probably disapprove	10	14	12	16	14	15	9	16	11	15	14	12	12
Disapprove	56	66	71	64	62	64	76	60	69	69	68	66	54

*Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 86, March 1969, pp. 7a and 8a.

In answer to a slightly different but similar question, "Should marijuana be legalized?" in a late 1970 Harris poll, 15-18-year-old high school students registered 70% "No."^{*} As Table XXXI indicates, even if we eliminate the 10th graders-- who include the 14-year-old students--the juniors and seniors, almost all over 15 years, showed 80% and 77% "disapproving" or "undecided; probably disapproving." The assumption must be made that, unless one of the samples was invalid (which is unlikely), many or even most of the "probables" on the disapproval side may have been drawn over to the other side. A shift of 8 or 9% in 20 months could be significant if it is "real" and if it continues. In the same Harris poll some other interesting questions were asked:^{**}

"Why don't even more young people use marijuana?"

1. fear of damaging their health
2. fear of arrest

"What reasons for not using it impress you least?"

1. fear of school authorities
2. parental disapproval

"If legalized, would not pot smoking become as common as drinking?"

Yes - 71%

Also, 62% of high school students and 53% of college students said they believed marijuana leads to "hard drinking and addiction."

These answers speak volumes, not only about drug use, but about basic issues of child rearing, effective constraints, school administrations, etc. They also tend to lend credence to the opinions of the average citizen

^{*}Louis Harris poll, Life, January 8, 1971, p. 26.

^{**}Ibid., p. 26.

on these issues. Indications of the possible effects of de facto legalization of marijuana in such places as college campuses are now numerous.* The difficulties in keeping it away from minors in such a milieu (even in the army) are also becoming apparent.

Actual numbers of drug users in 1969 and in the spring of 1970 could have been higher than the polls indicate (though this is not likely to have a high probability), or there could have been a vast increase in drug experimentation and use over the last year.** A recently reported survey of Pennsylvania high schools reportedly lists "one of every five high school seniors as a "high user" and states that one in every ten students "are regularly using drugs in large amounts."*** Polls of college students-- which will be discussed later--show a spectacular increase in the use of drugs of all types on our campuses in the past year and a half. But what might be even more important is the "self-fulfilling prophecy" possibility

*"Marijuana is the common denominator among all groups. The acceptance it has gained is so widespread that prosecution for possession has relaxed at a number of colleges. In the minds of many, it has been declassified as a narcotic." (The New York Times, Sunday, January 17, 1971, p. 52.) This article goes on to point out that some of the "way-out" students are now shifting to alcohol, both to enhance the effects of marijuana and to substitute for it. The less "far-out" students, on the other hand, are now taking to marijuana in ever-increasing numbers.

**Some data such as answers to questions like the following are of value if compared to other years to show possible trends. They do not give very hard data, however. A blatant heroin user, for example, would cause a big splash and be known by everybody in a very conservative school where no one else used it, etc.:

Do you personally know anyone who has used -

	<u>High School</u>	<u>College</u>
Marijuana	Yes 62%	Yes 83%
Amphetamines	Yes 41%	Yes 62%
LSD	Yes 35%	Yes 57%
Heroin	Yes 19%	Yes 35%

(Harris poll, Life, January 8, 1971, p. 26.)

***The Philadelphia Inquirer, November 28, 1970, p. 6.

here. One can't ignore the overall consensus "feeling" of high drug-use (even higher than it is), the "legitimacy" which goes with widespread use, and the approval of "prestigious" men--for this affects the way people behave. Furthermore, this could be a high-risk (even if not as high a probability) situation where (like danger to life from aircraft accidents), prudent people do not want the probability to increase and most people would prefer to reduce it.

e. Alienation and Decision-Making

The current changes in attitudes in our society that may be significant are, obviously, those which could alter or circumvent the value systems held by the young. Whether the changes are for better or worse depends to some degree on the value system of the one making the judgment. There are, however, some "absolutes" which any prudent man, regardless of his persuasions, cannot ignore. If there are truly signs of a breakdown in the value system of a significant segment of our youth or even a method of substituting for or bypassing it, which will not hold up under sober examination by a twenty-year-old, we must be concerned. If there is any chance of such a breakdown, there is also a chance--perhaps even a better one than that of a drastic, harmful change in our society--that we may be encouraging a situation which is more likely to increase the probability of rearing a number of somewhat disturbed minors. This cannot be "good" by any standards related to the real world. Under normal circumstances, the danger of such a situation is insignificant; and even in the somewhat odd situation today, it is not great. The "normal," traditional situation finds truly concerned family adults calming the fears of the young facing an uncertain world and helping them over the rough spots. This brings with it all the problems of such an

association (including, eventually, the "in-law" problem), with adults often attempting to be helpful in areas that, despite their love and concern, are not closely analagous to their own experiences. Overall, however, there may be a real question today about which method has more shortcomings--the old, family approach (perhaps less effective than of old) or the extreme, and even not so extreme, independent, "youth-cult" method. It remains to be seen whether significant numbers of educators, members of the media and public figures chose wisely when they apparently read greater benefits into the latte "life style" and to some extent even underwrote it.

A hesitancy to subscribe to the "new" youth-cult approach need not be based solely on the alarm over it demonstrated by parents (although any researcher ignores the overwhelming concern by parents on family issues at his peril), but from lack of convincing evidence that it is a wise approach from a purely "horse-sense" point of view. Young people are being asked to make decisions in areas in which they may not be emotionally stable enough to do so. Furthermore, they are simultaneously being discouraged from getting the competent, truly concerned, loving adults to help them over the rough spots. They (and we) are told that they are more intelligent and better educated than earlier students moving through the school systems. First, this may not be that relevant. Emotional stability may not have improved, and the new "youth cult" milieu may be full of pitfalls with which earlier generations did not have to cope. For example, making an honest, unbiased decision "based on conscience" about the validity of a war in which one has such possible personal involvement as fighting in that

war is a big order for any man, let alone a teenager.* If one then offers an interesting circumvention of this difficult and frightening duty, based on the idea that the one with real courage is the one who refuses to serve, not the one who gets shot at, life may really get difficult for many young men. They may, of course, attempt to rationalize themselves into the former frame of mind if they are called up; but when they look at themselves in the mirror in the morning, they may have difficulty in suppressing

*The results of the following poll of college students taken in 1968, a year when casualties in Vietnam (though relatively very light compared to our other wars) were heavy enough to generate a massive publicizing of them, complete with detailed pictures and interviews, raises some interesting questions:

"If [you] plan to avoid military service which one of the three reasons is most important to you in trying to avoid military service--because you feel we are involved in an illegal and immoral war in Vietnam, or because you have better things to do than wasting two years of your life, or because you frankly want to avoid the possibility of getting yourself killed?"

	<u>Freshmen</u>	<u>Seniors</u>
1. Immoral war	35%	29%
2. Have better things to do	46%	54%
3. Don't want to get killed	14%	13%
4. No answer	5%	3%

(The Beliefs and Attitudes of Male College Seniors, Freshmen and Alumni, a Study by Roper Research Associates, Inc., prepared for Standard Oil Company, New Jersey, May 1969.)

If a man really believes choice number one without a selfish motivation, and does not wish to further an immoral cause (i.e., war and killing; it's harder on the selective objection to specific war; one has to know a good deal about the issues and both the long-term and short-term good resulting, or evil reduced or eliminated, through the war, vs. the destruction from the battles), he probably falls into the same category as other conscientious objectors. These are well adjusted, honest men who, primarily for religious reasons, do not believe in war. (Some of these conscientious objectors have served valiantly under fire as unarmed, combat medical men, helping the wounded of both sides.) Men have refused to serve in all our wars and in greater numbers than today, no matter how "righteous" the wars were. This was so in World War II and in our Civil War, when Union troops felt they were fighting to save the Union and abolish slavery. The one thing all wars have in common is that one can get hurt in them; and every man in his right mind is afraid of getting hit in a war. One must ask if this idea is really more obscure or immaterial to over 80% of those who "plan to avoid military service" today.

other insights, or imagined insights, into their motives. This may also hold true, but to a lesser degree, for many of those who "drop out" of, or simply won't try, difficult jobs, school, etc., because the "establishment is corrupt." Maybe so; but often the quizzes and tasks were also difficult for them; and unless they are complete charlatans, even with themselves, they may end up with more self-doubts than ever. Many of these problems, therefore, may be traceable to parents and high school instructors who provided insufficient training and guidance and forced decisions on the youngsters before they were ready for them. The decisions involved in "doing your own thing" are not necessarily easily made; they can be very difficult and even disturbing, especially to the young. But apparently for the usual, obvious reasons, many of the young seem to be the last to admit that they fear to--or cannot--cope with the decisions.

In a survey taken by the Purdue group in January of 1968, there were some indications that the high school students (particularly girls) were somewhat less likely to be influenced by their parents than by their teachers:

TABLE XXXII*
INFLUENCE BY PARENTS AND TEACHERS
On High School Students

	TOTAL SAMPLE	SEX	
		BOY	GIRL
I question many of my parents' attitudes and beliefs.			
Disagree	30	33	28
Unsure; but probably disagree	8	9	8
Unsure; but probably agree	11	13	10
Agree	50	46	53
I question many of my teachers' attitudes and beliefs.			
Disagree	35	33	36
Unsure; but probably disagree	11	12	11
Unsure; but probably agree	13	13	13
Agree	40	42	38

*Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 82, January 1968. Girls also registered slightly more "Radical Left" and significantly less "Conservative Right" in the June 1970 poll mentioned earlier in this section.

This far-from-unusual attitude toward teachers might be very important today. Teachers have always been lodestones for some adolescents, particularly those who were having difficulties with their parents. Traditionally this was not in the least disturbing. Teachers were, to an exceptional degree, stable people who had a genuine interest in the young and who gently, but firmly assisted them through the difficult periods and guided them back toward the influence and value system of their families and the world in which they must live. Today, the vast majority of adults still understand the necessity of such action; but some adults, other than the members of their families, apparently feel that acquiescing in, or even abetting, the resulting degree of alienation of some youth from their families is justified on the basis of political or social reasons. A small, but apparently growing, minority of high school teachers today seem to see their role as propagating humanist left values. To some degree they (but not nearly so much as college instructors) are aided in abetting the alienation of children from their families by the attitudes of some people in the public media and even by some public figures. This occurs not so much by outright approval of radical youth, but rather by "praising with faint damning," which tends to transmit approval to the youngsters: "I don't agree with their actions, but in the environment of what they consider to be the immoral Vietnam war, nuclear weapons, etc..." In short, the focus is on the political statements of the young, presumably by feeling that they reach these positions for the same reasons and in the same way adults do.

Not surprising are indications that, as one goes down the scale of student competence, measured by grade scores (intelligence?)--at least to the "below average" category, students tend to have less rapport with their parents and to have fewer opinions on issues. It is also not surprising that "alienated" students should more frequently appear at the lower end of the scale. This is a general phenomenon which has been noticeable over a long period of time and may simply mean that some students are having difficulties both at home and in school. Nor does this occurrence necessarily coincide with economic status and environment; though there is, of course, a relationship between the I.Q. of the parents and the students, and, in turn, a general relationship between income and level of the parents and of education. Many "underprivileged" students, however, have generally good rapport with their parents, as indicated by the percentage of Negro, Puerto Rican and Indian children, who rate their influence on family decisions as high.

TABLE XXXIII*

RACE AND AUTONOMY IN THE FAMILY
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
(In Percent)

<u>Influence-Family</u>	<u>RACE</u>			
	<u>White</u>	<u>Negro</u>	<u>American Indian</u>	<u>Puerto Rican</u>
Great deal	24	32	32	42
Considerable	30	22	11	0
Moderate	23	19	18	8
Some	15	18	21	33
Little or no	7	8	18	17

These parents may have less time to spend with their children (the fathers frequently "moonlight" on a second job and many mothers work) and, furthermore, the children may be less likely to get assistance from the

*Purdue Opinion Panel, Pol No. 89, June 1970, p. 12. Of course, many alienated youth will have dropped out of school as soon as legally possible and will not appear in the Purdue data.

parents on more complicated school work and in decisions on complex foreign policy issues, etc. The relationship of the school to these students is important, but also a little hard to define. Here, the non-white opinion splits, with blacks quite close to the whites in feelings of autonomy:

TABLE XXXIV*
RACE AND AUTONOMY IN SCHOOL
High School Students
(In Percent)

<u>Influence-School</u>	<u>White</u>	<u>Negro</u>	<u>American Indian</u>	<u>Puerto Rican</u>
Great deal	31	28	18	8
Considerable	26	22	16	17
Moderate	18	16	24	25
Some	14	18	13	8
Little or No	10	15	26	42

And in the matter of discipline, one gets some feeling for the attitudes of these students in an important area where they can make a judgment:

TABLE XXXV**
RACE AND NEED FOR DISCIPLINE
High School Students
(In Percent)

<u>Need for Discipline</u>	<u>Race</u>			
	<u>White</u>	<u>Negro</u>	<u>American Indian</u>	<u>Puerto Rican</u>
From parents and school	31%	34%	24%	8%
From parents only	25	22	18	25
From schools only	1	2	8	8
From themselves only	30	24	24	25
Have enough now	11	16	26	33

The need for discipline in the schools expressed by Negro students was reflected by the opinion of non-white adults, including their parents:***

SCHOOLS ARE:

	<u>Not strict enough</u>	<u>Just about right</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
White	52%	32%	14%
Non-white	62%	21%	13%

*Ibid., p. 12.

**Ibid., p. 13.

***Gallup Opinion Index, December 1970, p. 17.

It is interesting to compare this "square" approach to the issue by all Negro students and their parents (as well as by all youth: late in 1970, only 10% said their parents were "too strict" and 8% thought they were "too permissive"*) with the opinions of the "Radical Left" students shown on p. 49 of this section. The vast majority of students, in fact, show a good adjustment to their parents, school and surroundings.

Even an "anti-establishment" attitude, however, does not necessarily mean that students are alienated from their families. In fact, among those students who are "right-wing" anti-establishment, typified by those with a tendency to want a military career and who have a feeling that military leaders could cure the world's ills, there tends to be a close rapport with their families. The truly "alienated" group seems to be to a greater extent in the category of the "Radical Left"--or, stated another way, the "Radical Left," as isolated through cross-comparison of the Purdue group data, is more likely to describe an alienated and probably not-too-happy adolescent. The "Middle Group," which felt the American way of life was flexible enough to work within, "reported very much interest excitement and stimulation from their family, their friends and their teachers."** The descriptive summaries of these two groups by the Purdue Opinion Panel analysts are as follows:***

*Louis Harris poll in Life, January 8, 1971, p. 22.

**Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 89, June 1970, p. 10.

***Ibid., pp. 14-15.

...the Conservative Right (19%) reported that the American way of life is superior to that of any other country. The Conservative Right also reported:

1. jobs, the Establishment and society are very interesting, exciting, and stimulating,
2. their family, friends, and teachers are very interesting, exciting, and stimulating,
3. in their family, they feel a great deal of autonomy in decisions that directly affect them,
4. most children and high school students need more discipline these days from their parents and school,
5. they know they will hold the same beliefs as the Establishment and work within the authority of the Establishment.

Students described...as the Radical Left (18%) reported that the American system is not flexible enough; radical change is needed. The Radical Left also reported:

1. more are Negroes (than in other categories),
2. their community and school are not very interesting, exciting, or stimulating,
3. their family, friends, and teachers are not very interesting, exciting, or stimulating,
4. jobs, the Establishment, and tradition are not very interesting, exciting, or stimulating,
5. the following individual referents are not very interesting, exciting, or stimulating: the future, ambition, communication, criticism, competition, making decisions, and taking risks,
6. in their family, they feel little or no autonomy in decisions that directly affect them,
7. children have enough discipline now; if more is needed, it is from themselves only,
8. they never will join the Establishment.

The latter group of youngsters appear to be unwilling or unable to adjust to society as currently constituted. Some of this group may be very "advanced" intellectually and emotionally; but there is no reason to believe that there is a higher percentage of such children in this group than in the others. In fact, the large majority of students at the higher end of the I.Q. scale have closer rapport with their parents, indicate a very open mind to change, but are also apparently reluctant to lightly jettison the value systems of their society.

This, of course, leads one to look again at some of the attitudes that apparently are beginning to be accepted by some secondary school educators and observers. When high school students are considered to be "hopeful" because they are against the Vietnam war and pollution, etc., this judgment cannot be faulted if it is taken to indicate that the students have a sense of responsibility and are loving and charitable. But the assumption may also be that the students arrived at these opinions in the way an adult would; and this might begin to raise doubts about the judgment of their opinions.* The reasons why and which groups of the young arrive at these opinions could be important. Today's "alienated" are apparently more likely to be included in the group that accepts the au courant causes. It is but

*A fascinating study of how students don't conform to the adult assumptions of their pattern of thinking was done in 1970 by Simon Wittes. In this study, the author attempted to evaluate the effect of the "power structure" (an adult concept, like the idea of the "establishment") on the alienation or non-alienation of youth. He set up criteria which he felt should indicate this impact (and I have no argument with his criteria) only to find that numerous answers came out different from what he had hypothesized. In the final analysis only one significant relationship was found: students who feel closer to their peer group feel more secure when attending a well-ordered, powerfully administered school. (Simon Wittes, People and Power [Ann Arbor, Michigan: Center for Research on Utilization of Scientific Knowledge, Institute for Social Research, The University of Michigan, 1970].)

a short step from admiring the conclusions of a student to assuming that he has "sound judgment" and is "intelligent" and "good." If the student comes to a conclusion, with which we agree, before the other students do, we may even consider him a pacesetter, a prophet of what is to come. As indicated above, the "alienated" activist student need be none of these. Furthermore, accolades might only encourage his alienation at a time when he needs help to increase contact with his family and his surroundings. In fact, since alienated high school students normally make up a higher percentage of the lower scholastic categories, in which many students are likely to have "no opinion" on many issues, putting the alienated from this group in a position where they stand a high chance of being asked to make decisions on complicated social and diplomatic issues, might be quite disturbing to some already somewhat confused and not too talented youngsters. On the other hand, the student who is slow to come to "correct" conclusions on complicated issues and refuses to be pushed into doing so, need not necessarily be obtuse; he may actually be more analytical and mature. Today those rejecting the extreme "youth cult" ideas are, according to the data, much more likely to fall within the more intelligent groups than are those who accept it.

In fact, the whole new "involvement" atmosphere, at least the way it is often applied today, may have some questionable effects on students over the whole spectrum of potential. Some intelligent, extremely "motivated" eager learners, the traditional "sponges" striving to soak up information, may be turned off by a process which, every time they have absorbed a few drops, tries to prematurely squeeze it out of them. These bright children

may know the futility of the blind leading the blind and may not like to discuss complex issues with uninformed youngsters. They may prefer to learn some facts on which they can base an opinion before they want to discuss "issues," let alone become actively "involved" in the "solution" of all types of social and political problems. The new "process" in the case of these eager, smart (and far from shy) children seems something like constantly pulling up a plant to see how its roots are growing. Furthermore, they may not respect a specialist teacher who keeps acting as though the students knew as much about his specialty as he does; and they may dislike the almost "group encounter" sessions which some classes tend to become. What may be worse, under this new atmosphere in high schools, some students are perhaps being "prepared," through a process of "social education," for a world that might exist only in the minds of a minority of "social engineers" in our school systems and that may never come to be. A less portentous situation, from society's point of view, but a serious one from the point of view of many students, is one mentioned earlier in which the least fitted and somewhat confused students may be encouraged to dive into a much too complex and disturbing decision-making arena. The result may be that they often end up not making the decision, while rationalizing that they have, but are really having it handed to them, either directly or indirectly, as in former times, by adults; but now, for the "alienated," there is a good chance that these adults are non-family members, some of whom may have what some parents would consider ill-conceived motivations. This is not to say that students should "be seen and not heard"; on the contrary, it is saying perhaps students should be taught more so that when they are asked to make a judgment they are equipped to do so.

There are some signs today that many of the "alienated" young are not making independent decisions any more than the "nonalienated." The only difference is that the nonalienated are aided by their parents and other traditionally responsible, concerned and loving adults, and the alienated become susceptible, not only to misguided high school and college instructors, but also to aberrant, irresponsible and even vicious groups.* In fact, the disquieting thing about much that is accepted and even approved today by the New Left is the irresponsible mindlessness of many of the statements, to say nothing of the apparently somewhat psychologically inadequate adolescents that accept and chant slogans on cue from abusive (often adult) "directors."

*The epitome of such irresponsibility was the "counterculture" adulation of the Charles Manson clan and their deeds. This reaction may bear a vague, but only a vague, resemblance to the feelings for Robin Hood, Jesse James and even John Dillinger in the 1930's. All fought the "establishment"; but the mysticism surrounding the Manson group and the mindlessness, by normal standards, of the killings, puts this crime more in the Leopold-Loeb (no heroes to anyone) rather than in the Robin Hood category.

The New York Times "News of the Week in Review," January 31, 1971, p. 2 reported:

Among the counterculture, Manson achieved almost instant star status. He became the cover boy of the underground press, one of 'us' merely because he was not one of 'them!'

Manson's popularity on the left paled a bit when it became clear that his political views were at best underdeveloped, and at worst, absurd. He also fell victim to the growing feeling that random violence is counterproductive "adventurism." Nevertheless, long articles by and about him still appear in the underground press.

Note that the reason "Manson's popularity on the left paled a bit," was not because of the utter brutality and viciousness of the acts, but because his political views were not orthodox and because "random violence is counterproductive."

As indicated by the previous data, this "activist" group is a minority of students and would normally not be worth the attention given it here. It may be interesting, however, to determine what effect--if any--educators, mass media and public figures, who inspire and support this minority, have had in setting the "style" and shaping the milieu for youth. More important is the question of whether attempts have been made to stack the deck against the "nonconformist" youth who resists nonfamily adult and minority youth pressure from the right or left. The technique mentioned above, of singling out the vague, nonassociable, but "evil," establishment or power structure to begin the alienation process, may be one of these.

B. Overview of University Students

The formal, identifiable segment of society with the most obvious "alienation environment" seems to be the universities. They bear attention because an ever-larger number of minors are being fed into them each year (50% of high school graduates in 1970); they get exceptional and, up until the second half of 1970, generally sympathetic news coverage; and they have been one of the traditional sources of upward mobility in the nation. Particularly in the past four decades, these institutions have been influential in government and the national media to a degree disproportionate to their size. Nonetheless, the high school environment has been much more important than college in enveloping and directly affecting virtually all of our youngsters; and, in addition, it forms the basis of the college-bound student's ability to cope with college.

We must keep in mind that the college system may be changing. With about 50% of all high school graduates entering college in 1970 and a

lowering of the standards of the system becoming a definite possibility, we may have not only a larger, but a different group of people to contend with. Open-admissions programs, though inordinately hard on parents' pocketbooks, may or may not damage the educational system, depending on whether or not they are accompanied by a "high mortality" rate in the freshman year. Without this filter system, which may be starting to disappear, college graduates simply may not be college educated. Jobs for all of them will, of course, not be available at the salary levels they now expect. There will, in any case, probably be too many graduates; and if the filter system is reduced, they will probably be less likely to be high-caliber people.

Nevertheless, the instructors and students may still look on themselves as "elites" and perhaps "pacesetters" for the future; and many others will believe them. The "union card" of the college degree is not about to disappear overnight. These schools will still be important to individuals who need these union cards and to those who are influenced by academia, and the very numbers of those who have had some college education and may be affected by it, make them important.

The students are obviously the first concern in the college situation, so a survey of possible effects of the college milieu on them may be in order. This task is by no means easy, particularly if one tries to determine whether what he is seeing is the effect of the influence of the campus or a change in local or national environment as a whole. Nonetheless, a comparison of a high school and a college group (or perhaps this same group at different times, if the samples truly indicate the feelings of a "cohort") may be interesting to look at. High school students who indicated they

would go to college in the 1967 Purdue Opinion Panel poll of high school sophomores, juniors and seniors are contemporaries of the college students polled by the Gallup organization in 1969 and 1970. Perhaps these two groups may be validly compared.

The comparison quickly brings to light some changes in opinion of youngsters from the same "cohort." Sophomores and juniors in college in 1969 were juniors and seniors in high school in 1967. The political philosophy of the "cohort" also changed somewhat (37% Democrat, 32% Republican, 9% other, 21% undecided, for college-bound high school students in 1968, compared to 25% Democrat, 25% Republican, 50% Independent, for college freshmen in the spring of 1969). Those on the right, the Republicans, seem to have held more firm in college than the Democrats. One might assume that this reflects a return to normal after the enthusiasm of the campaigns for Democratic "peace" candidates in 1968. There was a temporary Democratic "surge" in the May 1968 college-bound high schoolers' choices-- 45% Democrat, 25% Republican, 3% other parties, 25% undecided--but this had already subsided by late 1968. Things were already back to normal directly afterward; i.e., 37% Democrats, 32% Republicans, 9% some other party and 21% undecided. In November of 1967, 38% had considered themselves Democrats and 31% Republicans; 2% were for some other party; and 28% were undecided. In 1969, the sophomores in college, who belong to the same "cohort" as those included in the 1967 high school figures, differed somewhat from the college freshmen listed above: the percentage of college students who considered themselves Democrats increased as the class level went up (freshmen 25%; sophomores 31%), and this was evident right through to graduate school.

In the spring of 1970, the political preference makeup of college students shifted radically, but that was during the Cambodian operation when a nationwide student "strike" was attempted. There was a huge jump in the number of Independents and a drop in both major parties, but particularly the Republican party. It remains to be seen if it will continue that way. The following tables, presumably taken in late April or May 1970, show the 1969 and 1970 college political preferences.

TABLE XXXVI

POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATION
College Students, June 1969*

"In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat or Independent?"

	<u>Republican</u>	<u>Democrat</u>	<u>Independent</u>
	%	%	%
NATIONAL	24	32	44
SEX			
Men	23	32	45
Women	25	33	42
AGE			
18 yrs. & under	24	25	51
19 years	26	31	43
20 years	28	29	43
21 - 23 years	18	38	44
24 yrs. & over	26	39	35
REGION OF COLLEGE			
East	18	32	50
Midwest	25	31	44
South	29	36	35
West	22	30	48
PARENT'S INCOME			
\$15,000 & over	29	25	46
\$10,000 - \$14,999	26	31	43
\$7,000 - \$9,999	16	36	48
Under \$7,000	15	47	38
CLASS IN SCHOOL			
Freshman	25	25	50
Sophomore	25	31	44
Junior	26	35	39
Senior	19	40	41
Graduate	23	42	35
TYPE OF COLLEGE			
Public	23	32	45
Private	29	31	40
Denominational	15	43	42

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 48, June 1969, p. 39.

TABLE XXXVI contd.

DEMONSTRATORS	11	36	53
NON-DEMONSTRATORS	29	31	40
RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE			
Protestant	36	29	35
Catholic	15	39	46
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY			
Extremely Conservative	59	18	23
Fairly Conservative	45	22	33
Middle-of-the-Road	35	28	37
Fairly Liberal	12	39	49
Extremely Liberal	3	40	57
STUDENTS WHO HAVE:			
Done Social Work	22	34	44
Been Drunk	26	29	45
Tried Barbituates	15	20	65
Tried Marijuana	15	25	60
Tried LSD	12	6	82

TABLE XXXVII

POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATION
College Students, June 1970*

"In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat or Independent?"

	<u>Republican</u>	<u>Democrat</u>	<u>Independent</u>
	%	%	%
NATIONAL	18	30	52
SEX			
Men	19	27	54
Women	18	34	48
AGE			
18 years & under	21	33	46
19 years	20	27	53
20 years	18	28	54
21 - 23 years	16	29	55
24 years & over	14	40	46
REGION OF COLLEGE			
East	12	29	59
Midwest	22	26	52
South	20	38	42
West	18	26	56
PARENT'S INCOME			
\$15,000 & over	18	21	61
\$10,000 - \$14,999	23	26	51
\$ 7,000 - \$ 9,999	17	41	42
Under \$7,000	10	48	42
CLASS IN SCHOOL			
Freshman	19	31	50
Sophomore	21	25	54
Junior	17	31	52
Senior	18	30	52
Graduate	8	42	50
TYPE OF COLLEGE			
Public	16	31	53
Private	23	29	48
Denominational	23	25	52
RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE			
Protestant	29	32	39
Catholic	11	37	52

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 60, June 1970, p. 21.

In a more recent poll (December 1970) 13% of the students indicated that they were "highly favorable" to the Republican party while 15% said they were highly unfavorable." For the Democrats the reading was 19% and 7% respectively.* On the assumption that the students could rate both parties unfavorably if they chose, and based on the ratio of "fairly favorable" to "very favorable" on other questions (it runs from a minimum of 2 to 1, to 8 to 1) these figures may show some current increase in support of the regular parties. Since the questions are different from those asked in the above polls, however, we can not use this information to find a trend, but only for what it actually says.

In addition to classifying themselves according to political party preference, college students also classified themselves as conservatives or liberals; their choices make an interesting contrast with those of high school students. In the spring of 1970 high school students were categorized according to their responses to three questions descriptive of their political orientation. The answers by percentages of college-bound high school students are listed in Table XXXVIII below. As a comparison, directly below them, under the same categories, are the answers of college students who were asked the identical questions in 1969 and 1970 by Daniel Yankelovich. The answers of the college students are broken down according to types of college

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 68, February 1971, p. 18.

students formulated by Mr. Yankelovich from results of other questions; these types are listed at the left.

TABLE XXXVIII
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
COLLEGE-BOUND HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
AND COLLEGE STUDENTS

<u>Conservative</u>		<u>Middle Group</u>		<u>Radical Left</u>		<u>Undecided</u>	
"The American way of life is superior to that of any other country."		"There are serious flaws in our society today, but the system is flexible enough to solve them."		"The American system is not flexible enough; radical change is needed"			
<u>COLLEGE-BOUND HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS--1970</u>							
	%		%		%	%	
May	20		52		16	11	
December	17		51		13	18	
<u>COLLEGE STUDENTS---1969 AND 1970**</u>							
	<u>Conservative</u>		<u>Middle Group</u>		<u>Radical Left</u>		
	%	%	%	%	%	%	
	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	
Forerunners	10	4	69	58	21	38	No undecided category offered
Career-minded	21	13	71	74	8	13	
All	17	10	70	68	13	22	

*Purdue Opinion Panel, Polls No. 89, June 1970, pp. 5a and 6a, and No. 90, January 1971, pp. 3a and 4a.

**Youth and the Establishment, Daniel Yankelovich Inc., New York, 1971, p. 36. The categories of college students are supposed to represent "career-minded" and "those not concerned only with careers," according to the 1968 survey criteria for a Yankelovich/Fortune Magazine article (referred to at length later in this section). As cited on page 16 of Youth and the Establishment, the forerunners, 44% of the total are said to "take the practical advantages of college for granted," and to them going to college meant the "opportunity to change things rather than make out well within the system," and that "this motivation for going to college...symbolizes a whole set of new values, attitudes and beliefs we have come to associate with the college rebellion."

Another survey in the spring of 1969, which gave the responses of college freshmen (the high school seniors of the spring of 1968), classified the political orientation of all college students as follows:*

TABLE XXXIX
POLITICAL ORIENTATION
COLLEGE STUDENTS--1969

	<u>Extremely Conservative</u> %	<u>Fairly Conservative</u> %	<u>Middle of the Road</u> %	<u>Fairly Liberal</u> %	<u>Extremely Liberal</u> %	<u>Don't Know</u> %
National	2	19	24	41	11	3
Freshmen	2	17	24	43	11	3
Sophomores	3	21	23	41	9	3
Juniors	2	18	28	40	11	1
Seniors	1	22	21	39	16	1
Graduate Students	1	18	24	40	14	3

It is interesting to compare the above poll to one taken in December 1970 by the same organization but in which the question was worded differently. Left and Far Left might be prejudicial terms compared to Fairly Liberal and Extremely Liberal, even on the campuses. This should hold (or even be more true) for the terms Right and Far Right compared to Conservative and Extremely Conservative. The result, as one might suspect, is a large increase in the Middle of the Road group (the only title which wasn't different from the 1969 poll). Without trying to see a "trend," however, the information on where the students see themselves in the political spectrum is interesting.

TABLE XL
POLITICAL ORIENTATION*
COLLEGE STUDENTS--1970

"This card lists political positions from the far left to the far right. Considering your own political views, where would you place yourself on this scale?"

	December, 1970					
	Far Left	Left	Middle- of-Road	Right	Far Right	Don't Know
	%	%	%	%	%	%
NATIONAL	7	30	40	15	2	6
SEX						
Male	7	30	37	18	2	6
Female	5	29	47	11	2	6
AGE						
18 years & under	7	30	40	15	2	6
19 years	4	32	42	14	2	6
20 years	4	34	37	18	3	4
21-23 years	11	30	41	12	1	5
24 years & over	6	38	31	17		8
REGION OF COLLEGE						
East	8	39	39	5	2	7
Midwest	8	29	38	17	3	5
South	5	21	53	17	1	3
West	6	29	32	21	2	10
TYPE OF COLLEGE:						
Public	7	27	42	15	2	7
Private	7	37	36	14	2	4
Denominational	4	31	41	17	4	3
PARENTS' INCOME						
\$15,000 & over	7	34	36	17	2	4
\$10,000-\$14,999	4	29	44	14	3	6
\$ 7,000-\$ 9,999	6	30	44	15	1	4
Under \$7,000	8	27	37	19	2	7
CLASS IN SCHOOL						
Freshman	6	22	48	15	2	7
Sophomore	5	34	36	17	2	6
Junior	6	29	41	15	3	6
Senior	7	36	36	16	1	4
Graduate	15	44	32	6		3
RELIGION						
Protestant	3	22	48	20	2	5
Catholic	3	27	45	18	2	5

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 68, February 1971, p. 36.

The Liberal-Conservative breakdown among all college students by their own estimate in the spring of 1970 was as follows:*

TABLE XLI

LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE ORIENTATION
ALL COLLEGE STUDENTS--1970

	<u>Liberal</u> %	<u>Conservative</u> %	<u>No Opinion</u> %
Freshmen	60	28	12
Sophomores	59	29	12
Juniors	59	23	18
Seniors	59	28	13
Grad. students	69	22	9
All students	61	26	13
General Public	34	52	14

(Here is a real "gap," a political orientation gap, between the "decoupled" university students, particularly graduate students, and the public. Even among the 21 to 29 year old "youth" on the "outside" the weight of opinion was conservative.)

Graduate students today are almost invariably further left on most subjects than undergraduate students. This is not surprising, however, for graduate students tend to be more similar to young instructors (who traditionally have more liberal ideas, particularly those who are in the social sciences); in fact, not only do many of them become instructors, but some already teach while they are still students.

If you wish to pinpoint possible factors in college environment that might be useful in determining why and which students dissent, instructors may be the best "indicator" group in our universities. The steady and growing

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 59, May 1970, p. 8.

increase in students since World War II (with the exception of the GI Bill 'explosion' and the decrease thereafter, it has been steady), has led to an unparalleled increase in instructors. The curve reached its steepest

TABLE XXXVIII
 POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
 AND COLLEGE STUDENTS
 The following tables on college faculty

members are the results of a study by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, with the cooperation of the American Council on Higher Education, completed in the spring of 1970 (as reported by Seymour Martin Lipset and

CEVERE EDUCATION LADDORSTUIN THE NOVEMBER 1970 issue of Psychology Today).

	%	%	%	%
May	20	TABLE XLII	16	11
December	17	51	13	18

COLLEGE STUDENTS' POLITICAL SELF-APPRAISAL OF THE FACULTY AND 1968 SUPPORT FOR NIXON, BY FIELD OF STUDY

Field of Study	Conservative		Middle Group		Radical Left		Nixon Support category offered
	1969	1970	1969	1970	1969	1970	
Physical Sciences	3		71	74	8	13	
Humanities	17	10	70	68	13	22	19
Fine Arts			62		17		23
Education			52		22		36
Biological Sciences			41		27		40

Physical Sciences (n=7,599)
 Humanities (n=9,546)
 Fine Arts (n=3,732)
 Education (n=3,277)
 Biological Sciences (n=4,403)
 Business (n=2,080)
 Engineering (n=4,165)
 Agriculture (n=1,348)

Purdue Opinion Panel, Polls No. 489, June 1970, pp. 5a and 6a38 and No. 90, January 1971, pp. 3a and 4a.
 Youth and the Establishment, Daniel Yankelovich Inc., New York, 1971, p. 36. The categories of college students are supposed to represent "career-minded" and "those not concerned only with careers," according to the 1968 survey criteria for a Yankelovich/Fortune Magazine article (referred to at length later in this section). As cited on page 16 of Youth and the Establishment the forerunners, 44% of the total 506 said to "take the practical advantages of college for granted," and to them going to college meant the General Purpose (GAP) things rather than making out well within the system," and that "this motivation for going to college...symbolizes a whole set of new values, attitudes and beliefs we have come to associate with the college rebellion."

TABLE XLIII

FACULTY SUPPORT OF STUDENT ACTIVISM, BY FIELD OF STUDY (PER CENT)

<u>Field of Study</u>	<u>Approve of Student Activism</u>	<u>Approve of Student aims 1968 Columbia Student Revolt</u>	<u>Agree no Place for Student Demonstrations On Campus</u>
Social Sciences (n=6,845)	63	67	13
Humanities (n=9,546)	56	60	22
Fine Arts (n=3,732)	51	57	26
Education (n=3,277)	45	54	28
Physical Sciences (n=7,599)	40	48	27
Biological Sciences (n=4,403)	40	51	28
Business (n=2,080)	29	42	33
Engineering (n=4,165)	26	36	36
Agriculture (n=1,348)	19	29	47

TABLE XLIV

CONSERVATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD VIETNAM WAR AND POLITICAL SELF-APPRAISAL BY FIELD OF STUDY AND RELATIVE ACADEMIC STATUS OF SCHOOL (Nonweighted Percent)

	<u>High</u>		<u>Medium</u>		<u>Low</u>	
	<u>Resist. Commu- nism in Vietnam</u>	<u>Conser- vative</u>	<u>Resist. Commu- nism in Vietnam</u>	<u>Conser- vative</u>	<u>Resist. Commu- nism in Vietnam</u>	<u>Conser- vative</u>
Social Science	15	8	20	10	28	14
Humanities	16	11	24	14	31	20
Fine Arts	23	17	32	19	39	26
Education	28	15	42	23	46	28
Physical Science	22	16	36	24	52	39
Biological Science	25	19	42	29	59	38
Business	32	24	54	39	67	50
Engineering	41	29	55	45	67	52
Agriculture	52	38	68	52	80	65

Obviously the social sciences is one discipline in which liberal and humanist left thought prevails and in which left-liberal "activism" is more likely to be accepted. What is interesting is the breakdown, based on the questions indicated, according to fields within the social sciences; and what is perhaps even more striking is the large difference of opinion between age groups of professors within disciplines:

TABLE XLV
SUPPORT FOR STUDENT ACTIVISM, BY FIELD WITHIN THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES
(In Percent)

	<u>Approve of student activism</u>	<u>Agree, most American colleges are racist</u>
Sociology (n=1,009)	71	58
Social work (n=451)	71	58
Psychology (n=2,046)	63	48
Social psychology (n=263)	79	60
Clinical psychology (n=415)	65	52
Experimental psychology (n=566)	62	44
Political Science (n=1,230)	63	46
Anthropology (n=402)	56	51
Economics (n=1,439)	58	42
All Social Scientists (n=6,845)	63	49

TABLE XLVI
SUPPORT FOR STUDENT ACTIVISM,
SELECTED SOCIAL-SCIENCE DISCIPLINES, BY AGE
(In Percent)

<u>Field and age</u>	<u>Approve of student activism</u>	<u>Agree, student disrupters should be expelled</u>
Sociologists		
20s (n=174)	81	40
30s (n=347)	73	56
40s (n=288)	72	58
50s (n=144)	59	67
60s (n=56)	55	75
all ages (n=1009)	71	56
Psychologists		
20s (n=358)	67	60
30s (n=811)	68	61
40s (n=533)	63	65
50s (n=232)	56	75
60s (n=112)	38	76
all ages (n=2046)	63	65
Political scientists		
20s (n=267)	76	52
30s (n=470)	66	64
40s (n=284)	58	77
50s (n=154)	44	82
60s (n=55)	39	95
all ages (n=1230)	63	67

The "differences associated with age were surprisingly large. In each discipline, as age increases, support for student activism decreases." It is almost too neat: we are accustomed to more vagaries in opinion distributions when the control variable is one so generally inclusive as age."^{*} This was apparently so even though the authors "expected to find big generational differences in support for campus activism among the social scientists."

^{*}Seymour Martin Lipset and Everett Carl Ladd, Jr., "And What Professors Think," Psychology Today, November 1970, p. 106.

And they felt that "young untenured assistant professors are obviously closer to the interests, insecurities and perspectives of student dissenters than are older, tenured professors."^{*}

This may be a key problem: the prudent person must wonder if it is wise to have many ill-prepared, some even confused and somewhat "psychologically inadequate" late adolescents exposed to authority figures who are "closer to" and possibly themselves beset by the "insecurities and perspectives of the student dissenters." It may be more likely that under these conditions questionable groups on campus will be glorified and the alienation from parents and society will be deliberately promoted:

In a survey of 1961 college alumni, taken in 1968, alumni were shown to have mixed feelings towards student activists. The alumni generally thought that there had been a good deal wrong with the university when they had attended and felt that these things should be changed. However, they expressed moderate opinions on student involvement and on militancy as a whole and tended to differentiate between acceptable and unacceptable forms of activism, involvement and militancy. They were very much against student involvement in the administration of colleges but were for students having a voice in the curriculum and in determining their own behavior. Those who were younger, who were from high-quality private colleges, had majored in social sciences or humanities, had had good grades and had spent some years in graduate school (1/3 of the alumni did) were more likely to support activism.^{**} One senses, however, that perhaps these alumni may not have truly grasped

^{*}Ibid.

^{**} Joe L. Spaeth and Andrew M. Greeley, Recent Alumni and Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970), pp. 99-110 passim.

what the new activists were really like. Furthermore, as the preceding charts indicate, in almost all cases a majority of the strongest supporters of the activists were not prepared to accept the problems which are almost bound to follow when such people are encouraged--these "supporters" wanted to expel "student disrupters."

In June of 1969, the "gripes" of the student demonstrators were thought by the students as a whole to be as follows:

TABLE XLVII
GRIPES OF STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS
AS DESCRIBED BY ALL COLLEGE STUDENTS*

	%
Not enough say in running of college	42
Current inadequacies of society	22
Adult and governmental authority	16
The Vietnam war	11
Want to have their voices heard	7
Civil rights	6
They have no real gripe	8
Other responses	5

"All persons interviewed were then asked if they agree or disagree with the complaints named. In each case large majorities expressed agreement."

Note that the Vietnam war drew only an 11% vote for the "biggest gripe," which might say a good deal for how the student activists and perhaps even significant sections of the student bodies felt: they saw bigger "problems" and were out to get more power in the colleges to change "society" and to

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 48, June 1969; p. 8. Table adds to more than 100 percent due to multiple responses.

reduce "adult, and governmental authority". Polls on some of these issues and showed the following results:

TABLE XLVIII
 MORE SAY IN RUNNING OF COLLEGES?^{*}
 (In Percent)

	All Students	Demonstrators	General Public
Yes, should have a greater say	81	92	75
No, should not	17	6	25
No opinion	2	2	5

TABLE XLIX
 MORE SAY ON ACADEMIC MATTERS?^{**}
 (In Percent)

	All Students	Demonstrators	General Public	Agree, most American colleges are racist
Yes, should have a greater say on the academic side of colleges--that is, the courses, examinations, and so forth?	86	86	63	56
No, should not	13	13	33	43
No opinion	2	1	4	1

Today some feel that the basis of student protest is legitimate and that their wish for more say in running the colleges lies in their desire to eliminate the dehumanizing, factory approach to education, in which the student is "just a number." There are many things wrong with our university system, and they are things which we have all recognized. There may be little doubt, for example, that many required subjects act as a "filter" that, together with some equally rigid "syllabuses" of courses,

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 48, June 1969, p.7.

**Ibid.

tend to screen out people who are not clearly the ones who should be eliminated. This probably holds for all colleges, but it may be more true for schools that specialize in training people for jobs requiring spontaneity and creativity as well as intelligence and persistence. Our military academies come first to mind, followed closely by universities that house our foreign service schools, operations analysis departments, management schools, etc. We have all felt that some good people were being eliminated by this process and there is evidence that might indicate that this is so.* But the difficulty for the young people in college (as well as for the adults) is judging how capable the students are who are being filtered out, how and why it is happening, and how they can be helped.

One gets the feeling that even many of the students' ideas on this issue may not be very relevant. They cry out against the problem and seem at times to assume that it will be solved by a more "personalized" school. But insofar as this means, for example, a lower student/instructor ratio, we must be cautious; for this may be a simplistic solution for a real, but much more complex, problem. For example, under the current situation, it would be hard to make the case that the instructor/student ratio alone is the key to most undergraduate learning. As the following chart shows, the college graduates (and student undergraduate population) did not exceed the post-World War II-G.I. Bill "hump" until the early 1960s:

*Arthur W. Chickering, Education and Identity (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1971), pp. 302-305, 285-287.

And they felt that "young untenured assistant professors are obviously closer to the inter-views of student dissenters than are older, tenured professors."^{**}

TABLE 1
NUMBER OF EARNED DEGREES GRANTED
IN THE UNITED STATES 1861 - 1966*

YEAR	BACHELOR	MASTER	DOCTOR
1861	n.a.	n.a.	3
1872	n.a.	794	14
1880	n.a.	879	54
1890	115,539	1,015	49
1900	27,410	1,583	382
1910	37,199	2,113	443
1920	47,326	4,279	615
1930	114,411	6,296	1,299
1940	186,500	26,731	3,290
1950	433,734	58,219	6,333
1960	394,889	74,497	9,829
1966	524,117	140,772	18,239

This may be a key problem: the prudent person must wonder if it is wise to have 1872 ill-prepared, some even confused and somewhat "psychologically inadequate" 1890 adolescents used to authority figures who are "closer to" 1910 possibly themselves be 1913 by the "inscurities and perspectives of the 1930 student dissenters." It is 1936 more 12,299 that under these conditions questionable on campus will be glorified and the alienation from parents 1966 society will be deliriously promoted.

In a survey of 1961 college alumni, taken in 1968, alumni were shown to have mixed feelings towards student activists. The alumni generally thought that there had been a good deal wrong with the university when they had attended and it has been years since it has been very far below that figure. Only a fraction of that number, but by and large older and perhaps more moderate opinions on student involvement and on militancy as a whole and competent instructors, taught during the G.I. Bill hump. Nevertheless, tended to differentiate between acceptable and unacceptable forms of activism, despite the unparalleled large classes, fantastic overcrowding and lack of involvement and militancy. They were very much against student involvement of "personal attention," the "creativity" and scholastic achievement in the administration of colleges but were for students having a voice of students in that period was quite outstanding. I am reluctant to change the curriculum and in determining their own behavior. Those who were quickly accept the idea that in undergraduate school small classes with younger, who were from high-quality private colleges, had majored in social sciences or humanities, had had good grades and had spent some years in much communication between students and many less-than-excellent instructors (the need for great numbers of them guarantees this) is preferable, graduate school (1/3 of the alumni did) were more likely to support activism. One senses, however, that perhaps these alumni may not have truly grasped by a few superior men. This latter way of learning is based on the

~~assumption that there are those in the world who are better informed than~~
~~ibid.~~

^{**}Stephen H. Spurr, Academic Degree Structures: Innovative Approaches (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970), p. 97. The source of the figures is the U.S. Office of Education.

^{**}This is not to say these students would not have done better with less rigid schedules of required subjects and greater choice and flexibility of curriculum: it merely says they did well under "worse" conditions.

others, and that one way to learn is to simply listen a good deal to the better informed, if they are in a position and desire to enlighten us.

The real question, again, however, is what is it that the dissenters really want? Is it really the desire but lack of opportunity to learn that drives the activists to demand more and more attention? Even if one were to grant that the "gripes" were legitimate, it soon becomes apparent that the appearance of radical activists could be a symptom of something more than long-standing campus problems. Some new kind of activist mode seems to be forming. One gets some sense of what the demonstrators (28% of the students) were becoming when questions such as that below were answered in the following way:

TABLE LI
EXPEL CAMPUS LAWBREAKERS?*
(In Percent)

"Do you think college students who break laws while participating in campus demonstrations should be expelled?"

	<u>Demonstrators</u>	<u>All Students</u>	<u>General Public</u>
No, should not	62	40	11
Yes, should	31	54	82
No opinion	7	6	7

And in 1969 over two and one-half times as many student demonstrators (40%) had tried marijuana than non-demonstrators (15%); over three times as many (21%) had taken barbiturates (non-demonstrators, 6%); over twice as many (7%) had tried LSD (non-demonstrators, 3%); considerably more (67%) had been drunk (non-demonstrators, 53%); and less than half as many (16%) thought that premarital sexual relations were wrong (non-demonstrators, 34%).**

The following "profile" contains some further information on student demonstrators and compares the demonstrator and non-demonstrator of 1969:

* Gallup Opinion Index, No. 48, June 1969, p. 7.
** Ibid., pp. 19, 32.

TABLE LII
PROFILE OF THE STUDENT DEMONSTRATOR
AND THE NON-DEMONSTRATOR²⁵

	<u>Have</u> <u>Demonstrated</u> %	<u>Have not</u> <u>Demonstrated</u> %
All students	28	72
Sex		
Men	31	69
Women	24	76
Age		
18 yrs. & under	27	73
19 years	24	76
20 years	33	67
21-23 years	28	72
24 yrs. & older	32	68
Region of college		
East	34	66
Midwest	29	71
South	22	78
West	28	72
Politics		
Republicans	13	87
Democrats	31	69
Independents	34	66
Political philosophy		
Extremely conservative	22	78
Fairly conservative	16	84
Middle-of-the-road	15	85
Fairly liberal	33	67
Extremely liberal	61	39
Parents' income		
\$15,000 & over	32	68
\$10,000-\$14,999	27	73
\$7,000-\$9,999	31	69
Under \$7,000	30	70
Class		
Freshmen	28	72
Sophomores	28	72
Juniors	25	75
Seniors	24	76
Graduate students	41	59
Type of college		
Public	28	72
Private	30	70
Denominational	27	73

*Ibid., p. 13.

The demonstrators consider themselves the vanguard of the students, if not of all youth; but more of their importance may stem from what other people think they are than from their actual potential. We have mentioned the significant numbers of young instructors who at least until recently supported them. There was also a strong indication that Eastern and Western seaboard social science departments were highly affected by pro-activism. College administrators feared the demonstrators and many in the media seemed to feel that they really spoke for youth. I have yet to see a convincing argument to substantiate the position that they (and almost they alone) voice the spontaneous and long-term hopes and desires of youth or even of college students. And the least that one could say from the sample of the credentials of those instructors who were the most active supporters of the demonstrators (compared to the professors who opposed them) is that it would be hard to endow them with a strong sense of historical perspective.

1. Who are the Activists?

The question still remains, who are the demonstrators? Are they the smarter people, those better qualified to make judgments? We may be able to gain some feeling in gross terms for the probable top number of "intelligent" people in this group and even for the likelihood of finding which types of people are among them.

First of all, how intelligent are the students in this group? At first glance, one might feel that they are the very bright students. An unusually high percentage of graduate students (41%) have joined the.

ranks of the demonstrators, and traditionally graduate students have been thought to be among the better students. Graduate students probably make up about 12% or more of the student body, and about 5% of this 12% have been demonstrators. TABLE L
NUMBER OF EARNED DEGREES GRANTED
IN THE UNITED STATES 1861 - 1966*
 If we assume that activists were also be found

YEAR	BACHELOR	MASTER	DOCTOR
1861	n.a.	794	14
1872	n.a.	879	54
1880	15,539	1,015	149
1890	27,410	1,583	331
1900	37,199	2,113	443
1910	47,326	4,278	615
1920	111,411	14,629	2,299
1930	186,500	26,731	3,900
1940	433,734	58,219	6,633
1950	394,889	74,497	9,829
1966	524,117	140,772	18,239

potential graduate students in the undergraduate schools (which admittedly depends on a further, even more questionable assumption of a constant state of political liberalism throughout college), we must conclude that perhaps more than a third (12 or 15% of 28%) of the demonstrators made up of graduate and potential graduate (i.e., bright) students. This is a great number of bright radicals and it might be worth considering (1) where the demonstrating undergraduates come from and (2) where the demonstrating potential and actual graduate student comes from.

The current instructor population is well over half a million, and it has been years since it has been very far below that figure. About 9% of college-bound high school students with above-average and excellent grades (these two categories contain 56% of all college-bound students) fit the Radical Left category in June 1970. Nevertheless, despite the unparalleled large classes, fantastic overcrowding, and lack of "personal attention," the "creativity" and scholastic achievements of students in that period was quite outstanding. I am reluctant to boundly accent the idea that undergraduate schools, small classes with sufficient communication between students and many less-than-excellent instructors (the need for great numbers of them guarantees this) is preferable, from the point of view of learning, to straight lectures in large classes by a few superior men. This latter way of learning is based on the assumption that there are those in the world who are better informed than

*ratings report such as family educational background to account for about 4.5% of the total (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970), p. 14. The source of the figures is the U.S. Office of Education.

**This is not to say these students would not have done better with less rigid schedules of required subjects and greater choice and flexibility of curriculum; it merely says they did well under "worse" conditions.

college freshmen (4% average and about .5% excellent students). Open admission programs will probably increase the numbers of less talented undergraduates who are more likely to be Radical Left; but they would not be what is normally considered graduate school material.

Of the high school group entering college, probably somewhere between 5 and 8% are Radical Left students whose mothers and fathers went to college. (The total percentage of Radical Left high school children whose parents went to college is between 15 and 18%.) These students are likely to be in the average or above-average category but not in the excellent one. We found earlier that the high school students who chose the Radical Left as their political orientation were typified by an alienated, possibly unhappy adolescent. In order to get some feel for the number of Radical Left students entering college who are not alienated from their parents and environment, I first looked at the number of excellent and above-average students with college-graduate parents on the premise that more parents with this background would be sympathetic to--or at least would not strenuously oppose--Radical Left ideas of their children. Presumably, if this were the case, these Radical Left students would be less alienated from their families and might be more psychologically "adequate" (stable). (Even this assumption, however, might prove inefficacious; for there is expert opinion that parents who are loathe to take on their children in a head-on confrontation could be unknowingly abetting their instability.)*

*Herbert Hendin, "A Psychoanalyst Looks at Student Revolutionaries," The New York Times Magazine, January 17, 1971, p. 19; Bruno Bettelheim in an address "Youth in Turmoil," reported in the Philadelphia Inquirer, February 4, 1971, p. 1.

As indicated above, only about 1% of college-bound high school students are Radical Left and excellent students. About 11% of the excellent high school students are Radical Left, but the excellent category includes only 7% of the total number of high school students. Children of college-graduate parents who are making excellent course grades comprise about 5% of the college-bound high school students. Even though 73% of these students go to college, children of college-graduate parents who are excellent scholastically and Radical Left are only about one-half of one percent of all college-bound high school students.

A smaller percentage of college-bound high school students with college-graduate parents fall into the above-average and average groups than are found ⁱⁿ the excellent one; but the former groups are larger, and Radical Leftism is, as we have seen, greater among the less gifted students. Radical Left, above-average high school students with college-graduate parents make up about 2.3% of the college-bound students. The total percentage of all college-bound, above-average high school students of college-graduate parents, without regard to political orientation, is about 14%. About 45% of all college-bound students fall into the above-average category, but only 20-27% of students with college-graduate parents are in this group. Since there are only 15-18% of all children of such parents who consider themselves Radical Left, about 2.3% of them should be in this group.

The students making average grades include 40% of those going to college; about 6 of that 40% represents students who have parents who are college-graduates. Of these 6%, about 1% are likely to be Radical Leftists.

In summary, a total of less than 4% of the college-bound high school students are Radical Left, excellent, above-average or even average students and come from homes where the parents are college graduates. Even presuming that the great majority of these parents and students agree in outlook and assuming that this is an indicator of a higher likelihood of better adjustment of youngsters, and taking into account that some will not agree, the actual figure for well-adjusted radicals will be much smaller than 4%. If we then eliminate the average students, we are left with about 3% excellent and above-average, college-bound, Radical Left students who may also be the most well-adjusted of this group.

Obviously we are not isolating the source of college demonstrators by this method. (Twenty-eight percent of the student body have demonstrated, almost always for Leftist causes.) We are not even isolating demonstrating graduate and potential graduate students. Even if we include college-bound students from non-college-graduate parents--who, as we have seen, are far less likely to be liberal than the college-educated parents--we cannot come up with more than 4% at the most who are Radical Left and have excellent and above-average grades. Moreover, if we are looking for the percentage of bright Radical Leftists who are also well-adjusted (according to our criteria of compatibility with the family), then 4% must be further reduced. As we have shown, the Radical Left group seems to contain the most high school students who are unstimulated by their families, their friends, school, community and almost anything else; they also have little feeling of autonomy in making

ranks of the demonstrators, and traditionally graduate students have decisions within the family. This, in turn, might emphasize personality been thought to be among the better students. Graduate student- probably problems. In addition, we assume that some of the 4% of Radical Left make up about 12% or more of the student body, and about 5% of this 12% students will have parents who strongly disapprove of Radical Left ideas, have been demonstrators. If we assume that activists will also be found thereby possibly further alienating students from their families and in a similar percentage of potential graduate students in the under-reducing their confidence and consequently their stability.*

graduate schools, (which admittedly depends on a further, even more On this basis, one could make the argument that there are just questionable assumption of a "constant state" of political liberalism too few bright Radical Leftist adolescents (particularly stable and throughout college), we must conclude that perhaps more than a third happy ones) in their natural state in the high school population to be (12 or 15% of 28%) of the demonstrators is made up of graduate and the source of even a sizeable portion of the 28% of college student potential graduate (i.e., bright) students. This is a great number of demonstrators. This means one of several things: (a) Some young people bright radicals and it might be worth considering (1) where the demon- are radicalized when they reach the campuses so that activists are re- strating undergraduates come from, and (2) where the demonstrating potential cruited from the large majority of bright, non-alienated students (many and actual graduate student comes from.

----- About 5% of college and high school students with above-average

and e *As can be imagined, finding terms acceptable to all for the description of the different characteristics of students is an almost insurmountable task. In fact, providing an analytic description in any terms is extremely difficult. Students who look irresponsible to some look extremely responsible to others; the value of a student's ability to adjust to a given system is looked on as very commendable and a sign of a stable person by some but almost reprehensible by others. Some seem to subscribe to this latter idea because of feelings that our society and its systems are themselves sick and one must be somewhat illegitimate to adjust to them. I lean heavily, therefore, on the picture given by the Purdue Opinion Panel analysts for a feeling for the nature of the Radical Left, Conservative Right and Middle groups of high school students (see app 171). I also take their records of the achievement levels claimed by the students as a rough measurement of relative scholastic competence. The judgments about whether these children are truly happy or not or are likely to be well-adjusted or psychologically inadequate here (based on the idea that alienated, very discontented people are normally not as happy as satisfied people. Other sources such as the writings of Professor Schwab and Dr. Hendin, cited supra seem to partially substantiate the feeling that student protesters and revolutionaries might be ill-equipped to cope with the problems of making decisions and that there may even be a significant probability of finding personal problems among the more extreme politicized activists.

of whom as a result may tend to become alienated from their parents and possibly become somewhat less stable);* (b) They are largely made up of the more alienated, not so bright and perhaps psychologically inadequate students; (c) A large percentage are bright but are alienated and psychologically inadequate students; (d) A combination of these. But, if as many as 41% of the graduate students are demonstrators and if we assume for the moment that their unexpectedly great numbers are not totally due to something such as a change of attitude on the part of bright, moderate students in the campus milieu, then (b) or even (c) might at least partially explain the source of activists. At worst this could indicate something wrong with our universities.

The important questions about the whole demonstrator issue, therefore, might be: what is deemed more important in the "demonstrators club"--the ideology of the student or his intelligence? Are the activists recruited or do they spontaneously join? How much do the followers believe? Are many bright students convinced by fellow students? Do they succumb to the instructor "authority figures" and the persuasive atmosphere of the university? ("We all agree because we are all intelligent men. No intelligent man thinks otherwise.") Are bright, potential opposition students intimidated by them? Do good students with less than ultra-liberal ideas get turned off by a hostile environment in the graduate schools? Perhaps

*This process of "conversion" is described excitedly by Charles A. Reich in The Greening of America (New York: Random House, 1970), p.224: "In a brief span of months a student, seemingly conventional in every way... transforms himself into a drug-using, long-haired, peace-loving 'freak.'"

some of all the above and additional elements play a role.*

There is no doubt that college students as a group react differently from high school students. And individually they react differently in college from when they were in high school; that is, they change as they get "older." How much they change, and why, is another question; but change they do. In comparing some of their basic attitudes between high school and college years we are able to see some changes. Some of the issues are hard to compare because of the difficulties in using the polls mentioned earlier. For example, the two charts which are given in the portion "Generation Gap Seen by Young and Old" of the June 1969 Gallup Opinion Index cannot be used as a comparison with the Purdue charts at the beginning of this section. The Purdue charts, which led that group to conclude in 1970 that there was no generation gap, compared the young peoples' gripes about young people with their estimate of the parents' gripes about young people. The two Gallup charts in the tables below compare the gripes of each about the other. In other words, this poll is asking two groups two different questions, and as in any poll of separate groups, it is normally extremely important that the questions be exactly the same if they are to be used for comparison. In any event, this poll was not intended to be used to see if there were a gap, but

*There is much anecdotal evidence of, but no exhaustive data on the forcing of a "low profile" on bright conservatives, middle-of-the-roaders, and even less radical liberals on our campuses; and there are, as we have seen, a great number of them leaving the high schools for college. The International Committee on University Emergency, including such prestigious, far from reactionary scholars as Harvard's Edwin O. Reischauer and Paul Freund, Chicago's John Hope Franklin and Yale's Alexander Bickel, said it wanted "to alert campus and public" to the fact that "increasingly from Berkeley to Berlin, political criteria are being used to evaluate academic performance..." (Fred M. Hechinger, "For Campus Freedoms," The New York Times, Sunday, November 22, 1970, Section IV, p. 7.) Many students, particularly graduate students in the social sciences, have reported this privately to Hudson Institute staff members.

rather to see if people thought there were. As indicated earlier, they do; and this poll tends to confirm it: "seven in ten college students think a 'generation gap' exists, and the same proportion of older persons in the populace hold this view."^{*}

TABLE LIII

BIGGEST GRIPE OF COLLEGE STUDENTS
ABOUT PARENTS' GENERATION?

Too set in their ways	36%
A lack of communication (they won't listen to us)	18
Too conservative	8
Indifferent, apathetic.	8
Materialistic	6
Too strict.	6
Their views on morals	4
Racial prejudice.	4
They stereotype young people	4
Other responses	6
No gripe about them	11
No opinion	3
	114%

TABLE LIV

BIGGEST GRIPE OF PARENTS
ABOUT YOUNG PEOPLE?

Undisciplined behavior.	30%
Lack respect for authority.	16
Youth are overindulged.	10
Irresponsible	7
Parents too permissive.	7
Smug, too self-assured.	6
Use of drugs	4
Too idealistic, naive	2
Other responses	4
No gripe about them	12
No opinion	6
	104%

^{*}Gallup Opinion Index, No. 48, June 1969, pp. 19, 20. Totals add to more than 100% since some persons gave more than one response.

There are other questions, however, on which college and high school students can be more directly compared. One of these is the legalization of marijuana. In March 1969, high school seniors overwhelmingly disapproved--by almost 8 to 2--of the legalization of marijuana; yet, one year later, in the spring of 1970, these same young people, as college freshmen, were 46% for and 49% against it.** In a late 1970 poll, college students as a whole registered 53% in favor of legalizing marijuana;*** all adults in another poll in late 1970 opposed it by 86%.****

The detailed breakdown of the spring 1970 poll which showed all college students 50% in favor of legalization, is as follows:

TABLE LV
LEGALIZE MARIJUANA?*****
ASKED OF COLLEGE STUDENTS

"Do you think the use of marijuana should be made legal, or not?"

		April 24-May 3, 1970		
		Should	Should Not	No Opinion
		%	%	%
NATIONAL		50	44	6
SEX				
	Men	54	40	6
	Women	45	49	6

*The opinions of the college-bound high school seniors should not be too different from the overall view. The excellent, above-average, and average students all register 80% or more against legalization; those with college graduate parents and high-income families disapproved 74 and 76% respectively. Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 86, March 1969, pp. 17a and 18a.

**Gallup Opinion Index, No. 60, June 1970, p. 22.

***Harris poll in Life, January 8, 1971, p. 26.

****Gallup Opinion Index, No. 65, November 1970, p. 25.

*****Gallup Opinion Index, No. 60, June 1970, p. 22.

AGE			
18 years & under	45	52	3
19 years	48	45	7
20 years	49	44	7
21-23 years	58	37	5
24 years & over	46	46	8
REGION OF COLLEGE			
East	60	33	7
Midwest	53	41	6
South	38	57	5
West	51	42	7
POLITICAL AFFILIATION			
Republican	36	59	5
Democrat	43	52	5
Independent	58	34	8
PARENTS' INCOME			
\$15,000 & over	58	37	5
\$10,000-\$14,999	45	46	9
\$ 7,000-\$ 9,999	50	45	5
Under \$7,000	42	53	5
CLASS IN SCHOOL			
Freshman	46	49	5
Sophomore	50	43	7
Junior	55	37	8
Senior	54	41	5
Graduate	52	40	8
TYPE OF COLLEGE			
Public	51	42	7
Private	55	40	5
Denominational	36	60	4
RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE			
Protestant	37	58	5
Catholic	52	42	6

Some change was, of course, to be expected as these adolescents became young adults. (A change through the years was even evident in a 1969 Purdue poll of high school students; 10th graders were somewhat less lenient--16% for, 82% against the legalization of marijuana--than 12th graders). And,

of course, there is a general shift in attitudes among all high school students in the country as a group: there was a 6 or 7% change in their attitude toward the legalization of marijuana in the past year and a half. But the increase of 28% in approval in the one year between their senior high school and college freshman years is a little too dramatic to be attributed to just growing up.*

A similar shift seems to occur in regard to the attitude toward extramarital sexual relations. In the March 1965 Purdue survey of the "worst practices," of high school students, "sexual misbehaving" was high on the list. Yet, as the following chart shows, people from the same "cohort," who were college juniors in the spring of 1969, felt that extramarital sexual relations are not wrong (67% to 28%). Part of this might have been due to growing up, or perhaps college-bound high school students were usually more liberal on this issue. Furthermore, the times were changing: the "new morality" had been having some effect even on the high school students' attitude toward those who "had not followed the morals or rules relating to the behavior of unmarried people" as early as the late 1950's and early 1960's (see p. 6).

*As can be seen from many of these charts, there is a measurable, but not drastic change of opinion of college students as they proceed from the freshman year through the senior year. Generally, this is a liberalizing change up through the junior year and then, often, a slight shift back towards conservatism in the senior year. These changes can be expected because people pass from late adolescence to adulthood in as well as out of college; they do continue to grow up. Undoubtedly, when students first enter college, they receive a shock of change, but apparently not enough to drastically alter all of their basic attitudes. Greater changes take place as they become sophomores and juniors. Much of the personality change and growth through the college years has been analyzed from a sizeable sample of students from diverse colleges in a book cited earlier, Education and Identity, by Arthur W. Chickering.

TABLE LVI

PRE-MARITAL SEX RELATIONS*
ASKED OF COLLEGE STUDENTS

"There's a lot of discussion about the way morals and sex are changing in this country. Here is a question that is often discussed in women's magazines...what is your view on this--do you think it is wrong for a man and woman to have sex relations before marriage, or not?"

	<u>Yes</u> %	<u>No</u> %	<u>No Opinion</u> %
NATIONAL	29	66	5
SEX			
Men	24	72	4
Women	37	55	8
AGE			
18 yrs & under	32	62	6
19 years	35	59	6
20 years	26	69	5
21-23 years	28	67	5
24 yrs & older	21	74	5
REGION OF COLLEGE			
East	24	71	5
Midwest	33	59	8
South	33	65	2
West	25	70	5
POLITICAL AFFILIATION			
Republican	38	56	6
Democrat	30	66	4
Independent	25	69	6
PARENTS' INCOME			
\$15,000 & over	23	74	3
\$10,000-\$14,999	33	63	4
\$ 7,000-\$ 9,999	31	64	5
Under \$7,000	38	58	4
CLASS IN SCHOOL			
Freshman	30	65	5
Sophomore	29	67	4
Junior	28	67	5
Senior	28	65	7
Graduate	30	63	7

* Gallup Opinion Index, June 1969, p. 32.

TABLE LVI, cont.

	<u>Yes</u> %	<u>No</u> %	<u>No Opinion</u> %
TYPE OF COLLEGE			
Public	29	66	5
Private	20	74	6
Denominational	56	36	8
DEMONSTRATORS			
	16	80	4
NON-DEMONSTRATORS			
	34	60	6
RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE			
Protestant	36	57	7
Catholic	39	55	6
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY			
Extremely Conservative	50	44	6
Fairly Conservative	41	55	4
Middle-of-the-Road	38	54	8
Fairly Liberal	25	71	4
Extremely Liberal	4	92	4
STUDENTS WHO HAVE:			
Done Social Work	32	62	6
Been Drunk	19	77	4
Tried Barbituates	9	89	2
Tried Marijuana	5	94	1
Tried LSD	1	95	4

When a late 1970 poll asked a question regarding the degree of promiscuity the results were as follows:*

"Is it all right to have sexual relations if you are:"

	<u>High School</u> %	<u>College</u> %
Dating Casually?	No 78	No 68
Going Steady?	No 69	No 51
Planning to Marry?	No 57	Yes 52
Formally engaged?	Yes 45	Yes 72

*Harris poll in Life, January 8, 1971, p. 27.

Here, again, the change between high school and college opinion is considerable; but the difference in attitude on this subject between the general public and college students is so striking that one has to question whether, on a growing number of issues, the college campus is not becoming a more and more detached, or decoupled, segment of our society. What we see by comparison of the data on this issue, is the difference of opinion between the college students and their parents. Adults over the years have become more opposed to such practices. Even when the question, "Do you think that two people who are in love and engaged to be married should wait until marriage to have sexual relations or not?" was asked in 1965, 64% of the adults said they should wait. This compares strikingly to the 1969 question above in which 72% of the college students said it was all right. In 1937, 57% of adults polled felt it was wrong to indulge in extra-marital relations, and in 1954, 53% felt the same way. But in 1969, 68% of adults opposed it, 21% felt it was all right, 11% had no opinion or wouldn't answer. Yet, as we have seen, in June of 1969, 66% of college students felt such behavior was not wrong, 29% felt it was wrong, and 5% had no opinion. Also noteworthy are the extremes of opinion between the politically more conservative students and those who have not used drugs, on the one hand, and the fairly liberal and extremely liberal students and those who have tried barbiturates, marijuana, and LSD, on the other. Despite the contraceptive pill, there are still a great number of pregnancies among the young; and because of promiscuity and the pill, they have an even higher degree of venereal disease.*

*See page 9.

Probably the most disturbing aspect of the college campus milieu, and one which no doubt contributes substantially to the problems mentioned above and to many others, is the enormous increase in drug use on our campuses in the year and a half covered between the surveys shown in Table LVII. Extreme opposition to the legalization of marijuana seems justified if the de facto legalization of possession on campus, which has been in effect in the past two years, shows such results. Furthermore, the worries of parents (and high school students) seem justified. The increase in the more dangerous drugs and the much higher probability of experimenting with them among people who have used marijuana is also alarming.

TABLE LVII

FREQUENCY OF MARIJUANA USE
COLLEGE STUDENTS

	Ever used [*] 1969 %	Ever Used ^{**} 1970 %	Used in Last 12 Months 1970 ^{**} %	Used in Last 30 Days 1970 ^{**} %
ALL STUDENTS	22	43	39	28
SEX				
Male	25	49	44	31
Female	18	35	33	23
CLASS IN SCHOOL				
Freshman	23	38	35	24
Sophomore	25	46	43	32
Junior	23	50	44	27
Senior	19	40	40	30
Graduate	13	54	43	31
AGE				
18 years & under	21	35	32	22
19 years	21	49	46	32
20 years	24	53	48	35
21-23 years	23	40	36	25
24 years & over	20	43	33	19
TYPE OF COLLEGE				
Public	24	43	39	26
Private	24	49	44	32
Denominational	4	34	32	26

*Gallup Opinion Index No. 48, June 1969, p. 30.

**Gallup Opinion Index No. 68, February 1971, p. 2.

TABLE LVII, Cont.

	Ever Used <u>1969</u> %	Ever Used <u>1970</u> %	Used in Last 12 Months <u>1970</u> %	Used in Last 30 Days <u>1970</u> %
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY				
Extremely conservative	11			
Fairly conservative	9			
Middle-of-the-road	15			
Fairly liberal	25			
Extremely liberal	49			
AREA OF STUDY				
Humanities		47	44	31
Math & Science		41	40	26
Social Science		57	52	36
Engineering		40	30	21
Business Administration		41	35	24
Education		26	23	15
SPECIAL ANALYSES (of those who have:)				
Used amphetamines in last 30 days		87	86	82
Used hallucinogens in last 30 days		100	100	98
Drunk beer in last 30 days		51	47	33
Drunk wine in last 30 days		58	53	39
Drunk hard liquor in last 30 days		51	47	31
Used barbiturates in last 30 days		88	86	84

TABLE LVIII

FREQUENCY OF BARBITURATE USE
COLLEGE STUDENTS

	Ever Used <u>1969</u> %	Ever Used <u>1970</u> %	Used in last 12 months <u>1970</u> %	Used in last 30 days <u>1970</u> %
ALL STUDENTS	10	14	10	5
SEX				
Male	11	17	12	6
Female	9	10	6	4

*Gallup Opinion Index, June 1969, p. 29.

**Gallup Opinion Index, February 1971, p. 5.

TABLE LVIII, cont.

	Ever Used 1969 %	Ever Used 1970 %	Used in last 12 months 1970 %	Used in last 30 days 1970 %
CLASS IN SCHOOL				
Freshman		15	9	4
Sophomore		17	15	9
Junior		10	5	4
Senior		17	10	2
Graduate		12	7	3
AGE				
18 years & under	11	12	7	4
19 years	10	18	15	6
20 years	9	16	12	8
21-23 years	11	13	7	3
24 years & over	10	15	11	7
TYPE OF COLLEGE				
Public	12	15	9	5
Private	9	12	8	3
Denominational	1	22	20	10
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY				
Extremely conservative	6			
Fairly conservative	7			
Middle-of-the-road	6			
Fairly liberal	12			
Extremely liberal	21			
AREA OF STUDY				
Humanities		16	11	6
Math & Science		13	10	7
Social Science		21	14	5
Engineering		12	7	7
Business Administration		11	7	4
Education		6	3	1
SPECIAL ANALYSES (of those who have:)				
Used marijuana in last 30 days		36	28	14
Used amphetamines in last 30 days		70	65	39
Used hallucinogens in last 30 days		55	48	30
Drunk beer in last 30 days		18	13	7
Drunk wine in last 30 days		22	16	8
Drunk hard liquor in last 30 days		19	15	8

FREQUENCY OF HALLUCINOGEN USE
COLLEGE STUDENTS.

	Ever used 1969*	Ever used 1970**	Used in last 12 months 1970**	Used in last 30 days 1970**
	%	%	%	%
ALL STUDENTS	4	14	12	6
SEX				
Male	5	17	14	7
Female	3	11	9	4
CLASS IN SCHOOL				
Freshman	6	13	11	5
Sophomore	4	16	15	8
Junior	2	17	12	6
Senior	5	16	12	4
Graduate	1	12	7	4
AGE				
18 years & under	4	11	11	5
19 years	5	16	16	7
20 years	3	20	16	8
21-23 years	5	13	9	3
24 years & over	4	10	7	7
TYPE OF COLLEGE				
Public	5	13	10	5
Private	2	15	13	5
Denominational	1	23	20	16
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY				
Extremely conservative	6			
Fairly conservative	1			
Middle-of-the-road	3			
Fairly liberal	4			
Extremely liberal	12			
AREA OF STUDY				
Humanities		20	17	9
Math & Science		17	13	8
Social Science		17	15	7
Engineering		12	9	7
Business Administration		8	6	3
Education		6	4	2
SPECIAL ANALYSES (of those who have:)				
Used marijuana in last 30 days		46	39	21
Used amphetamines in last 30 days		59	54	34
Drunk beer in last 30 days		16	13	7
Drunk wine in last 30 days		21	18	9

*Gallup Opinion Index, June 1969, p. 31.

**Gallup Opinion Index, February 1971, p. 6.

TABLE LIX, cont.

	<u>HALLUCINOGENS</u>			
	Ever	Ever	Used in	Used in
	used	used	last 12	last 30
	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1970</u>
	%	%	%	%
SPECIAL ANALYSES (cont.)				
Drunk hard liquor in last 30 days		15	13	6
Used barbiturates in last 30 days		61	57	37

We see here once more the increased tendency to have more users of all drugs within the extremely liberal group. Surely here is a gap between the worried parent and the experimenting student: better than four in ten college students have used marijuana and as many as almost three in ten may use it at least once a month. One out of seven students is willing to experiment with drugs that are classified as harmful to him and one in sixteen is perhaps willing to do it once a month. And the increase of drug use in the denominational colleges has been phenomenal: they are now far ahead of the public and private schools in the use of hallucinogens and barbiturates. Apparently the campuses are full of optimistic pot users: of the students who have used marijuana within the last thirty days, 85% feel it is not injurious to the health (vs. 8% who think it is) and 92% do not think it will lead to hard drugs (vs. 2% who think it will). These opinions diverge widely from those of the overwhelming majority of the general public (including noncollege youth) and their parents.

On other issues, however, college students are still quite close to their parents. On two very basic ones--the relevancy of religion and faith in the system's reward for ability--the students sound much as their parents do.

If we equate relevance of religion to college students in 1970, the subject of Table LX, below, with the church attendance of adults and college students in 1969 (see p. of the Adult section), we find that in 1969 42% of the adults and 47% of the college students attended church during the week they were questioned and in the spring of 1970 42% of the college students found religion relevant. In late 1970, 43% of the college students said they attended church regularly and 56% said religion was important to them.* A breakdown on the feelings of students towards the relevance of organized religion according to age, class, etc., follows:

TABLE LX

RELEVANCE OF RELIGION**
ASKED OF COLLEGE STUDENTS

"Is organized religion a relevant part of your life at the present time, or not?"

	<u>APRIL 24-MAY 3, 1970</u>	
	<u>Yes</u> %	<u>No</u> %
NATIONAL	42	58
SEX		
Men	38	62
Women	50	50
AGE		
18 years & under	51	49
19 years	43	57
20 years	39	61
21-23 years	38	62
24 years & over	41	59
REGION		
East	38	62
Midwest	39	61
South	50	50
West	41	59
POLITICAL AFFILIATION		
Republican	56	44
Democrat	56	44
Independent	30	70

* Harris poll in Life, January 8, 1971, p. 26.

** Gallup Opinion Index, June 1970, p. 18.

TABLE LX, cont.

	<u>APRIL 24-May 3, 1970</u>	
	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
PARENTS' INCOME		
\$15,000 & over	32	68
\$10,000-\$14,999	42	58
\$ 7,000-\$ 9,999	49	51
Under \$7,000	56	44
CLASS IN SCHOOL		
Freshman	46	54
Sophomore	44	56
Junior	37	63
Senior	38	62
Graduate	41	59
TYPE OF COLLEGE		
Public	39	61
Private	38	62
Denominational	69	31
RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE		
Protestant	51	49
Catholic	57	43

It is of interest to note the more conservative feeling toward religion among the graduate students toward many of the issues given previously in these polls. There may also be a dichotomy between the more liberal students and others in the graduate class. In light of the large number of demonstrators and the greater representation of the Left among graduate students, it is possible that the dichotomy is even sharper in this class than in any other.

All students show a strong belief in the value of ability and hard work:

TABLE LXI

REASON FOR SUCCESS*
ASKED OF COLLEGE STUDENTS

"Do you think people who are successful get ahead largely because of their luck or largely because of their ability?"

	April 24-May 3, 1970		
	Luck	Ability	No Opinion
	%	%	%
NATIONAL	9	88	3
SEX			
Men	9	87	4
Women	9	89	2
AGE			
18 years & under	9	89	2
19 years	11	86	3
20 years	8	91	1
21-23 years	8	87	5
24 years & over	9	88	3
REGION OF COLLEGE			
East	13	82	5
Midwest	7	90	3
South	9	90	1
West	6	90	4
POLITICAL AFFILIATION			
Republican	5	93	2
Democrat	8	91	1
Independent	11	85	4
PARENTS' INCOME			
\$15,000 & over	10	87	3
\$10,000-\$14,999	10	85	5
\$ 7,000-\$ 9,999	6	92	2
Under \$7,000	6	93	1
CLASS IN SCHOOL			
Freshman	9	88	3
Sophomore	11	87	2
Junior	9	88	3
Senior	7	89	4
Graduate	8	88	4

* Ibid., p. 23.

TABLE LXI, cont.

TYPE OF COLLEGE	April 24-May 3, 1970		
	<u>Luck</u> %	<u>Ability</u> %	<u>No opinion</u> %
Public	9	89	2
Private	11	83	6
Denominational	6	92	2
RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE			
Protestant	6	93	1
Catholic	9	88	3

In the Harris poll in late 1970, 52% of the college students felt that "success and wealth" were worth striving for.* In another poll at the same time, 53% of a different sample felt "material things people work hard for" are "worth the time" it takes to get them.** These indicators may show that there has not been a tendency among students to discard these values or that there was one but the tendency is now changing; or they may simply show that in the past the right questions were not asked. That students were interested in careers for other reasons than merely making money was also evident in the beginning of 1969. In the following Gallup poll, students were notably interested in going into what Gallup calls the "helping" professions.

TABLE LXII
PREFERRED FIELD OR OCCUPATION BY AGE 40*
ASKED OF COLLEGE STUDENTS

"What field or occupation do you expect to be in when you are age 40?"

Teaching	29%
Business Management.	8
Housewife.	8
Law.	5
Clergy	5
Engineering.	4
Social Work.	4
Medicine	2
Others.	24
Don't Know	11

*Life, January 8, 1971, p. 22.

**Survey in Seventeen, February 1971, p. 123. This sample included non-students. See the comments on this poll in the footnote on p. 32.

***Gallup Opinion Index, June 1969, p. 18.

It is essential to have the "helping" professions, but there is a question whether large numbers of students have true "callings" to them. Some of these professions could also be considered to be "decoupled"; that is, they are only indirectly attached to the system; the rules of measurable productivity are hard to apply to them; hard decisions and discipline which must be enforced in order to maintain necessary standards can more easily be avoided.

Some, however, apparently do not recognize these concerns about the necessity of discipline and productivity; they, in fact, see them as just another indication of the outdated thinking associated with the current system which is the real villain. An extreme version of this approach is contained in the book, The Greening of America. The book abounds with hyperbole describing the catastrophe that is now American society: "Americans have lost control of the machinery of society"; "...disintegration of the social fabric, and the resulting atmosphere of anxiety and terror in which we all live"; "less than two hundred years later almost every aspect of the American dream has been lost"; "the family, the most basic social system, has been ruthlessly stripped of its functional essentials"; "beginning with school, if not before, an individual is systematically stripped of his imagination, his creativity, his heritage, his dreams, and his personal uniqueness...instinct, feeling and spontaneity are repressed by overwhelming forces;" "for most Americans, work is mindless, exhausting, boring, servile, and hateful'...."*

If one believes this is truly the state of affairs, and some apparently do, a sensible man would have to think that drastic changes are necessary; he might be looking desperately almost anywhere for answers. Professor Reich recommends a change of "consciousness" to understand and to cope with our new

**Charles A. Reich, The Greening of America, (New York: Random House, 1970), op. 5-21, passim.

technological "corporate society," a "mindless juggernaut...obliterating human values," which leads not only to domestic disaster, but to things such as the Vietnam war, "with its unprincipled destruction of everything human...."

The hope is in a new form of revolution, spearheaded by a vanguard of certain youth who follow a philosophy "which will in time include not only all youth, but all people in America." Only a new culture can control the machinery of society, but "its emotions can be comprehended only by seeing contemporary America through the eyes of the new generation." After a man has saved himself from his "present danger" he must learn to live in a new way: it requires the creation of a new "reality....the process of creatio which has already been started by our youth in this moment of utmost sterility darkest night and extremest peril...."*

*Ibid., pp. 19, 20, passim. When one gets to this new "reality" in the book, it is rather disappointing. Much of what Professor Reich claims for the special insight of his type of youth is either contrived or is probably nothing new to most people, and might stem from an underestimation and unknowing caricature of his fellow citizens. His "solutions" are based on his people not being like the rest of men--hypocritical, materialistic exploiters of their fellow man, "plastic," artificial--but rather on their being "truthful," true to oneself first and foremost, sticking firmly to principles, wearing one's heart on one's sleeve, only working at what one wants to, not being bound by unpleasant obligations (legal or otherwise), being free to enjoy life and beauty.

This new philosophy strikes one as not being new. A faint, yet clear and familiar echo of the young European Romantics of the late 18th and early 19th centuries can be heard in it, and it is difficult to miss:

....disciplined individualism was no longer enough for the Romantics. It came to mean to them no more than individually bowing to the same "fixities" and "definitives." And the Romantic craved not to find the same universal truth, but to experience reality in a way wholly his own. This was to be done not by reasoning, but through feeling, sentiment, imagination, instinct, passion, dream and recollection. These, unlike syllogistic reasoning, were modes of experience in each case spontaneous and unique....

(J.L. Talmon, Romanticism and Revolt, Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1967, p. 139.)

But there are other points of view given by competent analysts--some possibly as subjective, others perhaps not--on such students and the issues they and their mentors discuss. The work of these analysts brings into question the perception of the virtues of youth, particularly the virtues of students activists. Professor Joseph Schwab of the University of Chicago, a sympathetic analyst of college-student protest, identifies this specific issue as related to one of the "radical privations" which many students must endure. (Analysts such as Professor Schwab make some rather broad statements, too, but about a much narrower and presumably familiar subject--in Professor Schwab's case, the radical students.)

Students are ignorant of defensible grounds of morality, using, instead, three platitudes: "sincerity," "self-integrity," and "service to others." Two of these are good platitudes (integrity and service), but until the complexities and interconnections of "self," "other," "integrity," and "service" are understood, they can only dazzle and mislead.*

Professor Schwab also writes that, contrary to suggestions by some, he did not find a valid differentiation between college activists as "the best or better students" and the non-activists as "the poor and average students." The activists, he asserts, "appear to be drawn from and to represent well, almost the entire spectrum of student competence....In short, student activists are students."^{**} The Scholastic Aptitude test scores of 46 identified activists for example, were found to be distributed in a similar pattern to students as a whole:

*Joseph J. Schwab, College Curriculum and Student Protest (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 37. Later I will refer at length to this study which was partially done under a Ford Foundation grant. The Saturday Review calls Professor Schwab an experienced, dedicated and popular educator.

**Ibid., p. 33.

- TABLE LXIII

DISTRIBUTION OF SCHOLASTIC APTITUDE SCORES*

	Verbal		Quantitative	
	Activists	All	Activists	All
750-800	11%	13%	15%	13%
700-749	33	26	22	24
650-699	30	25	28	24
600-649	13	18	22	19
550-599	11	12	4	12
500-549	2	4.5	9	5
Below 500	0	1.5	0	3

For the entire group (All) N=700; for Activists, N=46

Professor Schwab points out that these data show that the student activists do include some of our "best students...with respect to mathematical as well as verbal competence."^{**} On the other hand, he states that the "audible leaders" and "doctrinal theorists" do not come from these superior students. He further states:

Neurosis, unfortunately, is no respecter of intellectual potential; the superior group has its full share of serious symptoms, generalized hostility, and difficulty in establishing effective relations with over-thirties.

But Professor Schwab feels that if one subtracts the "seriously ill"--and "even if we stretch the meaning of 'hostility' and 'difficulty in establishing relations' about as far as they will go," and discount the recovery rate after mid-adolescence--"a substantial proportion of the superior group [of activists] remains: highly intelligent, flexible, potentially capable of effective relations with a variety of people." He feels strongly that they should not be abandoned to the radicals by other youth and adults.

*Ibid., p. 32.

**Ibid., p. 33, 34.

The following discussion might shed some light on the makeup of the demonstrators that we discussed earlier, particularly regarding their relationship to the numbers of Radical Left and other "political" categories of college-bound high school students. Professor Schwab estimates that as few as 15% "on some campuses" and rarely more than 50% of student activists are sick, demagogues, imitators of demagogues or members of the New Left. The rest, occasional protesters, are moved by everything from "the ordinary impulse of any late adolescent to use an opportunity to thumb a nose at (not kick in the teeth) the parental generation," to "a sense of generational loyalty," to a sheeplike attitude, for fear of being left out, which exceeds the fear of "what they are being led to do."^{*} He makes the point, however, that "occasional" protesters become "regulars" for reasons that have nothing to do with the issues. Based on the statements of "dozens" of student sit-in attendees, he states, "For most it is one thing and very clear: they discover community." But the brighter ones soon decide that the euphoric "religious" experience of a sit-in is lacking something and, further, that the experience cannot be repeated by repeating the same happening. He concludes that they discover that "community is much more than a warm, crowded nest with lots of cheeping." This "hunger for community," he claims, is not confined to the activists, but to a "majority of students generally."

This means that we are talking about a student group that for many of us includes our own children and the children of our friends. They are, on the whole, ignorant, misinformed and confused; but they are also intelligent, serious and of decent, primitive habits...

He asserts, however, that the university is ill-suited to completely fill this gap and should not attempt to.

*Ibid., pp. 30-33.

That many students have this hunger, even that it is a legitimate hunger, constitutes no necessary reason why we should assuage it. That the university is Alma Mater is no reason for her becoming Omnia Mater. The university is only one of many agencies that affect students' lives; it has a character derived from its social functions; and this character can unsuit it to some other functions.

Professor Schwab proposes changes in the college curriculum to correct a condition stemming largely, he asserts, from "six classes of radical privation requiring curricular attention."^{*} The statement on the three platitudes, mentioned earlier, was part of a subset of one of these six. A few more are worth mentioning to give some feel for one analyst's observations of students that differ greatly from Professor Reich's.

Our students lack resources of durable satisfaction and pleasure.

They are untrained in the arts and disciplines of looking, listening, and reading with respect to form and structure, coherence and cogency. Hence they find little satisfaction in these acts and no impetus toward further development of the competencies involved. This indicates a special obligation of the humane disciplines.

Our students lack knowledge of the character and location of meaning and are consequently irresponsible in their use and reception of language. They are ignorant of canons of evidence and argument, and hence poorly equipped to judge solutions to problems.^{**}

In the area of decision-making, he says of the students:

They are ignorant of what is involved in the processes of decision and choice.

Most students are under the impression that good decisions are immediately derivable by simple matching of "principles" and cases; that decisions otherwise constructed are products of compromise

^{*} Ibid., p. 36.

^{**} Ibid., p. 40.

out of cowardice and self-interest--all these terms, including "compromise," being used invidiously. They are unaware of the complexity of actual cases: the conflict of principle which exists in almost all cases and inevitably requires compromise; the difficulty of bringing even one principle to bear on the ambiguities of real cases.

They lack experience in collaboration toward proximate goals. They believe that cooperation is possible only among persons who agree in all respects (doctrinalism). They are self-conditioned to behave accordingly, feeling uneasiness and distraction among persons whom they suspect of differing from themselves in "values," commitments, and ultimate goals. They have had little conscious experience of the fruitful collaboration that can result from discovery of common proximate goals among persons otherwise differing.*

He suggests a curriculum to help dissipate, to the degree that it can, the feeling among radical and other students, that they are aliens on the campus. He would rectify other wrongs to the young and through them the wrongs to the university. He feels strongly that the curriculum as it now is does not give sufficient opportunities to students to exercise their competence. This he would change.**

We may or may not agree with the conclusions of Professor Schwab's analysis and we do not need to agree with his possible solutions to the problems. We cannot, however, easily ignore his estimate that there are things wrong with some activist students, particularly those who are committed activists, for the warning signals are not confined to his study. Dr. Herbert Hendin, for example, a research psychiatrist at St. Luke's Hospital and a member of the faculty of the Columbia University Psychoanalytic Clinic, is working with a

*Ibid., pp. 37, 38.

**Ibid., pp. 30-41.

number of student revolutionaries who, for a fee, have agreed to be subjects for an experiment (none had come to the clinic on their own for treatment).

A series of interviews with fifteen such students obviously caused him to have sincere concern for the students, who had great inner turmoil and disturbing psychological conditions. The examples cited in an article* indicate that the political rebellion of these young people is really a manifestation of rebellion against personal difficulties. These ranged from an apparent need for greater restraints by parents and other adults to personal rejection by friends, all of which came out in political symbolism. There was also a strong indication that these students suffered because their parents had abdicated their positions of responsibility. Their parents had often failed to recognize and confront the students' problems head on (an abdication which is sometimes clothed in the terms "liberalism" and "permissiveness");** they had given too much attention

*"A Psychoanalyst Looks at Student Revolutionaries," The New York Times Magazine, January 17, 1971, p. 16.

**According to a newspaper article covering a speech given in Philadelphia by Dr. Bruno Bettelheim, noted psychiatrist and professor at the University of Chicago (with whom Dr. Hendin has some differences of opinion), Dr. Bettelheim seemed to corroborate Dr. Hendin's point on this issue.

Many parents are failing to "explain, understand and help" their children resolve "identity crises" which underly much of the unrest of today's young generation, he said.

He cited case studies in which a parent's refusal to put his foot down--impose his views on his child--resulted in the child's growing up confused, emotionally abandoned and radical. He urged parents to reason with their children....

[He] told of a father who even refused to "advise" his daughter whether to participate in a campus riot.

Parents would "rather risk killing" their children than have "an exchange" with them, he said.

to the political positions of students and not enough to their psychological needs; they had capitulated to students' demands through fear, etc.

Dr. Hendin concludes, however, that the "existence of inner turmoil does not invalidate" the students' critique of society--on the contrary:

But to discuss the historical and social forces that produce revolutionaries without knowing who student revolutionaries are or what they feel is misguided. However, even analysts and social scientists have ignored this inner dimension because of their involvement in the politics of the students. Agreeing with many of the students' criticisms of society, many psychoanalysts and social scientists try to become students' advocates and allies.*

He says that students can see through, and have a "benign contempt" for, "compassion that has its source in fear and sentimentality." His final sentence relates the remark of an arraigned student after a judge had given a "sympathetic talk on the problems of students today," and suspended sentence: "He means well, but with fools like that running the system, how can the revolution help but succeed?"**

Despite the small size of a few of these samples (although they appear to be variously supported by some of the Purdue findings which are based on quite extensive, perhaps even exhaustive data) and the possibly less than optimum study efforts, I would argue that a prudent man must conclude, on the evidence,

As a result, these children...are forever acting out unresolved oedipal complexes, they have been robbed of adult figures with which to positively identify, he said...

[They] oversimplify issues like poverty through which they seek escape from their own deprivation, he said.

(The Philadelphia Inquirer, February 4, 1971, p. 1).

* Hendin, p. 30.

** Ibid.

that he should take a cautious approach toward the political and social proclivities of activist students. Also, from this same evidence, it would seem that responsible people should be careful when involving activists in the analysis and decision-making processes, whether in school or out. As indicated earlier, such involvement may have undesirable consequences, not only for society, but, perhaps even more importantly, for these young people themselves. A group which is likely to contain a high percentage of the "decoupled," impractical, often pathetically unhappy and humorless--and possibly even somewhat disturbed--Radical Leftists of the high schools and demonstrators of the colleges is perhaps injured by being told it is an elite "vanguard." The added responsibility of making decisions on complex issues (a task at which, in the realm of reality, they apparently have little competence), without being able to seek the advice of many competent adults (which is hardest for this group), may be very disturbing to them. One must also be concerned when such people, with their probable bad judgment and lack of decision-making competence, are looked to for leadership in the development of "life styles" of youth, campus modes and mores--to say nothing of college courses and curriculum.

2. Youth Leaders and the Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

The previous data on youth primarily under 21 years of age is, not by accident, concentrated on high school and college students. Although non-students constitute a majority of the 17 to 22-year olds, they are generally not polled until they are 21. Some might assume that their attitudes are well enough reflected in the opinions of the 21-29-year olds. This might be correct;

but we seldom find out for sure, primarily because young nonstudents, as an identifiable group, are seldom asked what they think. A notable exception was a survey done by Daniel Yankelovich Incorporated for Fortune magazine in January 1969, which included in its sample of all youth, 384 nonstudents between the ages of 18 and 24. This sample included, of course, high school and college students living at home who are also polled elsewhere; but it did include, though it did not specifically indicate, the feelings of 18- and 19-year-olds at home, who were probably mostly nonstudents. Two recent polls mentioned earlier, one for Life magazine by Louis Harris and another for Seventeen were of all youth; the first was of those 15 to 21 years of age; the second, those 14 to 22. These polls also included, but did not specifically break out, the responses of 18- to 21-year old nonstudents.

Because the 1969 Fortune poll is a rather sizeable, well-known, professionally gathered and easily available poll, and it gives the opinions of non-student youth, I have drawn heavily on it. As we examine the poll results it is well to recall that as of June 1970, when half of the high school graduates went to college, those youths who finished high school and did not go to college represented about 28% of the excellent, 29% of the above-average and 62% of the average high school students. The capability of youth in this last category is not to be underestimated; from it, for example, come 40% of the college students. Among the young people who do not go to college, 29% have mothers who are college graduates, 46%

have mothers who are high school graduates and the same percentages have fathers with those levels of education.*

This Fortune poll is interesting from another point of view. It divides college students into two new categories: the "forerunners" (those concerned not only with careers--see the footnote on p. 228 for a description of these students), and the "practical-minded" (those for whom college is to improve careers). Fortune believed, apparently with some trepidation, that the "forerunners" had the "attitude toward college and careers" which "will become more prevalent in the years ahead."^{***} I will discuss these categories and the conclusions based on their answers later. First, let us look at some typical samples of the data that were published by Fortune and see what they might imply.

TABLE LXIV

CURRENT ISSUES - FORTUNE POLL^{***}

	<u>No college</u>	<u>—Practical college</u>	<u>Forerunner college</u>
Which, if any, of the presidential candidates comes close to your own point of view?	%	%	%
Nixon	31	38	27
Humphrey	23	24	17
Wallace	25	9	3
None of these	15	25	50

*Several studies of high school students in 1954 and 1959 indicated that "a very large proportion of the sample's brightest students did not enter college." Furthermore, in 1959 the probability of the "academically able" children of lower-income families going to college was highly dependent on many factors; e.g., whether there was a college in their home town (53% went if there was; only 22% if there wasn't); but their more affluent, equally competent peers were not so affected: 82% of these children went to college regardless if there was a local college or not. (James W. Trent and Leland L. Medsker, Beyond High School [San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1968], pp. 25, 27.)

**Fortune, January 1969, p: 70.

***Ibid., pp. 70, 71.

TABLE LXIV Cont.

	<u>No college</u>	<u>Practical college</u>	<u>Forerunner college</u>
What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?			
	%	%	%
Vietnam war	48	37	27
Racial problems & civil rights	27	31	32
Crime and lawlessness	14	12	4
Politics (the election, leaders, etc.)	9	10	11
Lack of understanding	6	7	13
General unrest in the nation	5	11	17
Breakdown in morals, respect	5	7	6

Concerning the most important problem, a Gallup poll of college students in December 1970, showed the first two topics similarly lined up. The topics below them are not as closely related to those given in the Fortune poll. The "general unrest in the nation" is somewhat close to "domestic unrest and/or strikes"; and "lack of communication/generation gap" might cover part of the Fortune topic, "Lack of understanding."

TABLE LXV

WHAT'S WRONG WITH AMERICA?*

COLLEGE STUDENTS

	<u>STUDENT POLITICAL VIEWS</u>		
	<u>ALL STUDENTS</u>	<u>TOTAL LEFT</u>	<u>TOTAL RIGHT</u>
	%	%	%
Vietnam War	19	20	15
Racial Problems	15	14	14
Apathy/Uninvolvement	14	13	15
Economic Situation/ Inflation, Unemployment, Poverty	13	13	9
Polarities/Inability to Get Together	13	20	8
Misplaced Values	11	13	10
Domestic Unrest/Strikes	11	8	17
Youth Unrest	10	5	14
Present Administration	9	13	8

* Gallup Opinion Index, No. 68, February 1971, p. 43.

TABLE LXV Cont.

	STUDENT POLITICAL VIEWS		
	ALL	TOTAL	TOTAL
	STUDENTS	LEFT	RIGHT
	%	%	%
Air, Water, Environmental Pollution	8	9	8
Lack of Communication/ Generation Gap	6	6	6
The System	6	10	2
All Others	27	28	21
Don't Know	2	1	3

A valid comparison of the Fortune and Gallup polls on these questions might be between the percentages of students choosing similar topics.

If so, such a comparison might show a drop in emphasis between 1968 and 1970 on specific issues (Vietnam and racism) and an increase in emphasis on more diffused, real or imagined ills of the country.

TABLE LXIV, Cont.

CURRENT ISSUES - FORTUNE POLL

	<u>No college</u>	<u>Practical college</u>	<u>Forerunner college</u>
Do you agree with those who have called ours a "sick" society? *			
	%	%	%
Yes	44	32	50
Comments in support of this view (some made more than one):			
Too much extremism	34	35	28
Loss of human concern	27	31	34
High crime rate	25	27	15
Defiant, rebellious youth	24	17	11
Hypocrisy in politics	9	17	10
Breakdown of democracy	7	10	12
Fear of social or economic change	1	4	9

*Polls indicate the general (adult) public refusals to agree that ours is a "sick" society.

TABLE LXIV, Cont.

	<u>No College</u>	<u>Practical college</u>	<u>Forerunner college</u>
In view of the developments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the U.S. made a mistake in sending troops to fight there?			
	%	%	%
Yes	46	51	67
No	42	39	27
Don't know	12	10	6
Would you describe yourself as a "hawk" or a "dove"?			
	%	%	%
Hawk	47	37	20
Dove	37	45	69
Don't Know	16	18	11
Have your attitudes toward the Vietnam war changed in any way recently?			
	%	%	%
Yes	26	35	35
If they have changed, have you become:			
More hawklike	13	14	7
More dove-like	13	21	28
Which of the following phrases describe your personal feelings about the war?			
	%	%	%
Sympathy for our boys	78	75	76
<u>Patriotism</u>	<u>46</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>22</u>
Strong support for the U.S. position	46	26	14
Feeling of helplessness	31	31	54
Disgust with our government	30	40	54
Anger at our government	20	24	31
Anger at opponents of the war	19	11	6
Sympathy for the Vietcong	11	8	21

TABLE LXIV, Cont.

Aside from the particular issues of the Vietnam war, which of these values do you believe are always worth fighting for?*

	No college	Practical college			Forerunner college		
	1968	1968	1969	1970	1968	1969	1970
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Protecting our national interest	73	65	51	37	40	25	20
Containing the Communists	68	59	55	41	28	31	17
Counteracting aggression	65	75	64	60	50	47	35
Fighting for our honor	64	44	33	21	20	15	12
Maintaining our position of power in the world	54	46	33	20	22	17	11
Protecting allies	53	51	43	32	37	33	20
Keeping a commitment	30	24	17	14	14	12	14

*The 1969 and 1970 breakdown under this question comes from Youth and the Establishment, A Report on Research for John D. Rockefeller 3rd and the Task Force on Youth, by Daniel Yankelovich, Inc., 1971, pp. 63 and 64. This study apparently uses the same categories and presumably the same sample and plotting technique as the Fortune survey; the author seems merely to have changed the name of the "practical college" category to "career-minded." More important, however, nonstudent attitudes were not included in the 1969 and 1970 studies.

The Seventeen poll of late 1970 of students and nonstudents asked another question that might be considered to be about "fighting for something." It indicated that 90% of the boys and 70% of the girls in the 18 to 22-year old bracket feel there is something they would "risk their life for." Fifty-one per cent of the boys and 32% of the girls listed loved ones and family friends as the "something;" 30% of the boys, but only 12% of the girls, gave country and United States. Because of the starkness of the question--"would you risk your life?"--combined with a greater range of choices given by Seventeen, compared to the broader question with more limited political choices listed in Table LXIV above, the Seventeen poll may indicate a trend in the direction of the "forerunners" thinking on this issue. One would not be surprised if this were so, although the degree of change is hard to gauge. In any event, we may never know, because the 1968, 1969 and 1970 polls are dissimilar.

On the other hand, the morality issue is apparently not total; 67% of all youth (15 to 21 years old) interviewed for the Life Harris poll mentioned earlier, said they would work for a "company that handles defense contracts."

TABLE LXIV, cont.

	<u>No college</u>	<u>Practical college</u>	<u>Forerunner college</u>
Which of the following statements express your own values and point of view?			
We should set our own house in order before we police the rest of the world	% 91	% 83	% 86
There are worse things to fear politically than the threat of communism	47	64	82
Do you feel that draft resistance is justified under any circumstances?			
Yes	17	36	67
No	79	61	31
Do you feel that civil disobedience is justified under any circumstances?			
No	77	61	28
Yes	18	32	66
Do you feel that the action of the police at the Chicago Democratic Convention was justified?			
Yes	49	39	21
No	26	40	60
Both sides were at fault	6	13	12
No opinion	19	8	7
Do you feel this country is doing too much, enough, or too little for black people?			
Too much	% 20	% 15	% 7
Enough	45	47	22
Too little	35	38	71
Reasons given (some gave more than one):			
Blacks do not yet have equal opportunity	54	41	40
Blacks' living standard is still too low	36	14	16
There is still too much prejudice against blacks	31	34	38
Would you welcome more emphasis in this country on combating poverty?			
Yes	% 73	% 78	% 87

One can see from the responses to these questions that another not outrageously prejudicial term for most of the "forerunners" would be "the more Radical Left" students.* Most students and nonstudents, as well as adults differ with them. They are left of everyone; in 1968 they were, in most cases, further left of the "practical-minded" students than the "practical" students were of the nonstudents. Since this is so, they would, of course, be "forerunners" if our college faculty (particularly the young faculty) and students were to continue their leftward movement.

Despite the obvious similarity of their views to their parents', which we showed earlier, most students have the normal youthful impatience with the pace of events. It is striking that in the question above on whether this is a sick society, a greater percentage of both nonstudents and "forerunners" thought so than "practical" college students. But one must keep in mind that in October 1968, the nonstudents and "forerunners" had quite different reasons for considering it "sick." In the case of the nonstudents, a good part of this feeling apparently came from their apprehension about "defiant and rebellious youth." Fifty-six percent of this group preferred nonliberal candidates in 1968 (Nixon--31%; Wallace--25%); only 25% were pro-Humphrey. Although only one-third of the "practical" college students subscribed to the idea that this was a sick society, 47% of them also showed a preference for nonliberal candidates: 38% chose Nixon and 9% Wallace; only about half that many (24%) selected Humphrey. On this political issue, "practical" college students gave a rather strong "no opinion" response (25%), although not so strong as among the "forerunners"

*Although internal evidence in the Yankelevich-Fortune data suggests that some 10-20% could be considered "Right-wingers."

(50%). Nevertheless; in 1968 the 47% (Nixon and Wallace) of this 58% of college students ("practical" students) added to the 56% of that large majority of youth who are not students made up a formidable block of opinion among youth bucking the tide of opinion of much of the media and of the vast majority of college instructors, particularly those at the better quality schools and in the social sciences.*

Other questions in Table LXIV such as "putting our own house in order" obviously could mean quite different things to different groups of youth; but if and in so far as, the opinions of the "practical-minded" or "career-minded" students have shifted toward those of the "forerunners" in 1969 and 1970 as shown in polls of presumably the same samples of students, the attitudes of forerunners could be thought to have been prophetic in 1968. According to the 1971 study, Youth and the Establishment as well as other data, there is some evidence to indicate that in some issues and primarily among college students, this may have been the case.** But 1970, the year of the "great student strike," may have been a bad time to try and find "political" trends. Today there are some signs that could be taken to be the beginning of a cooling-off period and--barring some new upheaval--a swing toward the opposite direction; but a swing all the way back is less likely. This is not to say that important student opinion studies, such as Youth and the Establishment, could or should have been held up to wait until things "settled down."

* The "practical" students' endorsement of their opinions looks somewhat more like the nonstudents' than the "forerunners';" and their political opinions apparently did not match those of professors, at least not those of the social scientists and the instructors at the "better schools."

** See footnote, p. 16 of Youth and the Establishment and p. 70 of Fortune, January 1969, for a description of the criteria used to classify them.

The following tables give comparisons of data for 1968, 1969 and 1970, published by Daniel Yankelevich, Inc., in Youth and the Establishment and Fortune, January 1969. Although the years 1968 to 1970 may be too short a time to even substantiate the simplest conclusions, one could nevertheless make the argument from these surveys that, based on the persistent increase or decrease in the percentage of negative or positive answers to the questions, a trend was evident. On the other hand, there are some responses in these surveys that indicate there was really a fluctuation in opinion from 1968 through 1970, rather than a trend. Particularly in some basic areas, such as feelings of identity with family and other groups, we get an equal or higher reading for all students (including forerunners*) in 1970 than we got in 1968; most 1969 readings on this question are considerably higher than they were in either 1968 or 1970. In other comparisons, the perturbation in 1969 was down from either 1968 or 1970. Perhaps the data were affected because we were getting readings from two "crisis" years (1968 and 1970) and one "non-crisis" year (1969).

Another factor in judging changes in student opinions is that of the parents' influence on them. If we accept the data that show that students identify strongly with their parents, we should probably not assume that, at least in "noncrisis" years, this will have no effect on students' opinions. If their parents' attitudes, including their political attitudes, do not fluctuate wildly (and they apparently are not doing so now) and the students maintain their identity with their parents, as even most of the "forerunners" do--adult influence on students in "noncrisis" years may still be significant --at least as significant as the students' influence on their parents' opinions.

*Who identified much more strongly with the middle class and their nationality in 1970 than in 1968.

The results of the following surveys by selected youth* are interesting, particularly insofar as they include nonstudent opinion. It might also be of interest to compare these results with those of similar questions from more recent polls taken by other groups.

TABLE LXVI

IDENTIFICATION - FORTUNE POLL**

With which of the following groups, if any, do you feel a sense of solidarity and identification?

	<u>No college</u>	<u>Practical college</u>			<u>Forerunner college</u>		
	<u>1968</u> %	<u>1968</u> %	<u>1969</u> %	<u>1970</u> %	<u>1968</u> %	<u>1969</u> %	<u>1970</u> %
Your family	82	78	80	84	65	75	72
The middle class	65	68	80	68	35	60	50
People of your race	61	46	67	48	28	48	35
People of your generation	60	65	85	75	68	81	76
People of your nationality	54	45	60	44	26	48	39
People of your religion	49	46	52	41	32	37	25
Students	23	75	88	94	72	87	91
The new left	3	5	6	7	19	23	26
The old left	2	3	5	2	8	11	5

TABLE LXVII

AGREEMENT WITH PARENTS***

Do you agree with your parents' values and ideals?

Yes - 73%

(This poll was taken of all youth 15 to 21.)

*Obviously a different scheme of categorization might produce entirely different schisms and agreements; but for valid reasons (such as the fact that the data would have to be reexamined to produce different categories and that these categories are apparently accepted by others), I will stick with them.

**Fortune, January 1969, p. 71. The 1969 and 1970 data are added for comparison from Youth and the Establishment, p. 73.

***Harris poll, Life, January 8, 1971, p. 23.

TABLE LXVIII

ADMIRATION AND DISLIKE - FORTUNE POLL*

	<u>No college</u>	<u>Practical college</u>	<u>Forerunner college</u>
Which, if any, of these men do you admire?			
	%	%	%
Edward Kennedy	58	50	56
Richard Nixon	30	29	19
George Wallace	30	17	7
Lyndon Johnson	26	24	11
Hubert Humphrey	25	16	16
Eugene McCarthy	24	45	65
Mayor Richard Daley	15	15	9
Stokely Carmichael	5	7	20
John Kenneth Galbraith	3	17	34
Allen Ginsberg	2	5	22
Paul Goodman	2	4	13
Che Guevara	1	6	20
Herbert Marcuse	1	2	9

Which, if any, of these men do you intensely dislike?

Stokely Carmichael	50	53	32
George Wallace	33	50	70
Hubert Humphrey	23	20	23
Lyndon Johnson	22	23	30
Richard Nixon	16	18	28
Eugene McCarthy	6	7	7
Mayor Richard Daley	5	27	50
Che Guevara	4	15	9
Edward Kennedy	3	5	2
John Kenneth Galbraith	2	8	4
Allen Ginsberg	2	8	6
Paul Goodman	1	4	6
Herbert Marcuse	1	5	6

*Fortune, January 1969, pp. 71, 72. In the Harris poll in Life, cited above, the 15-to-21-year-olds were asked to choose, from a list of well-known people, those whom they most and least admired. The results were as follows:

<u>HEROES</u>	<u>NONHEROES</u>
Robert F. Kennedy	Fidel Castro
Bill Cosby	Eldridge Cleaver
Neil Armstrong	George Wallace
John Wayne	Ho Chi Minh

TABLE LXIX
FOR PRESIDENT IN 1972?*

Whom would you like to see elected President in 1972?

		<u>Highly Favorable and Favorable Ratings</u> <u>Among College Students - December 1970</u> **	
		%	%
Kennedy	20.9	Lindsay	81
Nixon	19.0	McCarthy	79
McCarthy	12.7	Muskie	78
Muskie	8.6	McGovern	76
Wallace	7.8	Kennedy	75
Humphrey	6.1	Rockefeller	63
Julian Bond	3.6	Humphrey	60
McGovern	3.0	Nixon	49
Agnew	2.5	Reagan	48
Reagan	2.1	Agnew	36
Rockefeller	1.9	Wallace	16
Howard Hughes	.6		
Birch Bayh	.2		
No opinion	2.6		

In their responses to these questions, the "practical" students again look somewhat more like the non-college youths than do the "forerunners"; but perhaps the most important single item is the overwhelming lack of identity on the part

* Seventeen, February 1971, p. 119. The questions in this poll were asked of all youth between 15 and 24. See p. 32, this section for a discussion of this poll and the sample of youth it covers.

** Gallup Opinion Index, No. 68, February 1971, p. 21.

of the nonstudents with students.* This fact is even more interesting because this group presumably contains some high school students who intend to go to college, some of whom should identify with college students. Also the distinction made as to who is included in the student category--"those who were attending college at the time of the survey"--might not have included those college graduates between the ages of 21 and 24 in the student category. This should have placed some recent college graduates in the category of nonstudents, a portion of whom are more likely to be sympathetic to students than those who had never been to college.**

The lack of identity of the nonstudents with students does not at all mean that the person who did not go to college is mindlessly under the influence of adults. In Table LXVI note that in 1968 a majority of nonstudents (60%--a

*The Seventeen poll showed indications of a lack of sympathy with disorderly students on the part of all youth, including high school and college students, college-bound students and recent college graduates (p. 127):

"College administrators in the handling of campus disturbances have	Total Youth	Total Boys	B 14-17	B 18-22	Total Girls	G 14-17	G 18-22
	not been strict enough	43%	44%	44%	45%	42%	45%
handled them about right	28	26	31	22	29	31	28
been too repressive	29	30	25	33	29	24	33

The Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 90, January 1971 (pp. 23a and 24a), showed even more hostility among 10th, 11th and 12th grade high school students:

"Law officers, like state or local police, should be called to the campus when college students cause disturbances."

	Definitely Agree	Probably Agree	Definitely Disagree	Probably Disagree
	All students	52%	23%	11%
College-bound students	51	24	11	10

**The effect of this possible facet of the sampling should be kept in mind in evaluating responses to all questions.

small majority compared to even greater ones of 65 and 68% for "practical" and "forerunner" students, but still a clear majority); said they felt "a sense of solidarity and identification" with people of their "generation" although only 23% felt this way about students (compared to 75 and 72% in 1968, 88 and 87% in 1969, and 94 and 91% in 1970 for the two student categories). What is clear is that, at least in October of 1968 this vast majority of youth did not feel that students spoke for them.*

In the following tables, many of the responses of nonstudents, as well as both categories of students, showed that they have the normal feelings of independence and impatience with their parents as well as those feelings shared among all youth that are different than they assume their parents' feelings on these same subjects to be. It is the strength of these feelings among youth that is different; normally the nonstudents are on one end of the continuum and the "forerunners" on the other. (On the "faith in the democratic process" question, however, the nonstudents are closer to the "forerunners;" but this response is hard to evaluate: for example, it could, on the one hand, reflect "Right-wing" sentiment and indifference and on the other, disillusioned "Radical Leftism."

*Note also the wide spread between the numbers of high school Radical Leftists and college people of the same persuasion, particularly the "forerunners," based on answers to identical questions.

TABLE LXX

YOUTH'S AND PARENTS' ATTITUDES - FORTUNE POLL*

	<u>No college</u>	<u>Practical college</u>	<u>Forerunner colleene</u>
Are the following attitudes more applicable to you or your parents? *			
Likely to compromise with things you don't like			
Parents	44	45	56
Self	20	20	16
Respectful of people in positions of authority			
Parents	41	42	56
Self	16	8	4
Likely to accept things as they are			
Parents	40	44	52
Self	31	26	24
Fearful of financial insecurity			
Parents	39	40	47
Self	33	28	18
Have faith in the democratic process			
Parents	38	30	50
Self	11	18	13
Tolerant of other people's views			
Parents	31	20	15
Self	43	57	60
Honest with oneself			
Parents	25	19	14
Self	24	26	39
Interested in other people			
Parents	24	16	11
Self	37	49	43
Interested in money			
Parents	23	28	48
Self	37	23	12
Likely to do something about what you believe to be right			
Parents	22	13	8
Self	33	36	50
Open to the world			
Parents	16	8	7
Self	55	54	66
Interested in beauty			
Parents	15	9	9
Self	40	42	43
Optimistic about the future			
Parents	14	17	23
Self	63	49	42
Self-centered			
Parents	14	9	17
Self	36	53	43
Concerned with what is happening to the country			
Parents	14	12	9
Self	36	35	45

*Fortune, January 1969, p. 179.

In the area of some more basic questions, however, there is a striking difference of opinion between nonstudents and student. The feelings of nonstudents here are closer to their parents'; those of the "practical" college students lie in the center. But on some very important questions of self-discipline--"which of these restraints, imposed by society and its institutions, can you accept easily? Requirement that you be married before you live with someone" and "The power and authority of the 'boss' in a work situation"--in 1968 the "practical" students were closer to the "forerunners" than to the nonstudents.

Unfortunately, we have no figures for nonstudents in 1969 and 1970. The polls of those two years seem to indicate that the work attitudes of the "forerunners" might have been prophetic because of the decreased numbers of college students who can "easily accept" the "power and authority of the 'boss' in a work situation." In 1968 the "forerunners" registered 52% who could and by 1969 the "career-minded" ("practical" college) had decreased to 50%. Whether all students will eventually drop to the 1970 figure for the "forerunners"--only 29% who can "easily" accept this situation, and whether this trend should be discouraged (or at least not encouraged), can lead to some interesting speculation. On other issues--for example, staying away from marijuana and harder drugs, abiding by unpopular laws and even conforming in matters of clothing--the opinion of both categories of students fluctuated over the three years and the "practical" college seemed not to follow the "forerunners'" earlier opinions. In fact, in two out of five cases, the "practical" college students could have been considered the prophetic group; that is, the "forerunners'" opinion in 1970 veered more toward the "practical" college opinion

of 1969. (In another case--abiding by unpopular laws--the decrease of the positive response of the "forerunners" bottomed out at 12% in 1969 and stayed there in 1970 and the "practical" college increased from 17% to 21%).

TABLE LXXI

ACCEPTANCE OF RESTRAINTS - FORTUNE POLL*

Which of these restraints, imposed by society and its institutions, can you accept easily?

	<u>No college</u>	<u>Practical college</u>			<u>Forerunner college</u>		
	<u>1968</u> %	<u>1968</u> %	<u>1969</u> %	<u>1970</u> %	<u>1968</u> %	<u>1969</u> %	<u>1970</u> %
The prohibition against marijuana	77	69	59	59	37	35	30
The prohibition against other drugs	85	83	82	90	63	63	84
The power and authority of the "boss" in a work situation	74	60	56	50	52	40	29
Requirement that you be married before you live with someone	69	50			36		
Conforming in matters of clothing and personal grooming	65	45	39	44	28		28
Outward respectability for the sake of career advancement	54	39			17		
Having little decision-making power in the first few years of a job	48	38			23		
Abiding by laws you don't agree with	43	35	17	21	21	12	12
Showing respect for people you may not, in fact, respect	33	25			17		
Pressures to close one's eyes to dishonest behavior	9	3			2		

* Ibid., p. 180. The 1969 and 1970 data are from Youth and the Establishment, pp. 51 and 52.

When the subject of careers was discussed with the young in 1968, their responses were more similar than the criteria--which supposedly led to the definition of the groups as "practical-minded" and "forerunners"--might imply. The "challenge of the job" was rated higher than the "money earned" by all three categories of youth. "Prestige and status of job" was rated last by all groups. All three categories rated "opportunity to make a meaningful contribution" above "ability to express yourself," "importance of the job" and "prestige and status of the job." This seems to weaken the criterion of the "forerunners" given in the Fortune poll and in Youth and the Establishment as specifically "those not concerned only with careers."

Over 50% of all categories had definite and specific career plans. The most pronounced difference was in their attitudes toward salary and the influence of their family on their decision to take a position; but of course there were differences of degree on all issues. On the matter of salary and family influence in 1968, "practical" students were closer to the nonstudents. The noncollege group normally includes the largest number of young people from low-income families, so this may be the reason for their citing the money interest. Among the "practical" college students, one-third were from blue-collar families, and possibly some of the same incentive may be at work here. On the matter of the importance of the job, the nonstudents were closer to the "forerunners."

Assuming, always, as Youth and the Establishment implies, (and there seems to be no reason to doubt it) that we are comparing like samples, some answers are interesting in respect to which groups have changed and (considering other data, such as the growing disapproval of adults of so many things of which the "forerunners'" approval continued to grow) what unexpected

directions these changes took; e.g., the opportunity to make a "meaningful contribution" and "family" influence has increased among the "forerunners" and decreased among "practical" college; the ability to express themselves has decreased drastically among "practical" college and only slightly among "forerunners."

TABLE LXXII

INFLUENCE ON CAREER - FORTUNE POLL*

Which of these items will have a very great influence on your choice of career?

	<u>No college</u>		<u>Practical college</u>		<u>Forerunner college</u>	
	<u>1968</u> %		<u>1968</u> %	<u>1970</u> %	<u>1968</u> %	<u>1970</u> %
Own family	62		48	46	25	32
Challenge of the job	61		77	64	74	63
Money that can be earned	57		58	46	21	19
Opportunity to make a meaningful contribution	55		71	68	80	82
Stimulation of the job	52		70		77	
Ability to express yourself	50		63	48	75	71
Importance of the job	42		55		46	
Prestige or status of the job	34		33		13	
Which will have no influence at all?						
Prestige or status of the job	46		50		64	
Importance of the job	24		16		20	
Own family	22		37		44	
Money that can be earned	20		23		48	
Opportunity to make a meaningful contribution	19		12		2	
Ability to express yourself	18		9		6	
Stimulation of the job	17		10		4	
Challenge of the job	11		5		4	

* ibid., p. 181; the 1970 figures are from Youth and the Establishment, p. 39.

The Harris poll in late 1970 of all 15 to 21 year olds--students and nonstudents--also seemed to show a lack of interest in standard career-related factors:*

"What factors are most important in choosing a job?"

1. Enjoyable work
2. Pride in the job
3. Pleasant working conditions
4. Creative satisfaction

"Least important factors:

1. Short hours
2. Recognition by society
3. Achieving status

As indicated earlier, though apparently largely produced by the same organization, for unspecified, but presumably valid, contractual reasons, the data for the 1969 CBS news program, Generations Apart, and the additional data gathered for Youth and the Establishment deviated from the 1968 Fortune poll. In the two later surveys no nonstudents were polled, so these surveys are not on youth but on students. The 1970 sample in Youth and the Establishment was made up of 872 college students and 408 "business executives and other Establishment leaders." Nonstudents apparently were not interviewed; they only hint as to why they were not interviewed came from statements in the study regarding who they had in mind to take part in conferences on various issues between youth and top members of the Establishment. According to the report, "major emphasis would be on the Forerunner student group, with secondary emphasis on the more Career-Minded majority of college students."**

*Life, January 8, 1971, p. 24.

**Youth and the Establishment, p. 16, item 4.

Youth and the Establishment contains much interesting data on the two categories of students; but, unfortunately, almost all the questions asked were not identical to those reported in the 1969 Fortune survey. The comparisons the study does make, between 1969 and 1970, in many cases do seem to show an increase in what might be called "radicalism" in both the "forerunners" and "career-minded" students in 1970 as compared to 1969, and the evidence of this study, as well as some other data mentioned earlier, seems to show that the "forerunners" are being followed to the Left. If this is sufficient justification for the title, the term "forerunner" would be apt. The problem is that only the short time span between 1969 and 1970 is compared; even 1968 data sometimes breaks the "trend." Furthermore, we do not know what significance for the future lies in this trend. Where a trend does seem to appear, from this data as well as others, it is far from a universal phenomenon, covering all subject areas. Historically, student groups touted as being avant garde have not been prophetic. The "forerunners" of 1948 did not turn out to be the Left-wing student supporters of Henry Wallace; on the campus the very middle-of-the-road "silent fifties" followed them. Nor were the student pacesetters for the "silent fifties" the precursors of the 1960's. In fact, the very same students, themselves, particularly the very "liberal" ones, tended to change when they graduated college and reached their late twenties and early thirties.

Perhaps more interesting than the poll data in Youth and the Establishment is the apparent thrust of its Task Force inquiry and recommendations. The apparent aim of the Task Force was to find ways to get students, particularly the "forerunners," and powerful Establishment men to collaborate on finding methods of solving the country's problems. The subjects which college students

and businessmen were expected to be able to get together on wéré poverty, racism, pollution, overpopulation and drug addiction; and "both groups see the need of reforming our political institutions to get the job done. (Italics mine.) Also the study found that there was much less "student backlash among business leaders as a group than the general public." In addition, the Task Force apparently felt that the greater likelihood of the "forerunners" making themselves available for this high-level conference group was a reason for using them.* This is a very questionable criterion--even a minor one--for competence in dealing with complex issues. Furthermore, as we have seen, the emphasis of the study was to be on the "forerunners." This tends to narrow the field of participants to a specific minority of students. The danger here is that the group may progress from being only "forerunners" of the students to the "forerunners" of all society; that they will speak for all youth today and all the adults they will become.

Indeed, this study explicitly states about the forerunners: "We believe these young people will not change their basic outlook once they are out of college."*** A statement which, in time, would tend to make this group different, it further states that "we must broaden our frame of reference from 'forerunner' college students to include those of similar outlook who have already graduated from college or dropped out or never attended college."***

*Youth and the Establishment, pp. 28, 34, 38 and 39.

**Ibid., p. 82. In a poll taken by a Johns Hopkins team at the same time of almost 8,000 freshmen and juniors of four-year colleges (but not including predominantly Negro schools or "specialized institutions") 87% listed "family life" and 64% picked "their careers" as what "would be...most important to them in ten years;" a self-prediction with a somewhat different perspective than that held today by the "forerunners." The Johns Hopkins study group claimed that this student group represented the life styles of about three-fourths of all students. (The Philadelphia Inquirer, February 12, 1971, p. 20.)

***Youth and the Establishment, p. 82.

We can follow the reasoning of such a study if we make several assumptions, among them:

- a) that these students (and others "of similar outlook") really are the source of wisdom among the young, those who will shape the future of the establishment;
- b) that we must accept not only this source of pacesetters but implicitly their mode of thinking.

This premise could easily become a self-fulfilling prophecy, and one gets the uneasy feeling that it already has begun to do so in the minds of some. Obviously, if those who have the power to give the "forerunner" students influence are convinced that the students are right and furthermore will almost inevitably get such influence--and rightly should have it--these students and any adults who think the way they do will of course have a good chance of becoming influential; and the prediction will be correct.

Is something like this beginning now? According to The New York Times of December 6, 1970, John D. Rockefeller 3rd recently voiced an increasingly heard thesis: "The main responsibility for a movement toward reconciliation and joint action now rests with the Establishment. Young people have been involved and committed for some time. It is our turn now." The article further stated, "This conclusion was based in part on a recent 'Study of Youth and the Establishment.'"

Although the study showed that "during the last year, such activist tactics as blockades, resisting or assaulting the police, or holding authorities

*Youth and the Establishment, p. 82.

as captives have gained further acceptance among... 'forerunners'," Mr. Rockefeller stated that "we're not doing as effective a job as we could" to meet our problems and "we have young people who are our leaders of tomorrow" who want "to have a part in decision making."

This line of reasoning is disquieting. First of all, assuming for the moment that we can somehow single them out, how does one know that these "future leaders" will think the same in later life, when they are ready to lead, as they now do in college? Are colleges the best environment to come to conclusions on hard, practical matters of the real world?^{*} Is not the "decoupled" nature of our campuses intentional? Are they not, particularly the non-physical science departments, of necessity, places for the contemplative life?: "Ideas for ideas' own sake," regardless of whether they are feasible?^{**} But today can one discuss at colleges even the problems of the campuses, particularly if a number of the definitions of the problems--to say nothing of their solutions--run contrary to the ideologies of the activist students

^{*}Referring to a study of our universities by a panel of academicians, financed by the Ford Foundation, The New York Times of March 9, 1971 (p. 45) reported the following:

Both students and faculty members, the report said, live in an isolated community that bears little resemblance to the real world. It doubted whether education could be made more relevant to students and society simply by developing new curriculums because, it said, too few students and faculty members have enough experience outside the education system to know what is relevant.

^{**}"Perhaps the central element of the image of the college professor is his concern for ideas as such. His supposed 'absent-mindedness' and his reputed impracticality reflect the notion that he is a man of thought rather than action... In other words, those whose concern is largely with the application of practical skills are, in our sample, highly unlikely to consider becoming professors." Ian D. Currie, Henry C. Finney, Travis Hirsch and Hana C. Selvin, "Images of the Professor and Interest in the Academic Profession," Sociology of Education, Fall, 1966.

and the militant, young instructors who inspire and abet them? In fact, since many real problems on the campuses are of little interest to ideologically-oriented activists, they may have less chance of getting on the "agenda" during periods of great activism.

One can have grave reservations about the wisdom of encouraging this minority of more radical young people to speak for "youth." The prudent man must ask, what are the credentials of these "future leaders" in our universities, these "forerunners"? How do we know that "We of the older generation need their fresh ideas, their feeling for change"; and why is it right and how do we know it will be productive for "older people to be pushed to re-think, both personally and institutionally" by this particular group?*

The most disquieting thing about such "forerunners" is the likelihood of finding among them a greater percentage of people who have the traits of the demonstrators and the Radical Left--their political philosophy, their reliance on drugs and their seeming lack of self-discipline. It is a small point, but the very classification of the "forerunners" as those not concerned only with careers" could imply that other youth are concerned only with careers. As we have seen from the data of the Fortune article that so classified the groups, this is clearly not so. As noted earlier, all youth, students and nonstudents alike, rate most "career" aspects of their professions below the more "selfless" aspects. (It should be pointed out that most nonstudent youth are already in the career world; this is a "meaningful" decision for them, but for most students it is a

*Speech by John D. Rockefeller, 3rd., in The New York Times, December 6, 1970, p. 65.

theoretical exercise that has yet to be tested against reality.) It is possible that the "forerunners" might care least about careers. A critic could argue from the evidence that these groups--"Radical Leftists," "demonstrators" and probably the "forerunners"--are the most unlikely groups to be listened to in the actual world of politics, social welfare, business and government; and this may even be the case on the campus.

For instance, how seriously should anyone making long-range plans for an established institution take advice from "forerunners" from whom almost 6 out of 10 "strongly agree" that "our foreign policy is based on our own narrow economic and power interests"; 1 in 3 "strongly agrees" that "severe economic recession and depression are inevitable with our type of economy"; an increasing number feel (12% agree "strongly," 42% "partially") that "the whole social system ought to be replaced by an entirely new one; the existing structures are too rotten to repair"; and 1 in 3 "strongly disagree" (and only 13% "strongly agree") that American democracy can "respond effectively to the needs of the people?"* What does one do with the advice of a group in which better than 1 in 4 wants to "do away with the political parties," more than 1 in 4 wants to "do away with the military," and almost 1 in 4 wants to "do away with the FBI?": Furthermore, more than 8 in 10 of the "forerunners" feel that the Black Panthers "cannot be assured of a fair trial"; 7-8 in 10 think this also is true for radicals

* In December 1970, 43% of the college students (49% of the freshmen, but only 23% of the graduate students) said change in America in the next 25 years would come through revolution--49% said through peaceful means and 8% had no opinion. Also, 44% agreed that "violence is sometimes justified to bring change in American society," 54% said not so and 2% had no opinion. Compare this to the opinion of the general public on the issue if violence is sometimes justified for this cause: No--81%; yes--14%; "don't know"--5%. (Gallup Opinion Index No. 68, February 1971, pp. 40 and 41.)

and hippies. How does one use the advice of people with such an outlook and why should that advice be more important than that of the majority--or for that matter, of any other minority group? The fact that this group can come to these far-reaching conclusions on highly complicated issues from the isolation of the campus, does not mean that they have any meaning in the practical world or that these students will think the same when they enter that world. The fact that such ideas have gained ground among all students in colleges, possibly even all youth might be reason for rejoicing or worrying, but it alone cannot be grounds for bowing to the inevitable or "rethinking both personally and institutionally."

We must ask again, what are the credentials of this minority? The "forerunners" are mostly social science majors (in the 1969 Fortune poll, 80% were in the "arts and humanities") and fewer than in any other category come from "blue-collar" families (only 1 in 4.) As we saw earlier, the majority of the best students going from high school to college and the vast majority of "well-adjusted" high school students, do not fit the activist mold. The activist's value is said to be his ability to spot, from his critical--if not hostile--position, the flaws in our society;^{*} but one wonders whether the less hostile, "career-minded" student isn't also sufficiently critical to spot our real flaws. Might it not be that using the activist for this task is like asking a paranoid to look for plots: he will find plots, any real ones, plus dozens dreamt up, and he may demand from a non-negotiable position that all the "plots" be stamped out.

* Schwab, p. 34.

3. Why the "Vanguard" Approach?

As we have seen, most nonstudent youth did not identify with students; in fact, there may be a greater gap between the attitudes of the ultra-liberal students and those of other youth than between most youth and adults.* The radical students can certainly not prove that they live in an environment better suited to produce genuine, practical social awareness than the youth who live and work in society. Some students, including perhaps the somewhat disturbed youngsters, may, however, be more guilt-ridden; but this does not mean they care more nor that they are better equipped to realistically suggest cures for complex social problems. On the contrary, such people are normally less well-equipped, and any prudent man must hesitate to endorse their judgment on the evidence at hand.**

That the opinions of these people should be considered by "business executives and other Establishment leaders" and that they preferably should be allowed to "have a part in decision-making" is, from one point of view, ironic: Millions of youths who are the "forgotten, unpolled masses" of non-students and who work in the plants and government bureaus of these "executives" and "leaders" cannot even get the plant superintendent or supervisor to let them "have a part in decision-making" or to listen to their ideas on

*See Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, "The Non-Generation Gap," Commentary, August 1970, pp. 35-39, for a discussion of this and other vertical "gaps" in society.

**See the article from The New York Times by Lowell, cited earlier, (p. Adult Section) for his description of the real crisis facing competent Negro students, on and off campus, largely because of the misguided efforts of such people.

politics, social problems, corporate responsibility, etc. Yet, from the recommendations in Youth and The Establishment, the men "at the top" presumably should bend an ear to the inexperienced, more radical, but favored young people; and a "short cut" to these powerful men will be built for them by adults.* Carried very far, this could lead to attempted high-level "social engineering" at its worst. Furthermore--and perhaps most important--by choosing this special minority of college students we tend to "disenfranchise" the vast majority of our youth, which by all criteria is more likely to include the more energetic and practical, solution-oriented people, more people who are likely to be better adjusted emotionally and to have more self discipline as well as more people with intelligence, ability and common sense. What gives one pause is that such ideas are not confined to any one study group Task Force or a few businessmen or government officials. We apparently are knowingly betting on what is quite likely to be the wrong horse, and one wonders why.

One easy answer is that things are changing and the old source of "pace-setters" cannot supply the new leadership which the country needs. This may be true, but there have always been changes, including the Industrial Revolution, the Civil War and its aftermath, the Great Depression and the New Deal, etc., and we have survived them well without jettisoning our value systems. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of people apparently do not subscribe to the ideas and aims of this particular new "vanguard." No evidence at

* In a suggested "dialogue" on eliminating poverty, for example:

Individual projects would be planned to give young people primary roles in diagnosis and problem identification and adult members primary roles in problem solution. (Youth and the Establishment, p. 18.)

present seems to prove this majority judgment to be wrong, and in a democracy, if the people's opinion is ignored, the nature of the fabric of government and society changes.

Another, darker answer is that things are not very different, but we are encountering the results of efforts to create an intellectual aristocracy, an ideologically "acceptable" elitist group, which is to be chosen less for its support by the people and proven ability than for its "correct" attitude. In America this sounds very far-fetched. This country's "vanguard," the men esteemed and humble, who made her great, have never been confined to "intellectual" origins or any given ideology. Rather, they were more likely to come from this vast "majority" reservoir of talent which, this thesis seems to say, would now be downgraded. When the President says of the college activists, "these people will never be the leaders of this country,"* he is perhaps speaking instinctively from a feeling that to make them leaders would be wrong; perhaps also that this would spell danger. If so, he is not alone. Virtually the whole country has voiced opposition to the activists, and a large majority to just about all they propose. These "superior," relatively nonproductive, negative, "ideologues" appear to put the demands for their questionable contributions too high. The public would not be alarmist to fear that they may casually change this great, complex, viable and beneficial, free society in ways which could be fraught with danger, and often for no real end.

*It is interesting to note in passing that these "forerunners," "demonstrators" and "radical left" youngsters' attitudes never coincide with those of youthful leaders, judged by standard, "square" leadership criteria. (See Merit's voluminous data in their 1970 "Survey of High School Achievers," Merit Publishing Co., Northfield, Ill.; also see Purdue's extensive study on leadership in high schools. But we should not dwell on this point because the criteria of leadership ability used in these studies is not necessarily the same in all cases as similar criteria for leadership in later life.

Of course, that this vanguard policy is being supported by intelligent men of good will is in itself evidence that there is no such "plot," regardless of its possibilities for success or consequences. One can see how it could become difficult for them to maintain this position, however. The tremendous number of readers of (and probably far smaller, but still a significant number of adherents to) the Greening of America-thesis, particularly among men of some influence in our society, plus remarks such as those of John D. Rockefeller, 3rd, as reported in The New York Times, do not help matters. Nor does the study, Youth and the Establishment allay one's fears; on the contrary, on page 84 we find the following:

Social science has made us familiar with the process of cultural diffusion. Change is often initiated by small extremist groups. The mass of the public react initially by rejecting the new ideas, and then begin to consider them with tempered selectivity. The proposals of the extremist groups become, in effect, one vast smorgasbord from which people of more moderate temperament pick and choose those ideas that fit in with their own traditional life styles.

On page 85, however, we learn that this is thought to cause grave hardships on some:

...the disparity between the outlook and values of Forerunner students and the ability of our institutions to respond to their needs may be so great that many of these young people may become totally embittered or alienated or anarchistic or hopeless in their outlook.

It was felt that, rather than waste this "talent" we should change our traditional process of selection mentioned above,

In the light of these considerations, the Task Force regards it as essential to the future well-being of our society that the process of assimilating the new values to the old ones not be left wholly to the accidents of circumstance. (Italics mine.)

The Task Force also believed that:

Without the energies and passion for change of the young, it is unlikely that those in the Establishment who have learned to accomodate themselves to the existing structures of the society will realize the full magnitude of the changes we must make in the years ahead. (Italics mine.)

The group concluded, therefore, that:

Somehow we must make it feasible to bring together concerned Establishment leaders with those young people who would rather at this stage in their lives make a contribution to the community rather than pursue a private career.

One wonders if the authors of this study appreciate the somewhat disturbing inferences that could be drawn from these statements.* Implicit in all such thinking is the assumption that we are in or are headed for a grave crisis because of a major failure of the current American system. This is at least a highly debatable point. Furthermore, the argument can be made that in at least some instances in which the system has been found wanting, it has been at least as much because "forerunner"-type people have been tampering with it as for any other reason.

4. The Young Workers and the New Life Style

This is not "alarmist", nor is it "backlash"; the public has already lost much because of policies proposed by ultra-liberal academics and

*Statements such as these might cause the general public to develop a tendency to indeed think they "can hear the swish of leather as saddles are heaved on their backs. The intellectuals and the young, booted and spurred, feel themselves born to ride us." ("Whose Country is America?" by Eric Hoffer, The New York Times Magazine, November 22, 1970. This is an interesting discussion of this phenomenon, as well as a current situation which finds "a certain rapport between the rich and the would-be revolutionaries.").

"intellectuals." Many of the universities, which they support directly and indirectly with their taxes, and which have been so vital to the society as a whole and to the upward mobility of their own children, have become a source of deep trouble; and now their public schools are deteriorating. This directly affects that majority of youth who do not go to college. Here, avant garde "elitists" within and without the schools pushed the introduction of new programs into the primary and secondary schools, abandoned discipline to a significant degree and succeeded in causing many schools to partially abdicate their responsibilities to provide a basic education. For the first time, our large city schools are turning out illiterates, largely because those who used to "flunk out" now are promoted; but largely also, one fears, because of less effective teaching. This result has a shattering effect on all groups, but is perhaps most regrettable among the underprivileged. As one Harlem resident put it, "These children can't all go to college; some are going to have to go to work." They all, non-white and white, can't continue in an unreal world where their performance gauged by some vague, unmeasurable criteria. Or can't they? If the youth cultists have their way, we may no longer be so sure of this.


As it is, the situation in many large corporations has changed considerably in recent years. Some simply put the people they hire, both white and Negro, back in school for a year, in "training programs," where much of what they should have learned in high school is taught to them. It is no small job to instill in them the self-discipline, value system and training, which normally came from the home and/or years in primary and secondary schools, and which is so vital to the person performing meticulous, complicated tasks. But

in one year more progress is apparently often made with those willing to learn than in several years of normal schooling. In our service industry-oriented (post-industrial?) society, these "academic" requirements become even more necessary than in earlier times. Service industry in this technological era does not only mean laundries. It means highly complex communications and transportation systems, sophisticated computerized data gathering and processing systems and other complicated and vast business and governmental operations. Ditch digging and even assembly-line jobs are decreasing, and installation and maintenance workers are becoming a larger and larger segment of the work force. What is needed today are "trouble shooters" on our vast systems, and even our private transportation units, good blueprint readers and innovators for installation, skilled, meticulous craftsmen for building and maintaining the needed plant and equipment. Today it is not only more important to know how to read, it is more important to have the "work ethic," to be a "self-starter" and to be highly responsible, as well as to have the self-discipline for meticulous, complicated work. There are increasing signs that the young are being let down in being prepared by the schools for these disciplines, as well as those needed for college.*

This is not a simple yearning for the good old days, which often look "good" in hindsight only because we conveniently forget the bad. Nor is it a prediction of imminent catastrophe: current productivity is high and though the rate of increase has fallen off in recent years (which is supposed to be normal going into a decline in the rate of production) The predictions are that 1970 saw it bottom out and it will now begin to rise.

*These talents are not necessarily different; Schwab's description of the gaps in student capability in basic thought processes outlined earlier are also deadly in the nonacademic world (see pp. 131-2).

FIGURE VII



Most youngsters today could "make it" in a Post-industrial society, but "most" may not be enough for this new, highly technical, service industry-oriented society of the future. We will need many such people simply because the momentum built up in the 1950's and 1960's will inevitably carry us into an era of technological dependency. What is more, our prosperity may depend to a larger degree than we know on a constantly rising rate of increase in productivity.

To repeat, in the future there may not be enough young people of this type to go around. This may be true partly because the huge numbers entering college take so many of the more "intelligent" youth out of the potential work force, and partly because the self discipline and skills needed for these increasingly technical jobs may not be so easily acquired in school anymore. This could be bad not only for those not suited to this type of work who are forced to try it nonetheless, but if it becomes pronounced enough it may cause problems for everyone. The telephones in Megalopolis, for example,

(possibly with the exception of Boston and Washington, which have large, quasi rural, "hinterlands" of talent to draw from) may be in for continuing trouble, and it is not vandalism we speak of, in New York today: the trouble is the centrals. Nor, apparently, is it just the expansion of the economy and the resulting expansion of demand. During the 1970 recession, when demand fell off, service still did not return to normal.* Automobile maintenance apparently did not improve during 1970 to the degree that the fall-off of sales might have led one to expect (though "hanging on, to the car for another year" might have increased repair requirements). On the other hand, perhaps here again imaginative, technically skilled "trouble-shooters" and dependable, careful, talented maintenance workers may be getting scarce. Even reading and understanding the increasingly technical repair manuals for this new equipment may be too much for many young people coming out of our schools today.

There is much anecdotal information, but little extensive definitive data, to support the fear that the new "life-style," encouraged by many of our schools, "intellectuals," members of the media and public personalities, is already affecting our technology. Despite the training programs mentioned earlier, it is seldom more than one year, and normally no more than a few weeks or even days, before new, young workers are placed in a spot where their productivity must be real and measurable. This can make difficulties for the unprepared youth. Nonproductivity, and particularly counterproductivity, are quickly apparent here. This does not mean that non-productive minority must immediately pay for their lack of ability--or

*It was reported on a 6:30 p.m. telecast on the subject on Channel 2, January 24, 1971, that the New York Telephone Company blamed its crisis on, among other things, a "shortage of skilled personnel."

even that they will pay in a short period of time; but it does mean that it will be quickly obvious to them that they cannot "measure up." It takes a neat degree of rationalization to tell oneself an automobile engine is running when it is not or that the problem was so difficult that the "system" couldn't handle it, if an older worker has it running and out of the shop in thirty minutes. It is even more difficult for a young man to convince himself he is good at his job when he puts half a dozen circuits out of operation while trying to repair one, has the quality-control man turn down his work time and again or sees older people working at night balancing his cash drawer against his tape. Certainly it cannot be good for young people to be disillusioned this way. As we have seen, it is usual for them to be enthusiastic and overestimate their capability; but today they are told that they are not overestimating their qualities. They are told they are brighter, more sensitive, competent and "good" than adults, and have so much to offer the world. Of course, though these compliments are thrown indirectly at the schools as well, in many ways the schools do less for the students in the areas cited above than schools used to. The result is that many young people who buy this bill of goods find everything very difficult on the "outside." Instead of being able to make their great "contributions" to the rather dull, "hypocritical" older people, they find that they can contribute hardly anything. More and more of them are almost totally dependent on these older people, not only to do their work for them, but to undo their mistakes.

Of course the majority of children, who were better trained at home and school, still do have something to contribute, and know that young peoples' mistakes are part of the learning process. The minority who can't

"measure up" either take a supercilious attitude and continue to rationalize that they are too good for these lower (read difficult) positions or they go through a very painful period of adjustment during which they are worth little and must change their whole way of thinking.

In the production plants the new life-style of college youth (if the activist syndrome catches on in the physical science departments--and it is appearing more often there now) could have an even greater effect than that of the "decoupled" minority of young workers. If we have badly designed equipment, the "mean time to failure" will go down and more repair skills will be required. If bad design is added to sloppy production methods, the repair requirements will go even higher. But we need this equipment and we need the people who can build and maintain it. We may have enough of those people today, despite the bad signs; but one feels we have the people despite the new life-style, not because of it. The glorifying and rationalization of this new life-style may at least delay some people's coping with the world as it really is (and the way most people want it) for a longer period. This could be bad for everybody, and it is at least possible that it may soon be--and, in some cases, is already being--encouraged by adults in decision-making positions. Those in government, industry and other private institutions who start new "helping"-type "programs" may continue to invent employment for these ill-trained, somewhat impractical, "superior" people. Children's centers, supplemental, lay and religious, educational efforts, neighborhood and even larger VISTA-type programs, to which so much money is allocated, can be marvelous undertakings with the right people working in them. But they can also be havens for those young people decoupled from society; here again it is hard to measure productivity (or if such measures exist, it is hard to get them recognized

or applied); and it is a wonderful place for self-righteousness. One has a suspicion that, insofar as this type of "decoupled" person is employed, the whole program suffers; recent efforts by VISTA and the Peace Corps to conscript more practical people who can "add another resource to the communities" they join, seem to bear this out.

5. Indicators of Youthful Opinion, Political Strength and Awareness

Until now, we have not had the way of measuring youthful opinion that we have had with adults--the vote. Even checking the voting pattern of the 21 to 24-year-olds is not very productive. Only 51% of the young people from 21 to 24 voted in 1968.* Furthermore, in opinion polls this age group is usually included in a larger category of 21 to 29-year-olds; so it is hard to check their particular stated attitudes against how they vote. Among the 21 to 29-year-olds as a whole only 55% of them voted in 1968. And, in states in which the 18 to 20-year-olds could vote, only 33% voted. This low vote may be due in part to the difficulties involved in first registrations. Some of this is because of residency requirements; this might change if local residency requirements for Federal elections are made illegal.

We should not expect too much from even this change, however, for census data also shows that "ninety-one percent of the young adults between 18 and 24 were living with their families." This does not appear to indicate a high degree of mobility in this age group; and, for voting purposes, college students maintain their original residency rights, so they can be considered to be living at home (which is probably the grounds on which

*U.S. Census figure as reported in the Philadelphia Bulletin, February 4, 1971, p. 1.

this finding was based). There are, moreover, discrepancies even in the registration and voting figures, which could make difficulties in checking youthful reactions to conditions or even their interest in politics. A Gallup poll of June 1968 showed that in the first half of that year only 34% of 21 to 24-year-olds were registered. Either a tremendous registration took place over a relatively few months of 1968 or something is wrong with either the Gallup response or the Census Bureau figure of 51% who voted in 1968. Assuming for the moment that the Census Bureau figures are correct, we still have some difficulties discerning what they mean from the point of view of all youth. We do know that the turnout among college-trained 21 to 24-year-olds was lower in the 1964 presidential election (despite their vast dislike for Barry Goldwater) than 45-year-olds with a grade school education. We also know that among 16 to 19-year-old employed men, 56% are in blue collar jobs; and one gets the feeling that people such as these may be more likely to vote than college students.

There are 40 million 14 to 24-year-olds in the country and there has been a 13 million increase in the size of the group since 1960. For predictive purposes, this figure is deceiving, because 1960 (as 1950) had an abnormally low number of people in this age bracket (depression birth-rates were very low); so the huge increase means this age group is getting closer to the normal percentage of youth to the total population. As the following table shows, however, the number of 14 to 24-year-olds is still lower than it has been for most of the 20th century. Furthermore; with the falling birthrate in the 1960's, the "top out" of the 1950's will be passed for this age category in the next ten years. In other words, it is unlikely that it will surpass 20% of the population by a significant amount in the foreseeable future. As this 1950's peak

passes into the 25 to 49-year-old group, the proportion of youth compared to the rest of the population should fall off sharply. We have seen that, during high school, young people think a good deal as their parents do on many issues. As far as increasing or decreasing preference for major political parties is concerned, high schoolers follow the trend of their parents. But they also tend to have a higher percentage who do not prefer either major party. In 1968, their choice of the Democratic party was closer to the parents' choice than was their preference for the Republican party. But both major party preferences were lower than their parents', and the number of high school students who chose either a third party or had no opinion was considerably higher than their parents'. We know about the support of the young for Eugene McCarthy at that time; what is less known is that they also gave greater support to George Wallace than did adults. The young people are more likely to go to extremes, in either direction--than adults. A recent Gallup poll found that among college radicals of both the left and right, there is an apparent appeal in extremism for its own sake; among other factors, "a significant proportion" of those students who considered themselves to be far left politically gave a highly favorable rating to the John Birch Society and the KKK; and a sizeable percentage of those who considered themselves to be far right gave a highly favorable rating to the SDS, the Weathermen, and the Black Panthers. Moreover, the percentages of highly favorable ratings in these cases were almost always strikingly greater than those given by the vast majority of students in the center politically.*

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 68, February 1971, pp. 12-19.

In respect to the generally unpolled 18 to 24 year old nonstudents, the vote may provide important data as to their opinions. Some data that came to light during the 1968 presidential election campaign offered some surprises: the 18 to 24 year olds were as strongly, and possibly even more strongly in favor of George Wallace as any other age group. Thirty percent "admired" him; of the "practical" college students, 17% felt the same; compared to this, only 13% of the adults voted for him.

Furthermore, young, white voters across the country showed the highest percentage who voted for Wallace. In fact, the Wallace vote was inversely related to the age level: 21 to 24 registered the highest vote for him (17%) and it decreased to its lowest level for voters 50 and over. (11%).* This higher percentage of youth voting for Wallace held in every category of the young: white, nonsouthern youth showed the same preference (in fact, nonsouthern voting showed the same pattern for all age groups as the national sample)**; more college-educated 21 to 29 year-olds voted for Wallace than did the college-educated in any other age group; and young people who were high school graduates followed the same pattern. The discrepancy between voting among people of the same age group with different educations, however, was largest between college- and high school-educated 21 to 29 year-olds. Twice as many high school-educated in this age group voted for Wallace as did the college-educated.

*Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, The Politics of Unreason: Right-Wing Extremism in America 1790-1970 (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 382.

**Ibid., p. 386.

TABLE LXXIV
EDUCATION, AGE AND WALLACE VOTE*

	<u>Age Groups</u>		
	<u>21-29</u>	<u>30-49</u>	<u>Over 50</u>
Percentage Wallace vote	4	29%	15%
Number		(41)	(137)
		<u>Grammar School</u>	
Percentage Wallace vote	20%	14%	9%
Until Number	(79)	(236)	(103)
		<u>High School</u>	
Percentage Wallace vote	10%	9%	8%
of the 21	(59)	(156)	(99)
Number		<u>College</u>	<u>at</u>

people+fi too few cases.

Only 38% of the 21-29 year-olds considered themselves Democrats in 1968, compared to 48% in 1964 and 46% for the overall population in 1968. Currently 35% of under 22 year-old voters consider themselves Democrats, 18% Republican 4% Wallacites, 40% undecided and 4% who "refuse to vote." About 22% continued to call themselves Republicans in 1968, but the numbers of Independents, or members of some other party (particularly Wallacite), among this group jumped from about 30% to 40% between 1964 and 1968. Twenty percent considered themselves Conservative, 39% middle-of-the-road, 23% Liberal, 5% Radical and 13% something other, or not sure. This varies from their parents' appraisal of themselves. But, in the off-year election of 1970, the 21 to 29-year-olds showed the least knowledge of any age group (or perhaps interest in) their congressional representatives. In fact, even though over 3/4 of these people were high school graduates (and among the 21 to 24 year-olds, 52% of the men

*Ibid., p. 393.

and 40% of the women had completed some college), the number of 21 to 29 year-olds who knew who their local congressman was, even during the election campaign, much closer to the grade school-educated, and manual occupation categories of the population than any others.

One possible significance of this data could be that the 21 to 29 year-olds as a whole, though quite interested in domestic and international affairs, may not be as disturbed by them as some may think. This, of course, accounts for the high degree of "happiness" in the 21 to 29 age group today* (only 5% say they really are not happy) and the 90% of the 15 to 21 year-olds who said their life had been happy so far and the 93% who said they expected it to be as happy or even happier in the future.** The other point of view is that the young simply don't believe in the system any more so they don't vote or get interested in normal politics. As we have seen, this is indicated by a small minority of young people, particularly among radical students, who say they think the problems of our society cannot be solved by our normal political parties or even by our system. But the lack of interest and failure to vote in this age group is not a recent phenomenon; as we stated earlier, they didn't turn out in 1964 against Goldwater, either.

*In General, how happy would you say you are:

	<u>Very</u>	<u>Fairly</u>	<u>Not Happy</u>
1969 (National)	43	48	6
1969 (21-29)	55	39	5
1947 (National)	38	57	4
1947 (21-29)	23	N/R	N/R

Gallup poll No. 67, January 1971.

**Harris-Life poll, 1971.

The idea that young people, in this generally happy, exciting period of life are more caught up in things other than politics, international affairs or deep social problems, may be a valid one. They will voice interest and concern, but these things are relative. Even only 11% of the college student activists considered the Vietnam war more important than scholastic issues in 1969.* Most of these admittedly happy young people in the pre-25 year-old period are quite possibly (and quite naturally) caught up in the much more exciting business of school, new friends, careers, courtship, marriage and the first child. It may take much prodding from older people to get many more of these young people to become more involved in politics, to say nothing about more radical activities.

6. A Critical Decision Point and Its Significance to Society

Despite the evidence in many areas, that would seem to indicate caution in any drastic assessment of youth and its role in society, one gets the feeling that we have brought ourselves to, or perhaps have already begun to pass, an important decision point. The direction we take may have an effect on developments in this country, perhaps even on our "life style" and eventually on our technology and society. There are, as always, many points of view on this issue, but two are paramount. The first can be roughly described as follows:

- 1) The period in which we live is one of great, almost inevitable change in all areas and in a direction that is basically good and to which we must accomodate ourselves.

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 48, June 1969, p. 8.

- 2) This trend must in many cases not only be tolerated but encouraged.
- 3) Value systems must be reexamined in the light of these new ideas with a readiness to jettison whatever need be, of our traditional systems.
- 4) Opposition to change (often, if not usually represented by the majority) is traditional and can be looked on in most cases as simply another part of the problem to be overcome, seldom as part of the solution. Under this premise the traditional support of a number of the young, particularly college students, for extensive (according to some opinion, even extreme) changes, currently to the left, is in order and good, presumably because it really is going in the "correct" direction. Only the degree to which we should encourage and assist the youthful movement toward the left varies among those who think it should be encouraged.*

A sympathetic but seldom articulated characterization of the second point of view holds that since ours is a sensitive societal structure, stemming from, among other things, a basic value system, changing this value system can have many grave effects on our society. Hasty, perhaps ill-considered changes have often proved to be counterproductive, sometimes in the very areas they were meant to improve, oftentimes in other vital areas that were not taken into account but nevertheless were highly sensitive to the change. Those who have this viewpoint therefore constantly ask for the credentials of those who encourage any program; they are quite likely to risk not achieving the benefits of programs pushed by those whom they consider to be unreliable (and they may occasionally miss substantial benefits this way), rather than risk the losses which implementation of the program might entail. This caution tends to make the activities of radical

*They may not have the same respect for the many youths with extreme right wing (Wallacite, for example) tendencies, who also want changes.

youth and their mentors, unconvincing to the general public.* It also makes the public sympathetic to people with better "credentials" (which at times makes them vulnerable, particularly to charismatic political leaders).

The moderate public is likely to feel that we should direct our programs more at the great majority of youth rather than at the radical few. To the extent that the majority of young people are abandoned by the adult population (as many in this group feel they largely have been on the campuses, to some extent in the government and industry, and even to a degree in the military services), they become quite concerned. They feel we should really be worrying about "turning off" the majority of youth. People from this group might feel that if we abandon those young people who subscribe to our value systems, we are hypocrites and do not have the courage of our convictions. Furthermore, they may feel that this vast majority of young people, who are their own children, are just too good to be left to the radicals. They cannot understand why we must be afraid to tell them it is no sin to be happy and not "involved" when one is young, particularly if one is a student. These people may also tend to feel that, because of their relative lack of perspective, youngsters are somewhat prone to see things in a crisis atmosphere. Furthermore, they seem to feel that worries come soon enough and that these youngsters will never get as good a chance again to be studious and contemplative--two functions these people may feel help to improve judgment when, in later life, "involvement" is paramount.

*This does not mean that if such New Left people, along with others with satisfactory credentials back a program, the majority will inevitably reject it because of the presence of radicals: witness the support for civil rights programs, etc.

Behind all this lies the curious, but absolutely vital, instinct about morale. This is an area where the opinion of the majority must be assessed, for it reflects morale. It is also an area where some intellectuals refuse to be disturbed (and perhaps are even elated) by certain types of "bad news." If a "decoupled" intellectual feels the country is too chauvinistic, belligerent, etc., a reduction of morale (particularly among young "squares") may appear good, or at least not alarming to him. This may not be true, however, for the man in the street. He may feel that if this "square" majority-of-youth group begins to feel abandoned, and morale among them drops, they may be up for grabs by anybody who wants to use them, Left or Right. Also, he knows the spin-off effects of a drop in morale (such as apparently occurred in Britain in the 1950's), which can be disastrous for this democratic form of government and free society, both of which he reveres.

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CHAPTER THREE

AN ANALYSIS OF ONE MINORITY

AN ANALYSIS OF ONE MINORITY*

A. Introduction

The following section is an examination of the attitudes and opinions of Negroes as a group and in relation to the population as a whole. Setting apart a particular group for examination is not a desirable endeavor, because no one group or individual carries with it a set of fixed, immutable attitudes towards any one thing. The setting apart of one group has always been a danger to our democratic society, which is made up of the amalgamation of the expressions of innumerable individuals, whose feelings and needs are important to society as a whole. Unfortunately, of late, we have been increasingly confronted with opinions of men presenting themselves as "spokesmen" for an entire bloc of people. In many ways these men may represent the deep frustrations and aspirations of a mistreated minority, struggling to realize itself; in other ways, they may cloud the true issues and present in a potentially explosive way that which could be handled by understanding and reason. It is imperative for decision-makers to recognize the true issues in making plans that will affect a large segment of our population who will, in turn, affect the ability of decision-makers to realize their plans.

In this section, therefore, we have attempted to uncover some of the attitudes of this minority of people who have long been discriminated against. The best way we know is to gather and analyze data found in opinion polls taken by proven and prestigious survey organizations. For this we have relied mainly on the Gallup organization whose survey techniques have been carefully developed since the 1930's.

*This section was written by Doris Yokelson.

Although Gallup polls are considered to be among the most reliable, a word of caution must be given here in the use of nonwhite responses: the size of the respondent sample of nonwhites in the normal Gallup opinion polls is very small, and, for this reason, is often unreported by Gallup. For example, the average size of the sample of a Gallup opinion poll is approximately 1,500 persons, carefully chosen so as to represent an accurate cross-section of the population. From this number, the correctly relative size of nonwhite respondents, 21 years and over, is 130. Since the average age of Negroes is 21 years*, the usual Gallup poll would also not be giving the opinion of a sizeable percentage of young Negroes. However, Gallup has taken such an extensive number of polls on related and similar issues, and has done so for so many years, that cumulative responses may be observed. In some years, sharp differences were noted which indicated changes had taken place; in other cases, the majority for or against an issue was clear. Also, some polls compared very well with those taken on similar questions by other organizations; other polls indicated a clear trend continuing over an extended period of time; some polls combined a number of these characteristics. This should be kept in mind when examining the Gallup polls that follow; where a special poll has been taken it will be noted. In some of the cases, the poll questions are specifically asked of Negroes and whites.

* According to 1969 census data. The average age of whites is 29.

B. White and Black Racial Attitudes

In general, the attitude of the American population towards racial matters has become more liberal in the past decade. Nationwide polls show trends in this direction on numerous questions. A recent Gallup poll, dealing with laws about racial intermarriage, showed a significant change-- a "dramatic change" said Gallup--in the feelings of the populace within the last five years towards laws prohibiting marriage between whites and blacks.

TABLE I
INTERRACIAL MARRIAGES*

"Some states have laws making it a crime for a white person and a Negro to marry. Do you approve or disapprove of such laws?"

	<u>Nationwide</u>		<u>Southern Whites</u>	
	<u>1965</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1970</u>
	%	%	%	%
Approve	48	35	72	56
Disapprove	46	56	24	38
No opinion	6	9	4	6

As could be expected, the greatest approval of laws prohibiting racial intermarriage came from whites in the South; but also the most striking change in attitude took place among this group within this short time period: a 16 percentage point drop in approval and an increase of 14% in disapproval, considerably higher than the change nationwide.

The feelings towards school integration were also changing in the last decade, during which time Southern white parents showed a remarkable shift in attitude.

*Gallup polls as reported in The New York Times, September 10, 1970, p. 22. The 1970 poll was conducted July 31 to August 2.

A large majority of people would now vote for a Negro for president:*

TABLE III

VOTE FOR A NEGRO?***

"If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for President and he happened to be a Negro, would you vote for him?"

	<u>Yes</u> %	<u>No</u> %	<u>No Opinion</u> %
1958	38	53	9
1963	47	45	8
1965	59	34	7
1967	54	40	6
1969	67	23	10

The busing of Negro and white school children from one school district to another was overwhelmingly opposed by about 8-1 in a Gallup poll of March 1970. However, it is apparent that other issues are involved in the matter of busing, such as sending the children away from their neighborhood into poorer and perhaps more dangerous sections; making them go to worse schools, or other schools without free choice; the desire not to have little children do so much traveling and leave the parental neighborhood, and other disruptions of neighborhood arrangements. It is interesting to note that nonwhites also clearly opposed the cross-busing, we can assume for the same basically parental reasons: 48% of nonwhites opposed it, 37% were in favor of it, and 15% had no opinion. The "no opinion" of the nonwhites, was approximately three times higher than that of any other category asked.

*Compare this with some other interesting figures: Would vote for a Jew-- 46% in 1937; 62% in 1958; 77% in 1963; 86% in 1969; Would vote for a Catholic-- 64% in 1937; 68% in 1958; 84% in 1963; 88% in 1969; Would vote for a woman-- 31% in 1936; 52% in 1958; 57% in 1967; 54% in 1969.

**Gallup polls (1969 poll conducted mid-March).

TABLE IVBUSING *Non-Whites:

Oppose	48%
Favor	37
No Opinion	15

Whites

Oppose	81%
Favor	14
No Opinion	5..

An almost 8 to 1 ratio was maintained in all other categories of persons asked. The better-educated, most affluent and those in the professional and business world were most opposed to busing.

It is important to realize that although there has been a general tendency of liberalization of attitudes towards racial issues--and this liberalizing trend can also be noted in other domestic issues, such as Medicare, social security, welfare and poverty assistance, and aid to education, all of which are clearly favored by the general American populace--whites as a whole appear to feel that they are asked to accept changes in the racial balance too quickly. It is difficult to know how much of this opinion may be due to a persistent racism or to feelings about the places and circumstances in which racial changes are taking place, in which other things are at stake: the quality of education, the safety of streets, the tranquillity of surroundings, the value of houses, the security of a job, the feeling of belonging to the like-minded, which is also cherished by Negroes. These values are also naturally desired by most American Negroes and they would like to integrate more quickly into that society (basically

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 58, April 1970, p. 9.

white) which provides the best of it for them. It should be evident that whites feel racial integration is being pushed too fast when they do not claim to be even aware that Negroes are being discriminated against, as we shall see later.

When the public is asked if racial integration in the United States is being pushed too fast or not, they respond by a solid 5-2 that it is. In fact, the feeling that racial integration is being pushed too fast increased from the beginning to the end of 1968, and again when the question was asked differently, from 1969 to 1970.

TABLE V

SPEED OF INTEGRATION*

"Do you think the Johnson Administration is pushing integration too fast, or not fast enough?"

	<u>Too Fast</u>	<u>Not Fast Enough</u>	<u>About Right</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
	%	%	%	%
April 1968	39	25	21	15
June 1968	45	20	22	13

"Do you think the administration is pushing integration too fast, or not fast enough?"

May 1968	45	20	22	13
October 1968	54	17	21	8

"Do you think the racial integration of schools in the U.S. is going too fast, or not fast enough?"

July 1969	44	22	25	9
March 1970	48	17	21	14

The breakdown of opinions according to categories yields some interesting sidelights to the question of racial integration. There were significant variations in many of the categories, the most overwhelming one, of course, being between whites and nonwhites, nonwhites being the only group in all

*Compiled from Gallup polls.

categories that did not think integration in the schools was proceeding too quickly. But even here, an unexpected 15 and 35% of the nonwhites felt it was going too fast or about right.

TABLE VI
RACIAL INTEGRATION OF SCHOOLS*

"What is your opinion--do you think the racial integration of schools in the United States is going too fast or not fast enough?"

	<u>March 1970</u>			
	<u>Too Fast</u>	<u>Not fast Enough</u>	<u>About Right</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
	%	%	%	%
National	48	17	21	14
Sex				
Men	54	15	19	12
Women	43	18	23	16
Race				
White	52	13	20	15
Nonwhite	15	42	35	8
Education				
College	41	27	19	13
High school	52	14	21	13
Grade school	47	12	24	17
Occupation		16		
Prof. & Bus.	47	20	19	14
White collar	49	18	23	10
Farmers	41	9	23	27
Manual	48	17	24	11
Age				
21-29 years	39	27	23	11
30-49 years	46	19	23	12
50 & over	53	11	19	17
Religion				
Protestant	53	14	20	13
Catholic	40	21	24	15
Jewish	x	x	x	x
Politics				
Republican	54	13	21	12
Democrat	46	18	24	12
Independent	47	18	19	16
Region				
East	40	21	25	14
Midwest	42	18	22	18
South	63	9	16	12
West	47	19	22	12

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 58, April 1970, p. 7.

TABLE VI, cont.

	<u>Too Fast</u> %	<u>Not fast Enough</u> %	<u>About Right</u> %	<u>No Opinion</u> %
Income				
\$15,000 & over	46	20	21	13
10,000-14,999	53	16	21	10
7,000- 9,999	48	19	23	10
5,000- 6,999	48	12	24	16
3,000- 4,999	45	18	17	20
Under \$3,000	46	14	22	18
Community Size				
1,000,000 & over	34	24	30	12
500,000-999,999	47	15	23	15
50,000-499,999	52	21	17	10
2,500-49,999	55	8	21	16
Under 2,500, rural	51	14	18	17

A recent Gallup referendum survey showed the following results:

TABLE VII
INTEGRATION*

- a. Racial integration should be speeded up.
- or-
- b. Racial integration should not be speeded up.

	<u>National Results</u>	<u>Regional Results</u>			
	<u>Total</u> %	<u>East</u> %	<u>Midwest</u> %	<u>South</u> %	<u>West</u> %
Should	38	45	35	29	43
Should not	62	55	65	71	57

In an interesting series of questions put by the Gallup poll to a sample of whites only, in May 1968, about whether there is discrimination against Negroes or not, it was shown that an overwhelming majority of whites do not think that Negroes are actually discriminated against

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 65, November 1970, p. 25.

TABLE VIII

IS THERE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST NEGROES?*

National Sample of Whites only, Gallup Poll

May 1968

"Who do you think is more to blame for the present conditions in which Negroes find themselves--white people or Negroes themselves?"

White people	-	24%
Negroes	-	54%
No opinion	-	22%

"Do you think most businesses in your area discriminate against Negroes in their hiring practices or not?"

Yes	-	21%
No	-	65%
No opinion	-	14%

"Do you think most labor unions in your area discriminate against Negroes in their membership practices, or not?"

Yes	-	19%
No	-	50%
No opinion	-	31%

"In your opinion, how well do you think Negroes are being treated in this community--the same as whites, not very well, or badly?"

The same as whites	-	70%
Not very well	-	17%
Badly	-	3%
No opinion	-	10%

In a poll taken by Roper Research in 1970 in Louisville, Kentucky, which I describe in detail later in this report, only 25% of whites thought that a white person would have a better chance of getting a job for which an equally qualified Negro and white were competing, than a Negro; 14% even thought a Negro would have a better chance.**

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 37, July 1968, pp. 19-22.

**Of the Negroes, 72% thought a white person would be preferred. See pp. 356-359 for a further discussion on job discrimination.

One reason for these responses may be that a person may not think there is discrimination in his own area and community, as the questions asked. It must be "someplace else." The reasons for this attitude are undoubtedly legion and very complex, with mixtures ranging from a purely pragmatic assessment, for better or worse, of what is actually perceived, on one hand, to extreme nonreaction to reality on the other.

There is an overabundance of examples of white discrimination for pragmatic reasons. There are, however, indications that some middle-class Negroes are also discriminating against the penetration of lower-class Negroes (and whites) into their areas. An example might be that of home-owning blacks in the area of New Cassel, in the town of North Hempstead, Long Island, who refused to allow prefabricated ranch homes to be built and subsidized by the Federal government throughout their community for low-income blacks. The reasons cited sounded identical to those usually given by home-owning whites: "People who rent don't keep up their houses;" "We want these funds spent in a proper manner;" "My husband and I worked hard for 12 years to keep up our home and are not sure that families moving in under these circumstances will help the community!"*

When whites only were asked about neighborhood racial integration in terms of class, they responded as follows:

TABLE IX
NEIGHBORHOOD RACIAL INTEGRATION BY CLASS**

"If a Negro family of the same income and education moved in next door, would you:"

<u>Whites Only</u>	
Mind a lot	19%
Mind a little	25%
Not at all mind	49%
Already a Negro next door	4%

* The New York Times, July 24, 1970, p. 333.

** Angus Campbell and Howard Schuman, Racial Attitudes in Fifteen American Cities (The University of Michigan, Institute for Social Research, July 1969).

It seems a well-nigh impossible task to sift out from each other some of the bases for the discrimination, whether they be racial, class, social, economic or because of important and little heard arguments that are known by the populace but not carried by the media. These latter have been well-covered in another section of this study on "Unexplored Popular Perceptions and Issues." Busing is an example of an issue of this sort, in which the racial discrimination aspect became secondary to a multitude of parent-child feelings. Perhaps in the following question, racial discrimination is a host to numerous discriminatory feelings; it is difficult to tell. A good part of "didn't like the people; undesirable people" might well be considered to be so.

TABLE X

NEIGHBORHOOD ATTITUDES*

Sample of Metropolitan Area Householders, 1965 and 1966

"Let's imagine that Mr. and Mrs. Smith were looking for a new home. They found a place they liked but they decided not to take it because they didn't like the neighborhood. What do you think they didn't like about the neighborhood?"

Dirty; not well kept up; crowded	47%
Didn't like the people; undesirable people	28%
Too many children	21%
Undesirable minority groups	16%
Noisy, heavy traffic	10%

A series of Gallup polls, covering four years, on the reaction to the integration of the neighborhood, showed a sharp upturn between 1963 and 1965 in those who would remain if one or a lot of Negroes moved in, and then a leveling off from 1965 to 1967, showing no trend. A majority said they would stay if "a Negro moved in," but not if "a lot" of Negroes did.

* John B. Lansing and Gary Hendricks, Automobile Ownership and Residential Density (University of Michigan Survey Research Center, 1967).

TABLE XI
NEIGHBORHOOD INTEGRATION*
Reaction to the Integration of the Neighborhood

	<u>National Sample</u>	
	<u>Would stay if</u>	<u>Would stay if a lot</u>
	<u>"a" Negro moved</u>	<u>of Negroes moved into</u>
	<u>in next door</u>	<u>the neighborhood</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
1963	55	22
1965	65	31
1966	66	30
1967	65	29

This is quite a different question from whether "you would mind or not" if a Negro moved next door, which was the question asked in Table IX. Undoubtedly a much greater percentage would "mind it" than think they would actually pick up and move if one Negro family moved next door. The difference in question invalidates whatever comparisons could have been made between these two questions in order to determine what role class might have played.**

Importantly, in various surveys, whites consistently show an overwhelmingly greater preference for segregated neighborhoods than do Negroes. Despite the feelings by most whites that Negroes are not actually being discriminated against; as shown in the series of polls above; in one poll on housing, whites very clearly recognized racial discrimination; and the percentages registered were very similar to the responses of Negroes:

*Gallup polls.

**See the work of Milton Rokeach pertaining to cultural differences between the rich and poor and between Negroes and whites. An article by Dr. Rokeach and Seymour Parker in The Annals of the American Society of Political and Social Science, Vol. 388, March 1970, entitled "Values as Social Indicators of Poverty and Race Relations in America" (pp. 97-111), reported findings that "lend support to the idea that considerable value differences do distinguish the rich from the poor, but not Negroes from whites. For the most part, differences found between the latter disappeared when socioeconomic position is controlled." (p. 97.)

TABLE XII
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING

"How many Negroes miss out on good housing because of racial discrimination?"

	<u>Whites</u>	<u>Blacks</u>
	%	%
"Many"	38	40
"Some"	30	26
"A few"	24	1/a
"None"	4	n/a
	22	

In a survey of the Castlemont section of Oakland, California, a blue-collar neighborhood which had been integrated and in which both whites and blacks seemed to feel integration was working well, almost one-half of the whites preferred a segregated neighborhood and one-half said it didn't matter one way or the other.

Do you think that businesses in your area discriminate against Negroes?

Yes - 65%

TABLE XIII
NEIGHBORHOOD INTEGRATION--CASTLEMONT **

"How is integration working?"

	<u>White</u>	<u>Black</u>
	%	%
Very well	29	70
Fairly well	50	24
Problems	15	2

"What is your preference in neighborhood racial composition?"

	<u>White</u>	<u>Black</u>
	%	%
Prefer all one race	46	1
Prefer mixed	4	45
Doesn't matter	50	54

* Campbell and Schuman. However, in the Roper-Louisville poll, mentioned earlier, 81% of the whites felt that the government "is doing enough" to help Negroes get better housing, jobs and education; 70% of the Negroes disagreed with this.

** William L. Nichols, The Castlemont Survey (University of California Survey Research Center, Berkeley, 1966).

The Roper survey taken in Louisville, Kentucky in 1970, showed that three-fourths of the Negroes preferred neighborhoods "evenly divided by race," but that almost two-thirds of the whites would like them all white and another fifth wanted them "mostly white." This was so despite the fact that "complete racial separatism was rejected strongly by both races."^{*}

How do Negroes perceive white attitudes towards them? In the two questions below, asked of Negroes in 1969 in fifteen large American cities, a realistic image of white attitudes towards them emerges. They quite clearly perceived the difference between "dislike" and "wanting to keep them down;" and although most Negroes thought that many whites dislike them, only a little more than one-fourth felt that most whites wanted to keep them down; most thought whites don't care one way or another. Moreover, very few thought that almost all whites dislike them; and although nearly one-half felt that many whites do, almost as many thought that only a few whites dislike Negroes. One could read the phrase "most whites don't care one way or another" as Negro recognition of white apathy towards their problems; or they might see it as "whites and Negroes have basically the same kind of problems and whites don't see them as different." In any event, the 64% of Negroes who felt that "most whites want to see Negroes get a better break" and "most whites don't care" come very close to the general band of opinion registered by the majority of whites in the Gallup polls above that Negroes are not being discriminated against.

^{*} Jean Heinig, "A Tale of Two Cities," The Public Pulse, April 1970, p. 4. See pp. 347 and 361-363 for a further discussion of Negro feelings towards integration.

TABLE XIV
NEGRO PERCEPTIONS OF WHITE ATTITUDES**

"Do you think only a few white people in (city) dislike Negroes, many dislike Negroes or almost all white people dislike Negroes?"

	<u>Negroes</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	
	%	%	%
Few white people dislike Negroes	38	37	38
Many dislike Negroes	44	46	45
Almost all dislike Negroes	13	11	12
Don't know	5	6	5

"On the whole, do you think most white people in (city) want to see Negroes get a better break, or do they want to keep Negroes down, or don't they care one way or the other?"

	<u>Negroes</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	
	%	%	%
Most whites want to see Negroes get a better break	30	28	29
Most whites want to keep Negroes down	28	26	27
Most whites don't care	34	34	34
Don't know	8	12	10

In the Roper poll taken in Louisville, mentioned earlier, Negroes were surprisingly much more optimistic about the improvement of white attitudes towards them than were whites.

TABLE XV
WILL WHITE ATTITUDES TOWARDS NEGROES IMPROVE?***

"Will white attitudes towards Negroes improve or get worse in the next five years?"

	<u>Negroes</u>	<u>Whites</u>
	%	%
Improve	51	34
Get worse	11	33

* Campbell and Schuman.

*** Heinig, p. 4.

Something of the underlying white attitudes towards Negroes and of the whites' own basic sense of values is revealed in the following Gallup poll on how they feel Negroes can attain their goals:

TABLE XVI
HOW NEGROES CAN ATTAIN GOALS*

"Negroes are interested in getting better jobs and gaining respect in their communities. What advice would you give them as a race to achieve these goals?"

	<u>Whites Only</u> <u>September, 1965</u>	
Get more education	44	
Work harder, try harder, don't expect something for nothing	19	
Improve themselves, be good law-abiding citizens, earn respect	15	
Be less aggressive, more cooperative, take it slower	14	
Stop riots, demonstrations, civil rights activities	12	
Cultivate self-respect	3	
Work together, become united	2	
All other	5	

(Note: Table adds to more than 100 percent because some people gave more than one answer.)

But the greatest number of blacks did not seem to be in disagreement with whites with the means to get ahead. Some might attribute these means to apathy and resignation; but they were clearly within the basic value system and were not meant to disrupt society, but to conform to it and take advantage of it.

* Gallup Political Index, No. 4, September 1965, p. 16.

TABLE XVII
THE FAVORED WAY TO NEGRO PROGRESS*

	<u>Negro</u>	<u>White</u>
	%	%
"Get more education"	79	78
"Go to church and keep out of trouble"	59	52
"Stop quarreling among themselves and unite"	57	41
Greater militancy and aggressiveness	3	--
Mass demonstrations, boycotts and other public protests	6	--

A small minority of Negroes--6%--said they would be ready to participate in riots and revolution.

In another part of the article describing this poll, the discussion centered around questions referring to the civil rights movement as a way to achieve gains for Negroes. Whether it was directly related to their attitudes towards the civil rights movement or not, the article does not make clear, but here 27% of Negroes said they had been active in civil rights causes (although only 18% reported that they were members of any civil rights organization, and this was most often the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People [NAACP]), and 22% said "They would be willing to engage in such activities as boycotts, marches, sit-ins or picketing stores."^{**}

Nearly all oppose violence; the approach favored by most Negroes is "non-violent protest" (61%). Whites prefer even less militant behavior; 52% think blacks should "negotiate" their grievances. Whites tend to think past demonstrations have been harmful to the movement; blacks think they've helped, but are less sure of their value in the future....

*Heinig, p. 4. The Roper Research poll, discussed in this article, was sponsored by the Louisville Courier-Journal and was conducted in the beginning of 1970: The survey was based on a 96-question questionnaire given to 508 whites and 506 Negroes living in and on the outskirts of Louisville, Kentucky.

**Heinig, pp. 2, 4.

Most whites agreed with the statement that "before Negroes are given equal rights, they have to show they deserve them." Most Negroes did not see the issue that way. Blacks and whites also differed on this statement: "Negroes will never get equal rights until they have the power to demand it." Most Negroes accepted this premise; whites sharply disagreed with this evocation of black power.

A majority of Louisville's whites (56%) even believed that the civil rights movement in Louisville is under Communist influence. This is a dismaying response, not shared by Louisville's Negroes, of whom only 15% thought it was. As of five years ago, a similar feeling was revealed among whites nationwide. In a Gallup poll, conducted in November 1965, 51% of whites thought that Communists have been "a lot" involved in the demonstrations over civil rights. In view of the great changes since 1965, this view may no longer hold.

TABLE XVIII
COMMUNIST INVOLVEMENT IN CIVIL RIGHTS DEMONSTRATIONS**

"To what extent, if any, have the Communists been involved in the demonstrations over Civil Rights?"

	<u>A Lot</u>	<u>Some</u>	<u>Minor</u>	<u>Not at all</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
National	48	27	10	6	9
White	51	27	9	4	9

* Compare these responses with the results of a survey of Negroes done by the Gallup organization for Newsweek (June 30, 1969). In response to a series of questions on violence, Negroes answered the following:

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
Would you join a riot:	11	68
Should Negroes arm themselves:	25	59
Can Negroes win rights without violence:	63	21
Will there be more riots in the future:	64	9
Are riots justified:	31	48

** Gallup Political Index, No. 6, November 1965, p. 17.

Apparently, the races differed in their stress on the means to getting ahead, Negroes emphasizing gaining political and economic power and whites advocating that Negroes get ahead by individual hard work, not "protests and demonstrations." Negroes clearly see that political and economic gains will advance their progress and position in life, but most whites either do not see a problem or think Negroes are pushing too fast.

In a poll on Negro feeling towards the Black Panthers, taken among 494 Negroes in New York, San Francisco, Detroit, Baltimore and Birmingham in early March 1970 by the Opinion Research Corporation, the Black Panthers were shown to be a little more than half as well-known to Negroes as the NAACP:

Total
%

TABLE CXIX
NEGRO FEELING TOWARDS BLACK PANTHERS

29

Know the Organization Very Well or a Fair Amount:

NAACP- - - - -	73%
SCLC- - - - -	62
Urban League - - - - -	53
CORE - - - - -	41
Black Panthers - - - - -	39
SNCC - - - - -	32

Favorable or Somewhat Favorable Towards:

NAACP - - - - -	83%
SCLC- - - - -	44
Urban League- - - - -	66
CORE- - - - -	52
SNCC- - - - -	44
Black Panthers- - - - -	37

The Black Panthers were most favorably thought of by Negro men under 30 years of age. Although the Black Panthers evoked the least favorable overall response, 70% thought the Black Panthers were an inspiration to young Negroes. This may be reflected in the responses to another question asked in the same survey:

TABLE XX
NEGRO FEELINGS TOWARDS BLACK PANTHERS

Which Organization Most Helpful to Negro Cause?

	Past 2 Years	Next 2 Years
NAACP	36%	32%
SCLC	26	22
Black Panthers	17	21
Urban League	9	9
CORE	5	3
SNCC	1	4

The results of this survey are surprisingly conservative, particularly since it was taken in the major cities, mainly in the non-South.

In a nationwide poll taken by Gallup in July 1970, rating various "controversial" American organizations, nonwhites rated the NAACP "highly favorable" over the Black Panthers by 7 to 1. Moreover, the "highly favorable" rating of the NAACP increased by 10% from December 1965 to July 1970.

TABLE XXI
HOW DO YOU RATE THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONS?*

	Nonwhite			
	Highly Favorable		Highly Unfavorable	
	July 1970	December 1965	July 1970	December 1965
	%	%	%	%
NAACP	76	66	1	6
Black Panthers	18		39	

Even the current preference for how they wish to be named remains unchanged among most Negroes. In two polls, the Louisville study and a survey taken by Gallup for Newsweek (June 30, 1969), Negroes far and away preferred to be called "Negroes." Next preferred, though by considerably fewer, was "colored" (although in the Gallup poll this term was also least liked). For those who are interested in the actual breakdown, the preference polls are

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 62, August 1970, pp. 14, 17.

included here. (The Roper Louisville poll asked whites as well, and there are striking variations between black and white responses):

TABLE XXII
WHAT DO NEGROES PREFER TO BE CALLED?
Gallup poll, Newsweek, June 30, 1969

	<u>Negroes</u>	
	<u>Like Most</u>	<u>Like Least</u>
	%	%
Negro	38	11
Colored people	20	31
Blacks	19	25
Afro-American	10	11
Don't care	6	6
Not sure	7	16

Roper Louisville poll, April 1970:

Prefer to be called:	<u>Negroes</u>	<u>Whites</u>
	%	%
Negro	51	27
Colored	11	16
Black	8	25
Afro-American	8	6
Other	4	3
No difference	16	14
No opinion	3	8

It is interesting to note that three times as many whites as Negroes seem to feel that it is better to use the term "black." It was pointed out in the article on the Louisville study that the term "black" was formerly considered to be the most derogatory of all, and this may be one reason why it is not appealing to Negroes.* In the Louisville study, "black" was not even preferred by Negro youth. But in the Gallup poll, the sharpest difference in preference was shown between younger and older Negroes--at least in the North: among Negro northerners in their twenties, "black" was chosen either ahead of or equal to the name "Negro." Also in the same poll, the

*Heinig, p. 4.

higher-income Negroes preferred "black" more often than those of lower income; Southerners were less likely to name "black;" and the term "Afro-American" was not liked at any level, remaining in the 5 to 10 percentile.

The Louisville study also brought out that complete racial separation was strongly rejected by both races; but a far greater percentage of Negroes preferred integration in all its various aspects than whites. This included the integration of neighborhoods, housing, jobs, and social contacts, including even intermarriage. Negroes approved or "wouldn't care" if there were social intermingling of the races; 44% of the whites disapproved of partying together. Only 33% of the Negroes opposed intermarriage; 86% of the whites were against it. In Louisville, the whites most against social contacts between races were those from the lower economic levels. Those who were college-educated did not mind getting together socially but were opposed to dating and intermarriage.

The Louisville survey brought out a clear difference between black and white concerns in the areas of their feelings about themselves--many more Negroes than whites felt depressed, lonely and blue*--and about their living

*"I often feel quite lonely"--45% Negroes; 24% whites.

"Sometimes I can't help wondering whether anything is worthwhile anymore"--55% Negroes; 23% whites.

"A person nowadays has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself"--67% Negroes; 44% whites. (Heinig, p. 2.)

A similar series of questions was asked by the National Opinion Research Center in February 1964.

	<u>National</u>	
	<u>Total</u>	<u>Negroes</u>
	%	%
"I'm going to read several statements, and I'd like to know whether you agree or disagree with each one."		
Agree:		
You sometimes can't help wondering whether anything is worthwhile anymore	30	55

	<u>National</u> <u>Total</u> %	<u>Negroes</u> %
Most people in government are not really interested in the problems of the average man	31	56
Nowadays a person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself	48	61
If you try hard enough, you can usually get what you want	82	90

"Here are a few statements that describe people. Please tell me whether each statement is true for you or not true for you."

True:

When problems come up, I'm generally able to find out how to solve them.	94	89
I worry a lot.	42	43
I tend to go to pieces in a crisis.	14	24

"We are interested in the way people are feeling these days. During the past few weeks, did you ever feel:"

Pleased about having accomplished something.	68	62
Particularly excited or interested in something.	52	58
Proud because someone complimented you.	54	55
Depressed or very unhappy.	36	54
So restless couldn't sit in a chair.	45	53
Things were going your way.	57	52
Lonely or remote from other people.	28	45
Bored.	32	42
Upset because someone criticized you.	17	23
On top of the world.	25	17

(Reported in the Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1, Spring 1969, p.151)

Two Louis Harris polls, one taken in August 1966, the other in April 1968, asked the same questions in both polls pertaining to these feelings. The 1966 survey also gives the figures for low-income whites, and it is interesting to compare their and Negro feelings to the population as a whole.

"I want to read off to you a number of things that some people have told us that they have felt. From time to time do you tend to feel that:"

	<u>August 15, 1966</u>			<u>April 15, 1968</u>	
	<u>National</u> <u>Total</u> %	<u>Negroes</u> %	<u>Low-income</u> <u>Whites</u> %	<u>National</u> <u>Total</u> %	<u>Negroes</u> %
The rich get richer, the poor get poorer.	48	49	68	52	57

conditions: housing, crime and neighborhood improvement. While whites most frequently answered "nothing" in response to the question, what are the "real problems" in their neighborhoods, Negroes had a plethora of real problems. Interestingly, in conducting the interview, the interviewers did not mention the subject of race until the interview was half over. This particular question was asked before this time, and responses were later compared

	August 15, 1966			April 15, 1968	
	National	Negroes	Low-income	National	Negroes
	Total		Whites	Total	
What I personally think doesn't count very much	% 39	% 40	% 60	% 48	% 61
Other people get lucky breaks	19	35	37	--	--
People running the country don't really care what happens to people like me	28	32	50	39	52
Few people understand how it is to live like I live	18	32	36	25	66
Almost nobody understands the problems facing me	17	30	40	22	52
Important things in the world don't affect my life	18	12	26	25	45
I feel left out of things	--	--	--	14	43

On every issue, the feeling of "alienation" increased from 1966 to 1968 for both whites and Negroes, but most especially for Negroes. (Survey reported in the Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1, Spring 1969, p. 152.)

In a Gallup poll taken in September 1969, in which Americans were asked to rate their lives, the responses were the following:

"In general, do you find life exciting, pretty routine, or dull?"

	Exciting	Routine	Dull	No Opinion
	%	%	%	%
National	47	43	8	2
White	49	43	7	1
Nonwhite	29	45	19	7

(Gallup Opinion Index, No. 52, October 1969, p. 25.)

as to black and white. Apparently the living problems were not a direct result of living in a poor neighborhood "Almost without exception, every neighborhood problem on the list is less troubling to lower economic level whites than to upper level Negroes."^{*}

TABLE XXIII
A REAL PROBLEM IN THIS NEIGHBORHOOD

	<u>Negroes</u>	<u>Whites</u>
	%	%
Supply of good housing	43	3
Juvenile delinquency	41	14
Crime	39	12
Upkeep of houses & yards	35	13
Street cleaning & repairs	30	18
Street lighting	26	23
Child day care for working mothers	23	10
Public transportation	21	21
Unemployment	19	2
Concern of public officials	16	10
Police treatment	11	2
Schools and education	10	6
Garbage collection	10	6
None or don't know	7	28

And crime:

TABLE XXIV
A REAL PROBLEM IN THIS NEIGHBORHOOD--CRIME

	<u>Negroes</u>	<u>Whites</u>
	%	%
Breaking into houses	59	48
Drunkenness	54	21
Gambling	52	3
Drug use among youths	38	14
Purse snatchings	36	13
Prostitution	33	4
Knifings & shootings	32	4
Muggings	17	4
Loan sharking	6	2
None or don't know	14	34

Again, each crime was more troubling to upper-level Negroes than poor whites. This sad fact was brought out again in the recent report on crime published by a Task Force of the President's Commission on Violence. The panel found that "urban blacks are arrested eight to twenty times more often than whites for homicide, rape, aggravated assault and robbery."^{*} Moreover, in 90% of the serious crimes--homicide, rape and aggravated assault--the victims are of the same race as the offenders. Of this percentage, 60-66% are carried out by Negroes against Negroes and 24-30% by whites against whites. The report supported the conclusion of the Louisville poll that a higher crime rate was primarily sustained by blacks against blacks.^{**}

TABLE XXV
CRIME AND ITS VICTIMS, BY RACE, 1970^{***}

Race of Offender & Victim	Criminal Homicide %	Aggravated Assault %	Forcible Rape %	Armed Robbery %
Both same race	90	90	90	51
Black vs. Black	66	66	60	38
White vs. White	24	24	30	13
Black vs. White	6	8	10	47
White vs. Black	4	2	--	2

Source: Victim-offender survey made by Task Force on Individual Crimes of Violence, an agency of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, 1969-70.

^{*}The New York Times, September 8, 1970, p. 1. A long article discussing the results of this report, "Black Crime: The Lawless Image," by Fred P. Graham, appeared in Harper's Magazine, September 1970.

^{**}"For the population as a whole," the report said, "persons 18 to 24 commit almost four times as many violent crimes as do persons over 25." The New York Times, September 8, 1970, p. 1.

^{***}The New York Times, September 8, 1970, p. 32.

National

Total

C. Negro Attitudes Towards Their Own Lives

I have been dwelling on racial attitudes, in social and political aspects of life, of the general American public, Negro and white. Let us now look at certain feelings of Negroes towards their own lives, their work, their families.

I shall deal with a series of questions asked by Gallup involving Negro satisfaction with family income, housing, work they do and education.


A series of Gallup opinion polls examining white and Negro satisfaction True.

and dissatisfaction with their family income from 1949 to 1969, reveals a 20% greater dissatisfaction among Negroes and a much lower satisfaction than among whites. The gap between Negro satisfaction and dissatisfaction considerably closed in 1965, the year after it was widest-- when there was only a 4% difference. The trend of these polls shows that despite the increase among Negroes of dissatisfaction with their income in the middle-1960's, their satisfaction rose steadily and slowly from 1949 to 1969; the great perturbation of the middle-1960's apparently peaked at the height of the racial disturbances in 1965.

height of the racial disturbances in 1965.

impact because...

FIGURE 1
NEGRO AND WHITE SATISFACTION AND DISSATISFACTION
WITH FAMILY INCOME
Gallup Polls



Closely similar results were reported in an Opinion Research Corporation poll done for CBS in June, 1968; London. "Almost without exception, ..."


"I would like to ask you if you are satisfied or dissatisfied with some things in your life. For example, would you say you are satisfied or dissatisfied with your family income?"

	A REAL PROBLEM IN THIS NEIGHBORHOOD	
	Whites	Nonwhites
	%	%
Satisfied	67	43
Dissatisfied	30	50
No opinion	3	7
Supply of good housing	43	3
Juvenile delinquency	41	14
Crime	39	12
Unkempt houses & yards	35	13
Street cleaning & repairs	30	18
Street lighting	26	23
Child day care for working mothers	23	10
Public transportation	21	21
Unemployment	19	2
Concern of public officials	16	10
Police treatment	11	2
Schools & education	10	6
Garbage collection	10	6

A slightly different picture holds true for Negro satisfaction and dissatisfaction with their housing. Again, whites have been generally very much more satisfied with their housing than Negroes and far more satisfied than dissatisfied. In 1949, when presumably their housing was not so good as now, 32% of Negroes were dissatisfied--only 14% more than whites--compared to 66% in 1965 and 48% in 1969. It appears that as better housing was provided, dissatisfaction with housing increased. Again, the peak of dissatisfaction was in 1965, at the height of the racial disturbances, and the trend reversed itself the following year.

	A REAL PROBLEM IN THIS NEIGHBORHOOD--THE FOLLOWING YEAR	
	Negroes	Whites
	%	%
Breaking into houses	59	48
Drunkennes	54	21
Prostitution	52	3
Problems among youths	38	14
Stabbings	36	13
Prostitution	33	4
Drug shootings	32	4
Drugs	17	4
Drinking	6	2
Don't know	14	34


FIGURE 11
NEGRO AND WHITE SATISFACTION AND DISSATISFACTION
WITH HOUSING *
 Gallup Polls



Over the years from 1949 to 1969, the Gallup opinion polls show that most Negroes have been satisfied with the work they do--though, again, much less than whites--and in the period 1965-69, very highly satisfied in comparison with the earlier years.

*Compiled from information in Gallup polls.

FIGURE III
NEGRO AND WHITE SATISFACTION AND DISSATISFACTION
WITH WORK THEY DO*



The 1970 Louisville poll, mentioned earlier, lends support to these responses: 68% of whites and 61% blacks think their present jobs are "about right." Only 18% of Negroes said "discrimination" was the reason they were held back in their jobs; 23% said it was "lack of training," 16% said "lack of experience." When asked what kind of job they would like to have if nothing stood in the way, twice as many blacks as whites did not know.**

*Compiled from information in Gallup polls.

**Heinig, p. 2.

An Opinion Research Report in early 1970, "Equal Opportunity: Its Time has Come," showed a striking switchover in the last decade in Negro responses toward job discrimination. The poll takers asked:

When companies turn down Negroes for jobs, do you think it is more because of:

	<u>% Negroes naming</u>		<u>% Whites naming</u>	
	<u>1956</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1956</u>	<u>1969</u>
Management prejudice	61	35	19	11
Negroes unqualified	9	39	50	75

A sharp increase is also revealed here in the white attitude that Negroes are not being discriminated against, but are unqualified for certain jobs.

How much of the white feeling that some Negroes are "unqualified" is a cover for deeper feelings of prejudice cannot be known; and how much of the lack of training and experience is due originally and presently to keeping Negroes back because of their race also cannot be known. Today, job training and training program opportunities are open to Negroes in numerous skilled occupations. The reasons why some of these programs may not be working satisfactorily may be legion: some may be due to racial prejudice; but others may be due to other complex issues playing a greater role than the racial problem. (See pp. 63-93 of the section, "Unexplored Popular Perceptions and Issues" for one view of some of these issues.)

The important point is that today most Negroes themselves feel that their jobs are satisfying and that lack of training and experience more than discrimination are keeping them from job opportunities. This is borne out by the slow, but steady gain in tolerance by whites and blacks in living and working together.

A series of polls taken by the Opinion Research Corporation in 1944, 1951 and 1956 and by Louis Harris in October 1963 and October 1965, show a steady decline in white racial discrimination in every aspect of employment: on equal jobs; on working next to Negroes; on having Negro supervisors; and on having integrated departments in a factory.* In the Opinion Research polls, the greatest jump towards tolerance was shown to have taken place between 1944 and 1951. Here again, the authors of the article reporting these polls indicated that racial prejudice alone did not seem to be the reason for management's reluctance to hire Negroes.

In view of the growing acceptance of working with Negroes that developed in the mid-1950's and the passage of Equal Opportunity legislation in the early 1960's, other factors appear to be responsible for the supervisor's lack of enthusiasm to implement training programs for Negroes.

Our studies further indicate that this reluctance may be a reflection of (a) their reaction to the educational and cultural gap between the average white worker and his black counterpart, and (b) their continuing emotional commitment to the tradition of individualism, which favors self-help over corporate philanthropy. More likely, perhaps, it reflects a conflict in values inherent in their own supervisory situations.

Yet, the unemployment rate for Negroes throughout the nation is twice the white race. The Louisville poll showed that in Louisville, 14% of Negroes interviewed were out of a job and 3% of whites; 38% of blacks and 15% of whites were employed as unskilled laborers; twice as many whites as Negroes were in white collar jobs; a very tiny percentage of Negroes were in executive positions.

* Joseph R. Goeke and Caroline S. Weymar, "Barriers to Hiring the Blacks," Harvard Business Review, September-October 1969.


Some observers apparently feel that the satisfaction of Negroes with their jobs is a depressing symptom, indicative of their acceptance of a subservient status. This attitude, when automatically assumed, would deny Negroes the personal feeling of satisfaction toward the work they are doing and would discredit whatever real progress may have been made in job improvements and attitudes (both white and black). The important factor is the indication of an increase in job satisfaction by Negroes at the same time that Negro employment opportunities have generally expanded.

In response to the Gallup opinion poll question: "On the whole, would you say you are satisfied or dissatisfied with your children's education?" both blacks and whites were decreasingly satisfied, since the high point of their satisfaction in 1966. The 1966 figures are puzzling, for they show a 20% increase from the previous year of the number of Negroes satisfied, a corresponding dip of 22% in Negro dissatisfaction, and a small drop in white dissatisfaction from the previous year, all of which were considerably reversed from 1966 to 1969. In general, Negroes were much more satisfied with their children's education in 1969 than they were in 1963-1965: a slightly greater percentage of Negroes were dissatisfied than satisfied in 1965, but in 1969 the figures were reversed and the percentage of those satisfied was 20% higher than those who were dissatisfied.*

* In the Louisville study, examined earlier, only 10% of the blacks named schools as a neighborhood problem; Negroes in Louisville considered their local schools comparable to those in other parts of the city.

FIGURE IV
NEGRO AND WHITE SATISFACTION AND DISSATISFACTION
WITH EDUCATION OF THEIR CHILDREN*


"On the whole, would you say you are satisfied or dissatisfied with (your) children's education?"



In summary, it appears from the trends that we have examined in the Gallup opinion polls and from various other polls, that since the middle of the last decade, Negroes are in general more satisfied with their economic condition, whether it be housing, income, work or ability to get a good education. The following figure gives an overall picture of these trends, according to Gallup polls, beginning with the area of most satisfaction--work--and descending to that of least satisfaction--family income.

*Compiled from information in Gallup polls.

FIGURE V
TREND OF NEGRO VIEWS SINCE 1963-65
 % Satisfied With...



And evidence shows that Negroes on the whole strongly favor racial integration, not black separatism. There are indications that feelings of segregation among Negroes are strongest among the very young, and in some issues, particularly among the young college graduates. It is interesting to note in the following table that fewer older college graduates are for segregation than any other category, including Negroes as a whole. This "conservatism" compares well with the "conservatism" registered by all college-educated, both white and black, on numerous issues in nationwide polls.

*See the section, "Unexplored Popular Perceptions and Issues," passim.

TABLE XVI
BLACK SEPARATISM*

	<u>All</u> <u>Negroes</u>	<u>College</u> <u>Grads</u>	<u>College</u> <u>Grads</u>	<u>All</u> <u>Negroes</u>
	<u>16-19</u>	<u>20-39</u>	<u>40-65</u>	<u>All ages</u>
	%	%	%	%
Negroes should run Negro neighborhood stores	22	30	13	18
Negro children should have Negro teachers	16	20	3	10
Whites should be discouraged in civil rights organizations	15	10	4	8
"Should be a separate black nation here!"	10	4	0	6

Has support for black separatism increased among Negroes within the last half decade? According to evidence gathered by a prestigious survey organization, it has not.**

Although the doctrine of black separatism has been increasingly voiced by some members of the black community, it still has only minority support; and there has been little change in black attitudes toward desegregation over the four-year period. For example, in 1964 some 72 percent of the blacks questioned said they were in favor of desegregation (with only 6 percent favoring strict segregation) and four years later 75 percent were favoring desegregation (with only 3 percent for strict segregation).

None of this is to say that Negroes do not have differing opinions from a majority of whites on numerous social and political issues. Their

*Campbell and Schuman.

**From an article in the Newsletter of the University of Michigan Institute of Social Research, carrying some of the findings gathered during the 1964 and 1968 election studies by Angus Campbell and other analysts at the University of Michigan Survey Research Center. See also pp. 338-339 and p. 347 of this section.

needs are pressing and real, and improvement of their conditions is one of the urgent problems of our time. Negroes have traditionally and overwhelmingly been Democratic, the party of the workingman, the poor and the ethnic minorities. On most foreign policy, political and domestic issues today, Negroes have been voting the way of the Democratic liberal, except in those issues that directly affect their children and the school--such as legalization of marijuana, busing and discipline in the school--in which they not only strongly line up with the majority of the population, but in some cases, such as discipline in the school, are more in favor of stricter action than the majority.*

D. Negro Feelings About Their Economic and Financial Status.

The following is a series of polls illustrative of Negro responses to their economic and financial status with white responses as a comparison. Some of them deal with what you might call "comfort status" and whether the comfort status has improved over the past years. Here again, we see that Negroes, by a large percentage, consider that their standard of living and comfort in life has been improving within the last half decade. Despite this, the great disparity of level of earnings between whites and Negroes is clearly shown: in a Roper poll in 1967 practically all Negroes are bunched

*See the section, "Unexplored Popular Perceptions and Issues," pp. 84, 85.

in the lower half of the income levels (\$5,000-9,000 and below) and most whites in the upper half (\$5,000-9,999 and above).^{*} In January 1938, a Roper poll for Fortune showed that about 65% of Negro respondents felt that a family of four could live on less than \$25 a week; 71% of the whites said it needed \$25-40 per week and over. An interesting Gallup poll from May 1937 found that Southern Negroes felt that a family of four needed one-half the amount of weekly income that Southern whites said was needed to live decently (\$25 and \$12).

By 1967, a Roper poll for the Saturday Evening Post, asking the same question that was asked in 1938, showed that the average response as to income needed by a family per week was, whites: \$127.12; Negroes: \$98.25. As of late 1970, a national sample of non-farm population reported in a Gallup poll that they thought a typical family of four needed a minimum of \$126.00 per week to live--\$96.00 per week more than in 1937, \$54.00 per week more than in 1957.^{**}

* The Negro family income as a per cent of white increased in the years 1965-1968 (from 54% to 60%) and there has been a steadily upward trend in the last years. The Negro median family income in 1968 was \$5,359; the white, \$8,936. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

** Presumably the difference between the Roper and Gallup figures may be accounted for by the difference in the wording of the question: Roper asked, "How much money do you need?"; Gallup asked for a minimum figure.

TABLE XVII
NEGRO AND WHITE ECONOMIC STATUS*

GALLUP

In your opinion, what is the smallest amount of income a family of four (husband, wife and two children) needs a week to live decently?

1937: <u>May 24</u>	By week	By year
National average (median)	\$30 ^a	\$1560
South:		
Whites	25 ^a	1300
Negroes	12 ^a	624

^aA similarly worded question in a January 13, 1952 Gallup release showed identical amounts.

ROPER FOR FORTUNE

How much money per week do you think the average family of four needs to live on around here, including necessities and a few inexpensive pleasures?

1938: January

	<u>National</u>		<u>Economic Status</u>	
	<u>Total</u>	<u>Negroes</u>	<u>Prosperous</u>	<u>Poor</u>
Over \$40 per week	22.3%	10.3%	30.2%	13.2%
\$25-\$40	49.0	25.0	45.5	53.9
Under \$25	21.6	59.2	14.9	25.6
Don't know	7.1	5.5	9.4	7.3

ROPER FOR SATURDAY EVENING POST^b

1967: December

	<u>Race</u>		<u>Economic Status</u>	
	<u>Whites</u>	<u>Negroes</u>	<u>Upper</u>	<u>Lower</u>
\$200 and over/week	12%	7%	35%	5%
\$150-199	24	14	23	14
\$120-149	24	15	10	15
\$101-119	12	6	5	12
\$90-100	13	20	7	21
\$60-89	8	24	7	18
Under \$60	3	9	--	12
Don't know	6	5	14	5
Median	\$127.12	\$98.25	\$172.06	\$99.54

^bColumns in this table are not rounded out to 100% and may total from 99 to 102%.

*Hazel Erskine, The Public Opinion Quarterly, Summer 1969, Vol. XXXIII, No. 2, pp. 273-276.

TABLE XVII, cont.

ROPER FOR SATURDAY EVENING POST

When it comes to living within your income, do you find it quite easy, not too difficult, fairly difficult, or almost impossible to live within your income?

<u>1967: December</u>	<u>Race</u>		<u>Economic Status</u>	
	Whites	Negroes	\$15,000 or over	Under \$5,000
Quite easy	28%	18%	40%	14%
Not too difficult	35	26	36	28
Fairly difficult	29	37	19	39
Almost impossible	7	18	5	18
Don't know, no answer	1	1	--	2

ROPER FOR SATURDAY EVENING POST

Finally, into which of these general groups did your total family income fall this past year--before taxes, that is?

<u>1967: December</u>	<u>Race</u>	
	Whites	Negroes
\$15,000 and over	11%	1%
\$10,000-\$14,999	17	4
\$5,000-\$9,999	39	26
\$2,500-\$4,999	13	26
Under \$2,500	7	27
Don't know, refused	14	16

GALLUP FOR LOOK

All things considered, would you say your family's standard of living is generally improving from year to year, or not? That is, are you able to live better as time goes on?

<u>1965: February</u>	<u>Race</u>		<u>Economic Status</u>	
	Whites	Negroes	Upper	Lower
Improving	81%	68%	94%	60%
Not improving	16	26	5	36
Don't know	3	6	1	4

TABLE XVII, cont.

ROPER FOR SATURDAY EVENING POST

Would you say that you live about as comfortably as your parents did when they were your age, or that your life is less comfortable than theirs, or that your life is more comfortable than theirs when they were your age?

1967: December

	<u>Race</u>		<u>Economic Status</u>	
	<u>White</u>	<u>Negroes</u>	<u>Upper</u>	<u>Lower</u>
More	78%	65%	77%	66%
Less	4	6	2	11
Same	17	21	21	16
Don't know	1	9	2	7

HARRIS FOR NEWSWEEK

As far as your pay goes, do you feel you are better off today than you were three years ago, worse off, or about the same as you were then?

1966: Summer

	<u>National</u>		<u>Nonsouth</u>		<u>South</u>	
	<u>1963</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1966</u>
Negroes only:						
Better	54%	55%	55%	55%	54%	55%
Worse	13	9	15	11	12	7
Same	28	29	25	28	29	30

in the lower half of the income levels (\$5,000-9,000 and below) and most whites in the upper half (\$5,000-9,999 and above).^{*} In January 1938, a Roper poll for Fortune showed that about 65% of Negro respondents felt that a family of four could live on less than \$25 a week; 71% of the whites said it needed \$25.40 per week and over. An interesting Gallup poll from May 1937 found that Southern Negroes felt that a family of four needed one-half the amount of weekly income that Southern whites said was needed to live decently (\$25 and \$12).

By 1967, a Roper poll for the Saturday Evening Post, asking the same question that was asked in 1938, showed that the average response as to income needed by a family per week was, whites: \$127.12; Negroes: \$98.25. As of late 1970, a national sample of non-farm population reported in a Gallup poll that they thought a typical family of four needed a minimum of \$126.00 per week to live--\$96.00 per week more than in 1937 \$54.00 per week more than in 1937.^{**}

* The Negro family income as a percent of white increased in the years 1965-1968 (from 48% to 60%) and there has been a steadily upward trend in the last years. The Negro median family income in 1968 was \$5,359; the white, \$8,930. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

** Presumably the difference between the Roper and Gallup figures may be accounted for by the difference in the wording of the questions: Roper asked, 'How much money do you need?', Gallup asked for a minimum figure.

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CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION
THE COUNTRY - 1970-1985

Some Important Factors in the Current Milieu

The foregoing analysis, though very far from being exhaustive, does seem to indicate that, with some exceptions, our society is progressing and changing at a normal rate. These changes are occurring because of the tugs and pushes of many forces and groups; and, like the ocean tides or the planets in the solar system, the combined groups of forces, while largely counteracting one another, nonetheless do tend to determine the shape and direction of our society. The forces at work within society are not new in most cases; if anything, the only new thing in the past decade was the unusual attention paid to some of these forces. This, of course, is important; fashionable attitudes tend to shape people's reasoning and priorities. But reaching conclusions based on fads is far from unique in history, and, over the long run, has also been part of the normal trends in our society.

We have seen such phenomena influence policy decisions over the years in this country. For example, in the late 1940's, despite the total lack of evidence to support the assumption, it was the vogue among many intellectuals, some of them quite influential, to consider Mao Tse-tung's party to be a group of "agrarian reformers" rather than true Communists. In the mid-sixties there was a widely accepted assumption, again without any evidence to support it, that the Soviet nuclear arms buildup was an attempt only to bring their stockpile up to parity with the U.S.; it was thought acceptable to reach "parity" with the United States when they would stop. Our strategic nuclear arms buildup was actually restricted, partly because of this assumption. We have had several such policy shifts which could not be completely explained by

sound or sometimes even logical techniques for the solution of problems in the main area of concern. Generally, however, these changes, as in the above examples, were in foreign and military policy in which, in the noncrisis, day-to-day activity of the nation, the short-range effects were not very obvious.

In the area of domestic policies and approaches to domestic issues there have, of course, been significant changes that have had more quickly felt effects on the everyday life of the average citizen, particularly in this century. Many of these, however, were brought on by the new demands after the heavy industrialization of the United States and were clearly apropos: labor and antitrust laws, housing and sanitary regulations. Others, particularly in recent decades, however, were less easily traceable to a logic connected to a demonstrable solution of a particular problem. Some changes in our educational system, for example, might fit this description; e.g., the idea that pupils should no longer be treated as people to be informed but primarily to be communicated with; lecturing should no longer be looked upon as teaching. This "fad"-approach to policy is in itself not necessarily bad, and all changes have had a touch of this in them (including the very apropos laws mentioned above). But if in the face of a pure (irresponsible?) fad-approach the balancing forces are muted enough, our society--that very sensitive "planetary system"--might begin to gyrate so wildly that it might either become somewhat unstuck or potentially dangerous forces might be applied to hold it together.

One gets the feeling that in some instances in the past decade, domestic as well as foreign and military policy recommendations began to

shift even more in the direction of the "fad"-approach, and ideas might have originated from less reliable sources. Here again, certain ideas and premises were pushed by people for reasons that might not have had much to do with the direct effect of adopting these premises, ideas and the policies they led to.

As discussed earlier, the second half of the past decade has seen a swing in the direction of believing that solutions would come from the Left and lately from the young. One sometimes wonders if turning to these "adults of the future" might not stem from the constant desire to look into and be one step ahead of the future. Furthermore, this is a comfortable position to hold in mid-Twentieth Century United States, when we care so much about and have such pride in our youth. But, as we have seen, according to some leading proponents of this movement toward youth, not all youth qualify. Those whom we are told to look to comprise a particular section of our youth, a rather obstreperous group who, though supposedly "politically aware," do not like the "two-party" system. In fact, a very narrow section of our youth has been selected with which we are to deal: that which has all the above qualifications and is also Left Wing.

The interesting thing is that some avant garde adults apparently think that, by turning in the direction of these Left-wing youth, they are striking a blow against those "mossbacks" who are against change or who even want to "turn the clock back." If the truth were known, they themselves might sometimes be backing ideas that would really turn the clock back. They, and the youth they support, sound so much like the intellectual, elitist revolutionaries of 1848 (who were largely made up of writers, students and

professors) that one is prompted to point out that this line of reasoning prevailed in an era before the Industrial Revolution. In those days, the intellectuals, with the possible exception of workers in the new, industrial cities of England and, in some cases, France, were the only "organized" groups in the cities, beside the privileged classes, that could make common cause. Since the Industrial Revolution, the people in areas affected by it have no longer needed such an elitist, "vanguard-of-the-revolution" leadership. The people started their own organizations, with their own organizers; no longer were they just ignorant "mobs" in cities, with nothing in common but the fact that they lived together. Education became available, then mandatory, in the lower grades.* Also, bad as their lot still was, they had begun to raise themselves above the level of abject poverty and brute existence. They were reaching the level from which they as a group could "take off."** They could now read and write; large groups had much in common: they were weavers, miners, ironworkers, etc. They had unions and a syndicalistic approach to getting social reform and better living by selective and professional pressures on the places that had the power to enact immediate change for their benefit--the industrial companies. But, because the people handling the pressure tactics now were professionals, the baby was much less likely to be thrown out with the bath water. Much could be accomplished within

*Rene Aibrecht-Carrie, Europe Since 1815, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), p. 29.

**Real wages in England and France by 1830 were already 60% higher than they were in 1780. (The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. IV, "War and Peace in the Age of Upheaval 1793-1830," ed. C.W. Crawley, [Cambridge: at the University Press, 1965], p. 59.)

the system. As early as the 1840's in Britain, it was the revolutionary content of Chartism that had the effect of alienating it from the trade unions.*

This is not to say that leaders springing from the people and legitimate, even elected, officials of organizations such as labor unions have never caused severe problems. For example, disastrous general strikes have at times hit Europe and led to chaotic conditions; but normally some framework remained so that total anarchy (apparently desired by a number of modern, elitist revolutionaries) did not occur. In modern Western Europe, the intellectuals were apparently deluding themselves when they thought they could truly lead the masses. The worst thing that happened to the French students' "May Revolution of 1968," from the revolutionaries' point of view, was that they were reinforced by a general strike by the unions. Though many observers did not seem to realize it at the time, the revolution was over the minute the alliance came about.**

Perhaps even more important, the increased knowledge, common outlook and organizational ability of modern workers, along with their very numbers and concentration, made them an important political force. Since the Industrial Revolution, in the democracies, the real power has gone to the people, with a subsequent loss of power by all elitist groups.

Many of these factors have always more or less applied to the independent-minded Americans; they had a strong belief in the democratic system, even before the Industrial Revolution took place in the United

*Albrecht-Carrie, p. 28.

**Most of the workers, young and old, had little in common with the student sons of the rich and told them so in no uncertain terms. (See Sanche de Gramont, "The French Worker Wants to Join the Affluent Society Not Wreck It," The New York Times Magazine, June 16, 1968, p. 62.)

States. Afterwards, they were strongly reinforced and supported by an increasing number of literate people, a larger suffrage and by a unique form of independent unionism. It was separated from politics (somewhat like the uniquely American separation of church and state) to a degree experienced nowhere else in the world.

In this century, this country has not been fertile ground for vanguard elitists. The time-tested, yet flexible forces at work for progress in this country have led to great accomplishments in improving the personal and material conditions of the people. This all has been achieved without a loss of the freedom and human dignity so important to the average citizen, so he traditionally opposes extremists who appear to threaten the system.

But, at the present time, perhaps we can no longer emphasize the point of the homogeneity of people in our cities quite as strongly as we could two decades ago. The change in the cities is occurring for many reasons, including the tendency from craft- or even company-wide unions in service industries not to contain large numbers of people. Many such workers are not unionized at all; many may have trouble unionizing in the face of opposition by militants who don't trust the "ignorant masses" and their union elections any more than they trust them in political elections. This phenomenon and also partly the growing number of people on welfare and the sizeable percentage of the eight million college students and instructors who are disassociated from ordinary society and live in the metropolitan areas are causing our cities to change. As in pre-Industrial Revolution days, large masses of people again have little in common except the fact that they happen to live together. One might be

tempted to argue that today the new vanguard person might have a better opportunity to lead a city mob than it has had since the period before the Industrial Revolution. One must quickly note, however, that he still does not have the free hand he had in early 19th Century Europe; for although he then, too, could only mobilize a minority, he could count on the neutrality or even the tacit acquiescence of many more of the masses who felt they had no loyalty to the privileged oligarchy who ruled them, had no other spokesman, were illiterate and in desperate need and therefore would risk the dangers of giving power to the radical intellectuals. Today, even among the neediest, there are other responsible, effective and popular spokesmen and organizations to turn to (see pp. 344, 345 for data on the overwhelming choice of the NAACP among Negroes), and there is a high rate of literacy in our cities.

The drive to make social reform predominant over traditional learning in our schools, the constant effort to convince Negroes and the lower economic level segments of our society that groups like the NAACP are "Uncle Tom" organizations, that the traditional helping organizations and the government itself do not have the people's interest at heart; that all unions are racist and fascist; that progress (no matter how great) is an illusion; that elections are a snare and a fraud--all tend to undermine the balancing forces in our cities today.

Unstructured, participatory democracy may be potentially more disruptive than it appears at first glance. Without paid, fulltime, professional organizers from the traditional, responsible organizations, the probability of getting intelligent, talented leaders (with the possible exception of some ideologues or even ideological fanatics) is slim.

Competent moderates are in great demand in industry, government and education, and are usually so overworked that they have great difficulty finding time to serve on community committees. Mediocre people are more likely to have plenty of time and, ideologues from the Right and Left are bound to turn out to "help the people," or "look out for their rights." Jobs with the Establishment are not important to the Left-wingers, anyhow, and though the Right-winger's "hang-up" with work keeps his numbers down, some Right-wing fanatics always seem to be able to find time for these committees. Such groups can create more problems than many good people could ever clear up, even on the off-chance that the ideologues and fanatics would submit to somebody's review. These groups are likely to jump into any area, from the electoral college to ecology, from anti-poverty programs to the anti-ballistic missile--and take right off; some because they don't know how difficult it is; others because they "know" what is right, so they don't have to worry about the "details." What is more important, their statements are usually more newsworthy, so they get the coverage; and even if the emotional, often simplistic, "solutions" are challenged, a battle of hyperbolic rhetoric is on, with much heat and little light. It makes good footage and copy; and soon the fact that the battle was really between two, usually tiny, extremist groups, to the exclusion of the large middle majority, is forgotten.

Insofar as this whole new, Leftish life-style has a tendency to foster this process, the present emphasis on the desires of today's Left-wing youngsters and their proponents is again significant. But even this emphasis is, in itself, not without recent precedent. In 1948, as mentioned earlier, a group of similar, young Left-wingers, primarily

college students, were saying almost the identical things being said today. They very vocally and energetically backed Henry Wallace in his third-party bid for the Presidency. There was, however, a difference in the coverage they received. In those days, there were no hungry TV networks desperately trying to keep 90 million TV sets lit up with newsworthy events. Newspapers and radio just did not seem to be in that much need of action. One has the feeling that, if TV had been here in 1948, many verbal, young, Left-wing Henry Wallacites might have been on it, and they probably would have learned the name of that heady game quickly. They also may have had some sympathetic commentators and might have ended up by getting enormous amounts of attention, perhaps even being called pacesetters. But, we had no TV; those who took up their cause as coming from the prophetic generation did not get the coverage either--and fortunately so, for all concerned. As indicated earlier in this study, it turned out that this segment of youth was not even prophetic about the universities, let alone the country. The almost ignored, great majority of serious, plugging, uninvolved, but scholastically competent G.I. Bill veterans, were the real precursors of the climate of the campuses in the 1950's.

This, of course, should have been no surprise for any historian who believes in the cyclical theory of events, particularly among the young. And the same theory could, and perhaps should, be applied today. But, again, for many reasons, it would be somewhat imprudent to say, "it's just the same old cycle." First, nothing is ever exactly the same. It is quite possible to believe this without losing sight of the fact that we cannot ignore the almost ever-present analogies of history. Second, those who really see certain youth as precursors and as the inevitable recipients of the reins

of power are getting extremely disproportionate literary and TV coverage. But, should this difference, other things being equal, be cause for concern? The acceptance of the new life-style by the young may be accelerated by TV today, but we have experienced this and even the effect of the affluent young on our national life-style before, without disastrous results. The automobile and the young, primarily under 30, set the pace for the Roaring Twenties. Basic values held up and the Depression snuffed out the affluence and much of this life-style, or perhaps simply accelerated an inevitable swing back.

But today, other things are not so equal. First of all, decades ago the balance of power throughout the world was being maintained by other powers, so if our morale had slumped, nothing drastic and irretrievable would probably have happened. Today things may be different. One failure of morale on our part, for example, and little countries could be swallowed up permanently by predatory Left-wing forces (there appear to be enough dynamic Left-wing powers to thwart moderate or Right-wing dangers). This may or may not appear tragic, according to one's point of view; but one thing inherent in this new life-style is isolationism, particularly when it concerns involvement with threats from Leftist forces.* Persistent attempts to erode national morale on this issue ("stop trying to be

*See Seymour Martin Lipset's article, "The Socialism of Insanity," in The New York Times Magazine, January 3, 1971, p. 6, for a discussion of the anti-Zionist, anti-Israel sentiment among the extreme Left. The extreme rejection of the premise that "containing Communism" was worth fighting for by college students, particularly the "forerunners," probably also indicates this, too. But we cannot be sure, because there was no question about containing Fascism. The greater number who felt that fighting to defend someone "against aggression" might have meant that they felt that "containing Communism" did not refer to defending people against Communist aggression; or it may have meant they felt we should fight to defend specific people against any kind of aggression or most people against aggressions other than Communist aggression.

world policemen') are endemic to this movement. Domestically, too, things could be different than a purely cyclical historian would predict. Because of the heed paid to this particular group by powerful men in "opinion-making," government, education and now, apparently, industry, it could have a disproportionate influence on domestic issues. For example, in the face of overwhelming opposition by all age groups (see pp. 57, 58, 206-208), the drive to legalize marijuana nevertheless goes forward, propelled by and for this group by influential adults. This is no small issue, particularly when one considers marijuana's appeal to the young, the lack of really hard evidence of its effects and the traditional concerns for and by the young in such matters, together with the spectacular rise in the use of drugs in places where almost de facto immunity from prosecution for possession exists, such as in some slums, at rock concerts and on so many college campuses (see pp. 208, 258-262). Similarly, pornography of all types flourishes in the face of overwhelming public opposition. To the average person, it probably also appears that the 2% of the people who believe our courts are too harsh on criminals (see p. 46) can drive our courts to be more and more

lenient with perpetrators, and the 98% who are more concerned with the victims have less and less success in maintaining the effectiveness of the courts.

Perhaps the most important change related to these unusual sociological factors today is the increased probability that the Democratic Party--that great American coalition of the working class, ethnic groups, small businesses, labor unions, classical liberal journalists, and increasingly in the post-war period, some classical liberal intellectuals--is beginning to split up. In our basically two-party system this could outweigh many other considerations. These people identified with the American system and the ethics that went with it. In recent years a great portion of the rank and file of the party apparently thought they had detected a swing of the ultra-liberals, as well as some Democratic public personalities well to the left on many national and international issues. This swing seemed to have made some of the traditional, classical liberals uncomfortable, and, according to the rank and file, to have drawn other liberals too far left. In addition, considerable numbers of some ethnic groups in certain key areas seem to many of the majority to have also moved left of, and to be in conflict with, the other ethnic, social, and economic groups.* The argument of many of this Democratic majority group is that they have held their liberal values while the minority has abandoned them for heavy-handed radicalism.

* Speaking of what are primarily Democratic groups in New York City, Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan say of the late 1960's: an "elite Protestant group...and better-off Jews determined that the Negroes and Puerto Ricans were deserving and in need, and on those grounds, further determined that these needs should be met by concessions of various kinds from the Italians and Irish (or generally speaking from the Catholic players [sic]) and the worse-off Jews. The Catholics resisted and were promptly further judged to be opposed to helping the deserving and the needy." (Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot [2d. ed.; Cambridge, Mass: The M.I.T. Press, 1970], p. LXIII.)

The polls show that this is hardly a universal principle that can be applied to all issues. On many basic issues the majority and many of the minority are still close. A large group of Democrats also argues, however, and apparently from a stronger position, that the most extreme and active members of this minority have control of what is left of the party structure in many areas and have tried to move the party to the left to such a degree that the platforms of some committees and candidates begin to impinge on the American value system. Their feeling disenfranchised from those who control the party tends to erode the party as an organization and as a social force, particularly in and on the fringes of the megalopolis areas of the Northeast.

B. The Work Force

It is difficult to decide whether or not the change in milieu of the young and the schools could have significantly adverse effects on our society and particularly on our vastly expanding, highly technologically oriented service industries. The effect of the new technology on the nation's life-style has been imaginatively and professionally covered by many writers,* so I will not go into it here, except to repeat the caveat mentioned earlier: the process is circular, and the life-style could also affect technology, particularly its rate of advance and its implementation. This is not to say that, if morale holds up, drastic effects such as a downturn or even a significant leveling off of technological development need occur. But, since all projections discussed to date are based on an ever-rising rate of increase in the development and use of technology, any change in the capability to do so would change the projections.

*See particularly, Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, The Year 2000 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), chap. II, "Comments on Science and Technology," pp. 66-117, passim.

The effects of this new life-style might also have an erosive effect on our prosperity and, therefore, our ability to finance real progress through technology. Furthermore, in light of recent economic difficulties, this is hardly the time to expect the public to cheer an elitist, nonproductive consumer. Since 1968, there has been a constant decrease in the "spendable average weekly earnings" (in 1957-1959 dollars) of a "production or non-supervisory" worker with three dependents, "on private, non-agricultural payrolls," from \$78.61 in 1968 to \$77.57 in 1970.* Actually, his "take-home" pay is not \$77.57, because state income taxes (and their increases), Social Security (and its increase), union dues (and their increases), have not as yet been deducted from this sum; only Federal taxes have been deducted from his gross. The scope of this study does not allow further pursuit of this subject--it may be one of the most important factors for the future; but economic predicting (to say nothing of public reaction to economic developments) is an extremely complex area to enter. But, insofar as the new life-style and its adherents might have even a minor, adverse effect on the rate of growth of productivity, and thus perhaps add to the inflationary spiral or force a decline of living standards, it must be of particular concern to everyone in this country. But here we run into a very difficult problem of analysis.

Overall productivity is measured in such a gross fashion, and measures of productivity are so arbitrary or hard to come by in our vastly expanded service industries, Federal, state and local governmental departments, education, etc., that the possible specific effect of this life-style on the "output per manhour" is hard to measure. As indicated earlier, (see p. 312),

*Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 94, No. 1, January 1971, p. 101, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

the rate of increase in productivity declined as the followers of the new life-style increased. But this is likely to be mere coincidence, because the sharpest decline (1968-1969) can be explained by the generally accepted economic phenomenon of the lag in layoffs catching up with the actual drop in orders (production). And, as indicated earlier, predictions are for an increase in productivity as production goes up, due originally in part to a lag in hiring.

For these reasons, we cannot go beyond a discussion of this problem. It should not be a useless discussion, however, particularly for those who worry about the future; for we may be able to spot some indicators which, linked to some later hard data on productivity, may help to spot trends.

The work areas are where the new life-style could have quite adverse effects above and beyond those mentioned earlier in discussing working youth (see pp. 309-316). On every job, there are (or were) unwritten, or sometimes even contractual, norms of both quantitative and qualitative productivity. Most workers are (or were) not too disturbed by a shirker or two. He used to catch hell from the foreman, cause embarrassment for the shop steward, lose the respect of fellow workers (on gangs or crews, such a man got the reputation of not being able to "hold up his end"), and if he were from a family who were all in the trade, he might suffer the worst of all censures--his family might be a little ashamed of him. On dangerous or piecework- jobs, this man was an anathema.* Today, however, there are

*This is any kind of job in which more money is made by "hustlers"; piecework jobs (including contract miners), transportation jobs in which good over-the-road and turn-around time means more pay per month or jobs in which by "shaking it up," men can get through in time to get to another job or get home earlier. (Portal-to-portal pay is still not that inclusive or universal.)

signs that these things may be beginning to change. Corporations cannot seem to handle things as well as they used to. Workers often no longer lose their jobs for unexcused absenteeism; on the contrary, in some plants they are actually given green stamps as a reward if they do show up.* Absenteeism means decreased productivity; even on the most humdrum production-line job, there are tricks to the trade. A replacement on a non-piecework job gets the same salary but cannot produce as much; on a piecework job, he only gets paid for what he produces, but he is likely to do poorer work. What might be even more important, however, is related to something mentioned earlier; that most work forces will put up with a shirker or two, but the limit is rather low. Some compulsive workers will continue if everyone else is sleeping on the job, but they are few and far between. When workers begin to feel they are suckers if they work harder than other men around them for the same pay, the productivity quickly "seeks its own level."

One very important area in which something similar to this apparently has happened is in our schools. Teachers in some areas learned that they would not be censured for not enforcing discipline in schools, and those who did enforce discipline found themselves in trouble, (facing an irate parent and/or lawyer), and embarrassing a school administrator who did not back them up against parents or lawyers. Teachers in those areas quickly got the message--with very bad results. The same thing seemed to happen in places where teachers had to have the consent of many hard-to-convince parents to make children repeat a grade and where no one was

*Jerry M. Flint, "Auto Industry Struggling to Stop Lag in Productivity," The New York Times, August 8, 1970, p. 10.

penalized for passing on dullards; now everyone passes--with disastrous results.* Teachers' unions, or any unions, cannot be expected to uphold standards on their own if their members become convinced through "company" actions that it is a "sucker's" game to attempt to cooperate in the venture. On the contrary, the name of the game is that the union officials look out for the welfare of their members and the "companies" look out for the stockholders.**

C. The New Technology and Its Demands.

As far as the adverse effects of these actions on our technological society is concerned, this is looked on as good by some people--they could not care less if society does not progress and expand. In fact, many appear to believe that a total collapse of our society is essential for a new "beginning." Though these extremist members of the New Left have few adherents believing in the last premise, interestingly enough, there are grave questions among all groups as to the benefits versus the disadvantages of this coming technological, service industry-oriented (post-industrial) society. In fact, there are no total supporters of every aspect of it.

*New York City's "incentive promotion" program shows the heights of silliness such trends can reach. The worst students are promoted to give them incentive to learn. One person in the school system in explaining why this program was started, stated that it was started "because nothing else worked" on these children.

**This includes taxpayers, pupils, etc. Pupils cannot be looked upon as "customers" in the full sense here; in other unions, workers are included in the customers, and all are affected by the spiraling inflation they may cause. Teachers are not necessarily personally affected by the "spiraling ignorance"; pupils, like stockholders, are unfortunately part of the group--from whom unions can take things without directly feeling it personally; many of the unpaid "boards of directors" (school boards) who represent these "stockholders" (taxpayers) are probably overpaid; and many of their "plant managers" (school superintendents) and their numerous assistants probably could exist under no other boards.

The reasons for and the extent of rejection of the new technology vary greatly. Prudent men must wonder, for example, about the future of spectacular advances in genetics. Choosing the sex, intellectual capacity, etc. of children before they are born involves terrible, almost God-like responsibilities. Even the thought of a "computerized world," with heavy emphasis on the rapid and simultaneous processing and computation of vast amounts of data, gives one pause. One can easily see the benefits of such systems, but one can also see the dangers of reliance on them. First of all, it initially appears that the post-industrial society may have to rely on large numbers of the kind of intelligent, self-disciplined, meticulous hardworking people for production, installation and maintenance, who may be in short supply, particularly if we continue to send so many of our better high school students to college and if the new lifestyle takes hold (see pp. 309-316). If the systems go down and "back-up systems" of little, old file clerks and their files, tellers and their cash drawers, bookkeepers and their books, operators and their switchboards are no longer there, we may be in for trouble. In some sense, we may be in a race to get the "trouble-free" systems built and installed before we run out of enough people to do it or to do the necessary, meticulous clerical work. At the same time, we must face the problems of the possible continuing need for large numbers of maintenance people, the "trouble shooters"--the most intelligent, imaginative, meticulous and highly self-disciplined of all. Hopefully, we will need so few of them and can pay them so much, that there will always be enough, despite white collar opportunities and changes in lifestyle.

But the "gap" is still there, "trouble-free" systems are very expensive and technically a long way off. Current systems requiring large numbers of skilled, dedicated people will be with us for a long time. We will have to build on this base, at a rate we can afford. It is possible that we will have so much trouble with this ongoing base that we will be in deep difficulty before we can get to the "brave new technological world." (Many bankruptcies occur because the company collapses before it can take advantage of its greatly expanded plant to tap a vast, new market.) Also, sections of the base may be progressing, but others may be lagging or even retrogressing; and since they (like all facets of the economy), are so often interdependent, everything might be in deep trouble. For example, it is a fine idea to have vast numbers of computers "talking" to one another across the country, thus avoiding all the usual "middle-man" delays and expense--and a limited number do this quite successfully today--unless, perhaps, the communications system over which they "talk" begins to deteriorate. If the communications system begins to drop "bits," and the computers use a "parity check" process to discover this, they will simply reject the data and won't "talk" at all. If they don't use a "parity check," they will accept garbled data and perhaps not recognize it as such, and so cause considerable confusion. The same thing holds true for "transceivers" in every home, linked over the normal communications system to central computers.

Secondly, even if such helpful new things as huge, computerized data systems work, fear of what might happen in society when the capability to gather, centrally store and quickly and selectively sort huge amounts of data, particularly data on people, is not completely groundless. Statisticians understandably will be euphoric over these huge data banks (and,

following Parkinson's Law, the data banks may get filled just because the capacity is there); but the extremely important right of personal privacy may be threatened.* It may be just too easy to cross-sort and even cross-correlate data on groups of people or individual citizens. Today, credit rating data and other information tread close to the right of privacy, and all of this, and much more personal data, may be made available to the centralized system. Here is an issue on which the attitudes of many of the New Left and their supporters and the general public coincide--though they may differ on who should be "put on file." As we have seen, the liberals and their proponents were far from opposed to placing over twenty million hunters in the National Crime Information Center (see pp.69-72), and some might argue that the average person is not likely to go to the barricades to keep several thousand student radicals out of a file system.**

Such issues could considerably increase opposition to technology, and perhaps in areas in which there was formerly support. Specific questions on technology are not often included in polls, but when they are the strongest objections are in the area of privacy. In the overall subject of technology, the analysts compiling the small 1970 Harvard University sample of

*See pp. 70-71 for overviews of the public's feeling on this matter, as indicated by a small poll on this very issue of "a computerized data bank on all Americans," a much larger Harris poll on privacy, and the public's opposition to wiretapping according to a small, "non-scientific" telephone survey in Philadelphia and a nationwide poll.

**Though he might--we haven't tested this one as we have the hunter issue. I hesitate here because of the public's sensitivity to breaches of due process and the right of privacy as indicated at the time of the trial of the "Chicago 7" in 1970 by the overwhelming opposition to the proposition that revolutionaries who threaten the existence of our government shouldn't be given a trial (see pp.56,57), and the specific objection to the existence of such file systems and to wiretapping, including the telephones of "radicals," which was the question asked in the Philadelphia survey.

opinion mentioned earlier (see pp. 70,71), concluded that "Americans tend to feel that machines have made their life easier." The pollsters also found, however, that "The subjects with a low level of information were found much more likely to feel that 'technology had made life too complicated' or want a 'return to nature.'" They felt this suggested "that in a technological society, it is those with the least knowledge in [sic] education that were the most likely to feel alienated and put the blame on technology."^{*}

There are some indicators that suggest that, at least until 1969, the better-educated were more likely to support certain highly technological ventures, both on their own merits and over other "Great Society," "helping"-type programs, than were the high school- or grade school-educated. But the degree of support among the better-educated was usually not enough to compete with the great degree of support for the "Great Society"-type programs among the less well-educated. There was nothing wrong with much of the technology that was being developed; it just couldn't compete with the increased interest in "helping" programs for the cities, the Negroes, the poor.

In the last few years, another sociological-type issue has arisen to make a strong demand for a piece of any Federal, state or local budget. This issue is, of course, the one raised by environmental considerations. In the Harris poll in the October 15, 1969 Life magazine, mentioned earlier, second on the list of programs people would least like to see have its funds reduced was any program dealing with pollution control. This attitude is quite unlikely to subside in the near future. Even if the interest begins

^{*}Report on the Harvard University Program on Technology and Society poll in The New York Times, December 15, 1970, p. 57.

to lose momentum, pollution control, like the issues of education (which was first on the list of those projects which should not have funds cut) and poverty programs (which was third on the list) is a legitimate and appealing cause and is bound to have real support among the people. Only obviously negative results from programs actually designed and implemented are likely to cool down this support. Furthermore, technology that tends to cause any environmental problems is likely to run into considerable trouble.

This situation could cause even more difficulty for some who most likely would support technological programs. The young and college students as a whole generally are in this group. The following table is made up of data resulting from a poll of 18 to 24 year-olds, taken in late 1968 and referred to extensively earlier in this work. It shows that all youth, and particularly the college students, were in favor of technology.*

TABLE I
FOR TECHNOLOGICAL IMPROVEMENT?--YOUTH

Would you welcome more emphasis on technological improvement?

	<u>No college</u>	<u>Practical college</u>	<u>Forerunner college</u>
Yes	53%	75%	56%

It is also clear, however, that although in 1968 they were not anti-technology, they were to some degree becoming aware of the human problems that might result from technological advances:

*A Daniel Yankelevich survey in Fortune, January 1969, p. 180.

TABLE 1 contd.

	<u>No college</u> %	<u>Practical college</u> %	<u>Forerunner college</u> %
With which of the following statements about technology do you agree?			
The problem is not technology--it's what society does with technology	66	81	88
Technological progress always involves human problems	44	55	58
Technology will permit man to reach his potential and control his destiny	36	39	31
Technology is the only means man has of solving existing problems	30	21	17
Only good can come from technological advances	28	19	11
The bomb is typical of what we can expect from technology	19	7	13
Technological advances can only mean more unemployment--it's not worth it	14	7	6
Advanced technology could eventually replace human beings	13	11	11
Technology is dehumanizing society	7	15	24

Which of the following specific applications of technology do you consider to be a very good things, which not a good thing at all?

Computerized instruction			
Very good	32	22	14
Not good at all	17	30	40
Genetic control			
Very good	22	20	14
Not good at all	19	38	47

It is interesting to note, on the other hand, the answers to the last question in relation to a highly controversial subject today:

	<u>No college</u>	<u>Practical college</u>	<u>Forerunner college</u>
	%	%	%
Supersonic airplane			
Very good	52	59	50
Not good at all	8	2	11

The pollution issue had not yet become popular and had not been generally linked to this aircraft. In 1968, even the avant garde "forerunners" showed an overwhelming weight of opinion on the "very good" side. Today, however, the plane's pollution potential, even though apparently not based on overwhelming and indisputable evidence of excessive air and noise pollution at very high altitudes, is nonetheless a very sensitive point, particularly with the same intellectuals who originally were all for it.

In fact, from other data covered earlier, one can surmise that the whole life-style of the "forerunner" and the "demonstrator" is likely not only to encourage anti-Establishment bias, but also to encourage antitechnology bias. This could have an eroding effect on the number of persons with protechnology attitudes in the better-educated group. The small Harvard sample apparently found that the "high pro-/low anti- ('pure pro')" technology group consisted primarily of "middle-information" high school graduates in professional/managerial jobs. This study implies that the alienation factor, mentioned in The New York Times article cited earlier, may be more significant than education in feeling comfortable with technology.

This may be true, but if this small sample represents a strongly felt nationwide attitude among the better educated, it is probably a new phenomenon. It was not generally reflected in the polls on technology in the 1960's.

One must assume that the better-educated of that era were also more likely to be of the "middle-" or "high-information" level on technical and other issues; so it is hard to trace the apparent coolness of such people in this sample purely to the normal skepticism of the better informed, intelligent people. On the other hand, anti-self discipline, antitechnological effects such as those discussed earlier, if they result from the new life-style, are likely to chiefly affect the young, college-educated people who are, as a group, a minority of the total number of better-educated.

D. The Environment of the Space Program

The support for our most ambitious technological effort, the space program, has not been overwhelming in any nationwide polls in the past ten years. On the other hand, such polls have been few and far between, the questions have not been consistent, and the timing of the polls might be questioned as to their appropriateness to indicate long-term support for the space program. In July 1965, 16% of the population felt the amount of money "spent on space exploration" should be increased, 42% felt it should be kept the same, and 33% wanted it decreased; 9% had no opinion.* In February 1969, the following statement and question were given and asked in a poll:

The U.S. is now spending billions of dollars on space research. Do you think we should increase these funds, keep them the same or reduce these funds?

In response, 14% voted to increase the funds; 41% were in favor of keeping them the same; and 40% wanted to decrease them; 5% had no opinion.[†]

* Gallup Opinion Index, No. 3, August 1965, p. 16.

** Gallup Opinion Index, No. 45, March 1969, p. 17.

This might be considered a somewhat "loaded" question with the use of the term "billions of dollars." If so, the 1965 poll may also seem somewhat "loaded" in other directions, for it asked questions about the importance of competition with Russia in the "space race."

Adding the "keep the same" to the "increase" percentage, we get a 58% overall pro-vote in 1965 and 55% in 1969. The small Harvard University poll of 200 people around Boston, mentioned above, indicated that in late 1970 "less than half the sample believes....that the space program, in the long run, will have a big payoff for the average person."* A telephone survey in Philadelphia, for which people called in on their own initiative, taken February 11, 1971 just after the return of the Apollo 14 moon-landing team, showed 55.5% rejecting the idea that we were "overspending on our space program."** Such indicators may suggest a basically "no-change" attitude over the years. They even might be challenged by the charge that the polls reflect the time and the way the questions were asked, rather than no change in opinion. This is ^{CAL}probably partially true, but it is not conclusive enough to throw out the evidence brought to light, particularly by the prestigious, nationwide, scientifically designed polls.

The nationwide polls indicate that despite the Russian spectaculars in the early sixties, the weight of opinion felt that the United States was ahead in the space race. In the 1956 poll, 47% felt that the United

*Irene Taviss, "A Survey of Popular Attitudes Toward Technology," Harvard University Program on Technology and Society, Cambridge, Mass., 1970, p. 3. This paper was prepared for delivery at the AAAS meetings, Chicago, December 28, 1970.

**The Philadelphia Inquirer, February 12, 1971, p. 19.

States was first in the field of "space research"; only 24% felt that Russia was; 3% felt that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were even; 25% had no opinion. Furthermore, in a March 1967 poll, 60% thought that it was not important to "send a man to the moon before Russia does." Only 33% felt it was important and 7% had no opinion.*

Interestingly, throughout the mid-early and mid-1960's, the moon project per se had generally failed to "turn on" a majority of the public, at least as far as appropriating money for it. The nationwide support increased as the project progressed, but apparently not as much as did support for the space program as a whole--whatever that means for the average person. One might feel that with all the news coverage the moon program should mean the same thing as the space program to the public, but opinion on the funding of the two programs differs. Here again, the estimated amounts of money needed to get to the moon and perhaps, again, the way and when the questions were asked, may have made a great deal of difference. If the money for the space program as a whole were stressed, it might not have received the support it did. In any event, it was not possible to get a nationwide majority of people in favor of the money spent on the moon project until 1969. In May of 1961, the Gallup organization registered the following results to a statement and question on this topic used in polls of a very large nationwide sample:

It has been estimated that it would cost the United States 40 billion dollars--or an average of about \$225 per person--to send a man to the moon. Would you like to see this amount spent for this purpose?

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 22, April 1967, p. 19.

The results: yes--33%; no--58%; no opinion--9%.* But in a similar poll a month later, in June 1961, in which a lesser amount of money was discussed and no breakdown of per-person cost was given, the results were as follows:

Congress has been asked to approve a program costing \$7 to \$9 billion over the next five years to enable the U.S. to send a man to the moon and bring him back safely. Do you think Congress should adopt the program or reject it?

Adopt it--42%; reject it--46%; no opinion--12%.**

According to a Harris poll taken just after the successful Christmas orbiting of the moon in 1968, only 39% of those polled were in favor of the Apollo moon program. On the other hand, a survey taken six months later, just prior to the launching of the first successful moon landing, did show a 12% jump to 51% approving of the program. But even this might have been temporary, as some of those who approved seemed to merely think that since we had gone through the program and come to the point of the launch, we might as well complete the shot and put men on the moon.***

As one might expect, in the early phases of the manned space program, little personal enthusiasm for a trip to the moon was registered.

TABLE II
WOULD YOU WANT TO GO TO THE MOON?****

If you were asked to go along on the first rocket trip to the moon, would you want to go or not?

		<u>1956</u>		<u>July 1966</u>		
<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>No opinion</u>		<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>No opinion</u>
%	%	%	%	%	%	%
8	90	2		17	81	2

*Gallup poll No. 645, May 1961.

**Gallup poll No. 647, June 1961.

***Harris poll, The Washington Post, July 14, 1969.

****Gallup Opinion Index, No. 14, July 1966, p. 21.

This question has not been asked recently, but there is little to indicate that the average man in the street had become any more enthusiastic about the moon program, even after the landings in 1969.*

As indicated earlier, from the above data, it is difficult to tell if the manned space program with its spectacular, "live" news coverage is helping to increase support for NASA or not.** To repeat, the moon program per se apparently did not solicit as much support in early 1969 as the overall space program, and aside from the small Boston poll there have been no recent surveys on the moon or space programs.

Perhaps more "measurable" and an important factor is who among the population has traditionally supported the space program. They have been in the past the more affluent and the better educated. In 1966, 68% of those earning \$10,000 per year and more, but only 28% of those earning \$5,000 or less, felt the space program was "worth it."*** The following figure, comparing the two nationwide polls on support of the space program taken by Gallup in 1965 and 1969, referred to earlier, shows a higher percentage of support among the better educated, the more affluent


*A Workbook of Alternative Future Environments for NASA Mission Analysis, Interim Report, HI-1271/2-IR, by Anthony J. Wiener, et al., Hudson Institute, Croton-On-Hudson, N.Y., December 31, 1969, pp. 4-14 to 4-21.

** There is evidence that TV, radio and newspapers do not necessarily change opinions on basic issues as much, or at least not as quickly as some might think. See Harold Mendelsohn and Irving Crespi, Polls, Television and the New Politics, Chandler Publications in Political Science (Scranton, Pennsylvania, 1970), pp. 170, 171; Herbert McClosky, Political Inquiry: the Nature and Uses of Survey Research, Department of Political Science and Survey Research Center, University of California, Berkeley (The MacMillan Company, 1969), pp. 31, 32; Anthony J. Wiener, et al., A Workbook of Alternative Future Environments for NASA Mission Analysis (HI-1272/2-IR, December 31, 1969), Section 4, pp. 16-17; John D. Robertson, "Public Reaction to Political Protest: Chicago 1968," Public Opinion Quarterly, Spring 1970, pp. 1-2.

***A Harris survey, The Washington Post Company, April 18, 1966.

and the young, in both polls. (For comparison's sake, the national percentages in these two polls were again: 1965: 16% increase funds; 42% keep the same; 1969: 14% increase funds, 41% keep the same. The totals of national approval each year were--1965: 58%; and 1969: 55%.)

FIGURE I



*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 3, August 1965, p. 16.

**Gallup Opinion Index, No. 45, March 1969, p. 17.

Along with the slight drop, 58 to 55%, in the opinion of the public as a whole who were in "favor of the program," the "support" shifted among people with a high school education to a position of somewhat less support for an increase in funds but much more support for maintaining the program as it is. In fact, it was the 16% growth in "keeping funds the same" among people in the high school education category that offset its 3% drop in the "increase" position as well as the losses in other educational categories, which kept the national decrease in support to only 3%.

This increase among the adults with some high school education of those who wanted to keep the program funded at its present level could again lead one to suspect an upward "perturbation" because of the successful moon orbiting mission, which had preceded the poll by about two months.

The fact that the budget had actually dropped apparently had either not been noticed or did not influence their decisions. If, however, the increase in support among the "keep the same" group of the high school educated category is a permanent phenomenon (and obviously two points are not enough to show any kind of trend), this could be important. The high school group is, as we have seen, not only the largest group today but is more heavily represented in the 21 to 29 year-old category than any other. It is least heavily represented in the above 50 category. Furthermore, the 21 to 29 year-olds had, with the exception of the recessions of 1960 and 1970, no experience with anything but affluence. The young and the affluent have traditionally shown more interest in the space program in almost every poll. The question is, are the high school


graduates acting this way (if they truly are) because they are mostly young or because they are high school graduates, or, because they are "affluent"? It is also possible that this large center group of mostly young and lower middle aged could be acquiring a sense of achievement by the manned and unmanned space program. Or perhaps up until 1969 the high school educated were heavily represented in the skilled trades and were relatively affluent compared to the pre and post war years. We will only know if this "new" attitude reflects a trend when more polls are taken on this subject, and even then, if the "affluence" aspect of it is important, perhaps not until the current recession is well over.

In the 1967 Gallup poll mentioned earlier in which people were asked about the importance of putting a man on the moon before the Russians did, 50% of the 21-29 year old group felt it was important and 45% felt it was not. (The overall national opinion was 33% "important" and 60% "not important".) In the February, 1969 Gallup poll mentioned earlier, the 21 to 29 year olds showed 19% in favor of increasing funds for the space program, 48% in favor of keeping the budget as is and 33% in favor of reducing it. (National overall groups showed 14% for increase, 41% for keeping the budget the same and 40% for reducing it.) Those of the professional and business group voted 20% to increase, 48% to maintain and 28% to reduce the budget. White collar workers voted 28% to increase, but only 38% to keep it the same and 34% to reduce the budget.

The following figure shows the "trend" in support among different age groups from 1967 to 1969 with points marked in 1969 for various income categories.

FIGURE 11.1
SUPPORT FOR THE SPACE PROGRAM
By Age

"Do you favor or oppose the space project
 aim of landing a man on the moon?"



—————	Under 35, favor	/ — / — /	Under 35, oppose
—————	35-49, favor	———	35-49, oppose
—————	50 and over, favor	— X — X —	50 and over, oppose
—————	Under 35, not sure	———	
—————	35-49, not sure	— —	
—————	50 and over, not sure	— X X —	

*The Harris Survey, in The Washington Post, July 31, 1967.


**The Harris Survey, in The Philadelphia Inquirer, February 17, 1969.

FIGURE 111*

SUPPORT FOR THE SPACE PROGRAM

By Income

"Do you favor or oppose the space project aim of landing a man on the moon?"



*The Harris Survey, in The Washington Post, July 31, 1967.

Future space programs, at least as of mid-1969, tended to find their supporters among the same groups.

TABLE III
MARS LANDING

There has been much discussion about attempting to land a man on the planet Mars. How would you feel about such an attempt--would you favor or oppose it?

July 1969

	<u>Favor</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
National	39	53	8
Education			
College	52	45	3
Highschool	39	52	9
Grade School	25	63	12
Occupation			
Prof. & Business	50	47	3
White Collar	48	43	9
Farmers	25	71	4
Manual	38	51	11
Age			
21-29 Years	54	41	5
30-49 Years	40	53	7
50 & Over	28	60	12

This support for NASA among the more affluent, better educated and the young should be good news for NASA as these categories are increasing in size. But this is only half the story.


E. The Competition for Federal Money

For example, regardless of how well the NASA plan of the 1960's was examined for its own international efficiency, imagination, direct and indirect value to the nation, etc., in the late fifties or early sixties, the

difficulties in which NASA's space program found itself in the country and in Congress could not have been foreseen. One would have had to do much broader analysis to have had any chance of even cranking some realistic caveats into the plans.

This does not mean that such "internal" analysis should not be done or that it is not valuable. It merely means that without the broader analysis the effectiveness of the planner may be greatly decreased. It would seem important, therefore, that NASA's long-range planners conduct a program to analyze these factors and take them into account. NASA competes with other agencies and their programs for its share of the Federal budget. Even though the support for NASA's space program per se has managed to hold its own (or slip somewhat, but not drastically), at the same time it has been slipping badly in the amount of support it can get in the battle with other agencies for a share of the budget. In fact, the percentage of the population that wants to cut the NASA budget in favor of other domestic "helping"-type, "Great Society" programs (welfare, education, on-the-job training, urban renewal, etc.), has been increasing.

FIGURE IV



In the Harris polls shown in the above figure, the space program was the one voted to be cut first from a list of Federal spending priorities. In a Harris poll of August 15, 1969, reported in Life magazine, the space program was chosen third to cut first, behind foreign aid and the Vietnam war. In the Life poll, the vote was 51% to cut the space program first. This is considerably greater than the percentages shown in the above figure; but in the Life poll, respondents were asked to choose 3 or 4 programs from a list of 11 and the figures add up to much more than 100%.

* Harris Poll, Washington Post, January 29, 1968
 ** Harris Poll, New York Post, February 18, 1969

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Besides being at or near the top of programs to be cut first, NASA always is either entirely absent from, or is near the bottom of the list of programs people wish to see receive increased funding.

TABLE IV
PROGRAM TO BE LEAST CUT IN FEDERAL SPENDING*

Which 3 or 4 (of 1-11 areas) would you least like to see cut in Federal spending?

Aid to education	60
Pollution control	38
Federal poverty program	34
Federal aid to cities	26
Federal highway financing	24

It is apparent from the above public opinion data that the approval or disapproval of any Federal program per se is only part of the problem for the sponsoring agency's long-range planners. Just as important is the attitude of the public toward priorities in the whole range of Federal spending; and from an even broader view, one senses that the continuing state of the morale and self-image of the public may be of great importance in planning for the 1970's and early 1980's.

In regard to priorities of Federal spending, depending on what government program we are concerned with--i.e., which has real priority or even "fad" appeal--the NASA budgetary effort might be hurt or helped. For example, ecology is one of the top priority items in the current government spending. The idea that satellites aid in knowing "earth resources" and thus aid in planning for their wise use and preservation has been aired.** Defending

* Harris poll in Life, August 15, 1969, p. 23.

** "Big Eye in the Sky," National Wildlife, publication of the National Wildlife Federation, Inc., a nonprofit corporation, Vol. 9, No. 2, February-March 1971, p. 35. This article has a descriptive sub-heading "Amazing new sensing devices, plus high-flying satellites, promise a dramatic leap forward in the fight to save our resources." From an organization "dedicated to improving the quality of our environment," this isn't a bad boost.

the use of satellites rather than aircraft for this purpose on a cost-effectiveness basis might be difficult but, unlike the SST, the space program has not yet been accused of being counterecology. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the pollution fighters, like the educators and poverty fighters, have it all over NASA when it comes to cutting up the budgetary pie. On balance, the ecology boom (except where the space program can ride its coattails) is probably bad news for NASA.

In the military area, NASA could make a large claim to great contributions; but again, looking at the current overall situation, this claim will count as a plus with some and a minus with others. This is based on attitudes which are not generated specifically for or by NASA; it merely reflects the milieu in which NASA now exists. This does not mean that NASA should disclaim any contributions to our military posture. It may mean, however, that while the "military-industrial complex" is in the doghouse, NASA may not gain much among the opponents of the "complex" (if it ever could), by being closely identified with it. On the other hand this may gain NASA support among other groups, and insofar as NASA contributes to the "inspection" technology with satellites which can assist in disarmament agreements without the need for on-the-spot foreign inspection teams, it could be popular even among those who are antimilitary. Furthermore, if the new isolationism grows, we may find others putting new emphasis on our strategic forces and in particular defensive forces, an area where NASA's support of the "warning" technology could be popular.

Evaluating the program from any single point of view, however, is difficult. For example, we have stressed the relative lack of enthusiasm for NASA budgets compared to other programs on the domestic front, but

broad as this approach may be; it is only part of the picture. We are an almost satiated country as far as technological achievements are concerned, and we are unique in this respect. The vast majority of states in this world fall under the category of "developing nations," particularly when compared with the United States. Such states are vastly impressed by a man walking on the moon, and to them it is extremely important when a flag is planted there. The nation that implants that flag is considered a great, perhaps the greatest, nation all around the world. In this respect, part of NASA's budget could be charged to the foreign policy budget. The President's foreign tour after the successful Apollo 11 mission in 1969 was doubtlessly greatly enhanced by the moon walk feat. This "spin off" from the space program is apparently by no means only in the area of technology.

F. Indicators for NASA Planners

Such "spin off" benefits notwithstanding, the budget must be paid for by the American taxpayer and be approved by the U.S. Congress. For this reason, though some might like to "bootleg" NASA funds in order to reap the direct and indirect benefits, such as those mentioned above, we must pay close attention to the overall domestic situation. As we have seen, it is by no means a simple task even to determine the current situation, let alone predict about the future domestic scene. There may be, however, some indicators that should be of interest to NASA and might be watched.

1. The Effects of the Spread of the New-Left Ideas.

A new lifestyle and the things it helps to bring about are of importance to NASA planners. Any tendency toward participatory democracy

could make things more complicated for the more sophisticated government programs. As indicated earlier, ad hoc committees on specific issues are less likely to understand the "big picture," but are nonetheless potential political power centers, and congressmen must take heed when they talk. It is not likely that such committees will often be pro-space. They are quite likely to be pro-"helping"-type domestic programs, and they are not likely to want to take the "unnecessary" government programs like NASA's into account. In fact, they are less likely to balance, even somewhat unrealistically, great expectations from the new, untried, or even old, but to date unproductive, Great Society-type programs, against the benefits that could accrue from the programs of a successful agency such as NASA. This is to a great extent possible in our current political environment because of the negative attitude of a majority of the public towards "unnecessary" programs compared to "helping"-type programs.

2. The Acceptance of the Youth Cult.

The youth movement and the great publicity its sponsors get can affect NASA. The more left radical youth and their mentors are likely to take a rather unsophisticated view of the relative costs vs. the benefits of most technical programs. In fact, insofar as technology is, among the counter-culturists, part of this current "dehumanizing" society, they are quite likely to be skeptical of most technology. This attitude does not have to be entirely reasonable to have an effect. The more people who become attracted to this way of viewing things, the more likely are emotional issues such as the antitechnology drive to take hold. This possibility may today be as great or even greater among some better-educated students than among the less-educated.

One could argue that the more successful the programs to help people with these opinions get into positions where they can influence the upper echelons of industry and government, the more likely that technological programs such as NASA's will also lose support among the better-educated off-campus, who have been some of NASA's best supporters. This need not necessarily be true, however; for reaction against New-Left activities may tend to polarize the situation rather than reduce support for NASA. One could argue, however, that if groups of opinion and policy makers were to surround themselves with New-Left youth and were themselves to subscribe to the new lifestyle, the complexions of such groups would change, probably to the detriment of NASA. An internal issue for NASA might also stem from this movement: there might be an eventual loss of interest in technology (including space technology), by potential NASA employees on the campuses. But this is highly unlikely to cause real problems for NASA.

3. Economic Changes.

The second problem that all government programs must face is the consequences of economic change. There is little that any government agency can do on its own to influence the economy, but it must be in the business of being concerned about it if it wishes to have viable alternatives. Recessions are a double-barreled threat to such "unnecessary" programs as NASA's. The more unemployment we have, the more demands there naturally are for Federal, state, and local, domestic, social programs to assist the public. At the same time, as personal income

* See pp. 298-309 for a discussion of the program sponsored by Daniel Yankelovich and John D. Rockefeller, III.

increases at a slower rate, the tax base and government income increases at a slower rate. The normal increase in demand for "helping"-type programs in a recession, along with a slowdown in the increase in government revenue, will probably tend to drive NASA down, or entirely off, the priority list for government money.

4. Morale.

A vaguer, but as important an issue is that of morale. When the planting of the United States flag on the moon stirs less feeling in many average Americans than it does in many West Germans, Spanish, and Taiwanese, then we may have a national problem in morale. The space program may be particularly sensitive to this issue because it is hard to sell it "logically" from the point of view of the man in the street.* If morale is low it is harder to get funds for the program through Congress even when other programs begin to lose their appeal.**

G. Providing a Prognosis of the Space Program's Future Environment

The "exterior" factors will probably continue to play as big, if not a bigger, role in determining NASA's fate in the future. Programs such as those that competed with the space program for Federal money in the sixties will still be in existence in the seventies. The important thing for NASA long-range planners is to provide options for changes for better

*See A Workbook of Alternative Environments for NASA Mission Analysis, pp. 4-27 to 4-31.

**Ibid. See also pp. 83-88 of this study for the decline in support of the \$40-50 billion school programs, which, however, may not make funds available for other than domestic "helping"-type programs, even if the local, state and Federal school budgets are cut.

or worse and to watch the indicators of coming problem periods. For example: one of the worst things that could happen to NASA would be a coalescence of the intensities of all the negative forces mentioned above. At the moment we have a significant recession and morale is not high, but other undesirable effects have yet to peak among the population as a whole, or even among NASA's chief supporters. Probably the key to watch is the lifestyle. At the moment the extent of change in this area may depend on the future effect of long-standing opposition among adults to much of what this lifestyle stands for. This is not to say that immediate, catastrophic consequences for the country or even for NASA will result from considerable movement toward the new youth cult and counter-culture attitudes. However, we do seem to be at least at a minor cross-road on this issue, and much will depend on the attitude of adults in government, business, on the campuses, and even in the armed services. The optimistic cyclical historian may see promise in some events that could be interpreted as reflecting a swing back toward traditional values. There certainly is enough latent but evident opposition to the counterculture among the public; but whether the morale of the public will hold up well enough to offset the onslaught of this well-supported minority and bear the burdens of making our society work, is another question. For those who tend to think along cyclical lines, the period of the pendulum is important. Encouragements to the adoption of this new lifestyle may tend to delay the return swing of the pendulum. This could cause the type of problems in our new, technological, service-industry-oriented society that were mentioned earlier. In any event, if this

*See pp. 298-316.

lifestyle begins to take hold or is slow to retreat, some space programs, though still possible today, may no longer be so in the future.

Since World War I, such swings have taken about a decade when normal forces have run their course. Today with the constant and increasing demand for change, this current "fad" should perhaps fade even faster. But a concerted effort to sustain it could make it last longer--which might mean that it could be around until the late 1970's. Such a delay in the return of the pendulum increases the chances of a coalescence of peaks with the other negative forces. It is too early to make a definitive statement on the duration or effects of the new lifestyle; but if it continues to grow, even if the avant-garde group soon tires of it, it will be a long time fading from the population as a whole. Events of the next year should help in predicting this trend.

As indicated earlier, economic cycles are important to calculate for estimates of the size of the Federal budget. If current prognostications are correct, and morale doesn't flag, we should be in an upswing within a year or so, which should continue into the late 1970's. With current programs, and barring another military involvement such as Vietnam, the growing Federal budget should be able to easily sustain a NASA effort at its current level. Here again, however, our domestic milieu is very important: Continued, large, local "helping"-type programs could eventually eat up a huge portion of any Federal budget. With the tendency towards sharing Federal revenues with seemingly insatiable state and municipal governments, even in boom times the "unnecessary" Federal programs will probably go begging. There is at present strong public support

for revenue sharing. * Furthermore, the new liberals perhaps because of their support for the help in the type of program and the lack of repeat with the national government may today be coincidentally joining forces with conservative Republicans in turning the power back to the states. The continued influence of this new of liberal class in the news media, governments and business could drive in force this movement and new software probably bad news for Federal programs in other areas whether for NASA. This occurs depends to a large extent on how much success the new liberals have in displacing the classical jobs and when they reveal in federal control the help in the type of programs and in the new executive branch of government. The date of the displacement, though large for a far right total; but the evidence of a concerted movement to provide Federal tax money with the Federal control, so far the support of the program for schools, welfare, housing, etc. is clearly highly unlikely to cause real problems. Another military involvement such as the current one in Vietnam is

unlikely for us and probably for the Communists if they do not prevail

3. Economic Changes.

with this type of warfare in Indochina. But if we should again become involved militarily it could bring a whole new situation into being. A consequence of economic change. There is little that any government great recession, or depression, likewise could change everything. Of course a series of total failures or catastrophic accidents in the manned space business of being concerned about it if it wishes to have viable alternatives. Recession is a double-barreled threat to such "unnecessary" programs as NASA's. The more unemployment we have, the more demands important parameters for the space program may still lie outside the program itself--in the direction of the country as a whole. there naturally are for Federal, state, and local, domestic, social programs to assist the public. At the same time, as personal income

*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 69, March 1971, p. 14.

* See pp. 291-309 for a discussion of the program sponsored by Daniel Yankelovich and John D. Rockefeller, I.

Things do not look particularly promising "out there" for NASA's near-future fiscal competition with most other agencies. Also, in the absence of a clear and significant direct benefit for the average man, public support for the program per se does not seem likely to go up much in the near future. On the other hand, better than 50% of the population support it now and, in time, disillusionment could cause support for certain "Great Society" programs to fall far enough to allow NASA to gain in relative support. Also, the "swing back" in domestic attitudes should come in time, and, as mentioned earlier, the "swing up" in the economic sector should come soon. If the new prosperity comes, and lasts long enough, NASA could see good days by the end of the seventies, possibly with relatively low points, in all negative factors coinciding. A "backlash" could even develop against the whole new life-style, and the "vanguard" approach to deciding on basic societal and political changes. As indicated earlier, there is still enough popular opposition to do it. This could cause a whole new self-image to develop, which might make the space program and other technical and nontechnical events that make America look great, more appealing. These things should "telegraph" changes for NASA and give the planners time to react.

At the moment, however, there are no strong signals that such a swing is imminent, partly because the "counterculture" strength is not that evident yet. There are indications that the society is firmer than some think; but there are also signs that the demands for Federal money for domestic, "helping"-type programs are part of that firm structure, rather than a part of the veneer of the new lifestyle. Conservation and antipollution programs apparently fit into this pattern of projects that

could be transitory to the elite, but strike a resounding note among the majority of the public. The publicity which the elite, particularly the young elite, can quickly command meshes with the little-known desires and efforts of vast numbers of the non-elite; and the media and government suddenly see a "groundswell" in favor of the "new" proposals. Since these strong feelings are usually not a "groundswell" due to agitations of the elite, but rather reflect desires that were there all the time in the largely ignored masses, these feelings are hard to change.

For the next few years, the trend will probably be one of no burgeoning interest in the space program and a continuing tendency to support "necessary" government-funded, domestic programs. Space program budgets will probably have to remain modest and will probably continue to be the target for reductions, through the mid- or even the late-seventies. Beyond this point things become much more speculative. If the "cycle" does not occur or is too slow in "coming round," many of the quasi nightmares about the country mentioned earlier (see pp. 374-381), just possibly could occur-- and they would be due in the late seventies. Similarly, if the swingback is not too long delayed, it would also take that long to be effective.

The conditions in the mid- and late-seventies will of course influence predictions for the early-eighties. Needless to say, because of the momentum of movements once they occur, if the late-seventies are bad, Utopian early-eighties are less likely. If none of the problems speculated about earlier occur, and the rapid growth of our GNP is accompanied by a decrease in the inflationary trends and unemployment, we could easily afford the current NASA budget. Obviously, if we have solved our poverty, education and urban problems by the 1980's, a moderate NASA budget might

be looked on as an easily afforded contribution to knowledge and science by a very affluent society. Such a prediction depends upon many conditions, all of which could occur, but may well not. If one were to write scenarios for this time period to get a feel for what alternative environments the planners might encounter, the "central-theme" scenario, based on today's indicators, is not likely to be over optimistic as far as imminent great improvements in relative support for NASA is concerned. But some current developments are important. The next year or two should give some clearer indications about economic trends and even the location among the population of potential increases or decreases of NASA's supporters, as well as possible degrees of support in the second half of the seventies. Once the estimate is firmer for this period, reasonable estimates for the first half of the eighties can be made. One thing, however, is quite likely to be the same for NASA in the eighties as it was in the sixties and early seventies: the trends in "outside" general forces in the society are likely to continue to have as much or more effect on NASA's support among the public, in Congress and in the executive branch as will NASA's own proposed programs, even if they only call for a moderate budget. This is a problem for most long-range planners, but it is no reason for them to despair. These strong, "outside" forces in the future, as in the past, will probably be based on feelings that have existed for a long time among the public, rather than on a sudden upsurge of agitation by any minority. By concentrating on maintaining a true "profile" of the public, rather than risking being misled by "caricatures," planners probably will continue to be able to evaluate the possible appeal of their own programs as well as that of projects of other organizations who compete for the same money.

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APPENDIX:

A STUDY OF A YOUTH COHORT--
1955-1968

APPENDIX: A STUDY OF A YOUTH COHORT--1955-1968*

A. Introduction

This section is an examination of the attitudes and values of one segment of the population--1961 college graduates--during their high school days and in the years following their graduation from college. They are an approximation of a "cohort," roughly constructed from basic data collected while they were attending high school and from a series of surveys made after they left college. This long-term view of one approximate group covers the years 1955 through 1968 and attempts to chart the trend of changes in attitudes and values of these young people as they left high school, had an experience of four years in college and went into the career world. Though no broad generalizations can be extracted from studying this "cohort," we can assume that this is a typical group of young people and that some insight can be gained into the changes in attitudes that accompany the normal growing-up process of youth in America at this point in time. The time difference of a decade is a serious drawback to making predictions--these young people graduated college in 1961 just prior to the advent of the great changes in the college milieu, and it is presently impossible to tell what long-term effects these changes might have on the present generation of college graduates.

B. The 1961 Alumni.

The descriptive material of the 1961 alumni plus the charts based on a survey taken in 1968 were taken from the book, Recent Alumni and Higher Education, by Joe L. Spaeth and Andrew M. Greeley, which was prepared for the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, and were used as the basis for this cohort section of the study. Material from this book is used liberally throughout this section.

* This section was written by Doris Yokelson.

** (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970), A General Report Prepared for the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education.

The majority of the 1961 college alumni were graduated from high school in 1957. They were in the 10th grade from September 1954 to June 1955; 11th grade from September 1955 to June 1956; and 12th grade from September 1956 to June 1957. The material for these years was taken from the obtainable Purdue Opinion Panel reports on high school students across the nation. This material will be compared with that on some of the attitudes held by the 1961 college alumni in 1968 (a simple form of cohort analysis from 1954 to 1968) to see what changes took place as the group went to college and then into careers. Comparisons between this high school and alumni material are not always easily made: first, only certain questions were available and, of course, in many cases they did not correlate between the years; second, the opinions of exactly those students in the grades we wanted who planned to go to college could not be broken out; third, at least 13% of these alumni did not go straight from high school to college, and 18% of the 1961 class had dropped out and returned at some later time; fourth, the data on the alumni seems to be to some degree questionable because of the method of the survey; i.e., sending out questionnaires and using the answers of those who responded--though the analysts conducting the survey have stated that the responses which they reported were weighted to take into account discrepancies in the original sampling design and that the sample of respondents returning all questionnaires was only minimally biased by non-response;* fifth, the raw data from the 1961 study was not available. But despite these shortcomings, a useful picture of trends in attitudes may emerge or some startling perturbation will be observed. We are also able to corroborate some trends emerging from this material with other sources.

* Spaeth and Greeley, footnote, p. 4.

1. Characteristics of the June, 1961 Alumni--From the Carnegie Commission Study:

- Sample - Based on a sample of 40,000 graduates of 135 accredited or large colleges and universities. Data were collected in 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964 and 1968. The 1968 survey was commissioned by the Carnegie Commission and is based on a 30% subsample of respondents who had returned all four previous questionnaires. Of the 6,005 persons drawn, 4,868 returned completed questionnaires--a response rate of 81%. 58% of the respondents were male and 42% were female.
- Marriage Status - 1/4 of all graduates were married as seniors; 2/3 of the married had children. In 1964, 3 years later, 2/3 were married and 2/3 of the married had children. In 1968, over 80% were married and 80% of these had children. The average number of children per family in 1968 was 2, the oldest child averaging between 3 and 4 years of age. Nearly 1/4 had met their spouses at their own college and over 1/5 were married to people who had not attended college at all.
- Family Background - 1/3 of their mothers and 40% of their fathers had gone to college. About 1/2 of their fathers were professionals, proprietors, managers or officials. 1/3 of alumni came from families with incomes of at least \$10,000 a year (in pre-1960 dollars). By 1968, 3/4 of the alumni were making as much as their parents; 11% of parents and 9% of alumni were making at least \$20,000 a year.
- College History - When they graduated in June 1961, 30% were 23 or older; 6% were 30 or older; 13% did not go straight from high school to college--the median delay was about 3 years. 18% of this class dropped out and came back; they left college for a term or more.
- Number Going to Graduate school - 35% enrolled in graduate school during the year after college. This percentage remained about the same during the next two years. By 1968, 17% were enrolled in graduate school. 3/5 had attended graduate school for some period; nearly 1/2 had attended for 1 year or more; 1/5 had attended for at least 3 years.
- Higher degrees - 1/3 had some kind of higher degree: .21% held a master's, 10% a professional and 4% a doctoral degree. 1/6 said they planned to earn a doctorate; over 2/3 said they intended to earn some kind of advanced degree.
- Plans for Children to Attend College - 93% of alumni expect all their boys to attend college and 86% expect all their girls to attend. Nearly all want some of their children to attend. 60% have done something financially for this--savings accounts, insurance, investments or trust funds. 99% say they will make some contribution to

financing their children's education; nearly 1/2 say they will contribute at least 3/4 of a child's expenses. Average parent thinks cost of keeping a child in school for a year will be about \$3,000.

This is a brief picture of the 1961 college alumni as of 1968. At first glance, a third of the alumni having enrolled in graduate school seemed inordinately high, but this has been found not to be out of line. Although the breakdown of the percentages of alumni according to college type and major are not given, we do know that the 1968 sample was weighted to represent the proper distribution of types of colleges attended and we hopefully assume that the course representation was similarly weighted. It is obvious from this and various other studies we have examined that the attitudes of persons in different fields differ considerably and are fairly consistent according to field.*

C. Social and Political Attitudes of the 1961 Alumni from 1955 to 1968.

1. Political Orientation

How liberal or conservative were these college alumni of the early 1960's? How did their social and political attitudes change as a group from high school to post-college and then as parents and emerging leaders of our society? Were their basic attitudes towards their colleges and studies and the role of students very different from the basic attitudes of college students today?

The 1961 alumni grew up in a time when some fewer high school students than in 1970 were planning to go to college and almost twice as many were

*Seymour Martin Lipset and Everett Carl Ladd, Jr., "And What Professors Think," Psychology Today, Vol. 4, No. 6, November 1970, p. 49; Ian D. Currie, et al., "Images of the Professor and Interest in the Academic Profession," Sociology of Education, Vol. 39, No. 4, Fall 1966, available in reprint from the Survey Research Center, University of California; Rodney Stark, "On the Incompatibility of Science and Religion," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Fall 1963, also available as a reprint from the Survey Research Center, University of California.

thinking of working after they got out of high school. In the 1950's, World War II was not long over: among those who had preceded these high school students in college were large numbers of veterans of the war who were highly motivated and goal-oriented; money was scarcer than now; young persons were still considered to help in bringing in the family income; fear of war and the premonition of another war were strong. As seen in Table I below, by 1955, 37% of high school students planned to go to college as compared to 50% in 1970. In this table--as in all other tables in this study--the high school grade the 1961 alumni were in at the time is outlined by a block: thus, in Table I below, in March 1955 they were in the 10th grade. It is interesting to note in this table that the percentage of high school students planning to go to college in March 1955 decreased slightly from the 10th grade to the 12th; and in June 1970 this percentage increased slightly from the 10th grade to the 12th grade. One would assume this percentage would increase; because those with lower grades and those who are disinterested in school, would be the ones to drop out between the 10th and 12th grades: figures in March 1964 show that the drop-out rate from grades 10 to 12 was 30%*. Almost twice as many students planned to go to work in March 1955 than in June 1970 and considerably fewer were thinking of going into military service in June 1970.

*Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 70, March 1964, p.7.

TABLE I
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS BY FUTURE PLANS--MARCH 1955 AND JUNE 1970

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March 1955*	Total Sample	Grade			Grade Achievement			Vocabulary score			Income		
		10	11	12	Poor	Avg.	Good	Low	Mid.	High	Low	Mid.	Upper
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
After high school, what do you plan to do? (boys answer as though you would not be drafted immediately).													
Go to work	23	21	22	27	31	28	14	29	25	13	32	25	14
Go to college	37	38	37	36	17	28	57	25	35	57	20	36	55
Take special training other than college	12	12	12	13	9	13	11	12	13	11	11	13	11
Enlist in military service	12	12	14	10	21	14	5	14	12	8	15	12	9
Girls: get married and be a housewife	7	7	7	8	7	8	7	8	8	5	11	7	6
Other plans or don't know	9	10	8	6	15	9	6	12	7	6	11	7	5

June 1970**	Total Sample	Grade			Very low	Course Grades		Excellent	Mother's Education			
		10	11	12		Below avg.	Above Avg.		Grade	H.S.	Coll.	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Which one of the following do you plan to do after finishing high school? (Mark only one).												
Go to college	50	46	50	52	7	24	38	72	73	32	54	71
Take special training other than college	15	15	16	15	12	23	20	10	3	20	14	8
Go to work	12	11	11	15	33	21	15	7	4	21	9	4
Enter military service	8	9	8	7	33	13	9	3	9	8	8	6
Other plans or don't know	15	19	15	10	14	21	18	9	12	18	14	12

*Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 41, p. 2a.

**Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 89, p. 1a.

In political party preference and voting choice, the 1961 alumni, while in high school, tended to follow the choices of their parents. In November 1956, when asked if they would vote for the same party as their parents, 58% of them said they would. During this highpoint of President Eisenhower's popularity, the 12th graders were even more enthusiastic supporters of Eisenhower than their parents were. Interestingly, the 10th and 11th graders gave considerably less support to Eisenhower than the 12th graders, and were even less pro-Eisenhower than their parents. In the three questions below, the 12th graders showed themselves more Republican-minded than either of the two earlier grades, though less inclined to vote for the same party as their parents.

TABLE 11
HIGH SCHOOL PARTY PREFERENCE*
10th, 11th and 12th Grades

<u>November 1956</u>	<u>Total Sample</u> %	<u>10th</u> %	<u>11th</u> %	<u>12th</u> %	(1961 Alumni-- graduating June 1957)
Which political party do you think has the most to offer the country?					
Republican	41	40	39	45	
Democratic	36	38	38	31	
Some other Party	1	1	0	0	
Undecided	20	20	20	20	


*The Purdue Opinion Panel Poll No. 47, p. 1a. I was not able to isolate the party preferences of those 12th graders who specifically intended going to college. These students would, of course, have more closely correlated with our 1961 college alumni. In this November 1956 poll, the students were not asked what they planned to do after high school and there was also no breakdown of answers by post-high school plans or by course grades. A previous Purdue Opinion poll, May 1956, showed that those whose mothers had attended college and those whose families had a higher income (two strong indicators of those who intended going to college) were very much more pro-Eisenhower than other students.

TABLE 11, CONT.

<u>November 1956</u>	<u>Total Sample</u> %	<u>10th</u> %	<u>11th</u> %	<u>12th</u> %
"If you could vote in the November elections, do you think you would vote for the same party as your parents?"				
Yes	60	60	62	58
No	19	20	18	20
Undecided	20	18	20	21
"If you could vote in the coming election for whom would you vote?"				
Eisenhower and Nixon	53	50	49	62
Stevenson and Kefauver	36	39	40	28
Some other candidate	1	1	1	1
Undecided	9	9	9	8

The following figure shows the comparison between the election choices of the 12th graders and their parents (the 30-49 year olds) at the end of 1956. Though the pattern of their voting is similar to their parents in this year, the students highly favored Eisenhower over Stevenson.


FIGURE 1
ELECTION CHOICE - 1956
12TH GRADE AND PARENTS



*Compiled from Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 47, November 1956 and election results.

In 1970 there is also a similarity in the party preference pattern of adults and high school students. In this year, both adults and high school students preferred the Democratic party over the Republican. In the polls below, the adult choice of parties was limited to the two major ones, whereas the high school students had a choice among these two and the American Independent Party. Noteworthy in the student opinion is the very high percentage of "undecided." It is possible to conjecture that this is the form the Independent vote took among the high school students: they have not yet had the opportunity to assess the performance of the two major political parties and, in addition, the nationwide trend among all ages is to an increased Independent vote. In the figure below, the adult Independent vote can no doubt be found in the high percentage of those who said there was "no difference" between the parties. Following this figure is a breakdown of the high school students' preference by grade levels.

FIGURE II
PARTY PREFERENCE--
ADULTS AND HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS



*Gallup Opinion Index, No. 64.

**Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 89.

TABLE III
PARTY PREFERENCE*
June 1970 - 10th, 11th & 12th Grade High School

"Suppose that the presidential election were held today. Which party do you think could do a better job of handling the problems facing this country?"	Total Sample	10th	11th	12th
	%	%	%	%
The Republican Party	16	18	15	14
The Democratic Party	25	23	25	26
The American Independent Party	8	8	7	7
No difference between parties	17	15	18	18
Undecided	31	32	30	30

The 1961 college alumni were Republican in 1964 and 1968, although they were less so than they felt themselves to be in 1956 and also less so than they considered their parents to be. The tables and figures below show the percentages of party affiliation of the 1961 alumni in 1964 and 1968; the net change from when they were 12th graders in 1956 to these years and from 1964 to 1968; and the party affiliation of their parents, as described by the alumni with the net difference between the alumni in 1964 and 1968 and their parents in 1964. The results show an enormously higher percentage of Independents among the alumni than among their parents--three times as many. The trends of the 1961 college alumni, as indicated here, seem to be away from the Democratic towards the Independent party and some increase in Republicanism.

*Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 89, June 1970, p. 21a.

It is important to remember that 1964 was the year that Barry Goldwater ran for President, and it is consequently not a good year for looking at political trends. It may even be considered to be a perturbation within a trend, and the changes from 1964 to 1968 may have primarily been a return to basic political orientation.

TABLE IV
PARTY AFFILIATION OF 1961 COLLEGE ALUMNI
IN 1964 AND 1968 AND NET CHANGE FROM
1956 TO 1964 TO 1968**

<u>Party Affiliation</u> 1964		<u>Party Affiliation</u> 1968		<u>Net Change</u> <u>12th Grade</u>		
	%		%	<u>11/56</u> to <u>1964</u>	<u>11/56</u> to <u>1968</u>	<u>1964</u> to <u>1968</u>
Republican	38	Republican	43	-7	-2	+5
Democratic	36	Democratic	29	+5	-2	-7
Independent	24	Independent	26	--	--	+2
Other	2	Other	2	--	--	0

TABLE V
POLITICS OF PARENTS OF
GRADUATING 1961 ALUMNI
(AS DESCRIBED BY 1961 ALUMNI)**

1964-Parent
Party Affiliation

Republican	44%
Democratic	44
Independent	8
Other	3

*From Spaeth and Greeley, pp. 100 and 101, and Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 47, November 1956. In 1956 none of the 12th graders chose another party and 20% were undecided.

**Spaeth and Greeley, pp. 100 and 101.


TABLE V, Cont.

Net Change in Party Affiliation Between
The Parents in 1964 and the Alumni
in 1964 and 1968

	<u>1964-Parent to 1961 Alumni 1964</u>	<u>1964-Parent to 1961 Alumni 1968</u>
Republican	-6	-1
Democratic	-8	-15
Independent	+16	+18
Other	-1	-1

FIGURE III

PARTY PREFERENCE - 1961 ALUMNI--1956, 1964, 1968*



*Compiled from information in Spaeth and Greeley and Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 47, November 1956.

For contrast and orientation, the actual voting percentages in the Presidential elections for the years concerned are given in the Table below. The alumni vote is found among the segment of voters under 30 years of age; their Republican party affiliation contrasts widely with the vote of others of their age group, especially in the Goldwater year; but the considerable percentage of Independents cannot be accounted for by the vote for Wallace. As discussed later, the Independent vote among the 1961 college alumni tends to be away from the Democratic party.

TABLE VI
VOTES IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
NATIONWIDE--ALL VOTERS AND VOTERS UNDER 30*

	1956	All Voters		Under 30		
		1964	1968	1964	1968	
%	%	%	%	%	%	
Republicans	57.8	38.7	43.4	36	38	
Democrats	42.2	61.3	43.0	64	47	
		Wallace	13.6	Wallace	13.6	15

As far as political orientation is concerned, about one-half of the alumni considered themselves to be liberal--and quite a bit more liberal than they felt their parents to be. When they were asked to describe their and their parents' political orientation they responded as follows:*

TABLE VII
LIBERAL ORIENTATION OF ALUMNI AND THEIR PARENTS
(ACCORDING TO ALUMNI) *

<u>Political orientation:</u>	<u>Parents</u>	<u>1961 Alumni</u>	
		<u>1964</u>	<u>1968</u>
<u>Liberal</u>	40%	56%	52%

There was, however, a slight decrease of liberalism from 1964 to 1968; and also when political orientation and party preference were combined, the 1961 alumni were found, in that time period, to have increased in numbers of conservative Republicans and to have lost in numbers of liberal Democrats. According to the authors of the survey on the alumni, the Democratic party lost out, mainly to the Independents, but also to the Republicans who were, in 1968, able to retain most of those who were from a Republican background and were Republicans in 1964, to gain back more than one-fifth from Republican backgrounds who had declared themselves Democrats in 1964, and to have pulled away one-third of those who had considered themselves Independents in 1964.

*Spaeth and Greeley, pp. 100 and 101.

TABLE VIII
POLITICAL LEANINGS OF ALUMNI, 1964 AND 1968*
(In Percent)

<u>Political Leaning</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Net Difference</u>
Conservative Republican	18	3	22	1	+4
Liberal Republican	20	2	21	2	+1
Conservative Democrat	13	4	12	5	-1
Liberal Democrat	23	1	18	3	-5
Conservative Independent	11	5	12	5	+1
Liberal Independent	13	4	14	4	+1
New Left	--		1	6	+1
Other	2	6	1	6	-1

In 1964, the highest percentage of 1961 college alumni considered themselves to be liberal Democrats; by 1968 this had changed to conservative Republican, with liberal Republican second and liberal Democrat third.**

One noteworthy point the authors of the survey made was that the income of these respondents had very little effect on changes in party affinities during the 1964-1968 period. As we can see in the table below, parties that we would normally think would hold people of higher or lower income, did not necessarily do so, and changes took place--or a party was able to retain its members--quite similarly across income lines. The fact that there was very little percentage difference in party changes among income groups may, in itself, however, represent a substantial shift in the outlook of some income groups who formerly might have differed more radically from each other.

*ibid., p. 102. Rank is our addition.

** The liberals of any party showed themselves to be more in favor of student and Negro protests than conservatives of any party; e.g., liberal Republicans favored protests more than conservative Democrats and Independents. See p. 443.

TABLE IX
ALUMNI RETENTION OF PARTY AFFILIATION
BETWEEN 1964 AND 1968, BY PRESENT FAMILY INCOME*

<u>Present Family Income</u>	<u>Party Affiliation</u>		
	<u>Republican</u>	<u>Democratic</u>	<u>Independent</u>
	%	%	%
\$15,000 and over	81	66	53
\$11,000 - \$14,000	84	66	54
\$ 8,000 - \$10,000	79	68	50
Under \$8,000	77	65	63

Politically, the 1961 alumni have remained moderate and fairly constant in their orientation. About one-half consider themselves to be liberals; the Democrats have lost members, mainly to the Independents; and the Republicans have gained. That the alumni have basically a moderate, sober and liberal-hued attitude will be shown later in their feelings about social and political experiences and in how they regard the college curriculum. The alumni considered themselves substantially more liberal than their parents and remained liberal as the years went on. Whether this is because they were college-educated and the college experience tends to make people liberal or whether this is the political tide, is not clear. No more than 40% of their fathers and mothers had gone to college. According to the authors of the alumni survey, there is evidence to show that college makes orientation more liberal; however, there is also much evidence in nationwide polls to indicate that on many domestic social and political issues college-educated people are more conservative than the less-educated.**

*Spaeth and Greeley, p. 104. The percentages represent the percentage of 100% who retained the party affiliation during the period from 1964 to 1968.

**See the section, "Unexplored Popular Perceptions and Issues," passim. In one study, published in 1968, analysts from the prestigious University of Michigan Survey Research Center concluded: ". . .on most questions involving social welfare, domestic expenditures, and transfers of wealth from more to less prosperous citizens, better educated Americans have been clearly more conservative, or less liberal, than the educationally underprivileged. . . .College-educated Americans have been as much as three or more times as opposed as grade schoolers to such concepts as 'the welfare state,' 'socialized medicine,' and even Medicare and other less 'radical' programs." (John P. Robinson, Jerrold G. Rusk, Kendra B. Head, Measures of Political Attitudes [Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute for Social Research, The University of Michigan, 1968], p. 45.)

2. Attitudes Towards Current Domestic Issues.

Although a very small percentage of the 1961 alumni participated in a number of experiences that are today considered important to a segment of college students, a significantly higher percentage would approve if their children had these experiences. (As we have seen, about 90% of the alumni expect their children to go to college.) This does not include taking drugs: although 4% of the alumni say they have experimented with drugs, only 1% would like their children to do so.* As for antiwar and civil rights demonstrations, less than 10% of the alumni had taken part in them, but 15% would approve if their children were to participate in an antiwar demonstration and 1/3 wouldn't mind if it were a civil rights demonstration. These figures seem low and bespeak of a moderate stance towards activism, but compare well with the number of college students in June 1969 who said they had demonstrated (28%).** However, the percentage of college demonstrators might well have increased over the last year and a half as the antiwar and anti-college administration campaigns mounted.

It is difficult here to separate the cause from the activity. It would be wrong to surmise from this information, for example, that only 15% of the alumni consider themselves "doves" as far as the Vietnam war is concerned;

*Gallup Opinion Index No. 68, February 1971, p. 1. The subject of use and approval of drugs has been carefully explored in another section of this report, "The Role of Youth in Today's Society." All adults nationwide are almost 9 to 1 against the legalization of marijuana (Gallup Opinion Index, No. 65, November 1970, p. 25); yet according to the latest Gallup poll, taken in December 1970, 42% of the college students said they had tried marijuana; almost double the 22% in 1969 and eight times the 5% in 1967; and 14% said they had used LSD compared to 4% in 1969 and 1% in 1967. Furthermore, 50% of all college students thought the use of marijuana should be made legal and 44% thought it should not. (Gallup Opinion Index, No. 60, June 1970, p. 22.)

**Gallup Opinion Index No. 48, June 1969, p. 13.

although only that percentage were in favor of having their children protest. Apparently, the 1961 alumni, as parents, would not like to see their children involved in the more militant and possibly violent aspects of activism, but are highly in favor of service.

TABLE X

ALUMNI ATTITUDES ON CERTAIN EXPERIENCES (PER CENT)*

<u>Experiences</u>	<u>I have</u>	<u>I would approve if one of my children</u>
Experimented with drugs	4	1
Participated in an antiwar protest	5	15
Participated in civil rights protest	9	30
Worked full time for a service organization such as the Peace Corps, VISTA, or the American Friends Service Committee	2	73
Volunteered to help others (a project to tutor underprivileged students, helping in a mental hospital, etc.)	43	91

The alumni also showed selective and moderate attitudes towards Negro and college students' protests. Although two-thirds thought that "Negro militancy is needlessly dividing American society," more than one-half felt that "in the long run" it "will be healthy for America." About an equal percentage--52 and 51%--felt that college protests were unhealthy and healthy for the country and only one-third could see white racism as the main cause of the Negro riots.

*Spaeth and Greeley, p. 100.

TABLE XI
ALUMNI ATTITUDES ON CURRENT ISSUES (PERCENT)*

<u>Statement</u>	<u>Agree Strongly or Somewhat</u>
College students should get draft deferments	69
Negro militancy is needlessly dividing American society into conflicting camps.	67
Graduate students should get draft deferments	63
In the long run, current protests of Negroes in the cities will be healthy for America	56
This country would be better off if there were less protest and dissatisfaction coming from college campuses	52
The protests of college students are a healthy sign for America	51
College students should lose their draft deferments for participating in demonstrations against the draft	42
The main cause of Negro riots in the cities is white racism	36

The alumni reactions to protest were considered by the authors of the survey to correlate highly enough to be called "support for militancy." An index of support for militancy was made up of agreement or disagreement with the previous items that were asked the alumni:**

- 1.. The protests of college students are a healthy sign for America. (Agree)
2. This country would be better off if there were less protest and dissatisfaction coming from college campuses (Disagree)
3. In the long run, current protests of Negroes in the cities will be healthy for America. (Agree)
4. The main cause of Negro riots in the cities is white racism. (Agree)

*ibid., p. 104.

**ibid., pp. 105-106.

-
5. Negro militancy is needlessly dividing American society into conflicting camps. (Disagree)
 6. College students should lose their draft deferments for participating in demonstrations against the draft. (Disagree)
-

According to the findings of the survey, the alumni who are from good quality and private colleges, have good grades, have spent a number of years in graduate school, are from upper-middle class backgrounds and are younger, are most likely to be in sympathy with the Negro and student protests. The authors state that this correlates rather well with what they know from other research--that the more intelligent, younger students from high-quality colleges are the ones who are likely to protest.*

TABLE XII

SUPPORT-FOR-MILITANCY INDEX BY TYPE OF COLLEGE ATTENDED**

<u>Type of College Attended</u>	<u>Percent in highest Quartile</u>
University (large public)	24
University (private)	37
University (other)	28
Protestant (low quality)	18
Protestant (high quality)	34
State college	18
Catholic	28
Liberal arts college	34

* Ibid., For another point of view on the nature and intelligence of activists, see the section, "The Role of Youth in Today's Society," pp. 209 ff.

** Spaeth and Greeley, p. 107.

TABLE XIII
SUPPORT-FOR-MILITANCY INDEX BY AGE AND COLLEGE QUALITY*
(PERCENT IN HIGHEST QUARTILE)

College quality	Age		
	28 or younger	29-31	Over 31
High	44 (1,208)	35 (737)	28 (158)
Medium	30 (1,151)	23 (879)	21 (304)
Low	23 (1,366)	16 (1,097)	10 (661)

In this material, as well as in another large study recently done on college faculty members for the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education and released in part in an article by Seymour Martin Lipset and Everett Carl Ladd, Jr., the age of the respondent is shown to play a major role in whether he will support militancy.** In the table above, those under 30 years of age were one and a half to two times more likely to support militancy than were those over thirty, regardless of the type of college attended. When type of college is introduced, those who were twenty-eight or younger and had attended a "high"-quality college were four times more inclined to support militancy than those who were over thirty-one and had gone to a "low"-quality college. Lipset and Ladd reported a similar phenomenon among college faculty members: "...the differences associated with age were surprisingly large. In each discipline, as age increases, support for student activism

* Ibid., p. 109.

** Lipset and Ladd, p. 106.

decreases. It is almost too neat: we are accustomed to more vagaries in opinion distribution when the control variable is one so generally inclusive as age."

When analyzed by career field, the alumni who were in the humanities and social sciences gave the highest percentage of support for militancy, those in business and engineering, the lowest. This general conclusion also correlates well with the survey analysis by Lipset and Ladd on college professors: "The percentage of social scientists giving at least tentative endorsement to student activism is more than twice that of professors of business, more than three times that of professors of agriculture."*

TABLE XIV
SUPPORT-FOR-MILITANCY INDEX BY 1968 CAREER FIELD**

<u>1968 Career Field</u>	<u>Percent in highest Quartile</u>
Physical sciences	36
Biological sciences	33
Social sciences	54
Humanities	62
Engineering	14
Medicine	33
Other Health	11
Education	24
Business	15
Law	48
Other professions	35

*Ibid., p. 50. For a further discussion of this, see pp. 231-236 of "The Role of Youth in Today's Society." See also an interesting study on the images of the professor and the characteristics of undergraduates considering college teaching as a profession. (Ian D. Currie, et al., "Images of the Professor and Interest in the Academic Profession," Sociology of Education, Vol. 39, No. 4, Fall 1966, available in reprint from the Survey Research Center, University of California.)

**Spaeth and Greeley, p. 108.

Thus, in the alumni study, if the respondent were young, had attended a "high"-quality, private university and were in the field of humanities or social sciences, he would be more likely to support militancy.

As we have seen, although there were more conservative Republicans among the alumni than any other political group, the majority of the alumni considered themselves to be liberal in orientation. In the table below, the liberals of any party are shown to favor militancy more than does any conservative group. Thus a liberal Republican was more sympathetic to protests than a conservative Independent or a conservative Democrat. If sympathy towards protests may be taken as a measure of liberalism, then the table also shows that in the scale from Republican to Democrat to Independent, the Independents tend to be more liberal as a group than either of the other two parties.

TABLE XV
ATTITUDES ON STUDENTS AND NEGRO PROTESTS,
BY POLITICAL LEANINGS (PERCENT AGREE STRONGLY OR SOMEWHAT)*

Attitude	Republican		Political Leaning				New Left
	Conser- vative	Liberal	Conser- vative	Liberal	Conser- vative	Liberal	
Student protests a healthy sign for America	30	55	.36	64	.43	.77	97
Negro protests will be healthy for America	33	58	.44	73	50	78	97
n	(1,638)	(1,595)	(899)	(1,292)	(914)	(1,031)	(89)

*Spaeth and Greeley, p. 105.

The 1961 alumni split their feelings about the ways students should be involved on the college campus. They did not think students should have a say in issues dealing with faculty and college administration, nor as to what is taught in specific courses; they did feel that students should be able to participate in organizing the curriculum, and to the extent that they are not breaking laws, in monitoring their own behavior and governing their participation in off-campus political activity. According to the findings of the survey, women more than men, younger alumni more than older, and graduates of "high"-quality colleges more than those from "low"-quality colleges were most inclined to support student involvement in college activity and in regulating their own behavior.

TABLE XVI
ALUMNI ATTITUDES TOWARD STUDENT INVOLVEMENT*
(PERCENT)

<u>Statement</u>	<u>Favorable to anti-student position</u>	
The students are capable of regulating their own lives and the college should stay out of this area	(Disagree)	66
The college should take the responsibility to see that students do not break the law	(Agree)	55
Students should have the right to protest against recruiters on campus if the students think the recruiters are helping to carry out immoral practices	(Disagree)	47
The college should assume responsibility for a student's behavior just as parents do	(Agree)	45
Rules governing student behavior should be made by the students	(Disagree)	43
Students should make the rules governing their participation in off-campus political activity	(Disagree)	34

*ibid., p. 77.

TABLE XVI, cont.

<u>Statement</u>	<u>Favorable to anti-student position</u>	
Rules governing student behavior should be enforced by students	(Disagree)	27
The college should not try to stop students from taking part in political activity	(Disagree)	17
Students should have the right to participate in decisions on		
Faculty tenure	(Disagree)	82
Admission standards	(Disagree)	80
Tuition and fees	(Disagree)	81
What is taught in specific courses	(Disagree)	58
Organization of the curriculum	(Disagree)	40

The student involvement items in the preceding table were combined into four indices: student politics; student control over rules; student power; and student freedom, and in the following tables were applied to the type of college attended and the career field.*

1. Student-politics index:

- a) The college should not try to stop students from taking part in political activity
- b) Students should have the right to protest against recruiters on campus if the students think the recruiters are helping to carry out immoral practices.
- c) Students should make the rules governing their participation in off-campus political activity.

2. Student-control-over-rules index:

- a) Rules governing student behavior should be made by the students.

*Ibid., p. 78.

- b) Rules governing student behavior should be enforced by the students.

3. Student-power index:

- a) Students should have the right to participate in decisions on:
- 1) Faculty tenure
 - 2) Organization of the curriculum
 - 3) What is taught in specific courses
 - 4) Tuition and fees

4. Student-freedom index:

- a) The college should assume responsibility for a student's behavior just as parents do (Disagree)
- b) The students are capable of regulating their own lives and the college should stay out of this area. (Agree)
- c) The college should take the responsibility to see that students do not break the law. (Disagree)

TABLE XVII

STUDENT-INVOLVEMENT INDICES
BY TYPE OF COLLEGE ATTENDED
(PERCENT IN HIGHEST QUARTILE)*

Type of college attended	Student-politics index	Rules index	Student-power index	Student-freedom index
University (large public)	28	17	23	36
University (private)	37	21	19	36
University (other)	27	13	21	35
Protestant (low quality)	21	13	11	17

*Ibid., p. 80.

TABLE XVII, cont.

<u>Type of college attended</u>	<u>Student-politics index</u>	<u>Rules index</u>	<u>Student-power index</u>	<u>Student-freedom index</u>
Protestant (high quality)	35	25	20	33
State college	18	15	20	21
Catholic	28	14	22	23
Liberal arts college	33	21	18	32

TABLE XVIII

STUDENT-INVOLVEMENT INDICES
BY 1968 CAREER FIELD (PERCENT IN HIGHEST QUARTILE)*

<u>1968 Career Field</u>	<u>Student-politics index</u>	<u>Rules index</u>	<u>Student-Power index</u>	<u>Student-freedom index</u>
Physical Sciences	31	15	24	40
Biological Sciences	40	13	28	33
Social Sciences	53	17	35	51
Humanities	52	32	28	42
Engineering	20	12	16	33
Medicine	39	19	19	28
Other health	14	24	30	24
Education	26	20	22	21
Business	20	11	13	25
Law	36	15	18	42
Other professions	34	16	25	35

*ibid., p. 80.

Again, the "high"-quality public and private college alumni whose career fields were in social sciences and humanities would be generally most likely to support student involvement. According to the table, the alumni in these two fields who were in sympathy with the students seemed particularly concerned about the students' right to take part in political activities and to regulate their own behavior.

In light of the belief by a number of analysts today that the student from a "high"-quality college is bound to be more intelligent and creative, some particular data which came out of the alumni survey is startling: "How much you read does not seem to be influenced by the quality of the college you attended."^{*} This was based on answers given by the alumni concerning the frequency of their cultural and reading activities and the number of books they owned seven years after graduation. Two indices were then made up indicating these activities: a serious reading index (read--not necessarily finish--a nonfiction book and a work of serious fiction; read poetry; and number of books owned); and an interest-in-the-arts index (listen to classical or serious music; go to concerts, plays and museums or art galleries). The survey showed that whether an alumni had gone to a high- or low-quality college had very little to do seven years later with the extent and frequency of his cultural activities, most especially his reading habits. This was particularly true of women, who registered much higher percentages of interest in the arts and reading than men regardless of college attended, and when they were from low-quality colleges were shown to have just as much interest in cultural activities and reading as men from high-quality colleges. Some of this could be due to the fact that, although men are busily pursuing

^{*} ibid., p. 33.

their careers directly after college, women may have more time to listen to music and read serious books; on the other hand, women may be inclined to pursue arts and reading whether they have time or not. "Nevertheless, the major point in this table is that sex is a far stronger predictor of serious reading and interest in serious music than is college quality." And, "relatively little more has been achieved in modifying reading and interest in the arts by the best colleges in the country than has been done by the poorest colleges."^{*}

TABLE XIX
CULTURAL ACTIVITIES BY SEX AND COLLEGE QUALITY

<u>College quality</u>	<u>Frequently listen to serious music</u>		<u>Frequently read serious fiction</u>	
	<u>Men</u> %	<u>Women</u> %	<u>Men</u> %	<u>Women</u> %
High	40	57	27	35
	33	40	19	42
	35	43	22	37
	32	38	16	44
	19	32	16	29
Low	25	34	15	35
	16	37	12	29

Even more surprising is that the same holds true for graduate school. Although the level of cultural activities increased with good grades and the number of years in graduate school, the quality of the graduate school had practically no effect on the reading behavior of the alumni in 1968.

^{*}Ibid., pp. 31 and 32.

TABLE XX
COEFFICIENTS OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN
INDICES OF CULTURAL ACTIVITIES AND BACKGROUND
VARIABLES (GAMMA)*

Background variable	Interest-in-the-arts index	Serious-reading index
College quality	.14	.08
College size	-.01	-.02
Control (private)	.05	.05
College grades	.17	.21
Years in graduate school	.18	.20
Graduate school quality	.18	.09
Father's education	.13	.11
Sex (male)	-.27	-.30
Age	-.12	-.09
Present family income	.10	.07

Moreover, although effort is presently being made by some researchers and analysts to show that a segment of today's youth is particularly nonmaterialistic and noncareer-minded in outlook--to show that this segment are "forerunners," desiring a new life-style of aestheticism, freedom and service beyond that ever desired by youth before in modern America^{**}--the 1961 college alumni, by overwhelming majorities, were shown to have wished that college

* Ibid., p. 27.

** See especially the work of Daniel Yankelovich for Fortune magazine, January 1969 and for John D. Rockefeller 3rd. For one discussion of the "forerunner" theory according to Yankelovich, see pp. 276-304 of this study in the section, "The Role of Youth in Today's Society." According to the Yankelovich Fortune survey, 58% of college students were categorized as "practical-minded"; that is, for them college was a practical matter, useful for earning money, having a more interesting career and gaining prestige in society. A majority of 54% of these were taking business, engineering or science courses. The rest of the college students were classified as "forerunners"; that is, they chose the statement about college aims that said they were not really concerned with the practical benefits of college, which they took for granted, but for them college meant the opportunity to "change things rather than make out well with in the existing system." Of this group, 80% were in the arts and humanities. The "practical-minded" were later called by Yankelovich, the "career-minded."

would primarily prepare students for understanding themselves and for cultural and social concerns rather than for practical, career training. They also expected college to be able to train them for careers, but that concern was far behind their concern for personal, cultural and social values. Seven years after they graduated college, the alumni generally reported that they would be most strongly in favor of colleges giving a humanistic education; that is, a broader general education in the humanities and especially the fine arts.

TABLE XXI

PERCENT RESPONDING TO THE QUESTIONS:
"WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING DO YOU THINK YOUR COLLEGE
SHOULD HAVE GIVEN YOU?" AND "WHETHER OR NOT YOU THINK YOU
SHOULD HAVE GOTTEN EACH OF THESE THINGS, PLEASE RATE THE EXTENT
TO WHICH YOUR COLLEGE AFFECTED YOU IN EACH OF THESE WAYS."*

<u>Item</u>	I think my college should have	<u>My college actually affected me</u>	
		<u>Greatly</u>	<u>Greatly or Somewhat</u>
Developed my abilities to think and express myself	98	41	87
Given me a broad knowledge of the arts and sciences	90	35	77
Expanded my tolerance for people and ideas	90	35	75
Helped me to learn how to make my own decisions	81	20	73
Helped me to formulate the values and goals of my life	80	20	64
Prepared me to get ahead in the world	70	18	66
Helped me to learn how to get along with others	69	23	68

*Ibid., p. 40.

TABLE XXI, cont.

<u>Item</u>	<u>I think my college should have</u>	<u>My college actually affected me</u>	
		<u>Greatly</u>	<u>Greatly or Somewhat</u>
Trained me for my present job	65	34	67
Helped me to learn ways of helping people	60	10	43
Helped me to form valuable and lasting friendships	54	25	57
Helped prepare me for marriage and family	39	7	30

They, furthermore, think that the college faculty and administration should also have these goals. Again, specific career training and gaining a high status in life were far down the list. In both these tables, the discrepancy is clearly shown between what the alumni thought they should have gotten and what they thought the college actually gave them. They clearly felt that changes are needed.

TABLE XXII
ALUMNI EVALUATION OF GOALS OF
FACULTY AND ADMINISTRATION AT THEIR COLLEGES
(PERCENT)*

<u>Aims, intentions, or goals of higher education</u>	<u>Absolute top importance</u>		<u>Absolute top or great importance</u>	
	<u>Should have been</u>	<u>was</u>	<u>Should have been</u>	<u>was</u>
Produce a well-rounded student, that is, one whose physical, social, moral, intellectual, and aesthetic potentialities have all been cultivated	32	14	80	50
Assist students to develop objectivity about themselves and their beliefs and hence examine those beliefs critically	24	7	74	37

* ibid., pp. 42 and 43.

TABLE XXII, cont.

<u>Aims, intentions, or goals of higher education</u>	<u>Absolute top importance</u>		<u>Absolute top or great importance</u>	
	<u>Should have been</u>	<u>was</u>	<u>Should have been</u>	<u>was</u>
Produce a student who, whatever else may be done to him, has had his intellect cultivated to the maximum	22	6	60	32
Train students in methods of scholarship, and/or scientific research, and/or creative endeavor	20	9	70	42
Serve as a center for the dissemination of new ideas that will change the society, whether those ideas are in science, literature, the arts or politics	18	6	59	27
Develop the inner character of students so that they can make sound, correct moral choices	18	10	64	37
Produce a student who is able to perform his citizenship responsibilities effectively	16	6	67	37
Prepare students specifically for useful careers	16	14	57	54
Provide the student with skills, attitudes, contacts and experiences which maximize the likelihood of his occupying a high status in life and a position of leadership in society	12	5	46	30
Make sure the student is permanently affected (in mind and spirit) by the great ideas of the great minds of history	11	4	41	24
Make a good consumer of the student-- a person who is elevated culturally, has good taste, and can make good consumer choices	5	2	31	19

To sum up the basic interest of the alumni in what college should give students and their attitudes toward career-training versus a humanistic education, Spaeth and Greeley wrote:

When asked what they would do differently, the alumni overwhelmingly choose courses and express interests in the arts and sciences, especially in the humanities, and most especially in the fine arts.

It is precisely those whose careers were such that little specific career preparation was possible in college who are the most likely to display such humanistic inclinations. Those such as engineers, educators, or businessmen, for whom rather specific undergraduate career training was possible, seem much less humanistic in their actions than do the others. Nonetheless, even this group shows reasonably strong humanistic orientations.*

3.. Some Personal Perceptions of the Alumni While in High School in 1956.

Concerning their feelings about themselves as persons, and consequently their willingness to be independent individuals and make decisions on their own, the highschoolers in May 1956 were more desirous of being natural than popular; generally did things because they wanted to and not because they felt forced to conform; strongly wanted to have other people's opinions in making decisions although not in order to make their decisions acceptable to others; were not afraid to be "different" from the group, though the majority felt greatly upset if the group didn't approve of them; that new ideas were good, though they generally did not feel that they themselves were the impetus for new ideas; and thought they had quite a bit of freedom. In the following table, the 1961 alumni were in the 11th grade at the time of the poll, and this is indicated, as in earlier tables, by a box.

*Spaeth and Greeley, p. 94.

TABLE XXIII
AN INDEX OF INDIVIDUALISM OR WILLINGNESS TO
BE "DIFFERENT" FROM THE GROUP--HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
MAY 1956*

	Total %	Sex		Grade		
		Boys %	Girls %	10 %	11 %	12 %
I feel greatly upset if the group doesn't approve of me	50	44	55	50	51	50
There is nothing worse than being considered an "odd-ball" by other people	38	37	39	38	42	27
I try very hard to do everything that will please my friends	51	49	53	56	51	46
A person who is different is almost always immoral	6	8	5	7	7	4
More than anything, I want to be accepted as a member of the group that is most popular at school	26	29	23	28	25	28
I fear being different from my friends so much that I try to find ways to be like them	15	18	12	17	15	11
Sometimes I go along with the group and sometimes I don't	77	76	78	74	77	89
One should try to be popular and natural at the same time	77	73	81	76	76	76
Sometimes, when making an important decision, I like to hear other people's opinions	81	76	85	80	80	88
I like discussion but I don't like arguments	60	52	67	62	61	65
Sometimes I feel that I have to go along with the group	39	39	38	38	38	38
Sometimes I will do something just to make people like me	29	31	27	29	28	35

* Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 44, May 1956, pp. 16a, 18a, 20a.

TABLE XXIII, cont.

	Total %	Sex		Grade		
		Boys %	Girls %	10 %	11 %	12 %
It's more important to be your natural self, even if it doesn't make you popular	78	74	82	78	78	84
I think things out for myself and act on my own decisions	45	49	42	45	50	37
I don't care whether I'm popular or not.	19	22	17	18	21	33
I don't care to have other people's opinions influence my decisions	15	17	13	15	17	14
My tastes are quite different from my friends'	18	20	16	18	18	16
I quite often disagree with the group's opinion	26	27	25	27	25	31
When I feel that people aren't interested in my company, I find others to associate with	56	56	57	56	56	55
I often suggest new activity for the gang to do	38	37	39	41	38	21
I am considered to be original at times	31	29	33	29	31	34
Occasionally I suggest something new, rather than follow what the gang wants	43	42	43	42	42	49
Sometimes it is good to introduce new ideas	78	72	83	75	78	82
My freedom may be a little too limited	19	20	18	21	17	16
I don't think my freedom is too limited	63	59	67	60	67	59
I like to have other people's opinions before I make up my mind	59	56	62	59	59	60
I avoid dating people that my friends don't know	11	11	11	12	11	1

TABLE XXIII, cont.

	<u>Total</u> %	<u>Sex</u>		<u>Grade</u>		
		<u>Boys</u> %	<u>Girls</u> %	<u>10</u> %	<u>11</u> %	<u>12</u> %
Before making any important decision I try to find out what is most acceptable to others	42	41	44	46	40	42
It's more important to be popular than to be your natural self	4	6	2	5	4	--
My life is pretty well planned for me	26	25	26	25	25	28

How might these feelings of the high school students in 1956 compare with those of students today? In January 1970, highschoolers were also asked some questions about how they felt about themselves, their friends and their parents

TABLE XXIV
PERSONAL FEELINGS OF HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
JANUARY 1970*

	<u>Total</u> %	<u>Sex</u>		<u>Grade</u>		
		<u>Boys</u> %	<u>Girls</u> %	<u>10</u> %	<u>11</u> %	<u>12</u> %
Do you worry about what your best friends think about what you say and do and how you look?						
Always	23	21	25	27	24	17
Frequently	26	25	26	25	27	25
Sometimes	32	32	33	31	33	33
Seldom	11	12	10	10	9	16
Never	7	9	5	7	7	8
How much influence do you feel you have in family decisions that affect you?						
A great deal of influence	20	20	20	19	19	21
Considerable influence	29	28	31	28	29	32
Moderate influence	22	22	22	23	24	19
Some influence	16	15	16	17	14	15
Little or no influence	13	14	12	13	14	13

*Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 87, January 1970, pp. 5a and 9a.

TABLE XXIV, cont.

	<u>Total</u> %	<u>Sex</u>		<u>Grade</u>		
		<u>Boys</u> %	<u>Girls</u> %	<u>10</u> %	<u>11</u> %	<u>12</u> %
All in all, how strict are your parents (or guardians) with you?						
Extremely strict	4	4	3	4	4	3
Very strict	9	9	10	11	10	8
Moderately strict	49	49	49	51	49	47
Not very strict	27	27	27	25	27	28
Not strict at all	7	8	7	5	6	11

And again, in April 1970, high school students were asked comparable questions about their feelings toward friendships, parents and values.

TABLE XXV
THINGS HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS WORRY ABOUT
APRIL 1970*

	<u>Total</u> %	<u>Sex</u>		<u>Grade</u>		
		<u>Boys</u> %	<u>Girls</u> %	<u>10</u> %	<u>11</u> %	<u>12</u> %
In the past year, how much have you been bothered by [these items] ...about which high school students worry?						
Friendships (getting acquainted; awkwardness; keeping a conversation going; etc.)						
Very much	12	11	12	13	11	10
Quite a bit	19	20	18	19	20	19
Some	23	23	24	25	22	23
A little	16	16	15	15	17	15
Not very much	28	28	27	25	27	31

Relationships with parents and other adults (having too many decisions made for me; being too easily led by them; getting into arguments; hurting their feelings; being different; being talked about or made fun of; etc.)

Very much	14	13	15	15	12	14
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*Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 88, April 1970, pp. 15a and 19a.

TABLE XXV, cont.

	Total %	Sex		Grade		
		Boys %	Girls %	10 %	11 %	12 %
Quite a bit	16	15	18	17	16	16
Some	23	25	20	22	24	21
A little	16	15	17	15	17	16
Not very much	29	30	27	26	28	31

Values (wondering how to tell right from wrong; confused on some moral questions; doubting the value of worship and prayer; not living up to my ideal, etc.)

Very much	14	11	17	12	15	15
Quite a bit	17	16	18	17	16	18
Some	23	24	21	22	23	23
A little	17	18	16	18	17	15
Not very much	27	28	25	27	27	27

Exact comparisons between the years cannot be made because the questions were asked differently. The difficulty in comparing these two years is made even greater by the fact that the high school students in 1956 were being asked about their feelings towards their friends and their group and in 1970 they were asked about their feelings towards friends, family and other adults. In general, however, the high schoolers in 1956 seemed less disturbed about their own sense of personal worth, their independence and their ability to make decisions. Both groups, however, generally worried quite a bit about pleasing their friends, felt able to make decisions about themselves and did not think their freedom was too limited. The great majority of the 1956 high schoolers seemed quite willing to sacrifice conformity for the sake of being themselves and leading their lives as they wished--that is, perhaps as much as a high school student could be expected to do.

4. Some Feelings of High School Students Towards Change and Democratic Principles.

The 1956 high school students were overwhelmingly for trying new ideas rather than always sticking to the old ways.

TABLE XXVI
WILLINGNESS TO TRY NEW IDEAS
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS--MAY 1956*

	Total %	Sex		Grade		
		Boys %	Girls %	10 %	11 %	12 %
We should be willing to try new ideas rather than always sticking to the old ways of doing things						
agree	91	90	92	90	92	38
?; probably agree	5	5	5	5	5	8
?; probably disagree	1	1	1	1	1	7
disagree	1	2	1	1	1	16

Nor were they any more likely to want to force the continuation of the traditional American way of life than a high schooler in 1967 or 1971.

TABLE XXVII
RESISTANCE TO CHANGING THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS**

	Total %	1956		
		10 %	11 %	12 %
The true American way of life is disappearing so fast that the government may have to force the people back into the old tradition.**				
agree	6	8	5	4
undecided; probably agree	12	15	11	1
undecided; probably disagree	20	24	17	18
disagree	60	53	64	66

* Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 44, May 1956, p. 14a.

** Ibid., p. 10a.

TABLE XXVII, cont.

	<u>1967</u>
	<u>Total</u>
	%
We should firmly resist any attempts to change the American way of life.*	
agree	19
undecided	13
disagree	67
	<u>1971</u>
	<u>Total</u>
	%
We should firmly resist any attempts to change the American way of life.**	
definitely agree	12
undecided; probably agree	12
undecided; probably disagree	19
definitely disagree	51

In the above table, the difference in the number of response alternatives makes comparison difficult. Moreover, the wording of the question asked in 1956 might have been so unpleasant that there was an extremely high negative reaction to it. Despite these drawbacks, a general band of overwhelming disagreement covering all three years may be seen. Also, the highly negative reaction in 1956 seems to be supported in another question involving belief in democratic principles; and it compares well with later years. In the following table on obedience and respect for authority, we again run across the problem of unequal numbers of responses and different wording of the question. In the 1967 poll, the question is asked about children--a far different person from an adult citizen.

*Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 81, November 1967, p. 5a.

**Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 90, January 1971, p. 7a.

TABLE XXVIII
OBEDIENCE AND RESPECT FOR AUTHORITY
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS

Obedience and respect for people in authority are the most important rules for being a good citizen.*

	Total Sample	May 1956		
		Grades 10	11	12
	%	%	%	%
Agree	65	66	66	64
Undecided; probably agree	15	15	16	12
Undecided; probably disagree	6	5	5	11
Disagree	12	11	11	12

Obedience and a proper respect for authority should be the very first requirements of a good citizen.**

	Total Sample	October 1964		
		Grades 10	11	12
	%	%	%	%
Agree	69	69	69	68
Undecided; probably agree.	14	13	13	15
Undecided; probably disagree	5	5	5	5
Disagree	9	8	9	9

Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues that children should learn.***

	Total Sample	November 1967		
		Grades 10	11	12
	%	%	%	%
Agree	76	78	78	71
Undecided	9	9	8	10
Disagree	15	13	14	19

*Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 44, May 1956, p. 12a.

**Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 72, October 1964, p. 17a.

***Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 81, November 1967, p. 3a.

Another series of questions in this vein also shows the 1956 high school students to have a strong belief in democratic principles. The same caveats mentioned above apply here as well.

TABLE XXIX
FAITH AND TRUST IN A LEADER
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS

Strict and strong leaders who demand that we follow them unquestioningly are not desirable in this country.*

	<u>Total</u> <u>Sample</u> %	<u>May 1956</u>		
		<u>Grade</u>		
		<u>10</u> %	<u>11</u> %	<u>12</u> %
Agree	66	66	65	63
Undecided; probably agree	13	14	14	12
Undecided; probably disagree	9	8	10	8
Disagree	10	9	9	17

Strict and forceful leaders who demand an unquestioning trust are not desirable in this country.**

	<u>Total</u> <u>Sample</u> %	<u>October 1964</u>		
		<u>Grade</u>		
		<u>10</u> %	<u>11</u> %	<u>12</u> %
Agree	47	49	47	45
Undecided; probably agree	14	13	14	14
Undecided; probably disagree	13	12	14	13
Disagree	21	20	19	23

What this country needs most is a few strong, courageous, tireless leaders in whom the people can put their faith.***

	<u>Total</u> <u>Sample</u> %	<u>November 1967</u>		
		<u>Grade</u>		
		<u>10</u> %	<u>11</u> %	<u>12</u> %
Agree	56	59	56	54
Undecided	14	14	14	15
Disagree	26	23	27	28

*Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 44, May 1956, p. 12a.

**Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 72, October 1964, p. 17a.

***Purdue Opinion Panel, Poll No. 81, November 1967, p. 3a.

All the above tables and comparisons do not mean that the 1961 alumni, as high school students in 1956, were necessarily any more or less democratic than their counterparts in other years. Other surveys and studies throughout the years up to the present time, both of high school students and of adults, show a grievous lack of knowledge of constitutional guarantees and principles. But the above polls give no evidence that the 1956 high school students were less democratic or individualistic than were students a decade later. They may show that there has been much less variation than expected among students throughout the years in their personal aims and in their desire for change within the democratic framework.

D. Alumni Attitudes on Science and Technology.

In general, college-educated people have been more in favor of scientific progress than the rest of the population; however, very recently various other issues have begun to throw shadows on this usual optimism and scientific curiosity--issues such as pollution, invasion of privacy, high costs and pressing domestic problems, as well as possible increasing suspicion of technology itself among the better-educated who had formerly been among its strongest supporters. In 1968 however, the 1961 college alumni were much less worried about the effect of science and technology on the rate of world change and the power structure than the general populace.*

* Spaeth and Greeley, p. 26. For a comparative discussion of other polls and survey research on changing attitudes toward technology by segments of population, see the Conclusions to this study, especially pp. 385 ff.

TABLE XXX
ATTITUDES ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR ALUMNI
AND FOR THE GENERAL POPULATION

Attitude	Alumni	General population
Scientific research is causing the world to change too fast	26%	54%
Because the experts have so much power in our society, ordinary people don't have much of a say in things	38%	72%

An "antiexperts" index, made up of the above two items and a third one-- "It's not enough to be a college graduate these days, you have to graduate from a good college to get a job worth having"--was related to a number of background variables. Measured by the antiexpert index, those who went to lower-quality, smaller, and state colleges, who got lower grades, and were women, were more likely to be worried by science and technology. And alumni who were in the humanities and education had a greater objection to the power of the experts than those in other professional fields. It was found, however, according to the index, that there was very little difference in feeling towards science and technology between alumni from a "high"-quality or "low"-quality college: those who had gone to a "high"-quality college were only slightly less suspicious of science and technology.*

*Spaeth and Greeley, pp. 33, 34.

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TABLE XXXI
COEFFICIENTS OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN ANTIEXPERTS
INDEX AND BACKGROUND VARIABLES*

<u>Background Variable</u>	<u>Gamma</u>
College quality	-.09
College size	-.08
Control (private)	-.01
College grades	-.08
Years in graduate school	-.01
Father's education	-.08
Sex (male)	-.08

TABLE XXXII
ANTIEXPERTS INDEX BY TYPE OF COLLEGE ATTENDED **

<u>Type of College Attended</u>	<u>Percent in Highest Quartile</u>
University (large public)	18
University (private)	17
University (other)	26
Protestant (low quality)	27
Protestant (high quality)	19
State college	27
Catholic	23
Liberal arts college	19

* ibid., p. 33.

** ibid., p. 34.

TABLE XXXIII
ANTIEXPERTS INDEX BY CAREER FIELD*

<u>1968 Career Field</u>	<u>Percent in Highest Quartile</u>
Physical sciences	15
Biological sciences	21
Social sciences	13
Humanities	30
Engineering	20
Medicine	14
Other health	22
Education	27
Business	18
Law	16
Other professions	22

Little has been done on how wide-spread the recently verbalized suspicion of technology has become and whether this suspicion is generally confined to those in the humanities and education fields. A short discussion of some of what is available is given in Section C of the Conclusions of this report, "The New Technology and Its Demands," pp. 385-393. A small pilot study concerning popular attitudes towards technology of 200 people of different ages, social classes and races in the suburbs of Belmont, Cambridge and Maynard around Boston in 1970 showed that occupation and education made more of a difference in attitudes than any other variable and that within the category of education, the level of information made the greatest impact. Those with a low level of information about technology were not

*ibid., p. 34.

significantly more likely to feel that "technology has made life too complicated," and "it would be nice if we could return to nature," than respondents with a high-level or moderate amount of information.*

E. Summary

In summary, this brief study of a youth cohort from 1956 to 1968 showed that these young people tended to have been open-minded, willing to change and to support democratic principles while in high school in 1956 and to have had moderate, selective, humanistic, liberal-hued attitudes toward the college experience and toward activism when they were surveyed in 1968, seven years after their graduation from college. The college experience did not seem to change their basic political and social orientation (although it also apparently did not give them what they thought they should have had). Whether this will be the case with those presently in college cannot be inferred from this study--it remains to be seen whether the increased activism and new mores of the college campus will have a changing, lasting effect on the outlook of the new generation.

*Irene Taviss, "A Survey of Popular Attitudes Toward Technology," Harvard University Program on Technology and Society, Cambridge, Mass., 1970, p. 6. This paper was prepared for delivery at the AAAS Meetings, Chicago, December 28, 1970.