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# Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FOREWORD</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. RISE OF AERONAUTICS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. THE NEW SPACE PROGRAM</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. TORTOISE BECOMES HARE</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. EXPLOITATION OF APOLLO</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. ON THE EVE OF SHUTTLE</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDEX</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Foreword

Five years ago, when the United States was celebrating its bicentennial, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration marked the occasion by—among other things—publishing a short narrative that summarized the role of NASA and its predecessor organization, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, in the development of aeronautics and space exploration.

Now it seems fitting to update that volume. With the first flight of the Space Shuttle a few months hence, we will cross a major threshold in the space program. In its operational lifetime, which will span the 1980s, the Shuttle will introduce revolutionary changes: routine access to the space environment for experimenters as well as for spacecraft and sensors; a minimum-g flight profile, notably reducing stress during launch and ascent and thereby reducing the special preparation formerly required for both people and hardware; and the potential for servicing expensive payloads in orbit or retrieving them for overhaul on the ground.

More subtle, and yet perhaps more important in the long run, are the changes in attitude that will accompany the new freedom of access to the space environment. Our present concept of space is forbidding: machines and humans are surrounded by hostile conditions that constantly threaten catastrophe, limiting many space activities to brief, one-shot excursions. The Space Transportation System will alter this concept through the confidence that comes from repetition and familiarity. Consider, for example, our altered concept of the moon. Before the Apollo landings, the moon was for us much the same image that humans had shared since antiquity—a remote, cold, somewhat romantic body. Our intellect told us it was intimately linked with the earth, but our emotions felt it was distant and unattainable. The first “giant step for mankind” was in the category of exciting derring-do. We were proud of the achievement; humans had done what they had never been able to do before. But it was the landings that followed, with extensive televised explorations of the lunar surface, that made the moon a familiar place, there for us to return to whenever we wished.

Such a familiarity with the space environment is what the Space
Transportation System will confer upon the human race. Frequent, routine flights; crews performing normal jobs in security and comfort; flight vehicles that are refueled, reloaded, and flown again many times—all these are comfortable analogs to transportation modes and operations that we are familiar with in our daily lives.

Access and familiarity will make space useful in much the same way that Conestoga wagons and the railroads made possible the mass settlement of the American continent, and as transport aircraft in only a few years made mass air travel a fact of everyday life. Reliable transportation negates or minimizes the liabilities of the environment; having done this, it opens up the way for use of the unique aspects of that environment.

Which brings us to the third, or serendipity, level of change that the Space Transportation System will generate. Once the system is in operation, I have confidence that uses will materialize that were never seriously considered—perhaps not even envisioned—by the planners and designers. These may be the real building blocks of progress.

Because this sequence of radical changes is in the offing, it is well to pause at the threshold and reflect on what went before and how we came to be at this juncture.

November 1980

Robert A. Frosch
Administrator
Preface

For some years the NASA History Office was embarrassed by a thin but steady stream of requests for copies of a brief history of NASA. Again and again we had to say that none existed. There had been one once, back in 1965, when Eugene M. Emme, NASA historian, wrote a *Historical Sketch of NASA* (EP–29). But it had been out of print for several years and by now was outdated enough to discourage a reprint. The project of a new short history kept nagging at our collective conscience, but we were busy with other things. It was not hard to convince ourselves that we just couldn’t stretch our staff resources that much.

Then in 1974 that persuasive imperative, necessity, took a hand. The American Public Works Association, armed with the blessing of a joint congressional resolution, was preparing a bicentennial volume of the history of 200 years of public works in the United States. Association officers asked NASA Administrator James C. Fletcher to have a chapter prepared on the aeronautics and space programs. Dr. Fletcher agreed; the project was assigned to our office. So now it would be done; the only question was whether someone in the office would do it or whether we would contract for a manuscript. Mindful of our long-felt need for a similar manuscript, I volunteered. The bicentennial volume got its chapter and here, revised and somewhat enlarged, is the NASA version. Now, since the first two printings seem to have found a rather diverse audience and our stock of copies has been exhausted, it seems useful to bring it up to date.

Because of the purpose for which it was originally written, it contains no reference notes and only a generalized bibliography. So I cannot blame the sources for errors or deficiencies; they are of my own cobbling.

October 1980

F.W.A.
Rise of Aeronautics

In 1913 the clouds of war were gathering over Europe and casting their shadows on America. The European powers were racing to arm themselves against each other, not only with conventional land and sea armaments, but also with the new weapon of the 20th century, the airplane. In their race they overcame the U.S. lead established by the Wright brothers and left this country in a technological backwash. Particularly disturbing to American observers was our primitive and unorganized aeronautical establishment—a frail shadow of the research facilities and government-subsidized industries arising in Europe.

Most active among the small group of concerned men in the United States was the secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, Charles D. Walcott. Convinced that the situation called for federal sponsorship of an aviation organization, he worked hard selling the idea both inside and outside the government. After several false starts, he succeeded. On 3 March 1915, President Woodrow Wilson signed into law a Navy appropriations bill with a rider establishing an independent Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. The munificent sum of $5000 was appropriated for the committee's first year's operations.

The new committee was unique in organizational structure, though in years to come it was to serve as a model for several others. Twelve presidially appointed members, serving without pay, drawn from the military and scientific sides of government and from the scientific community at large, were charged "to supervise and direct the scientific study of the problems of flight, with a view to their practical solution" and to "direct and conduct research and experiments in aeronautics."

First among the tasks of the committee was to find the dimensions of the problem. The members set out to survey the state of aeronautics in the United States. If their purpose had been to justify their existence, they would have found the results amply rewarding. Aviation was generally regarded as a daredevil sport practiced by a
handful of wealthy young men. Aeronautical research was virtually nonexistent. Only two American universities offered courses in aeronautical engineering. Research facilities such as wind tunnels were pitifully few in number and unsystematized in use. The aviation "industry" was a scattered collection of small handicraft shops. The military services had bought only a few dozen airplanes in the brief history of aviation, and nearly all of them were fatally obsolete by current European standards. And finally, none of the work in aeronautics within the government (located in the Weather Bureau, the Bureau of Standards, and the military services) and in the civil sector was coordinated. Clearly a federal laboratory for aeronautical research was urgently needed.

Army, Navy, and the committee considered establishing a joint research center. Since the War Department had funds for acquiring real estate, it bought a tract of land on the Back River near Hampton, Virginia. The intent was to colocate the aeronautical research facilities of the two military services and the committee. Realities of war intervened, however; the War Department left its research at McCook Field in Dayton, Ohio (later Wright Field, now Wright-Patterson Air Force Base); the Navy located its facility in Norfolk, Virginia. The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics—already acronymed NACA—went ahead with construction. Even so it was too late for the laboratory to assist the war effort. Not until 11 June 1920 was the three-building complex—one of them a wind tunnel with a 1.5-meter test section—formally dedicated as the Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory (named for Samuel P. Langley, aeronautical pioneer).

FROM WAR TO WAR

During the 1920s the new laboratory took form and substance. The needed theoretical base for scientific study of aeronautics was imported from Europe, and NACA staffed the laboratory slowly and carefully. A conscious decision was made to concentrate on the systematic study of aerodynamics—the interactions between the three-dimensional airspace and the shape and characteristics of a body moving through it—as the most needed of the many areas of research in aeronautics. Additional research facilities were built, carefully tailored to that purpose. Most of the credit for this hard focus and foresight should go to two dedicated members of the committee, Joseph S. Ames of Johns Hopkins University and Jerome C. Hunsaker of the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics.
By the end of the decade the fledgling NACA had achieved impressive results, recognized at home and abroad. In 1929 a distinguished British engineer declared: “The only people so far who have been able to get at something like accurate results from wind tunnel experiments are the workers at the experimental station at Langley Field.” In the same year a British engineering journal went further:

They [the Langley group] were the first to establish, and indeed to visualize, a variable-density tunnel; they have led again with the construction of the twenty-foot propeller research tunnel; and steps are now being taken to provide a “full-scale” tunnel in which complete aeroplanes up to thirty-five-foot span can be tested. The present-day American position in all branches of aeronautical knowledge can, without doubt, be attributed mainly to this far-seeing policy and expenditure on up-to-date laboratory equipment.

Among the most important results of Langley’s aerodynamic research with the new facilities were: the NACA cowling (1928), whose streamlined shape increased aircraft speed; systematic studies of aerodynamic drag which put firm numbers on the penalties to performance from such design practices as locating engine nacelles apart from the wings or fuselage instead of merging them into the

Langley Laboratory's first wind tunnel, finished in 1920.
structure (1930); and the penalties of using fixed, exposed landing gear instead of retracting the wheels into the structure (1929).

In Washington the 1920s saw the main committee and its technical subcommittees become established as the most knowledgeable source of advice on aeronautics in the country and the clearinghouse for exchange of information. Much of this sure rise to ascendancy in U.S. aeronautical research derived from the selection of George W. Lewis, professor of mechanical engineering at Swarthmore College, as director of aeronautical research. Joining NACA in 1919, Dr. Lewis for the next 26 years planned the research program, apportioned the money, and hired and trained the people in NACA.

The great depression that swept the United States in 1929 proved a boon to NACA in at least two senses. First, additional research facilities could be constructed at low depression prices (mostly with pump-priming money from the Public Works Administration); second, government salaries and the up-to-date research facilities suddenly were very attractive to promising young engineers. Thus, in 1931, the 9- by 18-meter "full scale" wind tunnel, then the largest in the world, was completed at a cost of $900,000; the

*The full-scale wind tunnel at Langley, completed in 1931.*
610-meter-long towing tunnel was also finished that year. More wind tunnels were added in the mid-30s, and from a total staff of 181 people in 1930, NACA grew to 523 by 1939. Painstakingly and systematically the researchers charted out the family of NACA wing shapes that would shortly lift military and civil aircraft all over the world. As aircraft speeds rose, new aerodynamic problems had to be solved. Stalls and spins, treacherous problems that had caused a fourth of all aircraft accidents, were explored, understood, and largely countered.

By 1936 NACA officials became aware of two interconnected problems looming on the horizon: (1) European nations were again rapidly building new research facilities; (2) room for growth was limited at Langley. Once more American leadership in aeronautics was challenged to expand its research base. As more evidence came in, the concern became alarm. In 1938, a special committee on expanded facilities was formed, and it recommended the immediate creation of a second aeronautical research center, this one in California. The new laboratory was authorized by Congress in 1939. Less than a month later, on 14 September, ground was broken at Moffett Field, a Navy airfield 64 kilometers south of San Francisco, for what

*Part of the extensive facilities of the Langley Research Center, 1967.*
would become the Ames Aeronautical Laboratory (named after Joseph S. Ames, president of Johns Hopkins University, charter member and from 1927 to 1939 the dedicated chairman of NACA). The most impressive physical structure was the huge 12- by 24-meter wind tunnel, which dwarfed its parent "full-scale" tunnel at Langley. Also a beginning was made on an impressive array of high-speed research facilities.

But this was not enough; the war had begun in Europe on 1 September. On 19 October 1939, a second special committee, this one headed by Charles A. Lindbergh who had annually surveyed European aviation progress for the Army Air Corps, urgently recommended the building of a third laboratory, this one to specialize in research on aircraft power plants. In June 1940 Congress agreed. A site was made available at the Cleveland municipal airport, and construction began on facilities to develop and test aircraft piston engines and their components, study fuels and combustion, and perform research in fundamental physics, chemistry, and metallurgy of power plants. In 1943 research would belatedly begin on jet

*Ames Research Center, 1970. The big 12- by 24-meter wind tunnel is housed in the large building on the left.*
engines. After Dr. Lewis's death in 1948, the new facility was named the Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory. Wartime expansion came to Langley too; the War Department bought more acreage and NACA expanded into a west area with additional facilities that doubled the research capability.

World War II dramatically changed NACA—and aviation. For NACA it meant a shift in both the nature and the size of its workload. For aviation it meant a surge in speed and altitude of combat aircraft. NACA turned its attention to the short-term urgencies of finding practical fixes for problems in military aircraft already in production or on the drawing boards. The rapid increase in performance and the punishing demands of combat flying had also generated or exaggerated a host of aerodynamic and structural problems. The workload was overwhelming. From 1941 through 1944 the NACA laboratories worked on 115 different airplane types. But results were quietly spectacular; fighter aircraft speeds and altitudes were increased, buffeting and stalls were cured, the tail design of the B-29 was saved from a dangerous weakness. The

*Lewis Research Center, 1963. The laboratory is on the near side of the Cleveland Airport.*
number of NACA personnel rose 13-fold from the 1939 figure, to 6800, and cadres from the Langley mother laboratory served as the administrative and research cores at the two new laboratories.

In the midst of expanding from one to three laboratories, NACA's work was effective. "The Navy's famous fighters—the Corsair, Wildcat, and Hellcat— are possible only because they were based on fundamentals developed by the NACA," Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox volunteered in 1943. "All of them use NACA wing sections, NACA cooling methods, NACA high-lift devices. The great sea victories that have broken Japan's expanding grip in the Pacific would not have been possible without the contributions of the NACA."

NEW HORIZONS

To the scientific community, the most exciting legacy of World War II was a glittering array of new technologies spawned by the massive war effort. Atomic energy, radar, antibiotics, the large rocket, radio telemetry, the computer, and the jet engine were war babies, lustily crying for expanded roles in the postwar world. The atomic age, the jet age, and the space age were at hand. They would shape the world's destiny in the next three decades and heavily influence the rest of the century.

The world's political order had been drastically altered by the war. Much of Europe and Asia was in ashes. Old empires had crumbled; national economies were tottering perilously. Astride opposite sides of the world, towering like colossi, stood the United States and the Soviet Union, newly made into superpowers. It soon became apparent that they would test each other's mettle many times before a balance of power stabilized. And each nation moved quickly to exploit the new technologies.

The atomic bomb was the most obvious and most immediately threatening technological change from World War II. Both superpowers sought the best strategic systems that could deliver the bomb across the intercontinental distances that separated them. Jet-powered bombers were an obvious extension of the wartime B-17 and B-29, and both nations began designing and building them. The intercontinental rocket held great theoretical promise, but seemed much further down the technological road. Atomic bombs were bulky and heavy; a rocket to lift such a payload would be enormous in size and expense. The Soviet Union doggedly went ahead with attempts to build such rockets. The American military temporarily
settled upon jet aircraft and smaller research and battlefield rockets. The Army imported Wernher von Braun and the German engineers who had created the wartime V-1 and V-2 rockets and set them to overseeing the refurbishing and launching of V-2s at White Sands, New Mexico. With its contractor the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, the Army developed a series of battlefield missiles known as Corporal, Sergeant, and Redstone. The Navy designed and built the Viking research rockets. The freshly independent Air Force started a family of cruise missiles, from the jet Bomarc and Matador battlefield missiles to Snark and the ambitious rocket-propelled Navaho, which were intended as intercontinental weapons.

By 1951 progress on a thermonuclear bomb revived interest in the long-range ballistic missile. Two months before President Truman announced that the United States would develop the thermonuclear bomb, the Air Force contracted with Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation (later Convair) to resume study, and then to develop, the Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile, a project that had been dormant for four years. During the next four years three intermediate range missiles, the Army's Jupiter, the Navy's Polaris, and the Air Force's Thor, and a second generation ICBM, the Air Force's Titan, had been added to the list of American rocket projects. All were accorded top national priority. Fiscal 1953 saw the Department of Defense for the first time spend more than $1 million on missile research, development, and procurement. Fiscal 1957 saw the amount go over the $1 billion mark.

The new postwar technologies were also having a dramatic effect on NACA. The swift rise of aircraft speeds and altitudes during the war had consumed the technological data base that NACA had so laboriously created in the 1930s. And now the jet engine, still in its infancy, portended another big surge in aircraft speed. Ahead lay the mysteries of the sound barrier, where strange things happened to fighter planes. Planes had crashed, men had died; by 1945 the need for information was urgent. In that year study began on a series of new wind tunnels; after many ups and downs the Unitary Plan was passed by Congress in 1949. It allotted $75 million to NACA for new wind tunnels and started a wind-tunnel center (Arnold Engineering Development Center) for the Air Force.

But aerodynamic research faced serious physical obstacles. The wind tunnel, NACA's principal tool for aerodynamic research, yielded accurate data for subsonic and supersonic speeds but at transonic speeds (mach 0.9 to 1.1) suffered a "choking" effect that garbled the data. Until this problem was remedied—if it could be
remedied—other means had to be devised. In 1943 NACA took steps to meet the challenge.

The short-term effort involved carrying test models to high altitudes in aircraft and dropping them, gathering flight data during their ballistic fall. This was only partially successful, since radar and telemetry were too primitive to return sophisticated data. Also, the objects seldom exceeded mach 1. The next step in this direction was to use rockets as motive power to launch models to transonic and supersonic speeds. Langley acquired a surplus naval station on Wallops Island, Virginia, for this purpose. It was called the Pilotless Aircraft Research Division. Later it became the Wallops Flight Center.

The long-term measure was to plan and operate, in concert with the Air Corps and the Navy, the first of what was to become a highly successful series of special research aircraft. NACA’s High-Speed Flight Research Station was established at Edwards, California, on Muroc Dry Lake. On 14 October 1947, Air Force Capt. Charles E. Yeager flew the X-1 aircraft faster than the speed of sound. The dreaded barrier was breached. On 20 November 1953, NACA’s Scott Crossfield in the D-558-2 reached mach 2. The X-1A, the X-2, the X-15—faster and higher they flew, peaking at mach 6 (7272

“Little missile row” at Wallops Flight Center, Virginia. Sounding rockets and small satellites are launched here.
Flight Research Center, 1967. At upper left is seen the edge of Muroc Dry Lake, whose rock-hard flat surface serves as the flight-test runway. In 1976 the center was renamed the Dryden Flight Research Center.

The X-1, first aircraft to fly faster than the speed of sound in level flight.
The X-15, which crowned the achievements of the research aircraft program with speeds over 7200 kilometers per hour and altitudes above 108,000 meters.

kilometers per hour) in speed and 108,000 meters in altitude. Over a span of 22 years and more than 700 flights, the specially built research aircraft perilously, meticulously filled in the flight envelope for transonic and supersonic flight and provided the design data for generations of post-World War II military aircraft.

Meanwhile researchers at Langley had worked away at the intransigent transonic wind tunnel and by late 1950 John Stack and his team had come up with the answer—the “slotted throat,” which eliminated the choking at or near the speed of sound and made the transonic tunnel an effective research tool. Within a year it had proved its worth; Richard Whitcomb discovered the “area rule,” a subtle balancing of the volume of fuselage and wings which produced the minimum-drag aircraft at transonic speeds. Quickly applied to military fighters already in design and construction, it enabled them to be the first fighters to break the sound barrier in level flight.

By the mid-1950s NACA had modern research facilities that had cost a total of $300 million, a staff totaling 7200. With each passing year it was enlarging its missile research in proportion to the old mission of aerodynamic research. Major NACA contributions to the military missile programs came in 1955–1957. Materials research led by Robert R. Gilruth at Langley confirmed ablation as a means of controlling the intense heat generated by warheads and other bodies reentering the earth’s atmosphere; H. Julian Allen at Ames demonstrated the blunt-body shape as the most effective design for reen-
tering bodies; and Alfred J. Eggers at Ames did significant work on the mechanics of ballistic reentry.

The mid-1950s saw America’s infant space program burgeoning with promise and projects. As part of the U.S. participation in the forthcoming International Geophysical Year, it was proposed to launch a small satellite into orbit around the earth. After a spirited design competition between the National Academy of Sciences–Navy proposal (Vanguard) and the Army–Jet Propulsion Laboratory candidate (Explorer), the Navy design was chosen in September 1955 as not interfering with the high-priority military missile programs, since it would use a new booster based on the Viking research rocket, and having a better tracking system and more scientific growth potential. By 1957 Vanguard was readying its first test vehicles for firing. The USSR had also announced it would have an IGY satellite; the space race was extending beyond boosters to payloads.

On the military front, space activity was almost bewildering. The missiles were moving toward the critical flight-test phase. Satellite ideas were proliferating, though mostly on a sub-rosa planning basis; after Sputnik these would become Tiros, weather satellite; Transit, navigation satellite; Samos, reconnaissance satellite; Midas, missile early-warning satellite; Pioneer lunar probes; Discoverer research satellites. Payload size and weight were constant problems in all these concepts, with the limited thrust of the early rocket engines. Here the rapid advances in solid-state electronics came to the rescue by reducing volume and weight; with new techniques such as printed circuitry and transistors, the design engineers could achieve new levels of miniaturization of equipment. Even so, heavier payloads were obviously in the offing; more powerful engines had to be developed. So design was begun for several larger engines, topped by the monster F-1 engine, intended to produce 4450 kilonewtons of thrust—eight times the power of the engines that lifted the Atlas, Thor, and Jupiter missiles.

All this activity, however, was still on the drawing board, work bench, or test stand on 4 October 1957, when the “beep, beep” signal from Sputnik 1 was heard around the world. The Soviet Union had orbited the world’s first artificial satellite.

The American public’s response was swift and widespread. It seemed equally compounded of alarm and chagrin. Our complacent certainty that this nation was always number one in technology had been rudely shattered. Not only had the Russians been first—
although that was bad enough—but Sputnik weighed an impressive 83 kilograms against Vanguard’s intended start at 1.4 kilograms and working up to 10 kilograms in later satellites. In a cold war environment, the contrast suggested undefined but ominous military implications.

Fuel for such apprehensions added up rapidly. Less than a month after Sputnik 1 the Russians launched Sputnik 2, weighing a hefty 500 kilograms and carrying a dog as passenger. President Eisenhower, trying to dampen the growing concern, assured the public of our as-yet-undemonstrated progress and denied there was any military threat in the Soviet space achievements. As a counter the White House announced the impending launch in December of the first Vanguard test vehicle capable of orbit and belatedly authorized von Braun’s Army research team in Huntsville to try to launch their Explorer-Jupiter combination. But pressures for dramatic action gathered rapidly. The media ballyhooed the carefully qualified announcement on Vanguard into great expectations of America’s vindication. On 25 November Lyndon B. Johnson, Senate majority leader, chaired the first meeting of the Preparedness Investigation Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. The hearings would review the whole spectrum of American defense and space programs.

Still the toboggan careened downhill. On 6 December 1957, the much-touted Vanguard test vehicle rose one meter from the launch platform, shuddered, and collapsed in flames. Its tiny 1.4-kilogram payload broke away and lay at the edge of the inferno, beeping impotently.

Clouds of gloom deepened into the new year. Then, finally, a small rift. On 31 January 1958, an American satellite at last went into orbit. Not Vanguard but the ABMA-JPL Explorer had redeemed American honor. True, the payload weighed only 14 kilograms against the 500 of Sputnik 2. But there was a scientific first; an experiment aboard the satellite reported mysterious saturation of its radiation counters at 965 kilometers altitude. Prof. James A. Van Allen, the scientist who had built the experiment, thought this suggested the existence of a dense belt of radiation around the earth at that altitude. And American confidence perked up on 17 March when Vanguard 1 joined Explorer 1 in orbit.

Meanwhile, in these same tense months, both consensus and competition had been forming on the political front: consensus that a national augmented space program was essential; competition as to
who would run such a program, in what form, with what priorities. The Department of Defense, with its component military services, was an obvious front runner. The Atomic Energy Commission, already working with nuclear warheads and nuclear propulsion, had some congressional support, particularly in the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. And there was NACA.

NACA had devoted more and more of its facilities, budget, and expertise to missile research in the mid and late 1950s. Under the
A moment of triumph with the announcement that Explorer 1 has become the first American satellite to orbit the earth. Here a duplicate Explorer is held aloft by (left to right) William H. Pickering of JPL, James A. Van Allen of the State University of Iowa, and Wernher von Braun of ABMA.

skillful leadership of James H. Doolittle, chairman, and Hugh L. Dryden, director, the strong NACA research team had come up with a solid, long-term, scientifically based proposal for a blend of aeronautic and space research. Its concept for manned spaceflight, for
example, envisioned a ballistic-shaped spacecraft with a blunt reentry shape, backed by a world-encircling tracking system, and equipped with dual automatic and manual controls that would enable the astronaut gradually to take over more and more of the flying of his spacecraft. Also NACA offered reassuring experience of long, close working relationships with the military services in solving their research problems, while at the same time translating the research into civil applications. But NACA's greatest political asset was its peaceful, research-oriented image. President Eisenhower and Senator Johnson and others in Congress were united in wanting above all to avoid projecting cold-war tensions into the new arena of outer space.

By March 1958 the consensus in Washington had jelled. The administration position—largely credited to James R. Killian in the new post of president's special assistant for science and technology—the findings of Johnson's Senate subcommittee, and the NACA proposal converged. America needed a national space program. The military component would of course be under DoD. But a civil component, lodged in a new agency, technologically and scientifically based, would pick up certain of the existing space projects and forge an expanded program of space exploration in close concert with the military. All these concepts fed into draft legislation. On 2 April 1958, the administration bill for establishing a national aeronautics and space agency was submitted to Congress; both houses had already established select space committees; debate ensued; a number of refinements were introduced; and on 29 July 1958 President Eisenhower signed into law P.L. 85-568, the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958.

The act established a broad charter for civilian aeronautical and space research, with unique requirements for dissemination of information; absorbed the existing NACA into the new organization as its nucleus; and empowered broad transfers from other government programs. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration came into being on 1 October 1958.

All this made for a very busy spring and summer for the people in the small NACA Headquarters in Washington. Once the general outlines of the new organization were clear, both a space program and a new organization had to be charted. In April Dryden brought Abe Silverstein, assistant director of Lewis Laboratory, to Washington to head the program planning. Ira Abbott, NACA assistant director for aerodynamic research, headed a committee to plan the
NASA's first high command. Hugh L. Dryden is presented his commission as deputy administrator by President Dwight D. Eisenhower with T. Keith Glennan, administrator, looking on.

Goddard Space Flight Center, 1967. This is the main NASA center for the design and operation of scientific satellites.
new organization. In August President Eisenhower nominated T. Keith Glennan, president of Case Institute of Technology and former commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission, to be the first administrator of the new organization, NASA, and Dryden to be deputy administrator. Quickly confirmed by the Senate, they were sworn in on 19 August. Glennan reviewed the planning efforts, approved most. Talks with the Advanced Research Projects Agency identified the military space programs that were space-science oriented and obvious transfers to the new agency. Plans were formulated for building a new center for space science research, satellite development, flight operations, and tracking. A site was chosen, two square kilometers of the Department of Agriculture’s research center in Beltsville, Maryland. In March 1961 the Robert H. Goddard Space Flight Center (named for America’s rocket pioneer) was dedicated.
The New Space Program

On 1 October 1958, the 170 people in Headquarters gathered in the courtyard of their building, the Dolley Madison House, to hear Glennan proclaim the end of the 43-year-old NACA and the beginning of NASA. The 8000 people, three laboratories (now renamed research centers) and two stations, with a total facilities value of $300 million, and the annual budget of $100 million were transferred intact to NASA. On the same day, by executive order the president transferred to NASA Project Vanguard, its 150-person staff, and remaining budget from the Naval Research Laboratory; lunar probes from the Army; lunar probes and rocket engine programs, including the F-1, from the Air Force; and a total of over $100 million of unexpended funds. NASA immediately delegated operational control of these projects back to the DoD agencies while it put its own house in order.

There followed an intense two-year period of organization, build-up, fill-in, planning, and general catch-up. Only one week after NASA was formed, Glennan gave the go-ahead to Project Mercury, America’s first manned spaceflight program. The Space Task Group, headed by Robert R. Gilruth, was established at Langley to get the job done. The new programs brought into the organization were slowly integrated into the NACA nucleus. Many space-minded specialists were drawn into NASA, attracted by the exciting new vistas. Long-range planning was accelerated; the first NASA 10-year plan was presented to Congress in February 1960. It called for an expanding program on a broad front: manned flight, first orbital, then circumlunar; scientific satellites to measure radiation and other features of the near-space environment; lunar probes to measure the lunar space environment and to photograph the moon; planetary probes to measure and to photograph Mars and Venus; weather satellites to improve our knowledge of Earth’s broad weather patterns; continued aeronautical research; and development of larger launch vehicles for lifting heavier payloads. Cost of the
program was expected to vary between $1 billion and $1.5 billion a year over the 10-year period.

To conduct such a program, NASA obviously needed capabilities it did not have. To that end Glennan sought to acquire the successful Army team that had launched America's first satellite, the Army Ballistic Missile Agency at Huntsville, Alabama, and its contractor, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California. The Army balked at losing the Huntsville group, claiming it was indispensable to the Army's military rocket program. Glennan for the time being had to compromise: ABMA would work on NASA programs as requested. The Army grudgingly gave up JPL. On 3 December 1958, an executive order transferred, effective 31 December, the government-owned plant of JPL and the Army contract with the California Institute of Technology, under which JPL was staffed and operated. Glennan renewed his bid for ABMA in 1959; protracted Army resistance was finally overcome and on 15 March 1960 ABMA's 4000-man Development Operations Division, headed

Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 1963. This contract facility has been the mainstay of NASA's lunar and planetary programs.
by Wernher von Braun, was transferred to NASA along with the big Saturn booster project.

As the 10-year plan took shape and the capability grew, there were many other gaps to be filled. NASA was going to be markedly different from NACA in two important ways. First, it was going to be operational as well as do research. So, it would not only design and build launch vehicles and satellites but it would launch them, operate them, track them, acquire data from them, and interpret the data. Second, it would do the greater part of its work by contract.
rather than in house as NACA had done. The first of these required tracking sites in many countries around the world, as well as construction of facilities: antennas, telemetry equipment, computers, radio and landline communications networks, etc. The second required the development of a larger and more sophisticated contracting operation than NACA had needed. In the first years, NASA leaned heavily on DoD for contracting assistance. Since its industrial contractors would be the same aerospace firms who were already doing extensive business with DoD, this was practical and workable, especially since NASA adopted most of the DoD procurement system.

The problem of launch vehicles occupied much attention in these first years. A family of existing and future launch vehicles had to be structured for the kinds of missions and spacecraft enumerated in the plan. In addition to the existing Redstone, Thor, and Atlas vehicles, NASA would develop:

- Scout, a low-budget solid-propellant booster that could put small payloads in orbit;
- Centaur, a liquid-hydrogen-fueled upper stage, transferred from DoD, that promised higher thrust and bigger payloads for lunar and planetary missions;

*The worldwide satellite tracking network, 1974.*

Legend:
- Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network [STDN] Facilities
- Deep Space Network [DSN] Facilities
• Saturn, which was expected to be flying in 1963 (with the proper upper stages it would put upwards of 23,000 kilograms in Earth orbit);

• Nova, several times the size of Saturn, to be started later in the decade for the more ambitious manned lunar flights anticipated in the 1970s.

In addition, work would continue with the Atomic Energy Commission on the difficult but enormously promising nuclear-propelled upper stage, Nerva, and on the Snap family of long-life electric power producers.

As much as larger boosters were needed, an even more immediate problem was how to improve the reliability of existing boosters. By December 1959 the United States had attempted 37 satellite launches; less than one-third attained orbit. Electrical components, valves, turbopumps, welds, materials, structures—virtually everything that went into the intricate mechanism called a booster—had to be redesigned or strengthened or improved to withstand the stresses of launch. A new order of perfection in manufacturing and assembly had to be instilled in workmen and managers. Rigorous, repeated testing had to verify each component, then subassembly, then total vehicle. That bugaboo of the engineering profession, constant fiddling and changing in search of perfection, had to be constrained in the interest of reliability. And since the existing vehicles were DoD products, NASA had to persuade DoD to enforce these rigorous standards on its contractors.

That was only one of the areas in which close coordination between NASA and DoD was essential and effective. In manned spaceflight, for example, there were essentially four approaches to putting man into space:

• the research airplane—the Air Force and NASA were already well into this program, leading to the X-15;

• the ballistic vehicle—NASA’s Project Mercury embodied this approach, with Air Force launch vehicles and DoD support throughout;

• the boost-glider—the Air Force had inaugurated the Dyna-Soar project (later renamed the X-20) in November 1957. A manned glider would be boosted into shallow Earth orbit, bounce in and out of the top of the atmosphere for part or all of a revolution of the planet, and land like an airplane. In May 1958 NACA had agreed to help with the technical side of the project. NASA continued that support;
the lifting body—a bathtub-like shape proposed by Alfred J. Eggers of Ames Laboratory; as a reentry shape it would be midway between an airplane configuration and the ballistic shape, developing moderate lift during reentry and landing like an airplane. This approach would be deferred for a few years before being explored by the Air Force and NASA.

In another area, communications satellites, DoD had its Courier program, a low-altitude, militarily secure communications satellite; it also had Advent, intended to be put into equatorial synchronous orbit by the Atlas-Centaur booster and provide global communications for the military. NASA had a passive communications satellite, Echo, a 30-meter inflatable sphere from which to bounce radar signals as a limited communications relay and, over a period of time and with accurate tracking, to plot the variations in air density at the top of the atmosphere by following the vagaries of its orbit. It had been agreed that NASA would leave active communications satellites (those that picked up, amplified, and rebroadcast radio signals from one point on Earth to another) to DoD. But this did not answer for long. By 1960 the American Telephone and Telegraph Company was asking NASA to launch its low-level, active communications satellite, Telstar. NASA also had another proposal for medium-altitude (roughly 17,900-kilometer orbit) communications satellites.

The AT&T proposal raised a fundamental problem: would industry develop communications satellites entirely with its own money or would the government fund such research? NASA sought and received presidential approval to go both ways—to provide reimbursable launches to industry and to do its own communications satellite research. First there was Relay, the medium-altitude repeater satellite. Beyond lay the imaginative proposal from Hughes Aircraft Company for Syncom, a synchronous-orbit satellite—one that would fly at 35,000-kilometer altitude, where distance, gravity, and velocity combined to place a satellite permanently over the same spot on Earth; by virtue of the lofty orbit, three of these satellites could cover the entire planet and require only a handful of ground stations.

By the time of the presidential election of 1960 the worst pangs of reorganization, redefinition, and planning were over. Programs were meshing with each other; contracting for large projects was becoming routine; the initial absorption of DoD programs had been completed; and a viable organization was in business.
There were operational bright spots as well. True, launch vehicles were still fickle and unpredictable—7 out of 17 launches failed in 1959. But finally in August 1959, NASA launched its first satellite that functioned in all respects (Explorer 6). Pioneer 5, launched on 11 March 1960 and intended to explore interplanetary space between Earth and Venus, communicated out to a new distance record, 35.7 million kilometers. The first of the prototype weather satellites, Tiros 1, launched on 1 April 1960, produced 22,500 photos of Earth's weather. Echo 1, the first passive communications satellite, was launched 12 August 1960, inflated in orbit, and provided a passive target for bouncing long-range communications from one point on Earth to another. Perhaps as important, millions of people saw the moving pinpoint of light in the night sky and were awed by the experience.

In late 1960 politics bemused the space program. Although not a direct campaign issue in the presidential campaign, the space program found little reassurance of its priority as an expensive new item in the federal budget. After John F. Kennedy was narrowly
elected, the uncertainty deepened. Jerome B. Wiesner, the president-elect’s science adviser, chaired a committee which produced a report both critical of the space program’s progress to date and skeptical of its future. Who would be the new administrator? What, if any, priority would the fledgling space program have in a new, on-record-hostile administration?

Then, once again, challenge and response. On 12 April 1961, Soviet Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin rode Vostok 1 into a 301-by-174-kilometer orbit of the earth. After one orbit he reentered the atmosphere and landed safely. Man had flown in space. Gagarin joined that elite pantheon of men who were the first to do the undoable—the Wright brothers, Lindbergh, now Gagarin. There was faint consolation on 5 May 1961, when Mercury essayed its first manned spaceflight. Astronaut Alan B. Shepard, Jr., rode a Redstone booster in his Freedom 7 Mercury spacecraft for a 15-minute suborbital flight and was picked out of the water 487 kilometers downrange. Success, yes; a good beginning, yes. But Gagarin had flown around the earth, 40,000 kilometers against Shepard’s 487. His Vostok weighed 4730 kilograms in orbit, contrasting with Mercury’s 953 kilograms in suborbit. Gagarin had had about 89 minutes in weightlessness, the mysterious zero-gravity condition that had supplanted the sound barrier as the great unknown. Shepard experienced 5 minutes of weightlessness. By any unit of measurement, the United States was clearly still behind, especially in the indispensable prerequisite of rocket power. As the new president had said, gloomily: “We are behind . . . . the news will be worse before it is better, and it will be some time before we catch up.”

The public reaction was less emphatic than after Sputnik 1 but congressional concern was strong. Robert C. Seamans, Jr., NASA’s associate administrator and general manager, was hard put to restrain Congress from forcing more money on NASA than could be effectively used.

President Kennedy was especially concerned. His inaugural address in January had rung with an eloquent promise of bold new initiatives that would “get this country moving again.” The succeeding three months had been distinguished by crushing setbacks—the Bay of Pigs invasion fiasco and the Gagarin flight. As one of several searches for new initiatives, the president asked his vice president, Lyndon B. Johnson, to head a study of what would be required in the space program to convincingly surpass the Soviets. Johnson, the only senior White House figure in the new administra-
tion with prior commitment to the space program, found strong support waiting in the wings. James E. Webb, new administrator of NASA, had an established reputation as an aggressive manager of large enterprises, both in industry and in the Truman administration as director of the Bureau of the Budget and undersecretary of state. Backed by the seasoned technical judgment of Dryden, his deputy, and Seamans, his general manager, Webb moved vigorously to accelerate and expand the central elements of the NASA 10-year plan.

The largest single concept in that plan had been manned circumlunar flight. Now the question became: could this country rally quickly enough to beat the Soviets to that circumlunar goal? The considered technical estimate was: not for sure. But if we went one large step further and escalated the commitment to manned lunar landing and return, it became a new ball game. Both nations would have to design and construct a whole new family of boosters and spacecraft; this would be an equalizer in terms of challenge to both nations and the experts were confident that the depth and competence of the American government-industry-university team would prove superior. In this judgment they found a strong ally in the new secretary of defense, Robert S. McNamara.

But Webb and his advisers were not content with a one-shot objective. The goal, they said, was a major space advance on a broad front—manned spaceflight, yes, but also boosters, communications satellites, meteorological satellites, scientific satellites, planetary exploration.

This was the combined proposal presented to the vice president and approved and transmitted by him to the president. It was the best new initiative the president had seen. So it was that on 25 May 1961 the president stood before a joint session of Congress and proposed a historic national goal:

Now it is time to take longer strides—time for a great new American enterprise—time for this nation to take a clearly leading role in space achievement, which in many ways may hold the key to our future on earth . . .

. . . I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to the earth. No single space project in this period will be more impressive to mankind, or more important for the long-range exploration of space; and none will be so difficult or expensive to accomplish.

The president correctly assessed the national mood. Editorial support was widespread. Congressional debate was perfunctory,
given the size of the commitment. The decision to land a man on the moon was endorsed virtually without dissent.

**THE LUNAR COMMITMENT**

NASA was exhilarated but awed. Dryden had returned from a White House meeting to tell his staff that "this man" (Webb) had sold the president on landing a man on the moon. Gilruth, immersed in what seemed to be big enough problems in the relatively modest Project Mercury, was temporarily aghast. But the die was cast. The nation had accepted the challenge to its largest technological enterprise, dwarfing even the wartime Manhattan Project for developing the atomic bomb and the postwar crash development of strategic missiles.

The blank check was there; the way to use it was far from clear. Since 1958, studies had been under way on a circumlunar manned flight. Since 1959, George M. Low, head of the manned spaceflight office in Headquarters, had ramrodded a series of progressively more detailed studies on the requirements for a manned landing on
the moon. Those studies had established a broad confidence that no major technological or scientific breakthroughs were needed to get a man to the moon or even to land and return him. But there were some operational unknowns; the blank check caused them suddenly to loom larger. The assumption had been that one simply built a big enough booster, flew directly to the moon, landed a large vehicle, and returned some part of it directly to Earth. But there were wide scientific disagreements as to the nature of the lunar surface. Was it solid “ground,” strong enough to support such a load? Or was it many feet of dust, in which a spacecraft would disappear without a trace? Or was it something in between? There were operational problems too: could the crew and ground control possibly handle the enormous peak of work that would bunch together in the landing phase of a direct-ascent mission? The alternative seemed to be that one boosted pieces of a lunar vehicle into Earth orbit, assembled and refueled them there, and took off for a direct landing on the moon. This too was fraught with hazards: could payloads rendezvous in Earth orbit? Could men assemble complex equipment in the demanding environment of space? Could such operations as refueling with volatile fuels—hazardous enough on Earth—be safely performed in space?

Some points were clear. The very massiveness of the effort would make this program different in kind from anything NASA had attempted. New organizational modes were essential; no one center could handle this program. A much stronger Headquarters team would be needed, coordinating the efforts of several centers and riding herd on an enormous mobilization of American industry and university effort.

Also, there were long-lead-time problems that needed to be worked on irrespective of later decisions. One of these was three years under way—a big engine. Work on the 4400-kilonewton-thrust F-1 engine would be accelerated. Another was a navigation system; accurate vectoring of a spacecraft from Earth to a precise point on a rapidly moving moon 370000 kilometers away was a formidable problem in celestial mechanics. Therefore the first large Apollo contract was let to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and its Instrumentation Laboratory, headed by C. Stark Draper, to begin study of this inscrutable problem and to develop the requisite navigational system.

The basic spacecraft could be delineated—the one in which a crew would depart the earth, travel to the moon, and return. It
should have a baggage car, a jettisonable service module housing the propulsion, expendable oxygen, etc. The Space Task Group was hard at work on these with its left hand, while its main effort on Mercury went forward. That left hand had to be strengthened.

A whole new logistics system was needed; from factory to launch, everything had outstripped normal sizes and normal transportation. There would have to be new factories, mammoth test stands, huge launch complexes. Railroads and highways could not handle the larger components. Ship transportation seemed the only answer. A massive facility design and site location program had to begin even before the final configuration of the vehicle was decided. Limited in the facilities and construction area, NASA decided to call on the tested resources of the Army Corps of Engineers. It proved to be one of the wiser decisions in this hectic period.

As planning went forward in 1961 and 1962, order gradually emerged. A new concept for how to get to the moon painfully surfaced: lunar-orbit rendezvous. A small group at Langley, headed by John C. Houbolt, had studied the trade-offs of direct ascent, Earth-orbit rendezvous, and other possibilities. They had been increasingly struck with the vehicle and fuel economics of this mission profile: after stabilizing in Earth orbit, a set of spacecraft went to orbit around the moon, and, leaving the mother spacecraft in lunar orbit, dispatched a smaller craft to land on the lunar surface, reconnoiter, and rejoin the mother craft in lunar orbit for the return to Earth. Over a period of two years they refined their complex mathematics and argued their case. As time became critical for definition of the launch vehicle, they argued their case before one NASA audience after another. Finally Houbolt, in a bold move, went outside of “channels” and got the personal attention of Seamans. This was a decision of such importance to the total program that imposed decision was not enough; the major elements of NASA had to be won over and concur in the final technical judgment. Dismissed at first as risky and very literally “far out,” lunar orbit rendezvous gradually won adherents. In July 1962 D. Brainerd Holmes, NASA director of manned spaceflight, briefed the House space committee on lunar orbit rendezvous, the chosen method of going to the moon.

Once made, this decision permitted rapid definition of the Apollo spacecraft combination. Launch vehicle configuration had been arrived at seven months earlier. The objective would be to put a payload of nearly 136000 kilograms in Earth orbit and 45000
kilograms in orbit around the moon. To do this required a three-stage vehicle, the first stage employing the F-1 engine in a cluster of five, to provide 33,000 kilonewtons of thrust at launch. The second stage would cluster five of a new 890-kilonewton-thrust liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen engine (the J-2). The third stage, powered by a single J-2 engine, would boost the Apollo three-man spacecraft out of Earth orbit and into the lunar gravitational field. At that point the residual three-spacecraft combination would take over: a command module housing the astronauts, a service module providing propulsion for maneuvers, and a two-man lunar module for landing on the moon. The engine on the service module would ignite to slow the spacecraft enough to be captured into lunar orbit; the fragile lunar module would leave the mother craft and descend to land its two passengers on the moon. After lunar reconnaissance, the astronauts would blast off in the top half of the lunar module to rejoin the mother craft in lunar orbit, and the service module would fire up for return to Earth.

A smaller launch vehicle, which would later be dubbed the Saturn IB, would be built first and used to test the Apollo spacecraft in Earth orbit. Even this partial fulfillment of the Apollo mission would require a first stage of 7300 kilonewtons of thrust and a high-energy liquid oxygen–liquid hydrogen second stage.

The grand design was now complete. But in the articulating of it, vast gaps in experience and technology were revealed. At three critical points the master plan depended on successful rendezvous and docking of spacecraft. Although theoretically feasible, it had never been done and was not within the scope of Project Mercury. How could practical experience be gained with rendezvous and docking short of an intricate, hideously expensive, and possibly disastrous series of experiments with Apollo hardware? Men would, hopefully, land and walk upon the moon. But could men and their equipment function in space outside the artificial and confining environment of their spacecraft? Other systems and other questions could be engineered to solution on Earth, but the ultimate questions here could only be answered in space. We had bitten off more than we could chew. Clearly something was needed between the first steps of Mercury and the grand design of Apollo. The gap was too great to jump when men’s lives were at stake.

Even Mercury sometimes seemed a very big mouthful to chew. But slowly, stubborn problem after stubborn problem yielded. The second suborbital flight, Liberty Bell 7, was launched on 21 July 1961; its 16-minute flight went well, though on landing the hatch blew off
Astronaut John H. Glenn, Jr., aboard his Mercury spacecraft Friendship 7, rose off the launch pad at Cape Canaveral on 20 February 1962 to become the first American to orbit the earth.

prematurely and the spacecraft sank just after Astronaut Virgil I. Grissom was hoisted to safety in a rescue helicopter. In September the unmanned Mercury-Atlas combination was orbited successfully and landed where it was supposed to, east of Bermuda. On 29 November the final test flight took chimpanzee Enos on a two-orbit ride and landed him in good health. The system was qualified for manned orbital flight. And on 20 February 1962, Astronaut John H.
Glenn, Jr., became the first American to orbit the earth in space. *Friendship 7* circled the earth three times; Glenn flew parts of the last two orbits manually because of trouble with his autopilot.

The United States took its astronaut heroes to its heart with an enthusiasm that bewildered them and startled NASA. Their mail was enormous; hundreds of requests for personal appearances poured in. Glenn had a rainy parade in Washington and addressed a joint session of Congress. On 1 March four million people in New York showered confetti and ticker tape on him and fellow astronauts Shepard and Grissom. Nor was the event unnoticed by the competition. President Kennedy announced the day after the Glenn flight that Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had congratulated the nation on its achievement and had suggested the two nations “could work together in the exploration of space.” The results of this exchange were a series of talks between Dryden of NASA and Anatoliy A. Blagonravov of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. By the end of the year they had agreed to exchanges of meteorological and magnetic-field data and some communications experiments.

A big year for the young American space program, 1962. Two more Mercury flights, Carpenter for three orbits, then Schirra for six. The powerful Saturn booster made its first two test flights, both successful. The first active communications satellite, *Telstar 1*, was launched for AT&T by NASA; later NASA’s own Relay communications satellite was orbited; and the first international satellite, Britain’s *Ariel 1*, was launched by NASA to take scientific measurements of the ionosphere. *Mariner 2* became the first satellite to fly by another planet; on 14 December it passed within 34,400 kilometers of Venus and scanned the surface of that cloud-shrouded body, measuring its temperatures. Then it continued into orbit about the sun, eventually setting a new communications distance record of 89 million kilometers. The fifth and sixth Tiros meteorological satellites were placed in orbit and continued to report the world’s weather. So successful had Tiros been that the R&D program had quickly become semioperational. The Weather Bureau was regularly integrating Tiros data into its operational forecasting and was busy planning a full-scale weather satellite system which it would operate. And the hard work on booster reliability began to pay off—18 successes to 9 failures or partial successes.

Not that all was sweetness and light. The Ranger, designed to photograph the moon while falling to impact the lunar surface, was in deep trouble. A high-technology program at the edge of the state
of the art, Ranger closed the year with five straight failures and another would come in 1963. JPL, the NASA agent; Hughes Aircraft Co., the contractor; and NASA Headquarters came under heavy pressure from Congress. Studies were made; reorganization realigned JPL and contractor to firm commitment to the project; NASA dropped the science experiments, and the last three Ranger flights were spectacularly successful, providing close-in lunar photography that excelled the best telescopic detail of the moon from Earth by 2000 times and dispelled many of the scare theories about the lunar surface.

Ranger 7 took this photograph of the lunar surface from an altitude of about 6 kilometers, 2.3 seconds before it crashed. The crater in the upper left corner measured about 91 meters in diameter and had an angular rock mass in its center which might have been the cause of the crater.
As the dimensions of Apollo began to dawn on Congress and the scientific community, there were rumbles: Apollo would preempt too much of the scientific manpower of the nation; Apollo was an “other worldly” stunt, directed at the moon instead of at pressing problems on Earth. Administrator Webb met both of these caveats with positive programs.

In acknowledgment of the drain on scientific manpower, Webb won White House support for a broad program by NASA to augment the scientific manpower pool. Thousands of fellowships were offered for graduate study in space-related disciplines, intended to replace or at least supplement the kinds of talent engulfed by the space program. Complementing the fellowships was an even more innovative program, government-financed buildings and facilities on university campuses for the new kinds of interdisciplinary training that the space program required.

From a modest beginning in 1962, by the end of the program in 1970 NASA had footed the bill for the graduate education of 5000 scientists and engineers at a cost of over $100 million, had spent some $32 million in construction of new laboratory facilities on 32 university campuses, and had given multidisciplinary grants to some 50 universities that totaled more than $50 million. The program marked a new direction in the government’s recognition of its responsibility for impact of its program on the civilian economy and a new dimension of cooperation between the university and the government. In part as a result of these new capabilities in the universities, NASA contracts and grants for research by universities rose from $21 million in 1962 to $101 million in 1968. The NASA university program proved very effective: on the political side it reduced tensions between NASA and the scientific-engineering community; on the score of national technology capability it enlarged and focused a large segment of the research capabilities of the universities.

To refute the other charge—that Apollo would serve only its own ends and not the broader needs of the nation’s economy—Webb created the NASA technology utilization program in 1962. Its basic purpose was to identify and hold up to the light the many items of space technology that could be or had been adapted for uses in the civilian economy. By 1973 some 30 000 such uses had been identified and new ones were rolling in at the rate of 2000 a year.

But the program went beyond that. A concerted effort was made in every NASA center not only to identify possible transfers of space
technology but to use NASA technical people and contractors to explore and even perform prototype research on promising applications. NASA publications described all these potential applications to researchers and industry; seven regional dissemination centers were established to work directly with industry on technical problems in the adaptation of space technology; in 1973 some 2000 companies received direct help and another 57,000 queries were answered. New products ranged from quieter aircraft engines to microminiaturized and solid-state electronics that revolutionized TV sets, radios, and small electronic calculators. NASA's computer software programs enabled a wide range of manufacturers to test the life history of new systems—see predictions of problems that could develop, how the systems would perform, how long they would last, etc. Many other facets of the space program were important to the quality and sustenance of life for citizens of the United States and the world:

Communications. Within a decade the communications satellite
proved to be a reliable, flexible, cost-effective addition to long-range communications. The Communications Satellite Corporation became a solid financial success, with 114,000 stockholders. As manager of the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium, it shared access to the global satellite system with 82 other nations who had become members of the consortium. Its array of sophisticated Intelsat communications satellites bracketed the world from synchronous orbit. Before these satellites existed, the total capability for transoceanic telephone calls had been 500 circuits; in 1973 the Intelsat satellites alone offered more than 4000 transoceanic circuits. Real-time TV coverage of events anywhere in the world—whether Olympics, wars, or coronations—had become a commonplace in the world’s living rooms. Satellite data transmission enabled industries to control far-flung production and inventories, airlines to have instantaneous coast-to-coast reservation systems, large banks to have nationwide data networks. And this communications revolution was only beginning. The next generation of communications satellite, Intelsat 5, started operations in 1976 with five times the capacity of its predecessor Intelsat 4 and a life expectancy of 10 years in orbit. In 1976 the Maritime Administration embarked on a global ship-control system operated by means of satellites. Experiments with ATS satellites would continue to refine the life-saving biomedical communication network which links medical personnel and medical centers across the nation. Especially valuable to isolated and rural areas, the network would afford them real-time access to expert diagnosis and prescription of treatment.

Weather forecasting. Like its brother the communications satellite, the weather satellite had in less than a decade become an established friend of people around the world. Potentially disastrous hurricanes such as Camille in August 1969 and Agnes in June 1972 were spotted, tracked, and measured by the operational weather satellite network of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The real-time knowledge of the storm’s position, intensity, and track made possible accurate early warning and emergency evacuation that saved hundreds of lives and millions of dollars in property damage. Near-global rainfall maps were being produced by 1973 from data acquired by NASA’s Nimbus 5. Not only did the heat-release information contained in such data markedly improve long-range weather forecasting, but the data were of immediate value in agriculture, flood control, etc. Ice-movement charts for the Arctic and Antarctic regions were extending shipping schedules in these areas by several months each year.
Medicine. NASA's experience in microminiaturized electronics and in protecting and monitoring the health of astronauts during spaceflight generated hundreds of medical devices and techniques that could save lives and improve health care. Multidisciplinary teams of space technicians and medical researchers were successful in developing long-duration heart pacers, for instance. Implanted in the patient's body but rechargeable from outside, the tiny pacer would regulate the heartbeat for decades without replacement, whereas the previous model required surgical replacement every two years. Space-derived automatic patient monitoring systems were being used in more and more hospitals. Tiny sensors on the patient's body would trigger an alarm when there was significant change in temperature, heartbeat, blood pressure, or even in the oxygen–carbon dioxide levels in the blood, a signal of the onset of shock. For researchers living inside space simulators for long periods of time, the Ames Research Center developed an aspirin-sized transmitter pill. In general medical practice, the transmitter pill was swallowed.
by the patient; as it moved through the digestive system it radioed to
the doctor diagnostic measurements of any of several kinds of deep-
body conditions—temperatures, stomach acid levels, etc.

Energy. The nation's stepped-up program of energy research
that began in 1973 found NASA with broad experience and an in-
being program of research in devices that collect, store, transmit, and
apply solar, nuclear, and chemical energy for production of mechan-
ical and electrical power. Solar cells had produced the electric power
for several generations of spacecraft; when arrays of them were
experimentally mounted on houses they supplied as much as three-
quarters of the energy needed to heat and cool the house. But solar
cells were too expensive to be competitive with other systems; work
was continuing on improving their efficiency and on new manufac-
turing techniques that would cut their cost in half. A long-standing
problem with the efficient use of electrical energy has been the
inability to store significant amounts of it for future use. NASA had
done much work on developing more compact, higher-storage-
capacity, longer-life batteries. Nickel-cadmium batteries developed
for the space program were already in general use; they could be
recharged in 6 to 20 minutes instead of the 16 to 24 hours required
for conventional batteries. Silver-zinc batteries used in spacecraft
were too expensive for commercial use, but their unique separator
material could double the capacity of conventional nickel-zinc
batteries. An extensive trial of this adaptation was begun with the
fleet of Postal Service electric trucks. Batteries with 5 to 20 times the
storage capacity of conventional mass-produced automobile bat-
teries could have a wide range of uses: low-pollution automobile
propulsion; storage of excess electrical power generated during low-
demand hours and release at times of peak demand, etc. Fuel cells
had been developed by NASA to provide the longer duration Gemini
and Apollo flights with electrical power; on Earth they could be used
either for energy storage or energy conversion. One of the ingre-
dients used in fuel cells was hydrogen; in this application hydrogen
was broken down and combined with oxygen in a complex chemical
process that produced water and electrical energy. But hydrogen is
also a superb high-performance, low-pollutant fuel whose source is
inexhaustible. Liquid hydrogen had propelled men to and from the
moon. With its years of work with hydrogen as a rocket fuel, NASA
had more experience than anyone else in the production, transporta-
tion, storage, pumping, and use of hydrogen. One possible use of
hydrogen was as compact, clean energy that could be transported
into large urban areas. Many kinds of Earth-based power plants could burn hydrogen, alone or in various combinations, to produce energy with low pollution side effects.

**APOLLO IMPACT**

The creation of NASA's university and technology transfer programs in the early 1960s could be considered a side effect of Apollo. There were others. All lunar reconnaissance programs had been impacted by Apollo. The latter part of Ranger had been reoriented; Surveyor, the first lunar softlander, was reconfigured to support Apollo. If Surveyor worked, it would provide on-the-lunar-surface photography plus televised digging in the surface of the moon for a better sense of soil composition. The remaining problem for Apollo was the need for detailed mapping photography of the moon. So by the end of 1963 a third program was initiated—Lunar Orbiter, a state-of-the-art mapping satellite that would go into orbit around the moon and photograph potential landing zones for Apollo.

The vexing questions of rendezvous and extravehicular activity still had to be answered. So on 3 January 1962 NASA announced a new manned spaceflight project, Gemini. Using the basic configuration of the Mercury capsule enlarged to hold a two-man crew, Gemini was to fit between Mercury and Apollo and provide early answers to assist the design work on Apollo. The launch vehicle would be the Titan II missile being developed by the Air Force. More powerful than Atlas and Titan I, it would have the thrust to put the larger spacecraft into Earth orbit. For a target vehicle with which Gemini could rendezvous, NASA chose the Air Force's Agena; launched by an Atlas, the second-stage Agena had a restartable engine that enabled it to have both passive and active roles. Gemini would be managed by the same Space Task Group that was operating Mercury; the project director would be James A. Chamberlin, an early advocate of an enlarged Mercury capsule.

Gemini began as a Mark II Mercury, a “quick and dirty” program. The only major engineering change aside from scale-up was to modularize the various electrical and control assemblies and place them outside the inner shell of the spacecraft to simplify maintenance. But perhaps not an engineer alive could have left it at that. After all, Gemini was supposed to bridge to Apollo, wasn’t it? Here was a chance to try out ideas. If they worked, they would be
available for Apollo. There was the paraglider, for example, that Francis Rogallo had been experimenting with at Langley. If that worked, Gemini could forget parachutes and water landings with half the Navy out there; with a paraglider Gemini could land routinely on land. And the spacecraft should be designed to have more aerodynamic lift than Mercury, so the pilot would have more landing control. And fuel cells instead of batteries; with enough electric power you could have longer duration flights. And fighter-plane-type ejection seats for crew abort, superseding the launch escape rocket that perched on top of Mercury.

All these innovations were cranked into the program, and contracts and subcontracts were let for their design and fabrication. Soon the monthly bills for Gemini were running far beyond what had been budgeted. In every area, it seemed, there were costly problems. The paraglider and ejection seats wouldn’t stabilize in flight; the fuel cell leaked; Titan II had longitudinal oscillations—the
dreaded "pogo" effect—to too severe for manned flights; Agena had reconfiguration problems. Cost overruns had become severe by late 1962; by March 1963 they were critical. The original program cost of $350 million had zoomed to over $1 billion—$200 million higher than the figures Associate Administrator Seamans had used in Congress a few days before! Charles W. Mathews, the new program manager, cracked down. Flight schedules were stretched out; the paraglider gradually slid out of the program. By early 1964 most of the engineering problems were responding to treatment.

With the Mercury program, the spacecraft design role in Apollo, and now Gemini, it was clear that the Space Task Group needed a home of its own and some growing room. On 19 September 1961, Administrator Webb announced that a new Manned Spacecraft Center would be built on the outskirts of Houston. It would house the enlarged Space Task Group, now upgraded to a center, and would have operational control of all manned missions as well as be the developer of manned spacecraft. Water access to the Gulf of Mexico was provided by the ship canal to Galveston.

_Michoud Operations, 1965._
Water access played a role in all site selection for new Apollo facilities. The big Michoud Ordnance Plant outside New Orleans, where the 10-meter-diameter Saturn V first stage would be fabricated, was on the Mississippi River; the Mississippi Test Facility, with its huge test stands for static firing tests of the booster stages, was just off the Gulf of Mexico, in Pearl River County, Mississippi.

All this effort would come together at the launch site at Cape Canaveral, Florida, where NASA had a small Launch Operations Center, headed by Kurt H. Debus. NASA had been a tenant there, using Air Force launch facilities and tracking range. Now Apollo loomed. Apollo would require physical facilities much too large to fit on the crowded Cape. For safety's sake there would have to be large buffer zones of land around the launch pads; if a catastrophic accident occurred, where all stages of the huge launch vehicle exploded at once, the force of the detonation would approach that of a small atomic bomb. So NASA sought and received congressional approval to purchase 450 square kilometers of Merritt Island, just northwest of the Air Force facilities. Lying between the Banana River and the Atlantic and populated mostly by orange growers, Merritt Island had the requisite water access and safety factors.

Planners struggled through 1961 with a wide range of concepts and possibilities for the best launch system for Apollo, hampered by having only a gross knowledge of how the vehicle would be
configured, what the missions would involve, and how frequent the launches would be. Finally on 21 July 1962 NASA announced its choice: the Advanced Saturn (later Saturn V) launch vehicle would be transported to the new Launch Operations Center on Merritt Island stage by stage; the stages would be erected and checked out in an enormous vehicle assembly building; the vehicle would be transported to one of the four launch pads several miles away by a huge tractor crawler. This system was a major departure from previous practice at the Cape; launch vehicles had usually been erected on the launch pad and checked out there. Under the new concept the vehicle would be on the launch pad a much shorter time, allowing for a higher launch rate and better protection against weather and salt spray. As with the other new Apollo facilities, the Corps of Engineers would supervise the vast construction project.

The simultaneous building of facilities and hardware was going to take a great deal of money and a great many skilled people. The NASA budget, $966.7 million in fiscal 1961, was $1.825 billion in FY 1962. It hit $3.674 billion the next year and by FY 1964 was $5.1

*Kennedy Space Center, 1966. A 111-meter-tall Saturn V launch vehicle has emerged from the cavernous Vehicle Assembly Building on its 1820-metric-ton crawler and begun its stately processional to the launch complex five kilometers away.*
billion. It would remain near that level for three more years. In personnel, NASA grew in those same years from 17,471 to 35,860. And of course this was small potatoes compared to the mushrooming contractor and university force where 90 percent of NASA's money was spent. When the Apollo production line peaked in 1967, more than 400,000 people were working on some aspect of Apollo.

Indeed, as the large bills began to come in, there was some wincing in the political system. President Kennedy wondered briefly if the goal was worth the cost; in 1963 Congress had its first real adversary debate on Apollo. Administrator Webb had to point out again and again that this was not a one-shot trip to the moon but the building of a national space capability that would have many uses. He also needled congressmen with the fact that the Soviets were still ahead; in 1963 they were orbiting two-man spacecraft, flying a 208-kilometer-orbit tandem mission, and orbiting an unmanned prototype of a new spacecraft. Support rallied. The Senate rejected an amendment that would have cut the FY 1964 space budget by $500 million. The speech that President Kennedy was driving through Dallas to deliver on that fateful 22 November 1963 would have defended the expenditures for the space program:

This effort is expensive—but it pays its own way, for freedom and for America. . . . There is no longer any doubt about the strength and skill of American science, American industry, American education and the American free enterprise system. In short, our national space effort represents a great gain in, and a great resource of, our national strength.

As 1963 drew to a close, NASA could feel that it was on top of its job. The master plan for Apollo was drawn; the organization and the key men were in place. Mercury had ended with L. Gordon Cooper's 22-orbit flight, far beyond the design limits of the spacecraft. For those Americans old enough to have thrilled to Lindbergh's historic transatlantic flight 36 years earlier, it was awesome that in only 50 minutes more flight time, Cooper had flown 955,000 kilometers to Lindbergh's 5000. Of 13 NASA launches during the year, 11 were successful. In addition to improved performance from the established launch vehicles, Saturn I had another successful test flight, as did the troublesome Centaur. The Syncom 2 communications satellite achieved synchronous orbit and from that lofty perch transmitted voice and teletype communications between North America, South America, and Africa. The Explorer 18 scientific satellite sailed out in a long elliptical orbit to measure radiation most of the way to the moon.
As 1964 dawned, the worst of Gemini's troubles were behind. The spacecraft for the first flight was already at the Kennedy Space Center (Launch Operations Center, renamed in November 1963 by President Lyndon B. Johnson), being minutely checked out for the flight. Too minutely, too time-consumingly. Not until 8 April did *Gemini 1* lift off unmanned into an orbit which confirmed the launch vehicle–spacecraft combination in the rigors of launch. The excessive checkout time of *Gemini 1* generated a new procedure. Beginning with the next spacecraft, a contingent from the launch crew would work at the factory (McDonnell Douglas in St. Louis) to check out the spacecraft there. When it arrived at the Cape, it would be ready to be mated with its Titan II, have the pyrotechnics installed, and be launched. Only in this way could one hope to achieve the three-month launch cycle planned for Gemini.

The new system delayed the arrival of the second Gemini spacecraft at the Cape. There the curse set in. Once on the pad the spacecraft was struck by lightning, threatened by not one but two hurricanes, and forced to undergo check after check. And when launch day finally came in December, the engines ignited and then shut down. More rework. Finally on 19 January 1965, *Gemini 2* rose from the launch pad on the tail of almost colorless flame from Titan II's hypergolic propellants, and in a 19-minute flight confirmed the readiness of a fully equipped Gemini spacecraft and the integrity of the heatshield during reentry. Gemini was man-rated.

The final test flight, a manned, three-orbit qualification flight, was conducted on 23 March without incident. Now the diversified flight program could continue. One program objective was to orbit men in space for at least the week that it would take an Apollo flight to go to the moon, land, and return. *Gemini 4* (3–7 June) stayed aloft four days; *Gemini 5* (21–29 August) doubled that time and surpassed the Soviet long-duration record; *Gemini 7* (4–18 December) provided the clincher with 14 days (330 hours 35 minutes). Of more lasting importance than the durability of the equipment was the encouraging medical news that no long-term harmful effects were found from
extended exposure to weightlessness. There were temporary effects, of course: heartbeat slowed down, blood tended to pool in the legs, the bones lost calcium, etc., but these conditions tended to stabilize after a few days in weightlessness and to return to normal after a few days back on Earth. So far there seemed to be no physiological time limit for man living in space.

A crucial question for Apollo was whether the three rendezvous and docking maneuvers planned for every lunar flight were feasible. Gemini 3 made the tentative beginning by testing the new thruster rockets with short-burst firings that changed the height and shape of orbit, and one maneuver that for the first time shifted the plane of the flight path of a spacecraft. Gemini 4 tried to rejoin its discarded second-stage booster but faulty techniques burned up too much maneuvering fuel and the pursuit had to be abandoned—a valuable lesson; back to the computers for better techniques! Gemini 5 tested out the techniques and verified the performance of the rendezvous radar and rendezvous display in the cockpit.

Then came what is still referred to by NASA control room people with pride but also with slight shudders as “Gemini 76.” The original mission plan called for a target Agena stage to be placed in orbit and for Gemini to launch in pursuit of it. But the Agena fell short of orbit and splashed into the Atlantic. The Gemini spacecraft suddenly had no mission. Round-the-clock debate and recomputation produced a seemingly bizarre solution, which within three days of the Agena failure was approved by Administrator Webb and President Johnson: remove the Gemini 6 spacecraft–launch vehicle combination intact from the launch pad and store it carefully to preserve the integrity of checkout; erect Gemini 7 on the launch pad, check it out and launch it; bring Gemini 6 out and launch it to rendezvous with the long-duration Gemini 7. And it happened. Gemini 7 was launched 4 December 1965; Gemini 6 was back on the pad for launch by 12 December. On launch day the engines ignited, burned for four seconds, shut off automatically when a trouble light lit up. On top of the fueled booster Astronaut Walter M. Schirra, Jr., sat with his hand on the lanyard of the ejection seat while the control room checked out the condition of the fueled booster. But the potential bomb did not explode. On 15 December Gemini 6 lifted off to join its sister ship in orbit. On his fourth orbit Schirra caught up to Gemini 7 and maneuvered to within 10 meters; in subsequent maneuvers he moved to within 30 centimeters. Rendezvous was feasible. Was docking?
On 16 March 1966, Gemini 8 on its third orbit docked with its Agena target. Docking too was feasible, though in this case not for long. Less than half an hour after docking for an intended full night in the docked position, the two spacecraft unaccountably began to spin, faster and faster. Astronaut Neil A. Armstrong could not stabilize the joined spacecraft, so he fired his Gemini thrusters to undock and maneuver away from the Agena. Still he could not control his single spacecraft with the thrusters; lives seemed in jeopardy. Finally he fired the reentry rockets, which did the job. By then ground control had figured out that one thruster had stuck in the firing position. Armstrong made an emergency landing off Okinawa. Despite hardware problems, docking had been established as feasible.

Rendezvous was new and difficult, so experimentation continued. Gemini 9 (3–6 June 1966) tried three kinds of rendezvous maneuvers with a special target stage as its passive partner, but docking was not possible because the shroud covering the target’s docking mechanism had not separated. The shroud did not prevent simulation of an Apollo lunar orbit rendezvous. Gemini 10 (18–21 July 1966) did dock with its Agena target and used the powerful Agena engine to soar to a height of 766 kilometers, the highest in space man had ventured. It rendezvoused with the derelict Agena left in orbit by Gemini 8 four months earlier, using only optical methods and thereby demonstrating the feasibility of rendezvous with passive satellites for purposes of repairing them. On the next flight Gemini 11 caught up with its target in its first orbit, demonstrating the possibility of quick rendezvous if necessary for rescue or other reasons. Each astronaut practiced docking twice. Using Agena propulsion, they rocketed out to 1372 kilometers above the earth, another record. The final Gemini flight, Gemini 12 (11 November 1966) rendezvoused with its target Agena on the third orbit and kept station with it.

Would astronauts be able to perform useful work outside their spacecraft when in orbit or on the moon? This was the question extravehicular activity (EVA) was designed to answer. The answers proved to be various and more difficult than had been envisioned.

Gemini 4 began EVA when Edward H. White II floated outside his spacecraft for 23 minutes. Protected by his spacesuit and attached to Gemini by an eight-meter umbilical cord, White used a hand-held maneuvering unit to move about, took photographs, and in general had such an exhilarating experience that he had to be ordered back
This photo looks out Gemini 11's window at the Agena rocket with which the Gemini crew is practicing rendezvous and tethered stationkeeping.

into the spacecraft. Because he had no specific work tasks to perform, his EVA seemed deceptively easy.

That illusion was rudely shattered by the experience of Gemini 9, when Eugene A. Cernan spent two hours in EVA; he had tasks to perform in several areas on the spacecraft. His major assignment was to go behind the spacecraft into the adapter area, put on the 75-kilogram astronaut maneuvering unit—a more powerful individual flight propulsion system the Air Force had built—and try it out. The effort to get the unit harnessed to his back was so intense that excessive perspiration within his spacesuit overtaxed the system and fogged his visor. The experiment was abandoned and he was ordered back into the spacecraft.

Much more pleasant was the experience of Michael Collins on Gemini 10. He tried two kinds of EVA: the first time he stood in the open hatch for 45 minutes and made visual observations and took pictures; the second time he went out on a 10-meter tether, maneuvered for 55 minutes with the hand-held maneuvering unit and even propelled himself over to the station-keeping Agena and removed a micrometeoroid-impact experiment which had been in space for four months.
America's first space walk. Astronaut Edward H. White II fired short bursts with his hand-held maneuvering gun to move around in the zero g of space before returning to the Gemini 4 spacecraft.

But reality raised its ugly head again during Gemini 11 when Richard F. Gordon, Jr., was assigned a full schedule of work tasks along the spacecraft but had to terminate after 33 minutes because of fatigue. He had battled himself to exhaustion trying to control his bodily movements and fight against the opposite torque that any simple motion set in train. It was Isaac Newton's Third Law of Motion in pure form.

NASA had learned its lesson. When Gemini 12 went up, many additional body restraints and hand- and footholds had been added. Astronauts had trained for the strange floating sensation by doing the same assignments in water tanks on Earth. Results were gratifying; in a 2-hour 6-minute tethered EVA (aside from two standup EVAs) Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr., successfully performed 19
separate tasks. Total EVA on this flight added up to 5 hours 28 minutes.

On the last seven flights, Gemini experimented with the aerodynamic lift of the spacecraft to ensure pinpoint landings on the earth's surface; with the dispersions possible when Apollo came in from 370,000 kilometers away, tired astronauts would need this. The inertial guidance system provided inputs to the computer, which solved the guidance equations. On flights 6–10 the reentry was controlled by the crew. On the last two flights the data were fed into the automatic system. Results were promising. The average navigational accuracy of the seven flights was within 3 kilometers of the aiming point, much better than previous flights.

Gemini was primarily a technological learning experience. So it is not surprising that of the 52 experiments in the program, more than half—27—were technological, exploring the limits of the equipment. But there were also 17 scientific experiments and 8 medical ones. An important one was the 1400 color photographs taken of Earth from various altitudes. This provided the investigators the first large corpus of color photographs from which to learn more about the planet we live on.

Probably the most valuable management payoff from Gemini was the operational one: how to live and maneuver in space; next was how to handle a variety of situations in space by exploiting the versatility and depth of the vast NASA-contractor team that stood by during flights. Finally there were valuable fiscal lessons: an advanced technology program had a “best path” between too slow and too fast. Deviation on either side, as had occurred in the early days of Gemini, could cost appalling amounts of money. But once on track, even economies were possible. Once Gemini flights were on track, for example, Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight George E. Mueller (successor to Holmes) had won agreement from his principal contractors to cut the three-month period between launches to two months. This was primarily to get Gemini out of the way before Apollo launches started, but it paid off financially, too; where total program costs for Gemini were estimated in FY 1964 to be $1.35 billion, the actual cost closed out at $1.29 billion.

This, then, was Gemini, a versatile, flexible spacecraft system that wound up exploring many more nooks and crannies of spaceflight than its originators ever foresaw—which is as it should be. Major lessons were transmitted to Apollo: rendezvous, yes; docking, yes; EVA, yes; manned flights up to two weeks in duration, yes.
Equally important, there was now a big experience factor for the astronauts and for the people on the ground, in the control room, around the tracking network, in industry. The system had proved itself in the pit; it had evolved a total team that had solved real-time problems in space with men’s lives at stake. This was no mean legacy to Apollo.

Some of the technological payoff had come too late. With the increasing sophistication of Gemini and the consequent slippage of both financial and engineering schedules, the Apollo designers and engineers sometimes had to invent their own wheel. But the state of the art had been advanced: thrusters, fuel cells, environmental control systems, space navigation, spacesuits, etc. In the development stage of Apollo the bank of knowledge from Gemini paid off in hundreds of subtle ways. The bridge had been built.

Throughout Gemini’s operational period, Apollo was slogging along toward completed stages and completed spacecraft. Saturn I, the booster almost overtaken by events, finished its 10-flight program in 1964 and 1965 with six launches featuring a liquid-hydrogen second stage. Not only was it proved out; the clustered-engine concept was demonstrated and an early form of Apollo guidance was tested. The last four flights were considered operational; one (18 September 1964) tested a boilerplate Apollo spacecraft. The last three carried Pegasus meteoroid-detection satellites into orbit. The last two Saturn Is were fabricated entirely by industry, marking a transition from the Army-arsenal in-house concept that had previously characterized the Marshall Space Flight Center. Ten launches, ten successes.

Meanwhile the larger brother, the Saturn IB, was being born. Its first stage was to generate 7100 kilonewtons of thrust, from eight of the H–1 engines that had powered Atlas and Saturn I, but uprated to 890 kilonewtons each. The second stage was to feature the new J–2 liquid hydrogen engine, generating 890 kilonewtons of thrust. It was a crucial element of the forthcoming Saturn V vehicle, since in a five-engine cluster it would power the second stage and a single J–2 would power the third stage.

Saturn IB was the first launch vehicle to be affected by a new concept, “all-up” testing. Associate Administrator Mueller, pressed by budgetary constraints and relying on his industry experience in the Air Force’s Minuteman ballistic missile program, pressed NASA to abandon its stage-by-stage testing. With intensive ground testing of components, he argued, NASA could with reasonable confidence
test the entire stack of stages in flight from the beginning, at great savings to budget and schedule. Marshall engineers had built their splendid success record by being conservative; they vigorously opposed the new concept. But eventually Mueller triumphed. On 26 February 1966, the complete Saturn IB flew with the Apollo command and service module in suborbital flight; the payload was recovered in good condition. On 5 July the IB second stage, the instrument unit—which would house the electronic and guidance brains of the Saturn V—and the nose cone were propelled into orbit. The total payload was 28,332 kilograms, the heaviest the U.S. had yet orbited. On 26 August a suborbital launch qualified the Apollo command module for manned flight; the attached service module fired its engine four times; and an accelerated reentry trajectory tested the Apollo heatshield at the 40,000-kilometer-per-hour velocity of a spacecraft returning from lunar distance.

The largest brother, Saturn V, was still being pieced together. Developed by three different contractors, the three stages of Saturn V had individual histories and problems. The first stage, although the largest, had a long lead time and was on schedule. The third stage, though enlarged and sophisticated from the version flown on Saturn IB, had a previous history. It was the second stage that was the newest beast—five J-2 engines burning liquid hydrogen. It became the pacing item of the Saturn V and would remain so almost until the first launch.

Of the three spacecraft, the lunar module was, early and late, the problem child. For one thing, it was begun late—a whole year late. For another, it differed radically from previous spacecraft. There were two discrete spacecraft within the lunar module; one would descend to the lunar surface from lunar orbit; the other would separate from the descent stage and leap off the lunar surface into lunar orbit and rendezvous with the command module. The engine for each stage would have to work perfectly for that one time it fired. Both had teething troubles. The descent engine was particularly troublesome, to the point that a second contract was let for a backup engine of different design. Weight was a never-ending problem with the LM. Each small change in a system, each substitution of one material for another, had to be considered as much in terms of kilograms added or saved as in any gain in system efficiency.

By the end of 1966, the Saturn IB and the block I Apollo command and service module were considered man-rated.

On 27 January 1967, AS-204, to be the first manned spaceflight,
was on the launch pad at Cape Kennedy, moving through preflight tests. Astronauts Virgil I. Grissom, Edward H. White II, and Roger B. Chaffee were suited up in the command module, moving through the countdown toward a simulated launch. At T-minus-10 minutes tragedy struck without warning. As Maj. Gen. Samuel C. Phillips, Apollo program director, described it the next day: "The facts briefly are: at 6:31 p.m. (EST) the observers heard a report which originated

The seared Apollo command module in which three astronauts lost their lives stands in mute desolation at Cape Canaveral.
from one of the crewmen that there was a fire aboard the spacecraft. . . .” Ground crew members saw a flash fire break through the spacecraft shell and envelop the spacecraft in smoke, Phillips said. Rescue attempts failed. It took a tortuous five minutes to get the hatch open from the outside. Long before that the three astronauts were dead from asphyxiation. It was the first fatal accident in the American spaceflight program.

Shock swept across the nation and the world. In the White House, President Johnson had just presided over the signing of an international space law treaty when Administrator Webb phoned with the crushing news. Webb said the next day: “We’ve always known that something like this would happen sooner or later . . . who would have thought the first tragedy would be on the ground?”

Who, indeed? What had happened? How had it happened? Could it happen again? Was someone at fault? If so, who? There were many questions, few answers. The day following the fire, Deputy Administrator Seamans appointed an eight-member review board to investigate the accident. As chairman he chose Floyd L. Thompson, the veteran director of the Langley Research Center. For months the board probed the evidence, heard witnesses, studied documentation. On 10 April Webb, Seamans, Mueller, and Thompson briefed the House space committee on the findings: the fire had apparently been started by an electrical short circuit which ignited the oxygen-rich atmosphere and fed on combustible materials in the spacecraft. The precise wire at fault could probably never be determined. Like most accidents it should not have happened. There had been errors in design, faults in testing procedures. But the basic spacecraft design was sound. A thorough review of spacecraft design, wiring, combustible materials, test procedures, etc., was under way. Congress was not satisfied. Hearings in both houses continued, gradually eroding Webb’s support on Capitol Hill.

The block I spacecraft would not be used for any manned flights. The hatch on the block II spacecraft would be redesigned for quick opening. The hundreds of miles of wiring in the spacecraft were checked for fire-proofing, protection against damage, etc. An intensive materials research program devised substitute materials for combustible ones. In effect the block II spacecraft was completely redesigned and rebuilt. The cost: 18 months delay in the manned flight schedule and at least $50 million. The gain: a sounder, safer spacecraft.

Well before men flew in Apollo spacecraft the question had
been raised as to what, if anything, NASA proposed to do with men in space after Apollo was over. With the long lead times and heavy costs inherent in manned space programs, advance planning was essential. President Johnson proposed the question to Webb in a letter on 30 January 1964. NASA's first-look answer surfaced in congressional hearings on the FY 1965 budget. Funds were requested for study contracts that would investigate a variety of ideas for doing new things in space with the expensively acquired Apollo hardware. Possibilities: long-duration Earth-orbital operations, lunar surface exploration operating out of an unmanned Apollo lunar module landed on the moon, long-duration lunar orbital missions to survey and map the moon, Earth-orbital operations leading to space stations.

Through 1965 and 1966 the studies intensified and options were fleshed out. The Woods Hole conference in the summer of 1965 brought together a broad spectrum of the American science community and identified some 150 scientific experiments that were candidates for such missions. By 1966 there was a sense of urgency in NASA planning; the Apollo production line was peaking and would begin to decline in a year or two. Unless firm requirements for additional boosters, spacecraft, and other systems could be delineated and funded soon, the production lines would shut down and the hard-won Apollo skills dispersed. In the FY 1967 congressional hearings, NASA presented further details and fixed the next fiscal year as the latest that hardware commitments could be deferred if the Apollo production line was to be used.

NASA went into the FY 1968 budget cycle with a fairly ambitious Apollo Applications proposal. It asked for an FY 1968 appropriation of $626 million as the down payment on six Saturn IBs, six Saturn Vs, and eight Apollo spacecraft per year. The Bureau of the Budget approved a budget request of $454 million. This cut the program by one-third. Congress appropriated only $253 million, so by mid-1968 the plan was down to only two additional Saturn IBs and one orbital workshop, with it and its Apollo telescope mount being deferred to 1971.

Manned spaceflight, with its overwhelming priority, had had both direct and indirect impact on the NASA space science program. From 1958 to 1963, scientific satellites had made impressive discoveries: the Van Allen radiation belts, Earth's magnetosphere, the existence of the solar wind. Much of the space science effort in the next four years had been directed toward finding more detailed data
on these extensive phenomena. The radiation belts were found to be indeed plural, with definite if shifting altitudes. The magnetosphere was found to have an elongated tail reaching out beyond the moon and through which the moon periodically passes. The solar wind was shown to vary greatly in intensity with solar activity.

All of these were momentous discoveries about our nearby space environment. The first wave of discoveries said one thing to NASA: if you put up bigger, more sophisticated, more versatile satellites than those of the first generation, you will find many other unsuspected phenomena that might help unravel the history of the solar system, the universe, and the cosmic mystery of how it all works. So a second generation of spacecraft was planned and developed; they were called observatory class—five to ten times as heavy as early satellites, built around a standard bus instrumented for a specific scientific discipline, but designed to support up to 20 discrete experimental instruments that could be varied from one

Surveyor 7, perched on the lunar surface in the highlands about 29 kilometers north of the big crater Tycho, took the photographs in this panoramic mosaic of the area around its landing site. In the center of the picture the rolling horizon is about 13 kilometers distant; the 1.5-meter crater in the foreground is about 5 meters away.
flight to the next—solar observatories, astronomical observatories, geophysical observatories. As these complex spacecraft were developed and launched in the mid-1960s, the first results were on the whole disappointing. The promise was confirmed by fleeting results, but their very complexity inflicted them with short lifetimes and electrical failures. There were solid expectations that these could be worked out for subsequent launches. But by the late 1960s the impingement of manned spacelift budgets on space science budgets reduced or eliminated many of these promising starts. Smaller satellites, such as the Pioneer series, survived and made valuable observations, measuring the solar wind, solar plasma tongues, and the interplanetary magnetic field.

Lunar programs fared somewhat better but did not come away unscathed. The lunar missions were now in support of Apollo, so they were allowed to run their course. Surveyor softlanded six out of its seven spacecraft on the moon from 1966 through 1968. Its television cameras gave Earthlings their first limited previews of

Lunar Orbiter 2 appears in this telephoto shot to be inside the huge lunar crater Copernicus. The mountains in the center of the crater rise 300 meters above the flat floor, as does the rim. Distance across this part of the crater is about 27 kilometers.
Mariner 4, at a slant range of 1250 kilometers, took this photo of Mare Cimmerium on Mars. With craters pockmarked by newer craters, Mars looked depressingly like the moon.

ghostly lunar landscapes seen from the surface level. Its instruments showed that lunar soil was the consistency of wet sand, firm enough to support lunar landings by the LM. Lunar Orbiter put mapping cameras in orbit around the moon in all of its five missions, photographed over 90% of the lunar surface, including the invisible back side, and surveyed potential Apollo landing sites.

Planetary programs suffered heavy cuts. The Mariner series was cut back, but its two flights provided exciting new glimpses into the history of the solar system. Mariner 4 flew past Mars on 14 July 1965 and gave man his first close-up view of Earth's fabled neighbor. At first glance the view was disappointing. Mars was battered by meteor impacts almost as much as the moon. While there were no magnetic fields or radiation belts, there was a thin atmosphere. Mariner 5 flew past Venus on 19 October 1967; this second pass at mysterious Venus found no magnetic field but an ionosphere that deflected the solar wind. The atmosphere was dense and very hot; temperatures
were recorded as high as 700 K, with 80% of the atmosphere being carbon dioxide. But the immediate future of more sophisticated planetary exploration seemed bleak. The ambitious Voyager program was curtailed in FY 1966, finally dropped in FY 1968; it envisioned large planetary spacecraft launched on Saturn V which would deploy Mars entry capsules weighing 2270 to 3180 kilograms.

The applications satellites had been a crowning achievement for NASA in the early 1960s. The NASA policy of bringing a satellite system along through the research and development stages to flight demonstration of the system and then turning it over to someone else to convert into an operational system received its acid test in 1962. With the demonstration of Syncom performance, the commercial potential of communications satellites became obvious and immediate. NASA’s R&D role seemed over, but how should the valuable potential be transferred to private ownership without favoritism? The Kennedy administration’s answer was the Communications Satellite Corporation, a unique government-industry-international combination. The board of directors would be made up of six named by the communications industry, six by public stockholders, and three named by the President of the United States. The corporation would be empowered to invite other nations to share the investment, the services, and the profits. This precedent-setting proposal stirred strong political emotions, especially in the Senate. A 20-day debate ensued, including a filibuster, the time-honored last resort in cases of deeply divisive issues, before the administration proposal was approved. On 31 August 1962, President Kennedy signed the bill into law. ComSatCorp, as it came to be called, set up in business. On 6 April 1965, its first satellite, *Early Bird 1*, was launched into synchronous orbit by NASA on a reimbursable basis. By the end of 1968, there was an Intelsat network of five communications satellites in synchronous orbits, some 20 of an expected 40 ground stations in operation, and 48 member nations participating. The Soviets had mounted a competitive system of Molniya satellites with first launch in 1965. They too had sought international partnership, but only France outside of the Iron Curtain countries signed up. By 1968 they had launched 10 Molniya satellites into their standard elliptical orbit. On the American side, the question of government-sponsored research on communications satellites was not completely solved by the creation of ComSatCorp. Congress continued to worry over the thorny question of whether the government should carry on advanced research on communica-
tions satellites versus the prospect that a government-sponsored monopoly would profit from the results.

Weather satellites were simpler in the sense that the relationship was confined to two government agencies. The highly successful Tiros was seized on by the Weather Bureau as the model for its operational satellite series. NASA had high hopes for its follow-on Nimbus satellite, bigger, with more instruments measuring more parameters. The Weather Bureau, however, felt that unless NASA could guarantee a long operational lifetime for Nimbus, it was too expensive for routine use. So NASA continued Nimbus as a test bed for advanced sensors that could provide better measurements of the vertical structure of the atmosphere and global collection of weather data.

Navigational satellites, one of the early bright possibilities of space, continued to be intractable. But there was a new entry, the Earth resources satellite. Impressed by the Tiros photographs and even more by the Gemini photographs, the Department of Interior suggested an Earth resources satellite program in 1966. Early NASA investigation envisioned a small, low-altitude satellite in sun-synchronous orbit. What could be effectively measured with existing sensors, to what degree, with what frequency, in what priority? These questions involved an increasing number of government agencies. Then there was the complex question of what trade-off was best between aircraft-borne sensors and satellite-borne ones. It was a new kind of program for NASA, involving many more government agencies and many more political sensitivities than the uncluttered researches in space.

The advanced research activities of NASA also became more subtle and difficult to track. An interlocking network of basic research and applied research, advanced research was designed to feed new ideas and options into the planning process. The most visible portion was flight research. The X-15 had culminated the series of Air Force–NASA research aircraft with a glittering series of speed and altitude records and a very solid base of aerodynamic data. The prototype B-70 had been turned over to NASA for research in large aircraft flying at supersonic speeds.

When the political question arose as to whether the United States should enter the international competition for a supersonic commercial transport aircraft—a sweepstakes already entered by Great Britain and France jointly with their Concorde and by the Soviet Union with its TU-144—NASA already had a solid data base
to contribute. It also had the laboratories and the contracting base to manage the program. But wise counsel from Deputy Administrator Dryden led to NASA's retreat into a supportive R&D role; he argued that with Apollo under way, NASA could not politically sponsor another high-technology, enormously expensive program in the same budget years without one of them being sacrificed to the other or killing each other off in competition for funds. The subsequent history of the supersonic transport program, including its eventual demise, was eloquent testimonial to the wisdom of his judgment. His death in December 1965 was a loss to the nation.

Another visible area of advanced research was the study of hydroplaning, the dangerous tendency of aircraft, when landing, to lose braking control on wet or slushy runways. Research done at Langley indicated that the wheels tended to float on top of the water surface; grooving the concrete would drain water and provide much greater traction. Quickly and successfully applied to runways, the same technique soon spread to the national highway system.

Other research efforts paid big dividends within the space program. Lewis Research Center had become involved in the use of liquid hydrogen as a rocket fuel in 1955. Although liquid hydrogen offered very attractive increases in thrust per kilogram as compared to previous fuels, hydrogen had a bad reputation left over from dirigible days and the Hindenburg disaster. But by 1957 Lewis was successfully and routinely firing an 89-kilonewton-thrust engine using liquid hydrogen as fuel. It was these tests that gave NASA the confidence in 1959 to decide that the upper stages of the lunar rocket should be fueled with liquid hydrogen. Without this additional rocket power, it might have been impossible—or at least much more expensive—to put men on the moon.

The quiet-engine program for commercial aircraft grew out of widespread public protest against noise levels around city airports. Again Lewis was the lead center; laborious research into all aspects of the jet engine (air inlets, turbine blades, exhaust characteristics) led to new possibilities that in combination would dramatically lower the level of noise generated by jet aircraft.

Long-range prospects of manned planetary exploration depended heavily on more efficient thrust-per-pound-of-fuel propulsion. To this end NASA had continued the long-range program inherited from the Air Force to develop a nuclear-propelled upper stage for a rocket. Engineering down to a compact package the enormous weight, size, and shielding of the kind of reactor used in
On 3 February 1966 the AEC-NASA Nuclear Rocket Development Station at Jackass Flats, Nevada, fired the first complete “breadboard” nuclear rocket engine to be tested by the United States. It made two successful 15-minute test runs that day at partial power.

nuclear electric-power plants was a severe challenge. The inevitable intensification of radiation density and temperatures defeated existing materials that would contain and transmit the heat to an engine. Time after time over the years, test firings of promising configurations had to be stopped prematurely when radiation corrosion took its toll. Finally in December 1967 the NRX-A6 reactor ran for one hour at full power, twice the time achieved before. Improvements in reactor fuel elements cut radiation control in half. The Snap program of radioisotope thermoelectric generators also progressed.
The Snap-27 was the long-life power source for the Apollo science experiments to be left on the lunar surface.

The flight-test program on lifting-body shapes for possible re-entry configurations of future manned spacecraft got under way at Flight Research Center in 1964. The M-2 lifting body designed at Ames Research Center made 100 flights. Results indicated that a man could reenter the atmosphere and land safely on a runway in a lightweight lifting-body aircraft. Encouraged by the basic data, NASA ordered two more lifting bodies with different configurations—the M-2/F-2 and the HL-10. The M-2/F-2 made 15 successful flights in 1966–1967. The HL-10, after modification, made 13 flights in 1968, 3 of them rocket powered.

Although the tragic fire of January 1967 delayed plans for manned spaceflight in Apollo hardware for something like 18 months, the versatility of the system came to the rescue. The burden of checking out the major components of the system was quickly shifted to unmanned flights while a quick-opening hatch was designed and tested, combustibles were sought out and replaced, and the wiring design was completely reworked. After a nine-month delay, flight tests resumed. On 9 November 1967, Apollo 4 became the first unmanned launch of the awesome Saturn V. A 110-meter-high stack of three-stage launch vehicle and spacecraft, weighing

*Three lifting-body configurations grouped on the dry lake bed at Flight Research Center—left to right, the X-24, M-2, and HL-10.*
2824 tons, slowly lifted off Launch Complex 39, propelled by a first-stage thrust of 33,800 kilonewtons. A record 126,529 kilograms of payload and upper stage were put into Earth orbit. Later the third stage fired to simulate lunar trajectory, lifting the spacecraft combination to 17,335 kilometers. With the third stage discarded, the service module fired its engine to raise the apogee to 18,204 kilometers, then burned again to propel the spacecraft toward Earth reentry at the 40,000-kilometer-per-hour return speed from the moon. All systems performed well; the third stage could restart in the vacuum of space; the automated Launch Complex 39 functioned beautifully. The once-controversial concept of “all-up” testing had been vindicated.

Next came the unmanned flight test of the laggard lunar module. On 22 January 1968, a Saturn IB launched a 14,392-kilogram lunar module into Earth orbit. It separated, tested its ascent and descent engines. The lunar module passed its first flight test.

Now to man-rate the huge Saturn V. Apollo 6, on 4 April 1968, put the launch vehicle through its paces—the stages, the guidance system, the electrical systems. Four of five test objectives were met; Saturn V was man-rated. The stage was set for the first manned spaceflight in Apollo since the tragic fire. Apollo 7 would test the crew and command module for the 10 days in space that would later be needed to fly to the moon, land, and return.

But beyond Apollo 7, the schedule was in real difficulty. It was the summer of 1968; only a year and a half remained of the decade within which this nation had committed itself to land men on the moon. Somehow the flight schedule ought to be accelerated. Gemini’s answer had been to launch missions closer together, but the size and complexity of Apollo hardware severely limited that option. The only other possibility was to get more done on each flight. For a time, however, it seemed that the next flight, Apollo 8, would accomplish even less than had been planned. It had been scheduled as the first manned test of the lunar module in Earth orbit, but the LM had a lengthy test-and-fix roadblock ahead of it and could not be ready before the end of the year, and perhaps not then. So a repeat of Apollo 7 was considered, another test of the command module in Earth orbit without the tardy LM but this time on the giant Saturn V. Eight years earlier that would have been considered a big bite; now, was it big enough, given Apollo’s gargantuan task?

In Houston, George Low didn’t think it was. After all, he reasoned, even this test-flight hardware was built to go to the moon; why
not use it that way? The advantages of early experience at lunar distances would be enormous. On 9 August he broached the idea to Gilruth, who was enthusiastic. Within days the senior managers of the program had been polled and had checked for problems that might inhibit a circumlunar flight. All problems proved to be fixable, assuming that Apollo 7 went well. The trick then became to build enough flexibility into the Apollo 8 mission so that it could go either way, Earth-orbital or lunar-orbital.

Apollo 7 was launched on 11 October 1968. A Saturn IB put three astronauts into Earth orbit, where they stayed for eleven days, testing particularly the command module—environmental system, fuel cells, communications. All came through with flying colors. On 12 November, NASA announced that Apollo 8 had been reconfigured to focus on lunar orbit. It was a bold jump.

On 21 December a Saturn V lifted the manned Apollo 8 off Launch Complex 39 at the Cape. The familiar phases were repeated: Earth orbit, circularizing the orbit, etc. But then the Saturn third stage fired again and added the speed necessary for the spacecraft to escape Earth’s gravity on a trajectory to the moon. All the rehearsed or simulated steps went well. On 23 December the three-man crew became the first human beings to pass out of Earth’s gravitational control and into that of another body in the solar system. No longer was man shackled to the near environs of Earth. The TV camera looked back at a small, round, rapidly receding ball, warmly laced with a mix of blue oceans, brown continents, and white clouds that was startling against the blackness of space.

On Christmas Eve Apollo 8 disappeared behind the moon and out of radio communication with Earth. Not only were the astronauts the first humans to see the mysterious back side of the moon; while there they had to fire the service module engine to reduce their speed enough to be captured into lunar orbit—irrevocably, unless the engine would restart later and boost them back toward Earth.

Another engine burn regularized their lunar orbit at 113 kilometers above the surface. TV shared the breathtaking bird’s-eye view of the battered lunar landscape with hundreds of millions on Earth. The crew members read the creation story from Genesis and wished viewers a Merry Christmas. On Christmas Day they fired the service module engine once again, acquired the 1000-meter-per-second additional speed needed to escape lunar gravity, and triumphantly headed back to Earth. They had at close range verified the lunar landing sites as feasible and proved out the hardware and com-
As Apollo 8 came around the backside of the moon after going into lunar orbit, the crew was greeted with this haunting view of the Earth rising above the desolate lunar horizon.

Communications at lunar distance—except for the all-important last link, the lunar module.

That last link, the lunar module, was still of major concern to NASA. Two more flights were expended to confirm its readiness for lunar landing. The Apollo 9 flight (3–13 March 1969) was the first manned test of the lunar module. The big Saturn V boosted the spacecraft combination into Earth orbit. The lunar-flight drill was carefully rehearsed; the command and service modules separated from the third stage of the Saturn V, turned around, and docked with the lunar module. The lunar module fired up and moved away to 183 kilometers; then the spacecraft rendezvoused and docked.

A final test—was anything different at lunar distance? On 18 May 1969, Apollo 10 took off on a Saturn V to find out. The entire
lunar landing combination blasted out to lunar distance. Once in lunar orbit, the crew separated the lunar module from the command module, descended to within 14 kilometers of the surface, fired the ascent system, and docked with the command module. Now all systems were “go.”

On 16 July 1969, Apollo 11 lifted off for the ultimate mission of Apollo. Saturn V performed beautifully. The spacecraft combination got off to the moon. Once in lunar orbit, the crew checked out Apollo 11 slowly rose off the launch pad at Kennedy Space Center on 16 July 1969, as the Saturn V thundered aloft on the way to landing the first men on the surface of the moon.
Astronaut Neil A. Armstrong took this photograph of Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr., deploying the passive seismic experiments at Tranquility Base, while the ungainly lunar module crouches in the background.

their precarious second home, the lunar module. On 20 July the LM separated and descended to the lunar surface. At 4:18 p.m. (EST) came the word from Astronaut Neil A. Armstrong: “Houston—Tranquility Base here—the Eagle has landed.” After checkout, Armstrong set foot on the lunar surface—“one small step for a man—one giant leap for mankind.” The eight-year national commitment had been fulfilled; man was on the moon. Armstrong set up the TV camera and watched his fellow astronaut Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr., join him on the lunar surface, as Michael Collins circled the moon in the Columbia command module overhead. More than one-fifth of the earth’s population watched ghostly TV pictures of two space-suited men plodding around gingerly in an unlikely world of gray surface, boulders, and rounded hills in the background. The astronauts implanted the U.S. flag, deployed the scientific experiments to be left on the moon, collected their rock samples, and clambered back into the lunar module. The next day they blasted off in the ascent module and rendezvoused with the command module.

The astronauts returned to an ecstatic reception. For a brief moment, man’s day-to-day divisions had been suspended; the world watched and took joint pride in man’s latest achievement in exploration. Astronauts and their families made a triumphant world tour which restated mankind’s pride in this new plateau of man’s conquest of the cosmos.
Exploitation of Apollo

The worldwide euphoria over mankind’s greatest voyage of exploration did not rescue the NASA budget. At its moment of greatest triumph, the space program was being drastically cut back from the $5-billion budgets that had characterized the mid-1960s. Part of the reduction was expected; the peak of Apollo production-line expenses was past. But the depth of the cut stemmed from emotional changes in the political climate, mostly centering on the unpopular Vietnam war—its sapping expenses in lives and money, the debilitating protests at home. As Congress read the public pulse, the cosmos could wait; the Soviet threat had for the moment been put to rest; the new political reality lay in domestic problems. NASA’s fiscal 1970 budget was reduced to $3.7 billion. Something had to give. The basic Apollo mission was continued, but the last three flights had to be deleted. Space science projections were hit hard. The ambitious $2-billion Voyager program for planetary exploration dwindled into oblivion; it would later resurface as the much more modest Viking. The new Electronics Research Center in Cambridge, Massachusetts, under construction since 1964, was sacrificed—transferred to the Department of Transportation intact, a $40-million facility and 399 of 745 skilled employees.

But the bought-and-paid-for projects continued to earn dividends. An Orbiting Astronomical Observatory (OAO 2) was launched 7 December 1968. It was the heaviest and most complex automated spacecraft yet in the space science program. It took the first ultraviolet photographs of the stars. The results were portentous: first hard evidence of the existence of “black holes” in space. Mariner 6 and 7, launched in early 1969, journeyed to Mars, flew past as close as 3200 kilometers, took 198 high-quality TV photos of the planet, 2000 ultraviolet spectra, and 400 infrared spectra of the atmosphere and surface.

Other programs continued with prepaid momentum. The fifth and sixth Orbiting Solar Observatories were launched in 1969, as
OAO 2, the orbiting astronomical observatory, was the largest, heaviest, and most complex scientific spacecraft NASA had developed. With its solar panels deployed, as shown here, OAO 2 was 6.4 meters wide, weighed 2000 kilograms, and carried 11 ultraviolet telescopes into space.

was the sixth Orbiting Geophysical Observatory. The supercritical wing, product of four years of wind-tunnel research by Richard T. Whitcomb at Langley, was committed to fabrication for test at Flight Research Center. The flight tests confirmed the theoretical data; the current generation of transport aircraft could fly up to 160 kilometers per hour faster, promising significant operating economies.

1970 saw the launch of Uhuru, which scanned 95% of the celestial sphere for sources of x-rays. It discovered three new pulsar stars in addition to the one previously identified. In 1971 Mariner 9 was launched; on 10 November, the first American spacecraft went into orbit around another planet. The early months in orbit were discouraging; a gigantic dust storm covered most of the Martian surface for two months. But the dust gradually cleared; photographs in 1972 showed startling detail. Mapping 85% of the Martian surface, Mariner 9 photographs depicted higher mountains and deeper valleys than any on Earth. The rocky Martian moons, Deimos and Phobos, were also photographed. OSO 7, launched on 29 September 1971, was the first satellite to catch on film the beginning of a solar flare and the consequent streamers of hot gases that extended out 10.6 million kilometers; it would also discover “polar ice caps” on the sun—dark areas several million degrees cooler than the normal surface temper-
atures. With the confirmation of black holes, the enigmatic collapsed star remnants so dense in mass and gravity that even light cannot escape, and the previous discoveries of quasars and pulsars, these findings added up to the most exciting decade in modern astronomy.

Planetary exploration opened further vistas of other worlds. *Pioneer 10*, launched 2 March 1972, left the vicinity of Earth at the highest velocity ever achieved by a spacecraft (51,200 kilometers per hour) and took off on an epic voyage to the huge, misty planet Jupiter. Giant of the solar system, swathed with clouds, encircled by a cluster of moons, Jupiter was an inescapable target if one hoped to understand the composition of the solar system. Out from the sun, out from Earth, *Pioneer 10* ventured for a year and a half, through the unexplored Asteroid Belt and far beyond. After a 992-million-kilometer journey, on 3 December 1973 the tiny spacecraft flew past Jupiter. It survived the fierce magnetic field and sent back photographs of the huge planet and several of its moons, measured temperatures and radiation and the magnetic field. Steadily sailing past...

*As the great dust storm on Mars cleared, the circling Mariner 9 photographed this giant mountain. Some 500 kilometers across at the base and rising to a height estimated to be 25 kilometers, Olympus Mons dwarfs any mountain on Earth.*
Jupiter, as photographed by Pioneer 10 from 2.5 million kilometers out. The large black oval to the left is the famous Great Red Spot, an enormous storm that has raged for at least hundreds of years. The small spot to the right is the shadow of Jupiter's moon Io.

Jupiter and away from the sun, in 1987 Pioneer 10 would cross the orbit of Pluto, becoming the first man-made object to travel out of our solar system and into the limitless reaches of interstellar space.

Pioneer 10's partner, Pioneer 11, took off on 5 April 1973 to follow the same outward path. On 3 December 1974 it passed Jupiter at the perilously close distance of 42 000 kilometers—as opposed to 129 000 kilometers for Pioneer 10—and returned data. The composite picture from the reports of the two spacecraft depicted an enormous ball of hydrogen, with no fixed surface, emitting much more radiation than it received from the sun, shrouded with a turbulent atmosphere in which massive storms such as the Great Red Spot (40 000 kilometers in length) had raged for at least the 400 years since Galileo first trained a telescope at Jupiter. Pioneer 11 swung around the planet and, taking advantage of Jupiter's gravitational field, accelerated outward at 106 000 kilometers per hour toward the distant
planet Saturn, where in 1979 it would observe at close range this lightest of the planets (it could float on water), its mysterious rings, and its 4800-kilometer-diameter moon Titan.

Going in the other direction, *Mariner 10* left Earth on 3 November 1973, headed inward toward the sun. In February 1974 it passed Venus, gathering information that confirmed the inhospitable character of that planet. Then, using Venus’s gravitational force as propulsion, it charged on toward the innermost planet, Mercury. On 29 March 1974, *Mariner 10* flew past Mercury, providing man a 5000-times closer look at this desolate, crater-pocked, sun-seared planet than had been possible from Earth. Using the gravitational field of its

*Venus was photographed from 720,000 kilometers by Mariner 10.*
A large, fresh impact crater on Mercury was photographed by Mariner 10 from 34,000 kilometers. The crater, 120 kilometers across, looks similar to many on the moon, but because Mercury has a gravitational field 2.3 times as strong as the moon's, material ejected at impact is not hurled nearly as far on Mercury.

host planet to alter course, Mariner 10 flew out in a large elliptical orbit, circled back by Mercury a second time on 21 September 1974, and a third time on 16 March 1975. The cumulative evidence pictured a planet essentially unchanged since its creation some 4.5 billion years ago, except for heavy bombardment by meteors, with an iron core similar to Earth’s, a thin atmosphere composed mostly of helium, and a weak magnetic field.

Fascinating as was the information on our fellow-voyagers in the solar system and as important as the long-range scientific import might be, Congress and many government agencies were much more intrigued with the tangible, immediate-return, Earth-oriented program that began operations in 1972. On 23 July ERTS 1 (Earth Resources Technology Satellite) was launched into polar orbit. From that orbit it would cover three-quarters of the earth’s land surface every 18 days, at the same time of day (and therefore with the same sun angle for photography), affording virtually global real-time information on developing events such as crop inventory and health, water storage, air and water pollution, forest fires and diseases, and
recent urban population changes. In addition, it depicted the broad-area—and therefore undetectable by ground survey or aircraft reconnaissance—geologic patterns and coastal and oceanic movements. ERTS 1 also interrogated hundreds of ground sensors monitoring air and water pollution, water temperature and currents, snow depth, etc., and relayed information to central collection centers in near real-time. The response was instantaneous and widespread; foreign governments, states, local governments, universities, and a broad range of industrial concerns quickly became involved in both the exploration of techniques to exploit these new

ERTS (Earth Resources Technology Satellite) photograph of the Washington-Baltimore area in October 1972. Green, red, and infrared images from the satellite were combined at Goddard Space Flight Center. Healthy crops and trees come out bright red in the infrared. Cities and industrial areas show as green or dark gray; clear water is black or dark blue. Washington is to be seen slightly left of center on the Potomac River; Baltimore is at the top center on Chesapeake Bay.
wide-area information sources and in real-time use of the data for pressing governmental and industrial needs. Some 300 national and international research teams pored over the imagery. For the first time accurate estimates were possible of the total planting and growth status of wheat, barley, corn, and rice crops at various times during the growing season; real-time maps versus ones based on data that would have been collected over a period of years; timber cutting patterns; accurate prediction of snow run-off for water management; accurate, real-time flood damage reports. Mid-term data included indications that the encroachments of the Sahara Desert in Africa could be reversed by controlled grazing on the sparse vegetation in the fringe areas; longer range returns suggested promise in monitoring strip mining and subsequent reclamation and in identification of previously unknown extensions of Earth faults and fractures important to detection of potential earthquake zones and of associated mineral deposits.

Like the experimental communications satellites of the early 1960s, the Earth-resources satellites found an immediate clientele of governmental and commercial customers clamoring for a continuing inflow of data. The pressure made itself felt in Congress; on 22 January 1975, Landsat 2 (formerly ERTS 2) was orbited ahead of schedule to ensure continuation of the data that ERTS 1 (renamed Landsat 1) had provided for two and a half years, and a third satellite was programmed for launch in 1977. This would give confidence to experimental users of the new system that they could securely plan for continued information from the satellite system.

The Earth-resources program had another important meaning. It was a visible sign that the nature and objectives of the space program were undergoing a quiet but dramatic shift. Where the moon had been the big target during the 1960s and large and expensive programs had been the name of the game, it became increasingly clear to NASA management as the decade ended that the political climate would no longer support that kind of a space program. The key question now was, "What will this project contribute to solving everyday problems of the man-in-the-street?" One by one the 60s-type daydreams of big, away-from-Earth projects were reluctantly put aside: a manned lunar base, a manned landing on Mars, an unmanned "Grand Tour" of several of the planets. When the Space Shuttle finally won approval, it was because of its heavy dedication to studies of our Earth and its convincing economies in operation.

Another sign of the times was that NASA was increasingly
becoming a service agency. In 1970 NASA for the first time launched
more satellites for others (ComSatCorp, NOAA, DoD, foreign
governments) than for itself. Five years before only 2 of 24 launches
had been for others. Clearly this trend would continue for some years.

Meanwhile Apollo was running its impressive course. *Apollo 12*
(14–24 November 1969) repeated the *Apollo 11* adventure at another
site on the moon, the Ocean of Storms. One attraction of that site was
that *Surveyor 3* had been squatting there for two and a half years. A
pin-point landing put the LM within 183 meters of the Surveyor
spacecraft. In addition to deploying scientific instruments and
collecting rock samples from the immediate surroundings, Astronauts
Conrad and Bean cut off pieces from *Surveyor 3*, including the TV
camera, for return to Earth and analysis after 30 months of exposure
to the lunar environment.

*Apollo 13* was launched 11 April 1970, to continue lunar explora-
tion. But 56 hours into the flight, well on the way to the moon, there
was a thump back in the service module behind the astronauts. An
oxygen tank had ruptured. Pressure dropped alarmingly. What was
the total damage? Had other systems been affected? How crippled
was the spacecraft combination? The backup analysis system on
Earth sprang into action. Using the meager data available, crews at
contractor plants all over the country simulated, calculated, and
reported. The verdict: *Apollo 13* was seriously, perhaps mortally,
wounded. There was not air or water or electricity to sustain three
men on the shortest possible return path to Earth. But, ground crews
and astronauts asked simultaneously, what about the lunar module,
a self-contained spacecraft unaffected by the disaster? The lunar
landing was out of the question anyway; the lifesaving question was
how to get three men around the moon and back to Earth before
their life-supporting consumables ran out. Could the LM substitute
for the command module, supplying propulsion and oxygen and
water for an austere return trip? The simulations said yes. *Apollo 13*
was reprogrammed to loop around the moon and set an emergency
course for Earth return. The descent engine for the LM responded
nobly; off they went back to Earth. It was a near thing—powered
down to the point of minimum heating and communication,
limiting activity to the least possible to save oxygen. Again the
flexibility and depth of the system came to the rescue; when reentry
was safely within the limited capabilities of the crippled Apollo, the
“lifeboat” LM was fondly jettisoned along with the wounded service
module. *Apollo 13* reentered safely.

The next flight was delayed while the causes and fixes for the
near-tragedy on *Apollo 13* were sorted out. On 31 January 1971, *Apollo 14* lifted off, the beginning of the scientific exploration of the moon. The major new system was a transporter, a cart on which to load equipment and bring back rock samples. A major target of the *Apollo 14* mission to Fra Mauro was to climb the walls of the Cone Crater; the attempt failed near the top when the walls turned out to be steeper than anticipated.

*Apollo 15* introduced the moon car, the lunar rover. With this electric-powered, four-wheel drive vehicle developed at Marshall at a cost of $60 million, the astronauts roamed beyond the narrow confines of their landing site and explored the area. Astronauts on this flight covered 28 kilometers of lunar surface, visited a number of craters in the Hadley-Apennines area, and photographed the ghostly ravine Hadley Rille. Thanks to the lowered exertion level because of the lunar rover, exploration time was doubled.

The remaining Apollo missions now had all the equipment

Apollo 15 Astronaut David R. Scott was photographed by the lunar rover, which was parked at the edge of the deep lunar trench Hadley Rille.
planned for lunar exploration. Apollo 16 landed in the Descartes area in April 1972, stayed 71 hours, provided photos and measurements of the lunar properties. Apollo 17, launched 7 December 1972, ended the Apollo program with the most productive scientific mission of the lunar exploration program. The site, Taurus-Littrow, had been selected on the basis of previous flights. Objectives were to seek out both oldest and youngest rocks to fill in the geologic history of the moon. For the first time a trained geologist, Harrison H. Schmitt, was on a crew, adding his professional observations. EVA time was over 22 hours and the lunar rover traveled some 35 kilometers.

Apollo was ended. From beginning to end, it had lasted 11½ years, cost $23.5 billion, landed 12 men on the moon, and produced an unassessable amount of evidence and knowledge. Technologically it had produced hardware systems several orders of magnitude more capable than their predecessors. In various combinations, the components of this technology could be used for a wider variety of explorations than the nation could possibly afford. The luxury of choice was, which of a half dozen possible missions?

Scientific answers were going to be returned over several decades. The Lunar Receiving Laboratory had been constructed in Houston to be the “archive” of the 382 kilograms of physical lunar samples that had been returned from various parts of the moon by six lunar-landing crews. Scientists in this country and 54 foreign countries were analyzing the samples with an impressive variety of instruments and the expertise of many scientific disciplines. Gross results had already established that the moon was a separate entity from Earth, formed at the same time as Earth some 4.5 billion years ago; that it had its own volcanic history; that with no protective atmosphere it had been bombarded by eons of meteors from outer space, which had plowed up the surface and in larger impacts had triggered secondary lava flows from the lunar interior. Refinement of data would go on for decades.

Apollo had proved many other things: the ability of our diversified system of government, industry, and universities to mobilize behind a common national purpose and produce on schedule an immense and diverse system directed to a common purpose. It not only argued that man could do many things in space, whether extended lunar exploration from permanent lunar bases or manned excursions to Mars, but argued that solutions to many of man’s major problems on Earth—pollution, food supply, natural disasters such as earthquakes and hurricanes, etc.—could be ameliorated or
controlled by the combination of space technology and the large-scale management techniques applied to it.

Next in manned spaceflight came Skylab. Trimmed back to one orbital workshop and three astronaut flights, Skylab had had a hectic financial and planning career, the converse of Apollo. The revised plan called for an S-IVB stage of the Saturn V to be outfitted as a two-story orbiting laboratory, one floor being living quarters and the other working room. The major objective of Skylab was to determine whether men could physically withstand extended stays in space and continue to do useful work. Medical data from the Gemini and Apollo flights had not completely answered the question. Since there would be far more room in the 27-meter-long orbital workshop than in any previous spacecraft, William C. Schneider, Skylab program director, devised a more extensive experiment schedule than all previous spaceflights combined. Most ambitious in terms of hardware was the Apollo telescope mount; five major experiments would cover the entire range of solar physics and make it the most powerful astronomical observatory ever put in orbit. The other major areas of experimentation were Earth-resources observations and medical experiments involving the three-man crew. There were important subcategories of experiments: the electric furnace, for example, would explore possibilities of using the weightless environment to perform industrial processes that were impossible or less effective on 1-g Earth, such as forming perfectly round ball bearings or growing larger crystals, much in demand in the electronics industry.

On 14 May 1973 a giant Saturn V lifted off from Kennedy Space Center to place the unmanned 74,910-kilogram orbital workshop in Earth orbit. Within minutes after launch, disquieting news filtered through the telemetry reports from the Saturn V. The large, delicate meteoroid shade on the outside of the workshop had apparently been torn off by the vibrations of launch. In tearing off it had caused serious damage to the two wings of solar cells that were to supply most of the electric power to the workshop; one of them had sheared off, the other was snagged in the folded position. Once the workshop was in orbit, the news worsened. The loss of the big shade exposed the metal skin of the workshop to the hot sunshine; internal temperatures soared to 325 K. This heat not only threatened its habitation by astronauts, but if prolonged might fog sensitive film and generate poisonous gases.

The launch of the first crew was twice postponed, while the far-flung ground support team worked around the clock for 10 frantic
Mission accomplished, the Skylab orbital workshop sails serenely above cloud-shrouded Earth in this photo taken by the last crew as they leave to return to Earth. The mission-saving emergency shroud shows clearly against the dark surface of the vehicle.

days, trying to improvise fixes that would salvage the $2.6-billion program. With only partial knowledge of the precise degree and nature of the damage, engineers had to work out fixes that met the known problems, yet were versatile enough to cope with unknown ones. There were two major efforts: first, to devise a deployable shade that the astronauts could spread over the metal surface of the workshop; the other was to devise a versatile tool kit of cutters and snippers to release the undeployed solar wing from whatever prevented it from unfolding.

On 25 May 1973, an Apollo command and service module combination was lifted into orbit by a Saturn IB. Apollo docked with the workshop on the 25th. The crew entered it the next day and deployed a makeshift parasol through the solar airlock. The effect was immediate; internal temperature began to drop. On 7 June Astronauts Conrad and Kerwin clambered outside the workshop and after a tense struggle succeeded in cutting the metal straps that ensnared the remaining solar wing; it slowly deployed and electrical power poured into the storage batteries. Human ingenuity and courage had made the workshop operational again.

The remaining Skylab missions were almost anticlimactic after the dramatic rescue of the workshop. With only minor problems, the missions ticked off their complicated schedules of experiments. In spite of the initial diversion, the first crew obtained 80% of the solar data planned; 12 of 15 Earth-resources runs were completed; and all
of the 16 medical experiments went as planned. Its 28-day mission completed, the crew undocked and returned to Earth.

The second crew was launched on 28 July 1973, completed almost 60 days in orbit, and exceeded by one-third the solar observations and Earth-resources runs planned. All the medical experiments were performed. The third crew (launched 16 November 1973) completed an 84-day flight with all experiments performed, as well as the additional observations of the surprise cosmic visitor, comet Kohoutek.

The vast mass of astronomical and Earth-resources data from the Skylab program would take years to analyze. A more immediate result was apparent in the medical data and the industrial experiments. With the corrective exercises available on Skylab, there was no physiological barrier to the length of time man could survive and function in space. Man's biological functions did indeed stabilize after several weeks in zero-g. The industrial experiments gave strong evidence that the melting and solidification process was promisingly different in weightlessness; single crystals grew five times as large as those producible on Earth. Some high-cost industrial processes apparently had new potential in space.
On the Eve of Shuttle

While Skylab was being built, other events significant to the future of space exploration were taking place. The initiatives bore the imprint of Thomas O. Paine, acting administrator after Webb's resignation in 1968 and administrator of NASA from March 1969 until he returned to industry in September 1970. One was a broad approach to increased cooperation in space exploration. As had so many of our international space initiatives in the postwar period, this effort offered separate proposals to the Soviet Union and to Western European countries. The approach to the Soviet Union began in 1968, with suggestions for advanced cooperation, especially in the expensive arena of manned spaceflight. One area of Soviet vulnerability might be rescue of astronauts and cosmonauts. By now the Soviet Union had lost four cosmonauts in flight, three in one accident, one in another. They had always evidenced a singular concern for cosmonaut safety. Perhaps some joint program could develop a system of international space rescue. The dynamics seemed right; by 1969 the evidence was clear that, whether the Soviet Union had in fact been in a moon-landing race with the United States, the United States was ahead. Secrecy in space was virtually nonexistent; size of payloads, destinations of missions, performance—all were detectable by tracking systems.

Paine's first offer was for Soviet linkup with the Skylab orbital workshop. But the very hardware implied inequity. The Soviets were not interested. Further explorations found lively Soviet interest in a completely new project to develop compatible docking and rescue systems for manned spaceflight. Negotiations proceeded rapidly. Completed by George M. Low, acting administrator after Paine's departure, the grand plan for the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) called for a mutual docking and crew exchange mission that could develop the necessary equipment for international rescue and establish such criteria for future manned systems from both nations. A Soyuz spacecraft would lift off from the Soviet Union and establish itself in orbit. Then an Apollo spacecraft would be launched to
rendezvous and dock with the Soviet craft. Using a specially developed docking unit between the two spacecraft, they would adjust pressurization differences of the two spacecraft and spend two days docked together, exchanging crews and conducting experiments. All of this was agreed to and rapidly became a significant test for the validity of the detente agreements which President Richard M. Nixon had negotiated with the Soviet Union.

An unprecedented detailed cooperation between the two superpowers ensued. A series of joint working groups of Soviet and American specialists met over several years to work out the various hardware details and operational procedures. At the Nixon-Brezhnev summit in 1973, the prospective launch date was narrowed to July 1975. The most concrete example of U.S.-USSR cooperation in space proceeded with good faith on both sides. The mission flew as scheduled on 15 July and smoothly fulfilled all objectives.

The other major initiative of Paine’s began on the domestic front and then expanded to the international front. Skylab having been narrowed to the point that it would be a limited answer to the future of manned spaceflight, President Nixon appointed a task group to recommend broad outlines for the next 10 years of space
exploration. Within this group, chaired by Vice President Spiro T. Agnew, Paine won acceptance for the concept of the Space Shuttle. In its original conception, the Space Shuttle would have been a rocket-boosted airplane-like structure that would take off from a regular airport runway, fly to orbital speed and altitude, deploy satellites into orbit, repair or retrieve satellites already in orbit, and, using an additional Space Tug stage, lift manned and unmanned payloads throughout the solar system. Compared to earlier methods, the big changes would be that the launcher and Shuttle would be reusable for up to 100 flights, halving the cost per pound in orbit. But subsidiary changes were only slightly less important: satellites could be designed for orbital rigors, not the additional ones of rocket launch. In a manned mission, the Shuttle could handle up to a seven-man crew in orbit; three of these could be non-pilot scientists who went along to operate their experiments in an unpressurized laboratory carried in the Shuttle cargo bay. The flight crew alone could deliver 29,500 kilograms of assorted satellites into orbit and could land on Earth with a returning payload of 14,500 kilograms.

The task group submitted its report to the president on 15 September 1969. It offered three levels of effort: option 1 would feature a lunar-orbital station, an Earth-orbital station, and a lunar surface base in the 1980s; option 2 envisioned a Mars manned mission in 1986; option 3 included initial development of space station and reusable shuttles but would defer landing on Mars until some time before the end of the century. Eventual peak expenditures on these options were estimated to vary from $10 billion down to $5 billion per year. Study and rework went on for more than two years. Paine left NASA to return to industry; his successor, James C. Fletcher, took office in April 1971 and immediately reviewed the status of the Space Shuttle, particularly for its political salability. He became quickly convinced that the Shuttle as then envisioned was too costly to win approval. Total costs for its development were estimated at $10.5 billion. Fletcher instigated a rigorous restudy and redesign which cut the cost in half, mainly by dropping the plan for unassisted takeoff and substituting two external, recoverable, reusable solid rockets and an expendable external fuel tank. This proved to be salable; President Nixon approved the development of the Space Shuttle on 5 January 1972.

First Paine and then Fletcher had been trying to get a commitment for a major system in the Shuttle from Western European nations. Their own joint space program had not been an unqualified
success. Western European nations had joined to form two international space organizations, ELDO to produce launch vehicles and ESRO to produce spacecraft and collect and interpret results. The technical capability was there, but political liabilities constantly plagued and disrupted—who paid how much of what, which nations got which contracts, etc.? The boosters had three stages, each developed in a different country. The launch record was a gloomy history of one kind of failure after another. After years of effort, Western Europe had little to show for its independent space program. A new start was in the air. It was into this restive environment that Paine came to talk about the next generation of the U.S. space program and to hold out promise of some discrete major segment to be developed and produced in Europe—a partnership that would give them a meaningful piece of the action with full pride of useful participation. Europe's response was warm, though it took a while to coalesce. Finally the joint decision was made: Western Europe would build the self-contained Spacelab that would fit in the cargo bay of the Shuttle spacecraft; a pressurized module would provide a shirtsleeve environment for scientists to operate large-scale experiments; an unpressurized scientific instrument pallet would give large telescopes and other instruments direct access to the space environment. The cost, an estimated $370 million. In 1975 Canada joined the international effort, agreeing to foot the $30-million research and development bill for the remote manipulator that will be used to emplace and retrieve satellites in orbit.

The Space Shuttle promised a whole new way of spaceflight: nonpilots in space; multiple payloads that could be placed where they were wanted or picked up out of orbit; new designs of satellites, free from the expensive safeguards against the vibrations and shocks of launch by rocket. The $5.2-billion program would buy two prototypes for test in 1978 and 1979. Projected flight programs from 1980 to 1991 identified a total of almost a thousand payloads to be handled by the Shuttle. True space transportation was in the offing.

In space science the big program was Viking, which represented the first major fruit of a decision NASA had made some years before: to focus the space science program on the planets. Apollo, the reasoning went, would keep scientists busy for years analyzing the mass of data and samples that had been returned from the moon. Not until that information had been assimilated would there be a need to consider whether more information was needed from the moon and, if so, what kind.

Meanwhile space science, while not neglecting the study of the
sun and the universe, would concentrate on the inner planets of our solar system and begin an assault on the enigmatic outer planets. Apollo had shown, and the early planetary flights had confirmed, that every celestial body has worthwhile lessons to teach—lessons that are important in their own right as science as well as lessons that illuminate problems on Earth. Why does Earth have the kinds and proportions of minerals that it has? Why tectonic plates and volcanism? Why oceans and the kind of atmosphere it has? Why does our atmosphere circulate and transfer heat the way it does? Every new body we study represents a new laboratory and a different data set.

So it was that Mars, the most likely of the inner planets, became the first target of the more ambitious planetary program. In two launches the Viking program proposed to deploy four spacecraft in the vicinity of Mars; two orbiters would photograph the surface and serve as communications relays, while two landers would descend to the Martian surface and photograph the terrain, measure and monitor the atmosphere and climate, and conduct chemical and biological tests on the soil for evidence of rudimentary life forms. It was very ambitious technology and complex science to be operated from 65,000,000 kilometers distance. But perform Viking did, in a technological triumph equal to—and in some ways greater than—the Apollo landings on the moon. Arriving in the vicinity of Mars in mid-1976, the spacecraft went into orbit around the planet. Subsequently the two landers arced down to the rock-strewn surface where each landed safely. The two orbiters circled the planet, mapping most of the surface. That surface depicted by the orbiters, plus the weather and seismic reports from the landers, told a story of a planet with a quiescent present but a very different, active past. Volcanoes half again as high as any on Earth and great eroded canyons deeper and longer than any on Earth spoke of times, probably three billion years ago, when Mars was very active volcanically, with widespread liquid flows. Trace gases in the present thin atmosphere indicate a much denser atmosphere in the past. There is water, frozen in the polar ice caps; there are occasional dust storms; there are seasonal as well as diurnal variations in temperature; there is only a trace of seismic activity now. Viking’s elaborate biology instruments detected no evidence of life forms. When the intensive one-year study of the planet ended, the spacecraft continued observations and reporting at intervals, providing further data on surface features, climate, and weather.

Earth’s nearest planetary neighbor, Venus, was also probed
Viking orbiter montage of 102 photos of Mars in February 1980 (left) shows the Valles Marineris bisecting the planet, a gorge that would stretch from coast to coast of North America; to its left, three large volcanoes poke up through the unusual cloud cover. Below, Viking Lander 1 views its surroundings after landing in July 1976. The horizon is about three kilometers distant. From the left toward the middle, wind-blown materials have formed low dunes. The larger of the two boulders in the center is eight meters from the spacecraft and three meters in diameter.

during the last half of the 1970s. Two Pioneer spacecraft were launched toward Venus in the summer of 1978. Studying Venus presents a notably different problem than Mars or Earth. Its thick, heavy, hot atmosphere is impervious to normal photography and can be "seen" through only by means of radar. The first spacecraft arriving at Venus in December 1978, therefore, was an orbiter equipped with mapping radar to delineate the major features on the surface. The second spacecraft was a bus which released four probes in a broad pattern; these parachuted slowly through the atmosphere, sending back measurements until they crashed. The Venusian atmosphere, they reported, is remarkably similar in composition and temperature on the day and night sides. There is a heavy sulfur content, with oxygen and water vapor at lower levels. By 1980 the orbiter had mapped over 80% of the Venusian surface. Major features resemble two continents and a massive island chain—except there is no ocean. Instead a rolling plain envelops the planet. One continent and the island chain are in the northern hemisphere. The continent is the size of Australia and has mountains taller than Everest; the island chain is apparently composed of two massive shield volcanoes more extensive than the Hawaii-Midway complex. The continent in the southern hemisphere is about half the size of
Africa and exposes the lowest elevations on Venus in the Great Rift Valley, a huge trench 280 kilometers wide and 2250 long, with a depth similar to that of the great rift on Mars.

Study of the outer planets using more sophisticated spacecraft began in 1977 with the launch of *Voyager 1* and *2* on 18-month flights to Jupiter. The *Voyager* system, *Science* magazine reported, was improved "by a factor of 150,000 times" over the *Mariner 4* system, which flew to Mars in 1965. *Voyager 1* made its closest approach to Jupiter in March 1979, with *Voyager 2* following in July. The sensors recorded in fine-grain detail the intricate weather patterns on Jupiter and detected massive lightning bolts in the cloud tops. Passes by the Galilean moons revealed startling differences: active volcanoes on Io, ancient rings on Callisto marking the edges of huge impact craters, Europa's surface laced with cracks from crustal movement, and Ganymede with a varying grooved and cratered surface.

With a boost from Jupiter's gravitational field, the Voyagers set course for distant, beringed Saturn, where *Voyager 1* arrived in November 1980. *Voyager 2* was scheduled to arrive in August 1981, after which, if sufficient control gas remains, the mission may be extended to far-away Uranus. The venerable *Pioneer 11* had visited Saturn in September 1979, discovering faint rings outside those discernible from Earth and demonstrating a safe flight path for *Voyager 2* to follow, if it goes on to Uranus.

In the study of the sun and its interrelationships with Earth, NASA continued analysis of the mass of data acquired by Skylab's Apollo telescope mount. *OSO 8*, launched in 1975 to make a detailed study of the minimum phase of the 11-year solar cycle, returned data until 1978. *Helios 2*, part of a joint program with the Federal Republic of Germany to study the basic solar processes, was launched in 1976. As the solar cycle moved toward its maximum phase, the *Solar Maximum Mission* was launched in 1980 to study solar flares in the wavelengths in which the sun releases most of its energy.

To study the effects of solar radiation on Earth's magnetosphere and atmosphere, NASA launched *International Sun-Earth Explorer 1* and *2* in 1977. Positioned some distance apart but in similar elliptical orbits, the two satellites (one provided by NASA, the other by the European Space Agency) monitored the complex interactions of Earth's magnetosphere with incoming solar radiation. In 1978 *ISEE 3* was added to the system. Positioned much farther out from Earth, the spacecraft receives the solar wind and flares about an hour earlier, when they are unaffected by the magnetosphere.
Voyager 1 and 2 photographs of Jupiter and its moon Io. Above, the violent weather patterns that constantly swirl around the edges of the Great Red Spot, the huge storm larger than Earth. Below, the vivid surface of Io, punctured with volcanoes and stained with their flow.
In study of the universe, the major program of the second half of the 1970s was the series of three high-energy astronomy observatories. *HEAO 1*, launched in 1977 and the heaviest scientific satellite to date, surveyed the sky for x-ray sources, identifying several hundred new ones. *HEAO 2*, following the next year, studied in detail the most promising of those sources. *HEAO 3*, launched in 1979, surveyed the sky for gamma-ray sources and cosmic-ray flux. The other satellite orbited for study of the universe was the *International Ultraviolet Explorer*. Carrying instruments from NASA, the United Kingdom, and the European Space Agency, *IUE* recorded ultraviolet emissions using two ground control centers from which the experimenters could direct the observations of the satellite much as is done with telescopes in observatories on Earth.

An intensified activity for NASA in the latter half of the 1970s was the congressionally mandated study of Earth’s upper atmosphere, to learn more about the effects of gases such as freon on the ozone layer. A continuous measuring program resulted; several agencies provided data from which a detailed model of the complex processes could be constructed.

The space applications program was active in the late 1970s. Communications research continued with the launch in 1976 of *Communications Technology Satellite 1*. A joint project with Canada, *CTS 1* investigated the possibilities of high-powered satellites transmitting public service information to small, inexpensive antennas in remote locations.

*Landsat 3* was launched in 1978, providing continuity for the flow of data to a growing number of users of Earth-resources information. The most ambitious new Earth-resources program was in agriculture. Encouraged by the results of the experimental Large Area Crop Inventory Experiment that ended in 1978 after demonstrating 90% accuracy in predicting the wheat production in the U.S. Southern Great Plains and USSR, the Department of Agriculture, with technical assistance from NASA and NOAA, began AgRISTARS (Agriculture and Resources Inventory Surveys Through Aerospace Remote Sensing).

A new form of resources surveying was attempted in 1978 with the launch of *Seasat 1*. Intended to report on such variables as sea temperature, wave heights, surface-wind speeds and direction, sea ice, and storms, *Seasat 1* was an instant success. Unfortunately its life was cut short after three months in orbit by electrical power failure. Enough data had been recorded, however, to verify the effectiveness...
of the instrumentation and the existence of a group of potential users in the weather, maritime, and fisheries communities.

In environmental research, NASA launched *Nimbus 7* in 1978, the last of the series of large, experimental weather satellites. One of its instruments, together with one on *Nimbus 4* and the observations of *SAGE* (Stratospheric Aerosol and Gas Experiment, launched in 1979), provided a profile and model of the ozone layer. The nation’s weather satellite system was augmented in 1978 by the launch of *Tiros-N* and *NOAA 6*, the first two of a new generation of improved weather satellites in near-polar orbit. *Tiros-N* was a principal U.S contributor to the international Global Atmospheric Research Program.

In geophysical research, a small experimental *Heat Capacity Mapping Mission* satellite was launched in 1978 to derive day and night temperatures of rock formations as a possible means of locating mineral-bearing strata. In 1979 another small satellite, *Magsat*, went into low orbit to take finer scale readings of anomalies in Earth’s magnetic field that are directly related to crustal structure and therefore to possible mineral deposits. In earthquake research NASA completed in 1979 the fourth phase of data gathering along the San Andreas Fault in California. By means of satellite ranging from specified points along both sides of the fault, experimenters estimated that the tectonic plates were moving 6 to 12 centimeters per year.

The largest consumer of the NASA budget and of management attention during the late 1970s was the Space Shuttle. Since its beginnings in the early 1970s, the development story for the Space Shuttle had been quite different from that of Apollo in the 1960s. The original projected costs had been halved to win the necessary political approval of the program; this cut was only achieved by making severe compromises in the original design—from a system that would take off from a runway like an airplane, fly into orbit, and return to land on a runway like an airplane, to a system that would take off vertically like a rocket, jettison the boosters and fuel tanks, and return to land on a runway like an airplane. This initial compromise was not to be the last, as the budget continued to be lean year after year. Potential development problems were worked around because the money was not available to investigate them. The consequences of this insufficient level of research during the development cycle were not apparent in the years when the Shuttle was being designed and the components fabricated. As late as 1977,
when the orbiter Enterprise was carried to altitude by a B-52 and dropped to make approach and landing flights at Dryden Flight Research Center, progress was seen to be sure, if a little slow.

By 1978 it became obvious that serious problems were dogging the main engines. A cluster of three of these high-pressure liquid-hydrogen-fueled engines would propel the orbiter into orbit, aided by two solid-rocket boosters. Not only were the main engines expected to produce the highest specific impulse of any rocket engine yet flown, but they also had to be throttleable and reusable—to fire again and again for many flights before being replaced. When by 1979 a series of painstaking component-by-component analyses had identified and fixed most of the problems and individual engines were experiencing better test runs, the first firings of the clustered engines generated a new set of problems. Grudgingly these too yielded to concentrated engineering rework; by the end of 1980 the total requirement of 80,000 seconds of test firing was at hand.

The other pacing item on the orbiter was the thermal protection tiling that would shield most of the orbiter surface from the searing heat of reentry. Manufacture and application of the 33,000 tiles lagged so badly that early in 1979 NASA decided to ferry the orbiter from the manufacturer’s plant in California to Kennedy Space Center so that the remainder of the tiles could be applied there while other work and system checks were being done. But problems continued. The tiles were brittle and easily damaged; they did not bond to the metal properly and thousands had to be reapplied; they were too fragile and more thousands had to be removed, made more dense, and reapplied. Between the tiles and the engines, the Space Shuttle budget overran for several years and the date for the first flight slipped two painful years, with serious consequences for many government, domestic, and international customers. By the end of 1980, however, first flight in the spring of 1981 seemed truly possible. Operational flights were solidly booked out to the middle of the 1980s and the other three orbiters were moving through manufacturing.

NASA’s advanced research examined a range of improvements for space, energy, and aeronautical systems. Research on space systems included new kinds of thermal coatings for portions of the Space Shuttle orbiter, lighter weight and more heat-resistant structural components made from composite materials for use in spacecraft, a charge-coupled sensor for exploring the near-infrared portion of the spectrum, a small liquid-oxygen-fueled engine for orbital transfer,
The Space Shuttle had its successes and problems. Above, the orbiter Enterprise is touching down at Dryden Flight Research Center in October 1977 as it nears the end of its successful descent and landing tests. Below, in July 1980 some 8000 thermal protection tiles were still to be installed on the orbiter.

ion thrusters for long-distance spaceflight or station keeping, and solar cells five times lighter and thinner than previous ones.

The late 1970s witnessed a substantial increase in energy research in NASA as the nation reacted to the oil shortages of 1973 and 1978. Mostly funded by the Department of Energy, the research has employed many of NASA's traditional skills: in propulsion,
development of automotive and industrial gas turbines; in energy generation, development of improved and cheaper solar cells, long-life fuel cells, and large, more efficient wind turbines.

In aeronautical research, the focus in these years was on making aircraft more efficient in use of energy, making engines quieter, and reducing pollution. One approach to energy conservation was reduction of aircraft weight through the use of composite materials in structural components. Another was in systematic improvement of engine components for better fuel and emission performance and for durability. Another was improved aerodynamic performance, first with the supercritical wing and then with the oblique wing, which by altering its angle of attack vis-à-vis the fuselage could tailor lift to speed; use of winglets, which promise a 6–8% reduction in drag; slotted panels on the wings to restore laminar flow of air over the wing, thereby reducing drag. Emission control was improved by 25–30% for large turbine engines in 1976–1977 and extended to small turbines in 1978 and 1979.

LOOKING AHEAD

NASA budgets of the late 1970s permitted few new starts. By 1979, for example, launches for NASA’s own program—as opposed to those NASA launched for others—were down to three, by 1980 to one. The planetary missions that were the most exciting part of the space program in the last half of the 1970s have been reduced to one mission in the first half of the 1980s: Galileo will send an orbiter and an atmospheric probe to Jupiter, beginning in 1984. In space astronomy, the Space Telescope is the central mission. In orbit, it will extend man’s vision almost to the edge of the universe, exceeding the capability of the best ground-based telescope by seven times the distance that can be penetrated and by 50 times the faintness of objects that can be detected. In solar physics, the International Solar Polar Mission, to launch in 1983, will use the gravity assist of Jupiter to approach the sun out of the ecliptic plane and view directly its polar areas. In applications, Landsat D, equipped with new-generation sensors, is to be launched in 1982.

Of all programs coming into flight status in the first half of the 1980s, the most promising in possibilities for innovation and unforeseen opportunities is the Space Shuttle. Designed to be a “space truck” that places into orbit all United States satellites as well as corporate and international satellites, designed to operate with the Spacelab that offers scientists shirtsleeve-comfort access to the space
environment, the Space Shuttle will much enlarge the possibilities of exploitation of the space environment. From its first few flights, it should unveil other aptitudes and unexpected potential, challenging the human imagination to continue to explore the largest laboratory man will ever have—the universe.

RETROSPECT

Where has NASA taken us? From the thin ribbon of Earth’s atmosphere out to the edge of the solar system in two decades. The moon, Mars, Venus, Jupiter, Mercury, Saturn being explored. Pulsars, quasars, black holes, all stunning clues to the life cycle of the universe. Solar flares, the corona, the internal structure of the sun, all of which have illuminated research to harness fusion energy on Earth. Quiet aircraft engines, the supercritical wing, economies in fuel consumption in aircraft. Vast improvements in worldwide communications, weather prediction, crop inventories, in knowledge of oceanic ice movements, of fish migrations, or urban development, of broad patterns of geological formations relating to earthquakes and mineral deposits. An expanded industrial and university capability for high-caliber research and development, for ultraprecision, high-performance workmanship. Thousands of new products in the commercial marketplace. These were some of the more immediate returns from the $79-billion investment this nation had made in civil aeronautics and space research through 1980.

Beyond these immediate returns, which are most noteworthy of the less tangible but nonetheless real returns on investment? The international space program, with more than 80 nations involved in mutually beneficial space projects? The joint Soviet-American manned spaceflight, which straightened at least momentarily the tortuous path of superpower competition by its irrefutable need for, and achievement of, significant cooperation? The longer term import of new insights from space sciences on origins of our spacecraft Earth, its mineral and energy resources, the fragility of its thin atmospheric envelope?

And beyond the present and near future, what of the historical lessons? Where else in the 20th-century history of our nation is more clearly encapsulated our dangerous national trait of international roulette, of a deep-seated complacency that can be penetrated only by extreme challenge: World War I and the too-late founding of NACA; World War II and the belated threefold expansion of NACA; the Cold War and scrambling from behind to NASA and Apollo?
The course of history tells us that new truths, once exposed, defy turning back the clock. The door to aeronautics and space has been opened. It can no more be slammed shut than could the door opened by Gutenberg's printing press or by gunpowder; by Galileo's telescope or by the steam engine; by Pasteur's discovery of germs or by the unleashing of nuclear energy. History impartially muses: who will have the vision and steadfastness of purpose to make the most of this newly opened door?

Finally, what of long-term questions? Will peaceful space competition prove to be a constructive alternative to war on Earth? Will space colonization be the eventual answer to overpopulation and depletion of the fragile planet Earth? Are there super-civilizations somewhere in the universe that can teach Earthlings how to resolve their self-centered conflicts?

At this stage in our excursion into the vastness of space, it is of course too early to venture answers. We are presumptuous even to formulate questions. In all humility, only one finding is certain: our first faltering steps into space have reaped incalculable, unforeseen rewards. Future possibilities are as limitless as man's enterprise chooses to venture.
Bibliography

The history of aeronautics, and even more so the history of astronautics, is fertile territory for the researcher, simply because it is a big field in which little serious work has been done.

The most ready access to NASA history is probably through the existing and forthcoming volumes of history and chronology produced in the NASA historical program. A list of such publications is available on request from the NASA History Office, NASA Hq., Washington, D.C. 20546. The archives of the History Office are open to researchers. Each of the NASA installations maintains record files on its portion of the NASA program and accession lists as a guide to records retired to the regional Federal Record Centers. The computerized information system RECON offers quick access to the technical literature.

The following titles will be helpful to those interested in the history of aeronautical research and the space program:


Index

Abbott, Ira, 17  
Aerodynamics, 2–4, 9–12  
Aeronautical industry, Europe, 1, 5, 62  
Aeronautical industry, U.S., 1–2, 98  
Aeronautical research, 2–8, 10, 18, 20, 62, 97  
Agena (Gemini rendezvous vehicle), 41, 48–49, 50 ill.  
Agriculture, Dept. of, 93  
Air Force, U.S., 9, 41, 44  
Aldrin, Edwin A., Jr., 51–52, 70 ill.  
Allen, H. Julian, 12–13  
“All up” concept, 53, 66  
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 25, 34  
Ames, Joseph S., 2, 6  
Ames Research Center, 6 ill., 39, 65  
Apollo missions:  
Apollo 4, 65  
Apollo 6, 66  
Apollo 7, 66–67  
Apollo 8, 67, 68 ill.  
Apollo 9, 68  
Apollo 10, 68–69  
Apollo 11, 69 ill., 70, 79  
Apollo 12, 79  
Apollo 13, 79–80  
Apollo 14, 80  
Apollo 15, 80 ill.  
Apollo 16, 80–81  
Apollo 17, 81  
Apollo 204 fire, 54–56, 65  
Apollo program, 32, 36, 41–46, 53, 56–57, 71, 81–82, 88–89  
Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP), 85, 86 ill., 98  
Apollo spacecraft, 30–32, 54. See also Command module, Lunar module, Service module.  
Apollo Telescope Mount, 57, 82, 84 ill., 91  
Ariel 1 (U.K. satellite), 34  
Arms race, 1, 8–9  
Armstrong, Neil A., 49, 70 ill.  
Army, U.S., 2, 9  
Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA), 21–22  
Army Corps of Engineers, 31, 45  
Astronauts, 34, 70. See also Manned space-flight.  
Atlas (ICBM; launch vehicle), 9, 13, 23, 41, 53  
Atmospheric research, 57–58, 93, 98  
Atomic bomb, 8–9  
Atomic Energy Commission, 19, 24  
B-70 (research aircraft), 62  
Baltimore, 77 ill.  
Batteries. See Energy research.  
Bean, Alan L., 79  
Black holes, 71, 73  
Blagonravov, Anatoliy A., 34  
Callisto (Galilean moon), 91  
Canada, 93  
Cape Canaveral, 33 ill., 44, 55 ill. See also Kennedy Space Center.  
Centaur (launch vehicle), 24  
Cernan, Eugene A., 50  
Chaffee, Roger B., 55  
Chamberlin, James A., 41  
Civil aviation, 1–2, 63  
Collins, Michael, 50, 70  
Command module (Apollo), 32, 54, 55 ill., 56, 67, 69–70, 83, 86 ill.  
Communications Satellite Corp. (ComSat-Corp), 38, 61, 79  
Communications Technology Satellite 1, 93  
Concorde (supersonic commercial transport aircraft), 62  
Conrad, Charles, Jr., 79, 83  
Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Co., 9  
Cooper, L. Gordon, 46  
Cosmonauts, 91. See also Manned space-flight.  
Crossfield, Scott, 10  
D-558-2 (research aircraft), 10  
Debus, Kurt H., 44  
Defense, Dept. of, 9, 15, 17, 20, 23–25, 79  
Doolittle, James H., 16  
Draper, C. Stark, 30  
Dryden, Hugh L., 16, 17, 18 ill., 19, 28, 29, 34, 63
Dryden Flight Research Center, 11 ill., 65 ill., 95, 96 ill.
Dyna-Soar project, 24

Earth (planet), 26 ill., 68 ill., 77 ill., 83 ill.
Earth-orbit rendezvous, 31
Earth-resources satellite program, 62, 93–94, 98
Echo (communications satellite), 25
Eggers, Alfred J., 13, 25
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 17, 18 ill.
ELDO (international space organization), 88
Energy research, 40, 103–04
Enos (chimpanzee), 33
Enterprise (Space Shuttle orbiter), 95, 96 ill.
ERTS 1 (Earth Resources Technology Satellite; Landsat 1), 76, 77 ill., 78
ERTS 2 (Landsat 2), 78
ESRO (international space organization), 88
Europa (Galilean moon), 91
European Space Agency, 91
Explorer (satellite), 13, 14
Explorer 1, 16 ill.
Explorer 6, 26
Explorer 18, 46

J-2 engine, 32, 53, 54
Jet aircraft, 8–9
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), 9, 21 ill., 35
Johnson, Lyndon B., 14, 17, 27–28, 47, 56
Johnson Space Center, 42 ill. See also Manned Spacecraft Center.
Jupiter (IRBM), 9, 14
Jupiter (planet), 73, 74 ill., 91, 92 ill., 97

Kennedy, John F., 27, 29 ill., 34, 46, 61
Kennedy Space Center, 45 ill., 47, 69 ill., 82.
See also Cape Canaveral.
Kerwin, Joseph P., 83
Khrushchev, Nikita, 34
Killian, James R., 17
Knox, Frank, 8

Landsat 1 (ERTS 1), 78
Landsat 2 (ERTS 2), 78
Landsat 3, 93
M-2 (lifting body), 65 ill.
M-2/F-2 (lifting body), 65
McNamara, Robert S., 28
Magsat, 94
Manned lunar landing, 28–30, 70 ill., 79, 80 ill., 81
Manned Spacecraft Center, 42 ill., 43
Mariner (interplanetary probe), 61
Mariner 2, 35
Mariner 4, 60 ill., 91
Mariner 5, 60–61
Mariner 6, 71
Mariner 7, 71
Mariner 9, 72, 73 ill.
Mariner 10, 75 ill., 76 ill.
Mars (planet), 60 ill., 71, 72, 73 ill., 88–89, 90 ill., 98
Marshall Space Flight Center, 22 ill., 53
Martin Marietta Corp., 39 ill.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 30
Mathews, Charles W., 43
Mercury (planet), 76 ill., 80, 81 ill., 98
Mercury project, 20, 24, 29, 31, 32–34, 41, 43
Michoud Ordnance Plant, 43 ill., 44
Military aeronautics, 2, 11–12, 17
Missile, 9, 12, 13, 15, 23
Mississippi Test Facility, 44 ill.
Moon, 35 ill., 58 ill., 59 ill., 68 ill., 70 ill., 80 ill. See also Lunar exploration.
Mueller, George E., 52, 53–54, 56
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), 1–4, 6, 10
budget, 5, 9, 12, 15
contributions, 7–8, 12–13, 17
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 17
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 17, 19
contracts, 22–23, 30, 36, 37
ten year plan, 20–21, 22, 28
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 38, 79, 93
National Space Technology Laboratories, 44 ill.
Navy, U.S., 2, 9, 42
Nimbus (weather satellite), 62, 94
Nimbus 4, 94
Nimbus 5, 38
Nimbus 7, 94
Nixon, Richard M., 86
NOAA-6, 94
Nuclear Rocket Development Station, 64 ill.
Nuclear rocket engine, 63, 64 ill.

OAO 2 (Orbiting Astronomical Observatory), 71, 72 ill.
Orbital workshop, 82, 83 ill., 85
Orbiting Astronomical Observatory (OAO 2), 71, 72 ill.
Orbiting Geophysical Observatory, 72
Orbiting Solar Observatory, 71
OSO 7, 72
OSO 8, 91
Ozone, 93
Paine, Thomas O., 85, 86, 87
Paris Airshow, 1973, 86 ill.
Pegasus (meteoroid-detection satellite), 53
Phillips, Samuel C., 55
Pickering, William H., 16 ill.
Pioneer (space probe), 13, 59, 90
Pioneer 5, 26
Pioneer 10, 73, 74 ill.  
Pioneer 11, 74–75, 91  
Planetary exploration, 20, 26, 34, 60–61, 73–76, 88–91  
Pogo effect, 43  
Pulsars, 72, 73  
Quasars, 73  

Ranger, 34–35  
Ranger 7, 35 ill.  
Relay (satellite), 25, 34  
Research, 15–17, 37 ill., 61, 62, 96–97. See also Aeronautical research, Atmospheric research, Planetary exploration, Solar research.  
Rocket, 8–9, 64 ill. See also Launch vehicles.  
Rogallo, Francis, 42  
Russia. See Soviet Union.  
Safety, 85  
Sage (Stratospheric Aerosol & Gas Experiment), 94  
St. Luke's Hospital, Denver, 39 ill.  
Samos (reconnaissance satellite), 13  
weather, 38, 62, 94  
Satellite tracking network, 23 ill.  
Saturn (launch vehicle), 24, 31–32, 34  
Saturn I, 46, 53  
Saturn I-B, 32, 53–54, 66, 67, 83  
Saturn (planet), 75, 91, 98  
Saturn program, 24, 31–32, 53  
Schirra, Walter M., Jr., 48  
Schmitt, Harrison H., 81  
Schneider, William C., 82  
Scott, David R., 80 ill.  
Scout (launch vehicle), 23  
Seamans, Robert C., Jr., 27, 28, 31, 43, 56  
Seasat 1, 93–94  
Service module (Apollo), 30–31, 54, 66, 68, 86 ill.  
Shepard, Alan B., Jr., 27, 54  
Silverstein, Abe, 17  
Skylab, 82, 83 ill., 84 ill., 85  
Snap program, 64–65  
Snap-27 (radioisotope thermo-electric generators), 65  
Solar cells, 40, 82, 95–96  
Solar Maximum Mission, 91  

Solar research, 58, 59, 72–73, 84 ill., 91, 97, 98  
Soviet Union, 8, 13, 34, 76, 85–86, 93  
Space medicine and biology, 39 ill., 40, 47–48, 84, 89  
Space program, international, 87–88, 98  
Space program, U.S., 16–17, 20–21, 26–29, 46, 56, 78, 85  
Space race, 27–28, 46, 85, 98  
Space science program, U.S., 57–59, 71, 85, 98  
Space Shuttle, 78, 87–88, 94–95, 96 ill., 97–98  
Space Task Group, 20, 31, 41, 43  
Space Telescope, 97  
Spacelab, 88, 97  
Sputnik 1, 13–14, 27  
Sputnik 2, 14  
Stack, John, 12  
Stratospheric Aerosol and Gas Experiment (SAGE), 94  
Sun. See Solar research.  
Surveyor (lunar lander), 41, 59–60  
Surveyor 3, 79  
Surveyor 7, 58 ill.  
Sustaining University Program, 36  
Synchrocyclotron, 37 ill.  
Syncom (synchronous-orbit satellite), 25, 61  

Technology utilization program, NASA, 36–37, 39 ill., 40–41, 98  
Telstar (communications satellite), 26  
Telstar 1, 34  
Thompson, Floyd L., 56  
Tiros (weather satellite), 13, 26 ill., 62  
Tiros 1, 26  
Tiros 5, 34  
Tiros 6, 34  
Tiros-N, 94  
Titan I (launch vehicle), 41  
Titan II (launch vehicle), 42, 47  
Transportation, Dept. of, 71  
Truman, Harry S., 9  
TU-144 (supersonic transport aircraft), 62  

Uhuru (x-ray astronomy Explorer), 72  
Unitary Plan, 9  
United States, 1, 8, 85–86  
Uranus (planet), 91  

V-1 (pulsejet-powered robot bomb), 9  
V-2 (rocket), 9
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Page Numbers</th>
<th>Illustrations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Van Allen, James A.</td>
<td>14, 16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanguard (satellite)</td>
<td>13, 14, 15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanguard 1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle Assembly Building</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venus (planet)</td>
<td>34, 60-61, 75</td>
<td>89-91, 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viking (research rocket)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viking Lander 1</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viking program</td>
<td>71, 88-89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Von Braun, Werner</td>
<td>9, 16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vostok 1</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voyager program</td>
<td>61, 71, 97</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voyager 1</td>
<td>91, 92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voyager 2</td>
<td>91, 92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walcott, Charles D.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallops Flight Center</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Webb, James E.</td>
<td>28, 29, 36, 43, 46, 56, 57, 85</td>
<td>43, 46, 56, 57, 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weightlessness</td>
<td>47-48, 52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whitcomb, Richard T.</td>
<td>12, 72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White, Edward H.</td>
<td>II, 51</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiesner, Jerome B.</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilson, Woodrow</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wind tunnel</td>
<td>3, 4, 5, 6, 9-10, 12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War I</td>
<td>1, 98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War II</td>
<td>7-8, 98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wright Brothers</td>
<td>1, 27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X-1 (research aircraft)</td>
<td>10, 11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X-1A (research aircraft)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X-2 (research aircraft)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X-15 (research aircraft)</td>
<td>10, 12</td>
<td>24, 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X-20. See Dyna-Soar project.</td>
<td>24, 62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X-24 (lifting body)</td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeager, Charles E.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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