

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

**ASSESSMENT OF THE
COMMUNICATION
AND TRACKING
SUBSYSTEM
VOLUME 2 OF 3**

18 MARCH 1988

1997年12月

1997年12月

1997年12月



APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002F
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8002
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002G
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8002
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002H
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.5

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8002
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002I
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.6

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8002
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002J
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8002
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002K
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.8

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8002
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002L
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.9

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8002
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002M
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.10

NASA DATA: []
 BASELINE [X]
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8002
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002N
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.11

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8002
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-80020
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.12

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8002
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002P
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.13

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8002
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002Q
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.14

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8002
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002R
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.15

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8002
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002S
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.16

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8002
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002T
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.17

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8002
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002U
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.19

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8002
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8002V
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.20

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8002
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8003
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT .

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

DATE: ASSESSMENT 3/05/88 NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003A BASELINE []
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.18 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8003
ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003B
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.21

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8003
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[p]	[p]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003C
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.22

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8003
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003D
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.23

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8003
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[p]	[p]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003E
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8003
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT.
 LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003F
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8003
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[p]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003G
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8003
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT.
 LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003H
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.5

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8003
ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[p]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003I
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.6

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8003
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[p]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT.
 LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003J
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8003
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[p]	[p]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT.

LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003K
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.8

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8003
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT.
 LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003L
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.9

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8003
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[p]	[p]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT.
 LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003M
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.10

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8003
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT.
 LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003N
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.11

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8003
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[p]	[p]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT.

LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-80030
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.12

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8003
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT.
 LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003P
NASA FMEA #: 1.2.13

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8003
ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003Q
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.14

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8003
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT.
 LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003R
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.15

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8003
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[p]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT.
 LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003S
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.16

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8003
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[p]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT.
 LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003T
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.17

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8003
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[p]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT.
 LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003U
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.19

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8003
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[p]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT.
 LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8003V
 NASA FMEA #: 1.2.20

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8003
 ITEM: VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[p]	[p]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT.
 LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8004
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 LOSS OF OUTPUT ANALYSES AGREE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004A
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8004
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[p]	[p]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 LOSS OF OUTPUT ANALYSES AGREE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004B
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.5

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8004
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[p]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 LOSS OF OUTPUT ANALYSES AGREE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004C
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.11.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8004
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 LOSS OF OUTPUT ANALYSES AGREE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004D
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.15

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8004
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 LOSS OF OUTPUT ANALYSES AGREE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004E
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.19

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8004
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 LOSS OF OUTPUT ANALYSES AGREE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004F
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.8

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8004
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[p]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004G
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.9

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8004
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[p]	[p]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004H
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.10

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8004
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[p]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004I
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.11.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8004
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[p]	[p]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004J
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.12.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8004
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[p]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004K
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.12.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8004
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[p]	[p]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004L
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.16

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8004
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004M
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.17

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8004
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004N
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.18

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8004
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[p]	[p]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-80040
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.21.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8004
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004P
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.23.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8004
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004Q
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.23.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8004
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[p]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004R
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8004
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[p]	[p]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004S
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8004
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004T
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8004
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004U
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.6

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8004
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004V
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.13

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8004
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004W
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.14

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8004
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004Y
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.20

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8004
ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004Z
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.21.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8004
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004AA
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.22.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8004
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8004BB
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.22.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8004
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYZED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8005
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[p]	[p]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
 OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005A
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8005
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
 OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005B
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.5

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8005
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
 OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005C
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.11.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8005
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
 OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005D
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.15

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8005
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
 OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005E
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.19

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8005
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
 OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005F
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.8

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8005
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005G
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.9

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8005
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[p]	[p]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005H
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.10

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8005
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[p]	[p]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
 OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
 FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005I
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.11.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8005
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[p]	[p]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
 OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
 FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005J
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.12.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8005
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
 OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
 FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005K
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.12.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8005
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[p]	[p]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005L
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.16

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8005
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[p]	[p]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005M
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.17

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8005
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
 OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
 FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88 NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005N BASELINE []
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.18 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8005
ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[p]	[p]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-80050
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.21.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8005
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
 OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
 FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005P
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.23.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8005
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[p]	[p]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
 OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
 FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005Q
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.23.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8005
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[p]	[p]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
 OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
 FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005R
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8005
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[p]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005S
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8005
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[p]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005T
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.4

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8005
ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[p]	[p]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005U
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.6

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8005
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005V
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.13

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8005
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[p]	[p]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005W
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.14

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8005
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[p]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005Y
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.20

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8005
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[p]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005Z
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.21.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8005
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[p]	[p]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005AA
NASA FMEA #: 1.1.22.1

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8005
ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[p]	[p]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU
FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8005BB
 NASA FMEA #: 1.1.22.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8005
 ITEM: REMOTE CONTROL UNIT

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[p]	[p]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. ANALYSES AGREE. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL RCU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8006
 NASA FMEA #: 3.1.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8006
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8006A
 NASA FMEA #: 3.1.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8006
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8006B
 NASA FMEA #: 3.1.3.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8006
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8006C
 NASA FMEA #: 3.1.3.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8006
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8006D
 NASA FMEA #: 3.1.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8006
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8006E
NASA FMEA #: 3.1.5

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8006
ITEM: TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8006F
 NASA FMEA #: 3.2.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8006
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8006G
 NASA FMEA #: 3.2.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8006
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8006H
 NASA FMEA #: 3.2.2.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8006
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8006I
 NASA FMEA #: 3.2.3.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8006
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8006J
 NASA FMEA #: 3.2.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8006
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8006K
 NASA FMEA #: 3.2.5

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8006
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8006L
 NASA FMEA #: 3.3.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8006
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8006M
 NASA FMEA #: 3.3.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8006
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (FLT DECK).

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8006N
 NASA FMEA #: 3.2.3.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8006
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-80060
 NASA FMEA #: 3.2.3.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8006
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8006P
 NASA FMEA #: 3.2.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8006
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] . [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8006Q
 NASA FMEA #: 3.2.5

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8006
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (FLT DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8007
 NASA FMEA #: 3.1.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8007
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (MID DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8007A
 NASA FMEA #: 3.1.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8007
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (MID DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8007B
 NASA FMEA #: 3.1.3.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8007
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (MID DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8007C
 NASA FMEA #: 3.1.3.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8007
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (MID DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8007D
 NASA FMEA #: 3.1.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8007
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (MID DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8007E
NASA FMEA #: 3.1.5

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8007
ITEM: TV CAMERA (MID DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8007F
 NASA FMEA #: 3.2.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8007
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (MID DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8007G
 NASA FMEA #: 3.2.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8007
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (MID DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8007H
 NASA FMEA #: 3.2.3.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8007
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (MID DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8007I
 NASA FMEA #: 3.2.3.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8007
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (MID DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8007J
 NASA FMEA #: 3.2.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8007
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (MID DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8007K
 NASA FMEA #: 3.2.5

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8007
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (MID DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8007L
 NASA FMEA #: 3.3.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8007
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (MID DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8007M
 NASA FMEA #: 3.3.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8007
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (MID DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8007N
 NASA FMEA #: 3.3.3.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8007
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (MID DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-80070
 NASA FMEA #: 3.3.3.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8007
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (MID DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8007P
 NASA FMEA #: 3.3.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8007
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (MID DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8007Q
 NASA FMEA #: 3.3.5

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8007
 ITEM: TV CAMERA (MID DECK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8008
 ITEM: TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008A
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8008
 ITEM: TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008B
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.3.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8008
 ITEM: TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING,
 EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008C
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.5

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8008
 ITEM: TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008D
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8008
 ITEM: TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
 CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
 MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
 VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
 VIEWING,
 EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
 P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008E
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8008
 ITEM: TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING,
 EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88 NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008F BASELINE []
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.3.1 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8008
ITEM: TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008G
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.5

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8008
 ITEM: TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008H
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8008
 ITEM: TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008I
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8008
 ITEM: TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
 CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
 MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
 VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
 VIEWING,
 EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
 P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008J
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.3.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8008
 ITEM: TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING,
 EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008K
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.5

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8008
 ITEM: TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008L
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8008
 ITEM: TV CAMERA B (KEEL/EVA)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008M
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8008
 ITEM: TV CAMERA B (KEEL/EVA)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008N
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8008
 ITEM: TV CAMERA B (KEEL/EVA)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-80080
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.3.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8008
 ITEM: TV CAMERA B (KEEL/EVA)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008P
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.3.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8008
 ITEM: TV CAMERA B (KEEL/EVA)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8008Q
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.3.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8008
 ITEM: TV CAMERA B (KEEL/EVA)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8009
 ITEM: TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING,
 EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009A
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8009
 ITEM: TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING,
 EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009B
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.3.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8009
 ITEM: TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING,
 EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009C
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.5

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8009
 ITEM: TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
 CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
 MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
 VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
 VIEWING,
 EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
 P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009D
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8009
 ITEM: TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING,
 EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009E
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8009
 ITEM: TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
 CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
 MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
 VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
 VIEWING,
 EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
 P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009F
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.3.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8009
 ITEM: TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING,
 EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009G
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.5

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8009
 ITEM: TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING,
 EVA AND COAS FOR CREW&a2160HVIBRECIION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009H
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8009
 ITEM: TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
		NASA [2 /2]	[]	[]	
IOA [2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]	
COMPARE [/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]	

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING,
 EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009I
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8009
 ITEM: TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009J
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.3.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8009
 ITEM: TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING,
 EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009K
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.5

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8009
 ITEM: TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009L
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8009
 ITEM: TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] (ADD/DELETE)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[X]
INADEQUATE	[]

REMARKS:
 LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009M
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8009
 ITEM: TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

INADEQUATE [X]

4560V

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009N
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8009
 ITEM: TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-80090
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.3.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8009
 ITEM: TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009P
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.3.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8009
 ITEM: TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FUNCTIONS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

ONLY THE WORST CASE

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8009Q
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.3.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8009
 ITEM: TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8010
 ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
 CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
 MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
 VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
 VIEWING,
 EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
 P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010A
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8010
 ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

from RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different NASA)
 [2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
 CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
 MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
 VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
 VIEWING,
 EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
 P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010B
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.3.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8010
 ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010C
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.5

NASA DATA: []
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8010
 ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING,
 EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010D
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8010
ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010E
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8010
 ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010F
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.3.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8010
 ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING,
 EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010G
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.5

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8010
 ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010H
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8010
 ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING,
 EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010I
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8010
 ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010J
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.3.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8010
 ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
 CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
 MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
 VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
 VIEWING,
 EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
 P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010K
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.5

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8010
 ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING,
 EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010L
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8010
 ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010M
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8010
 ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010N
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8010
 ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-80100
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.3.2

NASA DATA: -----
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8010
 ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010P
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.3.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8010
 ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8010Q
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.3.2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8010
ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8011
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM:
 MDAC ID: 8011
 ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
 CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
 MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
 VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
 VIEWING,
 EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
 P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8011A
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID: 8011
ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8011B
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.3.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM:
 MDAC ID: 8011
 ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
 CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
 MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
 VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
 VIEWING,
 EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
 P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8011C
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.5

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM:
 MDAC ID: 8011
 ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING,
 EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8011D
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM:
 MDAC ID: 8011
 ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
 CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
 MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
 VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
 VIEWING,
 EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
 P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8011E
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM:
 MDAC ID: 8011
 ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		AB		C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING,
 EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8011F
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.3.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM:
 MDAC ID: 8011
 ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING,
 EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

C-3

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8011G
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.5

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM:
 MDAC ID: 8011
 ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING,
 EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8011H
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM:
 MDAC ID: 8011
 ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8011I
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM:
 MDAC ID: 8011
 ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
 LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
 CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
 MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
 VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
 VIEWING,
 EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
 P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8011J
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.3.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM:
 MDAC ID: 8011
 ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN UNREASONABLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8011K
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.5

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM:
 MDAC ID: 8011
 ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING,
 EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8011L
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM:
 MDAC ID: 8011
 ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
] IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8011M
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM:
 MDAC ID: 8011
 ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8011N
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.4

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID: 8011
ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-80110
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.3.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM:
 MDAC ID: 8011
 ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8011P
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.3.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM:
 MDAC ID: 8011
 ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8011Q
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.3.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM:
 MDAC ID: 8011
 ITEM: TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8012
 NASA FMEA #: 5.1.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8012
 ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS WRIST

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
 WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
 PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
 REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
 VISUAL
 INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD
 RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8012A
NASA FMEA #: 5.1.2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8012
ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS WRIST

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
	FLIGHT HDW/FUNC		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]		[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]		[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]		[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8012B
 NASA FMEA #: 5.1.3.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8012
 ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS WRIST

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
 WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
 PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
 REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
 VISUAL
 INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD
 RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8012C
 NASA FMEA #: 5.1.5

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8012
 ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS WRIST

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
 WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
 PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
 REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
 VISUAL
 INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD
 RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8012D
 NASA FMEA #: 5.2.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8012
 ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS WRIST

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
 WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
 PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
 REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
 VISUAL
 INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD
 RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8012E
 NASA FMEA #: 5.2.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8012
 ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS WRIST

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
 WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
 PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
 REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
 VISUAL
 INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD
 RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8012F
 NASA FMEA #: 5.2.3.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8012
 ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS WRIST

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
 WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
 PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
 REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
 VISUAL
 INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD
 RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8012G
 NASA FMEA #: 5.2.5

NASA DATA: _____
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8012
 ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS WRIST

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
 WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
 PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
 REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
 VISUAL
 INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD
 RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8012H
 NASA FMEA #: 5.3.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8012
 ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS WRIST

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
 WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
 PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
 REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
 VISUAL
 INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD
 RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8012I
NASA FMEA #: 5.3.2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8012
ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS WRIST

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8012J
 NASA FMEA #: 5.3.3.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8012
 ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS WRIST

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
 WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
 PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
 REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
 VISUAL
 INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD
 RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8012K
 NASA FMEA #: 5.3.5

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8012
 ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS WRIST

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
 WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC
 PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
 REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
 VISUAL
 INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD
 RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8012L
 NASA FMEA #: 5.1.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8012
 ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS WRIST

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8012M
 NASA FMEA #: 5.2.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8012
 ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS WRIST

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8012N
 NASA FMEA #: 5.3.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8012
 ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS WRIST

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-80120
 NASA FMEA #: 5.1.3.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8012
 ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS WRIST

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY WORST CASE
 FUNCTION ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8012P
 NASA FMEA #: 5.2.3.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8012
 ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS WRIST

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY WORST CASE
 FUNCTION ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8012Q
 NASA FMEA #: 5.3.3.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8012
 ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS WRIST

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY WORST CASE
 FUNCTION ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8013
 NASA FMEA #: 4.1.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8013
 ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC OUTOUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
 ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
 PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE
 REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
 VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
 COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8013A
 NASA FMEA #: 4.1.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8013
 ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC OUTOUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8013B
NASA FMEA #: 4.1.3.1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8013
ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC OUTOUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8013C
 NASA FMEA #: 4.2.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8013
 ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC OUTOUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
 ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
 PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE
 REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
 VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
 COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8013D
NASA FMEA #: 4.2.2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8013
ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC OUTOUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8013E
 NASA FMEA #: 4.2.3.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8013
 ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC OUTOUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
 ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
 PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE
 REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
 VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
 COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8013F
 NASA FMEA #: 4.3.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8013
 ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC OUTOUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
 ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
 PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE
 REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
 VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
 COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8013G
 NASA FMEA #: 4.3.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8013
 ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC OUTOUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
 ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
 PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE
 REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
 VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
 COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8013H
 NASA FMEA #: 4.3.3.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8013
 ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC OUTOUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
 ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
 PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUUPPORT. UNLIKE
 REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
 VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
 COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8013I
 NASA FMEA #: 4.1.5

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8013
 ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC OUTOUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT CONSIDERED A FACTOR DURING RMS STOW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8013J
 NASA FMEA #: 4.2.5

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8013
 ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC OUTOUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
 ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
 PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE
 REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
 VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
 COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
 CONSIDERED A FACTOR DURING RMS STOW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8013K
 NASA FMEA #: 4.3.5

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8013
 ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF TVC OUTOUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUOPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT CONSIDERED A FACTOR DURING RMS STOW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8013L
 NASA FMEA #: 4.1.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8013
 ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[/N]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT DETERMINED TO BE FACTOR DURING
 RMS STOW. PTU STILL FUNCTIONING TO MOVE TVC INTO STOW POSITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8013M
 NASA FMEA #: 4.2.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8013
 ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[/N]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT DETERMINED TO BE FACTOR DURING
 RMS STOW. PTU STILL FUNCTIONING TO MOVE TVC INTO STOW POSITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8013N
 NASA FMEA #: 4.3.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8013
 ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[/N]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT DETERMINED TO BE FACTOR DURING
 RMS STOW. PTU STILL FUNCTIONING TO MOVE TVC INTO STOW POSITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-80130
 NASA FMEA #: 4.1.3.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8013
 ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8013P
 NASA FMEA #: 4.2.3.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8013
 ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[]	[]	[]	*
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8013Q
 NASA FMEA #: 4.3.3.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8013
 ITEM: TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
 FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8014
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8014
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC.	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8014A
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8014
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8014B
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8014
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8014C
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8014
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	3/05/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID:	COMTRK-8014D	BASELINE []
NASA FMEA #:	2.4.1.2	NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8014
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
				(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[X]
INADEQUATE	[]

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8014E
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8014
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8014F
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8014
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88 NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8014G BASELINE []
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8014
ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8015
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8015
ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] . [P] [P] [P] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8015A
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8015
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
 EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
 INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
 CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8015B
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8015
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
 EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
 INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
 CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8015C
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8015
ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8015D
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8015
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
 EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
 INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
 CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8015E
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1

NASA DATA: -----
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8015
ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8015F
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8015
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
 EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
 INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
 CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88 NASA DATA:
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8015G BASELINE []
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8015
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL
	FLIGHT				ITEM
	HDW/FUNC	A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
 EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
 INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
 CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8015H
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.4.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8015
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
 EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
 INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
 CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8015I
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.4.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8015
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8016
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8016
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8016A
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8016
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8016B
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8016
ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

RRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8016C
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8016
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8016D
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8016
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8016E
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8016
ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8016F
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8016
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8016G
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8016
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8017
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8017
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8017A
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8017
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8017B
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8017
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8017C
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8017
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8017D
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8017
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8017E
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8017
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8017F
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8017
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8017G
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8017
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8018
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8018
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X]
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
 VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
 AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
 CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8018A
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8018
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
 VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
 AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
 CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8018B
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8018
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE4392H[]

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
 VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
 AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
 CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8018C
 NASA FMEA #: 4.2.1.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8018
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
 VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
 AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
 CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8018D
 NASA FMEA #: 4.2.1.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8018
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
 VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
 AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
 CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8018E
 NASA FMEA #: 4.2.2.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8018
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
 VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
 AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
 CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8018F
 NASA FMEA #: 4.2.2.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8018
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
 VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
 AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
 CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8018G
 NASA FMEA #: 4.2.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8018
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
 VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
 AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
 CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8018H
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.4.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8018
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
 VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
 AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
 CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8018I
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.4.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8018
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8019
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8019
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8019A
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8019
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8019B
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8019
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
		NASA [2 /2]	[]	[]	
IOA [2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]	
COMPARE [/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]	

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8019C
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8019
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8019D
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8019
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
2	NASA [/2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
	IOA [2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
	COMPARE [/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMNT ID: COMTRK-8019E
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8019
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8019F
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8019
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8019G
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE
 NEW

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8019
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE
 INADEQUATE

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8020
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8020
ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8020A
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8020
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8020B
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8020
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8020C
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8020
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8020D
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8020
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8020E
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8020
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8020F
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8020
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8020G
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8020
ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8021
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8021
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
 EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
 INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
 CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8021A
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8021
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
 EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
 INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
 CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8021B
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8021
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
 EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
 INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
 CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8021C
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE [X]
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8021
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
 EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
 INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
 CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8021D
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8021
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
 EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
 INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
 CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8021E
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8021
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
 EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
 INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
 CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8021F
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8021
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
 EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
 INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
 CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8021G
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8021
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
 EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
 INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
 CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8021H
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.4.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8021
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
 EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
 INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
 CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8021I
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.4.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8021
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8022
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8022
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

**APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8022A
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8022
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8022B
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8022
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8022C
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8022
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8022D
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8022
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8022E
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8022
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8022F
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8022
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8022G
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8022
ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8023
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8023
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8023A
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8023
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8023B
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8023
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8023C
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8023
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8023D
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8023
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8023E
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8023
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8023F
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8023
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8023G
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8023
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8024
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8024
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
 EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
 INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
 CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8024A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8024
ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8024B
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8024
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
 EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
 INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
 CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88 NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8024C BASELINE []
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.1.1 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8024
ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8024D
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8024
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
 EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
 INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
 CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8024E
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8024
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
 EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
 INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
 CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8024F
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8024
ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8024G
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8024
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8024H
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.4.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8024
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
 EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
 INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
 CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8024I
 NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA: _____
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8024
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8025
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8025
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8025A
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8025
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[p]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8025B
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8025
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8025C
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8025
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8025D
NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8025
ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
	FLIGHT	A	B	C	
	HDW/FUNC				
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[p]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8025E
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8025
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[p]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8025F
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8025
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8025G
 NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8025
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

**APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8026	BASELINE []
NASA FMEA #: 4.4.1.1	NEW [X]
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK	
MDAC ID: 8026	
ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)	
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG	

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
		NASA [2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	
IOA [3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]	
COMPARE [N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]	

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]	[]	[]	[]	[] (ADD/DELETE)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[X]
INADEQUATE	[]

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8026A
 NASA FMEA #: 4.4.1.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8026
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8026B
 NASA FMEA #: 4.4.2.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8026
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8026C
 NASA FMEA #: 4.4.2.2

NASA DATA: []
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8026
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8026D
 NASA FMEA #: 4.4.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8026
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8027
 NASA FMEA #: 4.1.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8027
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[p]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PTU FAILURE TO MOVE RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8027A
 NASA FMEA #: 4.2.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8027
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PTU FAILURE TO MOVE RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8027B
 NASA FMEA #: 4.3.7
 NASA DATA: BASELINE []
 NEW [X]
 SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8027
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)
 LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PTU FAILURE TO MOVE RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8027C
 NASA FMEA #: 4.4.4.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8027
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PTU FAILURE TO MOVE RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8027D
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8027
ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PTU FAILURE TO MOVE RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8027E
NASA FMEA #: 4.4.4.1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8027
ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8028
 NASA FMEA #: 4.4.1.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8028
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[p]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT.
 LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
 ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
 PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
 REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
 VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
 COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
 DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8028A
 NASA FMEA #: 4.4.1.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8028
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[p]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [.]
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT.
 LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
 ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
 PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
 REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
 VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
 COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
 DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.

**APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8028B
 NASA FMEA #: 4.4.2.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8028
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[p]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT.
 LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
 ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
 PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
 REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
 VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
 COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
 DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8028C
NASA FMEA #: 4.4.2.2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8028
ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT.
LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8028D
 NASA FMEA #: 4.4.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8028
 ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[p]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT.
 LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
 ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC
 PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE
 REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW
 VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION
 COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE WAS NOT
 DETERMINED TO BE A FACTOR IN RMS STOW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8029
 NASA FMEA #: 3.1.6.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8029
 ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8029A
 NASA FMEA #: 3.1.6.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8029
 ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8029B
 NASA FMEA #: 3.1.6.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8029
 ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8030
 NASA FMEA #: 3.1.6.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8030
 ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN WORST CASE LOSS OF CCTV
 FUNCTIONS. CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8031
 NASA FMEA #: 3.1.6.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8031
 ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8031A
 NASA FMEA #: 3.1.6.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8031
 ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8031B
 NASA FMEA #: 3.1.6.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8031
 ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8032
 NASA FMEA #: 3.6.6.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8032
 ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN WORST CASE LOSS OF CCTV
 FUNCTIONS. CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8033
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8033
 ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A FWD P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8033A
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8033
 ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A FWD P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8033B
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8033
 ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A FWD P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8034
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8034
 ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A FWD P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
 CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
 RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8035
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8035
 ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B KEEL/EVA AFT P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8035A
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8035
 ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B KEEL/EVA AFT P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8035B
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8035
 ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B KEEL/EVA AFT P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8036
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.2

NASA DATA: -----
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8036
 ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B KEEL/EVA AFT P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/2] [1R] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
 CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAST FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
 RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
 CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8037
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8037
 ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C AFT P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8037A
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8037
 ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C AFT P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8037B
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8037
 ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C AFT P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8038
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8038
ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C AFT P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8039
NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8039
ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D FWD P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8039A
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8039
 ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D FWD P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8039B
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8039
 ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D FWD P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

**APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8040
 NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8040
 ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D FWD P/L BAY)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
 CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
 RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
 CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8041
 NASA FMEA #: 5.1.6.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8041
 ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (P/L BAY RMS WRIST TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF MLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTING IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIS CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8041A
NASA FMEA #: 5.1.6.4

NASA DATA: []
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8041
ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (P/L BAY RMS WRIST TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF MLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTING IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIS CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8041B
 NASA FMEA #: 5.1.6.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8041
 ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (P/L BAY RMS WRIST TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8042
NASA FMEA #: 5.1.6.2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8042
ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (P/L BAY RMS WRIST TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN LOSS OF MLA OUTPUT. LOSS OF MLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTING IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8043
 NASA FMEA #: 4.1.6.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8043
 ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (P/L BAY RMS ELBOW TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF MLA OPERATION RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8043A	BASELINE []
NASA FMEA #: 4.1.6.4	NEW [X]
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK	
MDAC ID: 8043	
ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (P/L BAY RMS ELBOW TVC)	
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG	

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
					(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[X]
INADEQUATE	[]

REMARKS:

LOSS OF MLA OPERATION RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8043B
 NASA FMEA #: 4.1.6.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8043
 ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (P/L BAY RMS ELBOW TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8044
 NASA FMEA #: 4.1.6.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8044
 ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (P/L BAY RMS ELBOW TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8045
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.6.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8045
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8045A
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.6.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8045
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8045B
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.6.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8045
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 LOSS OF OUTPUT IN AGREEMENT.

**APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8045C
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.8.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8045
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[<input type="checkbox"/>]	[<input type="checkbox"/>]	[<input type="checkbox"/>]	[<input type="checkbox"/>] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[<input type="checkbox"/>]	[<input type="checkbox"/>]	[<input type="checkbox"/>]	[<input type="checkbox"/>]
COMPARE	[/]	[<input type="checkbox"/>]	[<input type="checkbox"/>]	[<input type="checkbox"/>]	[<input type="checkbox"/>]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 LOSS OF OUTPUT IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8045D
 NASA FMEA #: 3.3.6.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8045
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8045E
 NASA FMEA #: 3.3.6.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8045
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8045F
 NASA FMEA #: 3.3.6.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8045
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8045G
 NASA FMEA #: 3.3.8.2

NASA DATA: []
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8045
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8045H
 NASA FMEA #: 4.3.6.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8045
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.

**APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8045I
 NASA FMEA #: 4.3.6.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8045
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO
 BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8045J
 NASA FMEA #: 4.3.6.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8045
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 LOSS OF OUTPUT IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8045K
 NASA FMEA #: 4.3.8.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8045
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 LOSS OF OUTPUT IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8045L
 NASA FMEA #: 5.3.6.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8045
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.

**APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8045M
 NASA FMEA #: 5.3.6.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8045
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8045N
 NASA FMEA #: 5.3.6.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8045
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 LOSS OF OUTPUT CRITICALITY IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-80450
 NASA FMEA #: 5.3.6.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8045
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 LOSS OF OUTPUT CRITICALITY IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8046
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.6.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8046
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 LOSS OF OUTPUT CRITICALITY IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8046A
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.8.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8046
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 LOSS OF OUTPUT CRITICALITY IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8046B
 NASA FMEA #: 3.3.6.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8046
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN WORST CASE LOSS OF CCTV
 FUNCTIONS. CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8046C
 NASA FMEA #: 3.3.8.1

NASA DATA: -----
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8046
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN WORST CASE LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTIONS. CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8046D
NASA FMEA #: 4.3.6.2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8046
ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8046E
 NASA FMEA #: 4.3.8.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8046
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8046F
 NASA FMEA #: 5.3.6.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8046
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8046G
 NASA FMEA #: 5.3.7.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8046
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8047
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.6.1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8047
ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8047A
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.6.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8047
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8047B
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.6.3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8047
ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8047C
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.8.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8047
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 LOSS OF OUTPUT AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8047D
 NASA FMEA #: 3.3.6.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8047
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8047E
 NASA FMEA #: 3.3.6.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8047
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8047F
 NASA FMEA #: 3.3.6.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8047
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8047G
 NASA FMEA #: 3.3.8.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8047
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8047H
NASA FMEA #: 4.3.6.1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8047
ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8047I
 NASA FMEA #: 4.3.6.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8047
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8047J
 NASA FMEA #: 4.3.6.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8047
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 LOSS OF OUTPUT IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8047K
 NASA FMEA #: 4.3.8.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8047
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 LOSS OF OUTPUT IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8047M
 NASA FMEA #: 5.3.6.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8047
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8047N
NASA FMEA #: 5.3.6.3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8047
ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT CRITICALITY IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-80470
 NASA FMEA #: 5.3.7.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8047
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 LOSS OF OUTPUT CRITICALITY IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8048
NASA FMEA #: 2.3.6.2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8048
ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8048A
 NASA FMEA #: 2.3.8.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8048
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8048B
NASA FMEA #: 3.3.6.2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8048
ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN WORST CASE LOSS OF CCTV
FUNCTIONS. CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8048C
 NASA FMEA #: 3.3.8.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8048
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN WORST CASE LOSS OF CCTV
 FUNCTIONS. CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8048D
 NASA FMEA #: 4.3.6.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8048
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8048E
 NASA FMEA #: 4.3.8.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8048
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	3/05/88	NASA DATA:	
ASSESSMENT ID:	COMTRK-8048F	BASELINE	[]
NASA FMEA #:	5.3.6.2	NEW	[X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8048
ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]	[]
					(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[X]
INADEQUATE	[]

REMARKS:
NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8048G
 NASA FMEA #: 5.3.6.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8048
 ITEM: WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NORMALLY USED FOR INTERNAL SCENES WHICH IS NOT CRITICAL. CARGO BAY USE WOULD UPGRADE CRITICALITY TO COVER WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8049
 NASA FMEA #: 3.2.6.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8049
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8049A
 NASA FMEA #: 3.2.6.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8049
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8049B
NASA FMEA #: 3.2.6.4

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8049
ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8049C
 NASA FMEA #: 3.2.8.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8049
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8050
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8050
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN WORST CASE LOSS OF CCTV
 FUNCTIONS. CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8050A
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.8.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8050
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN WORST CASE LOSS OF CCTV
 FUNCTIONS. CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8051
 NASA FMEA #: 3.2.6.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8051
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8051A
 NASA FMEA #: 3.2.6.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8051
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
ASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
	IOA [3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
	COMPARE [/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8051C
 NASA FMEA #: 3.2.8.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8051
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT WORST CASE FAILURE MODE COVERS ALL FUNCTIONS.
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8052
 NASA FMEA #: 3.2.6.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8052
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN WORST CASE LOSS OF CCTV
 FUNCTIONS. CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8052A
 NASA FMEA #: 3.2.8.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8052
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN WORST CASE LOSS OF CCTV
 FUNCTIONS. CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8053
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8053
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITIONS. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8053A
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8053
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITIONS. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88 NASA
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8053B BASELINE []
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.3 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8053
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT PROVIDES WORST CASE CONDITION. LOSS OF SYNC NOT ANALYSED.
 WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITIONS. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8053C
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.8.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8053
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT PROVIDES WORST CASE CONDITION. LOSS OF SYNC NOT ANALYSED.
 WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITIONS... ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

**APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88 NASA DATA:
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8054 BASELINE []
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.2 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8054
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
 CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
 RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
 CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8054A
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.8.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8054
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
 CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
 RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
 CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8055
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8055
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8055A
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8055
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8055B
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8055
ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8055C
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.8.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8055
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8056
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8056
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8056A
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.8.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8056
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
 CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
 RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
 CONDITION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8057
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8057
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8057A
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.8.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8057
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8058
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8058
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
 CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
 RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
 CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8058A
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.8.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8058
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
 CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
 RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
 CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8059A
NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.4

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8059
ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 / 1R] [P] [P] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8059B
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8059
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8059C
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.8.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8059
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPU COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8060A
 NASA FMEA #: 2.2.8.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8060
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
 LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
 STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
 CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
 RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
 CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8061
NASA FMEA #: 5.2.6.1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8061
ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS WRIST TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF CLA COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8061A
 NASA FMEA #: 5.2.6.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8061
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS WRIST TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF CLA COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT RESULTS IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. WRIST TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND ELBOW TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8061B
NASA FMEA #: 5.2.6.3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8061
ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS WRIST TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	*
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY WORST CASE
FUNCTION ANALYSED.
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION.
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8061C
 NASA FMEA #: 5.2.7.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8061
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS WRIST TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[/ N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL TVC FUNCTIONS. ONLY WORST CASE
 FUNCTION ANALYSED.
 CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION.
 ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
 OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8062
NASA FMEA #: 5.2.6.2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8062
ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS WRIST TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE [P]

REMARKS:

EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8062A
 NASA FMEA #: 5.2.7.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8062
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS WRIST TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE [P]

REMARKS:

EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM WRIST TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8063A
 NASA FMEA #: 4.2.6.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8063
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS ELBOW TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF CLA OPERATION RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8063B
 NASA FMEA #: 4.2.6.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8063
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS ELBOW TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT PROVIDES WORST CASE CONDITION. LOSS OF SYNC NOT ANALYSED.
 EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8063C
 NASA FMEA #: 4.2.6.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8063
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS ELBOW TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT PROVIDES WORST CASE CONDITION. LOSS OF SYNC NOT ANALYSED.
 EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8064	BASELINE []
NASA FMEA #: 4.2.6.2	NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8064
ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS ELBOW TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /2]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]	(ADD/DELETE)
-------------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------------

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE	[]
INADEQUATE	[]

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF TVC OUPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8064A
 NASA FMEA #: 4.2.8.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8064
 ITEM: COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS ELBOW TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING RESULTS IN LOSS OF TVC OUTPUT. LOSS OF TVC OUPUT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. ELBOW TVC NOT USED TO MONITOR CRITICAL FUNCTIONS AND WRIST TVC PROVIDES PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR MISSION SUPPORT. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION. ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM ELBOW TVC FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8065
 NASA FMEA #: 3.1.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8065
 ITEM: FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8065A
 NASA FMEA #: 3.1.8

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8065
 ITEM: FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8065C
 NASA FMEA #: 3.2.9

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8065
 ITEM: FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8065E
 NASA FMEA #: 3.3.9

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8065
 ITEM: FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8065G
 NASA FMEA #: 3.5.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8065
 ITEM: FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8065H
 NASA FMEA #: 3.5.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8065
 ITEM: FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8065I
 NASA FMEA #: 3.5.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8065
 ITEM: FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8065K
 NASA FMEA #: 3.5.6

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8065
 ITEM: FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8065M
 NASA FMEA #: 3.5.8

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8065
 ITEM: FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88 NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8065N BASELINE []
NASA FMEA #: 3.5.9 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8065
ITEM: FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-80650
 NASA FMEA #: 3.5.10

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8065
 ITEM: FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8066
 NASA FMEA #: 3.1.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8066
 ITEM: MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8066A
 NASA FMEA #: 3.1.8

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8066
 ITEM: MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8066B
 NASA FMEA #: 3.2.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8066
 ITEM: MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
 IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8066C
 NASA FMEA #: 3.2.9

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8066
 ITEM: MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8066D
 NASA FMEA #: 3.3.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8066
 ITEM: MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8066E
 NASA FMEA #: 3.3.9

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8066
 ITEM: MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8066F
NASA FMEA #: 3.5.1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8066
ITEM: MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE
IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8066G
 NASA FMEA #: 3.5.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8066
 ITEM: MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88 NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8066H BASELINE []
NASA FMEA #: 3.5.3 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8066
ITEM: MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY		REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
	FLIGHT		A	B	C	
NASA	[3	/ 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3	/ 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8066I
 NASA FMEA #: 3.5.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8066
 ITEM: MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8066J
 NASA FMEA #: 3.5.5

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8066
 ITEM: MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8066K
 NASA FMEA #: 3.5.6

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8066
 ITEM: MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8066M
 NASA FMEA #: 3.5.8

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8066
 ITEM: MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-80660
 NASA FMEA #: 3.5.10

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8066
 ITEM: MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. CRITICALITIES ARE IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8067
 NASA FMEA #: 7.1.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8067
 ITEM: CONSOLE MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE CRITICALITY TO 3/1R CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE MAINTAINED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8067A
 NASA FMEA #: 7.1.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8067
 ITEM: CONSOLE MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE CRITICALITY TO 3/1R CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE MAINTAINED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8067B
 NASA FMEA #: 7.1.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8067
 ITEM: CONSOLE MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE CRITICALITY TO 3/1R CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE MAINTAINED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8067C
 NASA FMEA #: 7.1.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8067
 ITEM: CONSOLE MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE CRITICALITY TO 3/1R CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE MAINTAINED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8067D
 NASA FMEA #: 7.1.5

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8067
 ITEM: CONSOLE MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE CRITICALITY TO 3/1R CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE MAINTAINED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8067E
 NASA FMEA #: 7.1.6

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8067
 ITEM: CONSOLE MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE CRITICALITY TO 3/1R CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE MAINTAINED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8067F
 NASA FMEA #: 7.1.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8067
 ITEM: CONSOLE MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE CRITICALITY TO 3/1R CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE MAINTAINED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8067G
 NASA FMEA #: 7.1.8

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8067
 ITEM: CONSOLE MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE CRITICALITY TO 3/1R CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE MAINTAINED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8067H
 NASA FMEA #: 7.1.9

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8067
 ITEM: CONSOLE MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE CRITICALITY TO 3/1R CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE MAINTAINED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8067I
 NASA FMEA #: 7.1.10

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8067
 ITEM: CONSOLE MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE CRITICALITY TO 3/1R CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE MAINTAINED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8067J
 NASA FMEA #: 7.1.11

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8067
 ITEM: CONSOLE MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
 ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
 GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
 CRITICALITY TO 3/1R CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
 MAINTAINED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8067K
 NASA FMEA #: 7.1.12

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8067
 ITEM: CONSOLE MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE CRITICALITY TO 3/1R CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE MAINTAINED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8067L
 NASA FMEA #: 7.1.13

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8067
 ITEM: CONSOLE MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE CRITICALITY TO 3/1R CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE MAINTAINED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8067M
 NASA FMEA #: 7.1.14

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8067
 ITEM: CONSOLE MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF CRT RESULTS IN LOSS OF CM AND PRESENTS WORST CASE
 CONDITION. NON CRITICAL FUNCTIONS WERE NOT ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8067N
 NASA FMEA #: 7.1.15

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8067
 ITEM: CONSOLE MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF CRT RESULTS IN LOSS OF CM AND PRESENTS WORST CASE
 CONDITION. NON CRITICAL FUNCTIONS WERE NOT ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8068
 NASA FMEA #: 7.1.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8068
 ITEM: CONSOLE MONITOR (CRT)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE CRITICALITY TO 3/1R CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE MAINTAINED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8068A
 NASA FMEA #: 7.1.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8068
 ITEM: CONSOLE MONITOR (CRT)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE CRITICALITY TO 3/1R CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE MAINTAINED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8068B
 NASA FMEA #: 7.1.3

NASA DATA: []
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8068
 ITEM: CONSOLE MONITOR (CRT)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
 ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
 GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
 CRITICALITY TO 3/1R CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
 MAINTAINED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8068C
 NASA FMEA #: 7.1.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8068
 ITEM: CONSOLE MONITOR (CRT)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE
 ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
 LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
 GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE
 CRITICALITY TO 3/1R CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE
 MAINTAINED..

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8068D
 NASA FMEA #: 7.1.5

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8068
 ITEM: CONSOLE MONITOR (CRT)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE CRITICALITY TO 3/1R CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE MAINTAINED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8068E
 NASA FMEA #: 7.1.6

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8068
 ITEM: CONSOLE MONITOR (CRT)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE CRITICALITY TO 3/1R CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE MAINTAINED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8068F
 NASA FMEA #: 7.1.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8068
 ITEM: CONSOLE MONITOR (CRT)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE CRITICALITY TO 3/1R CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE MAINTAINED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8068G
 NASA FMEA #: 7.1.8

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8068
 ITEM: CONSOLE MONITOR (CRT)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE CRITICALITY TO 3/1R CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE MAINTAINED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8068H
 NASA FMEA #: 7.1.9

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8068
 ITEM: CONSOLE MONITOR (CRT)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE CRITICALITY TO 3/1R CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE MAINTAINED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8068I
 NASA FMEA #: 7.1.10

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8068
 ITEM: CONSOLE MONITOR (CRT)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE CRITICALITY TO 3/1R CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE MAINTAINED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8068J
 NASA FMEA #: 7.1.11

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8068
 ITEM: CONSOLE MONITOR (CRT)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE CRITICALITY TO 3/1R CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE MAINTAINED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8068K
 NASA FMEA #: 7.1.12

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8068
 ITEM: CONSOLE MONITOR (CRT)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE CRITICALITY TO 3/1R CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE MAINTAINED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8068L
 NASA FMEA #: 7.1.13

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8068
 ITEM: CONSOLE MONITOR (CRT)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM BOTH CM WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF TV COVERAGE AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. GROUND MONITORS COULD POTENTIALLY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO DOWNGRADE CRITICALITY TO 3/1R CONSIDERING THAT RAPID CONTACT CAN BE MAINTAINED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:	3/05/88	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID:	COMTRK-8068M	BASELINE []
NASA FMEA #:	7.1.14	NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8068
ITEM: CONSOLE MONITOR (CRT)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF CRT RESULTS IN LOSS OF CM AND PRESENTS WORST CASE
CONDITION. NON CRITICAL FUNCTIONS WERE NOT ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C -
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8068N
 NASA FMEA #: 7.1.15

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8068
 ITEM: CONSOLE MONITOR (CRT)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 / 1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

LOSS OF CRT RESULTS IN LOSS OF CM AND PRESENTS WORST CASE
 CONDITION. NON CRITICAL FUNCTIONS WERE NOT ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8069
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20402-1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE [X]
 NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8069
 ITEM: TV PWR CNTL UNIT SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] [A]
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
 INADEQUATE [X]

REMARKS:
 FAILURE TO SWITCH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF MISSION. A SECOND GCIL REDUNDANCY FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV. LOSS OF CCTV AND ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8070
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20402-1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE [X]
 NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8070
 ITEM: TV PWR CNTL UNIT SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] [A]
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
 INADEQUATE [X]

REMARKS:

ELECTRICAL SHORT/OPEN COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION. A SECOND GCIL REDUNDANCY FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8071
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20402-1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE [X]
 NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8071
 ITEM: TV PWR CNTL SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[P]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/N]	[]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /3] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
 INADEQUATE [X]

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO SWITCH WOULD RESULT IN OPERATING IN PANEL OR CMD MODE
 WHICH PRESENTS ONLY OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8072
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20402-1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE [X]
 NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8072
 ITEM: TV PWR CNTL SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[P]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/N]	[]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /3] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
 INADEQUATE [X]

REMARKS:

AN OPEN SW WOULD REQUIRE THAT ALL CCTV FUNCTIONS BE SELECTED BY THE CREW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8073
 NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8073
 ITEM: TV SYNC SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
		NASA [/]	[]	[]	
IOA [3 /3]	[]	[]	[]	[]	
COMPARE [N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[]	

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA CREDIBLE FAILURE BUT NOT CRITICAL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8074
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8074
ITEM: TV SYNC SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL
	FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	A	B	C	ITEM
NASA	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)

ADEQUATE []
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. OPEN/SHORT PRESENTS A CREDIBLE FAILURE WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8075
 NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8075
 ITEM: TV DOWNLINK SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA CREDIBLE FAILURE BUT NOT CRITICAL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8076
 NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8076
 ITEM: TV DOWNLINK SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA CREDIBLE FAILURE BUT NOT CRITICAL.

**APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8078
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE [X]
 NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8078
 ITEM: TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC A)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] [A]
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
 INADEQUATE [X]

REMARKS:

OPEN/SHORT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC AND MISSION. SECONDS GCIL
 CMD FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY
 TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
 CREW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8080
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE [X]
 NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8080
 ITEM: TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC B)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] [A]
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
 INADEQUATE [X]

REMARKS:

OPEN/SHORT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC AND MISSION. SECOND GCIL
 CMD FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY
 TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
 CREW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8082
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE [X]
 NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8082
 ITEM: TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC C)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] [A]
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
 INADEQUATE [X]

REMARKS:

OPEN/SHORT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC AND MISSION SECOND GCIL
 CMD FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY
 TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
 CREW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8085
 NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8085
 ITEM: TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (RMS TVCS)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /2R] [P] [P] [P] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. CREDIBLE FAILURE BUT NOT A CIL.
 FAILURE TO SWITCH WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF EITHER RMS WRIST OR ELBOW
 TVC DEPENDING ON SWITCH POSITION. BOTH HAVE SAME CRITICALITY.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8086
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20409-1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE [X]
 NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8086
 ITEM: TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (RMS TVCS)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
 INADEQUATE [X]

REMARKS:

ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT COULD RESULT IN REDUCED MISSION
 EFFECTIVENESS DUE TO LOSS OF RMS TVCS WHICH DO NOT MONITOR
 CRITICAL FUNCTIONS. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
 VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON. LOSS OF RMS
 TVC'S COULD
 RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8087
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE [X]
 NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8087
 ITEM: TV PWR SWITCH (FLT DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 CRITICALITIES IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88 NASA DATA:
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8089 BASELINE [X]
 NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-1 NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8089
 ITEM: TV PWR SWITCH (MID DECK TVC)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 CRITICALITY IN AGREEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8091
 NASA FMEA #: 6.0.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8091
 ITEM: RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (STBD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO SWITCH MAINTAINS ELBOW OR WRIST TVC OPEATION TO
 PROVIDE PARTIAL MISSION SUPPORT. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE TO RMS
 STOW WAS NOT ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8091A
 NASA FMEA #: 6.0.6

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8091
 ITEM: RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (STBD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO SWITCH MAINTAINS ELBOW OR WRIST TVC OPERATION TO PROVIDE PARTIAL MISSION SUPPORT. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE TO RMS STOW WAS NOT ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8091B
 NASA FMEA #: 6.0.3

NASA DATA: ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8091
 ITEM: RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (STBD)
 LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO SWITCH MAINTAINS ELBOW OR WRIST TVC OPERATION TO
 PROVIDE PARTIAL MISSION SUPPORT. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE TO RMS
 STOW WAS NOT ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8091C
 NASA FMEA #: 6.0.7

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8091
 ITEM: RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (STBD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO SWITCH MAINTAINS ELBOW OR WRIST TVC OPEATION TO
 PROVIDE PARTIAL MISSION SUPPORT. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE TO RMS
 STOW WAS NOT ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8092
 NASA FMEA #: 6.0.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8092
 ITEM: RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (STBD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT RESULTS IN LOSS OF RMS TVC OUTPUT RESULTING
 IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE DURING RMS STOW WAS
 NOT ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8092A
 NASA FMEA #: 6.0.5

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8092
 ITEM: RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (STBD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT RESULTS IN LOSS OF RMS TVC OUTPUT RESULTING
 IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE DURING RMS STOW WAS
 NOT ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8092B
 NASA FMEA #: 6.0.4

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8092
 ITEM: RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (STBD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT RESULTS IN LOSS OF RMS TVC OUTPUT RESULTING
 IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE DURING RMS STOW WAS
 NOT ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8092C
 NASA FMEA #: 6.0.8

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8092
 ITEM: RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (STBD)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT RESULTS IN LOSS OF RMS TVC OUTPUT RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE DURING RMS STOW WAS NOT ANALYSED. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8093
 NASA FMEA #: 6.0.2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8093
 ITEM: RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (PORT)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO SWITCH MAINTAINS ELBOW OR WRIST TVC OPERATION TO
 PROVIDE PARTIAL MISSION SUPPORT. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE TO RMS
 STOW WAS NOT ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8093A
 NASA FMEA #: 6.0.6

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8093
 ITEM: RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (PORT)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO SWITCH MAINTAINS ELBOW OR WRIST TVC OPERATION TO
 PROVIDE PARTIAL MISSION SUPPORT. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE TO RMS
 STOW WAS NOT ANALYSED.

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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8093B
 NASA FMEA #: 6.0.3

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8093
 ITEM: RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (PORT)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 / 2]	[]	[]	[]	[X] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

FAILURE TO SWITCH MAINTAINS ELBOW OR WRIST TVC OPERATION TO
 PROVIDE PARTIAL MISSION SUPPORT. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE TO RMS
 STOW WAS NOT ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8094
 NASA FMEA #: 6.0.1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8094
 ITEM: RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (PORT)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[]	[]	[]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT RESULTS IN LOSS OF RMS TVC OUTPUT RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION. MECHANICAL INTERFERENCE DURING RMS STOW WAS NOT ANALYSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8095
 NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA: -----
 BASELINE []
 NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8095
 ITEM: TV CAMERA CMD FOCUS SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] [A]
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
 WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
 SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
 VEHICLE AND CREW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8096
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8096
ITEM: TV CAMERA CMD FOCUS SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY. SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8097
 NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8097
 ITEM: TV CAMERA CMD ZOOM SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] [A]
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY. SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8098
 NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8098
 ITEM: TV CAMERA CMD ZOOM SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] [A]
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY. SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8099
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8099
ITEM: TV CAMERA CMD IRIS SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
		NASA [/]	[]	[]	
IOA [2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]	
COMPARE [N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY. SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8100
 NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8100
 ITEM: TV CAMERA CMD IRIS SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] [A]
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
 WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
 SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
 VEHICLE AND CREW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8101
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8101
ITEM: TV CAMERA CMD TILT SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY. SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8102
 NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8102
 ITEM: TV CAMERA CMD TILT SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] [A]
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY. SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8103
 NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8103
 ITEM: TV CAMERA CMD PAN SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] [A]
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
 WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
 SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
 VEHICLE AND CREW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8104
 NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8104
 ITEM: TV CAMERA CMD PAN SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R] [P] [P] [P] [A]
 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY. SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8105
 NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8105
 ITEM: TV CAMERA PANTILT SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:
 NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. NOT CRITICAL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8106
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE []
NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8106
ITEM: TV CAMERA PANTILT SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] []
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY. SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/05/88
 ASSESSMENT ID: COMTRK-8107
 NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE []
 NEW []

SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
 MDAC ID: 8107
 ITEM: TV CAMERA ALC CMD SWITCH (PEAK)

LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[] *
IOA	[3 / 3]	[]	[]	[]	[]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[]	[]	[]	[]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [] [] [] [] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE []
 INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NO COMPARIBLE NASA CCTV FMEA. NOT CRITICAL.