



Verification and Validation of Adaptive and Intelligent Systems with Flight Test Results

**John Burken & Dick Larson
NASA, Dryden Flight Research Center
Edwards CA USA**

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Outline

- **Background Information**
 - Problem statement
- **Project Goals / Objectives**
 - Motivation
- **System Overview Architecture**
- **Adaptive Control System Design**
 - Neural Network Approach
- **Flight Approach**
- **V&V Task**
 - Loads 80%
 - G load limits Pilot limits +/- (self imposed)
- **Flight Results**



Background Information

Problem Statement

- **How do you V&V a Piloted Adaptive system?**
- **Constraints:**
 - **Piloted aircraft (Modified F-15)**
 - **Pilot limited any transients to +/-0.5 lateral gees & +/-2 longitudinal.**
 - **Flight Control Computers (quad system) (Level A)**
 - **The adaptive algorithms are processed on a single string system called ARTSII (Level B)**
 - **Any maneuver can not exceed 80% structural load limit.**



F-15 IFCS Project Goals

- **Demonstrate Control Approaches that can Efficiently Optimize Aircraft Performance in both Normal and Failure Conditions [A] & [B] failures.**
- **Advance Neural Network-Based Flight Control Technology for New Aerospace Systems Designs with a Pilot in the Loop**




Gen II Objectives

- **Implement and Fly a Direct Adaptive Neural Network Based Flight Controller**
- **Demonstrate the Ability of the System to Adapt to Simulated System Failures**
 - **Suppress Transients Associated with Failure**
 - **Re-Establish Sufficient Control and Handling of Vehicle for Safe Recovery**
- **Provide Flight Experience for Development of Verification and Validation Processes for Flight Critical Neural Network Software**



Motivation

These are survivable accidents




IFCS has potential to reduce the amount of skill and luck required for survival


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NASA NF-15B Tail Number 837



Extensively modified F-15 airframe



Canards

• Thrust vectoring nozzles

• ARTS II computer for added computational capability (Neural Network algorithm)

- Quadruplex digital flight control system
- No mechanical or analog backup
- Research control law processor (Enhanced Mode)



V & V Issues



- **System Overview Architecture**
Quad digital flight control computers (Level A)
- **Airborne Research Test System II (ARTSII)** (single string Level B)
- **Project tried to prove stability issues using Lyapunov methods for V&V but was not conclusive.**
- **Assumptions:**
 - **Single string signals may go hard over any time.**
 - **Note: If you had a dual redundant ARTSII the V&V task would be different then this projects V&V.**




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


Limited Authority System



- **Adaptation algorithm implemented in separate processor**
 - Class B software
 - Autocoded directly from Simulink block diagram
 - Many configurable settings
 - Learning rates
 - Weight limits
 - Thresholds, etc.
- **Control laws programmed in Class A, quad-redundant system**
- **Protection provided by floating limiter on adaptation signals**

Single Channel 400 Mhz






ARTS II



- **Provides Added Capacity (Throughput and Memory) to Run the IFCS Advanced Algorithms**
- **Airborne Research Test System II (ARTS II)**
 - VME Based System
 - 3 Single Board Computer (SBC) Processor Cards
 - 1553 Interface
 - PowerPC 750
 - 400MHz Operating System
 - 66Mhz Local Bus
 - 1 MB L2/Cache
 - 128 MB of SDRAM





Gen II Architecture (non Adaptive)






Gen II Architecture (Adaptive)





Flight Envelope

For Gen 2
Mach < 0.95





Flight Experiment

- **Assess Handling Qualities of Gen II Controller without Adaptation**
- **Activate Adaptation and Assess Changes in Handling Qualities**
- **Introduce Simulated Failures**
 - **Control Surface Locked (“B Matrix Failure”)**
 - **Angle of Attack to Canard Feedback Gain Change (“A Matrix Failure”)**
- **Report on “Real World” Experience with a Neural Network Based Flight Control System**




Direct Adaptive Neural Network Neural Network Design and Implementation for the F-15 837



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F-15 Intelligent Flight Control Systems

- Motivation / Problem Statement {The Big Picture}
 - Land a damaged airplane or, return to a safe ejection site.
- General Goals & Objectives
 - Flight evaluation of neural net software.
 - Increased survivability in the presence of failures or aircraft damage.
 - Increase your boundary of a flyable airplane.
 - Increase your chances to see another day.
 - Increase your chances to continue the mission.





Background : Historical Note



- **Neural Networks are a subset of Adaptive Control.**
- **Adaptive Control Research Started in the early 1950's.**
 - Auto-Pilot work (non-Neural Network).
- **Research Diminished due to the crash of X-15.**
 - Reference: Eugene Lavretsky, “Adaptive Control: Introduction, Overview, and Applications.”



General Neural Network Problem Statements Plus Others

- **Why Use a Neural Network?**
- **How much do Neural Networks help a controller?**
- **Why Use Dynamic Inverse Control?**
- **How much do Neural Networks cost w.r.t. compute power?**
- **How can we certify a Neural Network?**
- **Some of these questions are NOT answered in this presentation**





Why Neural Networks?



Neural Networks are Universal Approximators

Minimizes a H^2 norm

They permit a nonlinear parameterization of uncertainty




$$y = f(x) = W\sigma(Vx) + \varepsilon(x)$$

$$|\varepsilon(x)| < \varepsilon^* \quad \forall x \in \Omega$$


$$\dot{W} = - \left[\left(\sigma - \sigma' V^T \bar{x} \right) \eta + \kappa \|e\| W \right] \Gamma_W$$




Neurons in the human brain



Neural networks simulate the activity of biological neurons within the human body. Neural networks are implemented in an attempt to re-create the learning processes of the brain by recognizing patterns.



Single Neuron




Combination function, $a_j = \sum W_{jk} * X_k + b_j$

summation product



Multiple neurons

For 1 neuron with 3 **inputs**:



\otimes means product

$$\begin{aligned}
 a_j = & w_0 1 + \\
 & w_1 x_1 + \\
 & w_2 x_2 + \\
 & w_3 x_3 + \\
 & w_{12} x_1 x_2 + \\
 & w_{13} 1 x_3 x_2 + \\
 & w_{23} x_3 + \\
 & w_{123} x_1 x_2 x_3
 \end{aligned}$$



Activation Function for fully connected neuron



- Activation function for one neuron is written mathematically in a general form as:


$$a_j = w_j^{(0)} + \sum_{i_1=1}^d w_{ji_1}^{(1)} x_{i_1} + \sum_{i_1=1}^d \sum_{i_2=1}^d w_{ji_1 i_2}^{(2)} x_{i_1} x_{i_2} + \underbrace{\sum_{i_1=1}^d \sum_{i_2=1}^d \sum_{i_3=1}^d w_{ji_1 i_2 i_3}^{(3)} x_{i_1} x_{i_2} x_{i_3} + \dots}_{\text{Higher order terms}}$$

Higher order terms

Higher order terms increase the non-linear descriptive capability of the individual neurons within a neural network



Fully connected Higher Order Neural Network (HONN)



**Sigma-Pi is a sparsely
Connected HONN**

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Failures Investigated



2 groups of failures are “common” among aircraft mishaps/crashes.

- Aerodynamic Failures (A Matrix problems / lost aero surfaces, bent wings)
 - Canard Failure (0.8 to -1.75 multiplier)
- Control Failures (B Matrix problems / jammed control surfaces)




Overview of Safety Monitors

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Overview of new Safety Monitors



- **Neural Net Limiter**
 - Designed to prevent high rate of change of NN commands and hard range limits
 - Failure sets Sigma Pi disengage
- **Loads Monitor**
 - Model of 40 loads locations on aircraft structure
 - If any design limit loads (DLL) are exceeded, then disengage Sigma Pi



NN Limiter

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Floating Limiter



- **Requirements**
- **Design**
- **Simulation validation testing**
- **Summary**



Specific Requirements



- **Acceptance criteria**
 - **$\pm 2g$ vertical transient limit**
 - **$\pm 0.5g$ lateral transient limit**
 - **Do not exceed specified load criteria**
- **Induce “worst case” D sigma pi error**
 - **Stay within above limits**



Design Approach



- **Run safety monitors in FCS at 80hz**
- **All inputs to safety monitors are redundant (except beta, sigma pi)**
- **Tripped monitors will cause a downmode from sigma pi to conventional mode with a 1 sec fader**
- **Causes for disengagement are instrumented on TM bus**
- **Safety monitor parameters are changeable from config files or recompile**



Safety Monitor Constants set from Config File Method



- **Purpose**
 - Change floating limiter or loads monitor constants without recompiling the SCE-3 code
- **Method**
 - Load config files and checksum word in ARTS using PTC and transmit to FC via 1553 bus (multiplexed)
 - FC will read data into memory and output data on FTDR bus upon command sequence from cockpit (ground operation only)
 - FC will CCDL the checksum word to all 4 channels
 - The FC will re-compute the config file checksum when the ENANCED mode is first engaged.
 - If the checksum does not match the CCDL, the ENHANCED mode will be locked out and a CONFIG fail flag will be set




Floating Limiter Design



- **Apply a floating limiter window for the sigma pi commands (P,Q,R)**
- **Maximum rate of change is allowed within the window**
- **Limit the rate of change while on the floating limiter boundary**
- **Allow full authority up to the range limiter**
- **Provide flags to sigma pi to stop learning**



NN Floating Limiter





Black – sigma pi cmd
 Green – floating limiter boundary
 Orange – limited command (fl_drift_flag)
 Red – down mode condition (fl_dmode_flag)

Tunable metrics
 Window delta
 Drift rate
 Persistence limiter
 Range limits



Floating Limiter Regions



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Loads Monitor

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


Loads Monitor Stations



- Canard Root - Shear, Bending, Torsion
- Wing Root - Bending
- Horizontal Tail Root - Shear, Bending, Torsion
- Vertical Tail Root - Shear, Bending
- Aileron and Rudder - Hinge Moment
- Forward Fuselage 400 - Vert. and Lat. Bending - SE
- Vert. and Lat. Shear
- Aft Fuselage 627 - Vert. and Lat. Bending - SE
- Lat. Shear and Torsion
- Aft Fuselage 749 - Vert. Shear, Torsion - SE
- Tail Boom - Strength Envelope

- Not Shown :**
- Forward Fuselage 425 - Torsion
 - Engine Main Mounts - Vertical, Thrust - SE
 - Engine Forward and Side Links - Axial



- 20 Load Stations
- 45 Loads
- 40 Allowables - %DLL
- 5 Strength Envelopes

Positive Forces and Moments Shown



V&V



Verification

- Simulink Block Diagrams on NN
- Define I/O of NN signals
- Test for out of range for input signals
- Test for fault detection, identification, reversion logic
- Test NN with safety monitor to limit loads and G excursions
- Test loads and floating limiters
- Document test results

Validation

- Perform Avionics System closed loop Interface test
- Perform closed loop 1553 bus I/O testing, data latency, sample rate
- Perform closed loop testing using input file from and compare results
- Evaluate transients from Adaptive to conventional mode
- Perform functional test plan & Flight Test.



Neural Network Flight Test Video

**[A] matrix failure with adaptation on and off during a
1 g formation flight**



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
Conclusions



- **V&V for this project was by Limiting the size of the single string inputs from the ARTSII computer.**
- **We had 14 neural network trip outs due the the floating limiter.**



Questions?



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