

The Future of Software Certification - a Roadmap

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Autocode assurance issues

- Commercial code generators historically buggy
 - despite extensive heritage, bugs still remain
 - bugs often impossible to detect at model level or via simulation
- Commercial code generators are black boxes
- Autocode difficult to understand and review
- Diverse sources of domain knowledge
 - mathematical, algorithmic
 - physical, engineering
- Models not good for expressing requirements



Autocode review documents

- Verification says that the code is safe
- Certification says *why* the code is safe
- *Review document* explains how code complies with requirements:
 - Chain of reasoning from assumptions to requirements
- Traces between code, documentation and V&V artifacts
- Based on *proof:*
 - for all possible inputs, if the safety assumptions hold
 - then for all possible execution paths,
 - the safety requirements hold.



Example: Coordinate systems

• Level 2 Coordinate Systems (CxP 70138):

"All pertinent geometric technical data ... shall be in the coordinate systems described in this document."

- Problem:
 - Not directly represented in model or code
 - Transformations involve mathematical computations



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Summary

- AutoCert encodes and checks mathematical reqs
- Low to no false positives/negatives
- Make assumptions, data, equations explicit
- Traces code and model to verification artifacts
- Turns requirements into source code annotations
- Provides "oversight" of autocoder: IV&V
- Qualifiable: small kernel of trusted components
- Tight integration with Matlab tool suite
 - Minimal impact to existing process



Future work

- Greater domain coverage
 - More Simulink blocks/EML functions
 - Control law analysis
- More extensive documentation
 - Trace to external requirements
 - Safety cases
- Test case generation
- NExIOM integration



Other properties

- Execution safety
 - array bounds, variable initialization before use
- Representation conventions
 - consistent use of physical units
 - Euler angles: YPR vs RPY
 - quaternion handedness
 - time formats
- Dead code analysis



Traceability

• Traceability:

"the ability to link requirements back to rationales and forward to corresponding design artifacts, code, and verification artifacts"

- "why is this line of code safe?"
 code → verification conditions → assumptions
- "how is this requirement satisfied?"
 property → verification conditions → code

