



# ***Techniques for Conducting Effective Concept Design and Design-to-Cost Trade Studies***

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# ***Today's Presentation***

- ***Illustrates some key strategic aspects of conducting effective concept design & design-to-cost trade studies***
  - *What concept design is & why it's important*
  - *Fidelity needed in concept design solution*
  - *Techniques in designing mission level trade space*
  - *Challenges in determining credible design convergence*
  - *Recommended practices*





## ***Important Note***

- ***Concept design may be conducted using variety of methods***
  - *This presentation describes selected aspects of one method for conducting a concept design study*
    - ❑ *Uses a space observatory example*
  - *Method best suited to immature mission concepts that advance state of the art or that have high design uncertainty*





# ***What Concept Design is & Why it's Important***





# ***Concept Design is Exploratory Process to Determine System Level Design Baseline***

- ***Conducted in pre-Phase A & Phase A of Project Life Cycle to provide “feasible” system design baseline for new concept***
- ***As much an investigation of requirements as of design***
  - ***Concurrent investigation of:***
    - ☐ *Concept of operations*
    - ☐ *Requirements*
    - ☐ *Design*
    - ☐ *Performance*
    - ☐ *Technology development*
    - ☐ *Verification approach*
    - ☐ *Flight dynamics*
    - ☐ *Ground segment (ground stations, mission & science ops centers)*
    - ☐ *Launch interface*
    - ☐ *Cost*
    - ☐ *Schedule*
    - ☐ *Risks, etc.*






# NASA Project Life Cycle

## NASA Procedural Requirements 7120.5E

Figure 1

Concept Design Occurs in Pre-Phase A & Phase A  
of Project Life Cycle



Preliminary Design Occurs in Phase B  
Detailed Design Occurs in Phase C







# Concept Design Plays Central Role in Project Success

- *Earliest life cycle phases have most leverage over life cycle cost (LCC)*
  - *Concept design product effectively locks (or renders unchangeable) ~70% of system LCC*
    - ❑ *Per ref. (a) & ref. (b)*
- ***Such extraordinary leverage presents business case for conducting concept design in pragmatic & rigorous fashion***
  - *Particularly important for immature mission concepts that advance state of the art or that have high design uncertainty*





## ***Concept Design Plays Central Role in Project Success (Cont'd)***

- ***Done well, provides executable system level design baseline for project teams in Phase B & later phases***
- ***Not done well, can subject project teams in Phase B & later phases to system level redesign – in some cases, to multiple system level redesigns accompanied by:***
  - *Fluid technical baselines with ever-decreasing capabilities*
  - *Cost overruns & recurring schedule delays*
  - *Contract disputes & cancellations*
  - *Challenges in retaining trained personnel*







# ***Pre-Phase A / Phase A Offer Unique Venue for System Level Trades***

- ***Teams small, agile, closely coordinated***
  - *Typically operate absent many formalities of later project phases*
    - ❑ *e.g., typically no prime contracts, system level requirements not under configuration control until late in phase A*
  - *Can accommodate high rate of change in system level “requirements” & design characteristics (R&DC)*
    - ❑ *Enables broad investigation of trade space in relatively short time*
- ***Note:***
  - *“requirements” in quotes denotes interim reference capabilities used to guide evaluation of point designs in trade space*
  - *System level requirements aren’t baselined until SRR for a final concept design that meets technical & programmatic (including cost & schedule) constraints*






# ***Phase B & Later Development Phases Not Well Suited for System Level Trades***

- ***In Phase B, system level design is more difficult & expensive to change, e.g.,***
  - *Teams typically larger & more distributed*
  - *Prime contracts typically in place*
  - *System level requirements typically under configuration control*
  - *Preliminary design work assumes system level design complete*
- ***In Phases C & D, system level changes even more difficult & expensive to change***
  - *Teams typically even larger than in Phase B*
  - *System & subsystem level requirements typically under configuration control*
  - *Detailed design work either underway or has been completed*





# ***Fidelity Needed in Concept Design Solution***





# ***A Proposed Definition for “Feasible”***

- ***The term “feasible” is used frequently in concept design, but its use is often problematic***
  - *Often left undefined & subject to interpretation*
- ***This presentation uses “feasible” mission concept to mean:***
  - *Technical, cost, & schedule characteristics for a single, baseline mission concept design have been credibly converged to the 1st order by the end of Phase A,*
  - *such that the design may be developed, launched, operated, & decommissioned by a competent project team starting in Phase B within customary technical & programmatic margins*





# ***A Proposed Metric for Level of Convergence (1 of 2)***

- ***Credible convergence to 1<sup>st</sup> order by end of Phase A means:***
  - *System level sizing & performance (SLSP) of mission elements is confidently determined to within 90% of SLSP when flight system is delivered*
    - ❑ *For given cost & schedule constraints*
  - *i.e., there is residual uncertainty that SLSP could change by  $\pm \sim 10\%$  between end of Phase A & launch*






# A Proposed Model for Product Fidelity During Design Phases (Solid Black Curve)\*

Figure 2

\*Adapted from ref. (c), Fig. 3-4







## ***A Proposed Metric for Level of Convergence (2 of 2)***

- ***Solid black curve in Fig. 2 (uniform convergence) shows allowable SLSP error decreases as design moves from Phases Pre-A through C***
  - *End Phase A: 1<sup>st</sup> order, or 90% (accurate to 1 digit, ~ ± 10% error)\**
  - *End Phase B: 2<sup>nd</sup> order, or 99% (accurate to 2 digits, ~ ± 1% error)*
  - *End Phase C: 3<sup>rd</sup> order, or 99.9% (accurate to 3 digits, ~ ± 0.1% error)*
- ***Metrics for SLSP error are approximate guidelines only***
  - *Coarse model that depicts an idealized trend of fidelity in each phase*
  - *Assume calculations done properly, but with incomplete or incorrect information / assumptions*
- ***\* read as  $9 \times 10^1$  %, accurate to 1 significant digit***





## ***Example SLSP Error Convergence for Mass***

- ***For a 4,000 kg space observatory, system level mass should be known to:***
  - ❑ *End Phase A: Within  $\sim \pm 10\%$ , or  $\sim \pm 400$  kg of final launch mass*
  - ❑ *End Phase B: Within  $\sim \pm 1\%$ , or  $\sim \pm 40$  kg of final launch mass*
  - ❑ *End Phase C: Within  $\sim \pm 0.1\%$ , or  $\sim \pm 4$  kg of final launch mass*





# ***Role of (Selected) Resource Margins on Required Convergence***

- ***Solid black curve in Fig. 2 must be within allowable margins***
  - *Power & Dry Mass Margin requirements (per ref. (d)) are shown in Fig. 2*
    - ☐ *End Phase A:  $\geq 25\%$*
    - ☐ *End Phase B:  $\geq 20\%$*
    - ☐ *End Phase C:  $\geq 15\%$*
- ***Cost (not shown in Fig. 2) serves as design constraint***
  - *Cost margin (per ref. (e))*
    - ☐ *Cost through Phase D:  $\geq 30\%$  (guideline at Phase B start)*
    - ☐ *Cost through Phase D:  $\geq 25\%$  (requirement at Phase C start)*
- ***Other programmatic margin requirements apply as well, e.g.,***
  - *Schedule margin (per ref. (e)), not shown in Fig. 2*





# Importance of Concept Design Convergence to Project Manager

- **Project Manager at start of Phase B holds 25% margins for power & dry mass resources (Fig. 2)**
  - Can accommodate concept design credibly converged to within 10% of flight sizing & performance values for power & dry mass
    - ❑ Even if 10% error occurs in direction of needing more resources
  - Can't accommodate concept design credibly converged to within 30% of flight sizing & performance values for power & dry mass
    - ❑ if 30% error occurs in direction of needing more resources
    - ❑ Design de-scope likely required





# ***Techniques in Designing Mission Level Trade Space***






# Concept Design Mission Level Trade Space

## Selecting Trades to Expedite Convergence – 3 Cycle Example

Figure 3

Goal: Maximize Technical Capability within Cost & Schedule Constraints (Solid Red Lines)







# **Concept Design Mission Level Trade Space**

## **Selecting Trades to Expedite Convergence – 3 Cycle Example (Cont'd)**

- **Approach in Fig. 3 deduces R&DC for C design by interpolating on results from A & B designs (bounding cases)**
  - *Technical capability of point C isn't known at outset of study*
- **More like root finding algorithm than like successive refinement design process typically used in Phases B & C**
  - *In Phases B & C, each design is refinement of “baseline” system level design from prior phase*
  - *In concept design process discussed here, typically there isn't a “baseline” system level design until concept design is complete*
- **Purposely views design problem from multiple perspectives**
  - *Illuminates aspects that otherwise may have remained hidden*
    - ❑ *Helps stimulate creative thinking & mitigate biases*
    - ❑ *Helps discover “unknown unknowns” (UUs)*





# ***Why Selecting Bounding Cases is Important***

- ***Failure to select bounding cases may cause extrapolation to determine R&DC for final solution***
  - *Adds risk in technical, cost, & schedule estimates*
  - *May result if both A & B designs exceed cost & schedule constraints*
    - ❑ *Implies R&DC for B design didn't identify "true" science or technology floor (presumes a solution exists)*
- ***Or, may cause need for more design cycles***
  - *Deadline may not permit, or may drive significant team overtime*
- ***Optimistic A designs & "false" science floors for B designs are common***
  - *Customer's vision often isn't cost / schedule constrained*
  - *Customer may resist identifying "true" science or technology floor*
- ***Teams that recognize, or adapt to, these considerations pragmatically & quickly fare better than teams that don't***





# Selecting R&DC (Typical Case)

- **Typical Approach**

- *A Design: Most\* parameters reflect realistic desired capability*
- *B Design: Most\* parameters reflect science or technology floor*
- *C Design: Most\* parameters are between A & B capabilities*

*\* but not necessarily all*

- **R&DC for B design reevaluated after A design to assure solution space bounded**

- *Presumes A design done first*

- **Many parameters varied concurrently due to need to cover broad solution space in limited time\*\***

- *Experience shows teams can sufficiently understand parameter sensitivities*

*\*\* after approach originally used by Mr. John Oberright, NASA / GSFC Emeritus, for Space Technology-5 concept design study (1999)*





# ***Challenges in Determining Credible Design Convergence***





# ***Convergence Indicators Difficult to Define Objectively***

- ***Concept design is inherently an exploratory process with relatively high uncertainty***
- ***Concept design teams learn at high rate***
  - *Early assumptions & conclusions may be invalidated by later findings or by unpredictable discovery of UUs*
    - ❑ *Convergence can appear non-uniform (see copper line in Fig. 2)*
- ***Yet, indicators are desired to help avoid inferring convergence prematurely, e.g., due to:***
  - *Insufficient rigor*
  - *Study funds or time being exhausted*
  - *Pressure to meet a milestone deliverable, etc.*
  - *Biases*









# Convergence Determinations Often Evident Only in Hindsight

Figure 4







# ***Why Early Cost Estimates Tend to be Optimistic***

- ***A common characteristic of concept design is costs for a given design tend to increase with each design cycle***
  - *Particularly true for immature mission concepts that advance state of the art or that have high design uncertainty*
- ***As teams progress through cycles, they learn more of what may have been omitted / incorrectly assumed in prior cycles***
  - *After B cycle, cost of A design may increase*
  - *After C cycle, cost of A design may increase again, & cost of B design may increase*
    - ❑ *Causes A & B points to move to right in Fig. 4*
  - *When accompanied by schedule increases, A & B points also move into page*
  - *After C cycle, learning tapers off for most designs*
    - ❑ *Occasionally, a D cycle is needed (or may be planned from outset)*





## ***Why Early Cost Estimates Tend to be Optimistic (Cont'd)***

- ***Cost analysis is normally performed using multiple methods***
  - *One method is “grass roots” - uses relatively detailed work breakdown structure (WBS)*
- ***WBS dictionary for most space mission elements is relatively well known & largely existing, e.g.,***
  - *Spacecraft, launch, ground systems, etc.*
- ***Conversely, WBS dictionary for new instruments is unique***
  - *Design dependent, evolves as instrument design evolves*
  - *Key aspect for designs dominated by new instruments*
- ***Multiple cost cycles typically needed to develop well understood WBS free of significant gaps & overlaps***
  - *Cost fidelity improves with understanding of design and WBS*
  - *Gaps common in design & cost in early cycles as team learns*





# ***Subjective Criterion for Convergence Determination – Significant Surprises***

- ***One subjective criterion for credible convergence is whether team has experienced significant surprises***
- ***Team that hasn't experienced at least a few significant surprises should be cautious of its results***
- ***Lack of surprises may indicate:***
  - *Team hasn't progressed sufficiently down learning curve*
  - *Team didn't sufficiently exercise trade space or mitigate biases*
  - *Concept design study objective wasn't sufficiently challenging*





# ***Recommended Practices***





# General Guidance

- ***Treat design cycles as precious resource***
  - *Essential, but in limited supply due to time & resources available*
- ***Don't retrofit A & B designs with insights from later cycles***
  - *Time better spent just applying learning to final design*
- ***Document design results in reports (not briefings) at end of each cycle (see rationale in backup charts)***
  - *Reports (functional, not pristine) are record documents*
  - *Briefings, if needed, are built exclusively from approved reports*
- ***Focus on what "should" be done vs. what "can" be done***
  - *Address 1<sup>st</sup> order items that demand attention early*
    - ❑ *Defer lower order items to later phases*
  - *Focus team efforts on developing product, omit peripheral tasks*





# ***Analogy for 1<sup>st</sup> Order Level of Analysis Depth in Concept Design***

- ***Pre-Phase A & Phase A teams evaluate multiple designs in broad trade space in relatively short period***
  - *Analysis tools used typically are 1st order precision, agile enough to adapt to frequent / significant system level changes*
    - ☐ *Analogy: “Hacksaw”*
- ***By comparison, analysis tools typically used in:***
  - *Phase B are 2<sup>nd</sup> order precision, assume system level design stable*
    - ☐ *Analogy: “File”*
  - *Phase C are 3<sup>rd</sup> order precision, assume both system & subsystem level designs stable*
    - ☐ *Analogy: “Polisher”*







## ***Analogy for 1<sup>st</sup> Order Level of Analysis Depth in Concept Design (Cont'd)***

- ***Team using “hacksaw” in Phase C has done something wrong***
  - *Didn't credibly converge 1<sup>st</sup> order solution by end of Phase A*
  - *Re-doing concept design work late & out of sequence*
- ***Team using “polisher” in Phase A is doing something wrong***
  - *Won't move quickly or broadly enough to rough-out & credibly converge 1<sup>st</sup> order solution\**
    - ☐ *Recognize some design elements may not even exist in final concept design*

*\* Some high risk elements may selectively warrant added scrutiny*





# ***Avoid Significant Rounding Errors***

- ***To avoid masking resource margins, bookkeep design & performance calculations to 3 significant digits & report out to 2 significant digits***
  - *Should not be taken to imply there is 3-digit accuracy in concept design work -- there usually is not*
  - *Simply a numerical safeguard to avoid propagating rounding errors that could overwhelm ability to adequately determine design or performance margins*
  - *See margin example in backup charts*





# ***Recognize Typical (but Unofficial) Phases of Concept Design***

- ***Concept design teams developing immature mission concepts that advance state of the art often experience four phases of work***
  - *1) Unbridled Optimism*
  - *2) Shock*
  - *3) Denial*
  - *4) Acceptance*
- ***The quicker a team moves through phases 1,2, & 3 and arrives at Phase 4, the better that team will fare***
  - *See backup charts for additional discussion*





## ***Closing Thoughts***





## ***Closing Thoughts (1 of 2)***

- ***Concept design phases have extraordinary leverage over project success, it's important they be:***
  - *Conducted in rigorous & pragmatic fashion*
    - ❑ *Particularly for immature mission concepts that advance state of the art or that have high design uncertainty*
  - *Credibly converged to 1<sup>st</sup> order prior to Phase B*
    - ❑ *Project Manager relies upon this*
- ***Unknowns dominate for designs that advance state of art***
  - *Be cautious of early results, they may not be as initially appear*
  - *Use bounding trades to help discover major UUs & mitigate biases*
  - *Look for evidence of significant surprises / unexpected findings*
    - ❑ *Indicate team progressing down learning curve, results becoming more credible*
  - *Don't let first cost estimate be final cost estimate*





## ***Closing Thoughts (2 of 2)***

- ***Concept design phases provide unique venue to facilitate exploring & converging system level design***
  - *Use the opportunity in these phases well*
  - *Not used well, the work of these phases usually will have to be re-done*
    - ❑ *The later this realization occurs, the more expensive the resulting redesign is likely to be*







# References

- a) *Intermediate Systems Acquisition Course, Volume 2 Technical, Defense Acquisition University, Oct – Dec 1998, p. SE-1-24 and p. LM1-15*
- b) *Fundamentals of Systems Engineering (5<sup>th</sup> Ed., day 3, chart 44), Strategy Bridge International, Inc., Academy of Program / Project & Engineering Leadership, presented 11-15 Feb 2013 at NASA / GSFC*
- c) *The NASA Mission Design Process, An Engineering Guide to the Conceptual Design, Mission Analysis and Definition Phases; the NASA Engineering Management Council; 22 Dec 1992*
- d) *GSFC-STD-1000F (with Administrative Changes), Rules for the Design Development, Verification, and Operation of Flight Systems*
- e) *Goddard Procedural Requirements 7120.7, Schedule Margins and Budget Reserves to be Used In Planning Flight Projects and In Tracking Their Performance*





# ***Backup***





# ***Documenting Concept Design Results in Reports at End of Each Design Cycle***

- ***Provides official study record of what team did, how team did it, & what team found for present (& future) team use***
- ***Reports are developed for each subsystem / discipline***
  - *Built from standardized templates*
    - ❑ *Include analysis methods & example calculations*
  - *Provide coherent technical waypoints that enable team to recall designs & performance from prior cycles, often needed for scaling or comparison*
    - ❑ *High rate of design changes makes recollection difficult otherwise*
  - *Used for system level review, subsystem integration, independent review, new / follow-on team member orientation*
- ***Once approved, reports typically are under informal configuration control of Mission Systems Engineer***
  - *Briefings can be generated quickly from approved reports*
  - *Briefings contain only information in approved reports*





# ***Effect of Rounding Errors on Margin Determination***

- ***Rounding errors can significantly affect margin determination if adequate care isn't exercised***
  - *In some cases, rounding errors can fully mask margins such as those for mass & power shown in Fig. 2*





# ***Effect of Rounding Errors on Margin Determination (Cont'd)***

## ***Example***

**Case 1:** *Power Available* ***= 200 W***  
*Max. Estimated Power Required* ***= 249 W***  
*Power Margin* =  $100 (200 \text{ W} - 249 \text{ W}) / 249 \text{ W}$  ***= -19.7%***

**Case 2:** *Power Available* ***= 200 W***  
*Max. Estimated Power Required* ***= 151 W***  
*Power Margin* =  $100 (200 \text{ W} - 151 \text{ W}) / 151 \text{ W}$  ***= 32.5%***

***The margins for Cases 1 and 2 are -19.7% and +32.5%, respectively***

***Now consider a third case in which a designer rounds calculations to the first digit in Cases 1 and 2***

**Case 3:** *Power Available* ***=  $2 \times 10^2 \text{ W}$***   
*Max. Estimated Power Required* ***=  $2 \times 10^2 \text{ W}$***   
*Power Margin* =  $100 (2 \times 10^2 \text{ W} - 2 \times 10^2 \text{ W}) / 2 \times 10^2 \text{ W}$  ***= 0%***

***The margin for Case 3 is 0%***





# ***Effect of Rounding Errors on Margin Determination (Cont'd)***

## ***Example***

- ***Required power margin at end of pre-Phase A is 30% (Fig. 2)***
  - *Comparing Case 3 to Case 2 shows how rounding to 1st digit can fully mask a margin of over 30%*
  - *Additional errors can accrue when combinations of rounded results are used in successive calculations*
- ***To avoid masking resource margins, bookkeep design & performance calculations to 3 significant digits & report out to 2 significant digits***
- ***Notes:***
  - *This should not be taken to imply there is 3-digit accuracy in concept design work -- there usually is not*
  - *This practice is simply a numerical safeguard to avoid propagating rounding errors that could overwhelm ability to adequately determine design or performance margins*
  - *Margin calculation method is per ref. (d), Table 1.06*







# ***Recognize Typical (but Unofficial) Phases of Concept Design***

- ***Concept design teams developing new designs that advance state of the art often experience four phases of work***
- ***1) Unbridled Optimism***
  - *This phase features unbridled, optimistic performance desires levied as “requirements” before team gains credible understanding of associated cost & schedule*
  - *Meetings often not well-focused on study objectives*
    - ❑ *Often feature unproductive, run-on advocacy discussions of why mission has best science of all competing missions & why it has best chance to win*
- ***2) Shock***
  - *This brief phase usually begins after team completes its first credible cost estimate*





# **Recognize Typical (but Unofficial) Phases of Concept Design (Cont'd)**

- **3) Denial**

- *This phase features abundant rationalizations as to why models used to estimate costs weren't representative*
- *Team points to anything but excessively high technical capability as reason costs are too high in order that science return remains compelling relative to competition*
  - ❑ *Seeks to reduce costs in areas other than technical capability / science return below normal allocations*
  - ❑ *Theorizes why partner no-cost contributions will be higher than initially planned*
  - ❑ *Argues why the request for proposal is incorrect, etc.*

- **4) Acceptance**

- *This phase features the ultimate realization technical capability / science return must be lowered to design a credible mission concept*
  - ❑ *One that meets cost & schedule constraints according to established independent review standards*

