

RISK IS INTENTIONAL INTERACTION WITH UNCERTAINTY [1]

EXPLORATION MISSIONS ARE RISKY

- Exploration is venturing into unknown environment
- Unknown is uncertain
- NASA's Policy on Mission Assurance [3]
 - Accept residual risk
 - Remaining risk that exists after all mitigation actions have been implemented or exhausted in accordance with the risk management process

NEW FRONTIERS ANNOUNCEMENT OF OPPORTUNITY [2]

- No target is specified for mission residual risk
- Limited number of less mature technologies and/or advanced engineering developments are permitted
 - Must contain a plan for maturing systems to TRL 6 ... by no later than Preliminary Design Review (PDR)
- Proposers will likely concentrate on technology risk vs mission residual risk

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT IS RISKY




- Development means creating new behavior
- New is uncertain
- NASA's Systems Engineering Handbook [4]
 - Technology infusion is
 - Very complex process
 - Ad hoc approaches for different projects have varying degrees of success
 - Failure contributors are related to level of uncertainty at project inception

TRL 6 CAN CORRESPOND TO A WIDE RANGE OF MISSION RISK


QUALITY OF DEMONSTRATION AND ENVIRONMENT

- Nominal vs bounding loads
- Confirming success vs exploring failure
- Individual loads vs combined loading
- Scale of test article
- Gap between demonstration environment and operational environment
 - Thermal Protection System cannot test in fully relevant environment
- Single demonstration vs statistically relevant data set
- Pass/fail vs model correlation
- Attack Unknown and Under-Appreciated Risk [5]
 - Likely a factor of 2-5 higher than estimated risk at start of system operation
- Affected by
 - Pace of development
 - Prioritization of safety vs cost and schedule

Example: HEET TPS [6]



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



QUALITY OF PROTOTYPE

- Who built it?
 - Technologist vs industry
 - Experienced personnel available for flight build?
 - Same manufacturing infrastructure for flight build?
- When was it built?
 - Obsolescence of components or processes [7]
- Are the processes mature and repeatable?
 - Verification and acceptance criteria
- Are there raw material procurement issues?
 - Is the supply chain complex?
 - Sole source or intellectual property issues?
- Any scale changes required for flight?

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MISSION RESIDUAL RISK REDUCTION

Reliability growth [8] is improvement in reliability over time due to corrective actions to system design, operation... or the associated manufacturing process



- Assign reliability goal for system in Announcement of Opportunity [9]
 - Facilitates comparison of Expected Value from competing mission proposals
 - Proposers can allocate reliability requirements to subsystems
 - Balance new technology reliability against capability of other subsystems
- Assess reliability of subsystems and integrated system
 - Avoid costly reliability improvement for subsystems that do not drive integrated mission risk [10]
 - Search for unanticipated failure modes
 - Drive down Unknown Risks [5]
 - Concentrate on failure modes that dominate risk [11]
 - Monitor remaining opportunity for reliability growth
- Provide flexibility for TRL advances in mission development schedule
 - Different technologies have different design cycle duration
 - Short cycle time permits later design freeze in mission development timeline
 - Technology already transferred to industry can have shorter delivery schedule
 - New technologies are likely early in the reliability growth curve
 - Expect significant reliability improvement from an additional design cycle
- Test hard
 - Develop insight into technology capability limits
 - Vary test environments to assess sensitivity of response
 - Collect data to validate predictive models
 - Study failure phenomenology, including precursors [12]

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