

International Space Station Lithium-Ion Main Battery Thermal Runaway Propagation Test

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- NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) funded a task to evaluate thermal runaway (TR) propagation of Li-Ion batteries on the International Space Station (ISS)
 - Response to Boeing 787 Li-Ion thermal runaway (TR) events of 2013
- ISS Main EPS Li-Ion battery used analysis to show that the design would not propagate beyond battery to damage ISS
 - Requirement to verify this via test not levied on the project
 - NESC assessment of ISS Analysis indicated conservative approach
- NESC funded TR test with intent to verify the analysis results
 - Test Article ORU build February August 2016
 - Trigger method testing in March July 2016
 - Space Power Workshop, 4/27/17, "ISS Main Battery Large Cell Thermal Runaway Propagation Testing", Jason Graika
 - White Sand Test Bed Integration September October 2016
 - White Sands Battery Propagation Test in October 2016
 - Post Test analysis in November December 2016







- Battery ORU and Safety Features
- Battery ORU Test Article
- Battery TR Propagation Test Bed
- Battery TR Propagation Test
- Results and Findings







ISS Li-Ion ORU





GS Yuasa 134 A-hr cell

- 30 GS Yuasa LSE134-101 cells in series
 - Arranged in three "10 packs"
- •3.95 V/cell End of Charge Voltage
- ~15 Kwh
- Low Earth Orbit ~35 min discharge & 55 min charge
- 10 year (60,000 cycles) life





ORU Safety Features MMOD Shielding





MMOD Shield



MMOD test setup



Over Match - Penetration testing 10 mm 2017-T4 Aluminum Sphere @ 6.86 km/s









Overcharge Containment Testing

Note: Existing Ni-H₂ batteries do not have MMOD (Micro-Meteoroid Orbital Debris) protection Page No. 5



Ballistic Limit Testing







ORU Safety Features Flame Trap Pressure Relief Assemblies



- Allows ORU vent gas pressure relief
- Prevent Flames from escaping the ORU
- Baffles made of 300 series CRES (Stainless Steel)
- Directs vent effluent away from EVA crew member during Installation
- Once installed on ISS, vent ports face structure or adjacent ORUs, thus limiting effluent flow to EVA accessible areas

Note: Cell vents face up toward MMOD shielding - away from cold plate, adjacent cells, and IEA hardware





Li-Ion Battery ORU's





ORU Safety Features Radiant Heat Barriers & Cell Spacing





• ORU Layout – three Cell "10-Packs" and 12 Radiant Barriers



~2" ~1" Spacing Spacing between Cells

Radiant Heat Barrier (12 per ORU)

- Higher margin against thermal runaway propagation
- One barrier between each cell pair
- Reflects 787 reach-back safety additions





- As Flight Like as possible within cost and schedule constraints
 - Finned baseplate, enclosure, MMOD shield, flame trap vent assemblies, cell holding fixtures, thermal gaskets, radiant barriers, insulation, etc.
- Six live cells, 24 cell mass simulators
 - Live cells at and adjacent to initiating TR cell locations.
- Battery Interface Unit mass simulator
- Cable runs similar to flight configuration
- Additional Thermal Couple Instrumentation
- Enclosure modified to accommodate drill penetration apparatus



First two rows of cells on baseplate



Six live cells, 24 cell simulators



Trigger Method



- Patch Heater Method
 - Developmental tests on cells and mass simulators
 - Tested 800W heaters on a ISS cell
 - 1.2 MJ over 20 minutes to achieve TR
 - Resulted in TR with JR ejection
 - Too large of an initial temperature bias on battery and adjacent cells for implement on ORU TR test
- Drill Penetration Method
 - All resulted in TR within seconds with JR ejection
 - No temperature bias on adjacent cells, but requires breach of cell can prior to TR
- Drill Penetration Method selected for ORU TR test
- For further details reference
 - Space Power Workshop, 4/27/17, "ISS Main Battery Large Cell Thermal Runaway Propagation Testing", Jason Graika











White Sands Thermal Runaway Propagation Test Bed

- Flight-like finned active cooling loop from ORU manufacturer, painted black over anodized gold coating for proper emissivity
- Affinity chiller selected for circulation of cooling fluid
 - Dynalene HC-10 fluid, on-orbit uses ammonia
 - Thermal analysis determined that differences were acceptable
- Two cameras, one inside test article, one inside chamber
- Drill Penetration Apparatus installed





Cell 1

Drill penetration apparatus

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- ORU TR Test Execution October 26, 2016
 - Cells charged to 3.95 V at C/6 prior to test start (on-orbit EOCV)
 - Chamber <1 torr
 - Chiller temp ~40 deg F and average cell temp 75 deg F
 - Heaters turned off, cameras began recording, drill actuated
 - TR initiated in Cell 1, lower area of the curved side
 - Drill stopped when sparks & electrolyte release were observed
 - Drill re-started after 14 seconds, run until full TR observed (see video)
 - Chamber camera captured cell venting (see video)
 - Continued monitoring temperatures & voltages post-TR
 - No propagation of TR to adjacent cells
 - 5 intact live cells discharged at C/6 prior to opening chamber
 - Test article shipped to JSC for destructive physical analysis





USB Camera inside Test Article



USB Camera outside Test Article









• Test Summary – Cell Voltages







• Test Summary – Cell 1 and Cell 10 Temperatures



Note: TC 1 failure, erratic readings on TC6 due to intermittent contact with the cell case





• Test Summary – Baseplate Corner Temperatures



Note: Erratic readings on TC21 due to intermittent contact with the cell case





 Test Summary – Baseplate Corner near jelly roll winding final location







• Test Summary – Flame Trap Exit Temperatures







- ISS Li-Ion ORU TR Propagation Test
- Post-test Destructive Physical Analysis at JSC– Minimal Enclosure or MMOD shield damage







Post-test Destructive Physical Analysis at JSC



| Location | Mass (g) |
|----------------------------|----------|
| Cell Winding | 470 |
| Cell #1 remains | 328 |
| Front corner near cell 1 | 165 |
| Front corner near cell 5 | 157 |
| Cell Header | 157 |
| Baseplate cell 30 row | 128 |
| Top of live cells | 86 |
| Current collector | 44 |
| Top of mass simulator plus | |
| doghouse | 31 |
| In Flame Trap near cell 1 | 30 |
| Between Cell Rows 1-2 | 28 |
| Between Cell Rows 2-3 | 18 |
| Cell Core | 16 |
| Cell 5 and 6 area | 10 |
| | |
| Outside ORU under doghouse | 3 |
| TOTAL | 1671 |
| Pretest Mass | 3526 |
| Missing Mass | 1855 |







 Post-test Destructive Physical Analysis at JSC – Flame Trap, Cell 1, and Header







- Test Results
 - Trigger cell vented, achieved TR, followed by cell winding ejection
 - Battery enclosure contained TR products, including flames
 - Minimal damage to enclosure, MMOD shield, or radiant barriers
 - Gases vented and exited from enclosure
 - No propagation to neighboring cells
 - All 5 live cells maintained their pre-test Open Circuit Voltages
- Test Findings
 - Full-scale test did not propagate or damage adjacent cells
 - Cell winding ejection resulted in a suspected under-test condition
 - Limited ability to fully verify thermal model results
 - Battery design precluded effective use of patch heaters for TR trigger
 - Recommend development of TR trigger method that limits thermal bias
- Forward Work
 - NESC is pursuing further work on trigger method
 - Once developed, consider repeat the full-scale test
 - Use results to further assess thermal model predictions





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