Space Debris Sensor Recent Anomaly Attribution Scenario

-or-

A Cautionary Tale of How, While Trying to Measure the Source of One Type of Anomaly, We Ended Up Experiencing Anomalies of a Completely Different Kind...



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
SDS Introduction



- The Space Debris Sensor (SDS) is an instrument designed as a part of the DRAGONS program by NASA's Orbital Debris Program Office (ODPO) to provide statistical *in situ* data on the orbital debris population that is too small for ground-based remote sensing
 - Information on debris ranging from 50 µm to 500 µm+ in size
 - Estimates of this small debris population are currently based on inspection of exposed surfaces returned on Shuttle (retired 2011)
 - Technology intended to provide data to be used to update the NASA Orbital Debris Engineering Model (ORDEM)

Orbital Debris Measurement Coverage: SDS to address Data Gap at ISS altitudes as a technology demonstration






How Does SDS Work?



- SDS combines dual-layer thin films, an acoustic sensor system, a resistive grid sensor system, and sensored backstop to provide real-time impact detection and recording capability
 - Impact event observable data includes: Impact times, impact locations, hole size, and backstop energy/impulse
 - Derived data includes: particle size, impact speed, impact direction, and qualitative and quantitative particle mass density



SDS Introduction and Goals



- First flight demonstration of the Debris Resistive/Acoustic Grid Orbital NASA-Navy Sensor (DRAGONS) developed and matured by the ODPO
 - While other debris sensors have been flown before, this combination of technologies to thoroughly characterize the debris is unprecedented
 - The first flight demonstration in what is hoped to be a new generation of operational sensors flying at higher altitudes to fully characterize the debris environment

SDS Introduction and Goals



- The Space Debris Sensor (SDS) is a Class 1E NASA technology demonstration external payload aboard the International Space Station (ISS)
 - Limited budget
 - Accelerated schedule
 - Risk-managed experiment
- Primary goal Technology demonstration
- Secondary goal Take environment data


NASA Class 1E Hardware Overview



- "E" for *Experimental*
- New flight hardware classification intended to streamline flight certification
 - All the risk is assumed by the funding authority, in this case, the ISS Program Office (ISSPO)
 - Payload shall not perform mission critical functions
 - Shall not compromise safety of ISS crew or vehicle or SpaceX Dragon launch vehicle
- This hardware classification development and deployment coincident with SDS development life cycle
- Also motivated by NASA *Revolutionize ISS for* Science and Technology (RISE) initiative

SDS Overview **Principal Components & Vital Statistics**





SDS

Columbus External Payload Adapter (CEPA; SpaceX OEM, SDS GFE)

Weight:

- Total: 267.69 kg / 590 lbs
- CEPA: 117.94 kg / 260 lbs
- SDS: 149.75 kg / 330 lbs

Size:

- External Height: 67.56 inches
- External Width: 47.92 inches (CEPA with handrails)
- External Depth: 53.00 inches (CEPA with handrails)


Power

- 40W: SDS operating without heaters
- 155W: SDS operating with ISS heaters
- 100W: SDS non-operating with launch heaters


SDS Installation on ISS



- SDS launched on SpaceX 13 (Dec. 2017) and was robotically installed on 1 Jan. 2018
- Installation on the Columbus External Payload Facility (Col-EPF) in the ISS forward-facing (ram) direction








SDS Concept of Operations





Timeline



- Initial checkout confirmed that all command and data interfaces were operational
- After hours of normal operation, SDS Health & Status data stopped updating and SDS did not respond to commands (Anomaly 1)
 - Some of the software was still functional, because packets of information were still coming off of one interface
 - However, command and control were no longer functioning
 - Did not respond to software reboot commands
- The ODPO team determined that the only remaining option was to recycle the power
 - A power recycle returned SDS to normal operations

Timeline



- We were able to replicate the lockup using the ground unit, and identified it as a software issue
 - However, the instrument was not designed for software update
 - The original cost estimate to have software configurable was determined not to be within the financial constraints of the program
- The partial software lock repeated itself irregularly
 - The power recycle was repeated each time the SDS Health & Status data stopped (65 times over 25 days)
- Finally, on January 26, 2018, SDS did not recover from three consecutive power recycle attempts (Anomaly 2)
- Attempts at power up between February 9, 2018 and June 26, 2018 were also unsuccessful

Anomaly Resolution



- The initial loss of Health & Status was identified as a partial software locked-up state
- Investigation focused on finding an indicator to preempt the lock-up by issuing a software reboot command
- Software bug was identified in a commercial software module that had passed multiple software tests during development testing
- While final software configuration successfully went through communication and full functional testing, a test of long enough duration to manifest the problem was not repeated for final configuration

Anomaly Resolution



- There were several attempts to restore functionality, but there was no further response from the instrument
- As a direct result of the anomaly investigation (but after the fatal shutdown) a work-around was discovered whereby the software could have been updated in orbit prior to Anomaly 2
 - This would have allowed us to correct Anomaly 1, preventing the need for frequent power cycling
 - This method could be used in the future on ISS experiment packages using similar communications software

Summary



- Efforts through June 2018 were focused on recovery
 - Lessons learned being compiled
 - Beginning to look into science data small impacts were seen
- SDS experienced two types of anomalies
 - Anomaly 1 locked-up the software to a point where commanding and science data collection were not possible until a power cycle reset the payload
 - Anomaly 2 is of an unknown cause when SDS failed to reset or respond after an operational power cycle
- Other discrepancies have been identified, but it is not clear yet whether they are related
 - Only one of the two heater circuits seems to be working
 - Heater current draw is less than predicted
 - Some wiggles in data telemetry
- All 40 acoustic sensors and all 32 resistive grid circuits were functioning and collecting good science prior to second anomaly

Preliminary Lessons Learned



- Most probable cause of lost communication (Anomaly 2) was a hardware failure of the memory storage on the main interface processor
 - Failure may have occurred due to repeated power cycles or environmental effects (radiation, plasma, etc.)
- The software bug in the file management software passed several tests during development. Changes to the software caused the problem to manifest
 - Additional long duration software testing pre-launch would have discovered the problem prior to flight
- SDS was not designed with a software update capability due to cost
 - During anomaly resolution, the team learned that a low cost capability could have been added

Technology Demonstration Summary (to date)



- Collected over 1300 acoustic detection files and 26 days of resistance/engineering data
- Demonstrated impact detection in the flight environment

demonstrate the detection component	ground testing	flight experience
Impact Detection	\checkmark	\checkmark
impact time	\checkmark	\checkmark
impact location	\checkmark	✓
projectile direction	\checkmark	?
projectile speed	\checkmark	?
projectile size	\checkmark	?
projectile density (via impact energy)*	\checkmark	?

Because we only had 1 month of data, we have not yet identified any impacts large enough to confirm these capabilities in space

* Projectile density may be demonstrable in a qualitative sense by number of layers penetrated


Conclusions



- SDS was a *technology demonstrator* flight payload
 - Demonstrated DRAGONS sensor technology for MMOD environmental measurements
 - Anomaly #1 did not compromise this demonstration
- Analysis of SDS Health & Status and Science data continues to inform
 - Anomaly resolution effort (complete)
 - General sensor-related engineering issues
 - MMOD environmental measurement
- Source of Anomaly #2 is still unknown
 - Possible that power cycling contributed to it, but no way to confirm from available data
 - Plausible environmental factors could have contributed to ultimate failure (e.g., radiation)
- Lessons Learned informs ongoing DRAGONS-type instrument development

Example of Flight Impact Acoustic Data






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03:00

06:00

09:00



15:00

18:00

21:00

Jan 13

12:00

Example of potential line break

