

# Space Debris Sensor Recent Anomaly Attribution Scenario

-Or-

**A Cautionary Tale of How, While Trying to Measure the Source of One Type of Anomaly, We Ended Up Experiencing Anomalies of a Completely Different Kind...**




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**<sup>1</sup>Jacobs, NASA Johnson Space Center, Mail Code XI5-9E, Houston, TX 77058**


**<sup>2</sup>NASA Johnson Space Center, Mail Code XI5-9E, Houston, TX 77058**

**Spacecraft Anomalies and Failures Workshop  
11-12 December 2018, Chantilly, Virginia**





## SDS Introduction

- **The Space Debris Sensor (SDS) is an instrument designed as a part of the DRAGONS program by NASA's Orbital Debris Program Office (ODPO) to provide statistical *in situ* data on the orbital debris population that is too small for ground-based remote sensing**
  - **Information on debris ranging from 50  $\mu\text{m}$  to 500  $\mu\text{m}+$  in size**
  - **Estimates of this small debris population are currently based on inspection of exposed surfaces returned on Shuttle (retired 2011)**
  - **Technology intended to provide data to be used to update the NASA Orbital Debris Engineering Model (ORDEM)**




# Orbital Debris Measurement Coverage: SDS to address Data Gap at ISS altitudes as a technology demonstration






# How Does SDS Work?


- SDS combines dual-layer thin films, an acoustic sensor system, a resistive grid sensor system, and sensed backstop to provide real-time impact detection and recording capability
  - Impact event **observable data** includes: **Impact times, impact locations, hole size, and backstop energy/impulse**
  - **Derived data** includes: **particle size, impact speed, impact direction, and qualitative and quantitative particle mass density**






## **SDS Introduction and Goals**

- **First flight demonstration of the Debris Resistive/Acoustic Grid Orbital NASA-Navy Sensor (DRAGONS) developed and matured by the ODPO**
  - **While other debris sensors have been flown before, this combination of technologies to thoroughly characterize the debris is unprecedented**
  - **The first flight demonstration in what is hoped to be a new generation of operational sensors flying at higher altitudes to fully characterize the debris environment**




## **SDS Introduction and Goals**

- **The Space Debris Sensor (SDS) is a Class 1E NASA technology demonstration external payload aboard the International Space Station (ISS)**
  - Limited budget
  - Accelerated schedule
  - Risk-managed experiment
- **Primary goal – Technology demonstration**
- **Secondary goal – Take environment data**




## NASA Class 1E Hardware Overview

- “E” for *Experimental*
- New flight hardware classification intended to streamline flight certification
  - All the risk is assumed by the funding authority, in this case, the ISS Program Office (ISSPO)
  - Payload shall not perform mission critical functions
  - Shall not compromise safety of ISS crew or vehicle or SpaceX Dragon launch vehicle
- This hardware classification development and deployment coincident with SDS development life cycle
- Also motivated by NASA *Revolutionize ISS for Science and Technology* (RISE) initiative



# SDS Overview

## Principal Components & Vital Statistics




SDS  
sensor  
assembly

SDS  
electronics  
box

Columbus External Payload Adapter  
(CEPA; SpaceX OEM, SDS GFE)


- **Weight:**
  - Total: 267.69 kg / 590 lbs
  - CEPA: 117.94 kg / 260 lbs
  - SDS: 149.75 kg / 330 lbs
- **Size:**
  - External Height: 67.56 inches
  - External Width: 47.92 inches (CEPA with handrails)
  - External Depth: 53.00 inches (CEPA with handrails)
- **Power**
  - 40W: SDS operating without heaters
  - 155W: SDS operating with ISS heaters
  - 100W: SDS non-operating with launch heaters








## SDS Installation on ISS

- **SDS launched on SpaceX 13 (Dec. 2017) and was robotically installed on 1 Jan. 2018**
- **Installation on the *Columbus* External Payload Facility (Col-EPF) in the ISS forward-facing (ram) direction**






# SDS ISS Orientation









## Timeline

- **Initial checkout confirmed that all command and data interfaces were operational**
- **After hours of normal operation, SDS Health & Status data stopped updating and SDS did not respond to commands (**Anomaly 1**)**
  - **Some of the software was still functional, because packets of information were still coming off of one interface**
  - **However, command and control were no longer functioning**
  - **Did not respond to software reboot commands**
- **The ODPO team determined that the only remaining option was to recycle the power**
  - **A power recycle returned SDS to normal operations**



## Timeline


- **We were able to replicate the lockup using the ground unit, and identified it as a software issue**
    - However, the instrument was not designed for software update
    - The original cost estimate to have software configurable was determined not to be within the financial constraints of the program
  - **The partial software lock repeated itself irregularly**
    - The power recycle was repeated each time the SDS Health & Status data stopped (65 times over 25 days)
  - **Finally, on January 26, 2018, SDS did not recover from three consecutive power recycle attempts (**Anomaly 2**)**
  - **Attempts at power up between February 9, 2018 and June 26, 2018 were also unsuccessful**
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## Anomaly Resolution


- **The initial loss of Health & Status was identified as a partial software locked-up state**
- **Investigation focused on finding an indicator to preempt the lock-up by issuing a software reboot command**
- **Software bug was identified in a commercial software module that had passed multiple software tests during development testing**
- **While final software configuration successfully went through communication and full functional testing, a test of long enough duration to manifest the problem was not repeated for final configuration**





## Anomaly Resolution


- **There were several attempts to restore functionality, but there was no further response from the instrument**
- **As a direct result of the anomaly investigation (but after the fatal shutdown) a work-around was discovered whereby the software could have been updated in orbit prior to **Anomaly 2****
  - **This would have allowed us to correct **Anomaly 1**, preventing the need for frequent power cycling**
  - **This method could be used in the future on ISS experiment packages using similar communications software**



## Summary


- **Efforts through June 2018 were focused on recovery**
  - Lessons learned being compiled
  - Beginning to look into science data – small impacts were seen
- **SDS experienced two types of anomalies**
  - **Anomaly 1** locked-up the software to a point where commanding and science data collection were not possible until a power cycle reset the payload
  - **Anomaly 2** is of an unknown cause when SDS failed to reset or respond after an operational power cycle
- **Other discrepancies have been identified, but it is not clear yet whether they are related**
  - Only one of the two heater circuits seems to be working
  - Heater current draw is less than predicted
  - Some wiggles in data telemetry
- **All 40 acoustic sensors and all 32 resistive grid circuits were functioning and collecting good science prior to second anomaly**





## Preliminary Lessons Learned

- **Most probable cause of lost communication (**Anomaly 2**) was a hardware failure of the memory storage on the main interface processor**
  - Failure may have occurred due to repeated power cycles or environmental effects (radiation, plasma, etc.)
- **The software bug in the file management software passed several tests during development. Changes to the software caused the problem to manifest**
  - Additional long duration software testing pre-launch would have discovered the problem prior to flight
- **SDS was not designed with a software update capability due to cost**
  - During anomaly resolution, the team learned that a low cost capability could have been added




# Technology Demonstration Summary (to date)

- **Collected over 1300 acoustic detection files and 26 days of resistance/engineering data**
- **Demonstrated impact detection in the flight environment**

<i>demonstrate the detection component</i>	<i>ground testing</i>	<i>flight experience</i>
Impact Detection	✓	✓
impact time	✓	✓
impact location	✓	✓
projectile direction	✓	?
projectile speed	✓	?
projectile size	✓	?
projectile density (via impact energy)*	✓	?


- Because we only had 1 month of data, we have not yet identified any impacts large enough to confirm these capabilities in space

\* Projectile density may be demonstrable in a qualitative sense by number of layers penetrated




## Conclusions


- **SDS was a *technology demonstrator* flight payload**
  - Demonstrated DRAGONS sensor technology for MMOD environmental measurements
  - **Anomaly #1** did not compromise this demonstration
- **Analysis of SDS Health & Status and Science data continues to inform**
  - Anomaly resolution effort (complete)
  - General sensor-related engineering issues
  - MMOD environmental measurement
- **Source of **Anomaly #2** is still unknown**
  - Possible that power cycling contributed to it, but no way to confirm from available data
  - Plausible environmental factors could have contributed to ultimate failure (e.g., radiation)
- **Lessons Learned informs ongoing DRAGONS-type instrument development**





## Example of Flight Impact Acoustic Data


L1Q4, sensor threshold = 0.06 V





# Example of resistive grid temperatures





# Example of potential line break

