

Cybersecurity Threat Assessment of Small Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Aircraft Configurations

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What are your biggest cybersecurity concerns for emerging technology and autonomous systems?

What interesting insight have you gained from your trip to Silicon Valley?





UAS Cybersecurity Challenges



- Rapidly evolving systems and market
- Evolution towards cyber-physical systems within system-of-systems
- Continual emergence of new threats, vulnerabilities, and attack vectors.
- Lack of formal methods and standardization for cybersecurity
- Approaches
 - Best practices, using a combination of techniques
 - Analysis
 - Experience
 - Enumeration
 - Intuition
 - Constant vigilance
 - Build cybersecurity into the methods, procedures, and oversight roles throughout an organization
 - Compliance requirements and accountability

DoD Comprehensive Threat Model for Smart-Device Controlled UAS (Mansfield 2015)



• High-level top-down analysis of smart-device controlled UAS		TABLE 4. RISK ANALYSIS SUMMARY				
Threat model analyzed three categories		Threat Likelihood Impact Risk HARDWARE			Risk	
1.	Hardware					
2.	Software					
	Operating System					
	Software Applications		SOFTWARE			
3.	Communication Networks					
4.	People and Processes					
• Approach for each category						
•	Describe attack motivation		MMUNICATION NETWORK	_		
•	List threats					
•	Describe attack methods/vectors					
•	Suggest mitigations					
• Limit	 Limitations and Gaps 		HUMAN	_		
	High-level, general, non-specific					
•	Relies on top-down enumeration					

• Does not address malicious manufacturers/ providers or malicious GCS software developers

(Mansfield 2015) Mansfield, Katrina, Timothy Eveleigh, Thomas H. Holzer, and Shahryar Sarkani. DoD Comprehensive Military Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Smart Device Ground Control Station Threat Model. Defense Acquisition Research Journal (ARJ), April 2015, Vol. 22, No. 2: 240-273.

DoD Comprehensive Threat Model for Smart-Device Controlled UAS (Mansfield 2015)



Risk

10

0.1

Modification of Accountability Data

High-level top-down analysis of smart-device controlled UAS	TABLE 4. RISK ANALYSIS SUMMARY			
	Threat	Likelihood	Impact	
Threat model analyzed three categories	HARDWARE			
	Battery Exhaustion	0.5	100	
1. Hardware	Flooding	1.0	50	
2. Software	USB	0.1	100 10	
2. Software	Storage Snooping	0.5	50	
Operating System	Storage Jamming	0.5	10	
	Storage Erasure/Alteration	0.1	50	
 Software Applications 	SOFTW			
3. Communication Networks	Phishing	0.5	100 50	
J. Communication retworks	Phishing Data Leakage	1.0	50	
4. People (Mansfield 2015)	Spyware	1.0	100	
	Data Tampering	1.0	50	
Approach for each category	Elevation of Privilege	1.0	100	
	COMMUNICATIO			
 Describe attack motivation 	Eavesdropping	1.0	100	
• List threats	Spoofing Denial of Service	0.5	100	
• List threats	Jamming	1.0	100 10	
• Describe attack methods/vectors	Weak/Compromised Cryptography	0.5	50	
	Unencrypted Communication	0.1	50	
Suggest mitigations	Impaired Quality of Service	0.5	100	
	HUM	AN		
Limitations and Gaps	Breaking Policy	1.0	100	
	Inadequate Policy	1.0	100	
 High-level, general, non-specific 	Unencrypted Communication Carelessness with Cryptographic Keys	0.5	50 50	
 Dation on ton down anymeration 	Harmful Data Leakage	0.5	50	
Relies on top-down enumeration	Compromise of Personnel	0.5	100	
• Does not address malicious manufacturers/	Poor Risk Decisions	0.5	100	
	Poor Management/Maintenance	1.0	100	
providers or malicious GCS software developers	Overloading the Operator	0.5	10	
	Prevention of Accountability from Being Stored	0.1	10	
sfield 2015) Mansfield, Katrina, Timothy Eveleigh, Thomas H. Holzer, and Shahryar Sarkani. DoD Comprehensive Military	Destruction of Accountability Data	0.1	10	

(Mansfield 2015) Mansfield, Katrina, Timothy Eveleigh, Thomas H. Holzer, and Shahryar Sarkani. DoD Comprehensive Military Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Smart Device Ground Control Station Threat Model. Defense Acquisition Research Journal (ARJ), April 2015, Vol. 22, No. 2: 240-273.

sUAS Cybersecurity Threat Model Analysis (Javaid, 2002)



- Define the system
- Develop network and architecture models for analyis
- Enumerate and categorize threats (top-down and bottom-up)
- Perform risk assessment of each threat
- Take action based on severity of risks
 - Track, Mitigate, Redesign
- Continually reevaluate the threat model





Figure 1. Typical UAV Communication Scenario


(Javaid, 2012) Javaid, A. Y., Sun, W., Devabhaktuni, V. K., & Alam, M. Cyber security threat analysis and modeling of an unmanned aerial vehicle system. 2012 IEEE Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST), 585–590. https://doi.org/10.1109/THS.2012.6459914

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


Figure 2. Simple UAV block diagram

(Javaid, 2012) Javaid, A. Y., Sun, W., Devabhaktuni, V. K., & Alam, M. Cyber security threat analysis and modeling of an unmanned aerial vehicle system. 2012 IEEE Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST), 585–590. https://doi.org/10.1109/THS.2012.6459914

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		Rationale		
Criteria	Cases	Difficulty	Motivation	Ranks
	Unlikely	Strong	Low	1
Likelihood	Possible	Solvable	Reasonable	2
	Likely	None	High	3
		User	System	
	Low	Annoyance	Very Limited Outages	1
Impact [Medium	Loss of Service (LoS)	Limited Outages	2
	High	Long time LoS	Long time Outages	3
	Minor	No need for countermeasures		1,2
Risk	Major	Threat need to be handled		3,4
	Critical	High p	riority	6,9

TABLE II. ANALYSIS SUMMARY


Threat	Algorithm(s)	Likelihood	Impact	Risk
Jamming		3	1	3
Scrambling/Distortion		2	1	2
Eavesdropping		3	2	6
Cross Layer Attacks		2	1	2
Multi-Protocol Attack		2	1	2
Social Engineering		2	2	4
Sacchina	Device List	3	3	9
Spoofing	X.509 device Auth.	2	3	6
Comment on 1 Control	No MAC	3	3	9
Command and Control	SHA-1 MAC	2	3	6
Message Modification	AES MAC	1	3	3
Data Traffic Madification	Without AES	evice Auth. 2 3 MAC 3 3 -1 MAC 2 3 S MAC 1 3 out AES 3 1 th AES 1 1 -1/AES/MAC 3 2	1	3
Data Traffic Modification	With AES		1	
DoS on UAV/GCS	EAP/SHA-1/AES/MAC	3	3	9
Signal Integrity		3	2	6
Malicious Code,		1	2	3
Subroutine Exploit		1	3	3
Virus, Malware, Trojans and Keyloggers		3	2	6


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Updating Threat Model Analysis




- Cybersecurity models must be constantly updated and reviewed
 - Particularly for changes/revisions or when new cybersecurity concerns are identified





Systems are getting more complex...





See https://utm.arc.nasa.gov/ for more details.

How will we secure the future of unmanned aviation?