Risk-Based Safety and Mission Assurance: Approach and Experiences in Practice

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Abstract

In 2014, in response to a large volume of feedback from industry, the science community, and internal to Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), GSFC’s Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) Directorate began a transition to a risk-based implementation of SMA, departing from its longstanding practice of being primarily driven by a mostly-static set of Mission Assurance Requirements. The transition started out with a pilot project involving risk-based acceptance of bare printed circuit boards that was enormously successful, continued through a complete organizational transformation in 2015, and culminated with the baselining of formal Risk-Based SMA policy in 2016. This paper highlights five major examples of successful implementation of Risk-Based SMA that have demonstrated not only substantial savings in project resources, but also the ability to achieve the lowest level of risk in developing and operating inherently risky systems.

Key words: quality, reliability, risk-based safety and mission assurance, risk-informed decision making, risk management

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1.0 Introduction

In 2016, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) formally established a policy for risk-based safety and mission assurance (SMA) through the publication of Goddard Procedural Requirement (GPR) 8705.4, *Risk Classification Guidelines and Risk-Based SMA Practices for GSFC Payloads and Systems* (NASA GSFC, June 2016). This document serves to provide guidance and repeatability to projects seeking to align SMA requirements with the mission’s risk tolerance profile, greatly reducing the risk that the process of assigning requirements has missed a critical requirement or is imposing one that will excessively drive up programmatic risk. The guidance is expected to streamline internal review and approval and to provide a repository for lessons learned. This set in motion new approaches not only for selecting up-front requirements, but also for responding to various scenarios encountered in system development. In 2014, while GPR 8705.4 was being developed, GSFC’s SMA organization began pilot studies for implementing the approach. This paper presents the risk-based SMA framework that is embodied in GSFC’s command media (e.g., requirements directives and policy documents, standards, and a variety of other configuration-managed forms of documentation) and characterizes the benefits achieved for a small selection of key results since the policy has been instituted through the 2014 pilot study and formal implementation that started in June of 2016. It presents several case studies showing how these risk-based SMA principles were applied, along with their observed outcomes. In this paper, as in high-level directives and standards at GSFC that embody the risk-based SMA framework, direction will be in the form of guidance (i.e., “should” statements), while in most cases, it will be up to individual projects and stakeholder
expectations to establish requirements (i.e., “shall” statements). However, the risk-based SMA philosophy will emphasize that very few requirements are sacred and that risk should always be considered, especially in cases where there is a strong pushback against a requirement by the developer.

1.1 Goddard Space Flight Center Overview

NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center, NASA’s first and oldest space center, houses the largest organization in the United States of scientists, engineers, and technologists who build spacecraft, instruments, and new technology to study Earth, the sun, our solar system, and the universe. GSFC has about 25 current spacecraft and space instrument projects in development at the moment, some in-house, some contracted out-of-house, and some a mix of both. These projects enable space missions to collect scientific information, prove out technologies, provide a national service such as weather assessment and prediction, or support other national or international priorities. These include the James Webb Space Telescope, the GOES-R series of weather satellites, the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) series of weather satellites, and the ICESat-2 spacecraft with the ATLAS laser instrument to name a few. GSFC is also operating dozens of current spacecraft, such as the Hubble Space Telescope, the Magnetospheric Multi Scale mission formation, and much of the Earth-observing system (EOS) constellation, for example. GSFC has a very long history of mission success, with most missions surpassing their design lifetimes by at least a factor of two, and frequently a factor of five, 10, or greater. With GSFC’s resounding success in developing and operating space missions also comes a fear of departing from longstanding practices. Any challenge to longstanding successful practices, whether in science, engineering, or safety and mission assurance, prompts a concern that failure may be around the corner, with a potential to taint GSFC’s reputation. This fear introduced challenges in
transitioning from an approach of strict compliance to longstanding requirements to one of risk-based SMA.

2.0 Risk-Based SMA Overview

Risk-based SMA is a guiding principle for achieving safe and successful missions with limited resources. It focuses on mitigating specific risks using engineering judgment that are applicable to a project versus simply enforcing a set of requirements because they have always worked in the past. This does not imply that the focus of all SMA activities is driven by known risks, but rather the activities and requirements are prioritized based on the known risks and the risk posture of the project, and a continuous balancing of risk across the project is the objective (see section 3.3). Ultimately, risk-based SMA is all about looking at the interconnected and competing sides of project risks as opposed to treating risks as isolated concerns where individual mitigation actions cannot drive unintended consequences elsewhere. To be most effective at implementing risk-based SMA, it is important to consider risk in a very structured and rigorous way, where a risk, based on a concern that an undesired event will occur, will include a clear context as well as a likelihood and a consequence. Risks at GSFC come in three categories: technical, programmatic, and safety. A *technical risk* is a potential problem that involves the possibility of impact to Flight / Ground segments during operations (i.e., "end products" performing their desired functions in their operational environments).” A *programmatic risk* is a potential problem that involves the possibility of impact to development activities and / or the ability to deliver the required product within the allocated budget, schedule, and resources. A *safety risk* is a potential problem that involves the possibility of personnel injury or death and/or damage to facilities or other property outside the ownership of a project or
program. It should be noted that typical development and risk mitigation activities within SMA for space system development involve the use of resources and the encumbrance of programmatic risk in order to make technical risk as low as possible. (Thorough understanding of this trade is essential for effective implementation of risk-based SMA.) It is common practice to use barriers and controls to simply eliminate safety risks or to make their likelihoods extremely remote in the development of unmanned space systems.

The key elements of risk-based SMA are:

a. **Risk-informed framework** – architecting and prioritizing SMA practices toward the highest-risk areas and employing proactive functions to mitigate common risk drivers early in a project (for example, additional safety personnel applied to areas prone to mishaps or extra quality personnel applied to development efforts that are highly sensitive to workmanship errors).

b. **Risk-informed requirements generation** – applying more stringent requirements in areas that are more critical or sensitive to forces outside of the project’s control and employing guidance instead of strict requirements in areas where (1) there are many good solutions, (2) team capability is high for technical decision-making, and (3) supplier quality is high and stable.

c. **Risk-informed decisions** – decisions are made after considering the direct and collateral risks and benefits of all of the mitigation options (e.g., repair vs. use-as-is, make vs. buy).

d. **Risk-informed review and audit** – review and audit will expose adherence to and many violations of requirements, standard practices, best practices and lessons learned (within
GSFC and at external vendors) – the key is to use an assessment of risk that is relevant to
the mission conditions and objectives rather than a generic commitment to compliance to
determine the best path forward.

Risk-based SMA has the following attributes:

a. Upfront assessment of reliability and risk in order to prioritize how resources and
   requirements will be applied
b. Early discussions with the system developers about their approach to ensuring mission
   success and responsiveness to feedback and treatment of a departure from the developer’s
   standard approach as a risk
c. Hybrid requirements that allow greater risk where the design has greater fault tolerance
   and impose greater controls where fault tolerance is critical (e.g., using aggressively-
   screened parts for critical items and commercially-screened parts where the design is
   fault-tolerant)
d. Judicious application of requirements based on learning from previous projects, the
   results from the reliability/risk assessment, and the operating environment (e.g., lessons
   learned – multiple sources, cross-cutting risk assessments, etc.)
e. Characterization of risks to safety or mission success from nonconforming items to
determine suitability for use – the project determines whether to accept, not accept, or
mitigate risks based on consideration of all risks in the system
f. Characterization and mitigation of risks associated with particular designs, architectures,
or requirements sets.
g. Continuous review of requirements for suitability based on current processes, technologies, and recent experiences.

h. Consideration of the risk of implementing a requirement vs. the risk of not implementing the requirement.

i. Holistic, risk-based determination of the acceptability of items built to different standards based on the understanding of the practices combined with prior experiences, rather than seeking to address or close individual requirements gaps (e.g., per an inherited items process (NASA GSFC, March 2016)).

3.0 Risk Assessment and Documentation

Guidelines for performing rigorous risk assessments for space systems are provided in GSFC-HDBK-8005 – *Guideline for Performing Risk Assessments* (NASA GSFC, 2017). This handbook provides foundational principles for ensuring that risks are compared at the same level using a balanced approach.

This Section describes how GSFC characterizes the risk of nonconforming and *out-of-family* items. When developers ascertain that a nonconforming item is acceptable for use in a particular application, the developing organization should use reasonable means to eliminate or mitigate the effects of the nonconformance. The developer should determine the risk of using the item as is or establish an appropriate body (such as a material review board, parts control board, or
failure review board) to assess the risk. Achieving conformance after the fact is not necessarily the priority.

The subject matter expert, or, at GSFC, the Commodity Risk Assessment Engineer (CRAE), produces a risk statement to provide to the pertinent SMA Lead (e.g. the mission assurance manager or chief safety and mission assurance officer). The CRAE will ultimately present risk statements and supporting rationale to a project risk management board for disposition. Each CRAE is assigned one or more key commodity areas (such as bare printed circuit boards, standard spacecraft components, electronic packaging, electronic parts, or electromechanical devices) for which they are continuously accumulating knowledge through lessons learned and research. The SMA Lead works with the project to determine the acceptability of the risk and/or risk mitigation options that the CRAE has characterized and provided to them.

### 3.1 Risk-based handling of deviations from requirements and nonconforming items

NASA’s supply chain consists of a wide variety of suppliers, some of whom have thrived over decades through NASA contracts or subcontracts and others who may have no prior involvement in aerospace at all. As a result, a project can establish a requirements baseline and levy that baseline on a prime contractor and their subcontractors and encounter throughout the project lifecycle suppliers who declare in advance that they cannot or will not be able to comply with one or more of those baseline requirements. This may also apply to the prime contractor. Waivers or similar records are used to capture these requests for requirements relief, and they
should be vetted by a CRAE or appropriate commodity expert. These requests are then captured in a supplier risk management database as well as a lesson learned. Examples include:

a. Use of alternate and/or equivalent standards. The most typical examples are those used for printed circuit boards (PCBs), soldering, conformal coating and staking, and cable and wire harness manufacturing.

b. Use of a different electrical, electronic, and electromechanical (EEE) part quality and reliability grading system such as /883 vs. Class B.

c. Materials of a lower grade than minimum specifications

d. Items built to an unqualified or nonstandard process

Late discovery of these conditions, where requirements relief was not previously negotiated, will appear as a nonconformance.

After the supplier and the project agree to the requirements that will be applied, all failures to meet a requirement are documented in the project’s nonconformance reporting system.

The formality of such documentation should be commensurate with the mission risk posture. Nonconformances include:

a. Bare printed circuit boards or structural integrity coupons thereof not built to the specified requirements or not demonstrating compliance with requirements.
b. Items that have failed in functional or environmental testing where the root cause of the failure has not been eradicated.

c. Use-as-is for a part, material, or another item that is a direct hit against a credible part, material, or process alert (such as from a Government-Industry Data Exchange Program, or GIDEP alert, NASA Advisory, European Space Agency Advisory, etc).

d. Items that do not meet workmanship or quality requirements before or as a result of testing and handling.

e. Items that will be flown without complete environmental verifications relative to project requirements.

f. Items whose implementation does not follow manufacturer’s instructions, errata, or application notes.

g. Items that have been recalled by the manufacturer.

h. Mechanical parts or fasteners that do not meet project requirements including missing materials certifications (such as hardness testing).

i. Process nonconformances that lead to low quality that cannot be inspected (for example, failure to apply electrostatic discharge controls).

j. Modifications to a wiring assembly’s original design, to include, but not limited to

   (1) jumper wires

   (2) dead bugs

   (3) daughter boards

   (4) cut traces
Note: The presence of these types of electronic packaging features, as a means to realize an electrical design change without the penalty of redesigning the bare PCB and rebuilding the printed wiring assembly (PWA), does not necessarily indicate on its own that the design is not fully vetted or that the hardware carries heightened risk. The SMA team needs to be made aware when a modified PWA has been “inherited,” meaning that it has been fully characterized and vetted for the application and is intended to be used-as-is, so that the unexpected features are not treated as new, un-vetted repairs that require risk evaluation and thus are subsequently recorded as nonconformances. An example of this is in the receipt of a commercial-off-the-shelf component where such features would be fully expected and would not affect the form, fit, or function of the device.

The project will provide supporting information for items that are suspected to have been nonconforming as delivered (i.e., not due to end-user handling, processing, or storage) to the supply chain management organization to follow up with the vendor and determine the cause for the nonconforming item and the cause for the vendor having delivered a nonconforming item. Keeping good records of supplier product quality issues via a supplier risk management process is critical for determining whether the risk justifies greater SMA surveillance or involvement.

Prior to rebuilding or procuring an item that has been received in a nonconforming state, it is important to ensure that the causes both for the nonconformance and for the quality escape have been identified and mitigated or eliminated.
3.2 Out-of-Family Items

*Out-of-family* refers to items that meet all requirements while presenting performance in one or more areas that is significantly different from that of the majority of the current population or populations used in the past. Out-of-family behavior should prompt a risk assessment similarly to nonconforming items because it may be a sign of something unexpected or different that may lead to a previously uncharacterized degradation or failure mode. Out-of-family items should prompt a follow-up with the vendor in many cases to determine the cause. In general, when out-of-family items are determined to indicate a risk to the project, the nonconforming item process in section 3.1 should be followed.

3.3 Balanced-Risk Practices

As a general principle, the development team should always be considering the risk of taking actions vs. the risk of not taking actions. Part of this is a continuous process of questioning requirements, particularly in cases where enforcing or implementing a requirement has the potential for causing competing, previously unforeseen, risks or cost impacts. SMA teams should vet these types of requirements with the requirements stakeholder (generally the individual or organization that funds the effort and is expecting the return on investment in the form of scientific achievement) to discover lower risk alternatives. Threats to hardware, personnel, facilities, or the public should be identified by personnel from many disciplines, including safety, reliability, software assurance, quality assurance, and others. Those threats that are not mitigated with simple actions should be framed as risks and categorized as safety,
programmatic, or technical, as appropriate. It is essential to categorize risk appropriately since the risk likelihood thresholds are different in each category using GSFC’s risk management approach (NASA GSFC, 2012).

Many risks typically identified in hazard analysis by safety personnel are actually threats to mission hardware prior to launch (programmatic risks, because recovery is possible) or threats to hardware after launch (technical risks, because recovery is not possible), and these risks should be treated commensurate with risks in the same respective categories. Treating risks to mission hardware as safety risks may have the consequence of adding single point failures to the system when there is no actual safety need to do so, thereby unnecessarily reducing reliability.

4.0 Contract Type Considerations

Note that the contract type is an important factor in the selection of safety and mission success activities. Cost plus contracts rely significantly on oversight to ensure mission success and tend to be a close teamwork effort between the government and the vendor. As such, the role of the government is an oversight role, having authority at multiple levels for making decisions. Fixed price contracts and those dependent on best commercial practices or off-the-shelf designs should only be selected after a very careful review and assessment of the sufficiency of the vendor’s historical processes for ensuring mission success within the stakeholder’s defined risk posture. For fixed-price contracts, the role of the government is generally an insight role without authority to make decisions at lower levels. Furthermore, the general trend when stepping from Class A (lowest acceptable risk with highest National importance) down to a “do no harm”
(typically, a technology demonstration with tolerance for failure) risk posture, is one of less prescription (more objectives-based) and less documentation, leaving more to the developer’s standard practices. At the subcontract level, where the majority of the quality assurance requirements are implemented, the supplier may not be under contract at all and may be responding to a purchase order with limited or no NASA requirement flow down, as is the case with commercial off-the-shelf items. Careful coordination with the prime contractor is required in these instances when NASA has interest in looking at, or interacting closely with, the supplier’s process or product prior to delivery, such as when investigating the root cause for quality escapes or a failure. Distinguishing the roles and contract types is crucial to a successful partnership between NASA and its supplier.

5.0 Representative Risk-based SMA results

In this Section we will provide several examples of how these risk-based SMA principles were applied to improve the chance for mission success. These examples are summarized in the following table:

5.1 PCB Coupon Nonconformance Handling

To ensure the structural and electrical integrity of bare PCBs, GSFC had long imposed the standard-- *Qualification and Performance Specification for Rigid Printed Boards, IPC 6012 Revision B Class 3/A*, (IPC, 2004) and required structural integrity coupon microsections to verify compliance. Between about 2000 and 2010, GSFC had been seeing a nonconformance rate between about 20 and 30% across rigid PCBs, with some higher peaks at times. GSFC’s
approach was to treat the requirements in an absolute sense, although the standard itself suggests that there should be flexibility in interpretation. This subsequently resulted in rejection of all boards associated with nonconforming coupons, with few exceptions, as discussed below. It was quite common to require three or four iterations of board fabrication, in many cases to result in the determination that the first nonconforming board was the best out of all tries. There was no determination of the risk in using a board with nonconformances, but the schedule hit would frequently result in the loss of valuable system-level testing time as well as some boards becoming critical path items. Furthermore, upon detailed review of the causes of the nonconformance, it turned out that frequently, a different specification was flowed down through notes on the pre-existing drawing, or the PCB supplier had moved on and baselined their operations to the current version of the industry standard while GSFC was invoking an older, superseded version. In 2014, after several cases where the impacts to projects were extreme, focus was turned to the risk associated with common nonconformances. Upon determining very low to nonexistent elevated risks due to common nonconformances, a policy was instituted that required risk assessments to be performed on all nonconforming coupons. After roughly two years with the policy applying to in-house development efforts, 193 circuit board lots were assessed for risk, out of which 167 boards were selected to use-as-is, leaving 26 rejected nonconforming lots (< 15% rejected out of all nonconformances). Based on the typical range of costs for board manufacture and turnaround time, this resulted in a savings of between $400K and $3.0M, with schedule savings between 300 and 1200 weeks for component developments. Some such component developments were on the critical development path, representing direct effect on the overall project schedule, while others had an effect on internal schedule margins and reduced the time available to perform testing and verification activities. Note that
these cumulative schedule savings were enormous, but they are distributed over about 25 projects, and they are reflective of a high level of conservatism at the piece-part level that is inherent in projects at GSFC. While in most cases the component level slips have little direct effect on overall project schedules, the scrapping of items that entail minimal risk has the effect of increasing overall project risk by removing valuable testing time. Very few printed circuit board failures have occurred at GSFC over the past decade and none have been associated with boards accepted through this process. Aside from the clear benefit of eliminating unnecessary scrap, the process is one of continuous learning and improvement, where each risk assessment builds upon the previous, and spawns testing efforts that feed back into the assessment process. Initially, some of the assessments took four weeks or more, but after sufficient experience base, comparable assessments can now be performed in hours or days.

5.2 Metrology and Calibration Requirements

In 2014, a review of audit and assessment findings identified a trend of a challenging closure path associated with metrology and calibration internal and external findings. Furthermore, there were growing complaints from the development community as well as many instances of testing being seriously held up or disrupted by a Met/Cal concern. Review of a swath of these findings indicated no risks associated with what were typically requirements violations that ranged from the use of a box with an out-of-date calibration sticker through use of the wrong standard. These facts combined to suggest that there was a requirements problem. A two-year investigation revealed a range of issues with how Met/Cal requirements are imposed at GSFC, to include:
a. The lack of understanding about how Met/Cal applies across a large Center where equipment is transient, going from project to project, location to location, and environment to environment, where a sticker could never be sufficient to identify whether a piece of equipment is properly calibrated for its current environment.

b. The lack of understanding that calibration is a means to ensure the accuracy of measurements where accuracy is required, and not a means to guarantee that the equipment functions properly.

c. The lack of understanding that in most cases in an environment with a multitude of unique, specialized configurations, calibration of individual boxes is frequently overcome by the condition of the setup (for example, it was common to require power supplies to be calibrated and stickered, but they were frequently used with long cabling and other electronics in the loop that effectively negated the calibration in the location where accuracy was required).

d. The lack of understanding that the use of a different, but properly vetted, technical requirements standard affected the efficiency associated with the calibration lab, but not the risks associated with using calibrated equipment.

e. The fact that key measurements that require accuracy within a typical setup at GSFC were not at the input or output of a particular box, but at some arbitrary location within a configuration so that over-attention to calibration of individual boxes took the attention away from the locations where accurate measurements were actually required.

Subsequently, these issues were addressed through updates of both GSFC- and NASA-level requirements. Ultimately, the result was to empower the user and development
community, rather than the Met/Cal service labs, to determine how to implement Met/Cal requirements, not only saving significant money but enabling the Center to operate at an overall lower level of risk. The agency followed suit by changing the higher-level requirements as a result of our findings and actions.

5.3 PCB Copper wrap violations

In our review of nonconforming PCB coupons, the minimum copper wrap (length and thickness) requirement has been a persistent cause of board rejections. Copper wrap over vias in the board is shown in cross-section view in Figure 1.

The requirement emphasized both a two-surface contact of the wrap plating layer (both with the hole wall and the top-side annular ring plating) rather than a one-surface butt joint, as well as a minimum thickness for the section on the top surface (above the annular ring plating and measured 1 mil from the hole wall) connecting both features to increase PCB reliability. Two root causes were found for the most common nonconformances: (1) the planarization process used to optimize the panel’s surface flatness after the plating process reduces the wrap thickness with a ±60% accuracy (a panel can contain multiple boards), and (2) the requirement was not included in alternate standards used at the time for some builds (for example, the European Space Agency’s ECSS-Q-ST-70-11C instead of IPC-6012B Class 3/A).

During the development process for the Ice, Cloud, and land Elevation Satellite (ICESat)-II mission, the problem of copper wrap nonconformance once again emerged, this time affecting a
component that had already been manufactured and tested. A three-pronged testing approach was adopted to address the concern for ICESat-II, and subsequently for future projects. First, over 170 lifetimes in equivalent thermal cycles were performed on the test coupons from the ICESat-II component. Other than a setup glitch encountered and corrected early in the test, no change in resistance was encountered. Next, two independent testing regimens of interconnect stress testing (IST) were performed on samples made with different materials and layer counts as well as wrap thicknesses that ranged from 0 mils to 0.5 mils. Finally, boards were modelled using the COMSOL™ software tool to obtain simulated results. All three testing efforts and the modelling effort were consistent, demonstrating that copper wrap of 0.2 mils or 0.5 mils did not improve the reliability of the boards over that with 0 mils. Furthermore, each effort showed that failure only occurred after exposure to very extreme conditions and that the mode was a barrel crack leaving the copper wrap unaffected.

After these efforts, the PCB CRAE approached the IPC to form a subcommittee to reconsider the requirement for copper wrap, based on our results. Regular discussions regarding how to handle this requirement will continue in the future. A ballot for the amendment to the specification was taken, which, after passing, has resulted in the release of amendment 1 to the specification and reducing the minimum copper wrap thickness.

5.4 Reverse Tantalum Capacitors Installed on the International Space Station (ISS)

During the process of continuous risk review for GSFC projects, it was discovered that significant risks had been introduced to GSFC’s projects planned for installation onto the
ExPRESS Logistics Carrier (ELC) on the ISS. Requirements had been established that restricted the operational conditions to mitigate the risk associated with a pair (main and auxiliary) of reverse tantalum capacitors installed into the ELC avionics. The ELC is a platform used to house science instruments on ISS, as well as spare parts and components. The capacitors were installed in reverse bias orientation due to a drawing error that traces back to an old design that predates the use of polarity symbols. After a failure had occurred in a ground simulator of the avionics, an independent organization within NASA performed testing that resulted in the new restrictions. Subsequently, GSFC SMA reviewed the report along with supplemental test results. The inconsistency of the results within the report, relative to the on-orbit performance of the ELC avionics, suggested that a subsequent review was in order. In particular, in our initial tests, we were observing much more serious degradation in capacitors at room temperature in reverse bias conditions than those shown in the report, and our initial results combined with those in the reports did not seem to be consistent with the on-orbit performance. These results are shown in Figure 2, where 6 mA is considered the point at which circuit failure is imminent.

Furthermore, a figure in the report that indicated severe degradation in a short time when stepping from 22 degrees Celsius (C) dwell to thermal cycling between 25 and 35 degrees C raised many questions. On-orbit, the systems had been operating for between five and seven years without any anomalous behavior, with the last three being temperature-constrained to less than 25 degrees C. Prior to the imposition of the new restrictions, much higher temporary temperature excursions had occurred with no loss in performance. However, the thermal cycle testing between 25 and 35 degrees C brought about failure conditions within a month for many
of the capacitors. Figure 3 shows the performance of units tested in vacuum over many months and those that were brought out of the chamber for thermal cycling after about 2.5 months.

In testing, we noticed subtle variations in the performance over the weekends, when HVAC levels were relaxed. Since temperature controls remained, this suggested that humidity might be a factor. Subsequently, we began testing with a Nitrogen purge after a dryout period, and finally, results were achieved that were consistent with the on-orbit behavior. Moisture rather than temperature or temperature cycling was clearly the significant factor. Numerous tests were performed in vacuum, stepping up to higher temperatures, and with many refinements to better simulate the on-orbit environment. For example, testing results at 55 degrees C in vacuum are shown in Figure 4.

The testing performed by the independent NASA organization was generally at ambient pressure, with the presence of moisture. They had performed one set of tests in vacuum in a bell jar, with results that indicated acceptable long-term performance, but the tests were performed at room temperature; the effect of temperature was not explored. Since there was no temperature control capability in the bell jar, the parts were pulled out of vacuum before adding thermal cycles, resulting in severe degradation; the effect of humidity was not recognized. This degradation was not consistent with the on-orbit behavior of the capacitors.
At this point, it was confirmed that the testing conditions employed by the independent group violated “test as you fly” principles, missing the relevance of vacuum conditions to the on-orbit performance of the reverse bias capacitors.

A “common SMA sense” approach is to consider the risk of use-as-is only when returning the item to a compliant condition is not an option. Often we do not recognize that the action of returning an item to a compliant condition carries risk as well. It turns out that the only risk of leaving the capacitors alone (that have been functioning flawlessly beyond the system’s design lifetime, over 5 years) is that if one were to fail, power to payloads as well as telemetry to indicate status of the heaters would be temporarily lost. An astronaut extravehicular activity (EVA) would have to be planned and performed to replace the failed unit with the on-orbit spare. On the other hand, to prevent this risk, multiple risky and costly activities were planned and/or performed including: (1) temperature restrictions on payloads, as mentioned earlier, which would require many payloads to operate much longer than planned to meet science objectives, (2) requiring new payloads to add their own power supplies at much greater cost and adding new risks to individual payloads, and (3) planning and performing four separate EVAs to ultimately remove, repair, and replace all four of the avionics pallets proactively, even though any other component may fail in the system first.

Ultimately, the effort resulted in a recommendation to increase the maximum temperature of the new restriction to 40 degrees C (which is close to the highest temperature that would be encountered in the particular positions on ISS) and the decision to defer any further actions or requirements to payloads until a failure occurs.
5.5 On-orbit capacitor failures and anomalies

In preparation for a LandSat-9 rebuild of the thermal infrared sensor (TIRS) instrument in use on the LandSat-8 mission, GSFC SMA reviewed the anomaly history of TIRS, noting the behavior and open items on a fishbone (Ishikawa, or cause-effect) diagram used to identify potential anomaly causes. The anomaly review board had drawn the conclusion that a moisture-driven effect internal to a printed circuit board caused leakage currents and loss of insulation resistance that appeared many months after nominal operation on orbit. However, this cause was very unlikely after such an extensive period of time in vacuum, in particular since the boards had been through substantial thermal vacuum testing on the ground prior to launch without any issues. Behavior of the on-orbit leakage currents on TIRS bore a striking resemblance to the reverse bias capacitor performance discovered in our ground testing for the ELC problem described above, as shown in Figure 5.

A thorough examination was performed of the capacitor polarities in all related components on TIRS, and the polarities were found to be correct at all levels. At this point it was noted that while there was spare hardware, it had not been exercised in an attempt to resolve the anomaly, so subsequently GSFC SMA requested that spare boards be brought out of storage to be powered up and examined for the anomaly. Not long after power-up, the board started to exhibit the leakage current reflective of the on-orbit behavior. Placing a thermal camera over the anomalous board revealed focused hot spots growing in intensity over at least one ceramic capacitor in the circuit. The use of a high-resolution thermal camera pin-pointed the hot spot to a corner of the
capacitor, highly indicative of a crack. While cracks in ceramic capacitors have been somewhat common, we had not known of a case of one that was not discovered upon installation or during integration and test. Inspection of the part on the spare board and removal of the part gave no indications of an external crack. The thermal image is shown in Figure 6. Two capacitors that developed low insulation resistance during testing of the spare boards were carefully-removed from the board and subjected to detailed failure analysis. In each case the anomalous capacitor contained an internal delamination between an electrode and the ceramic dielectric. Furthermore, each capacitor exhibited an internal crack in the ceramic dielectric that was coincident with the delamination and extended between two adjacent electrode plates. Both the delamination and the crack features were self-contained within the capacitor chip (i.e., there were no externally-visible cracks). Internal delaminations and cracks that extend between the anode and cathode provide conduits within which electrically-conductive leakage paths may develop over time under bias.

Fortunately, the project had hundreds of spare parts from the same lot date code in inventory that would be useful for characterizing the lot. C-Mode Scanning Acoustic Microscopy (C-SAM), was performed on the lot to determine whether there were internal flaws in the pristine parts, such as voids or delaminations. The C-SAM results for over 300 residual parts revealed delaminations in around 50% of the parts in the lot. The task forward would be to link the delaminations in the spare parts with the anomalous parts on-orbit and on the spare board on the ground. The subsequent investigation revealed that this had been a long-standing problem, known in some communities, but not well-reported, without any broadly-published product
alerts. Over a dozen previous failures associated with the problem had been identified, but all within ground testing, and none on-orbit. However, after performing an analysis of on-orbit histories, a failure in 2014 of an instrument on NASA’s Solar Dynamics Observatory was linked to the problem, based on failure analysis records from years earlier and C-SAM testing of spare parts from the same lot. At that point, GSFC SMA released a NASA Advisory to warn the community about the problem, NA-GSFC-2017-002 (NASA GSFC, 2017). In the meantime, an aggressive process was undertaken to exonerate hardware on the roughly 25 projects in development and test at GSFC that have hardware developed and tested. After months of C-SAM testing of dozens of lots, and the performance of numerous secondary and tertiary tests, such as 85 degrees C/85% relative humidity accelerated testing, solder dip testing, and destructive physical analyses, only a few parts were encountered that warranted removal and replacement. The remaining activity involves bounding the problem to older lot date codes, as is evident in the collection of data that exists on the problem.

6.0 Implementation Challenges and Resolution

As mentioned earlier, GSFC’s history of success has produced a “cannot fail” culture and a barrier against change, especially when it comes to the core activities considered to be essential to mission success, such as systems engineering and safety and mission assurance. Furthermore, the discussion of implementing risk-based approaches has brought about confusion with earlier approaches such as “faster, better, cheaper” (NASA OIG, 2001) and interpreted to imply that more risk will be taken. The difference in the transition to a risk-based approach today is that it is based on rigorous risk assessment and a substantive comparison of alternate approaches, as opposed to a blind elimination of processes based on an assumption that they are costly.
6.1 Changing the culture

In order to get past the fear of failure associated with such change, it has been essential to perform continuous and persistent training at all levels in the organization, centered on real examples from pilot project implementation and from testing performed. At the core of the risk-based approach is a thorough understanding of risk, and while GSFC has been using risk management for well over a decade, there was not a rigorous and consistent approach for assessing and managing risk across the Center. The rigor and consistency are essential to effective risk-based SMA implementation, especially when some longstanding and long-trusted requirements are being displaced or diminished in authority, so this brought about further need for developing guidelines, building examples, and training development engineers and SMA personnel to understand and manage risk. A key element of this is promoting the understanding of the risks that come with implementing requirements as well as their effectiveness for buying down risks in operation (i.e., in space where in most cases hardware cannot be repaired). One of the biggest challenges has been reducing some of the conservatism at the piece-part level in exchange for more rigorous system-level analysis including fault-tolerance. The piece-part conservatism has become an artifact of the organizational structure with subject matter experts for a range of individual areas, such as electronic parts, printed circuit boards, materials, etc., that have traditionally had nearly-unfettered ownership of their elements among each of the projects. For highly-resource-constrained missions, piece-part conservatism has frequently led to reduced system-level testing because of long screening times, the need to respond to screening anomalies whose effects in the application are not clear, and occasional overtesting. This is one example of trading resources (e.g., costs and time to performing screening) and programmatic risk (e.g., risks that screening processes will take longer than expected or cost more because you damage
something) to buy down technical risk (risk of a failure when on-orbit). This is an example of an essential risk trade that must be understood for the most effective implementation of requirements. In support of, and beyond, the substantive assessment of risk necessary to convince the GSFC community to take a risk-based approach has been detailed assessment of data from integration and test, and on-orbit, as well as the collection of data from specially-designed tests in relevant scenarios. In Section 6.2 we will summarize the results to identify key collective take-aways from each of the example areas.

6.2 Discussion of Findings

We have described five major mission assurance challenges that could have taken a very different path to closure based on traditional practices of GSFC and NASA as a whole. In each of these instances, the traditional path was not likely to have led to hardware failure; however, the programmatic risk would have increased (i.e., cost and schedule growth). In 2014, after several cases where the impacts to projects were extreme, focus was turned to the risk associated with common nonconformances. Upon determining very low to nonexistent elevated risks due to common nonconformances, a policy was instituted that eventually required risk assessments to be performed on all nonconforming coupons. This ended up reducing scrap by about 85% and saved substantial schedule, resulting in not only cost savings but savings of key time allocated to system level testing. This involved steering away from the long-standing core assumption that high rates of nonconformance necessarily indicate an industry or manufacturing problem that drives up the risk of product failure. It also revisited the need to support standard technical requirements that are imposed broadly, with empirical evidence of their value and effectiveness. It showed that without technical rigor in the rationale used to establish them, these requirements could actually be counterproductive by unnecessarily driving up cost or reducing reliability. In
the same time frame, the huge burden of nonconformances in the areas of metrology and calibration led to a detailed investigation and a complete transformation of an approach based on empowering the user and development community, rather than the Met/Cal service labs, to determine how to implement Met/Cal requirements, not only saving significant money but enabling the Center to operate at an overall lower level of risk. The agency followed suit by changing the higher-level requirements as a result of our findings and actions. After some time implementing the printed circuit board risk assessment process, a common theme of manufacturing challenges in meeting the copper wrap requirement emerged, highlighted in a high risk that had been burdening the ICESat-2 project. This prompted a rigorous, multi-pronged testing regimen that ultimately showed that reliability was not improved by meeting the requirement, resulting in closure and a requirements update in the standard. In parallel, the NICER project on the International Space Station had become burdened by a late-breaking requirement to address a reverse polarity tantalum capacitor installed in the ExPRESS Logistics Carrier platform to which it would ultimately be installed, prompting detailed risk assessments and development of a range of rigorous tests. In this example, safety risk would have increased if astronaut Extra-Vehicular Activities were selected to achieve closure. Ultimately the ISS program decided to raise the maximum allowable temperature for the ELC users and eliminate further EVA plans, reducing cost and risk substantially across the board. Finally, the ceramic capacitor problem experienced on two GSFC missions on-orbit has brought about lessons in using all data to characterize an anomaly that has broad implications and using all resources available to try to recreate the anomaly. In particular, when drawing conclusions that drive costly corrective actions that also have associated risk, be sure that all available data have been exhausted. Furthermore, this problem and resulting investigation exposed a longstanding
problem that has existed with information transfer about known problems across the space community.

Although the long-standing practices that were challenged in these examples normally evolve out of past experiences within specific contexts (lessons learned) they can ignore the big picture view of risk and discourage new testing and new analyses of the prior data. Lessons learned are extremely valuable when the context is the same but can create solution bias when the context is sufficiently similar. Some relatively straightforward analyses were used to steer away from these well-intentioned paths and onto paths of lower risk while saving multiple millions of dollars and hundreds of weeks of project schedule.

7.0 Summary and Conclusions

This paper has presented a risk-based SMA framework that prioritizes understanding all sides of risk for a given problem as opposed to applying a bias toward compliance with quality requirements after a problem has occurred. Standard SMA requirements are a normalization of lessons learned and serve to streamline communication of expectations between customers and suppliers. They facilitate the plan and implementation of analyses and controls that maximize first-pass compliance. These examples show that once noncompliance has occurred, the SMA requirements may no longer be as useful as careful analysis and risk management. While NASA routinely uses material review boards, failure review boards, and anomaly review boards to understand the nature and impact of nonconformances, there is a bias towards returning the item to a state of conformance without consideration of the risk of doing so. This bias competes with performing deeper investigations of existing and new data to understand options and risks.
Process nonconformance is often equated with a lack of commitment to the requirements, or complacency, rather than considering if the nonconformance is actually feedback indicating a shortcoming in the requirement itself. Lessons learned are at the core of the methodology and are inherent in all activities but carry specific context that must be recognized. The examples presented demonstrate not only that the risk-based approach is effective at saving cost and schedule resources, but that it enables any project to operate at the lowest possible risk posture given its particular resource constraints.

8.0 References

Table 1. Summary of Risk-based SMA results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technical Area</th>
<th>“Traditional approach”</th>
<th>Risk-based approach</th>
<th>Results summary</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PCB test coupon nonconformance handling</td>
<td>Evaluate test coupons to favored standard (note that there are many standards used throughout the electronics community). Reject and refabricate all boards associated with nonconforming test coupons.</td>
<td>Use requirements from one or more commonly-used standards to define minimum requirements for a range of risk levels. Assess risk when nonconformance is found and determine whether risk is acceptable. Only refabricate if cause for nonconformance is understood and can be eliminated.</td>
<td>Out of 193 boards with nonconforming test coupons, over 85% had either no elevated risk or very low risk associated with the nonconformance. The risk acceptance resulted in millions of dollars and hundreds of weeks of schedule were saved relative to the traditional approach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metrology/Calibration Requirements</td>
<td>Every box that has been calibrated once must be actively tracked or controlled with a sticker and a database tracking system, whether it is planned for use in an accuracy-critical/sensitive function or not. Accuracy and periodicity limits are generic. Must follow one calibration technical requirements standard.</td>
<td>Multiple technical requirements standards approved. Users of equipment ensure items used for accuracy-sensitive applications are calibrated prior to use and are not tracked otherwise. Test setups broken for calibration only if the risk of breaking setup is lower than the risk of inaccurate measurement.</td>
<td>Hundreds of unnecessary calibrations not performed when no risk involved, no requirements for small companies to change their processes when they don’t involve risk, no longer breaking up test setups to perform calibrations just to meet the generic periodicity requirement. Changes were implemented across the agency as a result of our investigation findings and risk-based approach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCB copper wrap violations</td>
<td>Reject boards that do not have a minimum of 0.5 mil copper wrap</td>
<td>Perform testing to establish reliability basis for copper wrap dimension, for</td>
<td>Three independent lines of testing, plus additional finite element modeling</td>
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<tr>
<th>Table Entry</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tr>
<td>regardless of whether or not the drawing specified that a smaller dimension was allowed.</td>
<td>levels from 0 to greater than 0.5 mil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>effort shows that a greater amount of copper wrap does not improve reliability.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reverse Ta capacitor installed on orbiting flight hardware due to drawing error</td>
<td>Do whatever is necessary to replace the erroneously installed capacitors, and place costly and risky restrictions on payloads.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test capacitors from the lot in the most flight representative scenario and only replace capacitors and/or implement restrictions if the risks of replacement or restrictions are lower than the risk of using-as-is.</td>
<td>Testing in realistic environment shows that long life is expected, risk of proactive replacement and restrictions is greater than risk of using-as-is.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-orbit capacitor anomalies/failures</td>
<td>On-orbit anomaly was determined by anomaly review board (ARB) to be caused by an internal printed circuit board condition, without testing available spare boards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of planned changes to next build of same instrument prompted a review of ARB conclusions and subsequent testing of spare boards. Use of thermal camera discounted original theory and led to the discovery of a systemic problem with a wide class of ceramic capacitors.</td>
<td>Correct cause identified to ensure proper actions for rebuild of instrument. Identification of capacitor issue that affects entire space community and subsequent NASA advisory.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Figure 1. Copper wrap is the electrolytic hole plating deposition continuously extending onto the surface from a plated via structure. Schematic illustration of a wrap plating, 1 - cap plating, 2- wrap plating and, 3 - via fill.

Figure 2. Leakage currents of dozens of capacitors from the ELC lot date code (red) and a different lot date code (blue) at room temperature (23 deg C) in ambient pressure. The majority of samples show leakage that has extended to or beyond the 0.006 Amp limit over the duration of the test. The 0.006 Amp limit corresponds to the onset of circuit problems in the ELC avionics.
Figure 3. Leakage currents of all capacitors tested in vacuum until mid-June. Those that start to rise after mid-June were taken from the chamber and cycled between 25 and 35 deg C in ambient pressure. The 0.006 Amp level was determined to represent the onset of circuit problems in the ELC avionics.
Figure 4. Leakage currents of ELC lot date code capacitors tested in vacuum at 55 deg C, showing stable performance, well under the 6-mA limit. Note that the independent report found that temperatures should be restricted to 25 deg C or below based on the assumption that increasing use temperatures will drive up leakage current.
Figure 5. Comparison of leakage currents measured on-orbit on the LandSat-8 TIRS instrument and capacitor leakage current from ELC capacitor testing. A 54 mA bias is removed from TIRS currents.
Figure 6. Thermal image of spare board in test on the ground, showing hot spot over defective capacitor.