



NASA Perspective on Leading Indicators and Dashboarding

Prepared by
Roger L. Boyer, MS, CRE
Chief, Risk & Reliability Analysis Branch

Robert B. Cross, MS
Sr. PRA Analyst

NASA Johnson Space Center
Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA)

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Dashboards



- **Purpose – To convey information to programs, projects, Centers on the status of certain activities/requirements.**
- **Pro's – Promotes communication of key information.**
- **Con's – May not have all the right information to make a fully informed decision.**



NASA Safety/Quality Audit Dashboard




- **Dashboard was built as a tool to allow NASA headquarters and Centers to access “real time” audit data**
 - “Real time” because it is automatically updated after each audit
- **Shows audit results, corrective action progress, audit schedules for both Institutional, Facility, Operational (IFO) Safety and Quality Audits (QAAR)**
- **Flags corrective actions with color codes that are due within 30 days or late**
- **Allows agency level view to see if there are and Centers that are outliers**




Agency Level Dashboard

- Top level dashboard shows high level audit results, corrective action status, and audit schedule at Agency level
- Allows user to drill down to different areas or specific Centers






Agency Level Dashboard



- Agency level allows drilling down further into various areas such as findings by category
- Allows user to drill down to each Center for the same





Center Level Dashboard



- Center Specific audit data similar to Agency level, but for that Center only

SAARIS :: NSC AAO Dashboard Center

IFOSA - Total Closed vs. Open Findings GRC, (after July 2013)

Findings	Count	Percentage
IFO Closed	15	45.5%
IFO Open	18	54.5%

Load Dates for this Dashboard

Load Date	Audit Title
7/28/15	2014 GRC IFO Safety Audit (ID: 632)
7/29/15	2015 GRC QAAR (ID: 594)

Center

Center	Name
GRC	Glenn Research Center

QAAR - Total Closed vs. Open Findings GRC, (after July 2013)

Findings	Count	Percentage
QAAR Open	29	100%

IFOSA - Audit Health By CAP Due Dates Center

Audit Title	Total NC Findings	Closed NC Findings	Late	Due < Than 30 Day
2014 GRC IFO Safety Audit...	33	15	5	0

NOTE: To Maximize ANY Chart Use your Mouse to Hover over the chart, Right-Click and Select 'Maximize Chart'. To return, hover over chart, then Right-Click and Select 'Restore Chart Size'.

Click on a Center Name in ANY of the Charts to view data for that Center (except for Audit Schedule).

LEGEND for Center Audit Health Charts:
 RED = Past Due NOT Closed
 YELLOW = less than 30 days NOT Closed
 GREEN = Closed On Time

QAAR - Audit Health By CAP Due Dates Center

Audit Title	Total NC Findings	Closed NC Findings	Late	Due < Than 30 Days
2015 GRC QAAR (ID: 594)	29	0	16	2

AAO Audit Schedule - Complete and Scheduled

Center	Scheduled Aud...	Schedule d Aud...	Audit Type	Center Audit
GRC	07/28/2014	08/22/2014	IFO	IFO Safety Audit...
GRC	10/23/2014	10/31/2014	QAAR	Quality Audit As...

Click Links Below to Return to Agency Dashboards

- NSC AAO Dashboard
- NSC AAO - Center Audit Health by CAP Due Dates



NASA Flight Safety Dashboard



- **Dashboard was built as a tool to communicate risk across programs, mission phases, and overall mission risk to Program Management.**
- **Shows program specific Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) results used for verification of probabilistic requirements.**
- **Shows whether program specific PRA results meet agency level probability of Loss of Crew (LOC) Thresholds, Program level LOC requirements, and Program level Technical Performance Metrics (TPMs)**



Comparison of Mission Loss of Crew Estimates and Requirements



JSC S&MA Analysis Branch

PRA Version 2 Estimate¹ (1/1/2020)

	Pre-launch and Ascent		In-Space ²		EDL and Post Landing ⁵	Mission
	A	B	A	B	B	
Agency Threshold	1 in 300		1 in 150		1 in 300	1 in 75
ESD Reqmt (ESD 10002, Table R-16)	1 in 550	1 in 1400	TBD	TBD	1 in 650	TBD
ESD TPM Objectives	1 in 400 TPM 1.a		TBD	TBD	TBD	1 in 130 TPM 4.a
Best Estimate (by program)	1 in xxx	1 in xxx	1 in xxx	1 in xxx	1 in xxx	1 in xxx
Best Estimate (by phase)	1 in xxx		1 in xxx		1 in xxx	

- **High Level Assumptions**
 - 1
 - 2
 - 3



Leading Indicators



- **Purpose – To anticipate and mitigate problems prior to an accident**
- **Pro's – Proactive**
- **Con's – Not foolproof, can't catch everything. Can be expensive.**



Leading Indicators



- **NASA has employed a fleet lead program for programs like the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS).**
- **For certain equipment (e.g. Auxiliary Power Units), ground based units are operated and maintained with run time/cycles over that experienced by the fleet to proactively sense age related problems before they occur in flight.**
- **For the Space Shuttle Program, NASA had developed an accident sequence precursor program that evaluated anomalies during flight to determine if they were risk significant.**
 - Patterned after the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's program, but wasn't fully implemented before the end of the program.



Today's "Take Aways"



- **Dashboards/leading indicators help communicate information to decision makers and predict potential problems before they occur.**
- **Concern is that you are communicating the right information and not confusing the reader or decision maker.**



Questions?





Backup Charts





What is PRA?

- PRA is a comprehensive, structured, and disciplined approach to identifying and analyzing risk in engineered systems and/or processes. It attempts to quantify rare event probabilities of failures. It attempts to take into account all possible events or influences that could reasonably affect the system or process being studied. It is inherently and philosophically a Bayesian methodology. In general, PRA is a process that seeks answers to three basic questions:
 - ✓ What kinds of events or scenarios can occur (i.e., what can go wrong)?
 - ✓ What are the likelihoods and associated uncertainties of the events or scenarios?
 - ✓ What consequences could result from these events or scenarios (e.g., Loss of Crew, Loss of Mission, Loss of Hydrocarbon Containment, Reactor Core Damage Frequency)?
- There are other definitions and questions that it can help answer.
- The models are developed in “failure space”. This is usually different from how designers think (e.g. success space).
- PRAs are often characterized by (but not limited to) event tree models, fault tree models, and simulation models.



NASA Examples



- **Mission Level Risk Assessment**
 - Low Earth Orbit Operation (e.g. Shuttle and Station)
 - Cis-Lunar Cross Program Missions (e.g. Distant Retrograde Orbit)
 - Deep Space Gateway Design, Development, and Operation
 - Deep Space Transport Design, Development, and Operation
- **System Level Risk Assessment**
 - Orion Design and Operation
 - Space Launch Systems (SLS) Design and Operation
 - Ground Systems Development & Operation (GSDO) Design and Operation
 - Commercial Crew Partner Vehicles
- **Focused risk trade studies between current and proposed process/design. For example:**
 - Orion Service Module Propulsion System
 - SLS Engine Out Capability
 - GSDO Emergency Egress
 - XPRA Manual Steering, Post-Landing Crew Recovery



When can PRA be Performed?



NEW DEVELOPMENTS

The ideal time to conduct a PRA is at the beginning of the design process to incorporate the necessary safety and risk avoidance measures throughout the development phase at minimal cost.

EXISTING SYSTEMS

PRA can be applied to existing systems to identify and prioritize risks associated with operations. PRAs can evaluate the impact of system changes and help avoid compromises in quality or reliability while increasing productivity.

INCIDENT RESPONSE

In the event of unexpected downtime or an accident, a good PRA team can assess the cause of the failure and develop appropriate mitigation plans to minimize the probability of comparable events in the future.

In a nutshell, PRA can be applied from concept to decommissioning during the life cycle, including design and operations.



PRA Process




Probabilistic Risk Assessment Flow

- Examples:
- Loss of life
 - Loss of facility
 - Shutdown
 - Fire
 - Blowout
 - Leak
 - Exceeding limits




- Sequences of operation
- Timelines
- Operational Procedures
- Operational Rules/Assumptions
- Malfunction Procedures




- Hazard Reports
- Functional Analyses
- FMEAs
- Previous risk assessments
- External event assessment



- Training Manuals
- System Architecture
- Engineering Expertise
- P&IDs
- Human Error
- Common Cause



- Customer Data
- Industry Databases
 - OREDA
 - ICON
 - Well Master
- NPRD db
- EPRD db
- Other Assessments




Engineering Analysis is used to support success criteria, response time, etc.

Documentation of the PRA supports a successful independent review process and long-term PRA application



No Pie Charts,

They assume completeness and we know that we don't know it all.





Notional Risk Drivers via Pareto


(e.g. Top 80% of Calculated Risk)



A Pareto chart like this can be made for each project, mission phase, etc.

1 in xxx Risk


Various
Subsystems and
Scenarios



% of Risk



Notional Ascent Risk Profile (not a direct output of PRA)



This chart builds off of PRA results (that are time averaged over ascent), thus requires post-processing to get this profile.