

# *Ground System PRA Data Availability Case Study*

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GSFC Reliability









11 Sept 2019

NASA GSFC SMA Directorate

MAMII Meeting, GSFC - Greenbelt, MD

# PRA Process



## PRA Procedures Guide for Managers and Practitioners - NASA HQ 8/2002



- ### Risk Results and Insights
- Displaying the results in tabular and graphical forms
  - Ranking of risk scenarios
  - Ranking of individual events (e.g., hardware failure, human errors, etc.)
  - Insights into how various systems interact
  - Tabulation of all the assumptions
  - Identification of key parameters that greatly influence the results
  - Presenting results of sensitivity studies

# PRA Process



## End State of Concern / Initiating Event



End State of Concern = *Loss of Science Data*  
Initiating Event = *MMC Generates Commands*


# PRA Process

## Event Sequence Diagram - Event Tree



# PRA Process

## Event Tree - FTA




# CASE STUDY

## JPSS Ground Data Availability

# JPSS Ground System

JPSS Ground System High-level Architecture OV-2 (Dec 5, 2014)



MD – Mission Data  
 SMD – Stored Mission Data  
 MSD – Mission Support data

JPSS Ground System	Provider of SMD, TT&C, HRD/MSD	No Internal Support, Pass-thru Only	FVTS	Flight Development Organizations
Common Ground System (CGS)	Provider of SMD Only	Direct Readout & Field Terminals	GRAVITE	External

LEGEND:  
 Black/White Text – Block 1.2 +  
 Red Text – Block 2.0

# Data Availability PRA Goals

- Predict data availability for the JPSS Ground System in order to
  - Verify that the system will meet JPSS Level 1 requirement that  $\geq 99\%$  of science data collected be delivered to the data processing sites, measured over a 30-day period.
  - Identify the risks that could prevent the system from meeting the Level 1 requirement

What percentage of our data will we lose and why?




# Availability PRA

## Assumptions/Scope


- The spacecraft storage limit is 6.8 hours.
- All ground stations have a data storage limit of seven days.
- Ability to command the spacecraft must be lost for seven days to cause a data loss.
  
- The spacecraft is always fully functional.
- Latency is not considered.
- Security threats and environmental and other threats beyond the control of the design are not considered.
- Switching to the Consolidated Back-Up (CBU) and the B-Side CGS/DPN is not considered.
- Data storage at the JPSS SMD Hub is not considered.

# Availability PRA Challenges



- Complex System
- Data Availability is not Operational Availability
- Data Availability is not Reliability
- Due to Data Storage, Downtime is normally not Data Loss
- Software Limitations
- Parallel Data Paths with Storage



# Redefining System of Interest




# Event Sequence Diagram and Tree - Command




- MMC Generates Commands
- MMC Transmits Commands to WAN
- WAN Relays Commands to Ground Station (GS)
- GS Receives Commands and Transmits to SC

# Event Sequence Diagram and Tree


## - Data



- Receptors Receive SD
- Receptors Store SD [If successful, 7 Days to deliver; if not, 6.8 hours]
  - WAN Relays SD to IDPS
  - IDPS Receives SD from WAN
  - IDPS Xmits SD to ESPC
  - ESPC Xmits SD to End Users



# Availability Fault Trees



# 25 Monte Carlo Simulations

Event Description	Failure Probability	Basis
ESPC Xmits SD to Users in < 7 Days	0.0016%*	Model: 0 / 10K months failed
ESPC Xmits SD to Users in < 6.8 hours	0.0016%*	Model: 0 / 10K months failed
Loss of Svalbard Command Transmit > 7 Days	0.03%	Model: 3 / 10K months failed
Loss of Fairbanks Command Transmit > 7 Days	0.64%	Model: 64 / 10K months failed
Loss of Troll Command Transmit > 7 Days	9.0%	Model: 904 / 10K months failed
Loss of WSC/TDRS Command Transmit > 7 Days	0.01%	Model: 1 / 10K months failed
IDPS Rx SD from WAN in < 7 Days	0.0016%*	Model: 0 / 10K months failed
IDPS Rx SD from WAN in < 6.8 hours	1.36%	Model: 136 / 10K months failed
IDPS Xmits SD to ESPC in < 7 Days (NAB: no effect)	0.0016%*	Model: 0 / 10K months failed
IDPS Xmits SD to ESPC in < 6.8 hours (NAB: 0.055%)	0.05%	Model: 5 / 10K months failed
Loss of NSOF Command Generation > 7 Days	0.01%	Model: 1 / 10K months failed
Loss of NSOF Command Transmit > 7 Days	0.0016%*	Model: 0 / 10K months failed
Fairbanks Fails to Collect/FWD SD	19.08%	Model: 1908 / 10K months failed
McMurdo Fails to Collect/FWD SD	11.67%	Model: 1167 / 10K months failed
Svalbard Fails to Collect/FWD SD	1.09%	Model: 109 / 10K months failed
Space SGCN Fails to Collect/FWD SD	2.82%	Model: 282 / 10K months failed
Troll Fails to Collect/FWD SD	23.90%	Model: 2390 / 10K months failed
Fairbanks Fails to Collect/Store SD	18.29%	Model: 1829 / 10K months failed
McMurdo Fails to Collect/Store SD	11.33%	Model: 1133 / 10K months failed
Svalbard Fails to Collect/Store SD	1.28%	Model: 128 / 10K months failed
Space SGCN Fails to Collect/Store SD	2.85%	Model: 285 / 10K months failed
Troll Fails to Collect/Store SD	23.51%	Model: 2351 / 10K months failed
Loss of WAN > 7 Days	0.0016%*	Model: 0 / 10K months failed
WAN Relays SD to IDPS in < 7 Days	0.0016%*	Model: 0 / 10K months failed
WAN Relays SD to IDPS in < 6.8 hours	0.0016%*	Model: 0 / 10K months failed


This did not come easy!

\*Models with no failures have a calculated probability of 0.0016% based on a 90% confidence interval.

# Monte Carlo Simulation

- 10,000 1-month runs per model
- Loss times can be analyzed using 2 Raptor report files
  - Failure Times (i.e., when they failed)
    - Often tens of thousands of failures
    - Not given by run
    - Occasionally missing failures
  - Key Parameters (hours)

Run	MTBDE	MDT	MTBM
9912	316.8508	403.1492	3.911739
573	117.4191	62.58091	5.525604
2164	253.3123	106.6877	5.69241
5579	86.49955	33.50045	7.013477
6559	267.9833	92.01667	8.120707
7769	557.4377	162.5623	8.078807
6978	282.5626	77.43741	8.19022





Down Time	Events
403	1
250	4
213	2
201	6
184	2
163	1
155	2

- Results used to identify months with downtime exceeding memory capacity




# Data Availability Results



# Lessons Learned


- Data Availability can be calculated using PRA.
- Monte Carlo results can be incorporated into Fault Tree / PRA.
- Raptor
  - Not designed to model storage.
  - Not designed to provide downing event durations by run.
- Use the right methodology for the analysis.
  - PRA may not be the best fit for every data availability calculation.
  - Monte Carlo simulation alone may be better.
  - Recharacterize requirements to not drive methodology choices.



# PRA Process


## Event Sequence Diagram

Event Sequence Diagram (Logic)




# PRA Process

## Event Tree




# Event Sequence Diagram - Data



- Receptors Receive SD and Xmit
- Receptors Store SD [if successful, 7 Days to deliver; if not, 6.8 hours]
  - WAN Relays SD to IDPS (2)
  - IDPS Receives SD from WAN (2)
  - IDPS Xmits SD to ESPC (2)
  - ESPC Xmits SD to End Users (2)

# Event Tree - Data



# Monte Carlo Results

- Top Fault Tree Events

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- Top Event Tree Events

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