



Fracture Control for Additive Manufactured Spacecraft Structures

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- BACKGROUND
 - FRACTURE CONTROL
 - EXISTING STANDARDS
- FRACTURE CONTROL IMPLEMENTATION
- DESIGN FOR AM FRACTURE CONTROL
- CLOSING REMARKS

BACKGROUND: FRACTURE CONTROL




Static Strength

- **Design load x FS < Allowable**
- One load cycle
- Nominal material state

Organization or
project may invoke
fracture control


Service Life

- Accounts for pre-existing and/or accumulated damage in load carrying capacity
- Defines strength with damage present
- Determine safe interval of operation



Board of experts from each technical discipline



BACKGROUND: FRACTURE CONTROL



Questions to Address Today:

1. What gaps exist in current NASA standards related to implementation of fracture control on additive manufactured (AM) parts?
2. What AM-specific challenges exist in fracture control implementation and how can the intent of existing standards be met?

BACKGROUND: EXISTING STANDARDS




- MSFC-STD-3716 Standard for Additively Manufactured Spaceflight Hardware by Laser Powder Bed Fusion in Metals
- MSFC-SPEC-3717 Specification for Control and Qualification of Laser Powder Bed Fusion Metallurgical Processes
- NASA-STD-5019 Fracture Control Requirements for Spaceflight Hardware
- NASA-STD-5001 Structural Design and Test Factors of Safety for Spaceflight Hardware
- JSC 65828 Structural Design Requirements and Factors of Safety for Spaceflight Hardware
- NASA-STD-5009 Nondestructive Evaluation Requirements for Fracture-Critical Metallic Components

Discipline	NASA Requirement Gap
"M&P"	Non-metallic materials
"M&P"	Other AM techniques
Fracture Control	Implementation of Fracture Control
Structures	Structural Certification
NDE	Detectable flaw size

FRACTURE CONTROL IMPLEMENTATION



- ✓ Classify parts and identify those that are “fracture critical”
for fracture critical parts...



Fracture Control Certification Methodology (FCCM)

FCCM-1: Damage Tolerance Fracture Analysis

FCCM-2: Damage Tolerance Simulated Service Life Test

FCCM-3: Proof Test

Assumptions

- Process control: consistent and repeatable properties
- Accurate material and fracture properties available
-

Disclaimer: FCCMs should not be interpreted as proposed requirements, early drafts of requirements, or pre-approved by NASA to meet NASA-STD-5019.

FCCM-1: Damage Tolerance Fracture Analysis

- When to use
 - Test-validated fracture analysis tool is available
 - NDE can find Critical Initial Flaw Size at all locations of concern (90% reliability, 95% confidence)
- Summary
 - Perform damage tolerance flaw growth analysis
 - Assume minimum detectable flaw size at worst case location and orientation
 - Pressurized hardware: proof test and leak check according to FCCM-3
- Comments
 - Not appropriate if NDE cannot find CIFS
 - Option: CIFS can be increased locally by adding material to fall within NDE capability

FCCM-2: Damage Tolerance Simulated Service Life Test

- When to use
 - NDE cannot support FCCM-1
 - Fracture analysis tools unavailable
- Summary
 - Full-scale/flight-like part containing intentional defects subjected to flight load spectrum
 - Success criteria: no defects grow to cause a catastrophic hazard (i.e., structural failure, critical leak)
 - Initial defects correspond to CIFS at all locations of concern
 - May need ability to “pre-crack”
- Comments
 - Defect growth should be quantified
 - Fracture analysis may be calibrated with test data and applied elsewhere

FCCM-3: Proof Test

➤ When to use

- Simple load or test fixture can replicate flight loading
- NDE and/or fracture analysis cannot support FCCM-1
- “Low duty cycle” applications

➤ Summary

- Proof test enveloping flight limit load by a predetermined factor at all locations
- Suggested proof factor: $proof\ factor = burst\ factor \times \frac{1.5}{2.0}$
- Perform fracture analysis to verify CIFS is screened by proof test at all locations
- Perform post-proof NDE

➤ Comments

- Option: Increase CIFS locally by adding material so that it is screened by proof test

DESIGN FOR AM FRACTURE CONTROL



- Include fracture control considerations in AM design approach
 - Design for Non-fracture critical: Failsafe¹
 - Multiple redundant load paths
 - Design for similar to NFC: Low Risk^{1,2}
 - Combined stresses < 30% Ultimate Strength
 - Infinite fatigue life
 - Design for proof testing
 - Include test fixturing and/or load application features in part
 - Machine features off after proof test
 - Design for NDE
 - Iterate on design to provide CIFS that NDE can find at all locations
- AM design and optimization algorithms can include fracture control goals

¹NASA-STD-5019 (Fracture Control Requirements for Spaceflight Hardware)

²Note: MSFC-STD-3716 prohibits a NFC: Low Risk classification per NASA-STD-5019 on any AM part

CLOSING REMARKS



- NASA Standards have gap regarding implementation of fracture control
 - New requirement needed??
 - Guidance/handbook sufficient??
- Implementation of fracture control on AM parts to meet intent of existing NASA standards
 - Fracture Control Certification Methodology-1: Damage Tolerance Fracture Analysis
 - Fracture Control Certification Methodology-2: Damage Tolerance Simulated Service Life Test
 - Fracture Control Certification Methodology-3: Proof Test
- Design for AM Fracture control
- Next Steps at NASA
 - Discuss fracture control implementation internally and with industry
 - Release AM fracture control guidance

Recent seminar: McElroy, M. Fracture Control and Structural Certification Guidance for Additive Manufacture Spacecraft Structures. Presented at 4th ASTM Symposium on Structural Integrity of Additive Manufactured Materials & Parts, October 7-11, 2019, Washington, DC.

- Results of an industry survey related to potential collaboration with NASA on maturing AM fracture control and structural certification standards
- Nine leading space industry companies participated
- Goals: hear industry perspective on current needs/gaps and prepare to consult on new NASA guidance
- Available upon request

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