

Low C-SWaP Detect and Avoid: Defining Well Clear



Air Traffic Control Workshop 2019

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
Detect and Avoid




Detect and Avoid is the capability to remain well clear and avoid collisions

**RTCA-228 Phase 1
Concept of DAA:**


**Acquire
Intruders**



**Suggestive
Guidance to Remain
Well Clear**



**Directive Guidance
Issued to Avoid
Collision**



***Notional Volumes**

Does not indicate any temporal component that may exist



Well Clear



- **Well Clear is a separation standard required for UAS to satisfy FAR 91.111 and 91.113**

FAR 91.111: ...not operate so close to another aircraft as to create a **collision hazard**

FAR 91.113: Vigilance shall be maintained ... so as to **see and avoid other aircraft ... pilots shall alter course to pass **well clear** of other air traffic**

- **Detect and Avoid (DAA) Systems provide surveillance, alerts, and guidance to Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) to help them maintain *well clear* of other aircraft and avoid collisions**
 - **Designed as an alternative means of compliance for see-and-avoid regulations**
 - **DAA systems are essential for safe integration of UAS into the National Airspace System (NAS)**



Classes of UAS

Example Attributes Relevant to DAA and Well Clear



Large UAS

Example: Reaper



- Size: Business jet and up
- Flight in all airspace
- Integrate with all aircraft including TCAS equipped
- DAA requirements developed through RTCA
- Phase 1 DAA MOPS published – non-terminal ops in Class D/E/G – includes DAA radar
- Phase 2 includes terminal

Low Size Weight Power UAS

Example: TigerShark



- Size: >55 lbs to several thousand pounds
- Flight below 10,000 ft
- Carry ADS-B but may not TCAS
- DAA requirements developed through RTCA
- Phase 2 MOPS includes Low C-SWAP UAS
- Too small to carry Phase 1 DAA radar

Small UAS

Example: Raven




- Size: 55 lbs and below
- Flight at very low altitude
 - Currently < 400 ft
- Ops currently under Part 107
- Regulations for expanded ops in development
 - FAA IPPs
- DAA requirements developed through ASTM
 - In process



Previous Work



- In 2015, Sense and Avoid Science and Research Panel (SARP) developed a Well Clear Definition for large unmanned aircraft using distance and time, based on
 - Safety: Required Prob(NMAC) given a well clear violation < 5%, 2.2% achieved
 - Suitability*: Low rates of triggering a TCAS alert on the intruder aircraft
 - Intruder TCAS alerts were a major driver
 - RTCA SC-228 adopted definition within Phase 1 DAA MOPS (DO-365)
 - Led to DAA air-to-air radar requirements
 - Relaxing well clear definition and radar requirements may be possible when intruder is not equipped with TCAS



NMAC – Near mid-air collision (HMD \leq 500 ft., VMD \leq 100 ft.)
LoWC – Loss of Well Clear
HMD – Horizontal Miss Distance

* Various other suitability metrics were used as well



Phase 2 MOPS

DAA Well Clear Objective



Objective: Define alternative DAA Well Clear (DWC) for UAS encountering aircraft without a transponder (noncooperative)

- **Phase 1 DWC accounts for TCAS II alerts (Resolution Advisories)**
 - Definition is very safe but maybe unnecessarily large for noncooperative aircraft, which do not have TCAS

- **Low C-SWaP UAS are too small or budget-constrained to carry the large, high-power radar required by the Phase 1 MOPS**
- **A noncoop DWC may enable low C-SWaP UAS operations by reducing noncooperative surveillance requirements compared to RTCA SC-228 Phase 1**

- **Noncoop DWC is anticipated to be applicable to both Phase 1 UAS and low C-SWaP UAS encountering noncooperative aircraft**

— Focus of Talk



Outline



- Background
- ➔ • **Defining Well Clear Separation for Low C-SWaP UAS Encountering Noncooperative Traffic**
 - Approach
 - Results
- Summary




DAA Well Clear Analysis



- **Objective:** identify and assess DAA Well Clear (DWC) candidates based on safety and operational suitability metrics
- **Approach:** Monte Carlo simulation* using one million realistic encounters to evaluate unmitigated (without DAA) and mitigated (with DAA) performance against noncooperative intruders



Without DAA

- Analysis does not include response to a Detect and Avoid system
- Evaluates baseline collision risk
- Narrows tradespace



With DAA

- Analysis includes DAA response using DAIDALUS algorithm
- Validates collision risk of DAA equipped aircraft



* Assumes perfect surveillance




Encounter Model


Low C-SWAP UAS vs Noncooperative Intruders



Synthetic Encounter Generation (Uncorrelated Encounter Model)



Low C-SWAP UAS Encounter Characteristics



- Encounter models generate random aircraft trajectories that are statistically representative of noncooperative trajectories observed from radar data
- Results may not apply to higher speed UAS



Mitigated Metrics*




- **Safety metrics indicate whether desired separation is achieved**

- Risk ratio and loss of well clear ratios: $\frac{P(\text{NMAC or LoWC}|\text{encounter, with mitigation})}{P(\text{NMAC or LoWC}|\text{encounter, without mitigation})}$
- Ratio less than 1 indicates that the mitigated system reduces the risk of NMAC or LoWC; e.g., risk ratio of 0.1 indicates 90% reduction in risk

- **Operational suitability metrics indicate the appropriateness and severity of alerts required to remain well clear**

- Alert ratio: $\frac{P(\text{Alert}|\text{encounter, with mitigation})}{P(\text{NMAC}|\text{encounter, without mitigation})}$
- Alert ratio measures the alert frequency relative to the nominal NMAC frequency



*Additional metrics were computed but are not shown here




Outline



- **Background**
- **Defining Well Clear Separation for Low C-SWaP UAS Encountering Noncooperative Traffic**
 - Approach
 - ➔ – Results
- **Summary**



Unmitigated Analysis: Trade Space Down Selection




- **DWC Candidates chosen based on trade study^[1] of potential DWC based on:**
 - P - collision risk without DAA
 - MIR - maneuver initiation range
- **Results**
 - DWC1 achieves minimum MIR for 5% unmitigated collision risk
 - DWC2 is simple because it does not have a time component
 - DWC3 was proposed for terminal area UAS operations
 - DWC4 achieves an unmitigated collision risk smaller than 5%

| | DWC1 | DWC2 | DWC3 | DWC4 | Phase 1 |
|----------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| HMD* | 2000 ft | 2200 ft | 1500 ft | 2500 ft | 4000 ft |
| τ_{mod} * | 15 s | 0 s | 15 s | 25 s | 35 s |
| h* | 450 ft | 450 ft | 450 ft | 450 ft | 450 ft |

HMD – Horizontal Miss Distance



System Operating Characteristic for Low C-SWaP Encounters



- SOC allows simultaneous evaluation of safety and operational suitability
- Risk and LoWC ratio are largely insensitive to DWC definition
- HMD appears to have the largest effect on alert ratio
 - DWC1 and DWC3 have the same τ_{mod}^* , but DWC1 alerts more frequently


| | DWC1 | DWC2 | DWC3 | DWC4 | Phase 1 |
|----------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| HMD* | 2000 ft | 2200 ft | 1500 ft | 2500 ft | 4000 ft |
| τ_{mod}^* | 15 s | 0 s | 15 s | 25 s | 35 s |




Effect of Surveillance Range



NMAC Risk Ratios



Loss of Well Clear Ratios



Note: Different y-axis scales

- DWC 1, 2, 3 are largely insensitive to reduced surveillance ranges
- DWC 4 and Phase 1 experience large increases in risk ratio and loss of well clear ratio when surveillance range is reduced (see 2 NM blue bars)

New DWC candidates support surveillance ranges down to 2 NM



Summary



- **Well Clear used in RTCA SC-228 Phase 1 is not well suited for encountering noncooperative aircraft**
 - Overly conservative against aircraft not equipped with TCAS
 - Results in DAA radar requirements that cannot be met by Low C-SWaP UAS
- **Objective was to examine if a smaller Well Clear would be suitable for DAA using low C-SWaP sensors**
- **Performed simulation analysis of four candidate well clear definitions for low C-SWaP UAS against noncooperative equipped intruders**
 - NMAC and LoWC risk not sensitive to DWC parameters examined
 - Safety and operational suitability not dependent on τ_{mod}^*
 - Indicates τ_{mod}^* may not be necessary

**SC-228 selected 2200 ft horizontally, 450 ft vertically
for UAS encountering noncooperative aircraft**



Bibliography (images)



- MQ-9 Reaper by Lt. Col. Leslie Pratt, [source image](#), public domain
- TigerShark by Ken Ulbirch, [source image](#), NASA
- Raven by USGS, [source image](#), public domain



Backup





Future Work



- **Develop and validate sensor requirements based on the noncoop DWC**
- **Human factors evaluation of noncoop DWC**
- **Safety analyses in the presence of sensor noise**



Low C-SWaP UAS



- Typically operate at 500-10,000 ft MSL with speeds at or below 100 kts
- Extended operations in airspace classes D, E (non-terminal), or G (non-terminal) with transit operations in classes B and C
- Missions include air quality monitoring, aerial imaging and mapping, and law enforcement
- Can carry ADS-B and TCAS but typically will not be able to carry the Phase 1 radar (> 50 lbs)



Aerosonde

[Source Image](#)



Shadow (RQ-7B)


[Source Image](#)



Alerting and Guidance Algorithm



- **Detect and Avoid Alerting Logic for Unmanned Systems (DAIDALUS) as reference DAA algorithm**
- **Parameters for Corrective and Warning based on standard configuration for Phase 1**
 - τ_{mod}^* and h^* are not buffered
 - HMD^* for alerting $\sim 1.519 \times \text{HMD}^*$ for DWC
 - Time to the volume defined by HMD^* , τ_{mod}^* , and h^* for alerting
 - 30 seconds for Warning
 - 60 seconds for Corrective
- **Guidance based on 7 deg/sec turn rate**
- **4 second persistence and 2-of-4 (m of n) alerts**





Pilot Response Model



- **Use SC-228 pilot model created by Lincoln Laboratory**
 - Executed in deterministic mode
 - Always maneuvers horizontally in the direction of the minimum suggested maneuver; turns left if minimum suggestion is inconclusive
 - Follow guidance bands without buffer
 - **Timing:**
 - Decision updated according to alert state
 - Execution delay after decision: 3 sec
- **Analyze horizontal maneuvers only**
 - **Low-SWAP turn rate: 7 deg/sec**
 - Suitable for UAS speeds from 40 to 100 kts


| Alert Condition | Decision Update Period (s) |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------|
| No Alert | 24 |
| Preventive Alert | 15 |
| Corrective Alert | 9 |
| Warning Alert | 9 |
| Regain DAA Well Clear Guidance | 3 |




Safety Ratios



NMAC Risk Ratios



Loss of Well Clear Ratios



- Risk ratios are comparable among the DWC candidates
 - No statistically significant difference for risk ratios
- DWC1 and DWC2 have the lowest loss of well clear ratios


Risk ratios largely independent of DWC definition




Alerting Time and Range



Time of Alert Relative to Nominal/Unmitigated LoWC



Range at Time of Alert



- Time and range of alert are for any alert level
- Time of alert is the projected time to CPA when the alert occurs (to prevent DAA maneuvering from affecting the metric)
- Alerting time and range driven more by ModTau than HMD (DWC 1/2 difference)
- LoWCs have later alert times and ranges: indicates that LoWCs may be caused by late nominal (non-DAA) maneuvers