

**NEPP ETW 2019** 



## Model-Based Radiation Assurance for Satellites with Commercial Parts A. Witulski, B. Sierawski, R. Austin, G. Karsai, N. Mahadevan, R. Reed, R. Schrimpf Vanderbilt University

This work supported by NEPP and NASA OSMA Grant and Cooperative Agreement Number 80NSSC18K0493 and by JPL Subcontract Number 1592616



CRÉME: Cosmic Ray Effects on Micro-Electronics Code **GSN:** Goal Structuring Notation JWST: James Webb Space Telescope MBMA: Model-Based Mission Assurance MBE: Model-Based Engineering MOSFET: Metal Oxide Field Effect Transistor MRQW: Microelectronics Reliability & Qualification Workshop NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration R&M: Reliability & Maintainability R-GENTIC: Radiation GuidelinEsfor Notional Threat Identification and Classification **RESIM Radiation Effect System Impact Modeling** RHA: Radiation Hardness Assurance SEAM: System Engineering and Assurance Modeling SEB: Single Event Burnout SiC: Silicon Carbide STD: Standard SysML: System Modeling Language

## **Radiation Assurance Approaches for Space Systems**



#### Conventional:

- Widespread use of radiationhardened components
- Deep knowledge of components
- Several heavy-ion beam test campaigns
- Informed use of physics-based radiation modeling tools
- Relatively high budget and longterm development schedule
- Formal documentation of test procedures and results

#### "New, Commercial Space"

- Widespread, if not 100% use of COTS parts
- Little insight into components
- Minimal testing, possibly only proton testing of sub-systems
- Little use of radiation modeling tools
- Low budget, accelerated development schedule
- Little formal documentation or evidence of radiation behavior

### **Radiation Assurance for Space Systems**

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What can we do early in the development of the project, other than formal modeling or ion-beam testing, to "buy down" risk of radiation-related failures?





# Useful radiation reliability assurance platform characteristics:

- Model-based approach=digital representation of objects
- Tolerant of uncertainty, various levels of model fidelity
- Flexible as new info/design changes become available
- Qualitative arguments about why the system will work
- Quantitative estimates for reliability and location of weak links
- Systematically covers known faults (not ad hoc)

## System Engineering and Assurance Modeling (SEAM) Platform



- Web-browser based
- Can access as guest or create account
- Creates system model diagrams and argument for radiation assurance case
- Maintained by Vanderbilt University
- Contains examples and tutorial information

#### https://modelbasedassurance.org/



#### **GSN** Assurance Models

SEAM supports the Goal Structuring Notations (GSN) standard to build assurance case models. SEAM uses hierarchical models, as well as cross-referencing to manage complexity in GSN models. Additionally, SEAM allows linking assurance cases to system models to provide context to the assurance case argument.

#### Integrated Models

SEAMS allows context specification through crossreferencing of modeling entities across the models. Functional models are cross-referenced in the system fault propagation models to capture the impact (function loss or degradation) of and response (mitigation function) to failure effects. Sub-system models that implement specific functions are cross-referenced in functional models. Subsystem and functional models are cross-referenced in §

#### System Models

SEAM supports a subset of block diagram models in the SysML modeling standard. These include functional (hierarchical requirement) models and architecture design with block diagram models.

#### NASA R&M Hierarchy

NASA's Reliability and Maintainability Standard serves as a template to build radiation hardness assurance cases for using COTS systems in space missions. SEAMs provides template models of the R&M hierarchy to kick-start the assurance case development.

Examples A set of examples is available including:

#### Fault Models

SEAM extends the internal block diagram models to allow specification of discrete fault propagation to capture the faults and their anomalous effects within a block (subsystem) and their propagation across the system through subsystem interfaces.

#### Collaborate

Collaborate with your colleagues by simultaneously working on the same project. SEAM uses the WebGME modeling framework that works just like Google Docs; it updates and shows all changes to each user concurrently. And you never lose work because the models are stored in a database in the cloud.

## **Overall System Reliability Characterization Flow**



Vanderbilt Engineering **GSN:** Text Based RESIM/Questa [1,2] SysML: Diagramatic **Specifications** Quantitative System Architecture Environment info Based on rad data Part rad faults Mixed Signal Sim Goal/Strategy/Evidence System functions **Assurance Argument Functional models Specifications** System Waveforms Fault Trees **Bayesian Nets** Identify a function Tied to system functions Electrical +Rad sims Create BN graph Create FT structure Timing diagrams Export to BN Tool Export to FT Eval tools Probability distributions [1] A. F. Witulski, et al, RADECS, Sept. 2018. SFAM

[2] A. F. Witulski, et al, Trans. Nucl. Sci., August, 2019.

## Systems Engineering Assurance and Modeling (SEAM)

#### **Program History**

• FY16: Started as collaboration of NASAOSMA, HQ, NEPP

- Work on Goal Structuring Notation Safety Cases
- Single events on SRAM CubeSat application
- FY17: collaboration of NASA OSMA, HQ, NEPP
  - Added SysML and Bayesian Nets (BN) to platform
  - JPL sponsors application to C&DH board
- FY18: NASA OSMA, HQ, NEPP, JPL
  - Coverage Checks, Start work on Requirements, Compatibility with Magic Draw, Fault Trees
- FY19: NASA OSMA, HQ, NEPP, JPL
  - Requirements, Fault Trees
  - Initial import of radiation modeling tools
  - Application of SEAM to development lifecycle

# Radiation Reliability Assessment of CubeSat SRAM Experiment Board



- 28nm SRAM SEU experiment
- Reasons for integrated modeling
  - 1. Use commercial off-theshelf (COTS) parts
  - 2. System mitigation of SEL
  - 3. System mitigation of SEFI on microcontroller



Courtesy of AMSAT







### Functional Model: Count Upsets in SRAM



Functional models associate functions with components

## **Architectural Model of REM Board**





## **Component Fault Propagation Model**



0 \* << Block >> LinearRegulator Vout -On/Off Resist. F iahCurrent HighCurrent **High Current** werDisconnect owerDisconner Power Disconnect OffSignal On/Of TID Degraded Operatio Ntona) WrongResistance  $(\mathbf{E})$ Resistance Incorrect Output Voltage Low Output Voltage

Fault Propagation Models show how fault effects originate in components and propagate from the component through the structure of the system

Modelbasedassurance.org

### **Component Fault Propagation Model: Fault**



0 \* << Block >> LinearRegulator Vout -On/Off Resist. F HighCurrent HighCurrent **High Current** werDisconnect owerDisconner Power Disconnect OffSignal On/Off TID Degraded Operatio Originating ect Output Voltage E Resistance fault: TID, SEE Low Output Voltage

Fault Propagation Models show how fault effects originate in components and propagate from the component through the structure of the system

### **Component Fault Propagation Model: Anomaly**





Fault Propagation Models show how fault effects originate in components and propagate from the component through the structure of the system

#### **Component Fault Propagation Model: Port**



0 \* << Block >> LinearRegulator Vout On/Off Resist. C Port: F Passes anomalies to other components High Current HighCurrent verDisconnect owerDisconnect Power Disconnect Vout OffSignal 0n/0fi TID Degraded Operatio WrongResistance Ε Resistance Incorrect Output Voltage Low Output Voltage

Fault Propagation Models show how fault effects originate in components and propagate from the component through the structure of the system





Colors/Shapes Denote Function

[1] GSN Community Standard Version 1 2011

Goal=Claim Strategy=Inference Solution=Evidence Context=Background Justification=Rationale Assumption=Unsubstantiated Claim

#### **Benefits of GSN**

Makes assumptions explicit Connects assurance case to models of system Shows how argument is supported by evidence Context shows spacecraft environment and requirements

### **GSN Assurance REM SEU Experiment Board**





- Top Goal states overall objective
- Mission constraints can be radiation environment, performance requirements, cost constraints, etc.
- Top-level goals and strategies track NASA R&M template

### **Mission Assurance over the Development Lifecycle**



- Create radiation assurance case early in the development cycle-find radiation problems earlier
- "Time-Varying" Radiation Assurance Case
- *R. A. Austin*, R. D. Schrimpf, A. F. Witulski, N. Mahadevan, G. Karsai, B. D. Sierawski, and R. A. Reed, "Capturing and Modeling Radiation Hardness Assurance throughout the Project Lifecycle," 27<sup>th</sup> Annual Single Events Symposium, La Jolla, CA, 2019.
- Interaction of requirements, component knowledge, and system design information

#### The Parts Engineer

- Starting point: Single-event Burnout Requirement
- End work product: The approved part list
- Information needed: Mission orbit and lifetime (can change), parts currently in the system (can change), how the parts are used in the system (can change)
  - How can I keep up to date with system changes?
  - How can I capture my analysis?









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Part	Status	Comment
Microcontroller	Passed	
SiC power MOSFET	Passed with comments	Probability of failure of 2% at derating of 50% with current shielding





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  - In addition, the analysis requires the system to mature and will have to be re-evaluated if the system or mission changes





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#### Requirement



#### **Requirement Defined**

Id : RAD1

less than 1%

Text:

- **Beginning of Phase B: GSN** template for part assurance
  - Generic goals generated from part assurance templates
  - Framework for planning RHA activities

shall be less than 1%

<<Requirement>> **Ref - SEB Requirement** Goal Part survives SEB The probability of failure from SEB shall be Strategy **Determine part** susceptibility to SEB **Requirement: The probability of failure from SEB** Strategy Estimate environment Perform radiation Goal test Probability of failure from Calculate probability SEB is less than 1% of failure



#### Requirement

B C D Pre-A A E F Project Concept Concept & **Preliminary Design** Final Design & System Assembly, **Operations** & Closeout Life-Cycle Technology & Technology Studies Fabrication Integration & Test, Sustainment Phases Development Completion Launch & Checkout

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B

**Preliminary Design** 

& Technology

Completion

#### Requirement

Project

Phases

Life-Cycle

Pre-A

Concept

Studies

Vanderbilt Engineering E F

Closeout

**Operations** &

Sustainment

Strategy

Goal

Solution

Information about system needed in order to • perform test:

A

Concept &

Technology

Development

- Mission length, orbit, and shielding  $\rightarrow$ -Inputs to environment tool
- Part use in system  $\rightarrow$ Inputs to determine parametric failure levels
- Outputs from environment tool and part failure analysis  $\rightarrow$  Inputs for radiation test



C

Final Design &

Fabrication

D

System Assembly,

Integration & Test,

Launch & Checkout



<<Requirement>>

**Ref - Parametric Requirement** 

The operating voltage

Ref - Goal

Calculate probability of

for the part shall be 600 V

Id : RAD3

or greater

failure

Text:

#### Requirement



#### Requirement



#### Requirement



#### Requirement



#### Requirement

Vanderbilt Engineering



K

#### Requirement



#### Requirement



#### Requirement



Solution

**Environment description** 

#### Requirement

Project

Phases



Id : RAD2

Heavy ion testing

shall be performed to an

LET of 37 MeV-cm<sup>2</sup>/ma

200

10

20 30

40 50 60

LET [MeV-cm<sup>2</sup>/mg]

Text:

- Information about system needed in order to • perform test:
  - Mission length, orbit, and shielding  $\rightarrow$ -Inputs to environment tool
  - Part use in system  $\rightarrow$ Inputs to determine parametric failure levels
  - **Outputs from environment** tool and part failure analysis  $\rightarrow$  Inputs for radiation test



-

#### Requirement

Project

Phases

perform test:

•

-

-



#### Requirement

•

-

-



#### **Today's Example: Single Event Burnout** Requirement Vanderbilt Engineering Pre-A B C D F A E Project **Preliminary Design** Concept Concept & Final Design & System Assembly, **Operations** & Closeout Life-Cycle Technology & Technology Fabrication Integration & Test, Studies Sustainment Phases Development Completion Launch & Checkout Reliability Predicted **Requirement: Mission shall meet a reliability level** ۲ Ô Ó Goal End of Phase C • Calculate probability of - Probability calculation failure - Assuming nothing changed about the system from Phase B Ċ Solution **Probability of failure**

#### **Today's Example: Single Event Burnout** Requirement Vanderbilt Engineering C Pre-A A B D E F Project Concept Concept & **Preliminary Design** Final Design & System Assembly, **Operations** & Closeout Life-Cycle Technology & Technology Integration & Test, Studies Fabrication Sustainment Phases Development Completion Launch & Checkout Reliability Predicted **Requirement: Mission shall meet a reliability level** ۲ Ó 0 Goal End of Phase C • Calculate probability of - Probability calculation failure - Assuming nothing changed about the system from Phase B 🕂 850 V Reliability calculation attached to solution 0.8 🔶 650 V • 📥 600 V Reliability 9.0 % 400 800 200 600 1000 Aluminum Shield Thickness (mils)



- MBMA is a function of time
  - Captures the evolution of mission assurance as the system is developed
- MBMA enables concurrent engineering of reliability and design engineering
  - Argument structure show how a requirement is verified and how it is derived
- MBMA enables intelligent mission-specific requirements
  - Illustrates the creation of reliability requirements as more about the mission is known





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## **Fault Tree Generation Capability Added to SEAM**

- Fault tree captures logical relationships between events
- Inputs are probabilities of events
- System information in SEAM SysML model can be used to generate fault trees for various system functions
- Fault tree structure can be exported in standard format to other reliability tools





# Example: Fault Tree for Temperature Control Loop of a Command and Data-Handling Board



Vanderbilt Engineering



Component failure modes



- Promote visibility and adoption of SEAM, e.g., University Nanosat program at AFRL, S3VI at NASA, AAQ at Auburn, NASA MBx community
- Lower the barriers to learning and using SEAM-identify required prior knowledge and skills and make that information explicit
- Develop more libraries and templates of common spacecraft components, functions, assurance arguments

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