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2 **Main Manuscript for**  
3 **Marine wild-capture fisheries after nuclear war**

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38

### 39 **Classification**

40 Biological sciences: Environmental sciences

41 Physical sciences: Sustainability science

42

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44 food from the ocean, marine ecosystem modelling, abrupt climate change, bio-economic  
45 model, food system shock

46

### 47 **Author Contributions**

48 Designed research: KJNS, CSH, RFH, EDG

49 Performed research: KJNS, CSH, RFH, AL, JS

50 Analyzed data: KJNS, CSH, RFH, JC, AL, JS

51 Wrote the paper: KJNS, CSH, RFH, EDG, CGB, JC, JJ, NSL, AR, SS, OBT, LX

52

### 53 **This PDF file includes:**

54 Main Text

55 Figure captions 1 to 6

56

57 **Abstract**

58 Nuclear war, beyond its devastating direct impacts, is expected to cause global climatic  
59 perturbations through injections of soot into the upper atmosphere. Reduced temperature  
60 and sunlight could drive unprecedented reductions in agricultural production, endangering  
61 global food security. However, the effects of nuclear war on marine wild-capture fisheries,  
62 which significantly contribute to the global animal protein and micronutrient supply,  
63 remain unexplored. We simulate the climatic effects of six war scenarios on fish biomass  
64 and catch globally, using a state-of-the-art Earth system model and global process-based  
65 fisheries model. We also simulate how either rapidly increased fish demand (driven by food  
66 shortages) or decreased ability to fish (due to infrastructure disruptions), would affect  
67 global catches, and test the benefits of strong pre-war fisheries management. We find a  
68 decade-long negative climatic impact that intensifies with soot emissions, with global  
69 biomass and catch falling by up to  $18\pm 3\%$  and  $29\pm 7\%$  after a US-Russia war under  
70 business-as-usual fishing – similar in magnitude to the end-of-century declines under  
71 unmitigated global warming. When war occurs in an overfished state, increasing demand  
72 increases short-term (1-2 year) catch by at most  $\sim 30\%$  followed by precipitous declines of  
73 up to  $\sim 70\%$ , thus offsetting only a minor fraction of agricultural losses. However, effective  
74 pre-war management that rebuilds fish biomass could ensure a short-term catch buffer large  
75 enough to replace  $\sim 43\pm 35\%$  of today's global animal protein production. This buffering  
76 function in the event of a global food emergency adds to the many previously-known  
77 economic and ecological benefits of effective and precautionary fisheries management.

78 **Significance Statement**

79 Nuclear conflict poses the chilling prospect of triggering abrupt global cooling, and  
80 consequently, severely reduced crop production. However, the impacts on marine fisheries  
81 are unknown. If agricultural yields fall on land, could we turn to the sea instead? Here, we  
82 show that agricultural losses could not be offset by the world's fisheries, especially given  
83 widespread overfishing. Cold temperatures and reduced sunlight would decrease the growth  
84 of fish biomass, at worst as much as under unmitigated climate change. Although  
85 intensified post-war fishing could yield a small catch increase, dramatic declines would  
86 ensue due to over-harvesting. However, effective pre-war fisheries management would  
87 create a substantial buffer of fish in the ocean, greatly increasing the oceans' potential  
88 contribution during a global food emergency.

89 **Main Text**

90

91 **Introduction**

92 Nuclear weapons continue to pose a threat to humanity. Although global nuclear weapons  
93 stockpiles are lower today than their peak in 1986, arsenals are growing in India, Pakistan  
94 and North Korea, adding to those already maintained by the U.S., Russia, China, France,  
95 the U.K. and Israel (Robock and Toon 2012; Toon et al., 2017; 2019; Kristensen 2019).  
96 The U.S. and Russia are both undertaking extensive modernization programs for warheads  
97 and delivery systems (BBC 2019; SIPRI 2020), and increased tension in South Asia and  
98 recent failures to renew arms control treaties have intensified concerns about the prospect  
99 of imminent nuclear war (Mecklin et al., 2020; Pulla 2019). Beyond the devastating direct  
100 impacts, the soot inputs from fires ignited by nuclear air bursts are likely to cause global  
101 cooling and reductions in sunlight (Crutzen and Birks, 1982; Turco et al., 1983; Toon et al.,  
102 2007; Mills et al., 2008; Yu et al., 2019), similar to historical volcanic eruptions (Table 1;  
103 Miller et al., 2012; Sigl et al., 2015; Chikamoto et al., 2016; Eddebbar et al., 2019). Nuclear  
104 war driven climate perturbations are expected to disrupt global primary productivity, with a  
105 potential threat to human lives through crop failure in breadbasket regions and subsequent  
106 food shortages worldwide (Ehrlich et al., 1983; Özdoğan et al., 2013; Xia et al., 2013,  
107 2015; Jägermeyr, 2020).

108

109 Modeling approaches make it possible to evaluate the effects of nuclear war of varying  
110 magnitudes, with the model simulations used here (Toon et al., 2019; Coupe et al. 2019)  
111 showing surprising agreement with earlier simulations in terms of climate response (Mills  
112 et al., 2008, 2014; Robock et al., 2007a; Pausata et al., 2016). Process-based crop modeling  
113 frameworks have recently made it possible to further investigate potential implications of a  
114 nuclear conflict for global food security. Jägermeyr et al. (2020) found that even a limited  
115 regional nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan, using less than 1% of the world's  
116 nuclear weapons (5 Tg soot), is likely to decrease global caloric crop production by 11%  
117 for five years. This decrease would be four times larger than the highest observed historical  
118 anomalies. The high-latitude production shock would propagate globally through food trade  
119 dependencies. These alarming findings make it important to investigate how other parts of  
120 the global food production system may be affected by a nuclear war, in particular global  
121 fisheries, on which many societies depend (Allison et al., 2009; Golden et al., 2016).

122

123 The responses of global marine ecosystems and fisheries to both volcanic and nuclear war  
124 driven abrupt climate perturbations are largely unknown. Here, for the first time, we  
125 explore the impacts of nuclear war scenarios on wild-capture fisheries. Fish and other  
126 seafood provide almost 20% of the animal protein consumed by the global human  
127 population, out of which wild-caught seafood - the focus of the present study - make up  
128 approximately half (~80-120 Mt yr<sup>-1</sup>; FAO, 2018a; Pauly and Zeller, 2016). Further, wild-

129 caught seafood (herein simply “fish”) is a particularly important source of essential  
130 micronutrients in developing countries, with almost 1 billion people at risk to become  
131 micronutrient deficient if global fish catches fall (Golden et al., 2016). Concerningly, global  
132 catches have been stagnant or slightly declining since the 1990’s (Figure 1; FAO, 2018a;  
133 Pauly and Zeller, 2016), and in a majority of the world’s fisheries, biomass is depleted  
134 below the level that generates the maximum sustainable yield ( $B_{MSY}$ ; Costello et al., 2016).  
135 This indicates that present-day catches exceed the limits of productivity, whereas effective  
136 management measures, which are crucial to remedy this situation (Hilborn et al., 2020),  
137 have been projected to increase global fish biomass by 200-800 Mt (Costello et al., 2016).  
138 A closer investigation into the response and potential of the global fishery under an abrupt  
139 global food emergency is therefore warranted.

140

141 While fishing pressure has a major impact on fish populations and their ability to  
142 reproduce, the production of fish biomass also depends on environmental characteristics,  
143 most importantly net primary production (NPP) and water temperature (Chassot et al, 2010;  
144 Friedland et al., 2012). Since a nuclear war is expected to cause global cooling and decrease  
145 oceanic NPP (Toon et al. 2019; Coupe et al., 2019; Lovenduski et al., 2020), it is likely to  
146 have a significant impact on global fish catch. However, it is unknown how these global-  
147 scale shifts in NPP and temperature could combine to affect marine ecosystems and marine  
148 food productivity, and whether these effects would worsen or mitigate the predicted losses  
149 in agricultural food production.

150

151 Beyond direct climatic perturbations, a nuclear conflict is also likely to cause socio-  
152 economic perturbations that change global fishing behavior. Altered climate conditions  
153 leading to decreased crop production on land (Ehrlich et al., 1983, Xia et al., 2015,  
154 Özdoğan et al., 2013, Jägermeyr et al., 2020) could cause a general decrease in caloric  
155 supply and limit aquaculture and livestock production due to their dependence on feed  
156 (Mottet et al., 2017; SAPEA, 2017). This would likely raise the demand for wild-capture  
157 fish as a source of animal protein, leading to an increase in price and intensified fishing. For  
158 example, the Tambora volcanic eruption in 1815 and the associated crop failures triggered a  
159 hundred-fold increase in the exported catch of marine pelagic fish in the Gulf of Maine  
160 (Alexander et al., 2017). On the other hand, substantial damage to fisheries infrastructure  
161 (e.g., ships, harbors, fuel supply, processing facilities) along with supply chain disruptions  
162 could lead to reduced fishing effort, as would unsafe ocean travel due to geo-political  
163 instability (Beare et al., 2010). Although difficult to predict, such socio-economic changes  
164 may greatly influence fisheries outcomes after a nuclear war.

165

166 This study explores the effects of six nuclear war scenarios (Table 1) on the global biomass  
167 and catch of fish; five India-Pakistan scenarios of increasing intensity with black carbon  
168 (soot) loads of 5-47 Tg (details in Toon et al., 2019) and one substantially larger US-

169 Russia war injecting 150 Tg of soot (details in Coupe et al. 2019). All war scenarios are  
170 generated by a state-of-the-art Earth system model (CESM-WACCM; *Materials and*  
171 *methods*). Output from CESM-WACCM is used as input to the BiOeconomic mArine  
172 Trophic Size-spectrum (BOATS) model, a process-based ocean ecosystem model with  
173 dynamic fishing that has been applied in a number of future climate applications (Carozza  
174 et al., 2016, 2017; Galbraith et al., 2017; Lotze et al., 2019; Scherrer and Galbraith, *in*  
175 *press*). With a historical fisheries baseline simulation as the starting point (Figure 1;  
176 *Materials and methods*), we use BOATS to model the impact of nuclear war on global  
177 fisheries. Bracketing a range of possible changes in fishing behavior due to the war, we  
178 explicitly model five simplistic socio-economic responses: business-as-usual (BAU)  
179 fishing, a moderate or large increase (F+, F++) or decrease (F-, F--) in fishing intensity  
180 (Table 2; *Materials and Methods*). We also investigate how strong pre-war fisheries  
181 management improves the ocean's capacity to alleviate food losses. Beyond quantifying the  
182 effects of nuclear war, these simulations illustrate the potential effects of large volcanic  
183 eruptions or of socio-economic shocks on global marine capture fisheries.

184

## 185 **Results**

186 Below, we present the impacts of both nuclear war-driven climatic perturbations (soot  
187 inputs, Table 1) and socio-economic fishing responses possibly triggered by the global  
188 crisis (Table 2). For clarity, we hereon define a *scenario* as a specific combination of soot  
189 input and socio-economic response. First, we present an overview of the impacts in year  
190 two post-conflict, pinpointing the initial, transitory effects of altered fishing behavior. We  
191 then describe the longer-term (15 year) fisheries trajectories for all scenarios, illustrating  
192 the duration and rate of recovery. Then, we investigate the spatial patterns of change and  
193 link these to national-level seafood dependence for the 5 Tg case. Finally, we show how  
194 strong fisheries regulation increases the potential for higher global catches post-war. Unless  
195 otherwise stated, presented relative changes are anomalies from the BAU-control scenario,  
196 which has no war and BAU fishing behavior (*Materials and Methods*). In the text, we  
197 generally present numbers for the end-member cases of 5 and 150 Tg soot inputs.

198

### 199 ***Initial impacts on catch and biomass***

200 Nuclear war driven climate perturbations (Table 1) generally lead to significant short-term  
201 losses in global fish catch and biomass in year two post-war (Figure 2, S1). Larger soot  
202 input exacerbates losses, and the effect is linear with the associated reduction in  
203 photosynthetically active radiation (PAR; Tables S1-S4; *Materials and Methods*), which  
204 presumably drives the net reduction in global NPP (Figure S6). On average for all  
205 socioeconomic fishing responses, catch and biomass decrease by ~2% and ~1%  
206 respectively for every 1 Tg of soot (~4% and ~3% respectively for every 10% decrease in  
207 PAR).

208

209 Under BAU fishing, global biomass decreases by 1.6% ( $\pm 0.7\%$ , standard deviation of the  
210 five BOATS ensemble runs, *Materials and Methods*) in the scenario with a 5 Tg soot input,  
211 and up to 18 ( $\pm 3.5\%$ ) in the 150 Tg scenario (Figures 2a, S1a; Tables S1, S3). Since this  
212 biomass decrease also leads to a decrease in the global fishing effort (Equation 1), catches  
213 fall more than biomass; by 2.4 ( $\pm 0.8\%$ ) under 5 Tg, and up to 29 ( $\pm 7\%$ ) in the 150 Tg case  
214 (Figure 2b, S1b; Table S2, S4).

215

216 If the conflict is followed by intensified fishing due to increased demand (F+, F++; Table  
217 2), catch initially increases at the expense of biomass. Under the 5 Tg soot input, where the  
218 climatic effect is relatively small, F+ and F++ generate catch increases of 13 ( $\pm 17\%$ ) and  
219 17 ( $\pm 14\%$ ) respectively in year two post-war (Figure 2b). At the same time, F+ and F++  
220 cause a 10 ( $\pm 4\%$ ) and 23 ( $\pm 9\%$ ) global biomass decline (Figure 2a). Larger climate  
221 perturbations cause more rapid biomass collapse, and can preclude a net increase in catch.  
222 In the 150 Tg case, representing the strongest perturbation, even the greatly intensified  
223 fishing effort in F++ fails to compensate for the large negative climate impact, as global  
224 catches still fall by 14 ( $\pm 20\%$ ) (Figure S1B).

225

226 Conversely, decreased fishing intensity due to decreased ability to fish (F-, F--) decreases  
227 catch, but creates a net increase in biomass despite the climate-driven losses for almost all  
228 soot inputs (Figure 2). Under the 5 Tg soot input, F- and F-- result in substantial falls in  
229 global catch of 23 ( $\pm 19\%$ ) and 52 ( $\pm 24\%$ ) respectively. This increases global biomass by 7  
230 ( $\pm 4\%$ ) and 26 ( $\pm 7\%$ ) respectively. Larger soot inputs both exacerbate the falls in catch and  
231 diminish the biomass recovery that is enabled by the lowered fishing pressure. Again, the  
232 climatic effect is linear with PAR (Figure 2; Tables S1-S2).

233

### 234 *Decadal fishery response*

235 Longer-term global fisheries trajectories under BAU fishing (Figure 3a-c) show the general  
236 decrease and subsequent recovery in global fish biomass and catch in the decade post-war.  
237 In the 5 Tg case, global catch decreases by at most 3.6% ( $\pm 1.4\%$ ), occurring in year 5 post-  
238 war (Figure 3a). In contrast, with a 150 Tg soot input, the largest catch decrease is 31  
239 ( $\pm 9\%$ ) in year 3 post-war. Trajectories for the intermediate soot loads consistently lie in  
240 between. Eventually, both biomass and catch recover relative to the control climate, with  
241 recovery taking  $\sim 14$  years and somewhat exceeding the BAU-control (Figure 3a,b). Due to  
242 the climate driven biomass decline, which renders fishing less profitable, modelled fishing  
243 effort begins to decrease immediately after the war and lags harvest and biomass (Figure  
244 3c; Equation 1).

245

246 Increase in fish demand (F+, F++) in turn increases fishing effort. After an initial increase  
247 in catch, biomass is depleted, driving a fishery crash in all scenarios that lasts until the end  
248 of the simulation (Figures 3d-f, S2a-c). Catches drop below the BAU control two to three

249 years post-war, and stabilize about 45% and 75% lower by the end of the 15 year  
250 simulation. For all soot inputs, biomass under F+ decreases, at most by 50-60%, and under  
251 F++ by about 84%. This biomass depletion means that the largest intensification of fishing  
252 (F++) leads to the lowest total catch when integrated over the whole 15-year post-war  
253 period: under the 5 Tg and F++ scenario, cumulative catch falls by 38%.

254

255 If the war induces a substantial decrease in fishing (F-, F--), global catches initially  
256 decrease and fish biomass rapidly begins to recover (Figures 3g-i, S2d-f). The decline in  
257 catch, down to 49 ( $\pm 8$ )% in the F- and 150 Tg scenario, is maintained for the first 4 years,  
258 but eventually the recovering fish biomass increases catches long-term. By year five post-  
259 war catch has begun to exceed the BAU control catch for all soot inputs. At the end of the  
260 simulations, global biomass is almost double and four-fold under F- and F-- respectively  
261 (Figures 3h, S2e), and catches increase by approximately 60% and 140% (Figure 3g, S2d).  
262 Thus, the total cumulative catches over the 15-year post-war period is almost 30% higher  
263 under the 5 Tg and F-- scenario (in contrast to the cumulative 38 % decrease under 5 Tg  
264 and F++). The greatly decimated effort (Figures 3i, S2f) and higher biomass lead to  
265 increased catch efficiency, similar to observations in the North Atlantic after the end of  
266 World War II (Beare et al., 2010), which makes the fisheries more economically efficient.

267

### 268 ***Regional patterns of change***

269 While the climatic perturbations decrease the total global fish catch post-war, there is  
270 substantial spatial variability, with increasing catch in some regions (Figure 4). Averaged  
271 over the first five years post-war under BAU fishing, catch increases occur patchily in the  
272 tropics and subtropics, with increases being particularly strong in the Atlantic Subtropical  
273 Gyres under higher soot input scenarios. The largest decreases in catch occur along the  
274 equator and mid-latitudes. These spatial patterns generally follow spatial changes in NPP  
275 following the war predicted by CESM (Figure S3), with some influence from changes in  
276 water temperature (Figure S4). Spatial patterns of catch change under increasing or  
277 decreasing fishing pressure are similar to the patterns under BAU (Figure S5-S6).

278

279 The spatial patterns translate into differential impacts on the catches of individual fishing  
280 nations (Figure 5; Table S5; *Materials and Methods*). Here, we focus on the 5 Tg BAU  
281 scenario for comparison with the investigation of crop yields by Jägermeyr et al. (2020).  
282 Under this lower-impact scenario, several major fishing nations, such as Russia, Canada,  
283 Japan and the US, see substantial catch losses in their territorial waters under the modelled  
284 climatic perturbations. Some lower-latitude fishing nations like Mexico, Peru, Greece and  
285 Somalia experience increased catch potential. Yet, equatorial island nations, who are most  
286 dependent on marine food supply, suffer some of the largest declines. A comparison with  
287 the country-level dependence on marine ecosystems for nutrition (Selig et al., 2018)

288 suggest that these island states are particularly vulnerable to the predicted fall in catches  
289 (Figure 5b), among which Indonesia is the most populous country by far.

290

### 291 ***Benefits of fisheries regulation***

292 Strong pre-war management of fisheries greatly increases the capacity of marine fisheries  
293 to mitigate agricultural losses (Figure 6). If global fisheries are strongly regulated to  
294 maintain a healthy biomass before the onset of the conflict (Figure S8; *Materials and*  
295 *methods*), the short-term catch increase under intensified fishing post-war is greatly  
296 enhanced (Figure S9). Under a 150 Tg and F+ scenario (Figure 6), shown here to illustrate  
297 the extent to which intensified fishing could alleviate an extreme food crisis, global catch  
298 increases by 430 ( $\pm 350$ )% relative to the unregulated BAU control. This increase is  
299 achieved despite the substantial climatic impact associated with the 150 Tg soot input  
300 (Figure 2a). Catch rapidly decreases in the second year but remains somewhat higher than  
301 in the unregulated case until  $\sim 10$  years post-war.

302

### 303 **Discussion**

304 In summary, nuclear war-driven climatic perturbations have an overall negative effect on  
305 fisheries that increases with soot input, despite positive impacts in some subtropical  
306 regions. However, socio-economic responses to the nuclear war could greatly influence the  
307 trajectories of global fish catch and biomass. In the absence of strong pre-war management,  
308 if the nuclear war leads to intensified fishing (for example due to terrestrial food shortages)  
309 a small increase in the global catch is possible for the first few years post-war. This  
310 however rapidly depletes the fish stocks and is followed by a precipitous decline in catches.  
311 Strong fisheries regulation pre-war could instead allow catches to become many times  
312 higher than normal in the first year post-war, even despite large soot inputs. A decrease in  
313 fishing because of damaged infrastructure would lead to relatively large short-term catch  
314 decreases in a potentially critical time for global food security.

315

### 316 ***Role of NPP, temperature, fishing and adaptation***

317 The effect of the nuclear war driven climatic perturbations on global fish catch can largely  
318 be explained by the effects of NPP, temperature, and fishing pressure. Cooling slows the  
319 growth rates of fish, while lower NPP input decreases the amount of energy available for  
320 the ecosystem, causing the post-war decrease in simulated biomass and catches (Carozza et  
321 al., 2016; 2019). However, cooling also has a positive impact on the steady-state fish  
322 biomass, by increasing the efficiency with which energy supplied by NPP can accumulate  
323 as biomass in large organisms (Carozza et al., 2016; 2019). This accumulation is most  
324 apparent for the simulations in an unfished ocean (Figure S7), but is less pronounced in  
325 fished systems, where growth rates limit fish biomass more than NPP. We note that the  
326 representation of ecological processes in BOATS greatly simplifies trophic exchanges and  
327 does not include fish movement, and that it has a relatively high sensitivity to temperature

328 when compared with other models (Lotze et al., 2019). Still, integrated globally, the  
329 modelled catch decrease under BAU fishing is similar to the decrease in global oceanic  
330 NPP caused by the different soot inputs (Figure S7b), and is consistent with  
331 macroecological theory.

332

333 We note that both the nuclear war-driven climatic perturbations and anthropogenic global  
334 warming have negative impacts on marine fisheries, even though the former causes cooling  
335 and the latter warming. Model projections of the long-term (year 2100) decrease in global  
336 fish biomass or catch potential under unmitigated climate change (RCP 8.5), range from  
337 approximately 12-25 %, while strong mitigation (RCP 2.6) likely limits the decrease to  
338 <5% (Cheung et al., 2016; Galbraith et al., 2017; Gaines et al., 2018; Lotze et al., 2019). In  
339 comparison, the 150 Tg case yields maximum declines in catch and biomass of 31% and  
340 24% respectively under BAU fishing (<4% in the 5 Tg case). Thus, the negative impacts of  
341 unmitigated climate change on fisheries almost reach those of a large-scale nuclear war  
342 between the U.S. and Russia. However, the abruptness and duration of the negative impacts  
343 differ greatly, as do the underlying causal mechanisms. A nuclear conflict generates a net  
344 global decrease in oceanic NPP (Figures S7), likely attributed to a reduction in sunlight  
345 reaching the ocean surface (see Moore et al., 2004), in turn leading to a decrease in global  
346 catch and biomass. In contrast, the reductions under global warming result from a  
347 combination of NPP decreases driven by increased stratification (Kwiatowski et al., 2018),  
348 the decrease in the size of phytoplankton (Dunne et al., 2005) and the metabolic effects of  
349 warming on fish physiology (Carozza et al., 2019).

350

351 Our results also suggest that the marine fish catch is relatively more robust to the effects of  
352 a nuclear conflict than land-based food production. While total global fish catches here  
353 decrease by ~4% under the 5 Tg scenario, Jägermeyr et al. (2020) found an 11% decline in  
354 global crop production for five years under the same soot input. This difference arises  
355 because the ocean does not cool as much as land (cf. Fig. S6 in Toon et al., 2019), and  
356 because of the assumed adaptability of fish, and in turn fisheries, to a cooling environment.  
357 In contrast to crops, most fish stocks rapidly move and migrate in response to climate  
358 variations (Lehodey et al., 2006). Here, fishing fleets in turn increase their fishing effort in  
359 regions with climate-driven biomass increases, and vice versa, which alleviates global catch  
360 losses. This assumption is supported by the global ubiquity of fishing and the fleet's ability  
361 to track seasonal fish movements (Güet et al., 2019; Kroodsma et al., 2018). For  
362 agricultural systems, where the war-driven climate effects are most severe in regions that  
363 produce several major crops, the limited ability to rapidly adjust production to the changing  
364 climatic conditions (Butler et al. 2018) exacerbate crop losses.

365

366 *Food system linkages*

367 Both the drivers of fishing and the importance of global fish catches are interlinked with the  
368 impacts of nuclear war on other parts of the global food production system. Cereal  
369 production is about 25 times larger than fish catches globally (FAO, 2018b), with the  
370 caloric content per gram of cereals being almost six times that of fish (FAO 2001). This  
371 makes offsetting the losses of calories from agriculture very difficult. Still, it is reasonable  
372 to expect that cereal production losses post-war, estimated at 11% already under the 5 Tg  
373 case (Jägermeyr et al., 2020), would impair the production of other animal protein and  
374 increase the overall need for other foods. Here, the increase of global catch under greatly  
375 intensified fishing is limited to at most 30% in the 5 Tg case (and less under larger climate  
376 perturbations),  $\sim 30 \text{ Mt yr}^{-1}$  if using the present-day catch of  $\sim 100 \text{ Mt yr}^{-1}$  as a baseline  
377 (FAO 2018a; Pauly and Zeller, 2016). Such an increase would constitute a significant but  
378 small contribution to global food security. However, strongly regulated global fisheries  
379 could theoretically generate ‘emergency catches’ several hundred percent higher than  
380 unregulated fisheries. Since a catch of  $\sim 100 \text{ Mt yr}^{-1}$  makes up roughly 10% of the total  
381 animal protein supply (FAO 2018a), our results suggest that the 430 ( $\pm 350$ )% increase in  
382 global catches enabled by strong pre-war management (Figure 6) could offset a loss of  $\sim 43$   
383 ( $\pm 35$ )% of the present-day annual supply of all other animal protein (cultured fish, meat,  
384 dairy and eggs). Although short-lasting, such a buffer could be extremely valuable to  
385 mitigate a global food emergency and allow time for adaptation.

386

387 We also underline that the direct impacts of cereal production losses on fish demand are  
388 uncertain considering the differences in nutritional values and total production. The demand  
389 for fish may be more strongly connected to the production of other animal protein products  
390 (Brashares et al., 2004), in particular aquaculture products, for which the effects of nuclear  
391 war are poorly explored (Cropper and Harwell, 1985). Further, the capacity to adapt  
392 conventional agricultural production systems (Jägermeyr et al., 2020) and to scale up  
393 production of alternative foods (fungi, bacteria etc.) in the event of a crisis (Denkenberger  
394 and Pearce, 2015) could also be key in determining the demand for fish as well as the  
395 consequences of falling global catches.

396

397 Contamination of food due to nuclear fallout is a further concern for food security. Close to  
398 sites of nuclear power plant accidents, fish can become highly contaminated by radioactive  
399 pollution (Kryshev 1995; Buessler et al., 2016). However, radionuclides are strongly  
400 diluted in the ocean given the large volume of water, and the range and intensity of  
401 contamination of marine systems has been limited in past accidents (Grover and Harwell,  
402 1985; WHO, 2011; Buessler et al., 2016; Livingston and Povinec, 2000; Ilus, 2007).  
403 Although it is yet unexplored how the nuclear war scenarios used here would affect oceanic  
404 radionuclide concentrations, seafood appears less likely to be sensitive to nuclear fallout  
405 than terrestrial foods. This suggests that fish caught outside of the immediate war areas  
406 could provide a relatively safe food source, which might further increase demand.

407

408 It is important to underline that the fish biomass in BOATS represents only the fish and  
409 shellfish that have historically been targeted by fisheries (i.e., those reported in the Sea  
410 Around Us Database; Pauly and Zeller, 2016). In the event of global food shortage, it is  
411 possible that new marine organisms would become targeted by fisheries, expanding the  
412 scope for increasing marine catches. The total biomass of all fish species is highly uncertain  
413 (Jennings and Collingridge, 2015), meaning that this potential is poorly known, but the  
414 biomass of unexploited mesopelagic fishes is believed to be larger than the total global  
415 biomass of currently exploited wild finfish (Bar-On et al., 2019). If a global food crisis  
416 would induce the rapid development of more effective harvesting technologies for these  
417 dispersed fish and other currently unexploited species, fisheries could further mitigate  
418 terrestrial crop failures, but with potentially large and poorly understood consequences for  
419 marine ecosystems (St. John et al., 2016; Martin et al., 2020).

420

421 The conflict-driven changes in the global fish supply would likely have highly variable  
422 regional impacts, given the importance of factors like local food production capacity,  
423 purchasing power and trade network functionality (UN, 2011). We here find that the  
424 modelled climatic perturbations would cause the largest fall in fish catches in developed  
425 high-latitude countries, which are also the hardest hit by crop failures (Jägermeyr et al.,  
426 2020), and in developing equatorial island nations, which are highly fish-dependent (Selig  
427 et al., 2018). This suggests potential synergistic effects on regional food security, in  
428 particular if the drop in global food production reduces the willingness or ability to trade.  
429 At the same time, regional variations in management effectiveness and the resulting  
430 biomass levels (Hilborn et al., 2020, see *Uncertainties and limitations*), could also strongly  
431 impact the regional consequences. Overall, further investigation of the interdependencies  
432 between fishing, aquaculture (mediated through wild-caught fish being used as feed) and  
433 the rest of the food production system in the event of a global food crisis is needed.

434

#### 435 ***Uncertainties and limitations***

436 To our knowledge, this work is the first to quantify the response of global marine  
437 ecosystems and fisheries to abrupt, extreme climatic cooling. As a result, the associated  
438 uncertainties are bound to be large. An advantage of BOATS is that its key ecological  
439 processes (growth, metabolism, mortality and reproduction) are affected in a mechanistic  
440 way by changes in temperature and NPP (Carozza et al., 2016; 2019), increasing the  
441 model's generalizability. The modelled fish productivity response to anthropogenic climate  
442 change in BOATS agrees well with fish population-based (rather than ecosystem-based)  
443 estimates (Free et al., 2019; Lotze et al., 2019). This, together with the use of an optimized  
444 ensemble of parameterizations that allow us to explore a large part of the uncertain  
445 parameter space (Carozza et al., 2017; Galbraith et al., 2017), increases the confidence in  
446 the model results.

447

448 Still, the extreme rate and magnitude of climatic change modeled here may have  
449 consequences that are not accurately captured by BOATS. The model implicitly assumes  
450 that species will quickly migrate and adapt to the changing environmental conditions, and is  
451 unable to capture the importance of keystone species, or the seasonal timing of  
452 reproduction and feeding interactions. These factors may severely and perhaps irreversibly  
453 affect marine ecosystem productivity under rapid climatic change (Harwell et al., 1985;  
454 Cahill et al., 2013; Pinsky et al., 2020). The importance of such unresolved mechanisms is  
455 expected to be larger in ecosystems where the rate of adaptation is lower than the rate of  
456 climatic change (Baltar et al., 2019) – which is especially rapid in this study. For example,  
457 nearshore and coral reef systems have previously been suggested to be the most sensitive to  
458 rapid cooling (Harwell et al., 1985). The maintained biomass growth in BOATS may  
459 therefore be optimistic in such regions, as it disregards the risks for climate-driven non-  
460 linear ecosystem and productivity shifts due to non-instantaneous adaptation. Nonetheless,  
461 the increase in the productivity of some species and decrease in others in the Gulf of Maine  
462 after the 1815 Tambora eruption (Alexander et al., 2017), which had a greater radiation  
463 anomaly than the 5 Tg case modeled here (Table 1), lends some credibility to the  
464 assumption of regional species substitutability in BOATS even under the rapid climatic  
465 changes that could be caused by a nuclear war. We also emphasize that neither BOATS nor  
466 CESM resolves the potential impacts of nuclear war-driven changes in ocean acidification  
467 (as described in Lovenduski et al., 2020) on marine organisms. Work is currently underway  
468 to simulate the response of coccolithophores to acidification in CESM (Krumhardt et al.,  
469 2019); future studies will explore this idea further.

470

471 An important simplification in the present study is that the historical fisheries baseline  
472 (Figure 1) assumes that there is no effective fisheries management. Fishing effort instead  
473 evolves as predicted in an open access fishery, where effort only decreases when profit  
474 becomes negative (Equation 1; Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968). We use this assumption  
475 because it better reproduces the development of global catches (Figure 1), but note that it  
476 leads to a progressive decrease of fish biomass (Squires and Vestergaard, 2013; Galbraith et  
477 al., 2017) that is pessimistic. Indeed, while there is evidence of widespread biomass  
478 depletion worldwide (Costello et al., 2012; Costello et al., 2016; Palomares et al., 2020),  
479 current management methods have curtailed overfishing and increased biomass to a  
480 significant degree in more than half of the fisheries where stock assessments are made  
481 (which themselves make up 40-50% of the total global fish catch; Hilborn et al., 2020).  
482 Thus, the fisheries in several well-managed regions would respond more like in the  
483 simulation with a strongly regulated global fishery pre-war (Figure 7, S8).

484

485 Furthermore, we emphasize that the impacts that nuclear conflicts themselves might have  
486 on the effectiveness of management are highly unpredictable, but potentially important.

487 Lack of resources for fisheries regulation, stronger incentives for illegal fishing and  
488 collapse of international management organizations could impair management. On the  
489 other hand, war fosters increased (parochial) cooperative behavior, which is a key element  
490 in effective fisheries management (Bauer et al., 2016). This, or strict war-induced (possibly  
491 military) protection of countries' exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and their marine food  
492 resources could actually improve management effectiveness.

493

494 Since the realized effect of nuclear war on global fishing behavior is highly uncertain, the  
495 socio-economic scenarios were chosen to bracket a large possible range of alternative  
496 behaviors. This approach provides a generalizable understanding of the system's response  
497 to perturbations, but not a prediction of the most likely outcome. Consequently, the socio-  
498 economic scenarios generally have a larger impact on global catches than the climatic  
499 perturbation (Figure 2b). We speculate that a war might increase both fish prices and  
500 fishing costs (with opposing effects on fishing effort), that a larger war would cause larger  
501 increases, and that the prices and costs could eventually return to the pre-war level. Further  
502 socio-economic scenario development could explicitly address such counteracting effects  
503 and potential responses in the spheres of governance, markets and fisheries technologies  
504 (Merrie et al., 2018).

505

#### 506 ***Resilience of fisheries in the face of large-scale shocks***

507 The findings presented here are instructive for understanding possible global fisheries  
508 responses also under other shocks, both climatic and market-related. Large-scale volcanic  
509 eruptions would cause similar climatic perturbations (Table 1) with the associated effects  
510 on ecosystems and food production systems, while global fuel crises or food price spikes  
511 may also arise due to other factors (Baum et al., 2015). Volcanic eruptions large enough to  
512 have substantial global impacts have a global return period of about 500-1000 years but are  
513 unpredictable and have been associated with widespread famine and plagues (Stothers  
514 1984; 1999; Robock, 2007b; Newhall et al., 2018; Papale 2018). Further, the unfolding  
515 COVID-19 pandemic is expected to cause a global food emergency (UN 2020) which is  
516 already having diverse and rapidly evolving impacts on fisheries (FAO 2020). Beyond  
517 crises, fish prices have been rising over the past 20 years (Tveterås et al., 2012; FAO,  
518 2018b), and intensified demand, for example mediated by a slow-down of aquaculture  
519 growth (FAO, 2018a), could induce intensified fishing if unregulated.

520

521 Most importantly, our results show that poorly managed fisheries have a much lower  
522 capacity to contribute to global food emergencies than do well-managed fisheries (Figure  
523 6). For a short pulse in fishing intensity, the magnitude of this emergency catch potential is  
524 essentially proportional to the management-induced increase of fish biomass left in the  
525 ocean. Thus, management interventions that increase the biomass of fish globally help to  
526 buffer against food shocks. This result shows that effective fisheries management serves

527 not only to achieve sustainability (Costello et al., 2016; Gaines et al., 2018), but also  
528 provides a proactive contribution to the resilience of the global food supply. Beyond  
529 showing for the first time how global marine fisheries are impacted by climatic and socio-  
530 economic perturbations after a nuclear war, our generalizable findings thus also add to the  
531 imperative of effective fisheries management (Worm 2009).

532

### 533 **Materials and Methods**

534 To explore the potential impacts of nuclear conflicts on fisheries, we investigate six  
535 climatic perturbations of regional and larger scale nuclear wars (Table 1; Toon et al 2019;  
536 Coupe et al. 2019), an ensemble mean of three control climate runs without soot injection,  
537 and five socio-economic fishing responses (Table 2). The climate control run is first used to  
538 create the historical fisheries baseline up until 2019. Using the state of the fishery in 2019  
539 as the initial condition, we model how a nuclear war in the following year (year 1 post  
540 conflict), with and without accompanying changes in fishing behavior, impacts global fish  
541 biomass and catches.

542

#### 543 *Climatic perturbations after nuclear war*

544 The climate impacts of nuclear war are modeled using the Community Earth System Model  
545 (CESM) version 1.3, a state-of-the-art coupled climate model consisting of atmosphere,  
546 ocean, land, and sea ice components. CESM implements the Parallel Ocean Program (POP)  
547 physical ocean model (Danabasoglu et al., 2011), here at nominal 1 degree horizontal  
548 resolution and with 60 vertical levels, and the Biogeochemical Elemental Cycling (BEC)  
549 ocean ecosystem-biogeochemistry module, which represents the lower trophic levels of the  
550 marine ecosystem, and a dynamic iron cycle (Moore et al., 2004, 2013, 2018; Long et al.,  
551 2013; Lindsay et al., 2014; Harrison et al., 2018). Similar to other Coupled Model  
552 Intercomparison Project (CMIP) class models (Laufkötter et al., 2015, 2016), BEC  
553 simulates three phytoplankton functional types: diatoms, small phytoplankton, and  
554 diazotrophs as well as one zooplankton functional type. The productivity (carbon fixation)  
555 of the three phytoplankton groups are combined to generate NPP (Krumhardt et al., 2017),  
556 which is used, along with model-derived sea surface temperature, to drive the offline  
557 fisheries model. The CESM-BEC ecosystem and biogeochemistry model is well-validated  
558 in a variety of scenarios and performs favorably when compared with other CMIP class  
559 models (e.g., Tagliabue et al., 2016; Harrison et al., 2018; Rohr et al., 2020, and references  
560 therein).

561

562 The climatic response to nuclear war is simulated by injecting black carbon (soot) into the  
563 atmosphere above the South Asian subcontinent (India and Pakistan exchange; Toon et al.,  
564 2019), or over the U.S. and Russia (Coupe et al., 2019). Atmospheric circulation and  
565 chemistry is simulated in CESM using the Whole Atmosphere Community Climate Model  
566 (WACCM; Marsh et al., 2013) with nominal 2 degree resolution and 66 vertical levels, a

567 model top at ~145 km, and uses the Rapid Radiative Transfer Model for GCMs (Iacono et  
568 al., 2008) for the radiative transfer. The Community Aerosol and Radiation Model for  
569 Atmospheres (CARMA; Toon et al., 1988, Bardeen et al., 2008) is coupled with WACCM  
570 to simulate the injection, lofting, advection, and removal of soot aerosols in the troposphere  
571 and stratosphere, and their subsequent impact on climate (Bardeen et al., 2017). The India-  
572 Pakistan scenarios (5-47 Tg; Table 1) and US-Russia scenario (150 Tg) build on previous  
573 work by Mills et al. (2008; 2014) and Robock et al. (2007b) respectively.

574

### 575 ***Global fisheries model***

576 The BOATS model is used to estimate climatic and socio-economic impacts on global  
577 marine fish biomass and catch through time. We use the model thoroughly described in  
578 previous publications (Carozza et al., 2016; 2017; Galbraith et al., 2017), with improved  
579 accuracy of fish biomass in high-nutrient, low-chlorophyll regions (Galbraith et al., 2019)  
580 and a newly developed regulation component from Scherrer and Galbraith (*in press*).  
581 BOATS calculates fish biomass of three independent fish groups categorized as small,  
582 medium and large fish (defined by maximum sizes of 0.3 kg, 8.5 kg and 100 kg  
583 respectively) in non-interacting oceanic grid cells with a 1 degree horizontal resolution.  
584 Fish in each group grow to their maximum size from a common smallest size (0.01 kg)  
585 along the so-called size spectrum (Andersen et al., 2016), and the resulting biomass  
586 depends on the amount of energy available from oceanic NPP, temperature dependent  
587 metabolic growth and mortality rates, the fraction of energy allocated to reproduction and  
588 reproductive success (Carozza et al., 2016). Gridded maps of vertically integrated NPP  
589 along with sea surface temperature from CESM are used as input to the model. We  
590 underline that BOATS resolves only the subset of marine fish biomass that has been  
591 targeted by fisheries, for which model estimates can be compared with and constrained by  
592 global catch data (Pauly and Zeller 2016).

593

594 In BOATS, fishing effort evolves dynamically in each grid cell and fish size group,  
595 responding to changes in the biomass and the model's economic forcings (Carozza et al.,  
596 2017; Scherrer and Galbraith, *in press*). As is common in models simulating fishing activity  
597 (van Putten et al., 2012), it is assumed that profit is a main driver of fishing behavior, but  
598 also that fishing behavior can be more or less strongly influenced by regulation  
599 (management). BOATS represents the effort put into fishing each of the three fish size  
600 groups ( $k = 1, 2, 3$ ) as nominal fishing effort,  $E_k$  ( $\text{W m}^{-2}$ ; reflecting the boat power), which  
601 evolves over time as a function of the average profit, the regulation target for fishing effort,  
602  $E_{\text{targ},k}$  ( $\text{W m}^{-2}$ ) and the regulation effectiveness  $S$  (dimensionless;  $S \geq 0$ ) in a grid cell:

603

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dE_k}{dt} &= K_e \frac{revenue_k - cost_k}{E_k} e^{-S} + K_s (E_{targ,k} - E_k)(1 - e^{-S}) \\ &= K_e \frac{pqE_k B_k - cE_k}{E_k} e^{-S} + K_s (E_{targ,k} - E_k)(1 - e^{-S}) \quad (1) \end{aligned}$$

604 where  $p$  is the ex-vessel price of fish (the price at which the catch is sold when it first enters  
 605 the supply chain; \$ gwB<sup>-1</sup>, where gwB is grams wet biomass),  $c$  the cost per unit of fishing  
 606 effort (\$ W<sup>-1</sup> s<sup>-1</sup>),  $q$  the catchability (m<sup>2</sup> W<sup>-1</sup> s<sup>-1</sup>),  $B_k$  the fish biomass (gwB m<sup>-2</sup>),  $K_e$  (W<sup>2</sup> m<sup>-2</sup>  
 607 \$<sup>-1</sup>) the fleet dynamics parameter (which scales the rate of effort change with respect to  
 608 profit) and  $K_s$  (m<sup>2</sup> s<sup>-1</sup>) the regulation response parameter (which scales the rate of effort  
 609 change with respect to regulation). The catch is the product  $qE_k B_k$ , where the catchability  $q$   
 610 reflects the effectiveness with which a given unit of fishing effort catches fish, and  
 611 incorporates both gear technologies, fish finding or aggregating technologies, and skill and  
 612 knowledge of the crew.

613

614 As equation 1 states, the key factors determining the level of fishing effort in BOATS are  
 615  $B_k$ ,  $p$ ,  $c$  and  $q$  (Carozza et al., 2017) and the regulation parameters  $E_{targ,k}$  and  $S$ . If  $S$   
 616 approaches zero (no regulation), the nominal fishing effort will decrease if  $c$  increases  
 617 (increasing total cost), and increase if  $p$  or  $B_k$  increase (increasing revenue), all else being  
 618 equal. In line with the theory of open access fisheries (Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968), at  
 619 equilibrium fishing effort stabilizes at a level that generates zero profit.

620

### 621 ***Historical fisheries baseline***

622 We use BOATS with simple historical representations of fish price, fishing cost and  
 623 catchability, to create a historical fisheries baseline simulation determining the pre-war  
 624 state of fisheries and ecosystems. Based on the findings in Galbraith et al. (2017), the  
 625 historical fisheries trajectory is hindcasted by forcing the model with constant  $c$  ( $1.8 \times 10^{-4}$   
 626 \$ kW<sup>-1</sup>), constant  $p$  ( $1.1$  \$ kg<sup>-1</sup>), increasing  $q$  ( $5$  % yr<sup>-1</sup>) and no regulation ( $S = 0$ ), with the  
 627 climate control from CESM as input. Although these socio-economic approximations are  
 628 simplistic, they are within the ranges of empirical estimates (Sumaila et al., 2007; Squires  
 629 and Vestergaard, 2013; Eigaard et al., 2014; Palomares and Pauly, 2019), and reproduce the  
 630 historical evolution of global fisheries, with an increase, plateau and slight decline of global  
 631 catches and a continuous decrease in global fish biomass (Figure 1). The global distribution  
 632 of fish biomass and fishing effort in model year 2019 are saved to use as initial conditions  
 633 for the nuclear war simulations.

634

635 To investigate the benefits of strong pre-emptive fisheries management, we create an  
 636 alternative pre-war simulation. We use the dynamic fisheries regulation component  
 637 described in Scherrer and Galbraith (*in press*), and assume strong regulation effectiveness  
 638 ( $S = 10$ ) and regulation towards the local MSY target ( $E_{MSY,k}$ ).  $E_{MSY,k}$  is estimated for the  
 639 long-term monthly mean of the climate control from CESM in each grid cell. This approach

640 results in global catch and biomass trajectories similar to the historical baseline, but with  
641 higher catch and biomass in the last decades thanks to strong management (Figure S8).

642

### 643 ***Socio-economic responses***

644 Due to the large uncertainty of the effects of a nuclear war on global fishing behavior, we  
645 here use simple, exploratory socioeconomic responses. We modify two of the key  
646 economic model forcings, ex-vessel price of fish ( $p$ ) and cost of fishing effort ( $c$ ), to induce  
647 intensified or decreasing fishing as a response to a nuclear war. Intensified fishing is  
648 modeled by an instantaneous step increase in  $p$ , either a doubling (F+) or a factor-of-five  
649 increase (F++) in the year of the war. Decreased fishing is modeled here by an  
650 instantaneous two-fold (F-) or five-fold (F--) step increase in  $c$ . Finally, as a comparison,  
651 we model a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario where  $c$  and  $p$  remain unchanged throughout  
652 the war scenarios. When investigating the effect of pre-emptive management, we use the  
653 BAU, F+ and F++ scenarios combined with an immediate reduction of the regulation  
654 effectiveness to zero ( $S = 0$ ). Reduced regulation effectiveness is not necessarily the most  
655 likely socioeconomic response (see *Uncertainties and limitations*), but was applied for  
656 consistency with the other post-war scenarios. In all simulations, fishing effort evolves  
657 dynamically with a monthly time step, in response to the changes in  $p$ ,  $c$ ,  $q$  and  $B_k$   
658 (Equation 1).

659

660 The cost and price increases used here (2 and 5 times) were guided by the sparse available  
661 observations. First, the increases are substantially higher than historical variations (Sumaila  
662 et al., 2007; Lam et al., 2011; Tveterås et al., 2012; Kroodsma et al., 2018), since there is a  
663 large potential for extensive socio-economic changes post-war. In particular, the risk of  
664 unprecedented food shortage even under the 5 Tg emission scenario (Jägermeyr et al.,  
665 2020), the relatively high volatility of fuel prices (BP, 2019), and the hundred-fold  
666 intensification of fishing recorded in one region after the Tambora eruption (Alexander et  
667 al., 2017), warrant an investigation of large variations. Still, intensified fishing requires real  
668 fishing capital; boats, gears and crews. Although the substantial overcapacity present in  
669 many regions today could be mobilized post-war, this need for capital still constrains  
670 fisheries expansion. Therefore, we do not investigate higher price increases here.

671

### 672 ***Model runs***

673 Impacts of nuclear conflict and accompanying behavioral changes in the fishery were  
674 modeled for a 15-year period post-war using a total of 7 soot inputs (including the controls)  
675 and 5 socio-economic responses. We use the combination of BAU fishing and unchanged  
676 climate conditions - the “BAU control” - for comparison with all other scenarios,  
677 generating the percent changes given in the results. In addition, we simulate the impact of  
678 the climate scenarios on fish biomass in an unfished global ocean (see Supplementary Text;  
679 Figure S7), and the impact of the BAU, F+ and F++ scenarios on a strongly-regulated

680 global fishery (Figure 6; S9). To estimate the uncertainty in BOATS model predictions,  
681 each of the model runs (including the pre-war baselines) was repeated five times using  
682 different sets of parameter combinations derived from the model calibration process  
683 (Carozza et al., 2017; values given in table S1 of Galbraith et al., 2017). The five different  
684 parameter sets (the parameter ensemble) span a large range of the possible parameter space  
685 (SI in Galbraith et al., 2017), and results are presented with the ensemble mean and  
686 standard deviation.

687

### 688 ***EEZ catch changes and marine ecosystem dependence***

689 The total catch change is calculated for each EEZ by summing over the area, taking the  
690 average of the ensemble runs and over the first five years post-war. We use the country-  
691 level nutritional dependence from Selig et al. (2018) to indicate vulnerability, or the  
692 integrated dependence on marine ecosystems for countries lacking values for nutritional  
693 dependence. Dependent territories lacking data in Selig et al. (2018) were assigned the  
694 same value as their controlling central state. Disputed areas and joint regime areas were  
695 excluded from the analysis in Figure 5b.

696

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704

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## 980 **Figure captions**

981 **Figure 1.** Historical development of global fisheries. Simulated A) annual wild fish catch  
982 (Mt wet biomass) and B) total wild fish biomass (Gt wet biomass) over 1950-2019 from the  
983 historical fisheries baseline using the BOATS model. Shaded areas show the standard  
984 deviation for the five parameter ensemble runs, and dotted lines show the ensemble mean.  
985 The fishery and ecosystem state in 2019 are used as initial conditions for the nuclear war  
986 scenarios. In A), the grey solid line shows empirical global catches from Pauly and Zeller  
987 (2016), with uncertainty indicated by the shaded area.

988 **Figure 2.** Overview of short-term impacts of nuclear war on global fisheries. Panels show  
989 the average percent difference in A) biomass and B) catch between the business-as-usual  
990 (BAU) control simulation (no war) and different nuclear war simulations (5 to 150 Tg), in  
991 year 2 post-conflict. Each value is plotted against the war scenario (soot input indicated on  
992 upper x-axis) and its associated percent reduction in global photosynthetically active  
993 radiation (PAR). The slope for each marker type shows the impact of the climatic  
994 perturbation for a given socioeconomic response (F+/-, see Table 1), while the vertical



995 spread of the different marker types shows the effect of the socioeconomic responses.  
996 Statistics for linear regressions are given in tables S1 and S2.



997 **Figure 3.** Global fishery developments post-war. Panels show the % anomaly from the  
998 BAU control scenario (dashed line) for all soot inputs (solid lines). Upper row A)-C) shows  
999 trajectories of catch, biomass and fishing effort under BAU fishing, middle row D)-F)  
1000 trajectories under the intensified fishing scenario F+, and lower row G)-I) shows  
1001 trajectories under the decreased fishing scenarios F-. Shaded areas show standard deviation  
1002 for the five parameter ensemble runs while the solid lines are the ensemble mean. Light  
1003 yellow lines in panels D)-I) show the F+ and F- responses in the absence of a climatic  
1004 perturbation, i.e. the F+ or F- control.


1005 **Figure 4.** Spatial distribution of changes in fish catch. Panels show 6 different soot inputs  
1006 under BAU fishing, averaged over the first five years post-war. Panels A)-F) show the  
1007 mean difference in annual fish catch per square meter between the control (0 Tg) and the 5-  
1008 150 Tg soot inputs of the five ensemble runs. In the lower right corner, the global catch  
1009 difference in the five-year period is indicated (ensemble mean and standard deviation).








1010 **Figure 5.** Country level fish catch changes under the 5 Tg and BAU fishing scenario. In A),  
1011 the color of each exclusive economic zone (EEZ) shows the total change in modelled catch  
1012 (1000 ton wet biomass yr<sup>-1</sup>) relative to the BAU control scenario, averaged over the first  
1013 five years post-war. In B), change in EEZ level catch vs. national-level dependence on  
1014 marine ecosystems for nutrition is shown.



1015 **Figure 6.** Benefits of well-regulated fisheries. Development post-war under the 150 Tg and  
1016 F+ scenario (solid lines), when starting from a pre-war baseline with strong (green) versus  
1017 no (blue) fisheries regulation. A) shows catch anomaly (%) relative to the BAU control, and  
1018 B) the associated anomaly for fish biomass. Despite the substantial negative impact of the  
1019 large soot input (Figure 2a), catches still increase by ~430% in year one post-war.



**A****B**







**A****B**

**A****B**

**Table 1.** Overview of nuclear war-driven climatic perturbations. Radiative forcing, sea surface temperature (SST) and oceanic net primary productivity (NPP) anomalies are the maximum annual global means. Anomaly duration is the atmospheric residence time of aerosols. Details for India-Pakistan scenarios are in Toon et al. (2019), and for U.S.-Russia in Coupe et al. (2019). Previous nuclear war simulations, historical volcanic anomalies and projected global warming anomalies are given for comparison. NPP has not been reported for previous simulations of nuclear war or volcanic eruptions, indicated by not available (NA).

	Soot load	Warring Nations	$\Delta$ Radiative forcing	$\Delta$ SST	$\Delta$ NPP	Anomaly duration	Description
War simulations used in this study	5 Tg	India and Pakistan	-10.9 W m <sup>-2</sup>	-0.5°C	-3%	~10 yr	Lower-end regional conflict; 100 15 kt weapons
	16 Tg	India and Pakistan	-31.1 W m <sup>-2</sup>	-1.4°C	-7%	~10 yr	Intermediate regional conflict; 250 15 kt weapons
	27 Tg	India and Pakistan	-46.9 W m <sup>-2</sup>	-2.3°C	-10%	~10 yr	Intermediate regional conflict; 250 50 kt weapons
	36 Tg	India and Pakistan	-57.8 W m <sup>-2</sup>	-2.9°C	-12%	~10 yr	Higher-end regional conflict; 250 100 kt weapons
	47 Tg	India and Pakistan	-68.7 W m <sup>-2</sup>	-3.5°C	-16%	~10 yr	Upper-limit regional conflict; 500 100 kt weapons
	150 Tg	Russia and U.S.	-115.3 W m <sup>-2</sup>	-6.4°C	-37%	~10 yr	Nuclear superpower conflict; ~4400 100 kt weapons
Previous war simulations	5 Tg	India and Pakistan	~ -10 W m <sup>-2</sup>	-0.8°C	NA	~10 yr	Mills et al. 2014
	5 Tg	India and Pakistan	-8.2 to -10 W m <sup>-2</sup>	-0.1 to -0.6°C	NA	~10 yr	Pausata et al. 2016, range depends on war duration
	150 Tg	Russia and U.S.	-84.7 W m <sup>-2</sup>	NA	NA	~10 yr	Robock et al. 2007b
	<b>Perturbation</b>						<b>References</b>
Other climatic perturbations	Pinatubo eruption (1991 CE)		-6.5 ±2.7 W m <sup>-2</sup>	~ -0.1 °C	NA	~2 yr	Sigl et al. 2015; Chickamoto et al. 2016; Eddebbar et al. 2019
	Tambora eruption (1815 CE)		-17.2 ±4.9 W m <sup>-2</sup>	~ -1°C	NA	~2 yr	Sigl et al. 2015, Chickamoto et al. 2016
	Samalas eruption (1257 CE)		-32.8 ±9.6 W m <sup>-2</sup>	~ -1 to -2°C	NA	~2 yr	Sigl et al. 2015, Chickamoto et al. 2016
	RCP 2.6 global warming (2100 CE)		+2.6 W m <sup>-2</sup>	0 to +1°C	-2 to +1%	-	IPCC 2019, Lotze et al. 2019
	RCP 8.5 global warming (2100 CE)		+8.5 W m <sup>-2</sup>	+2 to +4°C	-11 to -4%	-	IPCC 2019

**Table 2.** Overview of modelled socio-economic responses. Price and cost changes are implemented instantaneously (step-change) in the year of the war. Each socio-economic response combined with a war-driven climatic perturbation (Table 1) make up a model scenario. Details in *Socioeconomic responses*.

Socio-economic response	Code	Drivers	Implementation
Business-as-usual	BAU	Socio-economic parameters unaffected by war	Unchanged fish price ( $p$ ) and fishing cost ( $c$ )
Intensified fishing	F+	Crop failure, food system collapse, increased fish demand	Two-fold increase in $p$
Greatly intensified fishing	F++	Severe crop failure, food system collapse, greatly increased demand	Five-fold increase in $p$
Decreased fishing ability	F-	Fuel scarcity, infrastructure destruction, security concerns	Two-fold increase in $c$
Greatly decreased fishing ability	F--	Severe fuel scarcity, infrastructure destruction, security concerns	Five-fold increase in $c$