



# Flight Simulator Demonstration and Certification Implications of Powertrain Failure Mitigation in a Partial Turboelectric Aircraft

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


# Objectives

- Test previously developed reversionary propulsion control modes for an aircraft with an electrified powertrain in a piloted flight simulator
- Investigate how current certification requirements apply to a concept aircraft with a turboelectric powertrain


# Background—Aircraft Description

- Single-aisle Turboelectric AiRCraft with Aft Boundary Layer propulsor (STARARC-ABL)
  - NASA concept with 2035 entry into service
  - 150-passenger class commercial transport
  - Traditional “tube-and-wing” shape
- Partial turboelectric powertrain
  - Thrust sources are two underwing geared turbofans and an electric, boundary layer ingesting tailfan
  - Geared turbofans produce thrust and power to drive the tailfan
  - There is no energy storage




# Background—Baseline Powertrain Control

- Inceptors provide the speed setpoint for each turbofan; the tailfan speed setpoint is based on the two turbofan speeds
- The baseline control design works well around the flight envelope for the nominal powertrain
- However, a powertrain subsystem failure could lead to potentially catastrophic cascading failures with the baseline control at some flight conditions




a) Normalized fan speed




b) Normalized net thrust

STARC-ABL Acceleration Response under Nominal Operating Conditions with Baseline Control



a) Normalized fan speed





b) Normalized net thrust

STARC-ABL Acceleration Response under Power System 1 Failure with Baseline Control

# Background—Reversionary Control

- Reversionary control modes
  - Control modes designed for off-nominal cases such as sensor/actuator/subsystem failures, which the baseline control was not designed for
  - Were developed to activate in case of subsystem failures in STARC-ABL powertrain and subsequently demonstrated\*
- The reversionary control modes have modified
  - Control limits
  - Schedules
- The reversionary control
  - Maintained system thrust response
  - Increased robustness to each type of subsystem failure
  - Produced less thrust than baseline



\*Simon, D.L., and Connolly, J. W., “Electrified Aircraft Propulsion Systems: Gas Turbine Control Considerations for the Mitigation of Potential Failure Modes and Hazards,” ASME Turbo Expo 2020, Turbomachinery Technical Conference and Exposition, GT2020-16335, September 21-25, 2020.

STARC-ABL Acceleration Response with Power System 1 Failure and Reversionary Control

# Testbed—Flight Simulator Setup






# Certification Standards

## Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)

- Which, if any, are applicable?
  - Part 25, *Airworthiness Standards: Transport Category Airplanes*
  - Part 33, *Airworthiness Standards: Aircraft Engines*
  - magniX Special Condition—relates to electric motor, controller, and high-voltage systems installed on the aircraft for use as an aircraft engine
  - One-Engine-Inoperative (OEI) requirements
- Is the STARC-ABL a two- or three-engine aircraft?
- Which is the critical engine?
  - the engine whose failure would most adversely affect the performance or handling qualities of an aircraft


# Addressing Certification Standards

- Given the magniX Special Condition, the tailfan is an engine → the STARC-ABL is a three-engine aircraft
- Either wing-mounted gas turbine engine is the critical engine because
  - its failure will result in a thrust asymmetry
  - it provides power to the tailfan
  - it provides significantly more thrust than the tailfan at low altitude, low speed conditions where a failure is most serious





# Testing Process

- Test control system robustness with reversionary control modes active to powertrain subsystem failures
  - Power system
  - Gas turbine engine
  - Tailfan
- Test specifically OEI requirements for three-engine aircraft





# Testing—Power System Failure

- Abrupt power system failure occurs in both cases
- With reversionary control inactive, catastrophic cascading failures occur
- With reversionary control active, failure did not propagate





# Testing—Geared Turbofan Failure

- Abrupt geared turbofan failure occurs in both cases
- With reversionary control inactive, catastrophic cascading failures occur
- With reversionary control active, failure did not propagate





# Testing—Tailfan Failure

- Abrupt tailfan failure occurs in both cases
- With reversionary control inactive, catastrophic cascading failures occur
- With reversionary control active, failure did not propagate



# Testing—Missed Approach at Denver

- Although Denver is a high altitude airport, the baseline control system is pretty robust to subsystem failures
- However, meeting the missed approach climb requirement is harder than at lower altitudes
- Abrupt geared turbofan failure occurred
- With reversionary control active, failure did not propagate
- Aircraft was able to climb and successfully exceed minimum steady climb gradient for one engine inoperative





# Other Testing

- Additional testing focused on those 14 CFR Part 25 regulations having to do with in-flight handling/controllability and maneuvering with OEI, especially the critical engine
- The pilot was able to maneuver without difficulty in all cases
  - change flight conditions
  - bank and turn



# Conclusions

- The reversionary control modes worked properly under all conditions tested and were robust to cascading failures
- Cascading failures demonstrate that control and health management schemes will be enabling for electrified aircraft propulsion technology to progress
- For the relatively traditional looking STARC-ABL, despite having an electrified powertrain, the current 14 CFR Parts 25 and 33 can reasonably be applied, but require interpretation
- The STARC-ABL met all tested requirements for one engine inoperative with reversionary control modes active
- Current certification standards will be insufficient as the diversity of aircraft designs increases



# Acknowledgments

- NASA Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD)/Transformative Aeronautics Concepts Program (TACP)/Transformational Tools and Technologies (TTT) Project
- NASA ARMD/TACP/Convergent Aeronautics Solutions (CAS) Project
- NASA Minority University Research and Education Project (MUREP)
- The original hazard mitigation schemes utilized here were developed under funding from the NASA ARMD Advanced Air Vehicles Program (AAVP), Advanced Air Transport Technology (AATT) Project, Power and Propulsion Subproject

