Discovery and Analysis of Rare High-Impact Failure Modes Using Adversarial RL-Informed Sampling

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- Formal verification
 - Difficult due to system size and complexity
 - Often requires making strong assumptions about system dynamics
 - Produces mathematical guarantees
- Sample-based approach
 - One-sided "proof" (falsifiability)
 - Requires simulation
 - Contingencies are explored in proportion to their likelihood
 - Expensive at scale
 - Often requires domain knowledge to inform exploration
 - Scenario "engineering" can violate principles of IV&V

System formulation

- System under test (SUT) embedded in a simulation, where it responds to a semi-stochastic environment
 - State space: $s \in \mathcal{S}$
 - Environment: set of stochastic disturbances $\mathcal{X} \sim p(x)$
 - Failure criterion: $s \in \mathcal{F} \subset \mathcal{S}$
- For particular state trajectory $\{s_0, s_1, \ldots, s_T\}$,

$$p(s_0, \dots, s_T) = p(s_0) \prod_{t=1}^T p(s_t \mid s_0 \dots s_{t-1}) = p(s_0) \prod_{t=1}^T p(s_t \mid s_{t-1})$$
$$= p(s_0) \prod_{t=0}^{T-1} p(x_t)$$

• Failure indicator function:

$$f(\mathsf{x}) = \mathbf{1}_{\mathcal{F}}(s(\mathsf{x}))$$

- Let X = [X₁, X₂,...X_T] ∼ p(x) be the random trace corresponding to a *T*-step "rollout" of the environment
- Failure probability is given by

$$\mu = P(f(X) = 1) = \mathbf{E}[f(X)]$$

• Estimated failure probability:

$$\hat{\mu}_{\mathsf{MC}} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} f(\mathbf{x}^{(i)})$$

where $\mathbf{x}^{(i)} \sim p(\mathbf{x})$.

- When failures are rare, direct Monte Carlo is
 - Inefficient
 - Inaccurate
- If process is accelerated, probabilities may be misleading

• Estimated failure probability:

$$\hat{\mu}_{IS} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} f(\mathbf{x}^{(i)}) \frac{p(\mathbf{x}^{(i)})}{q(\mathbf{x}^{(i)})},$$

where $\mathbf{x}^{(i)} \sim q(\mathbf{x})$.

• Surrogate distribution $q(\mathbf{x})$ skews the environment towards learned failure modes

Surrogate distribution

- A desirable surrogate environment
 - Reproduces learned failures
 - Preserves variance of original distribution
- Variance of the estimate is minimized when

 $q(\mathbf{x}) \propto f(\mathbf{x}) p(\mathbf{x})$

• Consider failure-conditioned distribution

$$p_{\mathcal{F}}(\mathbf{x}) = P(X = \mathbf{x} \mid f(X) = 1)$$
$$= P(f(X) = 1 \mid X = \mathbf{x}) \frac{P(X = \mathbf{x})}{P(f(X) = 1)}$$
$$= \boxed{f(\mathbf{x})p(\mathbf{x})/\mu}$$

Adaptive stress testing (AST)

- Accelerated validation framework
- Requires little knowledge of system under test
- Generates adversarial environments to find likeliest failures
- Better performance at scale
- Flexible and general







- Simulated system under test
- Stochastic system environment (set of disturbances)
- Formulates stress-testing problem as MDP or POMDP
- Agent chooses actions to optimize overall marginal likelihood with the constraint of eventual system failure
 - Solutions correspond to the *mode* of $p_{\mathcal{F}}(\mathbf{x})$



• Optimization:

$$\max_{\substack{\mathbf{x}_{0},...,\mathbf{x}_{T-1}\\\text{subject to}}} \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} \log p(\mathbf{x}_{t})$$

- State and environment spaces are continuous and high-dimensional
- Environment selection is parameterized as a policy
 - Probabilistic decision tree
 - Q-table
 - (Deep) neural network
- Failure constraint is enforced via penalty
- Reward is given by

$$r(s_t, x_t) = \log p(x_t) - \Delta d_F + R_F \cdot \{s_t \in \mathcal{F}\}$$

- AST produces optimal failure policy $\pi^*(s)$
 - Multiple modes are latently represented in policy
- Candidate surrogate is given by

$$q(x_t) = \epsilon p(x_t) + (1 - \epsilon) p(x_t + \mathbf{E}[X_t] - \pi^*(s))$$

• Failure probability:

$$\hat{\mu}_{PS} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} f\left(\mathbf{x}^{(i)}\right) \frac{p\left(\mathbf{x}^{(i)}\right)}{q\left(\mathbf{x}^{(i)}\right)},$$

where $\mathbf{x}^{(i)} \sim q(\mathbf{x}_t)$.

Example: runway (random rollout)



(1)

Example: runway (failure policy)



• For any initial state, rolling out the policy produces trajectories around the mode of the *conditional probability distribution*

$$p_{\mathcal{F}}(\mathbf{x}) = p(x_0, \dots, x_{T-1} \mid s_T \in \mathcal{F}) \propto f(\mathbf{x})p(\mathbf{x})$$

- We can use this policy as the "kernel" of a MCMC process
 - Distribution is resampled in its region of highest probability mass
 - Strongly accelerates convergence / mitigates "burn-in"
 - Allows immediate generation of independent failure traces
- Added benefits:
 - Estimates are formed directly in log-space
 - Importance sampling instability is circumvented

Example: sampling without disturbances



Natural system behavior moves state to right at constant rate

Example: sampling with disturbances (Monte Carlo)



State experiences stochastic perturbations

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Example: sampling failure policy



AST finds failures corresponding to a set likelihood threshold

Example: MCMC sampling failure policy



Learned policy becomes basis of statistical model

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Example: multimodal capture



Information about failure modes is stored implicitly in policy

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Case study: validation of ACAS sXu

- Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS X)
 - Replaces Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
 - Models aircraft encounters as POMDPs
 - Stores precomputed solution as large lookup table
 - Detects potential collisions between individual aircraft
 - Issues directive guidance in the form of resolution advisories (RAs)
- Variants:
 - Xa (commercial aircraft)
 - Xo (specialized missions)
 - Xu (unmanned aircraft)
 - **sXu** (small unmanned aircraft)

Research goal

Provide ACAS sXu development team with stress-testing tools and infrastructure to inform their ongoing work

Testing setup

- System under test: ACAS sXu binary
- Disturbances: pilot commands
 - Turning rate
 - Vertical rate
 - Forward acceleration
- Aircraft dynamics: simple multirotor with limited acceleration (g/2)
- Response to CAS: pilot compliance with 1-second delay
 - $\bullet\,$ Turning rate of $3^\circ/s$ complying with advised horizontal maneuvers
 - Acceleration of g/4 to g/3 complying with advised vertical maneuvers
- Failure criterion: small near mid-air collision (sNMAC)
 - 50 ft. horizontal separation
 - 15 ft. vertical separation

Result

Failure policy achieved 97% failure elicitation rate

Example: freeze failure





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