

# Failure Behavior and Control Based Mitigation for a Parallel Hybrid Propulsion System

2023 AIAA SciTech Forum

Session: GTE-05, GTE Controls and Operations

**Room: Celebration 1** 

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January 8th, 2024

#### **Background/Motivation**

- Challenge maintaining operability throughout a vast operating envelope with consideration of electrified aircraft propulsion (EAP)
  - Various EAP architectures add components
  - Additional components are coupled to and impact the operation of gas turbine engines
  - Increases chance of a failure
  - Concerns how failures in the electrical system will propagate to impact the turbomachinery
  - Desire to mitigate failures with reversionary control logic
- Focus on a parallel hybrid architecture
  - Relevant to regional and single-aisle aircraft
  - Garnered interest in recent years
  - Provides contrast to previously investigate turboelectric concept.
- Goal: Develop a model of a relevant parallel hybrid propulsion system, inject failures into the electrical power system, develop mitigation strategies, and evaluate operability through simulation studies



Artistic depiction of the parallel hybrid Sugar Volt concept vehicle



#### **Parallel Hybrid Engine Model**



Based on a Numerical Propulsion System Simulation (NPSS) model developed by the Georgia Institute of Technology under the NASA Electrified Powertrain Flight Demonstration (EPFD) project



### **Controller (normal operation)**

• Boost power determination:

 $P_{BP} = P_{BP,max} \varphi_P \varphi_{SOC} \varphi_{Alt} \varphi_{TS}$  $\varphi_{TS}$  is 1 when the boost command toggle switch is enabled and 0 otherwise. A rate limiter with a 15 s ramp is applied to assure a gradual transition

- Scheduled variable bleed valve (VBV)
- Gain scheduled proportional integral (PI) fuel flow rate controller with limit logic and min-max controller selection logic
- Generic acceleration/deceleration limit logic
- Set-point scheduling adjusts to changes in LPS EM power and boost

\*WoW = weight on wheels



#### **Controller (reversionary control)**



- Types of failures: failure of (1) LPS EM, (2) HPS EM, (3) energy storage system, (4) one of the engines on a 2-engine aircraft (no auxiliary power unit or ram air turbine)
- Failures could be full or partial (ex. 1 of several EMs fail)



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#### LPS EM Failure

- LPS EM command is limited according to severity of the failure
- Effectively alters the maximum boost power
- Used in determination of actuator inputs, control gains, and the set-point

#### Energy Storage System

 Accommodated through existing set-point logic (loss in energy storage capacity reduces the SOC → boost is limited for low SOC)

#### HPS EM Failure

- HPS EM command is limited according to the severity of the failure
- Power extraction unable to be supplied by the HPS EM is provided by the energy storage system accompanied by an adjustment in the LPS EM power command (no additional demands on the power system)

#### Engine Failure

 Power extraction lost by the failed engine will be picked up by the working engine using the energy storage devices accompanied by reduction in LPS EM power injection.

#### **Failure Analysis Study Overview**



Types of failures: LPS EM failure, HPS EM failure, energy storage system failure, failure of the other engine (no auxiliary power unit or ram air turbine)

Failures from a steady-state operating point	
Flight Conditions (Altitude, ft	0/0,0/0.3,5000/0.3,10000/0.4,15000/0.55,35000/0.8
/ Mach Number)	
PLA(°)	40, 48, 56, 64, 72, 80
Failure Duration (s)	0.015, 40
Failure Fractions	0.25, 0.33, 0.5, 1
Failure ID Delay (s)	0.015, 1, 3, 5
Boost Option	On, Off
TEEM Option	On, Off
Failures during transients	
Flight Conditions (Altitude, ft	0/0,0/0.2,5000/0.3,10000/0.4,15000/0.55,35000/0.8
/ Mach Number)	
PLA changes (°)	$40^{\circ} \leftrightarrow 80^{\circ}, 40^{\circ} \leftrightarrow 60^{\circ}, 60^{\circ} \leftrightarrow 80^{\circ}, 50^{\circ} \leftrightarrow 70^{\circ}$
Time of the failure insertion	0, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9
as a fraction of the transient	
time	
Failure Duration (s)	sustained
Failure Fractions	0.25, 0.33, 0.5, 1
Failure ID Delay (s)	0.015, 1, 3, 5
Boost Option	On, Off
TEEM Option	On, Off

**Additional Test Cases** 

- Take-off: sea level, increasing Mach number profile, decreasing weight on wheels, failures inserted at various times
- Landing: sea level, decreasing Mach number profile, increasing weight on wheels, failures inserted at various times

\*PLA = power level angle (throttle) 40° - idle power 80° - max power

Failure of the LPS EM from steady state sea level static (SLS) conditions with instantaneous failure ID and mitigation

- 16% reduction in maximum thrust
- Operability metrics maintain similar values without much disruption
  - Solid Lines: PLA = 40° (idle)
  - Dashed Lines: PLA = 64° (intermediate)
  - Dotted Lines:  $PLA = 80^{\circ}$  (max)



Failure of the LPS EM from steady state sea level static (SLS) conditions with failure ID and mitigation delayed by 5 s

- During delay period:
  - T<sub>4</sub> over-temperature (3%)
  - N<sub>hps</sub> over-speed (0.85%)
  - HPC SM reduction
    - Solid Lines: PLA = 40° (idle)
    - Dashed Lines: PLA = 64° (intermediate)
    - Dotted Lines:  $PLA = 80^{\circ}$  (max)



Failure of the LPS EM during an acceleration at sea level static (SLS) conditions with instantaneous failure ID and mitigation

- No significant degradation to operability
  - No limit violations
  - No reduction in HPC SM
  - —— Solid Lines: failure 0% through transient
- - Dashed Lines: PLA = failure 25% through transient
- ..... Dotted Lines: PLA = failure 50% through transient
- • • Dashed-Dotted Lines: failure 75% through transient 1/8/2024 2024 AIAA SciTech Forum





LPS – low pressure shaft HPS – high pressure shaft LPC – low pressure compressor HPC – high pressure compressor

W<sub>f</sub> – fuel flow rate T<sub>4</sub> – turbine inlet temperature N<sub>lps</sub> – LPS speed N<sub>hps</sub> – HPS speed SM – stall margin

Failure of the LPS EM during a deceleration at sea level static (SLS) conditions with instantaneous failure ID and mitigation

- No significant degradation to operability
  - Failure boosts LPC SM
- —— Solid Lines: failure 0% through transient
- - Dashed Lines: PLA = failure 25% through transient
- ..... Dotted Lines: PLA = failure 50% through transient
- • • Dashed-Dotted Lines: failure 75% through transient 1/8/2024 2024 AIAA SciTech Forum





LPS – low pressure shaft HPS – high pressure shaft LPC – low pressure compressor HPC – high pressure compressor

 $W_f$  – fuel flow rate  $T_4$  – turbine inlet temperature  $N_{lps}$  – LPS speed  $N_{hps}$  – HPS speed SM – stall margin

#### Parallel Hybrid vs. Turboelectric Comparison



- Parallel hybrid options have a few potential advantages over turboelectric:
  - Arguably less complex (no additional propulsors, less components)
  - No coupling of propulsors through the electric powertrain and no (or at least less need) for supervisory control logic to perform coordination.
    - Less consideration needed for failure propagation
  - Typically focuses on adding power to the LPS while power extraction could involve both shafts to a significant degree.
  - It is inherent with the boost feature that power injection variability must be designed into the controller.
    - Turboelectric concepts are envisioned to adhere to a power schedule at all times. Significant
      variations in power extraction would not be addressed in the nominal control design process
      but should be addressed separately through reversionary control development that is only
      applicable in the rare case of failure scenarios.

#### **Summary & Conclusions**



- A transient parallel hybrid propulsion system model was created.
- Control strategies were developed to operate the system under normal operating conditions.
- The control logic was appended to address failures within the electrical power system.
- Simulation results ...
  - demonstrated the success of the reversionary control modes
  - displayed the potential importance of quickly identifying failures and employing reversionary control logic (prevent over-temperature, over-speed, reduced stall margins)
- Parallel hybrid architectures could pose fewer challenges with respect to failure modes and mitigation than turboelectric concepts.

#### Acknowledgments



• Funded by the Advanced Air Transport Technology (AATT) project under the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD)

#### **Questions/Discussion**

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## **EXTRA CHARTS**



Failure of the LPS EM during an acceleration at sea level static (SLS) conditions failure ID and mitigation delayed by 5 s

- Same trends as with the steadystate failure simulations
  - T<sub>4</sub> over-temperature
  - N<sub>hps</sub> over-speed
  - HPC SM reduction
  - Solid Lines: failure 0% through transient
- - Dashed Lines: PLA = failure 25% through transient
- ..... Dotted Lines: PLA = failure 50% through transient
  - ---- Dashed-Dotted Lines: failure 75% through transient 1/8/2024 2024 AIAA SciTech Forum





LPS – low pressure shaft HPS – high pressure shaft LPC – low pressure compressor HPC – high pressure compressor

 $W_f$  – fuel flow rate  $T_4$  – turbine inlet temperature  $N_{lps}$  – LPS speed  $N_{hps}$  – HPS speed SM – stall margin

Failure of the LPS EM during a take-off scenario with instantaneous failure ID and mitigation

- No significant degradation to operability
- Reduction in thrust (not significant for driving design decisions)
  - Solid Lines: failure @ 5s
- – – Dashed Lines: failure @ 15s (
- ..... Dotted Lines: PLA = failure @ 25s



Failure of the HPS EM from steady state sea level static (SLS) conditions with instantaneous failure ID and mitigation

 Insignificant impact of performance and operability



- - Dashed Lines: PLA = 64° (intermediate)
- ..... Dotted Lines: PLA = 80° (max)



Failure of the other engine from steady state sea level static (SLS) conditions with instantaneous failure ID and mitigation

 Insignificant impact of performance and operability



- - - Dashed Lines: PLA = 64° (intermediate)

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..... Dotted Lines: PLA = 80° (max)

