

1 Georgia's potentials for sustainable
2 intensification, increasing food security and
3 rural incomes.

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19 Journals:

20 Environmental Research Food Systems

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22 Abstract:

23 Increasing global demand for agricultural commodities spurs conversions of natural
24 ecosystems. Sustainable intensification in areas of high yield gaps has been proposed a pathway
25 to achieve food security, support rural livelihoods, while also reducing the impact of commodity
26 production by narrowing yield gaps on existing agricultural lands, while improving resource
27 efficiency. Following the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Georgia
28 experienced one of the highest losses of agricultural productivity among all former USSR
29 countries and is now highly dependent on food imports. Closing yield gaps in Georgia through
30 sustainable intensification has the potential to increase food self-sufficiency, support rural
31 livelihoods, and strengthen food security and sovereignty. We estimated its potential for
32 sustainable intensification in current agricultural areas to achieve self-sufficiency for wheat,
33 maize, and barley. We found that crop yields can be doubled to tripled under high-input
34 production systems, using high-yielding varieties, optimized inputs, fertilizers, and pest control.
35 Yet, self-sufficiency in wheat can only be reached if at least 80% of the potentially attainable
36 yields are achieved and if land is strategically allocated between crops. To achieve such
37 increases, farmers need access to and training for using different crop varieties, fertilizers, and
38 pest and disease control practices and products. Intensification increases the risks to ecosystem
39 services' health and livelihoods, particularly raising equity concerns. Yet, intensifying very low
40 input systems is often found to be more sustainable, with high yield increases compared to
41 limited impacts on the environment. The high employment rate in the agricultural sector in
42 Georgia particularly provides opportunities to reduce poverty and increase livelihoods through
43 increasing incomes and food security.

44

45

46 1 Introduction

47

48 Increases in global demand for food commodities are expected to continue with ongoing trends
49 or greater meat consumption in middle-income countries, increasing use of bioenergy,
50 population increases, and little progress on reducing food waste. To meet national food
51 security goals, countries can increase their reliance on international trade or increase domestic
52 production. The first approach may be least costly but may increase the country's vulnerability
53 to food crises caused by trade disruptions, climate change, political instability, war, and short-
54 term market shocks (FAO 2015). Furthermore, reliance on international markets contributes to
55 outsourcing of environmental harms to those exporting countries, not least of which includes
56 habitat loss (Pendrill *et al* 2019, Curtis *et al* 2018) and embodied water loss (Chen *et al* 2021b,
57 Han *et al* 2018).

58 To increase domestic production there are three options: closing yield gaps on existing
59 agricultural areas, i.e., in areas where there are large differences between current and
60 attainable production, relocating agriculture to areas of higher potential production, or
61 expanding the overall agricultural area in the country. While the net environmental impacts of
62 intensification and land sparing versus more expansive diversified farming remain a subject of
63 intense debate, intensification carries two potential benefits of intense importance for global
64 sustainability goals: first, supporting rural development and livelihoods by helping move
65 farmers out of poverty traps (Beyer *et al* 2022), and second, contributing toward freeing up
66 land to set aside for nature restoration (Meyfroidt *et al* 2018, García *et al* 2020).

67 The net sustainability benefits of intensification increase when done through sustainable
68 intensification (e.g., optimizing fertilizer, pest, and disease control methods, using
69 complementary crop rotations, crop-livestock integration, and improved soil management, and
70 using high-yielding varieties) (Garnett *et al* 2013). In contrast, relocating agricultural
71 production to areas with higher potential agricultural or expanding overall agricultural areas are
72 likely to cause carbon emissions, habitat loss and fragmentation affecting biodiversity loss, and
73 disrupt existing livelihoods (Meyfroidt *et al* 2022). These outcomes tend to be highly unjust as
74 well, since most often it is the most vulnerable communities that suffer from their land being

75 classified as optimal for conversion to other land uses and who are unable to have their voices
76 heard in planning processes (Löfqvist *et al* 2022, Meyfroidt *et al* 2022). Intensification typically
77 requires higher and more efficient use of inputs and machinery posing additional challenges
78 such as pollution, pesticide resistance, degradation and others (Godfray and Garnett 2014,
79 Tilman *et al* 2001, Cassman *et al* 2003, Cassman 1999). However, impacts are lower when
80 intensifying from very low yield to more moderate yield levels, versus moving from moderate
81 to high yields. For example, applying additional N fertilizer in low input agricultural systems has
82 been found to hardly affect N₂O emissions, compared to adding the equivalent N in highly
83 fertilized system (Shcherbak *et al* 2014).

84 Analyses of where yield gaps exist within countries and concrete estimates for how much
85 closing these gaps through different intensification methods could contribute to reducing food
86 insecurity are thus urgently needed. Coarse global analyses on the subject of yield gaps point
87 to their high importance for global food security (Cassman and Grassini 2020). Yet high-
88 resolution within-country analyses are rare. Such work has, for example, been published for
89 China with a focus on self-sufficiency (Deng *et al* 2019), for Southeast Asia with a focus on rice
90 import needs (Yuan *et al* 2022), and for Russia focusing on post-soviet wheat production
91 (Schierhorn *et al* 2014, Schierhorn 2014). A better understanding of how to sustainably
92 intensify yields in Eurasia is especially critical given that conflicts remain an ongoing and
93 unpredictable pressure on food systems, often disrupting the food trade directly or the trade of
94 food production inputs (Zhang *et al* 2023, Lin *et al* 2023, Mottaleb *et al* 2022, Puma *et al* 2015,
95 Alexander *et al* 2022, Laber *et al* 2023).

96 The country of Georgia in the Caucasus region finds itself in a particularly challenging
97 agricultural situation. Compared to other former USSR countries, Georgia experienced one of
98 the highest declines in agricultural productivity with the resolution of the USSR. Agricultural
99 productivity declined by around 40% from its mid-1980s levels until 1994 (Bezemer and Davis
100 2003, Lerman 2004) and did not experience substantial increases towards the 2020s (Geostat
101 2022, Bezemer and Davis 2003). Yet, land abandonment rates in Georgia were minimal
102 compared to other former USSR countries (Lesiv *et al* 2018). Following the 2008 invasion by

103 Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetian (Tskhinvali) remain de facto occupied territories,
104 positioning Georgia in an ongoing conflict (Welton *et al* 2013, Janse 2021).

105 At the same time, Georgia is highly dependent on food commodity imports, particularly wheat
106 from Russia, one of Georgia's main sources of dietary energy per person (36.2% daily dietary
107 energy pp) (Geostat 2022, Jenderedjian and Bellows 2019, Mottaleb *et al* 2022). For example, in
108 2015, wheat self-sufficiency, i.e., the percent nationally produced from the total consumed
109 production was only 17%, while 96% of the additional consumed wheat was imported from
110 Russia (FAO 2020) (Table SI 1). Meat self-sufficiency was only 47%. However, self-sufficiency of
111 other commodities, such as vegetables was quite high, at 87% (Kharaisvili 2017). Increasing
112 self-sufficiency in wheat production in Georgia could be instrumental to regain power over food
113 staples in Georgia, reducing its dependency from foreign, i.e., Russian, powers (Patel 2012).

114 In Georgia, the agricultural sector additionally plays a key role for poverty reduction and
115 livelihoods. In 2012, around 25% of the rural population lived below the poverty threshold.
116 Around forty percent of Georgia's population is employed in the agricultural sector, and
117 agriculture is responsible for around forty-five percent of rural incomes (Gugushvili 2017,
118 Kaczmarek-Khubnaia 2020). Sustainable agricultural intensification can help to reduce rural
119 poverty by increasing incomes from higher production (World bank 2022, Kaczmarek-Khubnaia
120 2020, Ministry of Agriculture of Georgia 2017).

121

122 Here we aim to better understand Georgia's current self-sufficiency for major crop staples and
123 how sustainable intensification could increase crop self-sufficiency, food security and food
124 autonomy. We estimated the potential crop yield increases by comparing current yields to
125 attainable yields as estimated by both the top-down framework of the Global Agroecological
126 Zoning model (GAEZ v4) (FAO and IIASA 2021) and the bottom-up approach estimated by
127 Gerber *et al* (2024). This allows us to compare our results between both modeling approaches,
128 enhancing the interpretation and rigor of our estimates. With this we provide new insights into
129 Georgia's food self-sufficiency and its potentials for sustainable intensification through yield
130 increases.

131 The main research questions are:

- 132 • What is Georgia’s current self-sufficiency for major staple crops?
- 133 • What is the difference between current and attainable crop yields in Georgia and which
- 134 land management strategies are most effective in closing the yield gaps?
- 135 • How would production gains on current agricultural land affect food security and
- 136 autonomy?

137

138 1.1 Background

139 1.1.1 Study area

140 Georgia is located between the Greater and Lesser Caucasus mountains in the north and south
141 and the Black Sea to its west. Landscapes and ecosystems change over short distances from the
142 high mountains of the Greater Caucasus in the north-east, towards the foothills and large low-
143 lands in the west, and from the Mediterranean climate by the Black Sea to the steppes in the
144 east and southeast (Didebulidze and Plachter 2002, Buschmann 2020). Alongside its high
145 ecosystem diversity, Georgia is rich in biodiversity and is identified as one of the worlds
146 ‘biodiversity hotspots’ for its concentration of endemic species richness and, at the same time,
147 loss of natural habitats (Myers *et al* 2000). Moreover, Georgia is considered one of the centers
148 of origin for many domesticated plant and animal species (e.g., Mosulishvili *et al* 2019,
149 Sikharulidze *et al* 2022).

150 In 2009 almost half of the land in the Caucasus region had been transformed by humans, with
151 the plains, foothills, and subalpine belts the most impacted. For example, only 5-7% of the
152 original floodplain ecosystems in the larger Caucasus remained intact in 2009 with most areas
153 converted for agricultural production. In the Caucasus region as a whole, around 25% of
154 natural ecosystems remain intact, and only 10-12%, including forests and high mountains, can
155 be considered pristine (Zazanashvili and Mallon 2009). Rates of deforestation and land-use
156 change since 1987 are small, with only 0.3% of Georgia found to be deforested (Olofsson *et al*
157 2010, Chen *et al* 2021a, Geostat 2022, Cortner *et al* 2022).

158

159 1.1.2 Institutional and land system changes

160 The dissolution of the USSR caused profound societal, institutional, economic, and land system
161 changes (Stefes 2006, Buschmann 2020). Following independence in 1991, large collective and
162 state-owned farmlands (Kohlkozoes and Sovkhozoes) were sequentially distributed across
163 households to individually owned physical parcels of 0.25-5 ha. Each household received 0.75
164 ha on average (Kegel 2003, Kaczmarek-Khubnaia 2020, Buschmann 2020). On the one hand,
165 this enabled individual families to pursue subsistence agriculture, thereby reducing their
166 vulnerability to food shortages and price fluctuations during the transition and the emerging
167 conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Tskhinvali) (Kegel 2003, Jenderedjian and Bellows
168 2019). On the other hand, this caused a highly fragmented land system of small field sizes. Even
169 though small field are not necessarily less productive than large field (Livny 2012), the reduced
170 benefits of scale, the larger focus on subsistence agriculture, and lower trained landowners
171 reduced previous productivity. In addition, deterioration of irrigation and drainage systems due
172 to lack of maintenance after independence, high interest rates for agricultural investments
173 (Welton *et al* 2013), unfavorable taxation practices (Natishvili and Gubelatze 2018), and a lack
174 of property registration, which obstructs land investments and sales (Welton *et al* 2013,
175 Kochlamazashvili *et al* 2018), have limited agricultural productivity.

176 During the early 2000s, Georgia realized impressive economic growth, fueled by neoliberal
177 reforms and anti-corruption measures implemented between 2004 and 2012. Georgia's Gross
178 National Income (GNI) per capita increased from US\$1,120 in 2004 to US\$4,490 in 2014 (in
179 2017 USD) (Gugushvili 2017). However, rural poverty levels remained largely unaffected
180 (Gugushvili 2017). Since 2011, the Georgian government has significantly increased the budget
181 of the agricultural ministry, with the aim of increasing food safety and security (Ministry of
182 Agriculture 2015). A key strategy was to incentivize and support the development of
183 agricultural cooperatives to leverage scale effects and thereby overcome limitations of small,
184 fragmented farms (Welton *et al* 2013, Gelashvili 2020, Gugushvili 2017). The Georgian
185 government and international donors provided support including training, grants and credits
186 (Millns 2013). Efforts to increase land registration were expanded to ensure definite land titles
187 for farmers and enable a functioning land market (Kochlamazashvili 2019). In addition, since

188 2017 large investments have been targeted to recover and expand Georgia’s irrigation and
189 drainage systems to increase yields and reduce the risk of seasonal precipitation shortages
190 (Ministry of Agriculture of Georgia 2017, Natishvili and Gubelatze 2018). In total Georgia aims
191 to irrigate 200.000 ha by 2025, an increase by a factor of 2.3 from 2015 (88,000 ha) (Natishvili
192 and Gubelatze 2018), but still less than half of the irrigated area in 1989 (469,000 ha)
193 (Branscheid 1998).

194 2 Methods & data

195 Self-sufficiency in agricultural commodity production is a key indicator for understanding
196 countries’ availability of and risks associated with food supply among the four main pillars of
197 food security, i.e., availability, access, utilization, and stability (FAO 2015, Clapp 2016). First, we
198 calculated Georgia’s *self-sufficiency ratio* (SSR) for wheat, maize, and barley, three of the major
199 annual staple crops produced in Georgia’s agricultural statistics (Geostat 2022) and import and
200 export statistics obtained from FAO (FAO 2020) for the years 2006 to 2019. The SSR is defined
201 as the percentage of national production compared to the overall national consumption
202 (Formula 1 below) (FAO 2013, Clapp 2017). Higher self-sufficiency ratios decrease a country’s
203 vulnerability to food shortages, caused by, e.g., trade disruptions, war and conflicts, and price
204 volatility. Countries achieving 80-120% self-sufficiency are considered to produce roughly the
205 same amount of food that they consume (Clapp 2016). Self-sufficiencies above 100% for
206 specific commodities indicates production exceeding the national demand, which is common
207 for exported production.


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$$SSR = \frac{Production}{(Production + Imports - Exports)} \times 100 \quad [1]$$

209

210 To analyze Georgia’s potential for achieving self-sufficiency across the three crops without
211 additional land conversion we applied an 80% and 100% SSR threshold, as an SSR above 80% is
212 considered to be least vulnerable to food shortages (Clapp 2016). We then derived current and
213 potentially attainable yields for Georgia’s main annual staple crops, wheat, maize and barley.
214 We acquired current yields from the Georgian agricultural statistics (Geostat 2022). We used

215 two distinct datasets to derive potentially attainable yields, first the Global Agro-Ecological
 216 Zones (GAEZ) database provided by the FAO and IIASA (FAO and IIASA 2021) and attainable
 217 yield estimates by Gerber *et al* (2024). Attainable yields can be defined as the yield a skillful
 218 farmer reaches under the local biophysical conditions when accounting for economic and risk
 219 factors of production (Foulkes *et al* 2022). The datasets were generated using two very
 220 different approaches. The GAEZ models potentially attainable yields using a top-down approach
 221 based on the spatial explicit thermal, moisture, agro-climatic, soil and terrain conditions derived
 222 at the specific location of interest, under selected land management options (FAO and IIASA
 223 2021). Gerber *et al* (2024) estimated attainable yields using a bottom-up approach, defined as
 224 the highest 95% quantile of observed yields derived using annual yield and harvest data
 225 compiled following the methods in Ray *et al* (2019). In the case of Georgia, yields represent the
 226 national average of attainable yields for the selected crops for each year between 1975 to 2010
 227 (Gerber *et al* 2024). Data on current yields of wheat, maize, and barley were derived from
 228 Geostat (2022) and available for at regional level for all of Georgia, excluding the occupied
 229 territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Tskhinvali) (Figure 1, Figure SI 2-8). Yield data were
 230 provided as fresh harvest tons per hectare and converted to dry weight using the conversion
 231 factors in Fischer *et al* (2021).



232
 233 *Figure 1: Average yield in Georgia for grain crops. Note all crops experienced a yield increase since the 2000s.*

234
 235 The GAEZ v4 model provides a spatial explicit gridded, datasets at 5-arc minute (9.25km at
 236 Equator) resolution, representing the estimated agro-ecological attainable dry-weight in tons
 237 per hectare under current climate conditions (30-year average between 1990 and 2020) (FAO
 238 and IIASA 2021). With this, GAEZ estimates of attainable yields incorporates Georgia’s high


239 variability in landscapes and ecosystems. This is different to estimates by Gerber *et al* (2024),
240 providing an average attainable yield estimates at national level (gridded dataset at 5-arc
241 minute). By using two different estimation approaches, i.e., top-down (GAEZ) and bottom-up
242 (Gerber *et al* 2024), we are able to compare and understand variability and uncertainty of the
243 attainable yield estimates based on the different modelling approaches, and thereby enhancing
244 the interpretation and rigor of our analysis.

245 The GAEZ dataset provides 4 different crop management types derived from combining low and
246 high-input input (nutrient and pest) land management and rainfed and irrigated water
247 management:

- 248 • Low-input agriculture is described as traditionally managed, largely subsistence-based
249 farming systems, assuming the use of traditional cultivars, labor intensive techniques,
250 with no application of plant nutrients, and of chemicals for pest and disease control and
251 minimum conservation measures. Fallows are required to maintain soil fertility (Fischer
252 *et al* 2021).
- 253 • High input farming systems are assumed to be mostly market oriented. Production is
254 based on improved, high-yielding varieties, and is fully mechanized where possible.
255 High-input farming attempts to optimally apply nutrients, and controls for pests,
256 diseases and weeds (Fischer *et al* 2021).
- 257 • Rainfed systems, can be low or high input, but are limited by water availability during
258 the growing season.
- 259 • Irrigated systems assume that irrigation is scheduled such that no yield-reducing crop
260 water deficit occurs during the crop growth cycle (Fischer *et al* 2021).

261 Across these four options, for the purposes of this study we characterize high input, rainfed
262 systems as the sustainable intensification option on current croplands (no conversion of natural
263 vegetation), assuming good agricultural practices of input application, whilst also providing
264 potential for increasing yields and benefits to food security.

Georgia



265

266 *Figure 2: Land use and land cover (LULUC) in 2019 in Georgia based on Chen et al. (Chen et al 2021a). Occupied territories are, in*
 267 *the north-west, Abkhazia, and in the center-north, South Ossetia (Tskhinvali).*

268

269 We extracted the attainable yield from the GAEZ data at the location of annual agriculture
 270 (Chen et al 2021a) at 90 m resolution (Figure 2, SI §1). Following, we summarized the GAEZ
 271 attainable yields as the mean potentially attainable yields derived at the location of annual
 272 agriculture (Chen et al 2021a) weighted by the respective crop production per region derived
 273 from Geostat (2022). With Gerber et al (2024) providing national constant fresh harvest yields
 274 we extracted yields for 2010 directly from the dataset and converted them to dry weight using
 275 the conversion factors in Fischer et al (2021). We calculated yield gaps as the difference
 276 between the current and attainable yields.

277

278 Attainable yields usually describe the yields achievable given economic, biophysical and climatic
 279 risks. With that the attainable yield is often by around 20% lower than the potential yield. With
 280 yields approaching the potential yield threshold, it becomes increasingly difficult to sustain

281 yield increases because further increases require the elimination of small imperfection in crop
282 management which are not economically viable to eliminate (Cassman *et al* 2003, Foulkes *et al*
283 2022, Schierhorn 2014, Deng *et al* 2019, Lobell *et al* 2009). Given this increase in difficulty to
284 close yield gaps with increasing yields we calculated and reported two yield gap closure
285 scenarios, defined by 80% and 100% exploitable attainable yields *to close the yield gaps*.
286 Similarly, not all areas are suitable for irrigation, and irrigation systems are often costly, making
287 them more appropriate for high value agricultural commodities such as fruits and nuts.
288 Next, we assessed the *self-sufficiency ratio under the different attainable yields*. All crop
289 production increases were assumed to be based on yield increases alone. The area for each
290 crop was fixed at its 2019 area extent based on Georgian agricultural statistics (Geostat 2022).
291 Finally, we extended the scenarios to maximize wheat self-sufficiency while keeping maize and
292 barley production at 100% and 80% self-sufficiency. To do this we first calculated how much
293 area could be spared from producing maize and barley under 80% and 100% attainable yield, to
294 achieve 80% and 100% of self-sufficiency for each region. Second, we evaluated how much
295 additional wheat could be produced on these areas under 80% and 100% attainable yields and
296 compared this to Georgia's wheat self-sufficiency demands. This analysis allowed us to
297 understand if Georgia would be able to achieve wheat sufficiency, without trade-offs in the self-
298 sufficiency of other crops, - i.e. if Georgia would be able to reduce its reliance on imports from
299 Russia and increase food security and sovereignty.


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301 3 Results

302 3.1 Food self-sufficiency for annual staple commodities in 2019

303 Evaluating Georgia's self-sufficiency for three annual crops (wheat, maize, barley), we found a
304 particular dependence on wheat imports, with 84% of Georgia's wheat consumption relying on
305 imports in 2019 (16% self-sufficiency) (Figure 3). Maize self-sufficiency was at around 70% in
306 2019, declining from around 100% in 2012 (Figure 3), partly due to reduced production (Figure
307 SI 1 & Figure SI 5-8), while yields for all crops increased during the same time (Figure SI 2-4).

308 Barley self-sufficiency remained high during all years of observation, with Georgia a net
309 exporter of barley in 2019 (Figure 3).



310

311 *Figure 3: Self-sufficiency ratios (see formular 1, above) for wheat, maize, and barley in Georgia.*

312


313 3.2 Actual vs. attainable yields

314 Actual yields closely match GAEZs estimates of low-input rainfed agriculture. Compared to the
315 GAEZ low-input agriculture yield estimates, currently attained yields as a percentage of the
316 modeled attainable yields were 75% for wheat, 104% for maize, and 71% for barley (Figure 4).
317 Compared to Gerber *et al* (2024) attainable yields, current yields where around 36% for wheat,
318 25% for maize, and 31% for barley (Figure 4).

319 The GAEZ model suggest that high-yielding varieties, optimized fertilizer application, pest, and
320 disease control (high input rainfed attainable yields) could increase yields to a maximum of
321 7.5t/ha (from 2.1 t/ha) for wheat, 8.1 t/ha (from 2.6 t/ha) for maize and 7.3 t/ha (from 1.8 t/ha)
322 for barley. Using the full potential of attainable yields according to Gerber *et al* (2024), yield
323 estimates reached to 5.7t/ha (from 2.1 t/ha) for wheat, 10.3 t/ha (from 2.6 t/ha) for maize and
324 5.9 t/ha (from 1.8 t/ha) (Figure 4).

325 At 80% of yield gap closure, GAEZs high input rainfed agriculture yields would be 6.0 t/ha for
326 wheat; 6.4 t/ha for maize; and 5.8 t/ha for barley, respectively (Figure 4). Under 80% yield gap
327 closure following Gerber *et al* (2024) attainable yields, yields would reach 4.5 t/ha for wheat;
328 8.2 t/ha for maize; and 4.7 t/ha for barley (Figure 4). Irrigation systems would further increase
329 yields, which suggests productivity growth is water-limited, and that increases in irrigated areas

330 would reduce the risk of yield losses during droughts and longer-term climate-driven changes in
 331 precipitation.
 332



333
 334 *Figure 4: Current vs. attainable yields for wheat, maize, and barley. The vertical line represents the current yield derived from*
 335 *Geostat (2022).*

336

337 3.3 Production gains on current agricultural lands & crop self sufficiency

338 Adapting land management to high-input agriculture (following the GAEZ model), or exploiting

339 the potential attainable yield following Gerber *et al* (2024) without changing the production

340 areas for each crop, as recorded in GEOSTAT for 2019 (Geostat 2022), would reduce, but would

341 not close the self-sufficiency gap for wheat, and would lead to above self-sufficiency production

342 of maize and barley (GAEZ, rainfed and irrigated) and Gerber *et al* (2024) estimations (Figure 5).

343 From currently 16% wheat self-sufficiency yield increases to 100% of the GAEZ attainable yields

344 on current wheat production areas would reduce the self-sufficiency gap to 22% for low input

345 rainfed, 61% for high input rainfed and 84% for high input, irrigated crop production. If 100% of

346 the attainable yields of Gerber *et al* (2024) were achieved on current wheat production areas

347 the wheat self-sufficiency gap could be reduced to 45% (Figure 5).




348
 349 *Figure 5: Self-sufficiency for wheat, maize, barley under the two different yield gap closure (left to right) and GAEZ crop*
 350 *management and Gerber et al (2024) attainable yield estimate on current crop production areas. Dashed lines indicate 80% self-*
 351 *sufficiency and solid line marks 100% self-sufficiency. Note that self-sufficiency of wheat is not reached, while maize and barley*
 352 *achieve self-sufficiency under GAEZ's high input assumptions and following Gerber et al.'s attainable yield estimates.*
 353

354 Only GAEZ's *high input irrigated* crop management under 100% of yield gap closure would
 355 reach the 80% self-sufficiency in wheat production (27.8 ktons, 2.2 kha) (Figure 5), which is an
 356 unlikely scenario, as irrigation for wheat across all production regions Georgia is extremely
 357 costly to implement and maintain.

358 However, the ability of intensification to increase maize and barley production above self-
 359 sufficiency enables a strategic potential to reduce the areas allocated to maize and barley in
 360 favor of wheat production without compromising self-sufficiency of those crops. We fixed
 361 maize and wheat at 80% and 100% self-sufficiency to understand how much additional wheat
 362 could be produces on the areas spared, and if those areas, when used for wheat production
 363 could close Georgia's self-sufficiency gap in wheat. Our calculation indicates that, if maize and
 364 wheat production were fixed at 80% and 100% self-sufficiency the additional area available for
 365 wheat production would meet and exceed Georgia's wheat self-sufficiency demand under 80%
 366 and 100% yield gap closure for GAEZ's high-input rainfed and irrigated crop production and
 367 under Gerber et al.'s attainable yield estimates (Figure 6).

368



369

370 *Figure 6: Wheat production differences at 100% (panel a and b 1 and 2) and 80% (panel c and d) attainable yields from 100%*
 371 *(panel a and c) and 80% (panel b and d) self-sufficiency including wheat production on spared land from maize and barley under*
 372 *the same 100%, 80% attainable yield assumptions. Zero indicates no difference between the self-sufficiency level and*
 373 *production, while positive values indicate above and negative below self-sufficiency wheat production (for area estimates see*
 374 *Figure SI 8). Notably, if 100% attainable yields are achieved across wheat, maize and barley, we find that wheat self-sufficiency*
 375 *can be achieved and surpassed under all 3 attainable yield estimates (while holding maize and barley production fixed at 100%*
 376 *self-sufficiency) (panel a). If 80% self-sufficiency across all crops would be aimed for, the attainable yield estimates suggest a*
 377 *larger surplus production (panel b) compared to the 100% self-sufficiency goal (panel a). Under the assumption that 80%*
 378 *attainable yields were achieved, we find that 100% wheat self-sufficiency would be achieved for the GAEZ estimates, but not for*
 379 *Gerber et al's (2024) estimate (panel c). However, aiming for 80% self-sufficiency, all three yield estimates suggest reaching the*
 380 *80% self-sufficiency goal (panel d).*

381

382 4 Discussion

383 Georgia has large potentials for sustainable intensification, increasing its self-sufficiency and
 384 food security, and in turn, attaining greater independence from foreign food imports and power
 385 dependencies. Current agricultural yields in low intensity rainfed production systems in Georgia
 386 could potentially triple if the attainable yield potential were exploited. This could be
 387 accomplished with the planting of high-yielding varieties, increased fertilizer application, ,
 388 improved pest and disease control, and increased mechanization. GAEZ data suggest that
 389 irrigation could additionally boost yields and reduce risks of harvest losses in case of lack of
 390 precipitation during the growing season. Considering the ongoing Russian aggression, and de
 391 facto occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Tskhinvali), achieving independence from
 392 Russian wheat imports for food security might be critical for increasing national sovereignty.
 393 Yet, while sustainable intensification can contribute to food self-sufficiency, it would also
 394 increase Georgia's reliance on fertilizer imports. Diversifying import sources beyond Russia,

395 Georgia's current main wheat and fertilizer supplier (Chatham House 2021), would be critical to
396 avoid transitioning from one dependency to another.

397

398 However, achieving 80% self-sufficiency for wheat, maize, and barley on currently used
399 agricultural lands is challenging. Yields would need to increase to 80% or 100% of the attainable
400 yields and wheat crops would need to expand over areas currently used by maize and barley to
401 achieve an 80-100% self-sufficiency in wheat, maize and barley production on current crop
402 areas (Figure 7). Incentivizing such a change from maize and barley to wheat production
403 requires strategic and efficient agricultural policies providing credits and incentives and
404 ensuring the availability of seeds and inputs for intensification and wheat production. However,
405 we also note that the datasets used for this analysis come with uncertainties. GAEZ data for
406 example has often been criticized for its approach, which was found to often underestimate
407 potentially attainable yields (Edreira *et al* 2021). At the same time, the lack of subnational
408 spatial variation in Gerber *et al's* (2024) attainable yield estimates does not well represent the
409 heterogeneity of landscapes in Georgia (e.g., see the differences in observed yields by region in
410 Figure SI 3-5). However, using both datasets in concert, which were derived using different
411 methodologies yet achieved very similar results, we believe that our results and conclusion are
412 robust to the uncertainties to each dataset.

413 In addition to increasing food security and self-sufficiency, increasing yields has the potential to
414 increase human well-being, through increases in incomes, food security, and poverty reduction
415 (Rasmussen *et al* 2018). Georgia, coming from a largely agrarian society with a low input
416 agriculture system matches similar characteristics which have been described to often result in
417 win-win situations, where intensification resulted in increases in well-being and benefits for
418 ecosystem services, as described by (Rasmussen *et al* 2018). Hence, one of the main challenge
419 to increase yields, food security and reduce poverty lies in providing access to inputs and seeds
420 to all landholders to avoid benefitting the most powerful, while excluding the least powerful
421 (Rasmussen *et al* 2018). This may be particularly challenging in Georgia due to the often-unclear
422 land tenure and highly fragmented land system in Georgia.

423 Sustainable intensification of agricultural production may also come with environmental costs:
424 if inputs are not optimally applied damage to natural ecosystems can occur (e.g., harm to
425 pollinators, nutrient runoff into waterways), and crop diversity and resilience could decline.
426 Meanwhile higher profitability may increase demand for land, spurring an expansion of
427 agriculture into natural ecosystems (Tilman *et al* 2001). To minimize environmental
428 consequences, it is imperative that the application of inputs and crop management is optimized
429 and that farmers have access to training and support of good agricultural practices. Shcherbak
430 *et al* (2014) suggest that following good practice for applying additional N fertilizer in low input
431 agricultural systems, such as the current system in Georgia, has a minimal effect on N₂O
432 emissions (Shcherbak *et al* 2014).

433 Historically, Georgia is home to one of the largest genetic wheat diversities globally. Yet in the
434 20th century, most old and endemic wheat varieties were replaced by modern breeders'
435 varieties in (Bedoshvili 2008), and only five endemic wheat varieties are actively sown
436 (Gelashvili and Mamardashvili 2017). However, the most frequently grown varieties are low-
437 yielding and poorly adapted to the regions (Sikharulidze *et al* 2022). Field experiments show
438 that high quality regionally-adapted varieties of wheat can double to triple currently achieved
439 wheat yields - supporting the results of the analysis in this paper - while also being more
440 resilient against diseases and providing high quality grains (Sikharulidze *et al* 2022).

441 Another risk of intensification is the risk of rebound effects, where higher yields and profits may
442 incentivize agricultural expansion into new areas instead of sparing land from production
443 (Meyfroidt *et al* 2022). Hence, support for intensification should be accompanied by sensible
444 environmental regulations limiting the conversion of natural ecosystems to warrant sustainable
445 agricultural growth that combines conservation and development.

446

447 Land fragmentation and lack of registration may be among the largest challenges for
448 sustainable intensification. Lack of land titles hamper a functioning land market and may reduce
449 farmers incentives to invest in improved production systems (Neudert *et al* 2019, Lawry *et al*
450 2017, Kochlamazashvili 2019). While some land concentration may be desirable to take
451 advantage of production at larger scale (Kochlamazashvili 2019), high land concentration and

452 large-scale land acquisitions may increase inequalities and marginalize less powerful actors and
453 smallholders (Oberlack *et al* 2016, Meyfroidt 2017, Chiarella *et al* 2022). Medium-scale
454 commercial farms that foster labor productivity, provide income, and integrate into retail value
455 chains are often seen to play a crucial role in balancing the trade-offs between employment,
456 food security, and poverty reduction. Georgia’s strategy of incentivizing and supporting
457 agricultural production or service cooperatives can be a way to achieve such benefits without
458 sacrificing land ownership and/or access, reducing the risk of increasing inequality and
459 exclusion (Chokheli and Javakhishvili 2018, Lerman and Sedik 2014, Lerman 2004). The most
460 relevant benefits of such agricultural cooperatives are cost reduction, market access, mutual
461 assistance between members, and access to financial resources. Starting in 2012, the Georgian
462 government expanded its support of agricultural development to increase the quality of rural
463 livelihoods, reduce poverty, drive rural development, and increase food security. They
464 particularly incentivized the formation of cooperatives with a change in taxation and new grant
465 systems in 2013, leading to around 1300 registered cooperatives in Georgia in 2018. Yet, many
466 of those are not active and lack support in formal structuring operational knowledge, and
467 information on the potential benefits (Chokheli and Javakhishvili 2018, Kochlamazashvili *et al*
468 2017).

469 Given the high potential for intensification in grain production, we may also expect additional
470 potential for yield increases across other agricultural commodities. This could further increase
471 Georgia’s food self-sufficiency, incomes, and provide opportunities for land sparing beyond the
472 current analysis including wheat, maize and barley.

473 5 Conclusion

474 Decreasing Georgia’s dependency on major food staple imports is important for Georgia’s food
475 security and national sovereignty, given past and current conflicts with Russia and the major
476 wheat trade disruptions caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. At the same time,
477 with around 40% of the Georgian population being employed in the Agricultural sector,
478 intensification of production has the potential to reduce poverty and support livelihoods in
479 Georgia, through higher incomes from increased yields.

480 In this analysis we showed that Georgia’s agroclimatic conditions allow for increasing self-
481 sufficiency to almost 80% in wheat, maize, and barley production without additional conversion
482 of natural ecosystems through sustainable intensification. Yet, to reach self-sufficiency in wheat
483 production, wheat planting will need to be expanded to areas that can be spared from maize
484 and barley or other annual crops following intensification to reduce the current yield gaps.
485 Intensifying other agricultural crops may additionally increase production and incomes, or spare
486 land, which could be used for further increasing food self-sufficiency. Policies incentivizing and
487 supporting such a transition need to ensure access by all landholders, to be effective in
488 supporting livelihoods and reducing poverty, instead of benefiting only the most powerful
489 actors. Initiatives to support and form cooperatives have the potential to support inclusive and
490 equitable rural development, since current gaps in access to training, agricultural credit, and
491 financing hamper agricultural sector development. Policies increasing the support (e.g.,
492 information, knowledge, technology, credit) and incentives to establish agricultural
493 cooperatives, expanding land registration, incentivizing wheat production, and providing access
494 to regionally adapted and high-yielding crop varieties, fertilizer, and pest control alongside
495 agricultural training can support food security and sovereignty and reduce rural poverty.

496

497 6 Acknowledgements

498 This research was funded by the NASA Land-Cover & Land-Use Change Program, grant
499 number [80NSSC18K0315](#) (PI: Pontus Olofsson). FG’s time was also funded by the University of
500 Cambridge School of Physical Sciences and the UK Research and Innovation’s Global Challenges
501 Research Fund under the Trade, Development and the Environment Hub (TRADE Hub) project
502 (project number ES/S008160/1).

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