


20 years

Humans To Mars, But How Many?

Trade Space Analysis for Mars
Mission Crew Size

2025 Human Research Program
Investigators' Workshop



Team Members

Name	Discipline	Organization
Core Team		
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Linda Burgess	Planning and Control Analyst	LaRC/AMA
Erin Moran	Technical Editor	LaRC/AMA
Jonay Campbell	Technical Editor	LaRC/AS&M

Bottom Line Up Front

A NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) assessment team recommended a methodology for performing trade space analysis for crew size determination for Mars missions. The methodology uses quantitative data from human performance modeling.

The assessment team did NOT make recommendations on the number of crew, rather the recommendations are on the trade space analysis methodology.

This presentation includes:

- A methodology for using human performance modeling to provided quantitative data of workload and expertise in support of crew size determination
- Results from three human performance models using IMPRINT
- Results from a custom-built model of crew expertise, based on training requirements
- A discussion on trade space analysis for Mars crew size




NESC Trade Space Analysis Assessment

To date, crewmembers onboard NASA's human spaceflight missions have been able to rely on real-time expertise and support from personnel in control centers on Earth to successfully accomplish their missions. For ISS missions, the MCC, the MER, and the POIC personnel, team with the crew to monitor and control the vehicle, vehicle systems, and payloads and provide expertise as needed.

Because of the distance-induced communication delay/blackout with Earth (e.g., up to ~22 minutes one-way and ~2 to 3 weeks each mission), Mars missions will differ from all previous human spaceflight experience in that the crew will be required to operate independently from the large and highly experienced teams on the ground.

Measuring the gap: Current ground-support expertise that would be unavailable for real-time support to a Mars crew



Panontin, T. L., Wu, S. C., Parisi, M. E., McTigue, K. R., & Vera, A. H. (2021) *Human-Systems Integration Architecture Needs Analysis: On-Board Anomaly Resolution During Autonomous Operations*. NASA's Human Research Program Technical Report.

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
NESC Trade Space Analysis Assessment

Without a systematic, repeatable process to determine the number of crew necessary to successfully accomplish these missions, NASA increases the risk in that crew sizes may be too small to meet mission objectives under nominal conditions and, more consequentially, the crewmembers may not have the expertise needed to successfully respond to unforeseen failures without the real-time expertise in MCC on which NASA has come to rely.



Proposed Solution

To define a methodology for performing trade space analysis for crew size determination for future missions to Mars using quantitative data from human performance modeling.



Militello et al. (2019). *Towards and Optimally Crewed Future Vertical Lift Vehicle: Crewing Strategy and Recommendations*. Prepared for U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Aviation & Missile Center.
 Lippert, A.F., Scripture, B. L., "A Review of Department of Defense Manpower Analysis to Inform Crew Size Determination for NASA's Manned Missions to Mars" (Master of Human System Integration Capstone). Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. (2021)

L. Shattuck, N. Shattuck, P. Matsangas. Personal communication with NPS researchers. (2020)

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Mars Transit Crew Model

*Dr. Donna Dempsey, Robert Sargent, Dr. Zhaofeng (Carl) Huang,
Peter Robinson, Marta Durham, Kyle Keyser, Sydney Hughes-Baird*


*Conduct Human
Performance Modeling*

IMPRINT Modeling
*Human performance
modeling of workload for a
task or mission segment.*

CQRM Modeling
*Modeling of expertise based
on a crew qualifications and
responsibilities matrix
(CQRM).*

SME Reviews
Reviews for each model.

Measuring the gap: Current ground-support expertise that would be unavailable for real-time support to a Mars crew



This model is designed to consider the crew daily workload on the transit to Mars, assuming continual but communication-delayed support from MCC.

Real-Time Tasking Shifted to Mars Crew

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SME Reviews
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Assumptions for Mars based on Flight Director and Payloads Operations Director interviews:

- MCC is prime for nominal planning.
- MCC is prime for nominal commanding with a communication delay.
- MCC and POIC are prime for resource allocation (e.g., power, thermal, bandwidth, data, O₂, N₂, vacuum access,...).
- MCC is prime for console analytic tools that can be performed with a comm. delay.
- Crew is prime for commanding for tasks requiring real-time or near real-time verification.
- Crew is prime for tasks with time constraints.
- Crew is prime for go-no-go calls requiring real-time data (e.g., crew lock depress).
- Crew is prime for tasks requiring real-time monitoring (e.g., some robotics operations).
- Crew is prime for tasks requiring real-time communication (e.g., IV crew).
- Crew is prime for tasks with bandwidth limitations.
- Crew is prime for console analytic tools impacted by the comm. delay or bandwidth limitations.

Model Scope and Data Sources

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SME Reviews
Reviews for each model.

The assessment team built an IMPRINT Force model of daily workload to assess what crew size is needed to accomplish a defined set of work.


- Gathered data sets, conducted SME structured interviews, and/or conducted statistical analysis
 - Time for likely medical events and their impact on crew workload using results from NASA's Integrated Medical Model (IMM)
 - Increased time for likely maintenance and repair w/o real-time support from MCC
 - Increased time for nominal MCC tasks reallocated to the crew
 - Increased time for emergency, warning, caution and advisory off-nominal response
 - Increased time necessary to respond to unforeseen failures
 - Increased time to maintain expertise via onboard refresher training

Objective: To determine how daily workload impacts crew size

- Perform same work hours on transit to Mars as a 4-person crew on ISS
- Maintain ~ 8.5 hours of sleep and maintain ~2.5 hours of daily exercise

Average Hours Per Crewmember

Adjusted ISS Scenario (with nom. Maintenance and IMM data)
compared to Mars Transit with Average Unplanned Events



Mars Transit Crew Model using ISS-equivalent task assumptions and assuming continual time-delayed communication throughout the mission

F-12. IMPRINT modeling predicts that average rates for unplanned events will reduce the available time for a four-person Mars crew to perform work by 41% compared with a four-person ISS crew.

Findings: Mars Transit Crew Model

using ISS-equivalent Task Assumptions

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SME Reviews
Reviews for each model.



The assessment team developed a formula to compute the number of crewmembers needed on a Mars mission to accomplish the same amount of work as an ISS 4-person crew.

Mars Transit Crew Model using ISS-equivalent task assumptions and assuming continual time-delayed communication throughout the mission

- F-14.** IMPRINT modeling predicts that more than six crewmembers will be needed to achieve the same number of work hours on a Mars transit as on a four-person ISS mission given average rates for all unplanned events.
- F-15.** IMPRINT modeling predicts that more than seven crewmembers will be needed to achieve the same number of work hours on a Mars transit as on a four-person ISS mission given 75% confidence level rates for all unplanned events.

Perform Trade Space Analysis


Provide recommendations to decision-makers as they consider the potentially competing factors in deciding on crew size for future missions to Mars.

*Perform Trade
Space Analysis*

Evaluate Crew Sizes
*Using quantitative modeling
results, evaluate different
crew sizes across trade
space dimensions.*



Recommendations
*Provide decision-makers
recommendations on crew
size.*




Notional curves convey the relationship between crew size, risk, and cost. Crew sizes too small to handle mission workload or respond successfully to unforeseen failures due to insufficient onboard expertise result in increased risk to mission success and crew safety (left curve). Increases in crew size, which reduce these risks, may likely drive mission costs prohibitively high (right curve).

Summary

The NESC assessment team:

- Defined a methodology for trade space analysis for crew size determination using quantitative data from human performance modeling
- Developed an evaluation framework
- Built human performance models that output workload and expertise based on Mars mission use cases
- Discussed trade space analysis of crew size using modeling results



The assessment team is NOT making recommendations on the number of crew, rather the recommendations are on the trade space analysis methodology.

- R-1.** Agency decision-makers should consider the crew workload and expertise within the crew necessary to accomplish primary mission objectives and respond to unforeseen failures when considering trades for crew size for Mars missions.