LEADERSHIP

and America's Future in Space

A Report to the Administrator
By Dr. Sally K. Ride
August 1987
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership in Space</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Option Development</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Initiatives</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission to Planet Earth</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploration of the Solar System</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outpost on the Moon</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humans to Mars</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmatic Assessment</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of Initiatives</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Studies</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picture Credits</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FIGURES

1 NASA Strategic/Long-Range Planning Activities .................................................. 8-9
2 Possible Programs to Capture Leadership after 1995 .......................................... 17
3 Leadership Matrix: Representative Achievements, 1957 to 1977 ......................... 19
4 Leadership Matrix: Representative Achievements, 1978 to 1990 ......................... 19
5 Mission to Planet Earth ......................................................................................... 24
6 The Comet Rendezvous Asteroid Flyby Mission .................................................. 27
7 The Cassini Mission ............................................................................................. 27
8 The Mars Rover/Sample Return Mission .............................................................. 28
9 Return to the Lunar Surface: Piloted Sortie, Expendable Lander ......................... 30
10 Piloted Mars Sprint Scenario—Split Mission Option: Earth-Orbital Cargo Flight Operations ................................................................. 33
11 Piloted Mars Sprint Scenario—Split Mission Option: Earth-Orbital Piloted Flight Operations ................................................................. 34
12 Piloted Mars Sprint Scenario—Split Mission Option: Mars-Orbital/Surface Operations .............................................................................. 34
13 Piloted Mars Sprint Scenario—Split Mission Option: Earth Recovery Operations .............................................................................. 35
14 Resources Required by Initiatives through 1992 .................................................. 46
15 Resources Required by Initiatives through 2010 .................................................. 46

TABLES

1 Transportation Requirements for the Initiatives .................................................. 42
2 Orbital Facilities Requirements for the Initiatives .................................................. 44

BOXES

Meeting the Challenge in Aeronautics and Space .................................................... 13
Transportation Requirements .................................................................................. 38
Technology ........................................................................................................... 39
Life Sciences Research .......................................................................................... 41
Space Station Evolution ....................................................................................... 43
The Office of Exploration ...................................................................................... 53
Education .............................................................................................................. 59
For nearly a quarter of a century, the U.S. space program enjoyed what can appropriately be termed a "golden age." From the launch of Earth-orbiting satellites, to the visits by robotic spacecraft to Venus and Mars, to the stunning achievement of landing the first human beings on the Moon, the many successes of the space program were exciting and awe-inspiring. The United States was clearly and unquestionably the leader in space exploration, and the nation reaped all the benefits of pride, international prestige, scientific advancement, and technological progress that such leadership provides.

However, in the aftermath of the Challenger accident, reviews of our space program made its shortcomings starkly apparent. The United States' role as the leader of spacefaring nations came into serious question. The capabilities, the direction, and the future of the space program became subjects of public discussion and professional debate.

The U.S. civilian space program is now at a crossroads, aspiring toward the visions of the National Commission on Space but faced with the realities set forth by the Rogers Commission. NASA must respond aggressively to the challenges of both while recognizing the necessity of maintaining a balanced space program within reasonable fiscal limits.

Two fundamental, potentially inconsistent views have emerged. Many people believe that NASA should adopt a major, visionary goal. They argue that this would galvanize support, focus NASA programs, and generate excitement. Many others believe that NASA is already overcommitted in the 1990s; they argue that the space agency will be struggling to operate the Space Shuttle and build the Space Station, and could not handle another major program.
Both views reflect concern over the current status of the space program, but each deals with only one aspect of the problem. The space program needs a long-range direction; it also needs the fundamental capabilities that would enable it to move in that direction. A single goal is not a panacea—the problems facing the space program must be met head-on, not oversimplified. But if there are no goals, or if the goals are too diffuse, then there is no focus to the program and no framework for decisions.

The goals of the civilian space program must be carefully chosen to be consistent with the national interest and also to be consistent with NASA's capabilities. NASA alone cannot set these goals, but NASA must lead the discussion, present technically feasible options, and implement programs to pursue those goals which are selected.

We must ask ourselves: "Where do we want to be at the turn of the century?" and "What do we have to do now to get there?" Without an eye toward the future, we flounder in the present. It is not too early to crystallize our vision of the space program in the year 2000. A clear vision provides a framework for current and future programs: it enables us to know which technologies to pursue, which launch vehicles to develop, and which features to incorporate into our Space Station as it evolves.

Leadership in space does not require that the U.S. be preeminent in all areas of space enterprise. The widening range of space activities and the increasing number of spacefaring nations make it virtually impossible for any country to dominate in this way. It is, therefore, essential for America to move promptly to determine its priorities and to pursue a strategy which would restore and sustain its leadership in the areas deemed important.

The Rogers Commission, in its concluding thoughts, states that NASA "constitutes a national resource that plays a critical role in space exploration and development. It also provides a symbol of national pride and technological leadership. The Commission applauds NASA’s spectacular achievements of the past and anticipates impressive achievements to come." Only with a clear strategy in place, and its goals for the future defined and developed, will the country be able to regain and retain leadership in space.
INTRODUCTION

In response to growing concern over the posture and long-term direction of the U.S. civilian space program, NASA Administrator Dr. James Fletcher formed a task group to define potential U.S. space initiatives and to evaluate them in light of the current space program and the nation's desire to regain and retain space leadership. The objectives of the study were to energize a discussion of the long-range goals of the civilian space program and to begin to investigate overall strategies to direct that program to a position of leadership.

The task group identified four candidate initiatives for study and evaluation. Each builds on NASA's achievements in science and exploration, and each is a bold, aggressive proposal which would, if adopted, restore the United States to a position of leadership in a particular sphere of space activity. The four initiatives are: (1) Mission to Planet Earth, (2) Exploration of the Solar System, (3) Outpost on the Moon, and (4) Humans to Mars. All four initiatives were developed in detail, and the implications and requirements of each were assessed.

This process was not intended to culminate in the selection of one initiative and the elimination of the other three, but rather to provide four concrete examples which would catalyze and focus the discussion of the goals and objectives of the civilian space program and the efforts required to pursue them.

When this activity began, several studies relevant to NASA's long-range goals and its ability to achieve those goals were already in progress. Some of these studies were being conducted by agencies external to NASA; others were internal NASA studies. This task group became familiar with those efforts, and sponsored others in areas not already covered. Additional information on all these studies is provided at the end of this report. The interested reader is referred to the published reports for detailed recommendations.
The major milestones of all relevant studies were plotted on a timeline, shown in Figure 1. This proved to be a useful summary for identifying the activities and their projected completion dates. A similar overview timeline should continue to be produced and revised, since it raises awareness of existing studies and coordinates related efforts. This is not a final report. Rather, it is a status report describing the work accomplished to date, and how this work will continue. The report discusses long-term goals of the civilian space program, current posturing required to attain these goals, and the need for a continuing process to define, refine, and assess both the goals and the strategy to achieve them.

Figure 1. NASA Strategic/Long-Range Planning Activities
<table>
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<th>Date</th>
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<td>SPC/ Spring Preview</td>
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<td>JUNE</td>
<td>NASA Microgravity Materials Assessment</td>
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<td>AUGUST</td>
<td>SPC</td>
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<td>NASA Education Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEPTEMBER</td>
<td>OSTP/NCOS Response</td>
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<tr>
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<td>NAS Space Technology Needs</td>
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<td>NAS Space Science in 21st Century</td>
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<td>OCTOBER</td>
<td>OSTP/NCOS Response</td>
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<td></td>
<td>NAC International Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>DECEMBER</td>
<td>NAC Life Science NSTSS Report</td>
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**Abbreviations:**
- **UNA-USA**: United Nations Association of the United States of America
- **SPC**: Strategic Planning Council
- **NAC**: NASA Advisory Council
- **AIA**: Aerospace Industries Association of America, Inc.
- **NCOS**: National Commission on Space
- **AIAA**: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
- **NAS**: National Academy of Sciences
- **OSTP**: Office of Science and Technology Policy
- **NSTSS**: National Space Transportation and Support Study
LEADERSHIP IN SPACE

For two decades, the United States was the undisputed leader in nearly all civilian space endeavors. However, over the last decade the United States has relinquished, or is relinquishing, its leadership in certain critical areas; one such area is the exploration of Mars. With the Mariner and Viking missions in the 1960s and 1970s, this country pioneered exploration of Mars—but no American spacecraft has visited that planet since 1976. Our current plans for future exploration of Mars include only the Mars Observer mission, to be launched in 1992. In contrast, the Soviets have announced a program of extensive robotic exploration of the Martian surface, beginning in 1988 and extending through the 1990s.

The Soviets are now the sole long-term inhabitants of low-Earth orbit. The first, and only, U.S. space station, Skylab, was visited by three crews of astronauts before it was vacated in 1974; the U.S. has had no space station since. The Soviets have had eight space stations in orbit since the mid-1970s. The latest, Mir, was launched in 1986 and could accommodate cosmonauts and scientific experiments for nearly a decade before the U.S. Space Station can accommodate astronauts in 1995.

The United States has clearly lost leadership in these two areas, and is in danger of being surpassed in many others during the next several years.

The National Space Policy of 1982, which "establishes the basic goals of United States policy," includes the directive to "maintain United States space leadership." It further specifies that "the United States is fully committed to maintaining world leadership in space transportation," and that the civilian space program "shall be conducted ... to preserve the United States leadership in critical aspects of space science, applications, and technology."
Leadership cannot simply be proclaimed—it must be earned. As NASA evaluates its goals and objectives within the framework of the National Space Policy, the agency must first understand what is required to “maintain U.S. space leadership” since that understanding will direct the selection of national objectives.

Leadership does not require that the U.S. be preeminent in all areas and disciplines of space enterprise. In fact, the broad spectrum of space activities and the increasing number of spacefaring nations make it virtually impossible for any nation to dominate in this way. Being an effective leader does mandate, however, that this country have capabilities which enable it to act independently and impressively when and where it chooses, and that its goals be capable of inspiring others—at home and abroad—to support them. It is essential for this country to move promptly to determine its priorities and to make conscious choices to pursue a set of objectives which will restore its leadership status.

Leadership results from both the capabilities a country has acquired and the active demonstration of those capabilities; accordingly, the United States must have, and also be perceived as having, the ability to meet its goals and achieve its objectives.

A U.S. space leadership program must have two distinct attributes. First, it must contain a sound program of scientific research and technology development—a program that builds the nation’s understanding of space and the space environment, and that builds its capabilities to explore and operate in that environment. The United States will not be a leader in the 21st Century if it is dependent on other countries for access to space or for the technologies required to explore the space frontier. Second, the program must incorporate visible and significant accomplishments; the United States will not be perceived as a leader unless it accomplishes feats which demonstrate prowess, inspire national pride, and engender international respect and a worldwide desire to associate with U.S. space activities.

National pride and international prestige are two natural benefits of leadership in space. National pride grows as citizens recognize their country’s abilities and achievements; international prestige rises as other nations recognize those abilities and achievements.

Perhaps most significant, leadership is also a process. That process involves selecting and enunciating priorities for the civilian space program and then building and maintaining the resources required to accomplish the objectives defined within those priorities. NASA can contribute to this process by: (1) establishing a vision and goals consistent with national space interests; (2) developing and recommending objectives and programs that support those goals; (3) articulating, promoting, and defending them in the political and fiscal arenas; and (4) effectively executing approved programs.

To this end, NASA embarked last fall on a review of its goals and objectives. As NASA Administrator Dr. James Fletcher stated, “It is our intent that this process produce a blueprint to guide the United States to a position of leadership among the spacefaring nations of Earth.”

The first step in this necessarily lengthy process was taken by NASA Senior Management’s Strategic Planning Council when it adopted the statement in the box on the next page.

This statement reflects the belief that NASA embodies the human spirit’s desire to discover, explore, and to understand. It should be noted that the Space Shuttle and Space Station are not viewed as ends in themselves, but as the means toward achieving the broader goals of the nation’s space program. Transportation and orbital facilities support and enable our efforts in science, exploration, and enterprise.
The next step in this process should be to articulate specific objectives and to identify the programs required to achieve these objectives. Of course, in some areas of study the programs have already been identified and are well under way. For example, the Hubble Space Telescope, a general-purpose astronomical observatory in space, is an element of NASA's program to increase our understanding of the universe in which we live; the redesign and requalification of the Space Shuttle's solid rocket booster joint is part of NASA's program to return the Space Shuttle to flight status. However, in other areas, such as piloted exploration, our objectives have not been clearly identified. Does this country intend to establish a lunar outpost? To send an expedition to Mars? What are NASA's major objectives for the late 20th and early 21st Centuries? The Space Shuttle and Space Station will clearly support the objectives, but what will they be supporting?

These questions cannot, of course, be answered by NASA alone. But NASA should lead the discussion, propose technically feasible options, and make thoughtful recommendations. The choice of objectives will shape, among other things, NASA's technology program, the evolution of the Space Station, and the character of Earth-to-orbit transportation.

MEETING THE CHALLENGE IN AERONAUTICS AND SPACE

NASA's vision is to be at the forefront of advancements in aeronautics, space science, and exploration. To set our course into the 21st Century and bring this vision to reality, NASA will pursue major goals which represent its aspirations in aviation and space. These goals are:

- Advance scientific knowledge of the planet Earth, the solar system, and the universe beyond.
- Expand human presence beyond the Earth into the solar system.
- Strengthen aeronautics research and develop technology toward promoting U.S. leadership in civil and military aviation.

Successful pursuit of these major goals requires commitment to the following supporting goals:

- Return the Space Shuttle to flight status and develop advanced space transportation capabilities.
- Develop facilities and pursue science and technology needed for the Nation's space program.

As NASA pursues these goals, we will:

- Promote domestic application of aerospace technologies to improve the quality of life on Earth and to extend human enterprise beyond Earth.
- Conduct cooperative activities with other countries when such cooperation is consistent with our national space goals.
STRATEGIC OPTION DEVELOPMENT

The statement adopted by the Strategic Planning Council describes NASA's mission, its vision, and the scope of its activities. But the next step in the process cannot be taken in the absence of a comprehensive strategy for the civilian space program. Without a coherent formulation of the United States' intentions and priorities, there is no context in which to evaluate the relevance or the importance of any proposed initiatives.

To lay the foundation for the definition and articulation of such a strategy, NASA is currently developing a process to systematically assess the posture of our space program and to refine and assess candidate strategies to direct its future. This process, strategic option development, is still in its early stages; nevertheless, the development of the process has yielded some interesting insights into existing and potential space strategies.

The application of strategic option development to charting the future of the U.S. space program initially evolved from analogies drawn from relevant aspects of business theory. Although it is unconventional to think of space endeavors in terms of a business, many concepts from the business world are applicable and quite useful.

Leadership in business is possible at any time during a product's life cycle. When a new product is introduced (the innovator stage) there is no competition. If the product is successful, the firm becomes the market leader by default. The drawback, of course, is that innovators must accept the high cost and high risk associated with being first. The space program in the early 1960s was an innovator's market. Nearly every successful effort produced a "first," but the risks, as well as the number of failures, were very high.

The launch of America's first astronaut in space, Alan B. Shepard Jr., on the Mercury Redstone II from Cape Canaveral on May 5, 1961.
In a mature business market (the late majority stage) there exists a balance, as many firms compete for some share of the market. At this stage, it is still possible to be a market leader by carving out a particular niche of that market or by delivering the highest quality or best value. The launch vehicle market, for example, is approaching a more mature stage, and many countries will be vying for leadership in the 1990s.

A firm engaged in more than one market must develop an integrated strategy which provides the flexibility to be both an innovator in a new market and the leading competitor in a mature market: this principle should be applied to a space program as well.

The business of space has expanded considerably since the 1960s. The areas of scientific research, space technology, space exploration, and space services are still open to leadership through innovation, but some are also now open to leadership in more mature markets. In fact, national space programs must now look at four stages of space leadership: (1) the pioneer stage, innovation in some particular area of research, technology, or exploration; (2) the complex second stage, a continuation of a pioneering effort, but with more complex objectives; (3) the operational stage, with relatively mature and routine capabilities; and (4) the commercially viable stage, with the potential for profit-making.

The activities of a space program can be characterized by physical regions of space: (1) deep space, (2) the outer solar system (the planets beyond the asteroid belt), (3) the inner solar system (the inner planets, the Moon, and the Sun), (4) high-Earth orbit, and (5) low-Earth orbit. Supporting technologies, such as launch capabilities and orbital facilities, are required to undertake all programs.

The complex concept of space leadership may be broken down into logical elements to form a two-dimensional matrix. The columns of the matrix are delineated by the four leadership stages outlined previously; the rows are the five physical regions of possible space activities, with a sixth row for supporting technologies and transportation. Each square of the matrix defines a particular area of possible leadership.

This matrix analysis provides a way to conceptualize alternative courses of action and can be used to describe and assess the space programs of spacefaring nations. It is possible to be a leader in a single square through any of a number of different programs. Figure 2 illustrates several programs which, if undertaken in the 1990s, would result in leadership in one area of space endeavor. For example, a country could be a leader in the highlighted area of a complex second effort in the inner solar system by successfully establishing a lunar outpost or by sending sophisticated rovers to other worlds.

Not all the squares will be accessible in the next decades. Technology has not progressed to the point that any nation is able to contemplate, for example, commercial prospects in the outer solar system. This figure does not represent a particular strategy; rather, it represents a collection of potential programs.

Being a leader in one area no longer results in overall space leadership. In the early 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union were the only competitors, and only the cells in the lower left corner of the matrix were accessible. As technology advanced and nations gained experience in space, the opportunities began to expand. In the 1960s, the U.S. learned to send satellites to geosynchronous orbit, scientific experiments to low-Earth orbit, spacecraft to Mars, and even astronauts to the Moon. America was undeniably the leader in space exploration, but the range of space activities was (by today's standards) relatively limited. In the 1980s, not only has the number of spacefaring nations increased, but so has the range of activities that
an interested nation might undertake.

The business of space has expanded and branched, and now encompasses such diverse and mature fields as remote sensing, microgravity materials research, commercial communications, and interplanetary exploration. It appears virtually impossible for a single nation to dominate in all space endeavors. Since the U.S. can no longer reasonably expect to lead the way in all activities, it is now important to adopt a strategy to strive for leadership in carefully chosen areas.

If nations engage in similar activities (occupy the same space on the matrix) the conditions exist for either rivalry or cooperation: if a nation engages in distinct activities (occupies a space alone), the conditions exist for uncontested leadership.

This matrix was used to broadly characterize the space programs of the United States and other spacefaring nations during two periods of the space age: (1) 1957 through 1977, illustrated by Figure 3; and (2) 1978 through 1990, illustrated by Figure 4.

The major programs, U.S. and non-U.S., were identified and placed in the appropriate squares. This is by no means a comprehensive compilation, but the selected activities are representative of space efforts during these periods. An admittedly subjective assessment was made of whether the public perceived the U.S. or non-U.S. efforts to be the leaders in a given square. Each square was then shaded either blue or red: blue if the U.S. was judged the leader, red if not.

A comparison of the two matrices graphically displays the difference between these two periods of time. In the early years of the space age, fewer areas were accessible and the U.S. was the clear leader in most; the matrix representing the 1980s illustrates the decline of U.S. leadership.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION OF SPACE</th>
<th>LEADERSHIP STAGE</th>
<th>PIONEER</th>
<th>COMPLEX SECOND</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
<th>COMMERCIAL VABLE</th>
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<tr>
<td>DEEP SPACE</td>
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<td>STAR PROBE</td>
<td>LUNAR OBSERVATORY</td>
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<td>OUTER SOLAR SYSTEM</td>
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<td>NEPTUNE FLYBY-PROBE</td>
<td>CASSINI</td>
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<td>INNER SOLAR SYSTEM</td>
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<td>MARS SAMPLE RETURN HUMAN EXP. TO MARS</td>
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<td>SHUTTLE 1</td>
<td>ASSURED ACCESS AND RETURN</td>
<td>COMMERCIAL LAUNCH VEHICLES</td>
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Figure 2. Possible Programs to Capture Leadership after 1995
Examining the programs of the spacefaring nations shows the basic character of each. The U.S. space program has historically been composed of pioneering efforts — significant firsts and complex second efforts, which emphasized advanced research, technology, and exploration. The general trend can be characterized as revolutionary, producing spectacular events, rather than moderate, evolutionary advances. Even the United States Space Shuttle, though designed to be operational, was a revolutionary concept — it did not evolve from existing launch vehicles.

These observations suggest that there is no one "correct" strategy; rather, there are many distinct strategic options. Clearly, each nation should choose and pursue a strategy which is consistent with its own rational objectives.

What should our choice be? Do we want to mature our operational Earth-orbiting capabilities to a viable commercial enterprise? Should we continue our leadership role in solar system and deep-space exploration? Or should we focus on venturing ever further outward from Earth with human expeditions to the planets?

The Soviet space program, which is radically different from the American program, can be characterized as systematic and evolutionary. The primary focus is not on advanced research and technology, but on incrementally developed operational capabilities, achieved through a strong commitment to a robust infrastructure. The Soviets have steadily evolved toward this operational state and they are now beginning to build on that operational base to move slowly into the commercial arena.

The Europeans and the Japanese appear to be pursuing strategies that combine desires to pursue science in selected areas and to achieve commercial viability in others. The launch system Ariane, the remote-sensing satellite SPOT, and the Japanese JEM (which will be devoted to materials science research) are all examples of elements in these strategies.
### Figure 3. Leadership Matrix: Representative Achievements, 1957 to 1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of Space</th>
<th>Pioneer</th>
<th>Complex Second</th>
<th>Operational</th>
<th>Commercially Viable</th>
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<td>Supporting Technologies</td>
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*Programs for which a U.S. NRO primary mission does not exist are marked in red to indicate a potential or actual failure.

### Figure 4. Leadership Matrix: Representative Achievements, 1978 to 1990

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<tr>
<th>Region of Space</th>
<th>Pioneer</th>
<th>Complex Second</th>
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<td>Supporting Technologies</td>
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*Programs for which a U.S. NRO primary mission does not exist are marked in red to indicate a potential or actual failure.
LEADERSHIP INITIATIVES

To energize a discussion of long-range goals and strategies for the civilian space program, four bold initiatives were selected for definition, study, and evaluation:

1. **Mission to Planet Earth**: a program that would use the perspective afforded from space to study and characterize our home planet on a global scale.

2. **Exploration of the Solar System**: a program to retain U.S. leadership in exploration of the outer solar system, and regain U.S. leadership in exploration of comets, asteroids, and Mars.

3. **Outpost on the Moon**: a program that would build on and extend the legacy of the Apollo Program, returning Americans to the Moon to continue exploration, to establish a permanent scientific outpost, and to begin prospecting the Moon’s resources.

4. **Humans to Mars**: a program to send astronauts on a series of round trips to land on the surface of Mars, leading to the eventual establishment of a permanent base.

The intent is not to choose one initiative and discard the other three, but rather to use the four candidate initiatives as a basis for discussion. For this reason, it was important to choose a set of initiatives which spanned a broad spectrum of content and complexity.
The ground rules for this study are important to understand, since they influenced the detailed definition of the initiatives. The ground rules, set forward at the outset of this study, were:

- The initiatives should be considered in addition to currently planned NASA programs. They were not judged against, nor would they supplant, existing programs.
- Each initiative should be developed independently. There is, of course, considerable synergism between certain initiatives. For example, one possible progression for human exploration could be the development of a lunar outpost, followed by an expedition to Mars. However, in order to provide a clear starting point for discussion, the four were considered to be distinct.
- The initiatives should achieve major milestones within two decades.
- The Humans to Mars initiative should be assumed to be an American venture. It was beyond the scope of this work to consider joint U.S./Soviet human exploration.

Two initiatives, Mission to Planet Earth and Exploration of the Solar System, had a body of recent work from which to draw. The 1986 report of the Earth System Sciences Committee of the NASA Advisory Council. Earth System Science: A Program for Global Change, clearly states goals for the future observation of Earth. Two reports by the Solar System Exploration Committee of the NASA Advisory Council similarly articulate goals and recommendations for solar system exploration. Titled Planetary Exploration through Year 2000: Part One: A Core Program, and Part Two: An Augmented Program, these reports outline both a conservative, steady program for solar system exploration and a set of more challenging, exciting missions to be undertaken if resources to do so become available. The other two initiatives, Outpost on the Moon and Humans to Mars, did not have clearly delineated strategies available and no specific organization within NASA was dedicated to their advocacy.

The candidate initiatives were developed and presented to NASA management to: (1) evaluate the initiatives and their implications, and (2) promote a discussion of the attributes of each initiative to determine the elements which are most important to NASA and to the United States.

Each initiative was developed by a separate task group, which discussed the goals, milestones, and elements of the initiative, and then determined the requisite transportation, space facilities, and technologies. For each initiative, an “advocate” was identified to work with appropriate NASA personnel to develop programmatic details. These four advocates presented the strategies, scenarios, requirements, and rationale to senior NASA management.
MISSION TO PLANET EARTH

Mission to Planet Earth is an initiative to understand our home planet, how forces shape and affect its environment, how that environment is changing, and how those changes will affect us. The goal of this initiative is to obtain a comprehensive scientific understanding of the entire Earth System, by describing how its various components function, how they interact, and how they may be expected to evolve on all time scales.

The challenge is to develop a fundamental understanding of the Earth System, and of the consequences of changes to that system, in order to eventually develop the capability to predict changes that might occur — either naturally, or as a result of human activity.

Background

With the launch of the first experimental satellites in the 1960s, NASA pioneered the remote sensing of Earth from space. Over the past two decades, the scientific community has concluded that Earth is in a process of global change, and scientists now believe that it is necessary to study Earth as a synergistic system. As stated in the Earth System Sciences Committee report cited earlier, "Global observations, new space technology, and quantitative models have now given us the capability to probe the complex, interactive processes of Earth evolution and global change." Interactive physical, chemical, and biological processes connect the oceans, continents, atmosphere, and biosphere of Earth in a complex way. Oceans, ice-covered regions, and the atmosphere are closely linked and shape Earth's climate; volcanism links inner Earth with the atmosphere; and biological activity significantly contributes to the cycling of chemicals (e.g., carbon, oxygen, and carbon dioxide) important to life. And now it is clear that human activity also has a major impact on the evolution of the Earth System.

Global-scale changes of uncertain impact, ranging from an increase in the atmospheric warming gases, carbon dioxide and methane, to a hole in the ozone layer over the Antarctic, to important variations in vegetation covers and in coastlines, have already been observed with existing measurement capabilities. The potentially major consequences, either detrimental or beneficial, suggest an urgent need to understand these variations.

We currently lack the ability to foresee changes in the Earth System, and their subsequent effects on the planet's physical, economic, and social climate. But that could change; this initiative would revolutionize our ability to characterize our home planet, and would be the first step toward developing predictive models of the global environment.
Strategy and Scenario

The guiding principle behind this initiative is to adopt an integrated approach to observing Earth. The observations from various sensors on platforms and satellites will be coordinated to perform global surveys and also to perform detailed observations of specific phenomena.

Mission to Planet Earth proposes:

1. To establish and maintain a global observational system in space, which would include experiments and free-flying platforms, in polar, low-inclination, and geostationary orbits, and which would perform integrated, long-term measurements.

2. To use the data from these satellites along with in-situ information and numerical modeling to document, understand, and eventually predict global change.

As illustrated in Figure 5, the global observational system would include a suite of nine orbiting platforms:

- Four sun-synchronous polar platforms: two provided by the United States and one each provided by the European Space Agency (ESA) and the Japanese National Space Development Agency (NASDA). The first platform would be launched in 1994 and all four platforms would be in orbit by 1997. These platforms would provide global polar coverage with morning and afternoon crossing times.

- Five geostationary platforms: three provided by the U.S. and one each by ESA and NASDA. These platforms would all be launched and deployed between 1996 and 2000.

Low-inclination, low-altitude payloads would also be included in the system. The Earth Radiation Budget Experiment satellite, launched from the Space Shuttle in 1984, and the synthetic aperture radar sensors, SIR-A and SIR-B, flown on the Shuttle in 1981 and 1984, are the types of experiments that would fall into this category. Another example would be a proposed Space Station-attached payload designed to obtain coverage of tropical rainfall with sampling at all local times.

The integrated system would measure the full complement of the planet's characteristics, including: global cloud cover, vegetation cover, and ice cover; global rainfall and moisture; ocean chlorophyll content and ocean topography; motions and deformations of Earth's tectonic plates; and atmospheric concentration of gases such as carbon dioxide, methane, and ozone.

Space-based observations would also be coordinated with ground-based experiments and the data from all observations would be integrated by an essential component of this initiative: a versatile, state-of-the-art information management system. This tool is critical to data analysis.
and numerical modeling, would enable the integration of all observational data and the development of diagnostic and predictive Earth System models.

This global observational system would be designed to operate for decades, serviced either by astronauts or robotic systems to ensure long life and to provide the continuing data collection, integration, and analysis required by this initiative.

Because of its international and interdisciplinary nature, the Mission to Planet Earth requires the strong support and involvement of other U.S. government agencies (particularly the National Science Foundation and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) and of our international partners. The roles of the various Federal agencies have been examined in detail by the Earth System Sciences Committee. NASA's responsibilities would include the information management system and platforms and experiments described previously. Most important, NASA would also provide the supporting technology, space transportation, space support services, and much of the scientific leadership.

Technology, Transportation, and Orbital Facilities

This initiative requires advances in technology to enhance observations, to handle and deliver the enormous quantities of data, and to ensure a long operating life. Sophisticated sensors and information systems must be designed and developed, and advances must be made in automation and robotics (whether platform servicing is performed by astronauts or robotic systems).

To achieve its full scope, this initiative requires the operational support of Earth-to-orbit and space transportation systems to accommodate the launching of polar and geostationary platforms. This does not represent a large number of additional launches, but it does require the capability to launch large payloads to polar orbit; Titan IVs would be used to accomplish this. Since the envisioned geostationary platforms would be lifted to low-Earth orbit, assembled at the Space Station, and then lifted to geosynchronous orbit with a space transfer vehicle, well-developed orbital facilities are essential. By the late 1990s, the Space Station must be able to support on-orbit assembly, and a space transfer vehicle must exist.

Summary

NASA, with its technical and scientific expertise, is uniquely suited to lead Mission to Planet Earth. Only from Earth orbit can we gain the perspective necessary to observe the Earth System and the interaction of its components on a global scale. We now understand what to observe and how to observe it. While we do not yet know how the data will piece together, the resulting Earth System models, developed and refined over years of study, are the important products of this initiative, and would establish NASA as a responsive agency ready to meet the challenge of a genuine time-critical need. Championing this initiative would establish the United States at the forefront of a world-recognized need to understand our changing planet.
EXPLORATION OF THE SOLAR SYSTEM

This initiative would build on NASA's longstanding tradition of solar system exploration and would center on the quest to understand our planetary system's origin, and its evolution. Solar system bodies are divided into three distinct classes: primitive bodies (comets and asteroids), the outer (gas giant) planets, and the inner (terrestrial) planets. Each class occupies a unique position in the history of the solar system, and each is the target of a major mission in this initiative, which includes a comet rendezvous (the Comet Rendezvous Asteroid Flyby mission), a mission to Saturn (Cassini), and three sample return missions to Mars. The centerpiece of the initiative is the robotic exploration of Mars: the first of these three automated missions would bring a handful of Mars back to Earth before the year 2000.

Background

In the 1960s and 1970s, exploration of the solar system was an important and visible component of the U.S. space program. Highly successful missions such as *Pioneer*, *Viking*, and *Voyager* made the United States the unchallenged leader in the exploration of the planets. Our spacecraft were consistently both the first and the best. While the Soviet Union concentrated most of its efforts on the exploration of Venus, the rest of the solar system was left to the United States.

But now almost a decade has elapsed between U.S. planetary missions—the last was *Pioneer Venus*, launched in 1978. *Galileo* (to Jupiter), *Magellan* (to Venus), and the *Mars Observer* are in line for launch between 1989 and 1992, but no other planetary missions have been approved. Although the successful *Voyager* missions to the outer planets clearly established U.S. leadership in exploration of the outer solar system, plans for the future beyond the *Galileo* mission are uncertain.

Other nations have recently begun to undertake innovative and challenging programs (the recent international flotilla to Halley's Comet is an excellent example). The Soviets have announced an ambitious program for the exploration of Mars which will culminate in a sample return mission, and the Europeans have set a long-term goal of returning a sample from a comet. Although currently scheduled U.S. missions will ensure that the United States will remain a leader in certain areas of solar system exploration through 1995, the position of the United States beyond 1995 is in question. This initiative would maintain U.S. leadership in exploration of the outer planets, and would regain and sustain U.S. leadership in the exploration of both the planet Mars and the primitive bodies of the solar system.
Strategy and Scenario

This initiative is based on the balanced strategy developed by the Solar System Exploration Committee of the NASA Advisory Council and elucidated in its two reports (cited previously) describing a Core Program and an Augmented Program for planetary exploration. The missions include:

1. **The Comet Rendezvous Asteroid Flyby (CRAF) mission** would investigate the beginnings of our solar system, studying a Main Belt asteroid and a comet, which represent the best-preserved samples of the early solar system. Because of their primordial nature, comets can provide critical clues about the processes that led to the origin and evolution of our solar system.

The CRAF mission scenario is shown in Figure 6. After a 1993 launch and a six-month cruise, the spacecraft would fly past the asteroid Hestia at an altitude of about 10,000 kilometers. CRAF's visual and infrared asteroid imaging systems would conduct investigations of Hestia's surface composition and structure. CRAF would then continue its journey for a rendezvous with a periodic comet, Tempel 2. The spacecraft would maneuver to within 25 kilometers of the comet's nucleus and begin a series of observations, which includes shooting two penetrators into the nucleus itself for detailed in-situ measurements. The spacecraft would fly in close formation with the comet until it nears the Sun and becomes active; then the spacecraft would maneuver farther away to observe the comet's coma and tail.

2. **The Cassini mission** would explore Saturn and its largest moon, Titan. The giant outer planets offer us an opportunity to address key questions about their internal structures and compositions through detailed studies of their atmospheres. Titan is an especially interesting target for exploration because the organic chemistry now taking place there provides the only planetary-scale laboratory for studying processes that may have been important in the prebiotic terrestrial atmosphere.
The Cassini mission proposed in this initiative would be a considerably expanded version of the Cassini mission considered by the Solar System Exploration Committee. (Figure 7 shows the scenario for the baseline version of Cassini.) This expanded mission would be launched in 1998 for the long interplanetary voyage to arrive at Saturn in 2005 with a full array of investigative instruments. An orbital spacecraft and three probes would conduct a comprehensive three-year study of the planet and its rings, satellites, and magnetosphere. One atmospheric probe would be launched toward Titan. The expanded Cassini mission would also carry one probe to investigate the Saturnian atmosphere, and one semi-soft lander which would reach the surface of Titan.

3. The Mars Rover/Sample Return missions would, in journeys covering hundreds of millions of miles, gather samples of Mars and bring them back to Earth. Because of its relevance to understanding Earth and other terrestrial planets, and because it is the only other potentially habitable planet in our solar system, Mars is an intriguing target for exploration.

The Mars Rover/Sample Return mission scenario is shown in Figure 8. It would involve a soft landing on the Martian surface, deployment of a “smart” surface rover to select and collect samples, delivery of the samples to an ascent vehicle, and transfer of the samples from Mars orbit to a return vehicle. The samples would then most likely be returned to a sample handling module on the Space Station for analysis. The initiative would include three such missions: two launched in 1996, probably sending redundant rovers and ascent vehicles to ensure return of a sample in 1999, and one launched in 1998/99 with return in 2001.

Technology, Transportation, and Orbital Facilities

As it is defined, this initiative places a premium on advanced technology and enhanced launch capabilities to maximize the scientific return. It requires aerobraking technology for aerocapture and aeromaneuvering at Mars, and a high level of sophistication in automation, robotics, and sampling techniques. Advanced sampling methods are necessary to ensure that geologically and chemically varied and interesting samples are collected for analysis.

The Solar System Exploration initiative significantly benefits from improved launch capability in terms of the science returned from both the Mars and the Cassini missions. In fact, it is a heavy-lift launch vehicle that enables the full complement of three different probes to be carried in the expanded Cassini mission.

The Space Shuttle is not required for any of the missions in the initiative. The Space Station
would not be needed until 1999, when an isolation module may be used to receive the Martian samples.

Summary
This initiative adopts the broad strategy devised by the Solar System Exploration Committee for a balanced, systematic program of solar system exploration. Spacecraft would be sent to a comet (Tempel 2), an outer planet (Saturn), and an inner planet (Mars), to study representatives of each of the three distinct classes of solar system bodies in exquisite detail. The U.S. would take a bold step forward in the exploration of Mars and we would pat our leadership in exploration of the outer solar system. The scientific return over the next two decades would complement the outstanding solar system exploration program of the 1960s and 1970s and would offer additional insights into the evoluction of our Earth and the solar system.

Background
The Apollo Program was a great national adventure. We sent explorers to scout the cratered highlands and smooth maria of the Moon, and to bring samples collected on their trips back to laboratories on Earth. The world was fascinated by the Apollo missions and the information they obtained, and the samples provided scientists many exciting clues about the Moon’s origin and chemical composition.

The Apollo era ended 15 years ago, before we could fully explore the promise of lunar science and lunar resources. But we learned that human beings can work on the surface of the Moon, and we laid the technical foundation to develop the scientific and engineering tasks for the next stages of exploration. This initiative would send the next generation of pioneers – to pitch their tents, establish supply lines, and gradually build a scientifically, and technically productive outpost suitable for long-term habitation.

This initiative represents a sustained commitment to learn to live and work in space. As our experience and capabilities on the lunar surface grow, this extraterrestrial outpost will gradually become less and less dependent on the supply line to Earth. The first steps toward “living off the lunar land” will be learning to extract oxygen from the lunar soil, where it is plentiful, and learning to make construction materials. The lunar soil would eventually be a source of oxy-
gen for propellant and life-support systems, and a source of material for shelters and facilities.

The Moon’s unique environment provides the opportunity for significant scientific advances: the prospect for gains in lunar and planetary science is abundantly clear. Additionally, since the Moon is seismically stable and has no atmosphere, and since its far side is shielded from the radio noise from Earth, it is a very attractive spot for experiments and observations in astrophysics, gravity wave physics, and neutrino physics, to name a few. It is also an excellent location for materials science and life science research because of its low gravitational field (one-sixth of Earth’s).

Strategy and Scenario
This initiative proposes the gradual, three-phase evolution of our ability to live and work on the lunar surface.

Phase I: Search for a Site (1990s)
The initial phase would focus on robotic exploration of the Moon. It would begin with the launching of the Lunar GeoScience Observer, which will map the surface, perform geochemical studies, and search for water at the poles. Depending on the discoveries of the Observer, robotic landers and rovers may be sent to the surface to obtain more information. Mapping and remote sensing would characterize the lunar surface and identify appropriate sites for the outpost. The discovery of water or other volatiles would be extremely significant, and would have important implications for the location of a habitable outpost.

Phase II: Return to the Moon (2000-2005)
Phase II begins with the return of astronauts to the lunar surface. (The scenario is sketched in Figure 9.) The initiative proposes that a crew be transported from the Space Station to lunar orbit in a module propelled by a lunar transfer vehicle. The crew and equipment would land in vehicles derived from the transfer vehicle. Crew members would stay on the surface for one to two weeks, setting up scientific instruments, a lunar oxygen pilot plant, and the modules and equipment necessary to begin building a habitable outpost. The crew would return to the orbiting transfer vehicle for transportation back to the Space Station.

Over the first few flights, the early outpost would grow to include a habitation area, a research facility, a rover, some small machinery to move lunar soil, and a pilot plant to demonstrate the extraction of lunar oxygen. By 2001, a crew could stay the entire lunar night (14 Earth days), and by 2005 the outpost would support five people for several weeks at a time.

Phase III: At Home on the Moon (2005-2010)
Phase III evolves directly from Phase II, as scientific and technological capabilities allow the outpost to expand to a permanently occupied base. The base would have closed-loop life-support systems and an operational lunar oxygen plant, and would be involved in frontline scientific research and technology develop-
ment. The program also requires the mobilization of disciplines not previously required in the space program: surface construction and transportation, mining, and materials processing.

By 2010, up to 30 people would be productively living and working on the lunar surface for months at a time. Lunar oxygen will be available for use at the outpost and possibly for propellant for further exploration.

**Technology, Transportation, and Orbital Facilities**

This initiative envisions frequent trips to the Moon after the year 2000—trips that would require a significant investment in technology and in transportation and orbital facilities in the early 1990s.

The critical technologies for this initiative are those which would make human presence on the Moon meaningful and productive. They include life-support system technologies to create a habitable outpost; automation and expert systems and surface power technologies to make the outpost functional and its inhabitants productive; and lunar mining and processing technologies to enable the prospecting for lunar resources.

The transportation system must be capable of regularly transporting the elements of the lunar outpost, the fuel for the voyage, and the lunar crew to low-Earth orbit. This requires a heavylift launch vehicle and a healthy Space Shuttle fleet. The transfer of both cargo and crew from the Space Station to lunar orbit requires the development of a reusable space transfer vehicle. This and a heavy-lift launch vehicle will be the workhorses of the Lunar initiative.

The Space Station is an essential part of this initiative. As the lunar outpost evolves, the Space Station would become its operational hub in low-Earth orbit. Supplies, equipment, and propellants would be marshalled at the Station for transit to the Moon. It is therefore required that the Space Station evolve to include spaceport facilities.

In the 1990s, the Phase 1 Space Station would be used as a technology and systems test bed for developing closed-loop life-support systems, automation and robotics, and the expert systems required for the lunar outpost. The outpost would, in fact, rely on the Space Station for many of its systems and subsystems, including lunar habitation modules which would be derivatives of the Space Station habitation/laboratory modules.

**Summary**

This initiative represents a conceptual leap outward from Earth. The challenge is to tame and harness the space frontier—to go beyond *Apollo* and explore the Moon for what it can tell us, and what it can offer us, as a research and development center and as a resource in itself. Exploring, prospecting, and settling are parts of our heritage and will most assuredly be parts of our future.
HUMANS TO MARS

This bold initiative is committed to the human exploration, and eventual habitation, of Mars. Robotic exploration of the planet would be the first phase and would include the return of samples of Martian rocks and soil. Early in the 21st Century, Americans would land on the surface of Mars; within a decade of these first piloted landings, this initiative would advance human presence to an outpost on Mars.

Background

The Red Planet has piqued our curiosity and stimulated our imaginations for decades. Our previous exploration of Mars has revealed a fascinating world of enormous mountains and deep canyons, and a surface etched by erosion during ancient floods. Mars may once have supported life; in any case, it is the only potentially habitable planet in our solar system besides Earth.

America has led the way in humanity’s exploration of the worlds beyond our own planet. We have sent spacecraft to the outer reaches of the solar system, and our emissaries have walked on the surface of the Moon. The Human to Mars initiative would greatly increase our understanding of the solar system, and would push the frontier of human presence ever further beyond the confines of Earth.

The United States has also led the way in the robotic exploration of Mars. The last visitor to that planet was the extremely successful Viking spacecraft, which landed on the Martian surface in 1976, and transmitted data to Earth until late in 1982. During the coming decade, humanity will learn more about Mars, but it will largely be the result of ambitious Soviet, not American, programs. Our single mission to Mars, the Mars Observer, to be launched in 1992, is a small spacecraft which will perform an important geochemical characterization of Mars while in orbit around the planet. Meanwhile, the Soviets have announced three separate missions to Mars before 1995, and the possibility of a sample return mission in the late 1990s.

This leadership initiative declares America’s intention to continue exploring Mars, and to do so not only with spacecraft and rovers, but also with humans. It would clearly rekindle the national pride and prestige enjoyed by the U.S. during the Apollo era. Humans to Mars would be a great national adventure; as such, it would require a concentrated massive national commi-
ment—a commitment to a goal and its supporting science, technology, and infrastructure for many decades.

**Strategy and Scenario**

This initiative would:

1. Carry out comprehensive robotic exploration of Mars in the 1990s. The robotic missions would begin with the *Mars Observer*, include an additional *Observer* mission, and culminate in a pair of *Mars Rover/Sample Return* missions. These missions would perform geochemical characterization of the planet, and complete global mapping and support landing site selection and certification.

2. Establish an aggressive Space Station life sciences research program to validate the feasibility of long-duration spaceflight. This program would develop an understanding of the physiological effects of long-duration flights, of measures to counteract those effects, and of medical techniques and equipment for use on such flights. An important result would be the determination of whether eventual Mars transport vehicles must provide artificial gravity.

3. Design, prepare for, and perform three fast piloted round-trip missions to Mars. These flights would enable the commitment, by 2010, to an outpost on Mars.

The Mars missions described in this initiative are one-year, round-trip “sprints,” with astronauts exploring the Martian surface for two weeks before returning to Earth. The chosen scenario significantly reduces the amount of mass which must be launched into low-Earth orbit, and by doing so brings a one-year round trip into the realm of feasibility. This is accomplished by splitting the mission into two separate parts—a cargo vehicle and a personnel transport—and judiciously choosing the launch date for each.

The Mars cargo vehicle minimizes its propellant requirements by taking a slow, low-energy trip to Mars. The vehicle would be assembled in low-Earth orbit and launched for Mars well ahead of the personnel transport, and would carry everything to be delivered to the surface of Mars plus the fuel required for the crew’s trip back to Earth (Figure 10).

The personnel transport would be assembled and fueled in low-Earth orbit, and would leave for Mars only after the cargo vehicle had arrived in Mars orbit. It would carry a crew of six astronauts, crew support equipment, and propellant for the outbound portion of the trip (Figure 11). Once in Mars orbit, it would rendezvous with the cargo vehicle, refuel, and prepare for descent to the surface. The landing party would spend 10 to 20 days on the Martian surface, and then rendezvous with the personnel transport for the trip back to Earth orbit (Figure 12). Recovery in Earth orbit would return the crew to a Space Station rehabilitation facility (Figure 13). The round-trip time for this scenario is approximately one year.

![Figure 10.](image-url)

Piloted Mars Sprint Scenario—Split Mission Option: Earth-Orbital Cargo Flight Operations

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The initiative proposes three of these sprint missions, the third around the year 2010. By the second decade of the 21st Century, the U.S. would have the knowledge, the experience, and the technology base to begin developing an outpost on Mars.

Technology, Transportation, and Orbital Facilities

A significant, long-term commitment to developing several critical technologies and to establishing the substantial transportation capabilities and orbital facilities is essential to the success of the Mars initiative. The Mars expeditions require the development of a number of technologies, including aerobraking (which significantly reduces the amount of mass which must be lifted to low-Earth orbit), efficient interplanetary propulsion, automation and robotics, storage and transfer of cryogenics in space, fault-tolerant systems, and advanced medical technology. Technology development must be initiated immediately to support the timetable of this scenario.

Even with separate cargo and personnel vehicles, and technological advances such as aerobraking, each of these sprint missions requires that approximately 2.5 million pounds be lifted to low-Earth orbit. (In comparison, the Phase 1 Space Station is projected to weigh approximately 0.5 million pounds.) It is clear that a robust, efficient transportation system, including a heavy-lift launch vehicle, is required. The complement of launch vehicles must be able to lift the cargo and personnel required by the sprint missions to the Space Station in a reasonable period of time. Like the outpost on the Moon, this initiative requires a substantial investment in launch systems, for transport of both cargo and crew.
lant, and to assemble large vehicles. The Space Station would have to evolve in a way that would meet these needs.

Summary

This initiative would send representatives of our planet to Mars during the first decade of the 21st Century. These emissaries would begin a phase of human exploration and reconnaissance that would eventually lead to the establishment of a permanent human presence on another world.

A successful Mars initiative would recapture the high ground of world space leadership and would provide an exciting focus for creativity, motivation, and pride of the American people. The challenge is compelling, and it is enormous.

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Figure 13.
Piloted Mars Sprint Scenario—Split Mission Option: Earth Recovery Operations
PROGRAMMATIC ASSESSMENT

Each of the initiatives described in the previous section is a worthwhile program. Although each has something different to offer, each falls within the framework of NASA’s vision, each builds on and extends existing capabilities, and each elicits the reaction, “America ought to be doing this.” In the absence of fiscal and resource constraints, the United States would undoubtedly adopt all four. In the presence of those very real constraints, and the additional constraints imposed by the current state of our civilian space program, this course of action is not possible.

In its desire to revitalize the civilian space program, NASA must avoid the trap identified by the Rogers Commission during its investigation of the Challenger accident: “The attitude that enabled the agency to put men on the moon and to build the Space Shuttle will not allow it to pass up an exciting challenge — even though accepting the challenge may drain resources from the more mundane (but necessary) aspects of the program.” The Commission further observed (in reference to the Shuttle flight rates): “NASA must establish a realistic level of expectation, then approach it carefully.”

To establish a realistic level of expectation, NASA must consider the current condition of the space program, its strengths and limitations, and its capabilities for growth. Any bold initiative has to begin with and then build on today’s space program, which unfortunately lacks some fundamental capabilities. For example, our most critical commodity, Earth-to-orbit transportation, is essential to each of the initiatives. But the Space Shuttle is grounded until at least June of 1988, and when it does return to flight status, the flight rate will be considerably lower than that projected before the Challenger accident (a four-Shuttle fleet is estimated to be capable of 12 to 14 flights per year).
In hindsight, it is easy to recognize that it was a crippling mistake to decree that the Space Shuttle would be this country’s only launch vehicle. Several studies since the Challenger accident have recommended that the civilian space program include expendables in its fleet of launch vehicles. This strategy relieves some of the burden from the Shuttle, gives the country a broader, more flexible launch capability, and makes the space program less vulnerable in the event of an accident.

The problem of limited launch capability or availability will be magnified during the assembly and operation of the Space Station. Currently, NASA plans to use only the Space Shuttle to transport cargo and people to and from the Space Station. This places a heavy demand on the Shuttle (six to eight flights per year), but more important, it makes the Space Station absolutely dependent on the Shuttle. If Shuttle launches should be interrupted again in the mid-1990s, this nation must still have access to

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<th>TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS</th>
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<td>NASA transportation needs for the 1990s and beyond received considerable attention from the task group and committees examining agency goals and future program thrusts. The consensus of their findings is that if the Nation is to open a “Highway to Space,” we must regain regular and assured access to space and expand launch capacity based on expendable and reusable vehicles.</td>
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<td>“NASA should, on a most urgent basis, initiate a program to incorporate a diversified family of expendable launchers into its space flight program, to include a heavy-lift ELV. Payloads should be off-loaded from shuttle onto ELVs wherever possible.” Report of the Task Force on Issues of a Mixed Fleet, 1987</td>
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<td>“The U.S. should continue to expand its launch capacity based on a mixed fleet of expendable and reusable launch vehicles to preclude total reliance on any one launch system, so that the present manned and unmanned launchers will remain operationally healthy until the next generation of vehicles is fully developed.” U.S. Civil Space Program: An AIAA Assessment, 1987</td>
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<td>“The use of a mixed launch fleet will allow humans to fly when they are needed on a mission and allow unmanned vehicles to be the carrier of choice for other missions... Diversity will also allow a better matching of the scientific requirements of a mission with the launch capability needed to meet those requirements, rather than forcing the mission to meet the constraints of a single inflexible launch system.” The Crisis in Space and Earth Science, 1986</td>
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<td>“The shuttle fleet will become obsolescent by the turn of the century. Reliable, economical launch vehicles will be needed to provide flexible, routine access to orbit for cargo and passengers at reduced costs ... to reduce space operation costs as soon as possible. The mission recommends that three major space transport needs be met in the next 15 years: cargo transport to low Earth orbit; passenger transport to and from low Earth orbit; and round-trip transfer beyond low Earth orbit.” Pioneering the Space Frontier, 1986</td>
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space and the means to transport cargo and people to and from the Space Station. The importance of this capability was emphasized by the National Commission on Space in its report, *Pioneering the Space Frontier:* "Above all, it is imperative that the US maintain a continuous ability to put both humans and cargo into orbit."

From now until the mid-1990s, Earth-to-orbit transportation is NASA's most pressing problem. A space program that can't get to orbit has all the effectiveness of a navy that can't get to the sea. America must develop a cadre of launch vehicles that can first meet the near-term commitments of the civilian space program and then grow to support projected programs or initiatives.

Expendable launch vehicles should be provided for payloads which are not unique to the Space Shuttle—this is required just to implement current plans and to satisfy fundamental requirements.

A Shuttle-derived cargo vehicle should be developed immediately. A Shuttle-derived vehicle is attractive because of its lift capacity, its synergism with the Space Transportation System, and its potential to be available for service in the early 1990s. This cargo vehicle would reduce the payload requirements on the Shuttle for Space Station support and would accelerate the Space Station assembly sequence.

The United States should also seriously consider the advisability of a crew-rated expendable to lift a crew capsule or a logistics capsule to the Space Station. The logistics vehicle, for Space Station resupply and/or instrument return, would be developed with autodocking and precision reentry capabilities. The crew capsule would carry only crew members and supplies. would launch (with or without a crew) on the expendable vehicle, would have autodocking capability, and might also be used for crew rescue.

**TECHNOLOGY**

Rebuilding the Nation's technology base is essential for the successful achievement of any long-term space goal. It is widely agreed that we are living off the interest of the Apollo era technology investment, and that it is time to replenish our technology reservoir in order to enhance our range of technical options.

"The Nation has allowed its technology base to erode, leaving it with little capability to move out in new directions should the need arise." Letter from Daniel J. Fink (Chairman, NASA Advisory Council) to James Fletcher, dated August 14, 1986

"Space technology advancement underlies any comprehensive future space activity. The present course is a status-quo caretaker path with no potential growth. New commitments are called for in key technologies such as propulsion, automation and robotics, flight computers, information systems, sensors, power generation, materials, structures, life support systems, and space processing. We support the recommendation by the National Commission on Space for a three-fold increase in this relatively low-budget but extremely important area of space technology advancement, especially in view of strong foreign commitments to such technology development." *U.S. Civil Space Program: An AIAA Assessment, 1987*

"Research must be pursued on a broad front, to identify and quantify technical possibilities before their usefulness can be judged. Such a research and technology program is therefore properly conceived as opportunity generating, not directed toward applications." *Pioneering the Space Frontier, 1986*
These transportation capabilities are required just to launch, assemble, operate, and safely inhabit the Space Station, and to have some prospect of being able to support future initiatives.

Without sound, reliable Earth-to-orbit transportation available to lift sensors, spacecraft, scientists, and explorers to orbit, we will not be in a position to aggressively pursue either science or exploration. We have stated that transportation is not our goal—but it is essential to the successful pursuit of whatever goals we choose. If we do not make a commitment now to rebuild and broaden our launch capability, we will not have the option of pursuing any of the four initiatives described in the previous section.

The same can be said for advanced technology. The National Commission on Space observed that "NASA is still living on the investment made during the Apollo era, but cannot continue to do so if we are to maintain United States leadership in space." Several recent studies concur, concluding that our technology base has eroded and technological research and development are underfunded. The technology required for bold ventures beyond Earth's orbit has not yet been developed, and until it is, human exploration of the inner solar system will have to wait.

Project Pathfinder has been developed by NASA's Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology in conjunction with experts on the Lunar and Mars initiatives. Pathfinder would provide the technologies to enable bold missions beyond Earth's orbit: technology for autonomous systems and robotics, for lunar and planetary advanced propulsion systems, and for extraction of useful materials from lunar or planetary sources. It also deals in a significant way with the human ability to live and work in space, by developing technologies for life-support systems and the human/machine interface. Until advanced technology programs like Project Pathfinder are initiated, the excitement of human exploration will always remain 10 to 20 years in the future.

Life sciences research is also critical to any programs involving relatively long periods of human habitation in space. Because the focus of our life sciences research for the last several years has been on Space Shuttle flights, which only last for five to ten days, there has been no immediate need for a program to study the physiological problems associated with longer flights. Without an understanding of the long-term effects of weightlessness on the human body, our goal of human exploration of the solar system is severely constrained.

Before astronauts are sent into space for long periods, research must be done to understand the physiological effects of the microgravity and radiation environments, to develop measures to counteract any adverse effects, and to develop medical techniques to perform routine and emergency health care aboard spacecraft.

Project Pacer, developed by NASA's Office of
Space Science and Applications is a focused program designed to develop that understanding and provide the physiological and medical foundation for extended spaceflight. This research would be conducted in laboratories and on Space Shuttle missions in preparation for the critical long-term experiments to be conducted on the Space Station. Until the Space Station is occupied, and actual long-duration testing is begun, we will lack the knowledge necessary to design and conduct piloted interplanetary flights or to inhabit lower-gravity surface bases. Although the research conducted prior to the occupation of Space Station cannot provide definitive answers to several key questions, it is an essential precursor to the research and technology development on the Space Station.

**LIFE SCIENCES RESEARCH**

The prospect of an extended human presence in space on the Space Station and later on extended missions to the Moon or Mars requires a commitment to better understand and respond to biomedical, psychological, and human engineering challenges. Although there is great confidence that we will eventually establish a presence on other bodies in the solar system, there remains uncertainty in the medical community about the implications of such journeys for human health, safety, and productivity. A number of recent studies highlight concerns and identify areas requiring additional research.

"Space medicine is unique in the context of the other space sciences – primarily because, in addition to questions of fundamental interest, there is a need to address those issues that are more of a clinical or human health and safety nature... if this country is committed to a future of humans in space, particularly for long periods of time, it is essential that the vast number of uncertainties about the effects of microgravity on humans and other living organisms be recognized and vigorously addressed. Not to do so would be imprudent at best – quite possibly, irresponsible." A Strategy for Space Biology and Medical Science, 1987

"Many crucial issues in the three major areas of health, life support, and operational capabilities remain to be resolved before the safety of humans working in space over months and years can be assured. Certain aspects of physiological adaptation to microgravity may be life-threatening, especially over the long-term... Areas such as medical care, radiation protection, environmental maintenance, and human productivity are equally serious, but the research and development activities associated with these areas have at least begun on a modest scale. To neglect any of these areas could prove risky, and parallel research activities are recommended." Advanced Missions with Humans in Space, 1987

"Of paramount practical importance are human safety and performance. Long-duration flights on the Space Station will increase our understanding of the effects of the space environment on people and other living systems. Problems of bone demineralization and loss of muscle mass persist, and effective empirical solutions are unlikely to be found soon... It is imperative that basic research on this problem continue, both on the ground and in space." Pioneering the Space Frontier, 1986
Both technology development and life sciences research are pacing elements in human exploration.

The four initiatives represent widely varying levels of complexity and commitment. As part of the development and evaluation of the initiatives, an assessment was performed to estimate their relative complexities and therefore their relative impacts on the agency and its resources. The initiatives, and results from related studies, were reviewed to identify the required technology, transportation, on-orbit facilities, and precursor science. This assessment yielded the elements comprising each initiative—the building blocks of that initiative.

The assessment sought to define the initiatives to a reasonable level of detail through 2010. At this time, the initiatives would be in different stages of development. All Earth observing platforms would be in space with their observing systems operating; they would be serviced periodically, and would continue to transmit data to Earth for years. The final mission of the Planetary initiative would be complete: this initiative is not defined past 2010. The Lunar outpost would be well established, with most surface elements developed and delivered; it would receive continuing logistics support, but would be somewhat self sustaining, and have considerable potential for growth and for support of further exploration activities. In 2010, the nation’s Mars program would have just finished its human reconnaissance phase, and would be prepared to embark on the establishment of an outpost.

To provide a common starting point for each initiative, this analysis assumed the currently planned NASA space program as a foundation. That is, each initiative must be built from the foundation of a fleet of four Space Shuttles and a Phase 1 Space Station; everything else that would have to be added to accomplish the initiative, including additional Space Station modules, new transportation elements, unscheduled precursor science missions, etc., was assumed to be part of that initiative.

Some of the elements of each initiative would be developed solely for that initiative; many others could be common to other initiatives as well. An example of the former is the lunar oxygen plant designed to extract oxygen from the lunar soil. Although similar technologies might eventually be needed at a Mars outpost, the element itself exists only in the Lunar initiative. An example of an element which could be common to several programs is the space transfer vehicle of the Earth initiative. Although it would lift geostationary platforms from the Space Station to their final orbit, this vehicle could also be used to deliver other cargo (unrelated to the Earth initiative) to geosynchronous orbit. It could be the basis of a lunar transfer vehicle. Each initiative has elements which could be

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* REQUIRED TO RECOVER MARS SAMPLE

Table 1.
Transportation Requirements for the Initiatives
common to other programs, as well as initiative-specific elements.

An overview of the transportation elements required for the initiatives is shown in Table 1. The Earth and Planetary initiatives make the most modest demands on transportation, in terms of both essential new capabilities and frequency of use. But each of the initiatives requires an Earth-to-orbit transportation system comprised of more than just a Space Shuttle fleet.

A heavy-lift launch vehicle is either enabling, or significantly enhancing, to all the initiatives. A Shuttle-derived vehicle would have sufficient

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**SPACE STATION EVOLUTION**

The Phase 1 Space Station will be a permanently staffed "laboratory in space" by 1996. Other capabilities, such as an assembly station or a fueling depot, will not be included in the initial phase, but could be accommodated later if a need for those functions is clearly identified.

A key question for the not-too-distant future is "How should the Space Station evolve?" Since the Space Station is a means to pursue our goals, the answer depends on what those goals are. It is important to understand what each initiative demands of the Space Station. For example, the Planetary initiative makes few demands on the Space Station; the Mars initiative makes substantial demands.

NASA's Office of Space Station has set up a Strategic Plans and Programs Division whose charter is to understand how the Space Station would be required to evolve under a variety of scenarios for the future, and what provisions must be made in the design of the Phase 1 Space Station to ensure that the evolution is possible.

Space Station evolution workshops, held in September 1985 and July 1986, laid the foundation for understanding how to accommodate a variety of users whose requirements may not be compatible. These workshops recognized, for example, that a laboratory in space, featuring long-term access to the microgravity environment, might not be compatible with an operational assembly and checkout facility, as construction operations could disturb the scientific environment.

Space Station evolution planning will include an assessment of the implications of each of the four initiatives. It is important to have specific scenarios, with a level of technical definition behind them, to serve as a basis for these assessments. It is also important that results from these assessments feed back into the initiative scenarios. This iterative approach is required to establish reasonable evolution scenarios and initiatives that are compatible with the proposed evolution.
capacity for the Earth and Planetary initiatives. It would also satisfy the requirements of the Mars and Lunar initiatives through the 1990s, although shortly after the turn of the century both would need a vehicle with a lift capacity of 150,000 to 200,000 pounds. This higher lift capacity is needed primarily to supply the large amounts of propellant required for each initiative (about 2.2 million pounds to low-Earth orbit for each Mars sprint mission: 200,000 pounds to low-Earth orbit for each lunar trek).

The Lunar and Mars initiatives also have a critical need for the capability to transport personnel to and from the Space Station. This need could be filled by a personnel module added to the Shuttle, or by some other personnel carrier. The additional crew members would perform on-orbit assembly of the cargo and crew vehicles. Although there is currently no good estimate of the size of the crew required to assemble and test a vehicle in orbit, it is likely that the Lunar initiative, if it develops as projected in Phase III, would require more than 30 people in low-Earth orbit by the year 2010. It builds to this peak gradually, though, and the early assembly requirements (2000 to 2005) can be phased in slowly.

All the initiatives have other needs as well. The Planetary initiative's needs are limited to expendable stages, and possibly an Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle for the recovery of a returned Mars sample. The Earth initiative makes more substantial use of Earth-orbital transportation, including a transfer vehicle to lift fully assembled observing platforms from the Space Station to geosynchronous orbit, and sophisticated Orbital Maneuvering Vehicles to aid in platform servicing. The Lunar and Mars initiatives are more demanding. Both are likely to require Orbital Maneuvering Vehicles to transport personnel from the Space Station to orbital assembly sites. Most significant, both require substantial space transfer vehicles to transport crews from low-Earth orbit to either the Moon or Mars. Although the lunar transfer vehicle could be a derivative of a transfer vehicle to geosynchronous orbit (or vice versa), at this time it appears that the Mars transfer vehicle will demand a different design.

The orbital facilities required for each initiative are shown in Table 2. The Planetary initiative has limited requirements in this area; the other three have extensive needs that begin with the Phase I Space Station. The Phase I Space Station includes polar platforms and attached payloads for the Earth initiative; it serves as a technology and systems test bed for the Lunar initiative; and it will be a crucial laboratory for life sciences research and technology development for the Mars initiative.

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Table 2. Orbital Facilities Required for the Initiatives
All the initiatives require that the Space Station evolve additional capabilities, but the needs of the Planetary initiative (a sample return module) and the Earth initiative (servicing capability, operation of a space transfer vehicle) are relatively modest. The Lunar initiative requires gradual evolution to support the assembly, servicing, and checkout of lunar transfer vehicles. This requires more people in orbit (and therefore more Space Station modules and logistics traffic), spaceport facilities, and a propellant depot. The Mars initiative also relies on those spaceport facilities and additional crew accommodations, and although it will not occur quite as soon as in the Lunar initiative, the assembly of the large Mars cargo and piloted vehicles will be a significant task.

The Lunar initiative includes significant surface facilities such as habitation modules, laboratory modules, and an oxygen plant; the Mars initiative looks toward an eventual outpost (after 2015), but while similar surface facilities would be necessary at that time, they have not been included in the assessment to 2010. The Lunar and Mars initiatives both require landers, ascent vehicles, and rovers. These would most likely use some common technologies and subsystems, but they would not be identical.

The initiatives also require investments in technology development, and investments in institutional and human resources. This support early in the life of an initiative is vital to its success. The level of investment required is directly proportional to the magnitude and complexity of the initiative. The Earth and Planetary initiatives would be expected to have relatively modest needs; the Lunar and Mars initiatives would demand substantial technology development programs, and significant increases in highly skilled personnel and institutional facilities. The need for a dedicated, enthusiastic, and technically competent workforce must not be minimized; the Lunar and Mars initiatives would both require a significant increase in human resources.

The current level of definition of the initiatives, particularly the Lunar and Mars initiatives, is not adequate to reasonably estimate their costs. But while it was not appropriate to attempt to determine the absolute level of resources required by each, it was reasonable to estimate the relative levels through 2010. For each initiative, after the elements not included in current NASA plans were identified, the mass and size of each were estimated in order to determine the transportation requirements for that initiative. There was no attempt, at this early stage, to optimize the transportation system.

Figure 14 compares the resources required by the four initiatives during the next five years. It is important to understand the level of effort needed to support a new initiative during this period, since the country will also be relying on the civilian space program to return the Shuttle to flight, to revitalize its transportation system, and to continue serious preparations for the Space Station.

The Lunar, Earth, and Planetary initiatives would take about the same level of investment through 1992. The investment in the Lunar initiative would be primarily in technology and in early transportation development; in the Earth initiative, it would be largely in the development of the polar platforms, data handling system, and transportation; in the Planetary initiative, it would be primarily in technology, and in readying the Comet Rendezvous Asteroid Flyby mission for a 1993 launch.

The Mars initiative requires the largest commitment in the early years. This would be primarily an investment in transportation elements and in life science related additions to the Space Station. Transportation and Space Station use have not been optimized, so some reduction might be possible. The message, however, would not
change: the country would have to make a major investment in the next five years to land people on Mars in 2005.

The complexity of both the Lunar and Mars initiatives in the year 2000 demands technology developments early in the program. Thus, through 1992 the majority of the Lunar initiative, and a significant portion of the Mars initiative, would be comprised of those technology activities which lay the groundwork for the initiative. Like early work in transportation, there is considerable synergism in the early technology requirements of these two initiatives.

Figure 15 compares the initiatives through 2010. The Lunar and Mars initiatives are nearly an order of magnitude greater in programmatic scope than the Planetary and Earth initiatives. The levels of investment in the Earth and Planetary initiatives peak in the early-to-mid-1990s, and then decrease to levels which remain fairly constant through the first decade of the next century. The Lunar initiative does not require extraordinary resources through 1992, but the commitment builds substantially in the mid-1990s. It peaks in about 2000, at the time of this initiative's first human landing, and stays high through 2010 as the outpost is developed into a permanent base. The total level of effort through 2010 is large, and reflects the ambitious approach to the construction of the lunar base. However, the nature of this initiative allows considerable flexibility. For example, the outpost materials could be delivered to the surface rapidly or at a more deliberate pace: certain capabilities of the outpost could be emphasized and developed before others; or the transition from a temporarily occupied outpost to a large
permanently staffed base could be delayed. Any of these options would significantly reduce the investment through 2010.

Although the Mars initiative offers the greatest amount of human and technological drama, it also demands the greatest investment. The Mars initiative definition included only those elements required for the three sprint missions, the last in 2010, so the level of investment shown is artificially low between 2005 and 2010. The magnitude of the initiative indicates a large commitment of resources, and the timescale dictates that the investment peak in about 2000.

It is possible to reduce the early investment to a level comparable to that of the other three initiatives by allowing the first human landing to occur in 2010, rather than in 2005. The 2005 landing was selected at the outset to achieve the major milestone within two decades, but this analysis suggests that this ground rule may not be appropriate for the Mars initiative.
EVALUATION OF INITIATIVES

To this point, we have been considering four specific initiatives, each of which would, if adopted, provide leadership in a particular area of space endeavor. Now it is important to differentiate between an initiative and a strategy. A strategy provides an overall framework and direction; it identifies and prioritizes goals, and defines a course to attain them. An initiative should be an element of a strategy: a part, but only a part, of the larger picture. Initiatives would, of course, be best judged in the context of a strategy.

A process to define and evaluate candidate strategies for the civilian space program is being developed at NASA. This process will seek to identify possible strategies, then assess the likelihood of success and possible implications of each. They will be evaluated in relation to the existing and projected environment, and to the various conditions which may influence their success, such as:

- NASA’s strengths, its weaknesses, and its culture
- External threats to U.S. leadership
- Opportunities to exercise leadership
- Optimistic and pessimistic scenarios of uncontrollable factors which influence NASA and its ability to carry out its charter
- The existing U.S. space policy

_A successful Mars Rover/Sample Return mission blasts off, carrying its cargo of Martian samples back to Earth._
As potential strategies are modified in light of these factors, the result should be a set of two or three distinct, viable strategies whose resource requirements, threats to success, and implications to NASA and the nation are well defined and understood. Although this process is being developed at NASA, it is not NASA’s role to determine the overall strategy for the nation’s civilian space program; that must be a national decision. NASA should, however, be prepared to present viable options. The potential benefit of this process is evident. It can result in a cohesive strategy that is consistent with national goals, is based on a realistic appraisal of NASA’s strengths and weaknesses and the nation’s willingness to pursue it, and is resilient to changes in the international environment.

Ideally, of course, a strategy would already be in place. Then each initiative could be judged in light of its compatibility with the overall plan.

While stressing the need for a comprehensive strategy, we can nevertheless conduct a preliminary assessment of the initiatives, recognizing that the important considerations are the quality of the program, NASA’s ability to carry it out, and the public’s willingness to support it. In the process of this evaluation, we can see the elements of a potential strategy begin to emerge.

**Exploration of the Solar System**

In the 1960s and 1970s, planetary exploration was a vital and important component of the United States space program. However, while other nations are now vigorously pursuing solar system exploration, the U.S. has launched no planetary missions since 1978.

What does the next decade hold in store? The Soviets have announced their intent to launch three ambitious flights to Mars by 1995, and a Mars sample return mission by 2000. If they are successful with their new-generation spacecraft, and can continue to forge cooperative agreements with European nations, they will clearly have the greater momentum in the exploration of Mars by the mid-1990s.

The Chairman of the NASA Advisory Council’s Solar System Exploration Committee has expressed his concern about more than the exploration of Mars: “If we do not continue to carry out these challenging missions to the outer planets and comets and asteroids, we will quickly lose the limited momentum still remaining.”

The Solar System Exploration Committee has devised a strategy for planetary exploration through the year 2000, which presented “the minimum-level program that could be carried out in a cost-effective manner, and would yield continuing return of scientific results.” NASA should embrace this Core Program.

The Mars Rover/Sample Return mission is the centerpiece of the Solar System Exploration Committee’s recommended augmentation to its Core Program. This is a mission of bold scientific exploration and high technological drama, and a necessary precursor to the human exploration of Mars. The option for a 1998 launch (two years later than the 1996 date proposed in the initiative) should be preserved.
Although the Mars Rover/Sample Return was presented as a U.S. mission in this initiative, it could be performed in cooperation with our allies and/or in coordination with the Soviet Union. In fact, planetary exploration is well suited to international cooperation. The U.S. could benefit significantly by coordinating its Mars Observer with the three sophisticated Soviet missions to be launched for Mars over the next seven years. Coordination of these early flights, and exchange of resulting data, would leave the U.S. better prepared to undertake a Mars Rover/Sample Return mission, whether in coordination with the Soviets or alone.

Planetary exploration need not be NASA's primary focus, but it offers opportunities to exercise leadership in the international arena through organizing and participating in coalitions to achieve objectives which are consistent with U.S. goals, and it can provide important precursor information for either of the larger human exploration initiatives.

Robotic planetary exploration should be actively supported and nurtured within NASA. Although it does not have the immediate relevance of the Mission to Planet Earth, or the excitement of human exploration, it is fundamental science that challenges our technology, extends our presence, and gives us a glimpse of other worlds. As such, it enjoys widespread public interest and support. Although not necessarily at the pace suggested in this initiative, planetary exploration must be solidly supported through the 1990s.

This initiative directly addresses the problems that will be facing humanity in the coming decades, and its continuous scientific return will produce results which are of major significance to all the residents of the planet. The benefits are clear to a public that is increasingly concerned about global environmental problems like ozone depletion, buildup of greenhouse gases, and acidification of lakes and forests. And as the environment and its preservation become more pressing issues, the initiative retains its importance for many generations to come.

For this reason it should enjoy sustained public and Congressional support and interest. The U.S. is the only country currently capable of leading a Mission to Planet Earth, but the program is designed around, and requires, international cooperation. Admittedly, the initiative's international scope could complicate its coordination and implementation, but the concept embodied in the initiative enjoys widespread international support. As more and more countries are facing ecological problems, there is increasing interest in a global approach. In fact, this concept is supported by several international organizations, and may emerge as a theme for the International Space Year, 1992. This initiative represents an important opportunity for the United States to exercise leadership in an increasingly significant area.

As the Earth System Sciences Committee suggests, NASA is a natural leader for a Mission to Planet Earth. The National Science Foundation and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration will play important roles, and interagency coordination is crucial. But since the major focus is on observations from space and the coordination and analysis of these (and ground-based) observations, NASA is uniquely suited to lead the effort. It is a natural use for, and extension of, our low-Earth orbital facilities and capabilities, and would not severely drain resources from existing programs. This is an initiative well within NASA's

**Mission to Planet Earth**

Mission to Planet Earth is not the sort of major program the public normally associates with an agency famous for Apollo, Viking, and Voyager. But this initiative is a great one, not because it offers tremendous excitement and adventure, but because of its fundamental importance to humanity's future on this planet.
Humans to Mars

Exploring, prospecting, and settling Mars are clearly the ultimate goals of the next several decades of human exploration. But what strategy should be followed to attain those goals?

Any expedition to Mars is a huge undertaking, which requires a commitment of resources which must be sustained over decades. This task group has examined only one possible scenario for a Mars initiative—a scenario designed to land humans on Mars by 2005. This timescale requires an early and significant investment in technology: it also demands a heavy-lift launch vehicle, a larger Shuttle fleet, and a transportation depot at the Space Station near the turn of the century. This would require an immediate commitment of resources and an approximate tripling of NASA's budget during the mid-1990s.

More important, NASA would be hard pressed to carry the weight of this ambitious initiative in the 1990s without severely taxing existing programs. NASA's available resources were strained to the limit flying nine Shuttle flights in one year. It will be difficult to achieve the operations capacity to launch and control 12 to 14 Shuttle flights per year, and assemble, test, and continuously operate a Space Station in the mid-1990s. It would not be wise to embark on an ambitious program whose requirements could overwhelm those of the Shuttle and Space Station during the critical next decade.

This suggests that we should revise the ground rules and consider other approaches to human exploration of Mars. One alternative is to retain the scenario developed here, but to proceed at a more deliberate (but still aggressive) pace, and allow the first human landing to occur in 2010. This spreads the investment over a longer period, and though it also delays the significant milestones and extends the length of commitment, it greatly reduces the urgency for Space
Station evolution and growth, and consequently for transportation capabilities as well.

We must pursue a more deliberate program; this implies that we should avoid a “race to Mars.” There is the very real danger that if the U.S. announces a human Mars initiative at this time, it could escalate into another space race. Whether such a race was real or perceived, there would be constant pressure to set a timetable, to accelerate it if possible, and to avoid falling behind. Schedule pressures, as the Rogers Commission noted, can have a very real, adverse effect. The pressure could make it difficult to design and implement a program which would have a strong foundation and adequate momentum to sustain itself beyond the first few piloted missions. This could turn an initiative that envisions the eventual development of a habitable outpost into another one-shot spectacular. Such a dead-end venture does not have the support of most NASA personnel. Neither, according to the National Commission on Space, does it have the support of the public. A “theme brought forward repeatedly” in the Commission’s extensive public sessions was “a strong wish that our next goal for piloted space activity not be another Apollo—a one-shot foray or a political stunt.”

THE OFFICE OF EXPLORATION

During the majority of this work, there was no focal point within NASA for studies on human exploration. Recognizing this deficiency, and adopting one of the early recommendations of this study, the NASA Administrator has established the Office of Exploration to fund, direct, and coordinate studies related to human exploration.

Both of the human exploration initiatives described in this work were generated in a workshop or task force environment. The three to four months devoted to their formulation were adequate only to develop the starting point for in-depth studies. The Office of Exploration will be responsible for coordinated mission studies to develop these and other scenarios, to assess mission concepts and schedules, and to study trade-offs in requirements, technology, transportation, and facilities utilization. Advanced technology and transportation requirements cannot be developed in a vacuum. These mission studies will provide a context for planning technology and transportation development and Space Station evolution (and studies in these areas will, of course, feed back into the mission scenarios).

The establishment of the Office of Exploration was an important step. Adequate support of the Office will be equally important, and will be an indication of the commitment to long-term human exploration. There is some concern among observers that the Office was created only to placate critics, not to provide a serious focus for human exploration. Studies relating to human exploration of the Moon or Mars currently command only about 0.03 percent of NASA’s budget (approximately 1 dollar out of 3000); this is not enough.
The scenario described in this report is a rational, sustained program, leading to an outpost and eventual permanent base on Mars. But there is some fear that it is susceptible to transformation into a stunt. This could mortgage the viable space program we hope to have in the 1990s for a "spectacular," which may have few lasting benefits.

Settling Mars should be our eventual goal, but it should not be our next goal. Sending people to and from Mars is not the only issue involved. Understanding the requirements and implications of building and sustaining a permanent base on another world is equally important. We should adopt a strategy of natural progression which leads, step by step, in an orderly, unhurried way, inexorably toward Mars.

Outpost on the Moon

The Lunar initiative is a logical part of a long-range strategy for human exploration. The National Commission on Space recommended that the U.S. follow a "natural progression for future space activities within the solar system," and concluded that the natural progression of human exploration leads next to the Moon.

The establishment of a lunar outpost would be a significant step outward from Earth — a step that combines adventure, science, technology, and perhaps the seeds of enterprise. Exploring and prospecting the Moon, learning to use lunar resources and work within lunar constraints, would provide the experience and expertise necessary for further human exploration of the solar system.

The Lunar initiative is a major undertaking. Like the Mars initiative, it requires a national commitment that spans decades. It, too, demands an early investment in advanced technology, Earth-to-orbit transportation, and a plan for Space Station evolution. Even considering its gradual evolution over the first five years, the ambitious buildup of the lunar outpost envisioned in this scenario would require a high level of effort in the mid-to-late 1990s, and would place substantial demands on transportation and orbital facilities. This is a period when resources may be scarce.

However, this initiative is quite flexible. Its pace can be controlled, and more important, adapted to capability. It is possible to lay the foundation of the outpost in the year 2000, then build it gradually, to ease the burden on transportation and Space Station at the turn of the century.

The Lunar initiative is designed to be evolutionary, not revolutionary. Relying on the Space Station for systems and subsystems, for operations experience, and for technology develop-
ment and testing, it builds on and gradually extends existing capabilities. Many of the systems needed for reaching outward to Mars could be developed and proven in the course of work in the Earth-Moon region. It is not absolutely necessary to establish this stepping stone, but it certainly makes sense to gain experience, expertise, and confidence nearer Earth first, and then to set out for Mars.

This study did not include an assessment of the level of public support for these initiatives. However, there is considerable sentiment that Apollo was a dead-end venture, and we have little left to show for it. Although this task force found some who dismissed this initiative because "we've been to the Moon," it found many more who feel that this generation should continue the work begun by Apollo.

Although explorers have reached the Moon, the Moon has not been fully explored. This initiative would push back frontiers, not to achieve a blaze of glory, but to explore, to understand, to learn, and to develop; it would place the Apollo Program into a broader context of continuing exploration, spanning several generations of Americans. And it fits beautifully into a natural progression of human expansion that leads "from the highlands of the Moon to the plains of Mars."
CONCLUSION

Over the last 25 years, as a result of the success of programs like Apollo, Skylab, Viking, Voyager, and the Space Shuttle, the American public has come to expect this country to lead the world in space science, space exploration, and space enterprise. But during the 1980s, membership in the once-exclusive club of spacefaring nations has grown, and our leadership is being challenged in many areas.

In today's world, America clearly cannot be the leader in all space endeavors. But we will be the leader in very few unless we move promptly to develop a strategy to regain and retain leadership in those areas we deem important.

Leadership results from both the capabilities a country has acquired and the active demonstration of those capabilities. Thus, the strategy we choose must lay a strong foundation of scientific research and technology development, and must include visible, significant accomplishments that demonstrate the successful pursuit of our stated goals.

To stimulate a discussion of the future of the U.S. civilian space program, four potential leadership initiatives were developed. Each fits comfortably under the umbrella of NASA's charter. Each contains visible milestones within the next two decades, and each requires a solid foundation of technology, transportation, and orbital facilities.

It would not be good strategy, good science, or good policy for the U.S. to select a single initiative, then pursue it single-mindedly. The pursuit of a single initiative to the exclusion of all others results in leadership in only a limited range of space endeavor.

A strategy for the U.S. space program must be carefully selected to be consistent with our national aspirations and consistent with NASA's capabilities. It is not NASA's role to determine the strategy for the civilian space program. But it is NASA's role to lead the debate, to propose technically feasible options, and to make thoughtful recommendations.
It is in this spirit that we suggest the outline of one strategy—a strategy of evolution and natural progression. The strategy would begin by increasing our capabilities in transportation and technology—not as goals in themselves, but as the necessary means to achieve our goals in science and exploration. The most critical and immediate needs are related to advanced transportation systems to supplement and complement the Space Shuttle, and advanced technology to enable the bold missions of the next century. Until we can get people and cargo to and from orbit reliably and efficiently, our reach will exceed our grasp; until we begin the technologies proposed by Project Pathfinder, the realization of our aspirations will remain over a decade away.

The strategy emphasizes evolving our capabilities in low-Earth orbit, and using those capabilities to study our own world and explore others. With these capabilities, we would position ourselves to lead in characterizing and understanding planet Earth: we would also position ourselves to continue leading the way in human exploration.

According to the NASA Advisory Council’s Task Force on Goals, “Recognized leadership absolutely requires the expansion of human life beyond the Earth, since human exploration is one of the most challenging and compelling displays of our spacefaring abilities.”

We should explore the Moon for what it can tell us, and what it can give us— as a scientific laboratory and observing platform, as a research and technology test bed, and as a potential source of imported resources. While exploring the Moon, we would learn to live and work on a hostile world beyond Earth. This should be done in an evolutionary manner, and on a time scale that is consistent with our developing capabilities.

The natural progression of human exploration then leads to Mars. There is no doubt that exploring, prospecting, and settling Mars should be the ultimate objectives of human exploration. But America should not rush headlong toward Mars; we should adopt a strategy to continue an orderly expansion outward from Earth.

The National Commission on Space urges 21st Century America “To lead the exploration and development of the space frontier, advancing science, technology, and enterprise, and building institutions and systems that make accessible vast new resources and support human settlements beyond Earth orbit, from the highlands of the Moon to the plains of Mars.” The United States space program needs to define a course to make this vision a reality.
EDUCATION

An informed public is essential to both the near- and long-term interests of the nation’s civilian space program. The public needs an appropriate base of knowledge of scientific and technological issues in order to make educated decisions on space-related goals. Additionally, today’s educational system must produce the high caliber scientists, engineers, technicians, social scientists, and humanists that will actually manage the large-scale space programs that are now envisioned. This means capturing the imaginations and interests of young people at an early stage in their educational careers and encouraging them to pursue studies that will prepare them to actively participate in the space program.

"Unless the youth of this nation are strongly motivated to seek their careers in the often difficult fields of science and technology — of which space is a particularly exciting and rewarding constituent — no amount of federal program emphasis can by itself sustain a long-term leadership role for the U.S. in civil space activities." U.S. Civil Space Program: An AIAA Assessment, 1987

“As revealed in a recent national survey of student achievement, an estimated 90 percent of America’s high school graduates may not be capable of accomplishing even the most routine high-technology tasks in the future. While up to 90 percent of high school graduates in other countries enjoy a proficiency in math and science, a mere 6 percent of U.S. graduates attain the same aptitudes.

... This challenge exists at every level from elementary through graduate education.” Pioneering the Space Frontier, 1986

“Thus, a strong educational system is an essential component of a vital science without which scientific progress would come to a rapid halt. It is most important to ensure that students are being broadly educated in concepts and skills which will be useful throughout their careers.” The Crisis in Space and Earth Science, 1986

“The future of space biology and medicine will depend on the quality of the young people attracted to the field. NASA should expand its fellowship programs to encourage predoctoral and postdoctoral training at Universities, research institutes, and NASA research centers. Even in a period of reduced flight opportunities, there is exciting important research to be done in ground-based laboratories.” A Strategy for Space Biology and Medical Science, 1987
ADDITIONAL STUDIES

Several studies provided significant inputs to the work described in this report. Brief synopses of the studies are provided below.

Study: The Next Giant Leap in Space: An Agenda for International Cooperation
Sponsor: The United Nations Association of the U.S.
Objectives: As part of the U.S.-USA's Multilateral Project, to provide an opportunity for private citizens to participate in an examination of the possibilities for international cooperation in the peaceful uses of space; to examine programs and policy options and to develop a list of recommendations for the U.S. to pursue.

Study: The Crisis in Space and Earth Science
Sponsor: Space and Earth Science Advisory Committee, NASA Advisory Council
Objectives: To determine the nature of the changes under way in the environment of space and Earth Science programs; to understand the implications of those changes and to make recommendations to enable NASA to proceed with a long-term, productive program in space and Earth Sciences; to develop a more rational process for making decisions, especially concerning the selection of major new initiatives; to determine how to optimize the use of limited available resources in such a way as to construct the best possible scientific program.

Study: NASA Mixed Fleet Study
Sponsor: Office of Space Flight, NASA Headquarters
Objectives: To formulate an overall NASA mixed fleet launch strategy and policy for the periods 1982-1985 and 1985-2010. The tasks included an assessment of mission needs; a launch vehicle database; launch vehicle payload capture analysis; mixed fleet scenario definitions; and mixed fleet strategy and policy.

Study: NASA Life Sciences Working Group
Sponsor: Administrator's Long Range Planning Office, NASA Headquarters
Objectives: To identify the specific questions which must be answered in the life sciences related to humans in long-duration space flight; to outline the research program required to resolve each issue; to assess NASA's program in terms of the emphasis currently given to each issue.

Study: National Commission on Space Privatization Issues
Sponsor: Aerospace Industries Association of America, Inc
Objectives: To develop criteria to decide where, in the National Commission on Space road map, industry is likely to desire privatization; to identify most attractive candidates in NASA report for privatization; to suggest NASA actions and ground rules which will increase industry interest in privatization.

Study: U.S. Civil Space Program: An AIA Assessment
Sponsor: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Objectives: To conduct an analysis and detailed discussion of both urgent near- and mid-term and selected long-term issues affecting the U.S. civil space program. Four categories of issues were addressed: restoring momentum, maintaining space leadership, organizing and managing the civil space program, and building for the future.

Study: Task Force on Issues of a Mixed Fleet of Launch Systems
Sponsor: NASA Advisory Council
Objectives: To examine the issues and questions, and make recommendations to NASA concerning a new policy to conduct the nation's space flight program with a mixed fleet of launch vehicles. The Task Force addressed three principal issues: an appropriate mix of Shuttle and expendable launch vehicles; appropriate policies and practices for NASA to use in planning and providing launch services; the role NASA should play with respect to current efforts to promote further commercialization of space launch services.

Study: Assessment of the Soviet Space Program
Sponsor: Administrator's Long Range Planning Office, NASA Headquarters
Objectives: To undertake a technical review of the capabilities of the Soviet space program to include transportation and launch systems, piloted programs, and space science programs.

Study: Task Force on Space Program Goals
Sponsor: NASA Advisory Council
Objectives: To assess the work conducted by NASA to respond to the National Commission on Space report and advise in the formulation of any plans, with the emphasis on near-term goals, objectives, program thrusts, and broad policy issues identified by the task force.
Study: Microgravity Materials Science Assessment Task Force
Sponsor: Administrator's Long Range Planning Office, NASA Headquarters
Objectives: To determine NASA's role in research, technology development, and hardware development; to identify essential areas of research; to assess NASA's role in assisting its customers interested in the TNs; to develop a plan for using the Shuttle, Spacehabs, free-fliers, and Space Station for microgravity processing research.

Study: A Strategy for Space Biology and Medical Science
Sponsor: Space Science Board, National Academy of Sciences
Objectives: To develop a strategy for space biology and medical science for the 1980s and 1990s; to identify and describe those areas of fundamental, scientific investigation in space biology and medicine that are both exciting and important to pursue; to develop the foundation of knowledge and understanding that will make long-term, piloted space habitation and, or exploration feasible.

Study: Educational Affairs Five-Year Plan
Sponsor: Educational Affairs Division, NASA Headquarters
Objectives: To develop a five-year plan to improve the quality of science, mathematics, and technology education in the nation's school systems and increase the talent pool of professional and technical personnel needed in the fields of aeronautics and space.

Study: Committee on Space Technology Needs for the Future
Sponsor: Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board, National Academy of Sciences
Objectives: To identify enabling and enhancing technology needed to support an aggressive civilian space program for the next 30 years, considering both mission goals and the need for reduced costs for acquisition and operations in space; review probable sets of space science, military, space applications, and piloted exploration missions; identify technologies needed to realize and support the defined missions; identify areas where new and innovative approaches are likely to produce exceptional systems, benefits, or new capabilities; define and prioritize a research and technology development program and identify projects and in-space research and technology needs to bring the necessary technology to a state of readiness.

Sponsor: Space Science Board, National Academy of Sciences
Objectives: To identify the major directions for space science for the years 1995-2015. The study was devoted to the review of six major disciplines: Fundamental Physics and Chemistry, Planetary/Lunar Exploration, Astronomy/Astrophysics, Earth Sciences, Solar/Space Plasmas, and Life Sciences.

Study: OSTP Comments and Recommendations on the National Commission on Space
Sponsor: Office of Science and Technology Policy, NASA Headquarters
Objectives: To develop a strategy on how to respond to the recommendations contained in the National Commission on Space report. This is intended to include a review of the current space-related policies and directives, as well as develop Presidential direction to appropriate agencies to examine the report and develop potential implementation plans.

Study: Task Force on International Policy and Program Issues
Sponsor: NASA Advisory Council
Objectives: To consider the long-range plans of NASA, other nations, and international bodies, with emphasis on opportunities for cooperative activities and alternative forms of such cooperation, as well as areas of present and potential competition; consider the use of international activities as instruments of foreign policy.

Study: Life Science Strategic Planning Study Committee
Sponsor: NASA Advisory Council
Objectives: Characterize present NASA life science programs; recommend major NASA life science research goals and objectives; project foreseeable progress in relevant life sciences and technologies; determine what research and development should be supported; formulate technical and scientific strategies to accomplish the selected objectives and goals.

Study: National Space Transportation and Support Study
Sponsor: Office of Space Flight, NASA Headquarters: Department of Defense
Objectives: To study the development of a second-generation space transportation system—making use of piloted and automated systems to meet the requirements of all users. A full range of options will be studied, including Shuttle-derived technologies and others. The study will examine the 1995-2010 time frame.
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34. Shuttle Launch: NASA

62
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