INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ASSESSMENT
OF THE
REACTION CONTROL
SYSTEM
Vol. 3 of 5

26 FEBRUARY 1988
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11140X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11140
ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6

LEAD AJ HARTMAN

IL ITEM

] *
X ]
N ]

A ]
/DELETE)

[ ]
[ ]
S.

FAILED OFF
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11141X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11141
ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1402
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11142X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ x ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11142
ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11143X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11143
ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11144X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-1

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11144
ITEM: RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

| CRITICALLY | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | CIL |
| FLIGHT HDW/FUNC | A | B | C |
| NASA [ 3 /1R ] | [ P ] | [ P ] | [ P ] | [ ] * |
| IOA [ 2 /1R ] | [ P ] | [ P ] | [ P ] | [ X ] |
| COMPARE [ N / ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ N ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
Adequate [ ]
Inadequate [ ]

REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11145X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11145
ITEM: RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 12

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1406
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11146X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11146
ITEM: RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 12

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2
NASA ID: FRCS-11147X
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11147
ITEM: RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 12

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1408
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11148X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11148
ITEM: RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 12

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88
C-1409
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11149X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11149
ITEM: RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 12

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11150X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11150
ITEM: RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

| ADEQUATE [ ] |
| INADEQUATE [ ] |

REMARKS:

LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11151X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2

NASA DATA:
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NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
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LEAD ANALYST:

FRCS
11151
RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13
D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11152X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11152
ITEM: RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
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REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1413
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11153X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11153
ITEM: RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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| COMPARE [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3/3 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11154X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11154
ITEM: RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1415
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11155X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2041-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ] NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11155
ITEM: RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1416
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11156X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2041-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11156
ITEM: RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

| CRITICALLY | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | CIL |
| FLIGHT | HDW/FUNC | A | B | C | ITEM |
| NASA | [ 3 /2R ] | [ P ] | [ P ] | [ P ] | [ ] | [ ] * |
| IOA | [ 3 /3 ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |
| COMPARE | [ /N ] | [ N ] | [ N ] | [ N ] | [ ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88

C-1417
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11157X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2041-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11157
ITEM: RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1418
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11158X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2041-2

ASSESSMENT DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11158
ITEM: RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11159X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2041-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11159
ITEM: RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1420
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11160
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-1
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11160
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11161X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11161
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

(ADD/DELETE)

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCG-11162X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ x ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCG
MDAC ID: 11162
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1423
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11163X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11163
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1424
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11164X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11164
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11165X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11165
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11166X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11166
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1427
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11167X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-1

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11167
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC A B C ITEM

NASA [3/2R] [P] [P] [P] [ ] *

IOA [3/2R] [P] [P] [P] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1428
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11168X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ x ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11168
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1429
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11169X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-1

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11169
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1430
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11170X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11170
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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| COMPARE [ / ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11711X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-2

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11171
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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IOA [3/3] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1432
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11172X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11172
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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COMPARE [ / ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1433
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11173X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11173
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1434
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11174X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11174
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11175X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-1

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11175
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1436
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11176X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11176
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1437
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11177X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11177
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1438
### APPENDIX C
### ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** FRCS-11178X  
**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KF-2037-2  
**NASA DATA:**  
- BASELINE [ ]  
- NEW [ X ]  

**SUBSYSTEM:** FRCS  
**MDAC ID:** 11178  
**ITEM:** MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17  
**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN

**ASSESSMENT:**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)

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**CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:** (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**

NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11179X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-1

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11179
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1440
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11180X  BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2042-1  NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11180
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1441
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-1181X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2042-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11181
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1442
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11182X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2042-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11182
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11183X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2042-2
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11183
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1444
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11184X  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2042-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS  
MDAC ID: 11184  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11185X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2038-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11185
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11186X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2038-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11186
ITEM: SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11187X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2038-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11187
ITEM:
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1448
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11189X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2038-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11189
ITEM:
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1450
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11190X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2033-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11190
ITEM: SWITCH ROTARY, RCS/OMS PROPELLANT QUANTITY GAUGE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

| CRITICALLY REDUNDANCY SCREENS | CIL |
| FLIGHT | HDW/FUNC | A | B | C | ITEM |
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| IOA [ 3 /3 ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88
C-1451
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11191X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2034-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11191
ITEM: SWITCH ROTARY, RCS/OMS PRESS

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC

REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A       B       C

CIL
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
LOSE DATA CONCERNING ULLAGE AND PRESSURES.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER AT THE MEETING ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1452
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11192X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2157-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11192
ITEM: METER, RCS/OMS PROPELLANT QUANTITY GAUGE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1453
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11193X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2158-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11193
ITEM: METER, RT OMS/RCS PRESSURE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS:  (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
LOSE ACCURATE DATA CONCERNING ULLAGE AND TANK PRESSURES.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER AT THE MEETING ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88
C-1454
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11194X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2158-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11194
ITEM: METER, LT OMS/RCS PRESSURE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
LOSE ACCURATE DATA CONCERNING ULLAGE AND TANK Pressures.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER AT THE MEETING ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1455
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11195X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2302-1

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11195
ITEM: SIGNAL CONDITIONER OF2

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1456
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11196X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11196
ITEM: SIGNAL CONDITIONER OF3
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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- IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
- COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

- [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

- ADEQUATE [ ]
- INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
SIGNAL CONDITIONER NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS ITS INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER AT THE MEETING ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88
C-1457
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11197X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2303-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11197
ITEM: SIGNAL CONDITIONER OF4

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC A B C ITEM

NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1458
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11198X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
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SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11198
ITEM: JET DRIVER (PRIMARY-ALL)
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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| IOA  | [ / ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |
| COMPARE | [ / ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

JET DRIVER FMEA HAS BEEN DELETED. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE RJDS WERE PART OF THE GN&C ANALYSIS. IOA RECOMMENDS A REFERENCE TO THE GN&C FMEAS BE MADE IN THE RCS EPD&C FMEAS.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11199X
NASA FMEA #: NONE

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11199
ITEM: JET DRIVER (PRIMARY-ALL)

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

JET DRIVER FMEA HAS BEEN DELETED. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE RJDS WERE PART OF THE GN&C ANALYSIS. IOA RECOMMENDS A REFERENCE TO THE GN&C FMEAS BE MADE IN THE RCS EPD&C FMEAS.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11200X
NEW [ ]
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11200
ITEM: JET DRIVER (VERNIER-ALL)
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
JET DRIVER FMEA HAS BEEN DELETED. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE RJDS WERE PART OF THE GN&C ANALYSIS. IOA RECOMMENDS A REFERENCE TO THE GN&C FMEAS BE MADE IN THE RCS EPD&C FMEAS.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1461
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11201X
NASA FMEA #: NONE

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11201
ITEM: JET DRIVER (VERNIER-ALL)

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
JET DRIVER FMEA HAS BEEN DELETED. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE RJDS WERE PART OF THE GN&C ANALYSIS. IOA RECOMMENDS A REFERENCE TO THE GN&C FMEAS BE MADE IN THE RCS EPD&C FMEAS.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11202X
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11202
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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| IOA  | [ 2 /1R ] | [ P ] | [ F ] | [ P ] | [ X ] |

COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
DIODES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THESE DIODES WERE PART OF THE HELIUM TANK ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THEY BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1463
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11203X
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11203
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
DIODES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE DIODES WERE PART OF THE HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THEY BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1464
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11204X
NASA FMEA #: NONE

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11204
ITEM: MICROSWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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| COMPARE    | [ N /N ]            | [ N ]| [ N ]| [ N ]| [ ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
MICROSWITCHES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE MICROSWITCH WAS PART OF THE HELIUM TANK ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11205X
NASA FMEA #: NONE

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11205
ITEM: MICROSWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC

REUNDANCY SCREENS
A
B
C

NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
MICROSWITCHES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE MICROSWITCH WAS PART OF THE TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1466
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11206X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11206
ITEM: MICROSWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL ITEM
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC A B C

NASA [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
MICROSWITCHES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE MICROSWITCH WAS PART OF THE TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1467
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11207X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11207
ITEM: MICROSWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
MICROSWITCHES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE MICROSWITCH WAS PART OF THE MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE 1-4 ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11208X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11208
ITEM: MICROSWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
MICROSWITCHES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE MICROSWITCH WAS PART OF THE MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE 1-4 ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11209X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11209
ITEM: MICROSWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
MICROSWITCHES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE MICROSWITCH WAS PART OF THE MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE 1-4 ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1470
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11210X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11210
ITEM: MICROSWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

CRITICALITY
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
MICROSWITCHES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.

SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE MICROSWITCH WAS PART OF THE MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE 1-4 ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11211X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2252-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11211
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

| BASELINE    | NEW |
| HDW/FUNC    |     |
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| (ADD/DELETE)                             |

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES IN CRITICALITY. B SCREEN SHOULD BE "NA" BECAUSE ISOLATION OF A LEAK IS A STANDBY FUNCTION.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1472
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11212X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2252-3
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11212
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

CRITICALITY
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC

REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A   B   C

NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES IN CRITICALITY. B SCREEN SHOULD BE "NA" BECAUSE ISOLATION OF A LEAK IS A STANDBY FUNCTION.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88   C-1473
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11213X
NASA FMEA #: NONE

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11213
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)  
ADEQUATE [ ]  INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLENTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

NO FMEA EXISTS FOR THIS FAILURE. CRITICALITY ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1474
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11214X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11214
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

NO FMEA EXISTS FOR THIS FAILURE. CRITICALITY ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11215X
NASA FMEA #: NONE

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11215
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

NO FMEA EXISTS FOR THIS FAILURE. CRITICALITY ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1476
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11216X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11216
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

NO FMEA EXISTS FOR THIS FAILURE. CRITICALITY ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.
**APPENDIX C**

**ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** FRCS-11217X  
**NASA FMEA #:** NONE  

**SUBSYSTEM:** FRCS  
**MDAC ID:** 11217  
**ITEM:** DIODE  

**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN

**ASSESSMENT:**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:**  
(If different from NASA)

| [ 2 /1R ] | [ P ] | [ F ] | [ P ] | [ A ] |

(ADD/DELETE)

* **CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:** (If applicable)  
  ADEQUATE [ ]  
  INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**

LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.

NO FMEA EXISTS FOR THIS FAILURE. CRITICALITY ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11218X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2270-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11218
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11219X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2266-1

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11219
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1480
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11220X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2266-1

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11220
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1481
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11221X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2258-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11221
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE, CAUSING LOSS OF VERNIERS THUS MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED CLOSED MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1482
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1302
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176A-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1302
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC

REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A     B     C

CIL
ITEM

NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *

IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1483
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1303
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176A-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1303
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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*CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1484
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1304
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176A-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1304
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE [ ] INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1305
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176A-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1305
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

| CRITICALLY | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | CIL |
| FLIGHT | FUNC | A | B | C |
| HDW/FUNC | | | | |

NASA [3/3] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

IOA [3/1R] [F] [F] [P] [X]

COMPARE [N] [N] [N] [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1486
# APPENDIX C
## ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1306  
**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KA-2176-1  
**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 1306  
**ITEM:** CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER  
**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)  

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)  

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**  
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1307
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1307
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1308
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1308
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE[ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1309
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1309
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1490
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1310
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176A-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1310
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1311
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176A-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1311
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1492
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1312
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176A-I

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1312
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
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REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1313
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176A-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1313
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1314
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1314
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1315
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1315
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1496
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1316
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1316
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *

IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1317
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1317
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

| CRITICALITY | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | CIL |
| FLIGHT HDW/FUNC | A | B | C | ITEM |
| NASA | [ 3 /1R ] | [ P ] | [ P ] | [ P ] | [ ] | * 
| IOA | [ 3 /1R ] | [ P ] | [ P ] | [ P ] | [ ] |

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1498
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1318
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2251-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1318
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1499
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1319
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2251-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1319
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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*CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1500
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1320
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2251-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1320
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

| CRITICALLY | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | CIL |
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| IOA | [ 3 /1R ] | [ F ] | [ P ] | [ P ] | [ X ] |

COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
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REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1501
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1321
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2251-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1321
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1502
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1322
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2252-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1322
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  NASA DATA:  BASELINE [ ]
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NASA FMEA #:  05-6KA-2252-2

SUBSYSTEM:  ARCS  NASA DATA:
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ITEM:  DIODE  NEW [ X ]

LEAD ANALYST:  D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS:  (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1504
### APPENDIX C

#### ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

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**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1324  
**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KA-2252-1  
**ITEM:** DIODE  
**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN

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| COMPARE| [ / ]     | [ N ] | [ ]   | [ ]   | [ N ] |

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)

| [ / ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |

(ADD/DELETE)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

| ADEQUATE | [ ] |
| INADEQUATE | [ ] |

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**REMARKS:**

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1325
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2252-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1325
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1506
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1326
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2267-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1326
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3/2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1507
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1327
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2267-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1327
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1508
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1328
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2251-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1328
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
**APPENDIX C**

**ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1329  
**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KA-2251-2

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 1329  
**ITEM:** DIODE

**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN

**ASSESSMENT:**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:**  (If different from NASA)

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**CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:**  (If applicable)

| ADEQUATE [ ] |
| INADEQUATE [ ] |

**REMARKS:**  
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1330
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2251-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1330
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1511
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1331
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2251-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1331
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1512
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1332
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2252-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1332
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1513
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1333
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2252-2

NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1333
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1514
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1334
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2252-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1334
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1515
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1335
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2252-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1335
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

NASA DATA:
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NEW [ x ]

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1516
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1336
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2267-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1336
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1337
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2267-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1337
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1518
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1338
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202A-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1338
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1519
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1339
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202A-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1339
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1520
**APPENDIX C**

**ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**NASA DATA:**  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]  

**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1340  
**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KA-2202A-1  

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 1340  
**ITEM:** DRIVER, HYBRID  

**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN  

**ASSESSMENT:**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* **CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:** (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**  
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1341
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1341
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1342
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1342
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1343
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1343
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1344
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1344
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1525
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1345
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1345
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1526
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1346
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2201-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1346
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

| CRITICALLY | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | CIL |
| FLIGHT | HDW/FUNC | A | B | C | ITEM |
| NASA | [ 3 /3 ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | * |
| IOA | [ 3 /3 ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |
| COMPARE | [ / ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1527
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1347
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2201-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1347
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1528
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1348
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2201A-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1348
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1529
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1349
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2201-2
NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ] NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1349
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

(ADD/DELETE)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1530
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1350
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202A-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1350
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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| NASA | [ 3 /1R ] | [ P ] | [ P ] | [ P ] | [ ] * |
| IOA  | [ 3 /1R ] | [ P ] | [ F ] | [ P ] | [ X ] |

SUMMARY:

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1531
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1351
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202A-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1351
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1532
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1352
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202A-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1352
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)  ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS: NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1353
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1353
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

| CRITICALLY | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | CIL |
| FLIGHT | HDW/FUNC | A | B | C | ITEM |
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| IOA | [ 3 /IR ] | [ F ] | [ F ] | [ P ] | [ X ] |
| COMPARE | [ / ] | [ N ] | [ N ] | [ ] | [ N ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1534
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1354
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1354
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1535
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1355
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1355
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1536
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1356
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1356
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
**APPENDIX C**

**ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** *(If different from NASA)*

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*(ADD/DELETE)*

**CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:** *(If applicable)*

| ADEQUATE [ ] |
| INADEQUATE [ ] |

**REMARKS:**

NO DIFFERENCES.

**REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1538**
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1358
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SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1358
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3/2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1539
## APPENDIX C
### ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1359  
**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KA-2201-2

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 1359  
**ITEM:** DRIVER, HYBRID  
**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN

**NASA DATA:**  
- **BASELINE [ ]**  
- **NEW [ X ]**

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 1359  
**ITEM:** DRIVER, HYBRID  
**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN

### ASSESSMENT:

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* **CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:** (If applicable)

**ADEQUATE [ ]**  
**INADEQUATE [ ]**

**REMARKS:**  
**NO DIFFERENCES.**

**REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1540**
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1360
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2201A-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1360
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3/2R] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1541
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1361  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2201-2  

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1361  
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID  

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN  

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

|            |                     | [ ] |
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1542
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1362
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2001-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1362
ITEM: FUSE, 1A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1543
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1363
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2001-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1363
ITEM: FUSE, 1A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1544
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1364
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2001-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1364
ITEM: FUSE, 1A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1545
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1365
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1365
ITEM: FUSE, 1A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88
C-1546
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1366
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ x ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1366
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1547
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1367
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1367
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1548
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1368
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1368
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

| CRITICALITY | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | CIL |
| FLIGHT | A | B | C |
| HDW/FUNC | | | |

| NASA | [ 3 /3 ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | * |
| IOA | [ 3 /3 ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | |

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1549
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1369
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1369
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1550
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1370
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1370
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1371
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1371
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88

C-1552
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1372
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1372
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1553
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1373
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1373
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1554
APPENDIX C
ASSessment WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1374
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1374
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1555
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1375
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1375
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1556
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1376
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2078-I

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1376
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1557
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1377
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2078-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1377
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

(ADD/DELETE)

REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88

C-1558
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1378
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1378
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1559
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1379
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [  X  ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1379
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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| COMPARE     | [ / ]    | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

| [ / ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88   C-1560
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1380
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1380
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88    C-1561
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1381
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1381
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
 IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1562
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88                            NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1382                            BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-1                           NEW [ X   ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1382
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1383
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1383
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1564
### APPENDIX C
### ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1384  
**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KA-2076-1  

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 1384  
**ITEM:** RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W  

**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN  

**NASA DATA:**  
**BASELINE [ ]**  
**NEW [ X ]**  

**ASSESSMENT:**  

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:**  
(If different from NASA)  

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:  
(If applicable)  
ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]  

**REMARKS:**  
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1385
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1385
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1566
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1386
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1386
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1567
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1387
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1387
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER (SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1568
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1388
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1388
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1389
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1389
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER (SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1570
APPENDIX C

ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1390  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-1  

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1390  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W  
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1571
APPENDIX C  
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1391  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-1

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1391  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1572

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER (SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1392
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2078-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1392
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88

C-1573
**APPENDIX C**

**ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1393  
**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KA-2078-1

**NASA DATA:**  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 1393  
**ITEM:** RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN

**ASSESSMENT:**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]  [ P ]  [ P ]  [ P ]  [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

**REPORT DATE 2/26/88**  
**C-1574**
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1394
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1394
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

| [ 3 /2R ] | [ P ] | [ P ] | [ P ] | (ADD/DELETE) |

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

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REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1575
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1395
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1395
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1576
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1396
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1396
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1397
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1397
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1578
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1398
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS 
MDAC ID: 1398 
ITEM: L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: 

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12076X-12080X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1579
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1399 
NASA FMEA #: 

NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS 
MDAC ID: 1399 
ITEM: L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH 

LEAD ANALYST: 

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC A B C ITEM

NASA [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

IOA [3 /1R] [P] [P] [P] [ ] [ ] [ ]

COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12076X-12080X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1580
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:             NASA DATA:  
ASSESSMENT ID:           ARCS-1400       BASELINE [  ]  
NASA FMEA #:          1400              NEW [  ]  
SUBSYSTEM:         ARCS  
MDAC ID:              1400  
ITEM:              L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH  

LEAD ANALYST:      

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)  
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)  
ADEQUATE [  ]  
INADEQUATE [  ]  

REMARKS:  
HELLEUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE- 
ANALYZED BY IOA.  SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12076X-12080X.  

REPORT DATE 2/26/88             C-1581
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1401
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [  ]
NEW [  ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1401
ITEM: L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

| CRITICALITY | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | CIL ITEM |
| FLIGHT | HDW/FUNC | A | B | C |
| NASA | [ / ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | * |
| IOA | [ 3 /3 ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |
| COMPARE | [ N /N ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [  ]
INADEQUATE [  ]

REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12076X-12080X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1582
APPENDIX C  
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID:  ARCS-1402  
NASA FMEA #:  

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  NEW [ ]  

SUBSYSTEM:  ARCS  
MDAC ID:  1402  
ITEM:  L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN  
CONTACTS 1, 2  

LEAD ANALYST:  

ASSESSMENT:  

| CRITICALITY | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | CIL ITEM |
| HDW/FUNC | A | B | C |
| NASA [ / ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | * |
| IOA [ 3 /3 ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |
| COMPARE [ N /N ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS:  (If different from NASA)  

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  (ADD/DELETE)  

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:  (If applicable)  

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]  

REMARKS:  
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B Switches RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.  SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12076X-12080X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1403
NASA FMEA #: 

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1403
ITEM: L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN
CONTACTS 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST: 

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
HEL IUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12076X-12080X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1404
NASA FMEA #: 

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1404
ITEM: L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN
CONTACTS 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST: 

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12076X-12080X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1585
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1405
NASA FMEA #: [ ]

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1405
ITEM: L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH CLOSE
CONTACTS 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

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| COMPARE | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12076X-12080X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1586
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1406 
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ] NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS 
MDAC ID: 1406 
ITEM: L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6 

LEAD ANALYST: 

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12076X-12080X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1587
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1407
NASA FMEA #: 

NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1407
ITEM: L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN
CONTACTS 7, 8

LEAD ANALYST: 

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12076X-12080X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1588
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID:  ARCS-1408  
NASA FMEA #:  
NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]  

SUBSYSTEM:  ARCS  
MDAC ID:  1408  
ITEM:  L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8  
CONTACTS 7, 8  
LEAD ANALYST:  

ASSESSMENT:  

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)  
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)  
ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]  

REMARKS:  
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.  SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12076X-12080X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  
C-1589
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1409 
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1409
ITEM: L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH GPC
CONTACTS 9, 10

LEAD ANALYST: 

ASSESSMENT:

| CRITICALITY | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | CIL |
| FLIGHT | HDW/FUNC | A | B | C | ITEM |
| NASA | [ ] / [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | * |
| IOA | [ 3 / 3 ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | |
| COMPARE | [ N / N ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ ] / [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12076X-12080X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSessment date: [ ]
Assessment ID: ARCS-1410
NASA FMEA #: [ ]

NASA data:
Baseline [ ] New [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1410
Item: L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH GPC
Contacts 9, 10

Lead Analyst:

Assessment:

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Recommendations: (If different from NASA)
[ ] / [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL Retention Rationale: (If applicable)
Adequate [ ] Inadequate [ ]

Remarks:
Helium Oxidizer and Fuel Isolation Valve A & B Switches Re-Analyzed by IOA. See Assessment IDs ARCS 12076X-12080X.

Report Date 2/26/88 C-1591
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1411 
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
Baseline [ ] 
New [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1411
ITEM: L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH CLOSE
CONTACTS 11, 12

LEAD ANALYST: 

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS: HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12076X-12080X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1592
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1412 
NASA FMEA #: 

NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1412
ITEM: L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 11, 12

LEAD ANALYST: 

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12076X-12080X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1413  NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2151-1 BASELINE [ ]
               NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1413 ITEM:
ITEM: L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH TALKBACK

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

| CRITICALITY | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | CIL |
| HDW/FUNC | A | B | C |
|-----------|---------------|-----|
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| IOA [ 3 /1R ] | [ P ] | [ P ] | [ P ] | [ ] |
| COMPARE [ /N ] | [ N ] | [ N ] | [ N ] | [ ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1594
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1414
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1414
ITEM: L/R HE OX TANK PRESS-1 PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1415  NEW [ X ]
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1415
ITEM: L/R HE OX TANK PRESS-1 PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1596
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1416
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1416
ITEM: L/R HE FU TANK PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
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REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1417
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1417
ITEM: L/R HE FU TANK PRESS-1 PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1598
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1418
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1418
ITEM: L/R HE OX TANK PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1599
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSessment DATE: 1/29/88
ASSessment ID: ARCS-1419
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1419
ITEM: L/R HE OX TANK PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88   C-1600
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1420
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1420
ITEM: L/R HE FU TANK PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
  
  ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1601
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1421
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1421
ITEM: L/R HE FU TANK PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1602
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1422
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203360-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1422
ITEM: L/R HE OX TANK TEMP-1 TEMP SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1423
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203360-1
NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1423
ITEM: L/R HE OX TANK TEMP-1 TEMP SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1604
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1424
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203360-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1424
ITEM: L/R HE FU TANK TEMP-1 TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

**NASA DATA:**
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

**ASSESSMENT:**

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1605
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1425
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203360-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1425
ITEM: L/R HE FU TANK TEMP-1 TEMP SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1606
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1426
NASA FMEA #: [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1426
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1607
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [date]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1427
NASA FMEA #: [ID]

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1427
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

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FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC

REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A   B   C

NASA [ ] [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1608
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1428 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1428 ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
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REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1609
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1429 BASELINE [ ]
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SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1429
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

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MDAC ID: 1430
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
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REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1611
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1431 
NASA FMEA #: 

NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS 
MDAC ID: 1431 
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER 

LEAD ANALYST: 

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
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REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1612
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: ___________ NASA DATA:
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NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS MDAC ID: 1432
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12086X-12101X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1613
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1433 BASELINE [ ]
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SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1433
ITEM: DIODE

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12086X-12101X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1614
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12107X-12124X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88   C-1615
**APPENDIX C**
**ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

**ASSESSMENT DATE:**
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1435
**NASA FMEA #:**

**NASA DATA:**
- Baseline [ ]
- New [ ]

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS
**MDAC ID:** 1435
**ITEM:** DIODE

**LEAD ANALYST:**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)

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* **CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:** (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**

LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12107X-12124X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1436
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SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12107X-12124X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1617
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1437
NASA FMEA #: [ ]

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1437
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: [ ]

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12107X-12124X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1618
APPENDIX C  
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1438
NASA FMEA #: ARCS-1438
NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1438
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: 

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12107X-12124X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88       C-1619
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1439
NASA FMEA #: [ ]
NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ] NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1439
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: [ ]

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12107X-12124X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1620
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1440  
NASA FMEA #:  
NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]  

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1440  
ITEM: DIODE  

LEAD ANALYST:  

ASSESSMENT:  

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)  

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)  

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]  

REMARKS:  
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12107X-12124X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1441
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1441
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC

NASA [ ]
IOA [ 2 /1R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12107X-12124X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1622
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1442 
NASA FMEA #: 

NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS 
MDAC ID: 1442 
ITEM: DIODE 

LEAD ANALYST: 

ASSESSMENT: 

CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL ITEM
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC A B C 

NASA [ / / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ * ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]

COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] 

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS: 
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 DIODES RE- 
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12130X-12145X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1623
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1443 
NASA FMEA #: 

NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS 
MDAC ID: 1443 
ITEM: DIODE 

LEAD ANALYST: 

ASSESSMENT:

| CRITICALITY | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | CIL |
| HDW/FUNC | A | B | C | ITEM |
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| IOA [ 3 /2R ] | [ F ] | [ P ] | [ P ] |
| COMPARE [ N /N ] | [ N ] | [ N ] | [ N ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12130X-12145X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1624
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1444  
NASA FMEA #:  
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1444  
ITEM: DIODE  
LEAD ANALYST:  

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12151X-12166X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1445 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS 
MDAC ID: 1445 
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12151X-12166X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1626
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1446
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1446
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 1, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER MCA #2 DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12192X-12207X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1627
**APPENDIX C**

**ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

**ASSESSMENT DATE:**

**NASA DATA:**

**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1447

**NASA FMEA #:**

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS

**MDAC ID:** 1447

**ITEM:** DIODE

**LEAD ANALYST:**

**ASSESSMENT:**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)

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*(ADD/DELETE)*

**CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:** (If applicable)

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**REMARKS:**

AFT MANIFOLD 1, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER MCA #2 DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12192X-12207X.

**REPORT DATE 2/26/88**

C-1628
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1448
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2269-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1448
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3/2R] [P] [P] [P] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD FALSELY FAILING THE VALVES CLOSED. NOTE: DIODES INCORRECTLY DRAWN ON VS70-943099 SHEET 44 FOR THE AFT RIGHT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1449
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2269-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1449
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA. NOTE: DIODES INCORRECTLY DRAWN ON VS70-943099 SHEET 44 FOR THE AFT RIGHT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1630
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID:  ARCS-1450  
NASA FMEA #:  

SUBSYSTEM:  ARCS  
MDAC ID:  1450  
ITEM:  DIODE  

LEAD ANALYST:  

ASSESSMENT:  

CRITICALITY  
FLIGHT  
HDW/FUNC  

NASA [ / ]  
IOA [ 3 /2R ]  
COMPARE [ N /N ]  

RECOMMENDATIONS:  (If different from NASA)  

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)  

REMARKS:  
AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER MCA #2 DIODES  
RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12208X-12223X.  

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]  

REDUNDANCY SCREENS  
A   B   C  
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(ADD/DELETE)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  
C-1631
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1451
NASA FMEA #: 

NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1451
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: 

ASSESSMENT: 

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
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(REM) (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS: 
AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER MCA #2 DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12208X-12223X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1632
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1452
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2269-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1452
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD FALSELY FAILING THE VALVES CLOSED. NOTE: DIODES INCORRECTLY DRAWN ON VS70-943099 SHEET 44 FOR THE AFT RIGHT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1453
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2269-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1453
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA. NOTE: DIODES INCORRECTLY DRAWN ON VS70-943099 SHEET 44 FOR THE AFT RIGHT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE.
### APPENDIX C
#### ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

**ASSESSMENT DATE:**

**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1454

**NASA FMEA #:** NASA

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS

**MDAC ID:** 1454

**ITEM:** DIODE

**LEAD ANALYST:**

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- IOA [ 3 /2R ]  [ F ]  [ P ]  [ P ]  [ X ]
- COMPAR [ N /N ]  [ N ]  [ N ]  [ N ]  [ N ]

**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)

[ / ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]  [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**

AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER MCA #3 DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12224X-12239X.

**REPORT DATE 2/26/88**

C-1635
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1455 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1455
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER MCA #3 DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12224X-12239X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1636
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1456
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2269-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1456
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATION.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1457
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2269-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1457
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1638
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:                   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1458            BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #:                        NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1458
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

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RECOMMENDATIONS:  (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE MCA #3 DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12240X-12255X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1639
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1459 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1459
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE MCA #3 DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12240X-12255X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1640
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1460
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2269-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1460
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [    ]
NEW [  X  ]

CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC A   B   C ITEM

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [    ]
INADEQUATE [    ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATION.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1641
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1461
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2269-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1461
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1642
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1462 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1462
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1643
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1463
NASA FMEA #: [ ]
NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ] NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1463
ITEM: DIODE

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1644
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1464
NASA FMEA #: [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1464
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1645
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID:  ARCS-1465  
NASA FMEA #:  

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]  

SUBSYSTEM:  ARCS  
MDAC ID:  1465  
ITEM:  DIODE  

LEAD ANALYST:  

ASSESSMENT:  

| CRITICALITY | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | CIL |
| FLIGHT | HDW/FUNC | A | B | C | ITEM |
| NASA [ ] / [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] * |
| IOA [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] |
| COMPARE [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS:  (If different from NASA)  
[ ] / [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)  
ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
APT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY.  SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  

C-1646
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1466
NASA FMEA #: [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1466
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: [ ]

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1467
NASA FMEA #: [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1467
ITEM: DIODE

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| COMPARE [ N /N ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1648
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID:  ARCS-1468
NASA FMEA #:  
NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:  ARCS  
MDAC ID:  1468  
ITEM:  DIODE

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RECOMMENDATIONS:  (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:  (If applicable)  
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  
C-1649
APPENDIX C  
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID:  ARCS-1469  
NASA FMEA #:  

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]  

SUBSYSTEM:  ARCS  
MDAC ID:  1469  
ITEM:  DIODE  

LEAD ANALYST:  

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RECOMMENDATIONS:  (If different from NASA)  

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:  (If applicable)  

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]  

REMARKS:  
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  
C-1650
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1470 
NASA FMEA #: 

NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ ] 

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS 
MDAC ID: 1470 
ITEM: DIODE 

LEAD ANALYST: 

ASSESSMENT: 

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS: 
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 
C-1651
## APPENDIX C
### ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

**ASSESSMENT DATE:**
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1471
**NASA FMEA #:** ARCS-1471

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS
**MDAC ID:** 1471
**ITEM:** DIODE

**LEAD ANALYST:**

**ASSESSMENT:**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1652
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1472
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2206-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [  ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1472
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1653
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1473
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2206-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1473
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS:  (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1654
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1474
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2206-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1474
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1475
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2206-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1475
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

*CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1476
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2207A-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1476
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3/2R] [P] [P] [P] [ ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1657
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1477
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2207A-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1477
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1658
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1478
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2207-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1478
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ITEM

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

CIL

ITEM

NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1479
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2207-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1479
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 / 3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1660
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1480
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2219-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1480
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

CIL

ITEM

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC

A

B

C

NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1661
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1481
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2219-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1481
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1482
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2207A-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1482
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1663
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1483
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2207A-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1483
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1664
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1484
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2207-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1484
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3/2R] [P] [P] [P] [D] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1485
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2207-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1485
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1666
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1486
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2219-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1486
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALLY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC A B C ITEM
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1667
**APPENDIX C**
**ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1487  
**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KA-2219-2  

**NASA DATA:**
- **BASELINE** [ ]
- **NEW** [ x ]

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 1487  
**ITEM:** DRIVER, HYBRID  
**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN

**ASSESSMENT:**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)

- [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

- ADEQUATE [ ]
- INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**

NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

**REPORT DATE 2/26/88**

C-1668
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1488
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2217-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1488
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3 /2R] [P] [P] [P] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1669
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1489
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2217-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1489
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1670
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1490
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2217-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1490
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3/2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1671
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1491
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2217-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1491
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88
C-1672
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1492
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2217-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1492
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3/2R] [P] [P] [P] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1673
### APPENDIX C
#### ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1493  
**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KA-2217-2

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 1493  
**ITEM:** DRIVER, HYBRID

**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN

**ASSESSMENT:**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)

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**REMARKS:**  
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

**ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.**
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1494
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2217-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1494
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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| COMPARE | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1675
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1495
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2217-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1495
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3/2R] [P] [P] [P] [P] [ ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1676
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1496
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1496
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88

C-1677
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1497
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1497
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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| COMPARE      | [ /N ]    | [ N ] | [ N ] | [ N ] | [ ] |   |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

| [ / ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1678
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1498
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1498
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1679
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1499
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-2
NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ]
            NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1499
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1680
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1500
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1500
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAYCause
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1681
**APPENDIX C**

**ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1501  
**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KA-2208-2  
**NASA DATA:**  
- BASELINE [ ]  
- NEW [ X ]  

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 1501  
**ITEM:** DRIVER, HYBRID  
**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN

**ASSESSMENT:**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

**REPORT DATE** 2/26/88  
**C-1682**
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1502
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1502
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1683
### APPENDIX C
#### ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1503  
**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KA-2208-2  

**ADDEO DATA:**  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 1503  
**ITEM:** DRIVER, HYBRID  

**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN

**ASSESSMENT:**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

**REPORT DATE** 2/26/88  
C-1684
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1504
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1504
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
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IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

AUDACIOUS [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
**APPENDIX C**

**ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1505  
**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KA-2208-2  

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 1505  
**ITEM:** DRIVER, HYBRID  
**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN

**NASA DATA:**  
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**NEW [ X ]**

**ASSESSMENT:**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)

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**REMARKS:**

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

**REPORT DATE 2/26/88**

**C-1686**
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1506
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1506
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ATEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1507
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1507
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1688
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1508
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1508
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
### APPENDIX C
#### ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1509  
**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KA-2208-2

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 1509  
**ITEM:** DRIVER, HYBRID

**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN

**ASSESSMENT:**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:**  
(If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* **CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:**  
(If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

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**REPORT DATE 2/26/88**  
**C-1690**
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1510
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1510
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1511
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-2

ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1511
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1692
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1512
NASA FMEA #: NASA DATA: 
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS 
MDAC ID: 1512
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST:

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COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1693
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID:  ARCS-1513 
NASA FMEA #: 

NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:  ARCS
MDAC ID:  1513
ITEM:  DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: 

ASSESSMENT:

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COMPARE [ N/N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.
## APPENDIX C
### ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

**ASSESSMENT DATE:**

**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1514

**NASA FMEA #:**

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS

**MDAC ID:** 1514

**ITEM:** DRIVER, HYBRID

**LEAD ANALYST:**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

**ADEQUATE** [ ]

**INADEQUATE** [ ]

**REMARKS:**

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

**REPORT DATE 2/26/88**

C-1695
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1515
NASA PMEA #: NASA DATA: 
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS BASELINE []
MDAC ID: 1515 NEW []
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1696
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1516
NASA FMEA #:  
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1516
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST:  
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NEW [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1697
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1517
NASA FMEA #: [ ]

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1517
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST:

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| I/OA        | 3 /3              | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY I/OA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1698
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID:  ARCS-1518  
NASA FMEA #:  
NASA DATA:  BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:  ARCS  
MDAC ID:  1518  
ITEM:  DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

| CRITICALITY | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | CIL ITEM |
| FLIGHT | HDW/FUNC | A | B | C |
| NASA | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] * |
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| COMPARE | [ N /N ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS:  (If different from NASA)  
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)  

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:  (If applicable)  
ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY.  SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1699
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1519
NASA FMEA #: [ ]

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1519
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST:

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COMPARISON [ N/N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1700
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1520
NASA FMEA #: [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1520
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1701
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [Blank]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1521
NASA FMEA #: [Blank]

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1521
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: [Blank]

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1702
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID:  ARCS-1522  
NASA FMEA #:  
NASA DATA:  BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]  

SUBSYSTEM:  ARCS  
MDAC ID:  1522  
ITEM:  DRIVER, HYBRID  

LEAD ANALYST:  

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RECOMMENDATIONS:  (If different from NASA)  

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:  (If applicable)  

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]  

REMARKS:  
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.  

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  
C-1703
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID:  ARCS-1523  
NASA FMEA #:  
NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]  

SUBSYSTEM:  ARCS  
MDAC ID:  1523  
ITEM:  DRIVER, HYBRID  

LEAD ANALYST:  

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RECOMMENDATIONS:  (If different from NASA)  

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:  (If applicable)  

ADEQUATE [ ]  
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REMARKS:  
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY.  SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1524
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2003-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1524
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
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REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1525
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2003-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1525
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1706
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1526
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2004-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1526
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1707
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1527
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2004-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1527
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1528
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2016-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1528
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1529  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2016-1  

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1529  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A  
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN  

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)  
ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  
C-1710
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1530
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2016-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1530
ITEM: FUSE, 1A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1531
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2014-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1531
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1712
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1532
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2014-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1532
ITEM: FUSE, 1A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

Adequate [ ]

Inadequate [ ]

REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1713
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1533
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2014-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1533
ITEM: FUSE, 1A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1714
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1534
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1534
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1535
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2005-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1535
ITEM: FUSE, 1A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1716
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1536
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2005-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1536
ITEM: FUSE, 1A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1537
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2005-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1537
ITEM: FUSE, 1A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1718
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1538
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2005-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1538
ITEM: FUSE, 1A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1539 
NASA FMEA #: 

NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ ] 

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS 
MDAC ID: 1539 
ITEM: FUSE, 1A 

LEAD ANALYST: 

ASSESSMENT: 

| CRITICALITY | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | CIL |
| FLIGHT HDW/FUNC | A | B | C | ITEM |
| NASA [ ] / [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] * |
| IOA [ 3 /3 ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |
| COMPARE [ N /N ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ ] / [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE) 

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 

REMARKS: 
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1720
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1540
NASA FMEA #: [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1540
ITEM: FUSE, 1A
LEAD ANALYST:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1541
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2136-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1541
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1722
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1542
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2136-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1542
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1542
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO CLOSE THE 1/2 VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1723
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1543
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2136-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1543
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1724
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1544
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2136-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1544
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO CLOSE THE 1/2 VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1545
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2126-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1545
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED OPERATIONS THUS LOSS OF MISSION. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING AN RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1726
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1546
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2126-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1546
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1727
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1547
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2126-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1547
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:

* ADEQUATE [ ]
* INADEQUATE [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2/2] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A] (ADD/DELETE)

REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED OPERATIONS THUS LOSS OF MISSION. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING AN RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88    C-1728
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1548
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2126-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1548
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1549
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2137-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1549
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

C-1730
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1550
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2137-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1550
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALLY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC A B C ITEM

NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *

IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]

COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO CLOSE 3/4/5 VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING RTLS/TAL MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1731
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1551
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2127-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1551
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
DISAGREE WITH BOTH. INABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A LEAK.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1732
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1552
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2127-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1552
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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| IOA 
[ 3 /1R ] | [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]   | [ X ]  |
| COMPARE 
[ N / ]  | [ ] [ N ] [ ]       | [ ]   |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY SECOND LEG OF 3/4/5 AND CROSSFEED LEG. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS PROPELLANTS TO BE EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1733
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1553
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2137-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1553
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88    C-1734
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1554
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2137-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1554
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALLY  REDUNDANCY SCREENS  CIL
FLIGHT                         HDW/FUNC       A    B    C       ITEM

NASA  [ 2 /1R ]           [ P ]       [ F ]       [ P ]       [ X ] *
IOA   [ 2 /2 ]           [ ]        [ ]        [ ]         [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ]           [ N ]       [ N ]       [ N ]       [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
Adequate [ ]
Inadequate [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE
INABILITY TO CLOSE 3/4/5 VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED
CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS. INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED DURING RTLS/TAL MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1555
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2127-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1555
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
DISAGREE WITH BOTH. INABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A LEAK.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1736
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1556
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2127-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1556
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1556
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE
THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED
BY SECOND LEG OF 3/4/5 AND CROSSFEED LEG. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
PREVENTS PROPELLANTS TO BE EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1557
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1557
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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| IOA [ 3 /2R ]  | [ P ] | [ F ] | [ P ] | [ X ] |
| COMPARE [ /N ] | [ ]   | [ N ] | [ ]   | [ ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO CROSSFEED WITH THE GPC. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH SWITCH AND OTHER GPC COMMANDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO CROSSFEED, THUS LOSS OF MISSION.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1738
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1558
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1558
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK. NOTE: NASA FMEA INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIES RELAY 56V76A116K44. IT SHOULD BE 56V76A116K46.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1559
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1559
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO CROSSFEED WITH THE GPC. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH SWITCH AND OTHER GPC COMMANDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO CROSSFEED, THUS LOSS OF MISSION.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1560
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1560
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADERATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1741
### APPENDIX C
### ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88

**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1561

**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KA-2132-1

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS

**MDAC ID:** 1561

**ITEM:** RELAY

**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN

**ASSESSMENT:**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:**

(If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* **CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:**

(If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

---

**REPORT DATE:** 2/26/88

C-1742
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1562
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2132-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1562
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1743
**APPENDIX C**  
**ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1563  
**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KA-2132-1  

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 1563  
**ITEM:** RELAY  
**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN  

**NASA DATA:**  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

**CIL ITEM**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)  
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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)  
ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

**REPORT DATE** 2/26/88  
C-1744
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1564
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2132-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1564
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1565
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1565
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO CROSSFEED WITH THE GPC. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH SWITCH AND OTHER GPC COMMANDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO CROSSFEED, THUS LOSS OF MISSION.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1566
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1566
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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| NASA       | [ 2 /1R ]         | [ P ] | [ F ] | [ P ] | [ X ] * |
| IOA        | [ 2 /2 ]          | [ ]   | [ ]   | [ ]   | [ X ]   |
| COMPARE    | [ /N ]            | [ N ] | [ N ] | [ N ] | [ ]     |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

| [ 3 /1R ] | [ P ] | [ NA] | [ P ] | [ D ] |

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1567
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1567
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
REdundancy Screens
CIL ITEM
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
A B C
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO CROSSFEED WITH THE GPC. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH SWITCH AND OTHER GPC COMMANDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO CROSSFEED, THUS LOSS OF MISSION.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1748
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1568
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1568
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ D ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
**APPENDIX C**
**ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1569  
**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KA-2132-1  
**NASA DATA:**  
- BASELINE [ ]  
- NEW [ X ]  

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 1569  
**ITEM:** RELAY  
**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN

**ASSESSMENT:**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:**  
(If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:  
(If applicable)

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**REMARKS:**

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

**REPORT DATE 2/26/88**

C-1750
APPENDIX C  
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1570
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2132-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1570
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ D ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
**APPENDIX C**

**ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1571  
**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KA-2132-1

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 1571  
**ITEM:** RELAY  
**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN

**ASSESSMENT:**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* **CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:** (If applicable)

  ADEQUATE [ ]  
  INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

**REPORT DATE 2/26/88**  
**C-1752**
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1572
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2132-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1572
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1753
### APPENDIX C
### ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1573  
**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KA-2128A-1

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 1573  
**ITEM:** RELAY

**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN

**ASSESSMENT:**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

**REMARKS:**

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

**REPORT DATE 2/26/88**  
**C-1754**
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1574
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128A-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1574
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. WITH RELAY FAILED HIGH, LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.

AT MEETING WITH subsystem manager on 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 was discussed. It was agreed upon that the issue (multiple failures) was raised due to different interpretations of NSTS 22206. Therefore, this issue remains open.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1575
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1575
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1756
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1576
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1576
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT CAUSING LOSS OF JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS PROPELLANTS TO BE EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS. LOSS OF MANIFOLD THRUSTERS DURING RTLS/TAL ABORT COULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO COMPLETE A PROPELLANT DUMP (1/1 ABORT)

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1757
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1577
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128A-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1577
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1758
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1578
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128A-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1578
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1578
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. WITH RELAY FAILED HIGH, LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C  
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1579  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128-1  

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1579  
ITEM: RELAY  
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)  
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)  
ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  
C-1760
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1580  BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128-2  NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1580
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE
THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT CAUSING LOSS OF JETS.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS PROPELLANTS
TO BE EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
LOSS OF MANIFOLD THRUSTERS DURING RTLS/TAL ABORT COULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO COMPLETE A PROPELLANT DUMP (1/1 ABORT).

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1761
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1581
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128A-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1581
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1762
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1582
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128A-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1582
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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| IOA | [ 3 /3 ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |
| COMPARE | [ N /N ] | [ N ] | [ N ] | [ N ] | [ N ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

| [ 3 /1R ] | [ P ] | [ NA] | [ P ] | [ D ] |

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. WITH RELAY FAILED HIGH, LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1583
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1583
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1764
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1584
MDAC ID: 1584
ITEM: RELAY

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1584 MDAC ID: 1584 ITEM: RELAY LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

NASA DATA: NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128-2 BASELINE [ ] NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC A B C ITEM

NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]

COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT CAUSING LOSS OF JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS PROPELLANTS TO BE EXPULLED TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS. LOSS OF MANIFOLD THRUSTERS DURING RTLS/TAL ABORT COULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO COMPLETE A PROPELLANT DUMP (1/1 ABORT)

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1765
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1585
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1585
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1766
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1586
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1586
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT CAUSING LOSS OF JETS. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVEN occurrence of PROPELLANTS TO BE EXPULLED TO MEET LANDNG WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS. LOSS OF MANIFOLD THRUS DURING RTLS/TAL ABRRT COULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO COMPLETE A PROPELLANT DUMP (1/1 ABRRT)

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSES. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1767
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1587
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128A-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1587
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1768
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1588
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128A-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1588
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

| [ 3 /1R ] | [ P ] | [ NA] | [ P ] | [ D ] |

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. WITH RELAY FAILED HIGH, LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1589
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2081-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1589
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1590
NASA FMEA #: 

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1590
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

ASSESSMENT:

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| IOA  | [ 3 /3 ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |
|COMPARE| [ N /N ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

| [ / ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THIS RESISTOR AS A FAILURE (FAILED SHORT). RLR TYPE RESISTORS CANNOT FAIL SHORT.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1771
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1591
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2081-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1591
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1772
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1592
NASA FMEA #: NASA DATA:

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS BASELINE [ ]
MDAC ID: 1592 NEW [ X ]
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

IOA INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THIS RESISTOR AS A FAILURE (FAILED SHORT). RLR TYPE RESISTORS CANNOT FAIL SHORT.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1593
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2083-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1593
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC

REduNDANCY SCREENS
A    B    C

ITEM

NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
 THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1774
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1594
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2083-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1594
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1775
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1595
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2083-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1595
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBILY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1596
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2083-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1596
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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ADD/DELETE

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1597
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2082-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1597
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1778
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1598
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2082-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1598
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT CREDIBLE. IOA
RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1779
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1599
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2083-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1599
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ] INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1780
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1600
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2083-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1600
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1781
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1601
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2082-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1601
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1782
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1602
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2082-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1602
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER (SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1783
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1603
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2081-1
NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1603
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

| CRITICALITY |
| FLIGHT     |
| HDW/FUNC   |

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1784
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1604
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2081-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1604
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1785
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88

NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2081-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1605
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1606
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1606
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THIS RESISTOR AS A FAILURE (FAILED SHORT). RLR TYPE RESISTORS CANNOT FAIL SHORT.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1607
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1607
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDACY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1788
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1608
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1608
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

NASA DATA:
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NEW [ X ]

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THIS RESISTOR AS A FAILURE (FAILED SHORT). RLR TYPE RESISTORS CANNOT FAIL SHORT.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1789
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1609
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2084-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1609
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1790
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1610
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2084-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1610
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

(ADD/DELETE)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1791
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1611
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1611
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1792
**APPENDIX C**

**ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1612  
**NASA FMEA #:**  
**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 1612  
**ITEM:** RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W  
**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN  

**ASSESSMENT:**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)  
ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**  
IOA INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THIS RESISTOR AS A FAILURE (FAILED SHORT). RLR TYPE RESISTORS CANNOT FAIL SHORT.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1613
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2085-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [    ]
NEW [  X  ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1613
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1794
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1614
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2085-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1614
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER (SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1795
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1615
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2085-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1615
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1796
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1616
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2085-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1616
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1797
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1617
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2085-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1617
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1798
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1618
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2085-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1618
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

| CRITICALITY | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | CIL |
| HDW/FUNC | A | B | C |
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| COMPARE | [ / ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1799
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1619
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1619
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

| CRITICALITY | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | CIL |
| HDW/FUNC | A | B | C | ITEM |
| NASA | [3/3] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] * |
| IOA | [3/3] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |
| COMPARE | [ / ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3/2R] [P] [P] [P] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1800
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1620
NASA FMEA #: 

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1620
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

IOA INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THIS RESISTOR AS A FAILURE (FAILED SHORT). RLR TYPE RESISTORS CANNOT FAIL SHORT.
APPENDIX C  
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1621  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2084-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1621  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W  
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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NASA [2/1R] [P] [F] [P] [X] *

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3/2R] [P] [P] [P] [D]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  
C-1802
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1622
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2084-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1622
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1803
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1623
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1623
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1804
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1624
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1624
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1805
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1625
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2084-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1625
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C  
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1626  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2084-2  
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1626  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W  
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  
C-1807
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1627
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1627
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1808
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1628
NASA FMEA #: NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1628
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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| IOA [ 3 /3 ] | [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] | [ ] [ ] |
| COMPARE [ N /N ] | [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] | [ ] [ ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

IOA INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THIS RESISTOR AS A FAILURE (FAILED SHORT). RLR TYPE RESISTORS CANNOT FAIL SHORT.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1629
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2085-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1629
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3/2R] [P] [P] [P] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

*CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1810
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1630
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2085-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1630
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER (SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1811
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1631
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1631
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1812
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1632
NASA FMEA #:

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1632
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

IOA INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THIS RESISTOR AS A FAILURE (FAILED SHORT). RLR TYPE RESISTORS CANNOT FAIL SHORT.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1633
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1633
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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| COMPARE [ / ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1814
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1634
NASA FMEA #: NASA

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1634
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THIS RESISTOR AS A FAILURE (FAILED SHORT). RLR TYPE RESISTORS CANNOT FAIL SHORT.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1635
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1635
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1816
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1636
NASA FMEA #: NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1636
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(REM: ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THIS RESISTOR AS A FAILURE (FAILED SHORT). RLR TYPE RESISTORS CANNOT FAIL SHORT.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1817
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1637
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2084-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1637
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC

REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C

CIL
ITEM

NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
 THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1818
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1638
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2084-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1638
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

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REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1819
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1639
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2108-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1639
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1820
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1640
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2108-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1640
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER (SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1821
APPENDIX C

ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1641
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1641
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1822
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1642
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1642
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1823
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1643
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2103-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1643
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

ITEM
NASA [ 2 /1R ] REDUNDANCY SCREENS
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
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COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1824
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1644
NASA FMEA #: NONE

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1644
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS THIS RESISTOR IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1825
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1645
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2103-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1645
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1646
NASA FMEA #: NONE

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1646
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

| [ 3 /3 ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |   |

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS THIS RESISTOR IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1647
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1647
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1828
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1648
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1648
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESMENT:

CRITICALITY

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IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER (SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1829
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1649
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2103-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1649
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1830
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1650
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1650
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS THIS RESISTOR IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1831
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1651
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1651
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3/2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1832
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1652
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-1
NASA ID: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1652
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1833
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1653
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2108-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1653
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1654
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2108-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1654
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER (SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REMARKS:

REPORT DATE 2/26/88
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1655
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1655
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1836
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1656
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1656
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER (SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1837
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1657
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2108-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1657
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC A B C ITEM

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1838
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1658
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2108-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1658
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88
C-1839
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1659
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1659
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC

REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A   B   C

CIL ITEM

NASA [ 3/3 ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] *

IOA [ 3/3 ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ]

COMPARE [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3/2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [   ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]

INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1840
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1660
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1660
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1660
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC

REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A   B   C

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ]
COMPARE [ / ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1841
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1661
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2103-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1661
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC

REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C

CIL
ITEM

NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *

IOA [ 3 /3 ]

COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREfore, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1842
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1662
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1662
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS THIS RESISTOR IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1843
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1663
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2103-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1663
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1844
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1664
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1664
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS THIS RESISTOR IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1845
APPENDIX C

ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1665
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1665
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1846
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1666
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1666
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER (SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1847
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1667
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2103-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1667
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1848
APPENDIX C  
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1668  
NASA FMEA #: NONE  
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1668  
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W  
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

| [3/3] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | (ADD/DELETE) |

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS THIS RESISTOR IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  
C-1849
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1669
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-1
NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ] NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1669
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1850
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1670
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1670
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL ITEM
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC A B C ITEM

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER (SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1851
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADUQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1852
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1672
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2108-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1672
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER (SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1853
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1673
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1673
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3/2R] [P] [P] [P] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1854
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1674
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1674
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1675
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1675
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

*CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1676
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1676
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER (SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1857
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1677
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1677
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1858
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1678
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1678
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88   C-1859
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1679
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1679
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1860
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1680
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1680
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1681
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1681
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1862
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1682
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1682
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1863
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1683
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2089-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1683
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ]  [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1864
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1684
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2089-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1684
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. Hartman

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1865
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1685
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1685
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1866
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

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| LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN |

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A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER (SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1687
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [  ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1687
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL RECURDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1868
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1688
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1688
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER (SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1869
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1689
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1689
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1870
## APPENDIX C

### ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1690  
**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KA-2087-1  
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**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 1690  
**ITEM:** RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W  
**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)  
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* **CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:** (If applicable)  
  ADEQUATE [ ]  
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**REMARKS:**  
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

**ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER (SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).**
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1691
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1691
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1872
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1692
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1692
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. Hartman

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88

C-1873
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1693
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-I

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1693
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1874
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1694
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1694
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1875
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1695
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1695
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1876
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1696
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1696
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER (SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1877
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1697
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2089-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1697
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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| COMPARE | [N/N] | [N] | [N] | [N] |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3/2R] [P] [P] [P] [D] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1878
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1698
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2089-2
NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1698
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1699
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1699
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

| CRITICALLY | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | CIL |
| HDW/FUNC    |                  | ITEM |
| FLIGHT      |                  |     |
| A           | B                | C    |

NASA [3/3] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [3/3] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3/2R] [P] [P] [P] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1880
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1700
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1700
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

|         |         |         | [ ]   |
|         |         |         | (ADD/DELETE) |

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER (SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1881
**APPENDIX C**

**ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1701  
**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KA-2088-1  
**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 1701  
**ITEM:** RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W  
**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN

**ASSESSMENT:**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]  
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

**REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1882**
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1702
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1702
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1883
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1703
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1703
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1884
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1704
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1704
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1885
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1705
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1705
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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COMPARE [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1886
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1706
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1706
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER (SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1887
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1707
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1707
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1888
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1708
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1
NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1708
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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| COMPARE     | [ / ]  | [   ] | [   ] | [   ] | [ ] | *

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1889
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1709
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1709
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1890
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1710
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1710
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER (SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1891
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1711
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2089-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1711
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBILY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1712
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2089-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1712
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1893
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1713
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   X   ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1713
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1894
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1714
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1714
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER (SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1715
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1
NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ] NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1715
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1896
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1716
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1716
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1897
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1717
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1717
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1898
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1718
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1718
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1899
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1719
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1719
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1900
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1720
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1720
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

| CRITICALLY  | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | CIL |
| FLIGHT HDW/FUNC | A | B | C | ITEM |
| NASA [ 3 /3 ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] * |
| IOA [ 3 /3 ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1901
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1721
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ x ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1721
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1722
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1722
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1903
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1723
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1723
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3/2R] [P] [P] [P] [P] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADVERTISE [ ]
INADVERTISE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1904
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1724
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1724
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1905
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1725
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2089-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1725
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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IOA [3/3] [] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [N/N] [N] [N] [N] [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/2R] [P] [P] [P] [P] [D] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1906
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1726
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2089-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1726
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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| IOA  |  [ 3 /3 ] |   |   |   |   |   | [ ] |   |
|COMPARE |  [ / ] |   |   |   |   |   | [ ] |   |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSessment ID: ARCS-1727
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL Retention Rationale: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

This Failure May cause Loss of Accurate Indication of the Valve Position. Redundancy Provided. Loss of All Redundancy May lead to FALSELY failing the Valve Closed, Possibly Effecting Mission Operations.

Issue Not resolved at meeting with subsystem manager on 1/20/88.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1728
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1728
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

| CRITICALLY | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | CIL |
| FLIGHT | A | B | C |
| HDW/FUNC | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |
| NASA | [ 3 /3 ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | * |
| IOA | [ 3 /3 ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |
| COMPARE | [ / ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1909
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1729
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1729
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

*ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1910
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1730
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1730
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.

ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1911
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ] NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1731 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: [ ] NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1731
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

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| IOA  | [ 3 /3 ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |
| COMPARE | [ N /N ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1912
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1732
NASA FMEA #: 

NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1732
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: 

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1913
**APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

**ASSESSMENT DATE:**

**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1733

**NASA FMEA #:**

**NASA DATA:**

**BASELINE** [ ]

**NEW** [ ]

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS

**MDAC ID:** 1733

**ITEM:** RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

**LEAD ANALYST:**

**ASSESSMENT:**

**CRITICALITY**

**REDUNDANCY SCREENS**

**CIL ITEM**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)

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* **CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:** (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

**REPORT DATE** 2/26/88 C-1914
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ] NASA DATA: [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1734 NASA FMEA #: [ ]
MDAC ID: 1734 NEW [ ]
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1735
NASA FMEA #: [ ]
NASA DATA: [ ]
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1735
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1916
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1736
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1736
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: 

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1917
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [Blank]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1737
NASA FMEA #: [Blank]

NASA DATA: BASELINE [Blank] NEW [Blank]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1737
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: [Blank]

ASSESSMENT:

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1918
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1738 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1738
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1919
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1739 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1739
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1920
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:                  NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID:  ARCS-1740          BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #:                        NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:  ARCS
MDAC ID:  1740
ITEM:  RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST:  

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RECOMMENDATIONS:  (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1921
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1741
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1741
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: 

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88
C-1922
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1742
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ] NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1742
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: 

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1923
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1743 
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1743
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: 

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1924
### APPENDIX C
### ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

**ASSESSMENT DATE:**

**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1744

**NASA FMEA #:**

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS

**MDAC ID:** 1744

**ITEM:** RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

**LEAD ANALYST:**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)

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**REMARKS:**

**AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.**

**REPORT DATE 2/26/88**

C-1925
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1745 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1745
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1926
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1746
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1746
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: 

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1927
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1747
NASA FMEA #: [ ]

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1747
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12081X-12085X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1928
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1748  
NASA FMEA #:  
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1748  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12081X-12085X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1929
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1749 
NASA FMEA #: 

NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ ] 

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS 
MDAC ID: 1749 
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH 

LEAD ANALYST: 

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12081X-12085X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1930
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1750
NASA FMEA #: NASA DATA:

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ]
MDAC ID: 1750  NEW [ ]
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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*CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12081X-12085X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1931
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1751
NASA FMEA #: [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:
ARCS
MDAC ID: 1751
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 1, 2

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12081X-12085X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1932
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1752  
NASA FMEA #:  
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]  

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1752  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4  

LEAD ANALYST:  

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)  
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*CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)  
ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]  

REMARKS:  
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12081X-12085X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ASSESSMENT DATE]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1753
NASA FMEA #: [NASA FMEA #]

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1753
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12081X-12085X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1754 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS 
MDAC ID: 1754 
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6 
LEAD ANALYST: 

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12081X-12085X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1755 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1755
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE
CONTACTS 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12081X-12085X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1756 
NASA FMEA #: 

NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ ] 

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS 
MDAC ID: 1756 
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8 

LEAD ANALYST: 

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 

ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 

REMARKS: 
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12081X-12085X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1937
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1757 
NASA FMEA #: 

NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ ] 

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS 
MDAC ID: 1757 
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLVS 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8 

LEAD ANALYST: 

ASSESSMENT: 

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| FLYING | ITEM |
| HDW/FUNC | A | B | C |
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| IOA | [ 3/2R ] | [ P ] | [ P ] | [ P ] | [ ] * |
| COMPARE | [ N/N ] | [ N ] | [ N ] | [ N ] | [ ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 

ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS: 
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12081X-12085X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1938
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1758 
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ ] 

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS 
MDAC ID: 1758 
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, 10 

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 

Adequate [ ] 
Inadequate [ ] 

REMARKS: 
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12081X-12085X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ] NASA DATA: [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1759 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: [ ] NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1759
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, 10

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12081X-12085X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1940
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1760 
NASA FMEA #: 

NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS 
MDAC ID: 1760 
ITEM: CONTACTS 11, 12 

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE [ ] INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12081X-12085X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1941
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID:  ARCS-1761  
NASA FMEA #:  
NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]  
SUBSYSTEM:  ARCS  
MDAC ID:  1761  
ITEM:  L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE  
CONTACTS 11, 12  
LEAD ANALYST:  
ASSESSMENT:  

| CRITICALITY | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | CIL ITEM |
| FLIGHT | HDW/FUNC | A | B | C | |
| NASA | [ / ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | |
| IOA | [ 3 /1R ] | [ P ] | [ F ] | [ P ] | [ X ] | |
| COMPARE | [ N /N ] | [ N ] | [ N ] | [ N ] | [ N ] | |

RECOMMENDATIONS:  (If different from NASA)  
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)  
ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]  

REMARKS:  
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED 
BY IOA.  SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12081X-12085X.  

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  
C-1942
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1762 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: NASA [ ]
NASA FMEA #: IOA [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS NEW [ ]
MDAC ID: 1762
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12102X-12106X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1943
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1763
NASA FMEA #: NASA DATA:
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS NASA \\
MDAC ID: 1763 IOA \\
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ] INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12102X-12106X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1944
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1764 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS NASA [ ]
MDAC ID: 1764 IOA [ ]/IR
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12102X-12106X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1765 
NASA FMEA #: 

NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS 
MDAC ID: 1765 
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH OPEN 
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST: 

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
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REMARKS: 
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12102X-12106X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1946
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1766 
NASA FMEA #: 

NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ ] 

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS 
MDAC ID: 1766 
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH OPEN 
CONTACTS 1, 2 

LEAD ANALYST: 

ASSESSMENT: 

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A B C 

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COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] 

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 

REMARKS: 
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12102X-12106X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1947
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1767
NASA FMEA #: [ ]

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1767
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH GPC
CONTACTS 3, 4

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

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REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12102X-12106X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1948
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [Blank]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1768
NASA FMEA #: [Blank]

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1768
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VALV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH GPC
CONTACTS 3, 4

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12102X-12106X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12102X-12106X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:            NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID:    ARCS-1770      BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #:          NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:  ARCS
MDAC ID:  1770
ITEM:  L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12102X-12106X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88        C-1951
APPENDIX C  
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID:  ARCS-1771  
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NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:  ARCS  
MDAC ID:  1771  
ITEM:  L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH  

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:  (If applicable)  
ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.  SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12125X-12129X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  
C-1952
APPENDIX C  
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID:  ARCS-1772  
NASA FMEA #:  
NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:  ARCS  
MDAC ID:  1772  
ITEM:  L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH  
LEAD ANALYST:  
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RECOMMENDATIONS:  (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:  (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.  SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12125X-12129X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1773
NASA FMEA #: [ ]

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1773
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

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| FLIGHT | HDW/FUNC | A | B | C | ITEM |
| NASA | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |
| IOA | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |
| COMPARE | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12125X-12129X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1774 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1774
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12125X-12129X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1955
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1775  
NASA FMEA #:  
NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1775  
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12125X-12129X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1956
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1776 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1776
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC
CONTACTS 3, 4

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12125X-12129X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1957
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1777 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1777
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC
CONTACTS 3, 4

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12125X-12129X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID:  ARCS-1778  
NASA FMEA #:  

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]  

SUBSYSTEM:  ARCS  
MDAC ID:  1778  
ITEM:  L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6  

LEAD ANALYST:  

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RECOMMENDATIONS:  (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:  (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
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REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.  SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12125X-12129X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID:  ARCS-1779  
NASA FMEA #:  

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:  ARCS  
MDAC ID:  1779  
ITEM:  L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE  
CONTACTS 5, 6  

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)  
ADEQUATE [ ]  
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REMARKS:  
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12125X-12129X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  
C-1960
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1780
NASA FMEA #: [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1780
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN
CONTACTS 7, 8

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12125X-12129X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1961
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:        NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID:          BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #:            NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1781
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

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REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12125X-12129X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:     NASA DATA:  
ASSESSMENT ID:       BASELINE [ ]      
                      NEW [ ]       
NASA FMEA #:         

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS         
MDAC ID: 1782            
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC  
CONTACTS 9, 10          

LEAD ANALYST:         

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)  
ADEQUATE [ ]  
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REMARKS:  
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12125X-12129X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:  ARCS-1783
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:  ARCS
MDAC ID:    1783
ITEM:       L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC
CONTACTS 9, 10

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC

REUNDANCY SCREENS
A    B    C

CIL
ITEM

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RECOMMENDATIONS:  (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:  (If applicable)

REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA.  SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12125X-12129X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: ___________________________ NASA DATA: ___________________________
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1784 BASELINE [ ] NEW [ ]
NASA FMEA #: ___________________________

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1784
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE
CONTACTS 11, 12

LEAD ANALYST: ___________________________

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12125X-12129X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1785 
NASA FMEA #: 

NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS 
MDAC ID: 1785 
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE 
CONTACTS 11, 12 

LEAD ANALYST: 

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

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INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12125X-12129X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88
C-1966
**APPENDIX C**

**ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1786  
NASA FMEA #:  
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1786  
ITEM: MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH  
LEAD ANALYST:  
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)  
ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**  
MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH 36 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12167X-12171X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID:  ARCS-1787  
NASA FMEA #:  

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:  ARCS  
MDAC ID:  1787  
ITEM:  MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST:  

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY  REDUNDANCY SCREENS  CIL

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RECOMMENDATIONS:  (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:  (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH 36 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12167X-12171X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-1968
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1788 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1788
ITEM: MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH FEED FROM RIGHT OR
FEED FROM LEFT SWITCH CONTACTS

LEAD ANALYST:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH 36 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12167X-12171X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1969
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1789 
NASA FMEA #: 

NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ ] 

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS 
MDAC ID: 1789 
ITEM: MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH FEED FROM RIGHT OR 
FEED FROM LEFT SWITCH CONTACTS 

LEAD ANALYST: 

ASSESSMENT: 

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 

ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 

REMARKS: 
MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH 36 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE 
ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12167X-12171X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID:  ARCS-1790  
NASA FMEA #:  

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]  

SUBSYSTEM:  ARCS  
MDAC ID:  1790  
ITEM:  L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH  

LEAD ANALYST:  

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:  (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]  

REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.  SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12146X-12150X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1791 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS NASA DATA:
MDAC ID: 1791 BASELINE [ ]
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH NEW [ ]
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| FLIGHT | A | B | C | ITEM |
| HDW/FUNC | | | |
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| IOA [ 3 /1R ] | [ P ] | [ P ] | [ P ] | [ ] | *
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12146X-12150X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1972
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1792 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1792
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12146X-12150X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ] [ ] [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1793
NASA FMEA #: [ ] [ ]

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1793
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN
CONTACTS 1, 2

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12146X-12150X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1974
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1794 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1794
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN
CONTACTS 1, 2
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

Adequate [ ]

Inadequate [ ]

REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12146X-12150X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1975
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ] NASA DATA: [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1795 NASA FMEA #: [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS BASELINE [ ]
MDAC ID: 1795 NEW [ ]
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC
CONTACTS 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH REANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12146X-12150X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1796 
NASA FMEA #: 

NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS 
MDAC ID: 1796 
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC 
CONTACTS 3, 4 

LEAD ANALYST: 

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS: 
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12146X-12150X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1977
## APPENDIX C
### ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

**ASSESSMENT DATE:**  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1797  
**NASA FMEA #:**  

**NASA DATA:**  
**BASELINE [ ]**  
**NEW [ ]**

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 1797  
**ITEM:** L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE  

**CONTACTS 5, 6**

**LEAD ANALYST:**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**

LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12146X-12150X.

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**REPORT DATE 2/26/88**  
**C-1978**
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1798 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1798
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE
CONTACTS 5, 6

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12146X-12150X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1799
NASA FMEA #: [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1799
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 7, 8

LEAD ANALYST:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12146X-12150X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1980
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1800
NASA FMEA #: [ ]

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1800
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN
CONTACTS 7, 8

LEAD ANALYST: [ ]

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12146X-12150X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1981
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [Date]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1801
NASA FMEA #: [ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1801]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1801
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC
CONTACTS 9, 10
LEAD ANALYST: [LEAD ANALYST]

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

[ ] ADEQUATE [ ]
[ ] INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12146X-12150X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1982
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID:  ARCS-1802  
NASA FMEA #:  
SUBSYSTEM:  ARCS  
MDAC ID:  1802  
ITEM:  L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, 10  
LEAD ANALYST:  

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:  (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA.  SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12146X-12150X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1803 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1803
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 11, 12

LEAD ANALYST:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12146X-12150X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1984
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1804 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1804
ITEM: L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE
CONTACTS 11, 12

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12146X-12150X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1805  
NASA FMEA #:  
NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]  

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1805  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH  

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)  

ADEQUATE [ ]  
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REMARKS:  
AFT MANIFOLD 1, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12172X-12176X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  
C-1986
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1806
NASA FMEA #: [ ]

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1806
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 1, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12172X-12176X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1987
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1807 NASA FMEA #:
MDAC ID: 1807
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
ITEM:
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

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REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 1, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12172X-12176X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1988
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE [ ] INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 1, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12172X-12176X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1809
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1809
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CONTACTS 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

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REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 1, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12172X-12176X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1990
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [Date]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1810
NASA FMEA #: [FMEA #]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1810
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
CONTACTS 3, 4
LEAD ANALYST: [Name]

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*CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 1, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12172X-12176X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1991
### APPENDIX C
#### ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

**ASSESSMENT DATE:**
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1811
**NASA DATA:**
- BASELINE [ ]
- NEW [ ]

**NASA FMEA #:**
**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS
**MDAC ID:** 1811
**ITEM:** MANIFOLD 1, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
**CONTACTS 3, 4**

**LEAD ANALYST:**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

- ADEQUATE [ ]
- INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**
AFT MANIFOLD 1, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12172X-12176X.

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**REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1992**
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: ________________________
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1812
NASA FMEA #: ________________________

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1812
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST: ________________________

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
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INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 1, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12172X-12176X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1993
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1813
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1813
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
CONTACTS 

LEAD ANALYST: 

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS: AFT MANIFOLD 1, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12172X-12176X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1994
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1814 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1814
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

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REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12177X-12181X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1815
NASA FMEA #: [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1815
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

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ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12177X-12181X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1996
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1816
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ] NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1816
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: 

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
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REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12177X-12181X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1817 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1817
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CONTACTS 1, 2

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12177X-12181X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1998
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1818 
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS 
MDAC ID: 1818 
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN 
CONTACTS 1, 2 

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE [ ] INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS: 
AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12177X-12181X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1999
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1819  
NASA FMEA #:  
NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1819  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC  
CONTACTS 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:  
ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)  
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)  
ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:  
AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12177X-12181X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ] NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1820 NEW [ ]
NASA FMEA #: [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1820
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

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| FLIGHT HDW/FUNC | A | B | C | ITEM |
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| IOA [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |
| COMPARE [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12177X-12181X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2001
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1821
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1821
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

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FLIGHT HDW/FUNC A B C

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IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12177X-12181X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2002
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1822 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1822
ITEM: MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CONTACTS 5, 6
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12177X-12181X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2003
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ] NASA DATA: [ ]
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NASA FMEA #: [ ] NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS NASA DATA:
MDAC ID: 1823 BASELINE [ ]
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ] INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12182X-12186X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2004
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1824  
NASA FMEA #:  

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1824  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH  

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12182X-12186X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1825  
NASA FMEA #:  
NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
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SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1825  
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH  
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
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INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12182X-12186X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2006
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1826 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1826
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CONTACTS 1, 2

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12182X-12186X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2007
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1827 
NASA FMEA #: 

NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ ] 

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS 
MDAC ID: 1827 
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS 1, 2 

LEAD ANALYST: 

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS: 
AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12182X-12186X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-2008
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1828 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1828
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
CONTACTS 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12182X-12186X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2009
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1829
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1829
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST: 

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12182X-12186X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2010
### APPENDIX C
#### ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

**ASSESSMENT DATE:**

**NASA DATA:**
- BASELINE [ ]
- NEW [ ]

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS

**MDAC ID:** 1830

**ITEM:** MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6

**LEAD ANALYST:**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)

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* **CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:** (If applicable)
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  - INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**

AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12182X-12186X.

**REPORT DATE 2/26/88**

C-2011
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ] NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1831 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: [ ] NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1831
ITEM: MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CONTACTS 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL ITEM
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC A B C ITEM

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IOA [ 3 / 2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12182X-12186X.

REMARKS:

CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2012
**APPENDIX C**

**ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

**ASSESSMENT DATE:**

**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1832

**NASA FMEA #:**

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS

**MDAC ID:** 1832

**ITEM:** MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:**  (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**

MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12187X-12191X.

**REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2013**
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1833 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1833
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

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*CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12187X-12191X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2014
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1834
NASA FMEA #: [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1834
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12187X-12191X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2015
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [Insert Date]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1835
NASA FMEA #: [Insert Number]

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1835
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
COMMAND 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12187X-12191X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88
C-2016
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [Date]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1836
NASA FMEA #: [FMEA Number]

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1836
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
COMMAND 1, 2

LEAD ANALYST: [Name]

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12187X-12191X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2017
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1837 
NASA FMEA #:  
NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS 
MDAC ID: 1837 
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC 
COMMAND 3, 4

LEAD ANALYST: 

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RECOMMENDATIONS:  (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12187X-12191X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  
C-2018
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1838 
NASA FMEA #: 

NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] NEW [ ] 

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS 
MDAC ID: 1838 
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC 
COMMAND 3, 4 

LEAD ANALYST: 

ASSESSMENT: 

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FLIGHT HDW/FUNC A B C ITEM 

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IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE) 

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 

ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 

REMARKS: 
MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12187X-12191X. 

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2019
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1839 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1839
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
COMMAND 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS: MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12187X-12191X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2020
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1840 
NASA FMEA #: 

NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ ] 

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS 
MDAC ID: 1840 
ITEM: MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE 
COMMAND 5, 6 

LEAD ANALYST: 

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
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REMARKS: 
MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12187X-12191X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1841
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID: ARCS
ITEM: 1841

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1842 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1842
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2023
**APPENDIX C**

**ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

**ASSESSMENT DATE:**

**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1843

**NASA DATA:**

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS

**MDAC ID:** 1843

**ITEM:** MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH

**LEAD ANALYST:**

**ASSESSMENT:** ARCS-1843 NASA IOA [3/2R]

**COMPARE:** [N/N] [P] [P] [P] [P] [P] [N] [N] [N]

**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)

**REMARKS:**

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

**REPORT DATE 2/26/88**

C-2024
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1844
NASA FMEA #: NASA DATA:
NASA ID: BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1844
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CONTACTS 1, 2

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
**APPENDIX C**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)

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**REMARKS:**

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1846 BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1846
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
CONTACTS 3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2027
APPENDIX C  
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:  
ASSESSMENT ID:  ARCS-1847  
NASA FMEA #:  
NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM:  ARCS  
MDAC ID:  1847  
ITEM:  MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 3, 4  
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88          C-2028
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: ARCS-1848
NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ] NEW [ ]
NASA FMEA #: Subsystem: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1848
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CONTACTS 5, 6

LEAD ANALYST:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

[ ] ADEQUATE
[ ] INADEQUATE

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2029
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ] NASA DATA: [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1849 NASA FMEA #: [ ]
MDAC ID: 1849 BASELINE [ ]
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE NEW [ ]
CONTACTS 5, 6 NASA DATA:
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
MDAC ID: 1849
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CONTACTS 5, 6 NASA DATA:
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COMPARE [N/N] [N] [N] [N] [N] [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ] INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2030
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [__] NASA DATA: [__]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1850 BASELINE [__]
NASA FMEA #: NEW [__]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1850
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CONTACTS 7, 8

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2031
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1851 
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS 
MDAC ID: 1851 
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN 
CONTACTS 7, 8

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2032
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1852
NASA FMEA #: [ ]
NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1852
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, 10
LEAD ANALYST: [ ]

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2033
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:   NASA DATA:   BASELINE [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID:    ARCS-1853     NEW [ ]
NASA FMEA #:  

SUBSYSTEM:     ARCS  
MDAC ID:      1853  
ITEM:         MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC CONTACTS 9, 10

LEAD ANALYST:

ASSESSMENT:

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REDUNDANCY SCREENS

CIL

FLIGHT

HDW/FUNC

A   B   C

ITEM

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IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2034
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [ ] NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1854 NEW [ ]
NASA FMEA #: [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1854
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CONTACTS 11, 12

LEAD ANALYST: [ ]

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: [Date]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1855
NASA FMEA #: [FMEA ID]

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1855
ITEM: MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE CONTACTS 11, 12

LEAD ANALYST:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDS ARCS 12001X-12075X.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2036
**APPENDIX C**

**ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88

**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1856

**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KA-2159-1

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS

**MDAC ID:** 1856

**ITEM:** L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 & 3/4/5 SWITCH TALKBACK

**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN

**ASSESSMENT:**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* **CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:** (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**

AGREE WITH IOA ANALYSIS.

**REPORT DATE 2/26/88**

C-2037
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1857
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2153-1

SUBSYSTEM: MDAC
MDAC ID: 1857
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH TALKBACK

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1858
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2154-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1858
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH TALKBACK

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1858A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2154-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1858
ITEM: L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH TALKBACK
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/2R] [P] [P] [P] (ADD/DELETE)

*CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2040
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1859
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2155-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1859
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, L/R OX & FU VLV SWITCH TALKBACK

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2041
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1859A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2155-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1859
ITEM: MANIFOLD 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, L/R OX & FU VLV SWITCH TALKBACK

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.

ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2042
**APPENDIX C**
**ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1860  
**NASA FMEA #:** 03-2A-203350-2

**NASA DATA:**  
**BASELINE [ ]**  
**NEW [ X ]**

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 1860  
**ITEM:** L/R FU TANK ULLAGE PPRESS SENSOR

**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN

**ASSESSMENT:**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1861
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1861
ITEM: L/R FU TANK ULLAGE PPRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2044
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1862
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1862
ITEM: L/R FU TANK OUT PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88
C-2045
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1863
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1863
ITEM: L/R FU TANK OUT PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88   C-2046
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1864
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1864
ITEM: L/R OX TANK ULLAGE PPRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2047
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1865
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1865
ITEM: L/R OX TANK ULLAGE PPRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2048
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1866
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1866
ITEM: L/R OX TANK OUT PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2049
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1867
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1867
ITEM: L/R OX TANK OUT PRESS SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2050
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1868
BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203365-1
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1868
ITEM: L/R FU TANK TEMP-1 TEMP SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2051
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1869
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203365-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1869
ITEM: L/R FU TANK TEMP-1 TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88
C-2052
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1870
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203365-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1870
ITEM: L/R OX TANK TEMP-1 TEMP SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2053
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1871
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203365-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1871
ITEM: L/R OX TANK TEMP-1 TEMP SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2054
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1872
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1872
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSessment:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2055
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1873
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1873
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2056
# APPENDIX C
## ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1874  
**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KA-2179-2

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 1874  
**ITEM:** CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER  
**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN

**ASSESSMENT:**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**

NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
**APPENDIX C**

**ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1875  
**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KA-2179-1

**NASA DATA:**  
**BASELINE [ ]**  
**NEW [ X ]**

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 1875  
**ITEM:** CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN

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**COMPARE**
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**RECOMMENDATIONS:**  
(If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* **CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:**  
(If applicable)

**ADEQUATE [ ]**

**INADEQUATE [ ]**

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**REMARKS:**

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1876
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1876
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2059
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1877
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1877
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2060
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1878
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1878
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2061
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1879
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1879
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1880
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1880
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2063
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1881
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1881
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC

REUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C

ITEM

NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *

IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]

COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2064
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1882
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1882
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1883
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1883
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2066
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1884
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2
NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ] NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1884
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTEHLY OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1885
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1885
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
### APPENDIX C
### ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1886  
**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KA-2180-2  
**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 1886  
**ITEM:** CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER  
**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN  

**ASSESSMENT:**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**

NO DIFFERENCES.

**REPORT DATE 2/26/88**  
**C-2069**
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1887
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1887
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2070
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1888
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1888
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLT HDW/FUNC A B C ITEM

| NASA | [ 3 /1R ] | [ P ] | [ P ] | [ P ] | [ ] |
| IOA  | [ 3 /2R ] | [ P ] | [ P ] | [ P ] | [ ] |
| COMPARE | [ /N ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1889
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1889
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1890
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1890
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1891
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1891
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C

NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2074
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1892
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1892
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2075
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1893
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1893
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2076
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1894
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1894
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1895
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1895
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-2078
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1896
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1896
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1897
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1897
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-2080
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1898
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1898
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88
C-2081
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1899
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-1
NASA DATA:
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SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1899
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2082
### ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1900  
**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KA-2179-2

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 1900  
**ITEM:** CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER  
**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN

**ASSESSMENT:**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:**  
(If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:  
(If applicable)  
ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**  
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1901
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1901
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-2084
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1902
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1902
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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*(ADD/DELETE)*

*CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)*

ADEQUATE [  ]
INADEQUATE [  ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2085
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1903
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-1
NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1903
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2086
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1904
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2184-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1904
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3/3] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

Adequate [ ]
Inadequate [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1905
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2184-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1905
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2088
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1906
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2184-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1906
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2089
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1907
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2184-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1907
ITEM: CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS:  
(If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2090
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1908
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1908
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2091
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1909
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1909
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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*CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2092
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1910
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1910
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

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REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-2093
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1911
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1911
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2094
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1912
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1912
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2095
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1913
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1913
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

| CRITICALITY |
| FLIGHT HDW/FUNC |
| REDUNDANCY SCREENS |
| A | B | C |
| NASA | 3/1R | P | F | P | X |
| IOA | 3/2R | P | F | P | X |
| COMPARE | /N | | | |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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*CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2096
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1914
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-2

NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ]
           NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1914
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE [ ]
                                      INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2097
**APPENDIX C**
**ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1915  
**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KA-2259-1

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 1915  
**ITEM:** DIODE

**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* **CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:** (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1916
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1916
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC

REdundancy Screens
A B C

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
### APPENDIX C
#### ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1917  
**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KA-2259A-I  
**NASA DATA:**  
- **BASELINE:** [ ]  
- **NEW:** [ X ]  

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 1917  
**ITEM:** DIODE  
**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN

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* **CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:** (If applicable)  
**ADEQUATE** [ ]  
**INADEQUATE** [ ]

**REMARKS:**

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

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**REPORT DATE 2/26/88**  
C-2100
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1918
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2271-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1918
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1919
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2271-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1919
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL ITEM
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC A B C ITEM

NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2102
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1920
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1920
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2103
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1921
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1921
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2104
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1922
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1922
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

ASSESS:

CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2105
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1923
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1923
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1924
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1924
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2107
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1925
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1925
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2108
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1926
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1926
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2109
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1927
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1927
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-2110
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1928
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1928
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1929
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1929
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

NASA DATA:

BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC

REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A   B   C

ITEM

NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2112
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1930
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1930
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2113
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1931
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1931
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2114
APPENDIX C
ASSessment WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1932
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1932
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2115
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1933
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1933
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2116
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1934  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-2

NASA DATA:  
BASELINE [ ]  NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1934  
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1935
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-1
NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ] NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1935
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC  REDUNDANCY SCREENS  CIL ITEM

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-2118
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1936
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1936
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
A B C

NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1937
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1937
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2120
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1938
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1938
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-2121
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1939
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1939
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2122
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1940
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1940
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2123
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1941
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1941
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2124
APPENDIX C  
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID:  ARCS-1942  
NASA FMEA #:  05-6KA-2260-2  
NASA DATA:  
BASELINE   [ ]  
NEW        [ X ]  

SUBSYSTEM:  ARCS  
MDAC ID:    1942  
ITEM:       DIODE  

LEAD ANALYST:  D. HARTMAN  

ASSESSMENT:  

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:  (If applicable)  
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REMARKS:  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1943
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1943
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2126
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1944
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1944
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2127
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1945
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1945
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLT HDW/FUNC A B C ITEM

NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *

IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]

COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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.CG: ADD/DELETE

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2128
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ] NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1946
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2271-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1946
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2129
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1947
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2271-1
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MDAC ID: 1947
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2130
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1948
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-2

NASA DATA:
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SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1948
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1949
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1949
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2132
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1950
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1950
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1951
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1951
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2134
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1952
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1952
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88   C-2135
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1953
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1953
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2136
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1954
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-2

NASA DATA:
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SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1954
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LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
Adequate [ ]
Inadequate [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2137
**APPENDIX C**

**ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET**

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1955  
**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KA-2259-1  

**NASA DATA:**  
- **BASELINE [ ]**  
- **NEW [ X ]**

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 1955  
**ITEM:** DIODE  
**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN

**ASSESSMENT:**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)

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* **CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:** (If applicable)

- ADEQUATE [ ]
- INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**

- IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

**REPORT DATE 2/26/88**

C-2138
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1956
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1956
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88
C-2139
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1957
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1957
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2140
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1958
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1958
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2141
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1959
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1959
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2142
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1960
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1960
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1961
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1961
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2144
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1962
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1962
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2145
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1963
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1963
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2146
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1964
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1964
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1965
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1965
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1966
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-2
NASA DATA:
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NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1966
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2149
APPENDIX C  
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1967  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-1  

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 1967  
ITEM: DIODE  

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN  

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1968
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1968
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2151
### ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1969  
**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KA-2259-1  
**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 1969  
**ITEM:** DIODE  
**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN

**ASSESSMENT:** CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS  
**NASA DATA:**  

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)  

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)  

**REMARKS:**  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

**REPORT DATE 2/26/88**  
**C-2152**
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1970
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-2
NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ] NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1970
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2153
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1971
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1971
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88          C-2154
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1972
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1972
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2155
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1973
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1973
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
### APPENDIX C
### ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1974  
**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KA-2260-2

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 1974  
**ITEM:** DIODE  
**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN

**NASA DATA:**  
- BASELINE [ ]  
- NEW [ X ]

**ASSESSMENT:**

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:**  
(If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* **CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:** (If applicable)
  
ADEQUATE [ ]

INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1975
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1975
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2158
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1976
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2270-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1976
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2159
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1977
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2270-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1977
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2160
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1978
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2270-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1978
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1979
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2270-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1979
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
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REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2162
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1980
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1980
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1981
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1981
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2164
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1982
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1982
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2165
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1983
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1983
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALLY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC A B C ITEM

NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1984  BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2  NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1984
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSSESSMENT:

| CRITICALLY REDUNDANCY SCREENS | CIL |
| FLIGHT | A | B | C | ITEM |
| HDW/FUNC | | | | |
| NASA | [ 3 /1R ] | [ P ] | [ F ] | [ P ] | [ X ] * |
| IOA | [ 3 /2R ] | [ P ] | [ P ] | [ P ] | [ ] |
| COMPARE | [ /N ] | [ ] | [ N ] | [ ] | [ N ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING
ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
 THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1985
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1985
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]

COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:

IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2168
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1986
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1986
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALLY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC A B C ITEM

NASA [3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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*CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING
ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2169
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1987
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1987
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1988
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1988
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1989
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1989
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL ITEM
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC A B C ITEM

NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2172
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1990
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1990
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1991
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1991
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88
C-2174
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1992
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1992
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1993
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1993
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2176
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1994
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1994
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT HDW/FUNC A B C CIL ITEM

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2177
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1995
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1995
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2178
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1996
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2220-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1996
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC

REDUNDANCY SCREENS

CIL
ITEM

NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *

IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADECATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2179
### APPENDIX C
#### ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-1997  
**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KA-2220-1

**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 1997  
**ITEM:** DRIVER, HYBRID

**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN

**ASSESSMENT:** CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA)  

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)  

ADEQUATE [ ]  
INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**  
NO DIFFERENCES.

**REPORT DATE 2/26/88**  
**C-2180**
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1998
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2220-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1998
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2181
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1999
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2220-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1999
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2182
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2000
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2185-2

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2000
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER INADVERTENTLY OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2183
APPENDIX C  
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2001
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2185-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2001
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88        C-2184
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2002
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2185-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2002
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER INADVERTENTLY OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.

AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES) WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2185
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2003
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2185-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2003
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2186
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2004
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2008-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2004
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
HDW/FUNC A B C ITEM

NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2187
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2005
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2008-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2005
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2188
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2006
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2009-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2006
ITEM: FUSE, 2A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2007
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2009-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2007
ITEM: FUSE, 2A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-2190

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARC-2008
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2007-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2008
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2191
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2009
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2007-1

ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2009
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2007-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2009
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2192
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2010
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2008-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2010
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2193
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88  
ASSESSMENT ID:   ARCS-2011  
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2007-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS  
MDAC ID: 2011  
ITEM: FUSE, 1A  
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88  C-2194
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2012
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2008-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2012
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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| COMPARE | [ /N ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] | [ ] |

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2195
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2013
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2007-1
NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ] NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2013
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ] INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2196
### APPENDIX C
### ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

**ASSESSMENT DATE:** 1/29/88  
**ASSESSMENT ID:** ARCS-2014  
**NASA FMEA #:** 05-6KA-2009-1  
**SUBSYSTEM:** ARCS  
**MDAC ID:** 2014  
**ITEM:** FUSE, 2A  
**LEAD ANALYST:** D. HARTMAN

**NASA DATA:**  
**BASELINE** [ ]  
**NEW** [ X ]

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**RECOMMENDATIONS:**  
*(If different from NASA)*

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: *(If applicable)*

* ADEQUATE [ ]
* INADEQUATE [ ]

**REMARKS:**  
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

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**REPORT DATE 2/26/88**  
**C-2197**
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2015
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2008-1
NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ] NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2015
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2198
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2016
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2008-1
NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2016
ITEM: FUSE, 1A

LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88   C-2199
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2017
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2007-1

SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2017
ITEM: FUSE, 1A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC

REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A     B     C

CIL ITEM

ITEM

NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.

REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2200