ONBOARD PROCESSOR TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

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Abstract

In this short review paper, I discuss the general need and requirements for the onboard embedded processors necessary to control and manipulate data in spacecraft systems. I review the current known requirements from a user perspective, based on current practices in the spacecraft development process. I then discuss the current capabilities of available processor technologies, and project these to the generation of spacecraft computers currently under identified, funded development. I provide an appraisal of the current national developmental effort.

Introduction

By nature of an introduction, I will recite a number of assumptions that are embedded in the NASA practices of implementing missions. I will then bring some practical realities of implementing new embeddable computer resources into these missions.

A good reference for backup material for this paper is the "NASA Space Systems Technology Model" Volume IIB, Chapter 11. More current material is included in the GAO Report "Space Operations, NASA Efforts to Develop and Deploy Advanced Spacecraft Computers."

For NASA to "sell" a mission project, the program manager must assure NASA senior management that the technology to implement the mission is "in hand." The Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology in its "NASA Space Systems Technology Model" has embedded a seven-layer description of technology readiness for implementation. For those readers with experience with the military description of the process of technology development, these generally correspond to the levels of 6.1, 6.2, etc. Readiness level seven implies that the technology has been used successfully in the relevant environment, and it is essentially "off the shelf." The goal of every NASA program manager is to use this "off the shelf" technology in his mission to simultaneously minimize risk, minimize cost, and meet mission goals. To gain performance or short-term cost advantage, a mission project manager may use a technology that is a little less mature and incur a little risk. This use of technology at the level six, or engineering model tested implies that the technology is mature but has not been used successfully in the relevant environment. A typical flight program takes five years from inception or proposal to flight. A year is taken for mission definition and technology tradeoff studies, three years for subsystem or payload development and test, and a final year for system integration and flight vehicle integration and test.

Most researchers and technology developers within NASA, especially those supported by the Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology, perform basic research at level one, where the basic physical phenomenon is discovered; or at applied research at levels two through four, or five, where the physical phenomenon is engineered into a conceptual design, the conceptual design is tested, the critical functions are tested, and major components are tested. With increasing levels of complexity, there is an exponential increase in associated developmental cost, and an
increasing level of commitment required by the OAST program management from the project user program office to keep the expensive technology development from "withering on the vine." In the processor development area, there has never been sufficient resources made available from the OAST program to carry computer development to level seven. The computers that NASA uses have been primarily adapted from military or militarized commercial computers. An example of such a computer is the NASA Standard Spacecraft Computer that was repackaged for the space environment by the NASA Standard Parts Program, run by the NASA Chief Engineer's Office. The most recent example is the Galileo computer, the Harris 80C86, which is a redesigned gate level copy of the Intel 8086 with a radiation hard fabrication and a limited amount of single-event upset immunity.

Within the commercial semiconductor industry, there is a rule of thumb that the capability of a technology will double every three years. In order to maintain a product market in this rapidly expanding technology area, the semiconductor manufacturers must have an overlapping developmental program. The time necessary to develop each next generation manufacturing capability is two or three years. The time necessary to design the next generation component technology is three years. The time to win market share for a new processor is a year, and the useful manufacturing lifetime is about three years.

To build a processor in the current environment, there is a fifty-million-dollar engineering investment to design, to manufacture, to integrate hardware, and to develop software operating systems and higher level language compilers. This cost must be recoverable from sales and does not include the component production facility. The facility costs are roughly one hundred million to capitalize and forty million per year to operate. Every three to five years, with increasing complexity, this facility must be recapitalized.

This has brought about an apparent paradox. To propose and build in mission hardware, the hardware must be mature in the marketplace. With a five-year mission development cycle, by the time the hardware is launchable, it is no longer available in the marketplace. It has become obsolete. Thus, we are building systems of obsolete hardware. The components must be delivered from warehouses of obsolete parts. Since they are no longer manufactured, it is impossible to acquire more should the warehouse become depleted without significant capital and manufacturing costs, which are beyond the scope of the mission. Both the DoD and NASA have recognized this for years, but there appears to be no long-term solution. This is a characteristic of a growth technology.

The military and space semiconductor manufacturers are almost wholly captive to the military and space industries and thus the government. The system operating environments and requirements are significantly different; there is somewhat of a carryover of manufacturing methods and practices; and there is a higher cost at almost an exclusively government-subsidized marketplace. The government recognizes this and is attempting to help through sponsorship of the Very High Speed Integrated Circuit (VHSIC) program, the MMIC program, the GaAs pilot line facility, and most recently with Semitech. The industry recognizes this and has been attempting to remedy it through Microelectronics and Computing Corporation (MCC) and Semiconductor Research Corporation (SRC).

Thus there are fundamental differences in the requirements, cost, marketplace, schedules, and readiness that confound the use of current or next-generation commercial processing technology in the space mission environment.
Requirements of the Natural Space Environment on Processors

The space environment imposes a number of physical constraints on the hardware to be used in spacecraft payloads. The physical constraints which must be met are the vacuum of space which imposes the constraint that all the electronics must be conduction cooled to maintain junction temperatures and thus long time reliability. This is normally done at the subsystem level into a heat rejection system. This conduction cooling forces a mass penalty onto the launch vehicle. The more power there is to dissipate, the more massive the thermal distribution and dissipation. Power is also much more expensive to generate. This has traditionally forced acceptance of low power complementary logic families to reduce the static dissipation of power.

In the Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) logic, standby power is near zero, and all power is dissipated dynamically by changes of logic state. This implies that the processor hardware can be powered down by reducing the system clock, a simple concept that allows operational phase tradeoff between tasks to be processed and the available power. Thus the speed power product is of critical importance to optimize functionality. The spacecraft orbit for the particular spacecraft also is important. Low earth equatorial orbits are relatively inexpensive to reach, and the natural radiation is reduced by the earth's shadow and magnetosphere. High geostationary orbit is expensive because of the energy required to launch and the higher radiation environment. Polar orbit is more expensive to launch because the launch vehicle cannot take advantage of the earth's motion, and the radiation environment is much more severe because of the lack of shielding by the magnetosphere at the poles, and the low polar altitude of the Van Allen belts, which are encountered twice each orbital period for the life of the mission.

The natural radiation environment is not so severe as the military strategic weapons environment, but several constraints are similar. The hardware must be designed at the cell within the chip level to be total dose tolerant to the level of the expected mission orbital life. It must be latch-up free. With the development of logic at the 1.25 micrometer minimum feature size, the amount of charge that retains the logic level within the cells of the devices is less than that deposited by a cosmic ray passing through the cells of the device. Parasitic devices inadvertently designed into the devices by following best commercial packing rules allow virtual Silicon Controlled Rectifier devices to exist within the wells of a CMOS device. There is no gate to allow these devices to turn on, and there is no means to turn them off. These cosmic rays in traversing the whole spacecraft pass through these devices on a statistical basis and turn on the SCR devices. This causes catastrophic device failure. The cosmic rays also can upset the logic by simply overwriting memory cells in conventional memory or within registers in a CPU. The logic must be designed to be "bullet proof." This additional design constraint costs design specialization, design time, and chip area. This is in direct opposition to the marketplace drivers of the commercial chip developer.

The commercial chip developer is interested in maximizing the number of gates on a chip whose parameters are centered within the commercial, market-driven manufacturing production facility. With the incorporation of 1.25-micrometer technology into digital flight control systems on military and commercial aircraft which fly at higher altitudes, cosmic ray latch-up and upset will likely become significant drivers in the cost and system complexity of such systems. Conventional passenger aircraft normally fly significantly above the protection that the atmosphere provides for cosmic rays. In a normal transcontinental flight, the
typical radiation dose to a passenger is equivalent to a chest x-ray, primarily
caused by other charged particles, but with a cosmic ray component. When these
systems are finally flown, there will likely be many unexplained upsets identified in
the fault tolerant architectures. Whether these fault tolerant control systems can
recover their system integrity and state between single event upsets is yet to be
determined. Thus in the current integrated circuit technology epoch, there should be
a merging of aeronautics and space requirements in the cosmic ray area.

The remoteness of the environment imposes additional constraints. The hardware
must be testable on orbit to allow operational validation. Except for Shuttle-
reachable satellites, the hardware cannot be repaired during its operational life;
therefore, it must include a level of fault tolerance and must have carefully
predicted failure statistical models.

Mission cost is a primary driver. Individual NASA space missions simply cannot
afford to develop their own hardware as one-time developments. Another primary
driver is performance. No mission can accept performance that is unable to meet its
needs. The commercial sector has made great progress in its marketplace. The
adaptation of commercially manufactured products for the space environment is very
costly and involves significant redesign. Only few commercial vendors see this
government-only space marketplace as a place for long-term profitability.

Desirable Attributes of a Spaceborne Processor

The attached requirements and targets should be achievable by the mid 90's for
technology levels six and seven from a variety of sources. The Generic VHSIC
Spaceborne Computer, developed by IBM and Honeywell through the SDIO/AFSTC SAT 144
program for use in their BSTS currently offers the most short term promise over the
80C86 used in Galileo. On the technology horizon, the Rad Hard -32 bit processor,
under development by a variety of consortia through the SDIO/AFRADC SAT 143 program
SSTS, offers the next most promising processor epoch. The short term targets and
goals are centered on a GVSC multiprocessor specification.

Current Spaceborne Processor Capabilities

I have collected from various sources, including commercial product offerings,
spacecraft mission documents and developmental planning documents, a representative
collection of the currently available processors. I have included this collection in
Table 1 as Processor Characteristics. By best estimates, I have attempted to
categorize its suitability and readiness. I will discuss the characteristics that I
have identified as columns in the table. I have categorized these columns as:
performance, using standard instruction set mixes where available (including the
DAIS, and Whetstone which, primarily, have suitability for control-type algorithms
with some arithmetic); the power of the CPU chipset; the radiation hardness and
mechanisms; the self-testability; sponsors; and other remarks. In Table 2, I have
followed the same format, and have identified when the implementing CPU chipset was
or is planned to be ready for use in the radiation hard space environment, when the
memory management unit is ready, when a bus interface unit is ready, and when a gate
array for use in "glue logic" is ready. I must note here that a chipset and a
fabrication technology do not make a spacecraft computer. Also in columns are the
CPU-ALU width for performance, the size of the memory space directly addressable, and
the high level software tools available for the user programmer. An additional
survey was published in the June, 1989, issue of "Defense Science," in an article

Conclusions

The technology is sufficiently mature to build an experimental ISES. If EOS NPOP-I holds schedule, the SDIO/AFSTC-sponsored Generic VHSIC Spaceborne Computer hardware will be ready and "off the shelf." If the EOS NPOP-I schedule slips, the SDIO/AFRADC-sponsored Radiation Hard 32-bit processor, a RISC-MIPS-based chipset, will then be sufficiently mature for "off the shelf" use.
DESCRIPTION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR EMBEDDED PROCEDURES

0 PERFORMANCE - INSTRUCTION RATE FOR STD MIX, DAIS, WHETSTONE, DHRYSTONE, ETC.
0 POWER - CMOS TO SMALLEST FEATURE SIZE - PRIMARY IMPACT ON WEIGHT
0 WEIGHT - LEO, EQUATORIAL IS EXPENSIVE; POLAR IS VERY EXPENSIVE, GEO EVEN MORE
0 SIZE - TO MEET MOUNTING/ THERMAL INTERFACE
0 ENVIRONMENT
   o TEMPERATURE - MIL STD TEMPERATURE RANGES
   o VACUUM - OUTGASSING, HEAT FLOW
   o VIB - LAUNCH
   o EMI/RFI INTERNAL/EXTERNAL - CANNOT INTERFERE WITH SENSORS, CANNOT BE
     INTERFERED WITH IN PRESENCE OF HIGH POWER XMTRS, SAR
   o RAD HARD CMOS - SINGLE EVENT LATCH UP FROM COSMIC RAYS
     TOTAL DOSE - BENIGN ENVIRONMENT WITH POTENTIAL BELT CHARGING
     SINGLE EVENT UPSET FROM COSMIC RAYS
0 TESTABILITY - VALIDATION ON ORBIT
0 FAULT TOLERANCE - FAIL OPERATIONAL, FAIL SAFE, CANNOT CONTRIBUTE TO MISSION
   FAILURE
0 MTBF/MTBCF - CONSISTENT WITH MISSION LIFE
0 "SECURITY"/INTEGRITY - PROTECTION FROM INTRUDERS, ACCIDENTS

ISES REQUIREMENTS (R)/TARGETS (T)

0 PERFORMANCE: 25 MIPS AGGREGATE DAIS MULTIPROCESSOR (T)
0 POWER: 200 W (T)
0 WEIGHT: 40 KG (T)
0 SIZE: 1/2 ATR, 6" X 10 " x 20" (T)
0 ENVIRONMENT:
   o TEMPERATURE - MIL SPEC -55°C TO +125°C OPERATING (INTERNAL) (R)
   o VACUUM - HERMETIC DURING STORAGE/ALL CONDUCTION COOLING (R)
   o VIB - LAUNCH ENVIRONMENT (R)
   o EMI/RFI - NON INTERFERING WITH MISSION/SCIENCE SENSORS (R)
   o RAD HARD CMOS - NO SINGLE EVENT LATCH UP (R)
     TOTAL DOSE: 3E5 RADS/S; (R FOR POLAR, GEO)
     SINGLE EVENT UPSET, LET > 42, IE-10 UPSETS/BIT-DAY (T)(R FOR CONTROL)
   o TESTABILITY - 100% (T)
   o FAULT TOLERANCE - FAIL OPERATIONAL, FAIL SAFE, REDUNDANCY
     TECHNIQUES ONLY (R)
0 MTBF/MTBCF - 60K HR/300K HR (T)
0 "SECURITY"/INTEGRITY TO MEET MISSION REQUIREMENTS (R)

(KEY R = REQUIREMENT)
       T = TARGET

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### TABLE 1. PROCESSOR CHARACTERISTICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROCESSORS (CHIPSET ONLY)</th>
<th>PERFORMANCE</th>
<th>POWER</th>
<th>RAD HARD</th>
<th>TESTABLE</th>
<th>SPONSOR</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1802</td>
<td>100 KIPS</td>
<td>0.5 W</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NATURE</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAGELLAN (COMMONLY USED)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80C86</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>0.5 W</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>MANY</td>
<td>GALTED (PELIGRIO SEU UPSET SPEC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA3300</td>
<td>750 KIPS</td>
<td>1.5 W</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>DOE</td>
<td></td>
<td>GAAS CANDIDATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46982</td>
<td>3 MIPS</td>
<td>3 W</td>
<td>CMOS-SOS</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>CDC-IRAD/SDIO</td>
<td>MOST VERSATILE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R1-RCA 1750</td>
<td>500 KIPS</td>
<td>2 W</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>SDIO</td>
<td></td>
<td>PROPRIETARY</td>
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<tr>
<td>GVSC (2)</td>
<td>4 MIPS</td>
<td>5 W</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>M/C</td>
<td></td>
<td>NASA SS INTEREST IN REVERSE ENGINEERING FOR RAD HARD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R0386</td>
<td>4 MIPS</td>
<td>3 W</td>
<td>NO (?)</td>
<td>NASA-SSF</td>
<td></td>
<td>JNISYS/UTMC-IBM-TRW/HONEY/EST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDC281</td>
<td>630 KIPS</td>
<td>3 W</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>DARPA-ORD</td>
<td></td>
<td>CURRENTLY 25 MIPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RH-32 (4-2)</td>
<td>25 MIPS</td>
<td>5 W</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>DARPA-ORD</td>
<td></td>
<td>NASA SS INTEREST IN REVERSE ENGINEERING FOR RAD HARD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GaAs MIPS (2)</td>
<td>200 MIPS</td>
<td>15W (CPU)</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>DARPA-ORD</td>
<td></td>
<td>NASA SS INTEREST IN REVERSE ENGINEERING FOR RAD HARD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 2. PROCESSOR CHARACTERISTICS (CONCLUDED)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROCESSORS</th>
<th>CHIPSET READY</th>
<th>MMU READY</th>
<th>BII READY</th>
<th>GA READY</th>
<th>ALU WIDTH</th>
<th>MEMORY SPACE</th>
<th>HIGH LEVEL SOFTWARE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1802 - (RCA)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>384K x 86</td>
<td>1802 ASS'Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80C86 (HARRIS)</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>BASIC, FORTRAN, PASCAL, -C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA3300 (32032)/(SANDIA)</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>256 x 16</td>
<td>ADA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46982 (CDC/1750)</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>64K x 16</td>
<td>JOVIAL/1750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R1-RCA 1750</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>64K x 16</td>
<td>JOVIAL/1750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVSC (2) (1750A) / (IBM-HONEY)</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>64K x 16</td>
<td>ADA/1750</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80386</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>256 x 16</td>
<td>ADA-C-PASCAL FORTRAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDC281 MDAC/MARCONI</td>
<td>87/89</td>
<td>NO PLANS</td>
<td>(SCI)</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>64K x 16</td>
<td>TARTAN ADA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RH-32 (4-2) (CORE MIPS)</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2x32x32</td>
<td>RISC-ADA/TLD ADA/CSALA-CORE MIPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GaAs MIPS (2)</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2x32x32</td>
<td>ADA/CORE MIPS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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CONCLUSIONS

THE CURRENT STATE OF THE ART FOR SPACECRAFT ON-BOARD COMPUTING IS LIMITED. EXPERIMENTS EMBODIED AS PROGRAMS MUST BE RELATIVELY UNSOPHISTICATED.