Reactive System Verification Case Study—Fault-Tolerant Transputer Communication

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September 1993
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Summary

A reactive program is one which engages in an ongoing interaction with its environment. A system which is controlled by an embedded reactive program is called a reactive system. Examples of reactive systems are aircraft flight management systems, bank automatic teller machine (ATM) networks, airline reservation systems and computer operating systems. Reactive systems are often naturally modeled (for logical design purposes) as a composition of autonomous processes which progress concurrently and which communicate to share information and/or to coordinate activities.

Formal (i.e., mathematical) frameworks for system verification are tools used to increase the users' confidence that a system design satisfies its specification. A framework for reactive system verification includes formal languages for system modeling and for behavior specification and decision procedures and/or proof-systems for verifying that the system model satisfies the system specifications.

In the study reported here, using the Ostroff framework for reactive system verification, an approach to achieving fault-tolerant communication between transputers was shown to be effective. The key components of the design, the decoupler processes, may be viewed as discrete-event-controllers introduced to constrain system behavior such that system specifications are satisfied.

The Ostroff framework was also effective. The expressiveness of the modeling language permitted construction of a faithful model of the transputer network. The relevant specifications were readily expressed in the specification language. The set of decision procedures provided was adequate to verify the specifications of interest.

The need for improved support for system behavior visualization is emphasized.

Introduction

Computer programs can be classified as either transformational or reactive. Transformational programs, the more common type, are typically designed to transform data via appropriate algorithms and to then output the results of the computation and terminate. First Order Logic (ref. 1) is routinely used to specify and to reason about the correctness of transformational programs. A reactive program is one that engages in an ongoing interaction with its environment (ref. 2). A system that is controlled by an embedded reactive program is called a reactive system. Examples of reactive systems are aircraft flight management systems, bank automatic teller machine (ATM) networks, airline reservation systems, and computer operating systems. Reactive systems are often naturally modeled (for logical design purposes) as a composition of autonomous processes which progress concurrently and which communicate to share information and/or to coordinate activities. Reactive systems are nondeterministic in that the sequence of events is not specified but depends on actions of the environment. Reactive system specifications often include response time requirements.

These reactive system process characteristics (autonomous, concurrent, communicating, nondeterministic, and time sensitive) have forced the development of new approaches to verify that a reactive system satisfies its specification. As noted by Alur (ref. 3), “The number of formalisms that purportedly facilitate the modeling, specifying and proving of timing properties for reactive systems has exploded over the past few years.” The diversity of process communication and coordination constructs and the variety of specifications of interest have contributed to this profusion of frameworks. The features required to further improve next-generation frameworks can best be determined through use and evaluation of currently available frameworks in many diverse applications. One objective for this report is to contribute to that evolutionary process.

The framework chosen for the analysis of a particular system must allow faithful modeling of essential system features in order to reliably infer system behavior from model behavior. In the study reported here, a framework developed by Ostroff was applied to verify an approach to achieve fault-tolerant transputer communication. In the following sections, we outline the Ostroff framework, review the approach to fault-tolerant transputer communication verified, describe the Transputer Network Model, and discuss verification procedures and verification results. The need for improved support for system behavior visualization is emphasized.

The Ostroff Framework

Formal (i.e., mathematical) frameworks for system verification are tools used to increase the users' confidence that a system design satisfies its specification. A framework for reactive system verification includes formal languages for system modeling and for behavior specification and decision procedures and/or proof-systems for verifying that the system model satisfies the system specifications. Ostroff's book (ref. 4) should be consulted for a comprehensive description of the framework used in this study (hereinafter referred to as the Framework). The description here is informal and necessarily incomplete.
A system is modeled as a composition of autonomous, concurrent, communicating processes. Each process is represented by a diagram. The elements of the diagram are nodes and labeled, directed edges which connect nodes and which model process transitions. For each process an activity or control variable, \( A_v \), is defined which ranges over the process nodes to indicate the location of control in the process.

We next review two types of transition which will be needed to model the transputer network. An assignment transition is illustrated in figure 1.

The transition \( \tau \) is enabled if control is at \( a_s \) (\( A_v = a_s \)) and if guard evaluates to \( \text{TRUE} \). Enabled transitions are held for at least lower ticks of the external (conceptual) clock and must occur no later then upper ticks of the clock. If the enabled transition \( \tau \) is taken, then \( A_v \) will be assigned the value \( a_d \) and the variables \( y_1, ..., y_n \) will be assigned the values of the expressions \( e_1, ..., e_n \), respectively. If a guard is missing, it is assumed to be \( \text{TRUE} \). If the list of variables is missing, then no variables are assigned values by the transition. If the time bounds are missing, they are assumed to be \( (\text{lower: 0}, \text{upper: infinity}) \), i.e., the transition is neither held nor forced.

Processes communicate via named channels in order to either transfer information or coordinate activities. A synchronous communication transition is illustrated in figure 2.

The meaning of the transition label "chan ! expr" is: if this transition is taken, then the value of the expression "expr" will be sent on channel "chan." The meaning of the transition label "chan ? y" is: if this transition is taken, then the value received on channel "chan" will be assigned to the variable "y." Communication is synchronous, i.e., enabled only if matching (same channel) transitions in both sending and receiving processes are simultaneously enabled. The first process to reach a send or receive transition will block, i.e., suspend activity, until the matching transition is also enabled. If an enabled communication transition is taken, the variable assignment described is made and then both processes continue independently.

A system behavior is a sequence of states wherein the initial state satisfies an initial condition specification and where following states are reached by taking an enabled transition in any component process. When transitions in a number of processes are enabled, the next transition taken is chosen nondeterministically. (The failure condition in which none of the component processes can progress because all transitions are disabled is called deadlock.) A system is said to satisfy a specification if all possible system behaviors satisfy the specification. The Framework specification language and decision procedures are described in a later section.

\[
\text{guard} \rightarrow \tau \ [y_1 : e_1, \ldots, y_n : e_n] : (\text{lower, upper})
\]

\[ a_s \quad \rightarrow \quad \tau \quad \rightarrow \quad a_d \]

\( a_s \) source node \( \quad y_1, ..., y_n \) variables

\( a_d \) destination node \( \quad e_1, ..., e_n \) expressions

\( \tau \) transition label \( \quad \text{lower} \) lower time bound

\text{guard} \quad \text{boolean expression} \quad \text{upper} \quad \text{upper time bound}

Figure 1. Assignment transition syntax.
Fault-Tolerant Transputer Communication

A transputer is a very large scale integration (VLSI) device which combines on a single silicon chip—a processor, memory for program storage, hardware-timers, and communication controllers which permit direct synchronous communication with other transputers (ref. 5). Networks of transputers have been used to implement a wide variety of reactive systems including systems for (a) robot guidance and control (ref. 6), (b) piloted-helicopter simulation (ref. 7), and (c) signal processing (ref. 8). Approaches to achieve fault-tolerant communication between transputers were investigated in 2. Output data on physical channel DECOUPLER 1 continuously loops through a sequence of three synchronous communications:

1. Input data on internal channel OUT1 from PRODUCER
2. Output data on physical channel SEND1 to CONSUMER
3. Signal PRODUCER on internal channel STATUS1

DECOUPLER 2 continuously loops through a similar sequence of three synchronous communications using channels OUT2, SEND2, and STATUS2. When both physical channels are operational, PRODUCER sends all information to CONSUMER over both physical channels. If physical channel SEND1 fails, then DECOUPLER 1 will block when it next attempts to use SEND1. However, PRODUCER will detect (infer) that DECOUPLER 1 is blocked if the signal on STATUS1 is not received within a prespecified time. Thereafter, PRODUCER will continue to communicate over the intact physical channel. The decoupler processes are effectively discrete-event-controllers introduced to constrain system behavior such that system specifications are satisfied.
The Transputer Network Model

OCCAM is the name of a concurrent programming language used to program transputers and transputer networks (ref. 9). To verify the approach to fault-tolerant transputer communication outlined above, an OCCAM implementation of the approach was first translated into the Framework diagram language representation shown in figure 4. A faithful translation was possible because both languages view systems as a composition of autonomous, concurrent, communicating processes and each OCCAM construct was expressible in the diagram language. In particular, the semantics of the synchronous communication construct in each language was identical.

The maximum size of the composite-system state space is an exponential function of the number of processes. Therefore, when attempting verification, it is important to simplify the system model by “abstracting away” unessential detail. Four such simplifications, which taken together reduce the size of the state space by many orders of magnitude, are incorporated into figure 4 and described next.

Focus on Process Communication Logic

The process communication logic is embedded in a simple, cyclic PRODUCER-CONSUMER system (fig. 3). The single transitions, produce in PRODUCER and consume in CONSUMER, represent the “other” activities of the communicating processes which typically include complex computations and communication with other transputers over other channels.

Simplify Data Structures

OCCAM channel protocol declarations permit communication of complex data structures. Data structure details are irrelevant when verifying OCCAM-level process communication logic because autonomous, lower-level controllers manage the physical data transfer. In figure 4, each communication transfers a single integer.

Project Behavior Using Logical Variables

An essential aspect of the design is the fact that, unlike a sending process which blocks until a matching receiving process is enabled, OCCAM semantics permit a receiving process to start a hardware-timer and to take a default action if the expected communication is not received before the timer “times out.” When the external channels are functional, these time-out transitions are never taken. The logical variable Fail1 (Fail2) is used in the guard of the send1 (send2) channel time-out transitions to eliminate the time-out transitions from the reachability graph (described in the next section) when external channel send1 (send2) is intact. Effectively we enhance system behavior visualization by obtaining a projection of relevant behavior.
Simplify Hardware-Timer Details

Because here we verify only qualitative temporal logic specifications, the upper time bound on transitions that model hardware-timers are set to unity when verifying response properties.

Verification Procedures and Results

For finite-state systems, the Framework provides software which uses the component process models to compute a system reachability graph and decision procedures which use the graph structure in evaluating the validity of certain system specifications. A reachability graph is a list of vertices and a list of edges connecting vertices that summarize possible system behavior. Graph vertices represent system states, and graph edges represent transitions which change system state. A behavior of the system is a path (a sequence of states) in the reachability graph which starts at a state satisfying an initial condition specification. A system satisfies a specification if all possible behaviors satisfy the specification. We present results for two cases—the Normal Operation case and the External Channel Failure case.

Normal Operation Case Results

In normal operation of the transputer network modeled by figure 4, both external channels between transputers are functional. The reachability graph of the system for this case was manually diagrammed and is shown as figure 5.

The diagram is relatively simple because process model details irrelevant to verification of fault-tolerant communication have been abstracted away as described earlier. In this section, we rely heavily on this diagram in order to emphasize the usefulness of this system-behavior-visualization aid. For conciseness we refer to a diagram of a reachability graph as a Graph.
Figure 5. Reachability Graph, Normal Operation Case. As described in the text this Graph is a projection of system behavior in that Timer transitions (never taken in Normal Operation) are suppressed in order to enhance system behavior visualization. In order to eliminate clutter resulting from long lines connecting vertices, some nodes are repeated. Repeated vertices are circled. The vertex number uniquely identifies the vertex.
Important system characteristics are evident in figure 5:

**The system is symmetric.** The symmetry of the Graph reflects the symmetry in the component processes with regard to use of the communication channels between processes. (During a modeling effort, absence of expected symmetry or regularity is often a clear indication of a modeling error.)

**The system is nondeterministic.** Many states may be exited by several transitions—any one of which can be chosen in a particular cycle. Transitions from the component processes *interleave*, indicating the cooperation among the processes to transfer data. *Unanticipated interleaving often results in undesirable system behavior.*

When, as in this case, the reachability graph is relatively simple, certain system specifications can be verified by visual inspection of the Graph. The relevant specifications are determined by considering what can go wrong. The fact that communication is synchronous introduces the possibility of *deadlock* if process communication logic is flawed. The fact that all data are sent via two autonomous decoupler processes introduces the possibility that data may arrive at the CONSUMER process “out of order.”

(In the following paragraphs, the symbols $S1$, $S2$, etc., are specification labels.)

Inspection of figure 5 will confirm that:

**S1 The system does not deadlock**—
because every state has exiting transitions.

**S2 All data produced are sent over both external channels in the order produced**—
because following each *produce* transition, both $send1$ and $send2$ transitions precede the next *produce* transition.

**S3 All data are consumed in the order sent**—
because following transmission of data over both channel $send1$ and $send2$, a *consume* transition precedes the next occurrence of a $send1$ or $send2$ transition.

Together S2 and S3 imply that although the data are transmitted via two autonomous decoupler processes—

**S4 All data produced are consumed in the order produced.**

The insight provided by the Graph is also very important when attempting to write formal specifications in preparation for using the Framework decision procedures.

An “obvious” specification for temporal-ordering of the data is:

**S5 Following a *produce* transition, a *consume* transition precedes the next *produce* transition.**

Specification S5 implies that data are consumed in the order produced. However, the Graph clearly shows that specification S5 is unnecessarily restrictive (reference node 25). That specification would also be impossible to implement (without compromising the fault-tolerance objective) because the PRODUCER process has no information with regard to the status of the CONSUMER process. In the next section, the decision procedures are applied to verify similar properties.

**External Channel Failure Case**

We begin with a brief review of the Framework specification language and decision procedures. The Framework specification language is a Temporal Logic in which many important reactive system properties can be expressed. Temporal logic specifications are interpreted over system behaviors (i.e., sequences of reachable states) which are summarized by a system reachability graph. A system satisfies a temporal logic specification if all possible behaviors satisfy the specification. Discussion of temporal logic is beyond the scope of this report; instead, we include (necessarily) imprecise English language interpretations of the temporal logic expressions used. We next review the three classes (*safety, precedence, and response*) of Temporal Logic specifications that we will need.

A *safety* specification is conventionally expressed in the form

**S6** \( \psi_1 \rightarrow \Box \psi_2 \)

read: if \( \psi_1 \), then *henceforth* \( \psi_2 \) where \( \psi_1 \) and \( \psi_2 \) are state-formulas.

A system satisfies this specification if \( \psi_2 \) is TRUE for all states following any state for which \( \psi_1 \) is TRUE.

Specifications involving *temporal ordering* of transitions can be expressed using the temporal operator \( P \) (*precedes*) as in

**S7** \( \psi_1 \rightarrow \psi_2 P \psi_3 \)

read: if \( \psi_1 \), then \( \psi_2 \) precedes \( \psi_3 \) where \( \psi_1, \psi_2, \) and \( \psi_3 \) are state-formulas. A system satisfies this specification if following any state in which \( \psi_1 \) is TRUE—a state in which \( \psi_2 \) is TRUE precedes a state in which \( \psi_3 \) is TRUE.
A *response* specification is of the form

$$S8 \quad \psi_1 \rightarrow \Diamond \psi_2$$

read: if $\psi_1$, then *eventually* $\psi_2$ where $\psi_1$ and $\psi_2$ are state-formulas.

A system satisfies this specification if following any state in which $\psi_1$ is *true*—a state in which $\psi_2$ is *true* is eventually reached.

The Framework provides decision procedures for safety, precedence, and response class specifications. The decision procedures use a system reachability graph, which summarizes possible system behavior, in evaluating specification validity. When a decision procedure for a class of specifications is invoked to verify a specification of the class, the decision procedure always terminates and either confirms the specification validity or provides information regarding the state(s) and transition(s) which violate the specification.

In the following paragraphs, we apply the specification language and decision procedures to verify that fault-tolerant communication between transputers is achieved. Specifically, we verify that *after failure of an external channel between transputers:*

**S9** The system does not deadlock.

**S10** All data are transferred between transputers in the correct temporal order.

The variables $Faill$ and $Fail2$ provide a convenient way to introduce an external channel failure. Referring to figure 4, when $Faill$ is assigned the value *true*, the DECOPULER $1: send1$ transition is disabled which effectively models channel $send1$ failure. The Graph (i.e., the diagram of the reachability graph) for this case is shown as figure 6.

The Graph includes both the “transient” system behavior in the cycle immediately following external-channel $send1$ failure and the behavior in the cycles thereafter. We next express the informal specifications $S9$ and $S10$ in terms of safety, precedence, and response class specifications and then invoke the appropriate decision procedure to check specification validity.

As noted earlier, a system is said to be *deadlocked* if it is in a state in which no transition (other than the clock transition) is enabled. The system was verified to be deadlock-free by invoking the safety decision procedure to verify

**S11** \[ initial \rightarrow \square ((enabled \tau) \land (\tau \neq Tick)) \]

i.e., following a state which satisfies the initial condition specification, some transition (other than the clock transition) is enabled in every reachable state.

Using the *precedence* decision procedure, we verified

**S12** \[ after\_produce \rightarrow (Next = send2) P (Next = produce) \]

i.e., after a transition which produces data, the data are sent before more data are produced ($Next$ is the next-transition-taken variable) and

**S13** \[ after\_send2 \rightarrow (Next = CONSUME) P (Next = send2) \]

i.e., after a transition which sends data, those data are consumed before more data are sent.

Using the response decision procedure, we verified

**S14** \[ after\_produce \rightarrow \Diamond after\_consume \]

i.e., all data produced are eventually consumed. The upper bound for all transitions was set to unity in computing the more-complex reachability graph (not shown) used to verify $S14$.

Validity of specifications $S11$, $S12$, $S13$, and $S14$ implies that fault-tolerant communication between transputers is achieved. After failure of an external channel between transputers—the system does not deadlock and all data are transferred between transputers in the correct temporal order.
Figure 6. Reachability Graph, External Channel (send1) Failure Case. This Graph is a projection of system behavior in that send2 channel timer transitions are suppressed in order to enhance system behavior visualization. In order to eliminate clutter resulting from long lines connecting vertices, some vertices are repeated. Repeated vertices are circled. The vertex number uniquely identifies the vertex.
Concluding Remarks

In the preceding, using the Ostroff framework for reactive system verification, an approach to achieving fault-tolerant communication between transputers was shown to be effective. The key components of the design, the decoupler processes, may be viewed as discrete-event-controllers introduced to constrain system behavior such that system specifications are satisfied.

The Ostroff framework was also effective. The expressiveness of the modeling language permitted construction of a faithful model of the transputer network. The relevant specifications were readily expressed in the specification language. The set of decision procedures provided was adequate to verify the specifications of interest (although decision procedures to verify more general classes of temporal logic specifications will often be useful or necessary).

However, the Ostroff framework and other current generation frameworks for reactive system verification are particularly weak in one very important dimension, namely, support for system behavior visualization. (The importance of system behavior visualization during the verification process was emphasized in the section discussing Normal Operation Case results.) "Inability to visualize system behavior" is a factor restricting current applications to small, safety-critical portions of complex systems. As a first step, software tools enabling one to interactively construct, to browse, and to compare reachability-graph diagrams are needed. Manual construction of these basic visualization aids is an extremely tedious task. There is great opportunity for innovation with regard to system behavior visualization tools. For example, in a related context, an approach wherein sequences of transitions are mapped into higher-level transitions improved behavior visualization (ref. 10). The surveys by Ostroff (ref. 11), Alur and Henzinger (ref. 3), and Scholfield (ref. 12) describe the vigorous, current research effort that is directed at developing more powerful frameworks for reactive system verification.

References


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