COTS-Based Fault Tolerance in Deep Space: Qualitative and Quantitative Analyses of A Bus Network Architecture*

Ann T. Tai  
IA Tech, Inc.  
10501 Kinnard Avenue  
Los Angeles, CA 90024

Savio N. Chau  
Leon Alkalai  
Jet Propulsion Laboratory  
California Institute of Technology  
Pasadena, CA 91109

Abstract

Using COTS products, standards and intellectual properties (IPs) for all the system and component interfaces is a crucial step toward significant reduction of both system cost and development cost, as the COTS interfaces enable other COTS products and IPs to be readily accommodated by the target system architecture. With respect to the long-term survivable systems for deep-space missions, the major challenge for us is, under stringent power and mass constraints, to achieve ultra-high reliability of the system comprising COTS products and standards that are not developed for mission-critical applications. The spirit of our solution is to exploit the pertinent standard features of a COTS product to circumvent its shortcomings, though these standard features may not be originally designed for highly reliable systems. In this paper, we discuss our experiences and findings on the design of an IEEE 1394 compliant fault-tolerant COTS-based bus architecture. We first derive and qualitatively analyze a “stack-tree topology” that not only complies with IEEE 1394 but also enables the implementation of a fault-tolerant bus architecture without node redundancy. We then present a quantitative evaluation that demonstrates significant reliability improvement from the COTS-based fault tolerance.

Keywords: COTS-based fault tolerance, IEEE 1394, space applications, tree topology, bus network reliability

Principal Contact: Ann T. Tai, a.t.tai@ieee.org

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1 Introduction

The X2000 architecture that has being developed by NASA/JPL is a distributed, scalable, fault-tolerant avionics architecture for multiple deep-space missions [1, 2]. The architecture is currently the baseline for the Space Technology 4 (a comet landing and sample mission) and the Europa Orbiter missions, which are scheduled for launch in the year 2002 and 2003 [3] respectively. In the X2000 architecture, the multiple computing nodes and devices are symmetric, meaning that the roles of computing nodes are interchangeable while devices are treated as intelligent nodes in the network. Moreover, driven by NASA's fast, better, cheaper space mission philosophy, this architecture stresses on using COTS products, standards and intellectual properties (IPs) to reduce development and recurring costs. The highest pay-off application of COTS in X2000 is the use of commercial bus standards, mainly due to the cost impact of the bus throughout the system and the enabling effect of the bus on system capability. Specially, the Peripheral Component Interface (PCI) bus [4], IEEE 1394 high-speed bus [5, 6], and I2C bus [7] are selected to implement the local computer bus, system bus, and engineering bus, respectively [8] in the X2000 architecture.

The major challenge for us is to deliver a highly reliable long-term survivable system based on architecture comprising COTS standards that are not developed for mission-critical applications. Accordingly, to report our experiences and findings on implementing COTS-based fault tolerance IEEE 1394 compliant fault-tolerant bus network for the X2000 architecture is the focus of our paper.

The IEEE 1394 bus has two implementations, cable and backplane. The backplane IEEE 1394 adopts the multi-drop topology and has been investigated by the aerospace industry [9]. Yet, the X2000 has selected the cable implementation because of its higher data rate, lower power consumption and much more substantial commercial support. However, the tree topology adopted by the cable implementation has created a formidable problem for a non-redundant bus network to tolerate node/link failures. Any single link failure will partition the tree into two segments and any single node failure can break the tree into three parts. A brute force approach is to duplicate the circuitry of each node and cross-strap them to the bus network. However, this approach was not considered by X2000 because of the extra power consumption, higher mass and volume, and the complexity in designing and testing the cross-strapping.

Although the IEEE 1394 bus has been enjoying fast growing popularity, its limitation in implementing highly reliable systems has not yet received enough attention. The spirit of our solution to the problem is to exploit the standard features of COTS in an innovative manner to circumvent their shortcomings in fault tolerance. In this paper, we derive and qualitatively analyze a special case of the tree topology called the "stack-tree topology". This topology not only complies with the IEEE 1394 standard but also enables the implementation of a fault-tolerant bus architecture. In particular, we discover that the stack-tree network architecture can exploit a standard feature of IEEE 1394 called "port-disable" [10] such that normal communications among the nodes can be assured to continue so long as no multiple non-clustered cut-type failures (see Section 3) occur. We also present a reliability evaluation that quantitatively compares three bus network architectures based on the stack-tree topology and its variants, namely, CST, CST, and CST. Due to the complex failure mechanisms of the network architecture CST, any effort to account exhaustively and exclusively for all failure scenarios based on straightforward
use of combinatorics is very difficult and inefficient. Therefore, we construct an analytic model based on recursive functions that traverse the entire network and enumerate all the concerned scenarios, enabling the exact solution for reliability measure. The evaluation results demonstrate that the proposed COTS-based fault-tolerant bus architecture leads to significant reliability gains for long-life deep-space missions. In the next section, we explain why we have selected IEEE 1394, and describe its benefits and restrictions we exploit and circumvent, respectively, for implementing a fault-tolerant bus architecture. In Section 3, we elaborate and qualitatively analyze the stack-tree topology that complies with IEEE 1394 and exploits its "port-disable" feature for fault tolerance. Section 4 presents the quantitative methods and results of reliability evaluation for the resulting fault-tolerant bus architecture. In the concluding remark, we discuss the significance of this effort.

2 IEEE 1394: Its Selection, Benefits, and Restrictions

In the process of selecting the high-speed and low-power buses, many commercial interfaces have been examined. The candidates for the high-speed bus included the IEEE 1394, Fiber Channel, Universal Serial Bus (USB), Fast Ethernet, Serial Fiber Optic Data Bus (SFODB), ATM, Myrinet, FDDI, AS1773, and SPI. Many of these buses (e.g., USB, AS1773, and SPI) fail to meet the requirements on data rate. Some of them are not suitable for real-time applications because of the indeterminacy of bus latency; whereas others have high power consumption, which is unacceptable by deep space applications (e.g., Fiber Channel, SFODB, ATM, and Myrinet). Moreover, unlike some space applications such as the Mars Pathfinder case, “COTS-based” means the direct use of commercial parts, components, or subsystems, the term COTS has a special definition for the X2000 architecture. Since at least one of the prospect X2000 customers, namely, Europa, requires to survive in a high-radiation environment, all the critical electronic components must be fabricated on specialized semiconductor foundries. Therefore, another important selection criterion is the availability of the radiation-hardened components for the COTS interface or an ASIC core design (COTS IP) portable to a rad-hard foundry. A rigid evaluation based on these criteria results in the selection of the IEEE 1394 bus. Similar criteria were given to the low-power bus selection with special emphasis on low-power consumption and much less consideration on performance. Our trade-off study concludes that I2C is the best compromise. The selection of 1394 and I2C enables the X2000 Program to procure COTS ASIC core designs, which can be integrated into a single chip. It is estimated that this approach will reduce the design effort by 30% when compared with the Cassini ASIC design [11], while the complexity of the ASIC is increased by 400%. Moreover, COTS products required by the IEEE 1394 and I2C implementation, such as bus monitors, prototype boards, and device drivers are readily available, which in turn, leads to further big savings.

IEEE 1394 is originally designed for commercial applications such as multimedia and portable phones. The current version of IEEE 1394 can support data rates of 100 Mbps, 200 Mbps, and 400 Mbps for the cable implementation that is based on a tree topology, and 50 Mbps and 100

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1 Although this engineering bus plays an important role in assisting the 1394 system bus for fault detection and recovery, the detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this paper.
Mbps for the backplane implementation that is a multi-drop bus. Indeed JPL designers are more familiar with the backplane implementation because of its resemblance to the IEEE 1553 bus that was used in the Cassini Project [11]; and the aerospace industry previously conducted studies on the backplane implementation [9]. Nonetheless, we have selected the cable implementation due to its high speed and extensive commercial support which enable us to optimize the benefits from using COTS. Accordingly, unless it is explicitly stated, all discussions on IEEE 1394 in this paper refer to the cable implementation.

Although there are various types of tree structure that satisfy the topology requirement of IEEE 1394, for space applications, it is preferred to have a “regular topology.” By “regular topology,” we mean a structure that is topologically simple and can be easily maintained as nodes are added or deleted from the system such that test and integration can be accomplished efficiently for substantial cost saving. Therefore, the stack-tree topology depicted in Figure 1 is proposed, where a node is either a flight computer or a device. There are three physical layer ports in each node. For each stem node, two or more of these ports are connected to the other nodes, while a leaf node has only one port connected.

![Figure 1: Bus Network based on Stack-Tree Topology](image)

Figure 2 depicts the baseline X2000 First Delivery avionics architecture where a stack-tree topology based 1394 dual bus (see Section 3) is shown.

![Figure 2: Baseline X2000 First Delivery Avionics Architecture](image)

As any tree structure, the stack-tree topology shown in Figure 1 has a potentially serious drawback. That is, a tree structure by itself is not fault tolerant as any single link failure will partition the tree into two segments and any single node failure can break the tree into three parts. What makes the design more difficult is that spare nodes dedicated for fault tolerance are
not permitted in the X2000 architecture due to power constraint. Although various schemes of fault-tolerant bus network have been proposed in research literatures (see [12, 13], for example), the restrictions from 1394 and from our application prevent us from utilizing those schemes since the majority of them involve either loops or spare nodes.

There are some fault detection provisions such as CRC in the 1394 standard, but they are inadequate to ensure the reliability required for long-life missions such as Pluto/Kuiper Express (a 12 to 15 year mission). On the other hand, IEEE 1394a [10] provides an employable feature called “port-disable,” which allows us to implement a 1394 compliant reconfigurable bus architecture, though this feature is not purposely designed for fault tolerance. In the following section, we describe and analyze, the stack-tree topology and its variants based on which we design an IEEE 1394 compliant fault-tolerant bus architecture.

3 Stack-Tree Topology based Bus Architecture

3.1 Concepts

In the interest of bridging the terminology between network topology and the X2000 MCM-stack packaging technology [14], we call the proposed topology “stack-tree topology.”

Definition 1 A stack tree is a tree where each stem node is connected to at most three other nodes among which at most two are stem nodes.

For example, the trees in Figures 3(a), (c) and (d) are stack trees while that in Figure 3(b) is not (as the right node at the first level below the root is connected to three stem nodes).

![Figure 3: Trees](image)

Definition 2 A complete stack tree is a stack tree where each stem node is connected to at least one leaf node.

Figure 3(c) depicts a complete stack tree (CST) with \( n \) stem nodes. We call this topology simplex complete stack tree which is denoted as CST\(_S\). Note that the nodes are labeled such that the stem nodes have ID numbers from 1 to \( n \), while the leaf nodes have ID numbers from \( n + 1 \) to \( 2n \). This labeling scheme will be used in the remainder of the paper. Further, we use \( n \), the number of stem nodes in a CST, to denote the size of the tree. Note also that the trees in Figures 3(c) and (d) are both CSTs. Based on the CST in Figure 3(c), we can define CST mirror-image as follows.
Definition 3 The mirror-image of a complete stack tree is a tree obtained by (1) removing the edges connecting the stem nodes with ID numbers i and j which satisfy the relation \( |i - j| = 1 \); (2) adding edges to connect the leaf nodes with ID numbers k and l which satisfy the relation \( |k - l| = 1 \).

Clearly, the CST shown in Figure 3(d) is a mirror image of that in Figure 3(c). It is worth to note that a CST and its mirror image do not have any stem nodes in common. Moreover, based on the above definitions, it can be shown that the mirror-image of a CST is also a CST.

3.2 Applications

3.2.1 The CST\(_D\) Scheme

The performance of the X2000 spaceborne systems must be scalable and gracefully degradable. Accordingly, our objective is to develop a fault-tolerant bus network architecture that will allow all the surviving nodes in the bus network to remain connected in the presence of node failures, without requiring spare nodes. The fact that a CST and its mirror image do not have stem nodes in common implies that losing a stem node in one tree will not partition its mirror image. Accordingly, a dual bus scheme comprising a CST and its mirror image, referred to as CST dual scheme (denoted as CST\(_D\)), as shown in Figure 4(a), will be effective in tolerating single or multiple node failures given that

1. The failed nodes are of the same type (all stem or all leaf) with respect to one of the CSTs (see Figure 4(b)), or
2. The failed nodes involve both stem and leaf nodes but they form a cluster at either end (or both) of a CST, which will not affect the connectivity of the remainder of the tree (see Figure 4(c)).

We use terminal clustered stem-leaf failures to refer to the second failure pattern. Thus, for the cases which involve only the above failure patterns, all the surviving nodes will remain connected (no network partitioning). On the other hand, if a stem node and a leaf node in a CST\(_D\) based network fail in a form other than terminal clustered stem-leaf failure (see Figure 4(d)), both the primary and mirror image will be partitioned.

![Figure 4: CST-Based Dual Bus Network](image-url)
3.2.2 The CSTR Scheme

With the motivation of building a robust bus network architecture capable of tolerating more node failures (in terms of number and type), we exploit a unique feature of IEEE 1394, namely, the port-disable capability [10]. This feature enables the physical connections between the physical layer of a node and the serial bus cable to become “invisible” from the viewpoint of the reminder of the bus network. The implication is the following:

1) By using disabled ports, backup connections between nodes can be added without forming loops (recall that loops are prohibited by IEEE 1394). By “backup connection,” we mean a serial bus cable that connects (via disabled ports) two nodes which are not expected to have a direct connection in the original network configuration (differing from connection replication); and

2) Upon fault detection, by disabling physical ports, a failed node will be allowed to be isolated from the rest of the bus network, and necessary backup link(s) can be activated (by enabling the corresponding ports) to repair the partitioned network such that messages can be routed in a reconfigured network, bypassing the failed node.

Consider a bus network based on the CSTₜ topology with n stem nodes, each of which has one leaf node, as shown in Figure 5(a). If we add a backup link between any two leaf nodes labeled i and j which satisfy the relation \(|(i \mod n) - (j \mod n)| = 1\), and also add a backup link to connect stem nodes 1 and n, then we get a topology as shown in Figure 5(b) (an instantiation of the topology in which \(n = 6\)). Because the added connections (dashed edges) are of inactive nature, the bus network remains free of loop and thus complies with the IEEE 1394 tree topology criterion. Figure 5(c) illustrates the bus network from a 3-dimensional perspective, where the network topology resembles a ring. Accordingly, we denote this bus network configuration as CSTR. To aid the description of failure mechanisms of a CSTR based bus network, we introduce the following terminology:

**Definition 4** A failed stem node i and a failed leaf node j in a CSTR based network of size n will form a cut-type failure if \(|(j \mod n) - (i \mod n)| \leq 1\.

![Figure 5: CST-Based Bus Network and Disabled Backup Links](image-url)
Figure 6 illustrates the concepts of cut-type and non cut-type failures. Specifically, the failures comprised by nodes 2 and 9 in Figure 6(a), nodes 5 and 11 in Figure 6(b), and nodes 1 and 12 in Figure 6(c) are cut-type failures. On the other hand, the node failures shown in Figures 6(d) and (e) are not cut-type failures.

Figure 6: Cut-Type and Non Cut-Type Failure

Further, we use the term clustered failure to refer to the failure of a group of nodes which are adjacent to each other such that there exists a shortest path between any two failed nodes in the group which does not go across a surviving node. Figures 7(a) and (b) illustrate the scenarios of clustered and non-clustered multiple cut-type failures, respectively. Clearly, while the latter failure pattern leads to a bus network partition, the former does not even if node 6 also fails, although both scenarios involve multiple cut-type failures. Therefore, the necessary and sufficient condition for partitioning a \( \text{CST}_R \) based bus network is as follows:

_A bus network based on the \( \text{CST}_R \) topology will be partitioned if and only if there exist multiple cut-type failures which do not constitute a single cluster._

Intuitively speaking, as illustrated by Figures 8(a) and (b), the first cut-type failure (single or clustered) will break the ring structure so that the remainder of the network becomes a \( \text{CST}_S \) based structure (with backup links); whereas the second cut-type failure (single or clustered) will break the \( \text{CST}_S \) based structure, resulting in network partitioning (see Figure 8(c)).

Figure 7: Clustered and Non-Clustered Multiple Cut-Type Failures

Figure 9 depicts the simplified X2000 architecture in which the \( \text{CST}_R \) based bus network described above is implemented. In the figure, the solid and dashed thick lines marked "1394 Bus" represent the active and backup links, respectively. During normal operation, the active connections are driven by enabled ports while the ports of backup connections are disabled to avoid loops.
The thin lines marked "I2C Buses" correspond to the interface for fault detection, isolation and reconfiguration. The I2C bus is a very simple low-speed multi-drop bus and used only for protecting the 1394 bus. Hence this engineering bus has very low utilization and power consumption. For additional protection, a redundant bus (consisting of the 1394 and I2C buses) which is a mirror image of the configuration shown in Figure 9 is proposed by our design [8]. For clarity of illustration, the connections of the redundant bus are not shown in the figure.

4 Bus Network Reliability Evaluation

4.1 Definition and Notation

In accordance with the objective of the fault-tolerant bus architecture described in Section 3.2, we define bus network reliability as follows.

*Bus network reliability* is the probability that, through a mission duration $t$, the network remains in a state such that all the surviving nodes are connected (no network partitioning).

Indeed the causes of a node failure encompass physical layer failure, link layer failure and CPU failure. Moreover, while redundant links (serial bus cables) are permitted in the X2000 architecture, redundant nodes are not allowed due to the power and weight constraints. As a result, the
likelihood of node failure is significantly greater than that of link failure. Therefore, in the reliability assessment that follows, we concern only node failure. On the other hand, when a node fails, we assume that there is a possibility that the faulty node may go undetected or the corresponding network reconfiguration process (including port disabling/enabling, etc.) may unexpectedly crash the system. We call the complement of the probability of such an event "coverage," denoted as $c$

Before proceeding to derive solutions of reliability measures, we define the following notation:

\begin{align*}
R_{CST}^S &\quad \text{Reliability of a CST}_S \text{ based bus network.} \\
R_{CST}^D &\quad \text{Reliability of a CST}_D \text{ based bus network.} \\
R_{CST}^R &\quad \text{Reliability of a CST}_R \text{ based bus network.} \\
\lambda &\quad \text{Poisson failure rate of a node.} \\
t &\quad \text{Mission duration.} \\
q &\quad \text{Probability that a node fails during a mission.} \\
c &\quad \text{Conditional probability that a faulty node is detected and the corresponding reconfiguration process is successful given that such a node failure occurs.}
\end{align*}

### 4.2 Evaluating $R_{CST}^S$ and $R_{CST}^D$

We begin with analyzing the CST$_S$ and CST$_D$ based bus network schemes. As explained in Section 3.2, terminal clustered stem-leaf failures in a CST will not affect the connectivity of the remainder of the tree. Thus we can retrieve a "remainder" from the original CST by eliminating the portion(s) comprised by terminal clustered stem-leaf failures. Consequently, according to the definition of bus network reliability defined in Section 4.1, the reliability calculation for a remainder leads to the solutions of $R_{CST}^S$ and $R_{CST}^D$. Specifically, we evaluate the reliability of a remainder by conditioning it on its size $k$ (the number of its stem nodes), or equivalently speaking, by conditioning it on the event that the terminal clustered stem-leaf failures involve $(n - k)$ stem-leaf node pairs. Note that a remainder of size $k$ in the original CST of size $n$ has $(n - k + 1)$ possible positions (which in turn, determines the positions of the terminal clustered stem-leaf failures). Note that the reliability of a remainder of size $k$ for a CST$_S$ based network is the probability that all $k$ stem nodes are failure-free and all faulty leaf nodes are detected and reconfigured successfully (if any). Letting this probability be denoted as $U(k)$, we have,

$$U(k) = (1 - q)^k \sum_{j=0}^{k} (1 - q)^{k-j}(cq)^j.$$

Then, the theorem of total probability leads to the following solution for $R_{CST}^S$:

$$R_{CST}^S = \sum_{k=1}^{n} (n - k + 1)U(k)(cq)^{2(n-k)}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)
where \( q = 1 - e^{-\lambda t} \) is the probability that a node fails during mission time \( t \) with failure rate \( \lambda \), and \((cq)^{2(n-k)}\) is the probability that \(2(n-k)\) nodes are involved in the terminal clustered stem-leaf failures and fault detection and reconfiguration for each of the failed nodes are successful.

Likewise, letting the reliability of a size-\(k\) remainder in a CSTD based network be denoted as \(V(k)\). According to the failure scenario analysis in Section 3.2.1, we have

\[ V(k) = 2(1 - q)^{k} \sum_{j=1}^{k} (1 - q)^{k-j}(cq)^{j} + (1 - q)^{2k}. \]

Thus, the measure \(R_{D}^{CST}\) can be expressed as

\[ R_{D}^{CST} = \sum_{k=1}^{n}(n - k + 1)V(k)(cq)^{2(n-k)}. \] (2)

### 4.3 A Recursive Model for \(R_{R}^{CST}\)

The solution for \(R_{R}^{CST}\) is considerably more difficult and impossible to be obtained based on the straightforward use of combinatorics methods because

1) The backup links (recall they are not equivalent to replicated links) enable the bus network to tolerate more node failure patterns, which makes the analysis of the conditions that cause network partitioning more complex, and

2) The ring-like structure makes it difficult to ensure that the failure scenarios considered in the model are exhaustive and mutually exclusive.

As explained in Section 3.2, a bus network architecture with a CSTR topology will be partitioned if and only if there exist multiple cut-type failures which do not constitute a single cluster. In other words, the surviving nodes in a CSTR based bus network will remain connected if there exists at most one cut-type failure cluster. In the model construction method described below, we view a single cut-type failure as a special case of cut-type failure cluster (where the size of the cluster is one) and treat a network that is free of cut-type failure as a special case of remainder (where the sizes of the cluster and remainder equal to 0 and \(n\), respectively).

Specifically, we first condition network reliability on the size of a cut-type failure cluster (the number of stem nodes involved in the cluster), then we evaluate the probability that the remainder, which is the portion of the CSTR based network structure excluding the cluster, is free of cut-type failure. The key step toward the evaluation of this probability is the derivation of a set of recursive functions that enumerate the combinations and permutations of failed and surviving nodes in the remainder where cut-type failure is absent. By successively expanding and reducing the sizes of the failure cluster and the remainder, respectively, and employing the recursive functions, we exhaustively enumerate the probabilities that a remainder is cut-type failure free. Accordingly, the measure we seek to evaluate can be expressed as
\[ R_{R}^{CST} = \sum_{m=1}^{n-1} n(cq)^{2m}F(n-m) + F(n) + (n-1)(G(n) + H(n)), \]  

where the index \( m \) represents the size of a cluster, \((cq)^{2m}\) is the probability that such a cluster exists and each of the individual failed nodes comprising the cluster is detected and undergoes reconfiguration successfully, the coefficient \( n \) is the number of possible positions of the cluster in the CST\( _{R} \) based network, and \( F(n-m) \) evaluates the probability that the remainder is cut-type failure free given that the size of the failure cluster is \( m \). This probability is solved by a set of recursive functions which “walk through” the remainder backward, ensuring that 1) the distinct scenarios characterized by the number and positions of failed nodes are exhaustively enumerated, and 2) the remainder is cut-type failure free. More succinctly,

\[ F(k) = F_0(k) + F_1(k) + F_2(k) \]

where \( F_0, F_1 \) and \( F_2 \) are the recursive functions that evaluate the probability of a cut-type failure free remainder of size \( k \). Specifically, \( F_0, F_1 \) and \( F_2 \) traverse from the end of the remainder where

1) both the nodes \( k \) and \( (k+n) \) are surviving nodes,

2) \( k \) is a failed node and \( (k+n) \) is a surviving node, and

3) \( k \) is a surviving node and \( (k+n) \) is a failed node,

respectively. For each step of the traversal, the recursive functions are derived in a way such that no cut-type failure would be formed within the resulting node-pair sequence. More precisely,

\[ F_0(i) = [F_0(i-1) + F_1(i-1) + F_2(i-1)](1 - q)^2 \]

\[ F_0(1) = (1 - q)^2 \]

\[ F_1(i) = [F_0(i-1) + F_1(i-1)](1 - q)cq \]

\[ F_1(1) = (1 - q)cq \]

\[ F_2(i) = [F_0(i-1) + F_2(i-1)]cq(1 - q) \]

\[ F_2(1) = cq(1 - q) \]

For example, if nodes \( i \) and \( (i+n) \) of the \( i \)th node pair in the remainder are a failed and a surviving node, respectively, then the status of the nodes \( (i-1) \) and \( (i-1+n) \) must be 1) failed and surviving, respectively, or 2) both surviving (otherwise a cut-type failure will be formed). This particular sequencing constraint is implemented by the recursive function \( F_2 \) (Equation (7)).
To aid further explanation of the model, we introduce the term cut-type failure node pair, abbreviated as CFP, which refers to the node pair that forms a cut-type failure. Per Definition 4 in Section 3.2, a stem node $i$ in a CST$_R$ based network of size $n$ potentially could be involved in three differing CFPs, as shown in Figure 10. Further, we call the CFPs $\{i, i + n - 1\}$, $\{i, i + n\}$ and $\{i, i + n + 1\}$ backward CFP, vertical CFP and forward CFP, respectively.

![Figure 10: Cut-Type Failure Node Pair](image)

It is worth to note that, due to different patterns of the junctions between the cut-type failure cluster and the remainder, the first term of Equation (3) takes into account not only for the cut-type failure clusters that are constituted by vertical CFPs but also the cut-type failure clusters that can be viewed as the clusters formed by forward and backward CFPs, as illustrated in Figures 11(a) and (b).

![Figure 11: Failure Cluster and Remainder](image)

For the special case where $m = 0$, the cut-type failure cluster becomes degenerate while the remainder spans the entire CST$_R$ based bus network. The corresponding scenarios are enumerated by the rest terms in Equation (3), namely, $F(n)$ and $(n-1)(G(n)+H(n))$. Although no coefficient is attached to $F(n)$, different starting positions of the “remainder” for this special case in the CST$_R$ based bus network are still taken into account by the recursive functions. That is, Equations (5), (6) and (7) together enumerate the combinations and permutations of failed and surviving nodes such that there is no cut-type failure formed within the remainder. As a result, different positions of a “remainder” in a CST$_R$ structure (where $m = 0$) are “inherently” considered by $F(n)$. For example, the “remainder” in Figure 12(b) can be viewed as a result of shifting the starting position of that in Figure 12(a) toward right by one node position — both cases (where $m = 0$) are enumerated by $F(n)$.

The only exception is the scenario in which $m = 0$ and a single cut-type failure (a forward or backward CFP) is formed at the “junction” where the two end of the “remainder” merge, as illustrated in Figure 11(c) (recall that a single CFP by itself will not partition the network). Since
the recursive functions are formulated in a way such that the cases where the remainder has an internal CFP are excluded, what missed in the term \( F(n) \) in Equation (3) but compensated by the last term \((n - 1)(G(n) + H(n))\) are the \((n - 1)\) different positions of this particular CFP. The derivations of \( G(n) \) and \( H(n) \) are based on the recursive functions which are formulated in a manner such that only the scenarios where the "merge" of the ends of the "remainder" results in a forward and backward CFP are considered, respectively (while CFP does not exist elsewhere):

\[
G(n) = [G_0(n - 1) + G_1(n - 1)] cq(1 - q) \tag{8}
\]

\[
G_0(i) = [G_0(i - 1) + G_1(i - 1) + G_2(i - 1)] (1 - q)^2 \tag{9}
\]

\[
G_0(1) = 0
\]

\[
G_1(i) = [G_0(i - 1) + G_1(i - 1)] (1 - q) cq \tag{10}
\]

\[
G_1(1) = (1 - q) cq
\]

\[
G_2(i) = [G_0(i - 1) + G_2(i - 1)] cq(1 - q) \tag{11}
\]

\[
G_2(1) = 0
\]

\[
H(n) = [H_0(n - 1) + H_1(n - 1)] (1 - q) cq \tag{12}
\]

\[
H_0(i) = [H_0(i - 1) + H_1(i - 1) + H_2(i - 1)] (1 - q)^2 \tag{13}
\]

\[
H_0(1) = 0
\]

\[
H_1(i) = [H_0(i - 1) + H_1(i - 1)] (1 - q) cq \tag{14}
\]

\[
H_1(1) = 0
\]

\[
H_2(i) = [H_0(i - 1) + H_2(i - 1)] cq(1 - q) \tag{15}
\]

\[
H_2(1) = cq(1 - q)
\]
4.4 Evaluation Results

Applying the models described above and using Mathematica™, reliability measures for the bus networks based on CST_s, CST_D and CST_R are evaluated with respect to the node failure rate \( \lambda \), size of bus network \( n \) and mission duration \( t \) (in hours).

Figure 13 depicts \( R_s^{CST} \), \( R_D^{CST} \) and \( R_R^{CST} \) as functions of component node failure rate \( \lambda \). In this evaluation, the size of the CST-based bus networks \( n \) is set to 16 (a 32-node network), the fault detection and reconfiguration coverage \( c \) is set to 0.9999 (which is conservative as the coverage is defined on a single node basis), and mission duration \( t \) is set to 90,000 hours which implies an over 10-year long-life mission. It can be observed from the figure that, while CST_D results in an appreciable amount of improvement from CST_s, CST_R leads to significantly more reliability gain. The quantitative results show that \( R_R^{CST} \) will be greater than 0.999997 if node failure rate \( \lambda \) is \( 10^{-8} \) or lower.

![Figure 13: Bus Network Reliability as a Function of Node Failure Rate (\( n = 16 \))](image)

Figure 14 shows the results of the evaluation for which \( \lambda \) is set to \( 10^{-7} \), \( t \) and \( c \) remain 90,000 hours and 0.9999, respectively, while \( n \) is kept as a variable parameter. It is interesting to note that \( R_D^{CST} \) equals to \( R_R^{CST} \) when \( n = 2 \). This is a reasonable result because for a 4-node network, the node failure patterns that will partition a CST_D based network coincide with the failure patterns that will partition a CST_R based network. It can also be observed that the reliability improvement by \( R_R^{CST} \) from \( R_D^{CST} \) becomes more significant as the size of the network increases. This is because more routing alternatives (comprised by active and backup links) are available in a larger CST_R based network.

Figure 15 illustrates the evaluation results of a study for which \( \lambda \) and \( n \) are set to \( 10^{-7} \) and 16, respectively, and \( c \) remains 0.9999, while mission duration \( t \) is kept as a variable parameter. It
is apparent that both $R_S^{\text{CST}}$ and $R_D^{\text{CST}}$ become unacceptable for long-life missions. On the other hand, $R_R^{\text{CST}}$ remains very reasonable (i.e., 0.999929) even when $t = 100,000$ (about 11.5 years).

5 Conclusion

We have presented qualitative and quantitative analyses of a COTS-based fault-tolerant bus network architecture. To implement COTS-based fault tolerance is becoming a major challenge today
when cost concern has led to increased use of COTS products for critical applications. On the other hand, vendors remain reluctant to incorporate fault tolerance features into COTS products because doing so is likely to increase development and production costs and thus weaken the market competitiveness of their products. Therefore, to cope with the current state of COTS is crucial for us. Our analyses demonstrate that a rigid assessment and innovative utilization of pertinent standard features of a state-of-the-practice COTS product could enable us to circumvent their shortcomings and facilitate effective implementation of a COTS-based fault-tolerant system for critical applications. Further, our effort on COTS-based fault tolerance reported in this paper and other developments of COTS-based highly reliable systems suggest to the vendors to incorporate fault tolerance features as implementation options of COTS products. These features will permit a COTS product, in a cost-effective manner, to satisfy the customers in both critical and non-critical application areas, strengthening the market competitiveness.

From analytic method point of view, the recursive function based model described in this paper enables us to obtain the exact solution of reliability measure for the CSTR based bus network which has complex failure scenarios. Indeed, our recursive function based method can be rather easily adapted for the evaluation of a bus network with constraints on reconfiguration and performance degradation. Currently, we are developing an extended model for further investigation into COTS-based fault tolerance for deep-space applications.

References


