A WINDSHEAR HAZARD INDEX

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1. INTRODUCTION

An aircraft exposed to hazardous low-level windshear may suffer a critical loss of airspeed and altitude, thus endangering its ability to remain airborne. In order to characterize this hazard, a nondimensional index was developed based on aerodynamic principals and understanding of windshear phenomena. This paper reviews the development and application of the Bowles F-factor, which is now used by onboard sensors for the detection of hazardous windshear. It was developed and tested during NASA/FAA’s airborne windshear program and is now required for FAA certification of onboard radar windshear detection systems. Reviewed in this paper are: 1) definition of windshear and description of atmospheric phenomena that may cause hazardous windshear, 2) derivation and discussion of the F-factor, 3) development of the F-factor hazard threshold, 4) its testing during field deployments, and 5) its use in accident reconstructions.

2. DEFINITION OF WINDSHEAR

In the context of aviation science, windshear refers to a wind speed or direction change experienced by an airplane over a particular distance or length of time. This definition covers an extremely wide range of meteorological phenomena, including convective turbulence, gust fronts, microburst, internal gravity waves, vertical shear (such as due to low-level atmospheric jetstreams), and terrain-influenced flow. Some of these events are merely nuisances, leading to poor ride quality, increased pilot workload, and rough landings. However, an aircraft exposed to windshear of sufficient intensity and duration, may lose flight performance with a critical reduction of airspeed or flight altitude. Windshear is deemed hazardous when it has the potential to reduce an aircraft’s energy state at a rate faster than can be added back by engine thrust, and thus endangers the aircraft by either reducing its airspeed below stall speed or by diminishing its elevation above the ground. This danger is limited to departing and arriving aircraft, since at this phase of flight, aircraft carry minimal excess energy and are at low altitude and airspeed. Moreover, the danger at low altitudes is further enhanced by the aircraft’s flight configuration of landing gear and flap settings, which require time to reconfigure in order to gain maximum performance.

3. WINDSHEAR HAZARD INDEX

An index that quantifies the windshear threat was developed by Bowles (1990a, 1990b), based on the fundamentals of flight mechanics and the current understanding of windshear phenomena. This index, known as the F-factor, incorporates observable atmospheric parameters, and scales with aircraft flight performance in such a way as to predict impending flight path deterioration.

The concept employed in the derivation of the F-factor is the total aircraft energy and its rate of change. The total aircraft energy is simply the sum of the air-mass relative kinetic energy (airspeed) and the internal potential energy (altitude above the ground). The aircraft total specific energy (energy per unit weight) is defined as

\[ E_T = z + \frac{1}{2} V_a^2 \]

where \( V_a \) is airspeed, \( g \) is gravitational acceleration, and \( z \) is altitude above ground. The above relationship uses air-mass kinetic energy, since airspeed, not ground speed, describes an airplane’s ability to climb and maintain altitude. Likewise, potential inertial energy is used since altitude above the ground is most important to an airplane and can be traded for increased airspeed. The time rate of change of \( E_T \) (which is also the potential rate of climb of the aircraft), can be equated with the aircraft energy input from thrust and drag as:

\[ \dot{E}_T = \frac{V_a \cdot \dot{V}_a}{g} = V_a \left( \frac{T_e - D}{W} \right) \]

where \( (T_e - D) / W \) is the ratio of the aircraft thrust minus drag to weight; i.e. the excess thrust to weight capability of the aircraft. Note that when thrust equals drag the aircraft will maintain a constant speed and altitude, or the pilot may maneuver to exchange aircraft potential energy for kinetic energy. The above relationship is valid for a uniform airmass. The effect of variable atmospheric wind fields can be included by combining \( \dot{E}_T \) with the appropriate aircraft equations of motion (e.g., Frost and Bowles 1984). Neglecting second-order terms, the new relationship becomes:

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where $U_i$ is the component of atmospheric wind directed horizontally along the flight path (positive for tail wind); $\dot{U}_i$ is the shear term—the time rate of change of $U_i$, experienced by the aircraft, and $w$ is the updraft within the airmass. In Eq. (2), the wind-field terms constitute a nondimensional parameter defined by Bowles (1990a, 1990b) as the F-factor:

$$F \equiv \frac{U_i}{g} - \frac{w}{V_a}$$

Note from Eq. (2) that a positive F-factor acts to decrease the energy state of an aircraft: the F-factor is positive for a descending air mass ($w < 0$) and a wind field accelerating in the direction of the flight path ($\dot{U}_i > 0$). In the absence of airmass vertical motion, performance-decreasing shears ($\dot{U}_i > 0$) act to decrease the energy state of the aircraft, while performance increasing shear ($\dot{U}_i < 0$) act to increase the energy state.

The shear term in Eqs. (2) and (3) is a function both of the meteorological event and the aircraft trajectory, e.g.,

$$U_i = \frac{\partial U_{i}}{\partial x} + \frac{\partial U_{i}}{\partial y} + \frac{\partial U_{i}}{\partial z}$$

Both horizontal and vertical shears contribute to the shear term. The first term in Eq. (4) is the product of the horizontal shear directed along the flight path and the aircraft ground speed. This term is the primary contributor to aircraft performance loss during most accident encounters. The second term is the product of the vertical change of horizontal wind and the aircraft ascent rate. This term predominates when the aircraft climbs or descends through strong vertical shears, but has no contribution for level flight. The final term is the local rate-of-change of horizontal wind with time, which usually has only secondary importance during typical windshear encounters. Rearranging terms in Eq. (2), the change in airspeed is:

$$V_a = g \left[ \frac{T_0 - D}{W} - \frac{\dot{z}}{V_a} - F \right]$$

Note that a loss of airspeed in a performance-decreasing shear (with $F > 0$) can be minimized by an increase in thrust and a reduction in altitude. For a strong shear that exceeds the thrust capability of the aircraft, i.e., $F > (T_r - D)/W$, a pilot may either manage his flight so as to maintain altitude while decelerating, maintain airspeed while descending, or some compromise of the two. At low altitude during takeoff or landing, the speed margin above aerodynamic stall speed is minimal and the height is critical. Numerous studies have been conducted (e.g., Hinton 1990, 1992) on optimal and practical techniques for escaping a windshear encounter. The recommended procedure in use today (Federal Aviation Administration 1987) results in extracting the maximum performance from the aircraft and maximizing the likelihood of exiting the windshear event prior to stalling or making ground contact.

The excess thrust-to-weight capability varies with aircraft type. For a 4-engine jet aircraft, the ratio may be about 0.15 at full thrust and maximum takeoff weight. Due to the thrust requirements for engine-out climb performance, 3- and 2-engine aircraft have higher performance than 4-engine aircraft. A typical 3-engine jet transport may have an excess thrust to weight ratio of 0.18 or more, while a twin-engine may exceed 0.2. Hence, by applying excess thrust, jet aircraft are capable of maintaining their energy state for conditions with $F < 0.15$. The situation becomes more critical for an unexpected windshear encounter on landing approach. The excess thrust to weight ratio is about -0.05 for a typical approach on a 3-degree glide slope. Hence, additional time would be needed to bring the aircraft to full thrust during a windshear encounter. Upon an unexpected encounter, significant total energy can be lost from the aircraft during the 5 to 10 seconds of time required to recognize the threat and reach full thrust (Hinton 1992).

Typical piston-engine general-aviation aircraft can reach full thrust in a shorter time than jet aircraft. As is apparent from Eqs. (2)-(4), the slower airspeed of piston aircraft reduces the impact from horizontal and vertical shear, but increases the significance of vertical winds. Hence, an atmospheric event considered hazardous to commercial jet aircraft may not be so for a piston-driven aircraft, and vice versa.

4. HAZARD THRESHOLDS

Since Eqs. (2)-(5) only describe the instantaneous effect of shear on aircraft specific energy and airspeed, the equations must be integrated over an appropriate scale length to characterize the hazard of the event. For example, very large magnitudes of $F$ may occur for brief moments from turbulence associated with the convective planetary boundary layer, but the positive values of $F$ are over small length scales and are quickly followed by negative values. Such oscillations of F-factor result in perceived turbulence, with airspeed oscillations and little net trajectory change. Thus, in order for the F-factor to be useful as a hazard metric it must be averaged or computed in such a way, to represent a significant deterioration in flight path. Such an effort was conducted by Lewis et al. (1994). They proposed that the F-factor be averaged over some given horizontal extent ($L$) as:

$$F(L) = \frac{1}{L} \int_{L}^{1} \frac{1}{L} \int_{L}^{1} \left( \frac{T_r - D}{W} \right) ds - \frac{\Delta V_a^2}{2gL} - \frac{\Delta Z}{L}$$

where the right side of Eq. (7) relates an average F-factor to the airplane performance capability lost over the spatial extent $L$. From (7) it is possible to determine the magnitude and spatial extent that the aircraft can survive, given specific initial energy conditions (speed and height) and allowable energy loss. Calculations were performed by Lewis et al for a range of cases in order to identify a minimum hazard threshold for $F$ and an appropriate minimum length scale (L) for windshear exposure. Each calculation assumed a profile of $(T_r - D)/W$ for a specific aircraft type on approach or departure. Each profile began with a value appropriate for either the take-off or landing phase of
flight (maximum for the airplane for takeoff and 0.05 for landing approach), then a delay interval for pilot recognition of the shear (thrust does not change), followed by a thrust ramp up period (the excess thrust to weight ratio linearly increases to the maximum value). The pilot recognition delay period was assumed to begin at entry into the shear, and maximum $(T_r - D/W)$ was reached at the time indicated by the sum of the pilot delay and the engine spool up. This calculation was done for a number of airplane types representing a range of conventional jet transport aircraft, and was based on realistic but conservative data. The limiting case, representing a worst-case low-altitude encounter, required a 1-km length scale and an average $F$ of 0.12 or greater. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has adopted the 1-km average $F$-factor as its hazard metric for windshear detection systems on jet transports, and considers windshear hazardous for $F > 0.1$, and a must alert threshold at $0.13$ (e.g., Hinton 1994).

The study by Lewis et al. (1994), however, did not address piston-driven aircraft, which composes the vast majority of general aviation aircraft. The minimum averaging scale and hazard thresholds are yet to be determined for these types of aircraft.

### 4.1 Altitude Bound for Windshear Threat

Based on our current understanding of potential worst-case shears, the hazard from windshear is limited to elevations below 500 m. For an unexpected windshear encounter above this altitude, a jet aircraft has an excess of potential energy that can be used to maintain flight speed (e.g., Eq. 5). In addition, an aircraft at this altitude is likely to have its landing gear up (increasing the level of maximum excess thrust), and may be carrying a larger airspeed.

### 4.2 Significance of Vertical Shear

Contribution of aircraft performance loss from vertical shear of horizontal wind can be evaluated from Eqs. (2)-(4). Any potential threat from vertical shear needs only to be evaluated for landing aircraft $(z < 0)$ when $\partial U_z / \partial z < 0$. Otherwise, for $\partial U_z / \partial z > 0$, a landing aircraft would encounter performance increasing shear; and for departing aircraft, any potential threat from vertical shear would be minimized by a flattening of the flight path angle (thus lessening the effect of the shear).

Assuming a hazard threshold of $\overline{F} = 0.1$, with $L = 1000$ m, and using Eqs. (3) and (4), the vertical shear is hazardous to an aircraft on approach, if it exceeds:

$$\frac{\partial U_z}{\partial z} > \frac{0.1g}{V_s \sin \gamma}$$

In Eq. (8), the left hand term represents the average vertical shear of $U_z$, over a depth of $L \sin \gamma$, where $\gamma$ is the flight path angle. Assuming a typical approach speed of 75 m/s and a flight path angle of 6 degrees (twice that of normal), the headwind would have to increase (with $z$) by at least 12.5 m s$^{-1}$ within a 100 m thick layer in order to meet the above hazard criteria. Headwinds of this magnitude are unusual on arrival, and none of the major jetliner accidents has been attributed solely to vertical shear.

### 4.3 Implementation

Reactive, or in-situ systems utilize data from the aircraft’s inertial/navigation and air data systems (Oseguera et al. 1992). Reactive systems must rely on real-time calculations of $F$-factor and apply gust rejection filters to minimize nuisance alerts. These systems give accurate readings, but cannot give warnings until the windshear event has been penetrated. Computation of a 1-km average $F$-factor requires about 15 seconds of exposure at typical jet airplane approach speeds. Many commercial jet aircraft are now equipped with reactive windshear warning systems which employ the $F$-factor concept.

Forward-looking onboard windshear systems can predict an impending hazard along the aircraft’s flight path (Arbuckle et al. 1996). Most of these systems can sense the horizontal shear and its scale, but must rely on some estimation for vertical velocity. Furthermore, radar windshear systems require the presence of precipitation and adequate clutter suppression. Lidar systems must be concerned with attenuation due to water vapor and heavy precipitation.

### 5. ATMOSPHERIC WINDSHEAR PHENOMENA

The threat from low-altitude windshear is limited to those atmospheric phenomena that maintain a significant level of shear over a particular range of scales. Phenomena with high levels of $F$, but over short distances (horizontal scales less than 400 m), are experienced as turbulence by commercial jet aircraft. Phenomena with wind shear distributed over large length scales (of order 10 km and greater) are unlikely to have magnitudes of shear that would directly affect the safety of an aircraft. However, those events having a mid-range of scales, i.e. horizontal scales of approximately 400 to 4000 m, are most likely to impact the performance of departing and arriving aircraft. The primary atmospheric phenomenon that can produce hazardous low-altitude windshear within this range of scales is the microburst. Since the late 1970’s when microburst phenomena were first recognized as threat to aviation (e.g., Fujita and Byers 1977), the vast majority of windshear accidents and incidents involving jet transports have been attributed to microbursts.

Strong low-level jets (LLJ) are sometimes associated with large magnitudes of vertical shear, although rarely reaching intensities hazardous to aircraft. The maximum wind speed of a LLJ is usually located at an altitude between 200 to 600 m above ground level, with peak speed ranging from 10 to 21 m/s (Whiteman et al. 1997). The performance loss due to descent through a LLJ can be demonstrated with Eqs. (3) and (4). For example, if a LLJ has a 21 m/s peak velocity at 200 m AGL, with winds decreasing to zero at the ground, then a typical approach into the headwind of the LLJ would generate an average $F$-factor (along a 3.8 km path) of 0.042. Hence, the performance loss experienced by a landing aircraft could be easily balanced by added thrust. Given the same example and using Eq. (8), the vertical shear only becomes hazardous if the aircraft descends along a −7.2 degree flight path angle. Thus our analysis suggest that the vertical shear associated with low-level jetstreams is well within the performance capability of aircraft, although aircraft with limited excess-thrust capability should apply caution during extreme LLJ events and avoid unusually-steep landing approaches.
6. MICROBURSTS AND MACROBURSTS

A microburst is loosely defined as an intense local downdraft with divergent surface outflow. Microbursts are associated with precipitation from convective clouds, and may produce magnitudes of vertical velocity and horizontal shear that can threaten landing and departing aircraft. Radar meteorologists identify surface outflows as microbursts when their peak horizontal divergence exceeds 10 m/s within a 1-4 km segment (e.g., Wilson et al 1984). Divergent outflows with horizontal scale greater than 4 km are sometimes termed macrobursts (Fujita 1985), although they may contain one or more embedded microbursts. The F-factor is most hazardous near the center of microburst outflows due to the strong downward motion and divergent shear. Performance-enhancing areas (F<0), which often surround the hazard area, are due to the increasing headwind and updraft near the enhancing areas (F>0), which often surround the hazard area. The F-factor is most hazardous for average F-factor of about 0.1 (see Fig. 2).

Proctor and Bowles (1992) found that the F-factor in microburst usually varied weakly with altitude, even though the contribution from horizontal shear diminishes with increasing altitude. Numerical model simulations indicate that the contribution from the horizontal component dominates near the ground but becomes less than the vertical component at altitude about 300 m (Byrd et al 1990). Since look-ahead sensor can only measure the component along the flight path, various models have been evaluated for estimating the vertical wind component of the F-factor (Vicroy 1992a, 1994). The results of these studies show that within the altitude of greatest interest (below 300 m) the following simple relationship worked very well:

\[ F = F_h(1 + \frac{\beta \varepsilon}{V_a}) \]  

(9)

where the horizontal contribution from Eq. (3) is defined as:

\[ F_h = \frac{U_s - \frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon}}{R} \frac{\partial V_a}{\partial x} \]

In Eq. (9), \( \beta = 2 \) if \( F_h > 0 \) and \( \beta = 1 \) if \( F_h < 0 \). Using the above approximations, an estimate of the total 1-km average F-factor can be deduced from the horizontal shear sensed by a look-ahead system. The estimated 1-km average F using Eq. (9) is compared in Fig. 1 for the DFW accident case.

7. FLIGHT TESTS

During 1991 and 1992 extensive flight test were conducted within microburst environments at Denver and Orlando. More than 75 microburst and strong gust fronts were penetrated at low altitudes (225-335 m) by NASA’s B-737 research aircraft (Arbuckle et al 1996). The plane was equipped with in situ, Doppler radar, LIDAR, and infrared windshear detection systems. Windshear information also was uplinked from a prototype Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) and was used to locate microburst events for potential encounters. The onboard look-ahead systems were activated prior to windshear encounters, and the aircraft in-situ system generated “truth” data as the event was penetrated. The X-band onboard Doppler radar, which utilized clutter suppression algorithms and F-factor estimations based on Eq. (9), was found to work extremely well within both high-reflectivity (wet) and low-reflectivity (dry) microburst environments. A comparison of the radar estimated average F-factor and in situ F-factor are shown in Fig. 3. A comparison of TDWR estimated F-factor with in situ F-factor measured during the microburst penetrations is shown in Fig. 4.

8. ACCIDENT RECONSTRUCTION

A US Air DC-9 unexpectedly encountered a rapidly intensifying microburst on approach to Charlotte in July of 1994. The plane crashed after encountering hazardous windshear with \( F > 0.3 \). The event was reconstructed using the aircraft flight profiles and a numerical simulation of the event with the Terminal Area Simulation System (TASS) model (see Proctor et al 1995). Analysis of the 1-km F-factor from the FDR data is shown with the TASS data in Fig. 5. A simulation of NASA’s windshear radar was performed with ground clutter data, NASA’s processing algorithms (including the estimation for vertical F-factor), and the three-dimensional TASS data set. In spite of the ground clutter, the radar simulation was able to identify the microburst hazard (Fig. 6) and issue a warning more than 30 s prior to the encounter. This study suggests that if the airplane had been equipped with windshear radar the accident may have been avoided.

9. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Windshear hazard characterization was a major component of the NASA/FAA airborne windshear program. Windshear radar systems which utilize the F-factor hazard metric are being produced by private vendors. These systems are being certified by the FAA for installation on many new jet aircraft.

References


**Figure 1.** Average F-factor experienced by Delta-191 during the 1985 DFW microburst encounter. The profile for estimated F is derived from Eq. (9).
Figure 2. Probability of a microburst exceeding a given $F_0$, based on a 251 microburst sample.

Figure 3. Radar flight test performance (Bracalente et al. 1994, Arbuckle et al. 1996).

Figure 4. TDWR vs in situ flight test performance (from Hinton 1993, 1994).

Figure 5. Comparison of reconstructed $\bar{F}$ profiles from the Charlotte windshear accident (Proctor et al. 1995). Analyzed from numerical simulation (TASS) and FDR data. [The FDR data was obtained from two sources that differed slightly: McDonnell Douglas-MDC and NTSB].

Figure 6. Simulated windshear hazard as viewed by an onboard radar for the Charlotte accident (Proctor et al. 1995). Viewed on approach 1 min prior to accident time.