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Crew Factors in Flight Operations XIV: Alertness Management in Regional Flight Operations Education Module

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February 2002
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Crew Factors in Flight Operations XIV: Alertness Management in Regional Flight Operations Education Module

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PREFACE

This report is based significantly on the NASA Technical Memorandum (TM):


The cited NASA TM is a general Education and Training Module addressing fatigue in commercial flight operations. It is the basis for this document, an Education and Training Module that has been tailored to address regional operations specifically.

The original acknowledgements highlight the numerous individuals that made many significant contributions to the NASA Ames Fatigue Countermeasures Group and the original Education and Training Module. These acknowledgements are now extended to include Dr. Philippa H. Gander, and Linda J. Connell for their many critical contributions to the NASA Ames Fatigue Countermeasures Group, the original Education and Training Module, and this Module tailored for regional operations. Other members of the Fatigue Countermeasures Group who provided lengthy searches through the NTSB and ASRS databases are Dinah Reduta and Tammy Nguyen. Additionally, we wish to thank the following individuals for their invaluable comments and suggestions in molding this publication to be as operationally relevant as possible; Robert Vandel (Flight Safety Foundation), Joe “Jay” Evans (National Business Aircraft Association, Inc.), Debbie McElroy (Regional Airline Association), and Scott Foose (Regional Airline Association).

Regional operations encompass a broad range of pilots and equipment. This module is intended to help all those involved in regional aviation, including pilots, schedulers, dispatchers, maintenance technicians, policy makers, and others, to understand the physiological factors underlying fatigue, how flight operations affect fatigue, and what can be done to counteract fatigue and maximize alertness and performance in their operations.
INTRODUCTION

In 1980, in response to a congressional request, NASA Ames Research Center created a Fatigue/Jet Lag Program to examine whether "there is a safety problem, of uncertain magnitude, due to transmeridian flying and a potential problem due to fatigue in association with various factors found in air transport operations." Since 1980, the Program has pursued the following three goals: (1) to determine the extent of fatigue, sleep loss, and circadian disruption in flight operations; (2) to determine the effect of these factors on flight crew performance; and (3) to develop and evaluate countermeasures to reduce the adverse effects of these factors and to maximize flight crew performance and alertness. It has been a priority since the Program's inception to return the information acquired through its extensive research to the operators—the line pilots, air carriers, and others. In 1991, the Program underwent a name change, becoming the NASA Ames Fatigue Countermeasures Group, to highlight the increased focus on the development and evaluation of fatigue countermeasures. (For a more complete description of the Group, see footnote below.) With this increased emphasis on countermeasures, it became important to organize and disseminate what had been learned about fatigue, sleep, and circadian rhythms in flight operations.

There is now enough scientific and operational data to create this Education and Training Module on strategies for alertness management for members of the regional operations community. The overall purpose of this module is to promote aviation safety, performance, and productivity. It is intended to meet three specific objectives: (1) to explain the current state of knowledge about the physiological mechanisms underlying fatigue; (2) to demonstrate how this knowledge can be applied to improving flight crew sleep, performance, and alertness; and (3) to offer strategies for alertness management.

This module is presented in three distinct sections. The first section addresses fatigue factors in regional operations. It provides report examples from the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) and National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reports to demonstrate that fatigue is a safety issue in the regional operations community. It discusses the causes of fatigue with specific focus on sleep and sleep loss, circadian rhythms and flight operations. It provides basic information on sleep, sleepiness, circadian rhythms and how flight operations affect these physiological factors. It explains the effects of fatigue on alertness, performance and flying. It identifies fatigue related factors in operational environments under FARs Part 121 and 135. The second section identifies some widely held misconceptions about fatigue and explains why they are false. Finally, the third section provides recommendations for alertness management strategies in Part 121 and 135 flight operations. This Education and Training Module is intended

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to be offered as a comprehensive resource that can be utilized in a number of different ways. It can be used as a reference by an individual or provided as a live presentation by a trained individual. The full presentation may require at least 60 min to complete. Those with less time may choose to emphasize certain highlights that are pertinent to them. Its interactive format will provide a forum for discussions of how this information and the recommended strategies can be applied in specific flight operations.

The information contained in the slide graphics constitutes the main body of this publication. The appendixes at the end of this module include the complete ASRS reports used for the examples provided throughout the main body of this publication. Brief introductions to sleep disorders and to relaxation techniques are presented in appendixes A and B, respectively. Appendix C contains summaries of relevant NASA publications, including studies in short-haul, long-haul, and helicopter operations, and the NASA/FAA study on planned cockpit rest in long-haul flying. Appendix D provides a list of representative publications from the NASA Ames Fatigue Countermeasures Group, and Appendix E contains cited literature and a list of general readings on sleep, sleep disorders, and circadian rhythms.

The format of this publication is designed for two purposes: (1) to facilitate training and (2) to provide a reference for those who use the information. For trainers, the slide graphics provide presentation material, while the text provides some guidelines as to what information should be addressed when presenting the Module. For those applying the information, the text elaborates on the slide graphics for later reference.

This is the first formal step taken by the NASA Ames Fatigue Countermeasures Group to provide education and training information on fatigue, sleep, and circadian rhythms specifically in regional flight operations, and to recommend strategies for managing alertness on the flight deck. As future scientific and operational advances are made, this module will evolve to incorporate the latest findings, information, and recommendations. Therefore, any comments, questions, or requests regarding this module would be greatly appreciated. Please address them to: Fatigue Countermeasures Group, NASA Ames Research Center, MS 262-4, Moffett Field, California 94035-1000.
Alertness Management in Regional Flight Operations

NASA Ames Research Center
Human Factors Research and Technology Division
Fatigue Countermeasures Group
Objectives

- Explain the current state of knowledge about the physiological mechanisms underlying fatigue
- Demonstrate the importance of fatigue in regional ops
- Describe the effects of fatigue on flight performance
- Identify fatigue factors in regional operations
- Dispel common misconceptions about fatigue
- Demonstrate how to apply this knowledge to improve sleep, performance, and alertness of pilots and recommend alertness management strategies

Fatigue Countermeasures Group

In response to a 1980 congressional request, NASA Ames Research Center initiated a Fatigue/Jet Lag Program to examine fatigue, sleep loss, and circadian disruption in aviation. Research has examined fatigue in a variety of flight environments, including short-haul and regional operations, using a range of measures (from self-report to performance to physiological). In 1991, the program evolved into the Fatigue Countermeasures Group, emphasizing the development and evaluation of strategies to maintain alertness and performance in operational settings. Over the years, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has provided support for fatigue research and other Group activities. From the inception of the Group, a principal goal was to return the information learned from research and other Group activities to the operational community.

The objectives of this Education and Training Module are to:

1. Explain what is known about the physiological mechanisms that underlie fatigue.
2. Demonstrate the significance of fatigue in the safety of regional operations by examining several fatigue-related incidents and accidents.
3. Describe how fatigue affects alertness, performance, and flying skills.
4. Identify fatigue-related factors in regional operations.
5. Address several common misconceptions about fatigue and sleepiness, examining and dispelling them based on scientific data.
6. Apply the available knowledge of fatigue to flight operations, and offer some specific fatigue countermeasure recommendations.
Overview

• Fatigue factors in regional operations

• Common misconceptions

• Alertness management strategies

The presentation is divided into three parts. First, there is a description of fatigue factors in flight operations, which includes: A) a demonstration that fatigue in aviation, and specifically in regional operations, is of national interest; B) a discussion of the principal causes of fatigue (i.e., sleep and sleep loss, circadian rhythms and their disruption, and the effects of flight operations on these physiological factors); C) a description of how fatigue affects performance and flying; and D) a discussion of specific fatigue factors in regional operations. Second, some common misconceptions regarding fatigue in aviation are presented, and application of the information provided in the first part demonstrates why these notions are incorrect. Third, a variety of countermeasures are introduced, including preventive approaches that can be used before flying or between flights, as well as operational countermeasures that can be used during flights.
Section A of this part (Part I) will demonstrate the importance of fatigue issues in aviation overall, and specifically in regional flight operations. Section B will discuss the two main physiological factors that affect fatigue: 1) sleep and sleep loss, and 2) circadian rhythms. With the principles of these physiological factors as a background, Section C will then discuss how regional operations affect fatigue, and Section D will address specific effects of fatigue on performance and flying.
Fatigue Factors in Regional Operations:

A. Fatigue is a Safety Issue in Regional Operations

This section demonstrates the importance of fatigue in aviation, and specifically in regional operations, by providing examples of fatigue-related incidents and accidents, and actions taken by the industry to address fatigue.

Throughout, this module cites several real-life examples, focusing mainly but not exclusively on regional flight operations, to demonstrate the significance and manifestations of fatigue.

An important point to remember is that fatigue is human based and should not be focused just on the pilots but within all aviation operations. For example, the NTSB has determined the probable cause of an accident involving a collision of a fuel truck with an American Airlines Fokker F28 MK100 that just arrived at the gate to be the fuel truck driver who fell asleep. This resulted in the collision of the fuel truck into the parked aircraft (NTSB ID No. CHI00LA076). Luckily there were no fatalities, but at least 20 passengers, who stood up immediately when the plane reached the gate, were thrown about causing 6 minor injuries when the truck impacted the right front of the aircraft traveling approximately 20-30 mph at 1730 local time. The medical and sleep study evaluation showed the driver suffered from severe obstructive sleep apnea and significant hypersomnolence.

All the examples provided in this module are accompanied by descriptions of the factors contributing to the accident or incident. Also included are results from a survey conducted in regional and commuter aviation that demonstrate the extent to which fatigue is perceived as a significant safety issue in these specific environments.
Fatigue Accidents in Commercial Aviation

- Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (August 18, 1993)
  - AIA Flight 808—McDonnell Douglas DC-8
  - No fatalities

- Nimitz Hill, Guam (August 6, 1997)
  - Korean Air Flight 801—Boeing 747-300
  - 228 fatalities

According to the NTSB, several major aviation accidents have been associated with fatigue.

For example, fatigue was cited by the NTSB as a probable cause and contributing factor in the crash of American International Airways Flight 808, a DC-8-61, in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba on August 18, 1993, about 1/4 mile from the approach end of the runway (NTSB/AAR-94/04). At the time of the crash, the flight crew had been on duty for 18 hours (9 hrs flight time). It was concluded that the flight crew was fatigued and suffered from sleep loss and circadian disruption, which all contributed to a negative effect on their performance during a critical phase of flight. As a result, the NTSB suggested a review and update of the FAA flight/duty time limitations, which would consider the most current research on fatigue and sleep loss.

A more recent example of a fatigue-related aviation accident is the crash of Korean Flight Air 801 on August 6, 1997 (NTSB/AAR-00/01). The Boeing 747-300 crashed into high terrain about 3 miles southwest of the airport after being cleared to land. Of 258 souls on board, the accident resulted in 228 deaths. The NTSB determined the probable cause to be the captain’s failure to adequately brief and execute the nonprecision approach and the first officer’s and flight engineer’s failure to effectively monitor and cross-check the captain’s execution of the approach. Contributing to these failures was the captain’s fatigue.
Is Fatigue a Concern in Flight Operations?

- National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
  - "... it is time for an aggressive Federal program to address the problems of fatigue and sleep issues in transportation safety"
  - "... educate pilots about the detrimental effects of fatigue and strategies for avoiding fatigue and countering its effects"
  - Fatigue cited as probable cause/contributing factor in aviation accidents

- Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
  - An objective of the National Plan for Aviation Human Factors

The following three sources indicate that fatigue is a concern acknowledged at a national level. Additionally, numerous studies have demonstrated fatigue-effects in commercial flight crews, including accumulated sleep loss, alertness and performance decrements, and unintended episodes of falling asleep during flight (see NASA representative publications in Appendix C).

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has stated the following in Safety Recommendations I-89-1, I-89-2, and I-89-3: “Based on its experience in accident investigation, the Safety Board believes it is time for an aggressive Federal program to address the problems of fatigue and sleep issues in transportation safety.” On January 19, 1994, based on a Safety Study Review, the NTSB recommended that the FAA “Require U.S. carriers operating under 14 CFR Part 121 to include, as part of pilot training, a program to educate pilots about the detrimental effects of fatigue, and strategies for avoiding fatigue and countering its effects.” A parallel recommendation was made regarding Part 135 carriers. For the first time, the NTSB cited fatigue as a probable cause in a major aviation accident. Through the research and other activities of the NASA Ames Fatigue Countermeasures Group, the FAA, and the NTSB, aviation is ahead of most other modes of transportation in examining the issue of fatigue and, especially, in developing potential countermeasures.

The FAA’s National Plan for Aviation Human Factors identifies fatigue as an area for continued basic and applied research. These are only three examples of highly visible national agencies that acknowledge and call for continued activities addressing the issue of fatigue in aeronautical operations.
Fatigue in regional flight operations, specifically, has gained national recognition as a safety issue as well.

In 1979, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) made a Safety Recommendation that asked the FAA to set the same flight and duty time standards for FAR Part 135 (which regulated most regional airlines operations at that time) as for Part 121 (which continues to regulate the major airlines), and reiterated the recommendation in 1980. In 1994, the Board published a Safety Study on Commuter* Airline Safety** recommending that all scheduled passenger service in aircraft with 20 or more seats (those with 10 or more seats when possible), be conducted under the same regulations as major airlines.

At present, nearly all regional airlines operate under Part 121 which consists of short and medium-haul scheduled airline service to small and large cities. The type of aircraft include turboprops with 19 passenger seats to regional jets that can carry up to 100 passengers.

The NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) has created an ASRS Database Report Set of "Commuter and Corporate Flight Crew Fatigue Reports." The Report Set contains a sampling of reports referencing commuter and corporate flight crew fatigue issues and duty periods. ASRS updates the report set and maintains the 50 most recent relevant ASRS Database records.

* While the terms commuter and regional are often used interchangeably, the report defined commuter as those operations conducted under Part 135.
** The document is listed in the Reference section of this TM.
Fatigue Accidents in Regional Operations

- Jamaica, New York (May 8, 1999)
  - Saab 340B/Part 121
  - 1 serious injury, 29 uninjured

- Milwaukee, Wisconsin (January 21, 2000)
  - Jetstream 3101/Part 121
  - 2 uninjured

- Brunswick, Georgia (April 5, 1991)
  - Embraer EMB-120, Brasilia/Part 135
  - 23 fatalities

It is apparent that fatigue has been recognized by the NTSB as a potential safety issue in commercial aviation as evidenced by the Guantanamo Bay and Korean Air accident reports. The NTSB also has identified fatigue as a safety concern in regional aviation accidents. In May, 1999 a Saab 340B made an approach to land in instrument meteorological conditions with an excessive altitude, airspeed, and rate of descent (NTSB ID No. NYC99FA110). The aircraft landed 7000 feet from the runway threshold and overran the runway. The pilots were on a continuous duty overnight (CDO) schedule and had only about 4 hr sleep prior to the accident flight.

Although fatigue is not always directly cited as a cause or contributing factor in accident investigations performed by the NTSB, fatigue related facts are uncovered. For example, a hold short clearance was not followed and a British Aerospace Jetstream 3101 proceeded across the active runway while a Boeing 727 was departing on the active runway (NTSB ID No. CHI00IA062). The probable cause was determined to be the hold-short clearance that was not followed by the flightcrew resulting in the near collision with the departing aircraft. The captain of the Jetstream stated that one of the contributing factors was crew fatigue. The incident occurred over 12 hr into the duty period and the crew's last sleep period was about 4 hr.

Another example is the crash of an Embraer EMB in Brunswick, Georgia in April 1991 where the aircraft suddenly rolled left until the wings were perpendicular to the ground, resulting in the aircraft falling in a nose down fashion (NTSB/AAR-94/04). While the NTSB identified that the probable cause for the loss of control resulted from the malfunction of the left engine control, the inability of the flight crew to handle the malfunction was further complicated by fatigue that resulted from a common practice of using reduced rest provisions to schedule limited rest periods rather than using the provisions for scheduling flexibility (when needed).
What Can Be Done About Fatigue?

- Change the FARs—takes an act of Congress (almost)
- Research fatigue issues that support FAA efforts
- Apply strategies to better cope with the current situation

This presentation will clearly demonstrate that fatigue in flight operations is a complex issue with no one simple answer. Rather, every component of the aviation system that can be addressed to improve alertness and performance in flight operations should receive attention. Several examples are provided here.

The Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) could provide one means of incorporating what is now known about the physiological mechanisms that produce fatigue. This can be a long process and one that can be complex in its own right. The FAA established an Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee working group that examined current flight/duty/rest requirements. The working group evaluated current FAR requirements, and their interpretation and application within the aviation industry. Also, the FAA has established a rulemaking team that examined flight/duty/rest requirements. A Notice for Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) was released, comments were made, and changes are under review by the FAA.

Another approach is to conduct research that provides scientific data to be used by policymakers concerned with regulatory issues or interpretation of the FARs. The research can be the basis for a variety of actions, including the production of Advisory Circulars.

In another possible approach, the information provided in this presentation can be used right now by any individual challenged by the physiological demands of flight operations. The basic information and countermeasure recommendations can be used by all in the aviation industry who want to improve their ability to cope with the existing situation.
The information listed here provides some insight into the research and activities that created the foundation for the development of this Education and Training Module. Since 1980, the NASA Ames Fatigue Countermeasures Group, in collaboration with the FAA, has conducted fatigue research, which recently has emphasized the testing and implementation of countermeasures. An example of these activities is the NASA/FAA study of planned cockpit rest, which demonstrated the effectiveness of a controlled in-flight nap to improve subsequent alertness and performance during critical phases of flight. The FAA is reviewing issues related to sanctioning “Controlled Rest on the Flight Deck.” Another important ongoing Group contribution is the production of scientific and technical publications, as well as industry articles, reporting study results and other information related to fatigue and potential countermeasures. Some representative Group publications suggested for further reading are provided in appendix D. Many publications can be downloaded from the Group’s web site at http://human-factors.arc.nasa.gov/ztteam/pubs.html or can be requested by contacting the Group at the address located in the Introduction (page v).
Fatigue is really a catchall term for a variety of different subjective experiences, for example, physical discomfort after overworking a particular group of muscles, concentration difficulties during a monotonous task, difficulty appreciating potentially important signals following long or irregular work hours, or simply difficulty staying awake. In the context of flight operations, crewmember fatigue becomes important if it reduces efficiency or otherwise degrades crew performance. Subjective fatigue can be affected by motivation or by the amount of stimulation coming from the environment. However, there are two systematic physiological causes of fatigue (and poorer performance)—sleep loss and circadian rhythms—both of which are affected by flight operations. It is also important to note that inadequate rest can result in sleep loss and circadian disruption, and can therefore be a source of fatigue in its own right. The NASA Fatigue Countermeasures Group focuses on these factors.
Fatigue Factors in Regional Operations:
B. The Physiology of Fatigue:
Sleep & Sleep Loss

This section provides basic information about the complex physiological process of sleep and the effects of sleep loss and sleepiness. The information, based on scientific research, will help provide a more complete understanding of the need for and importance of sleep.
Sleep Physiology: Two States of Sleep

- **NREM (non-rapid eye movement) sleep**
  - Physiological and mental activity slowed
  - Light sleep (stages 1 and 2); deep sleep (stages 3 and 4)

- **REM (rapid eye movement) sleep**
  - Physiological and mental activity increased
  - An active brain (dreaming) in a paralyzed body

It is widely believed that sleep is a time when the brain and the body shut off and then re-engage upon awakening. Actually, sleep is a highly complex physiological process during which the brain and body alternate between periods of extreme activity and quiet, but are never "shut off." Sleep is composed of two distinct states: NREM, or non-rapid eye movement, and REM, or rapid eye movement, sleep. These two sleep states are as different from each other as they are from wakefulness.

During NREM sleep, physiological and mental activities slow (e.g., heart rate and breathing rate slow and become regular). NREM sleep is divided into four stages, with the deepest sleep occurring during stages 3 and 4. There is usually very little mental activity during NREM stages 3 and 4. If awakened during this deep sleep, an individual may take sometime to wake up and then continue to feel groggy, sleepy, and perhaps disoriented for 10–15 minutes. This phenomenon is called sleep inertia.

REM sleep is associated with an extremely active brain that is dreaming, and with bursts of rapid eye movements (probably following the activity of the dream). During REM sleep, the major motor muscles of the body are paralyzed. If awakened during REM sleep, individuals can often provide detailed reports of their dreams.
Sleep Architecture: NREM/REM Cycle

• NREM and REM alternate throughout each sleep period

• Most deep sleep occurs in first half of sleep period

• REM periods longer, more regular later in sleep period

Over the course of a typical night, NREM and REM sleep occur in a cycle, with about 60 minutes of NREM sleep followed by about 30 minutes of REM sleep. This 90-minute cycle repeats itself throughout a typical sleep period. However, most deep sleep (i.e., NREM stages 3 and 4) occurs in the first third of the night, and REM periods are shorter early in the night and then become longer and occur more regularly later in the sleep period. Overall, about 25% of sleep time is spent in REM sleep and about 50% is spent in NREM stage 2.
This graph portrays a typical night of sleep for a normal adult. It exemplifies the sleep architecture discussed on the previous slide: REM (indicated by darkened bars) and NREM alternating throughout the period; most deep sleep occurring in the first half of the sleep period; and REM periods becoming longer and more regular later in the sleep period.
Sleep Physiology

- Amount and structure of sleep changes over the life span
  
  Sleep becomes less deep, more disrupted, and total nocturnal sleep decreases
  
  Daily percentage sleep loss is 3.5 times greater in long-haul flight crewmembers aged 50–60 than in those aged 20–30

- Quantity vs quality of sleep
  
  Getting 8 hr of disrupted sleep can have effects similar to too little sleep
  
  After sleep loss, sleep is deeper rather than longer

The amount and structure of sleep change profoundly over the life span. With increased age, sleep becomes less deep (most NREM stages 3 and 4 disappear) and more disrupted (awakenings increase), and the total amount of nocturnal sleep decreases. It is not that older individuals need less sleep, but it appears that with age, our ability to obtain a consolidated and continuous period of nocturnal sleep decreases. These changes can be seen in individuals starting as early as 50 years of age. This normal part of the aging process is reflected in the finding from a NASA study that long-haul flight crewmembers aged 50–60 had a daily percentage sleep loss 3.5 times greater during trip schedules than those aged 20–30 years.

The quality of sleep can be as critical as the quantity of sleep in restoring an individual. If an individual obtains 8 hours of sleep but the sleep is disrupted tens or hundreds of times, then upon awakening, the individual may feel as if only a few hours of sleep were obtained. There are many diverse reasons for disrupted sleep, from environmental causes (e.g., noise, light) to physical sleep disorders. For example, there is a sleep disorder called "periodic leg movements during sleep" that involves one or both legs twitching throughout sleep (see appendix A for further information). With each leg twitch, the sleeper is awakened briefly. Hundreds of these brief awakenings can occur during one sleep period. The sleeper can be completely unaware of the twitches or awakenings but feel sleepy and tired even after 8 hours of this fragmented sleep.

Another commonly held belief is that after sleep loss, an individual has to "make up" that sleep by sleeping a number of hours equal to those lost. Scientific laboratory studies have demonstrated that following sleep deprivation, recovery sleep is deeper (more NREM stages 3 and 4), rather than extended. During recovery sleep, an individual might sleep somewhat longer, but the most notable feature is the increase in deep sleep.
Sleep Physiology

- Effects of medications
  Can delay sleep onset, disrupt sleep structure, alter total sleep time

- Effects of environmental factors
  Noise, temperature, light, etc. may interfere with good sleep

- Effects of alcohol
  Suppresses REM, leads to withdrawal effects and more disrupted sleep
  Short-haul pilots increase consumption threefold on trips
  Can interact with sleep loss to increase sleepiness

There are many medications (non-sleeping pill), both prescribed and over-the-counter, that can adversely affect sleep. Depending on the specific action of these medications, they may delay sleep onset, disrupt the sleep structure, or alter total sleep time.

Environmental factors may also interfere with good sleep. Noise, light, low or high temperatures, and a variety of other factors can decrease the quantity and quality of sleep. With FAA support, NASA has examined the effects of environmental factors on sleep in on-board crew rest facilities.

Alcohol has a profound effect on the usual sleep cycle. After more than a couple of glasses of wine or a couple of beers (with individual variations), alcohol can essentially eliminate all of the REM sleep in the first half of a sleep period. This can lead to subsequent alcohol withdrawal effects in the second half of the sleep period, including sleep fragmentation. Unfortunately, the most widely used sleep aid in the United States is alcohol. Ironically, although often used to promote relaxation and the ability to fall asleep, it will generally have major disruptive effects on the subsequent sleep. One NASA study found that short-haul pilots, while within FAR guidelines, increased their alcohol consumption threefold during trips compared with home consumption. The common practice of using alcohol to relax before sleep is not recommended. Although alcohol may facilitate falling asleep, it has well-documented disruptive effects on sleep, which can adversely affect subsequent waking alertness and performance. Alcohol also interacts in a synergistic fashion with sleepiness. A sleep-deprived individual who is already sleepy will demonstrate more severe performance and alertness impairment following alcohol consumption.
Sleep Physiology

- Sleep disorders can disturb sleep and waking alertness
  
  Sleep problems can be diagnosed and treated by sleep-disorder specialists

- Sleeping pills
  
  Some help you fall asleep, stay asleep, which may improve your waking alertness
  
  Some alter sleep structure, create dependency, have carryover effects that may decrease waking alertness and performance
  
  Only recommended at the prescribed dose for short periods of time
  
  May have potentially serious side effects

There are physical sleep disorders that can disturb sleep and impair waking alertness and performance. (See Appendix A for some examples, such as sleep apnea.) These sleep disorders can have profound effects on waking function, and yet occur with the sleeper essentially unaware of their existence. Sleep problems can be diagnosed and treated effectively by accredited sleep disorders specialists and clinics.

Appendix A also provides some general information about sleeping pills. Some prescription sleeping pills may facilitate falling asleep and staying asleep, with subsequent improvements in waking alertness and performance. However, many sleeping pills alter sleep structure dramatically, create drug dependence, and have carryover effects that decrease waking alertness and performance. Proper use of these medications typically means taking the lowest dose, and that for only a few days. Many sleeping pills can have potentially serious side-effects, and none should be taken except under the care and guidance of a physician.
Like food and water, sleep is a physiological need vital to human survival and critical to human existence. Sleep loss can be additive and can result in a cumulative sleep debt. Estimates suggest that in the United States, most people get 1–1.5 hours less sleep than they need. During a regular 5-day work week a typical individual might accumulate a 7.5-hour sleep debt, equal to a full night of sleep loss, going into a weekend. In today’s society, many individuals actively attend to their nutrition and exercise to promote good health. Unfortunately, the first physiological need that suffers when individuals are faced with everyday pressures and demands is sleep. Losing sleep becomes a way of squeezing more hours and minutes into the day, which demonstrates a lack of concern for meeting this vital physiological need.

Sleep loss leads to increased waking sleepiness. Many people equate sleepiness with being lazy or acknowledge it only humorously. Sleepiness can have severe consequences for us as individuals and as a society. Sleepiness can degrade essentially every aspect of human performance. Sleep loss and sleepiness can decrease physical, psychomotor, and mental performance, and can increase negative mood and decrease positive mood. Therefore, a principal consequence of sleepiness is an increased vulnerability to performance decrements. It is important to consider this as a performance vulnerability because, like the effects of alcohol on performance and memory, sleepiness can lead to a reduced safety margin and an increased potential for operational incidents and accidents. Sleep loss and sleepiness resulting from extended duty or altered work/rest schedules have been suggested as contributory factors in many accidents and catastrophes. Many people put themselves at personal risk by driving when too sleepy, sometimes experiencing a near incident or an actual accident.

Sleep loss can result in a cumulative sleep debt. Sleepiness should be taken seriously. The vulnerability can be minimized, thus potentially avoiding an incident or accident.
Partial sleep loss and cumulative sleep debt affect waking alertness. Dinges and colleagues (1997) conducted a study that measured cumulative sleepiness and psychomotor vigilance performance. Sixteen subjects participated in the study. Subjects were assigned to two nights of baseline sleep (the averages for 16 subjects on both nights were consistent at 7.4 hrs), seven nights of 5 hrs sleep restriction, and a recovery night (when subjects slept as much as they wanted up to 10hrs). The psychomotor vigilance test (PVT), a visually-based sustained attention task, which consisted of 10-minute trials, was used to measure performance during baseline nights, restricted sleep nights, and the recovery night. Increasing performance-impairment or decreasing alertness is reflected as slower response times on the PVT. The average performances on the PVT trials for all subjects, recorded at 1000, 1600, and 2200 hrs, are shown on the above graph. The average number of PVT lapses (i.e., reaction times ≥ 500 milliseconds) was less than one on both baseline nights (B1 and B2) and significantly increased to three lapses after the second sleep restriction night (P2). Responses were much slower during the 7 days of restricted sleep (= 3), especially after day 7 (= .4). After a recovery night of sleep (R1), PVT performance improved and lapses decreased, however, sleep was not completely recovered, and PVT performance was (< 3) still significantly different from the baseline measures (< 1). These findings show that after a short period of partial sleep loss, performance lapses increase and stabilize until sleep is completely recovered.
Dawson and Reid (1997) conducted one of the first studies that attempted to compare levels of performance impairment caused by reduced sleep (i.e., sustained wakefulness) and levels of performance impairment due to alcohol intoxication. Forty subjects participated in the study and were randomly divided into two groups. One group maintained a 28-hour sustained wakefulness, and the other group consumed 10–15g alcohol at 30-minute intervals until their average blood alcohol concentration reached a level of 0.10%. Computer-based measures of cognitive psychomotor performance were recorded at half-hour intervals.

As shown in the graph above, the effects of sleep loss on performance are similar to those of alcohol intoxication. After 17 hours (number of hours of wakefulness: horizontal axis) of sustained wakefulness, performance impairment levels (left vertical axis) were (= 0.98) similar to the performance impairment levels of 0.05% blood alcohol concentration (right vertical axis). After 21 hours of sustained wakefulness, performance impairment levels were (= 0.94) similar to the performance impairment levels of 0.09% blood alcohol concentration. These findings indicate that performance decreases significantly in both conditions, sustained wakefulness and alcohol intoxication. The only difference between these conditions is that the performance impairment effects of alcohol intoxication appear more abruptly than the performance impairment effects of sustained wakefulness.
Sleepiness: Two Distinct Components

- **Physiological sleepiness**
  - Lose sleep, get sleepy
  - Underlying biological process
  - Only reversed by sleep

- **Subjective sleepiness**
  - How you feel; what you report
  - Can be concealed or altered by environmental stimulation, physical activity, caffeine, etc.

Two distinct components of sleepiness have been described. Physiological sleepiness parallels other vital physiological functions like hunger and thirst. Deprived of food or water, the brain signals that these vital physiological needs have not been met by developing feelings of hunger and thirst. When physiologically deprived of sleep, the brain’s signal is sleepiness. Just as the only way to reduce or eliminate hunger or thirst is to eat or drink, when an individual is physiologically sleepy, only sleep will reverse this vital need.

Subjective sleepiness is an individual’s introspective assessment of the feeling and a self-report of that status. An individual can rate current sleepiness on a scale from “wide awake and alert” to “extremely sleepy, ready to nod off.” However, this self-reported rating can be strongly affected by a variety of factors, such as environmental stimulation. The level of underlying physiological sleepiness can be concealed by an environment in which an individual is physically active, has consumed caffeine, or is engaged in a lively conversation. Whereas these factors may affect the self-reported rating of sleepiness (usually individuals will report greater alertness than is warranted), they do not affect the underlying sleep need expressed by the level of physiological sleepiness.
Subjective vs Physiological Sleep and Alertness

- It can be difficult to reliably estimate your own sleep and alertness, especially if you are already sleepy

- The good news:
  Tendency to overestimate time to fall asleep and underestimate total sleep time
  It may not be as bad as you think

- The bad news:
  Tendency to report greater alertness than indicated by physiological measures
  It may be worse than you think

It is usually difficult for most individuals to reliably estimate their own sleep or their waking alertness, especially if they are already sleepy.

Overall, there is a tendency for individuals to subjectively overestimate how long it takes to fall asleep and underestimate total sleep time, relative to physiological measures. Generally, people fall asleep faster and sleep longer than they think. So when an individual experiences a bad night of sleep, it may not have been as bad as it seemed.

However, the tendency is for individuals to subjectively rate themselves as more alert than is indicated by physiological measures. That is, most individuals are more likely to be sleepier than they report or experience.
Factors Affecting Sleepiness

- Prior sleep/wakefulness
- Circadian phase (time of day)
- Age
- Medical conditions
- Medications
- Alcohol
- Environmental/work conditions

The factors listed above have been demonstrated to affect waking sleepiness and, therefore, could be considerations in worsening or improving sleepiness.

Prior sleep/wakefulness refers to how long you have been awake. As you remain awake past 16 hours on your regular schedule, your probability of experiencing fatigue begins to increase. Many people experience significant cognitive impairment as they approach 24 hours without sleep. Beginning a flight after a long day of work increases your chances of becoming seriously fatigued.

Circadian phase refers to what time it is according to the biological clock in your brain (see the next section for more on circadian rhythms). Flying in the late night to early morning hours puts you at an increased risk for fatigue. Our bodies are programmed to sleep at night and to be awake during the day. Reversing this schedule, as shift workers often must do, can result in falling asleep at the wheel or controls during the nighttime and being unable to obtain adequate recovery sleep during the day.

The ability to obtain consolidated nighttime sleep gradually diminishes with age. As a result, older people are more likely to experience daytime sleepiness and should be particularly cautious when flying during the mid- to late afternoon and late at night.

Not surprisingly, medical conditions and medications can also affect sleepiness. The effects of alcohol and environmental conditions have already been discussed. Work conditions may affect sleepiness by creating an environment conducive to sleep or, conversely, to alertness. For example, a dimly lit work area may contribute to sleepiness, while a brightly lit room may help maintain alertness.
Fatigue Factors in Regional Operations:

B. The Physiology of Fatigue:
Circadian Rhythms

This second section provides basic information about circadian rhythms and how they apply to fatigue, jet lag, and shift work. Circadian rhythms are the second physiological factor that affects fatigue in flight operations.
Circadian Rhythms

- Circa = about; dies = day

- A circadian clock in the brain coordinates daily cycles:
  
  | Sleep/wake | Performance |
  | Temperature | Hormones |
  | Digestion   | Etc.      |

- Without any timing information from the environment, the biological day is about 24.2 hours

Over evolutionary time, the daily cycles in the physical environment (produced by the Earth's rotation) have become hard-wired into our neuronal circuitry in the form of a biological clock in the suprachiasmatic nucleus of the hypothalamus (located in the brain). However, since the beginning of the industrial revolution, we have developed a cultural environment in which there is ever-increasing pressure for around-the-clock operations and services. The expedient (but incorrect) assumption that we can and do function equally at any time of the day or night underlies many activities in our society, from medical diagnosis and treatment to many hours-of-service regulations.

When people live alone in environments from which all possible time cues have been carefully excluded (deep caves, underground bunkers, or specially designed apartments), they begin to live “days” that are generally longer than 24 hours. Regardless of how long someone's subjective “day” becomes in a time-free environment, the circadian clock still enforces an approximately 24.2-hour cycle in many functions. Some people even develop “days” as long as 50 hours with, for example, 36 hours of wakefulness followed by 14 hours of sleep.

The circadian clock can be thought of as analogous to the conductor of a symphony orchestra. Many different systems in the body, down to the level of individual cells, are capable of generating circadian rhythms independently, just as the members of an orchestra must each be capable of playing their own part. However, if they are not all synchronized appropriately, the harmony rapidly degenerates into cacophony.
In general, the body is programmed to be awake during the day, asleep at night.

In a usual 24-hour day, there are two times of increased sleepiness: 3–5 a.m. and 3–5 p.m.

Performance and alertness can be affected during a 2 a.m. to 6 a.m. window.

Overall, humans are physiologically programmed to be awake during the day and asleep at night.

Additionally, two periods of maximal sleepiness occur in a usual 24-hour period. The period 3–5 a.m. is a circadian low point for temperature, performance, and alertness. During this time, the brain triggers sleep and sleepiness. The other period of increased sleepiness is roughly 3–5 p.m. Most individuals have experienced an afternoon wave of sleepiness. These windows can be used to schedule sleep periods or naps because the brain provides a period of maximal sleepiness and an increased opportunity for sleep.

Performance and alertness can be decreased during the nocturnal window, which is from 2 a.m. until 6 a.m. For some, however, the afternoon window of sleepiness may occur between 2 p.m. and 4 p.m. This highlights some of the differences among individuals.
The data graphed above present combined findings from studies conducted in Israel, Texas, and New York (M. M. Mitler, et al, 1988). The graph shows a composite temporal distribution of 6,052 single-vehicle traffic accidents caused by the driver “falling asleep at the wheel.” Two major peaks in incidence occur between the hours of midnight and 7 a.m. (especially between 1 a.m. and 4 a.m.) and between 1 p.m. and 4 p.m. The data agree with vehicular studies performed in Germany and the Netherlands, as well as with studies among locomotive drivers of the German Federal Railways, where accidents occurred most within the same peak hours.
Circadian Synchronization

The circadian clock is synchronized (reset) daily by:

- Bright light (sunlight)
- Work/rest schedules
- Regular social factors

Unless timing information is received from the environment, the human circadian clock tends to run slow. The specific environmental time cues which synchronize it to a 24-hour day are known by the German term "zeitgebers," meaning "time-givers." Currently, two common zeitgebers have been identified: exposure to bright light and social factors.

Light affects the circadian clock by means of a direct neural pathway from the eye. The principle behind synchronization of the circadian clock by light/dark cycles is reasonably well understood and can be summarized as follows.

1. Light exposure in the subjective morning advances subsequent circadian cycles.
2. Light exposure in the middle of the subjective day has minimal effect.
3. Light exposure in the subjective evening delays subsequent circadian cycles.

To synchronize a circadian clock with an innate period of 25 hours to a 24-hour day requires that the clock be advanced by 1 hour per day. An appropriate exposure to sunlight every morning would achieve the necessary resetting. Conversely, to synchronize a clock with an innate period of 23 hours would require a delay of 1 hour per day, in other words, an appropriate exposure to sunlight every evening. While these examples illustrate the mechanism of synchronization, they are highly simplistic. In practice, synchronization of an individual's circadian clock to a 24-hour day depends on a complex combination of zeitgeber inputs. There is some evidence that the human circadian clock may be synchronized by certain social factors, including the work/rest schedule. However, the specific aspects of the social environment that constitute time cues have not yet been identified, and the mechanisms by which they affect the clock remain unknown.
Circadian Desynchronization

- Circadian clock cannot adapt immediately to duty/rest schedule changes or new environmental times
- Jet lag (crossing time zones)
  - Circadian clock is out of step with the environment
  - Different circadian rhythms adjust at different rates
- Night work/day sleep
  - Conflict between body and environmental synchronizers

When the circadian clock is out of alignment with the sleep/wake cycle, the result is known as circadian desynchronization. Two common causes of this phenomenon are jet lag and shift work.

Crossing time zones produces a zeitgeber disruption regularly encountered by commercial flight crews and frequent transmeridian travelers. The circadian clock resynchronizes only gradually to a new environmental time. Circadian rhythms in different functions adjust more or less quickly, depending on the tightness of their coupling to the clock and on their interactions with other physiological functions, each adapting at its own rate. Thus, after a transmeridian flight, not only is the circadian clock out of step with the local zeitgebers, but also different physiological functions are out of step with one another.

As mentioned previously, humans are physiologically programmed to be awake during the day and asleep at night. Even people who have worked a night shift for years may never completely physiologically adapt to that schedule due to the conflict between the body clock and environmental cues.
Shift Work

• Shift work: any schedule that requires someone to be awake and active when they would normally be asleep
• Requires overriding the circadian clock which preprograms daytime activity and nighttime sleep
• People switch back to daytime activity on days off
• Creates conflict between environmental synchronizers:
  - Work/rest schedules
  - Day/night cycles
  - Day-oriented society
• Different physiological functions out of step with one another

The basic problem with shift work (e.g., night operations) is that it requires people to somehow override the circadian clock, which preprograms us for daytime activity and nighttime sleep. The work/rest schedule itself may reset the clock of the shift worker to some extent. However, the competing zeitgeber inputs from the day/night cycle and our predominantly day-oriented society continually push it back toward its usual diurnal orientation. Thus, at best, the circadian rhythms of shift workers usually are only partially adapted to their current work/rest schedule. In addition, most shift workers revert to being day-active on their days off. This continuously changing orientation can result in chronic desynchronization of the circadian clock relative to the environment, and persistent internal desynchronization among different physiological systems.

Additional zeitgeber disruption, regularly encountered by flight crews and others who frequently shift back and forth between day and night duty, is related to the fact that the circadian clock resynchronizes only gradually to a new environmental time. Circadian rhythms in different functions adjust at different rates, depending on the tightness of their coupling to the clock and on their interactions with other physiological functions. Thus, after changing schedules, not only is the circadian clock out of step with the environmental and social zeitgebers, but also different physiological functions are out of step with one another.

The conflicting zeitgeber environment typical of shift work is further confounded in aviation operations by the day-to-day instability of the duty/rest cycles and by the element of unpredictability (associated with weather, mechanical problems, system delays, and other operational factors).
Effects of Jet Lag & Shift Work

- Jet lag and shift work can result in:
  - Disturbed sleep (inability to fall asleep or stay asleep)
  - Increased waking (work-time) sleepiness
  - Decreased physical or mental performance
  - Increased reports of fatigue
  - More negative mood
  - Gastrointestinal problems

- Be aware of these effects if flying after schedule or time zone changes

Circadian desynchronization from jet lag and shift work can result in a variety of symptoms.

Recent overviews of studies with shift workers indicate that 60% of them have sleep complaints, whereas only 20% of day workers have similar complaints; 75% of night workers experience sleepiness on every shift, and 20% report falling asleep.

Shift workers (particularly rotating shift workers) have a higher incidence of sick leave, more frequent visits to health care facilities at the work site, and more general health complaints than day workers. Night shift workers have higher incidences of gastrointestinal disorders, including general stomach discomfort and ulcers, than do day workers. These symptoms probably result from the interaction of several factors, including circadian desynchronosis and the increased domestic and social stresses that often accompany shift work.

If you experience jet lag or a reversed work/rest schedule, keep in mind that circadian disruption can result in decreased alertness and performance, which in turn, can affect skills critical for flying.
Fatigue Factors in Regional Operations:

C. Effects of Flight Operations on Fatigue

The previous section discussed the principal physiological factors that create fatigue. This section identifies how flight operations, and regional operations in particular, play a role in creating pilot fatigue.
How Flying Affects Fatigue

- Prolonged wakefulness
- Irregular sleep/wake schedules
- Night or late afternoon flying
- Monitoring role
- Workload
- Physical environment

Certain kinds of flight operations occur only during the day without early report times or late arrivals, involve minimal time-zone changes (and therefore minimal circadian disruption), and may have a minimal effect on usual sleep/wake schedules. However, there are nevertheless several aspects of flying that can contribute to fatigue. The factors listed above will be discussed in the following pages, but this does not exclude other aspects of flight operations that may also contribute to fatigue.
Effect of Regional Flight Operations

- Extended flights
  - Prolonged wakefulness
  - Fatigue from multiple flights, long day
- Restricted time for sleep
  (e.g., reduced rest, early wake-up, late night)
  - Sleep loss, cumulative sleep debt

Regional airlines have unique operational requirements. Scheduling practices common in regional operations include long duty days, reduced rest, reserve status, and CDOs, among others. These factors, as well as operational factors such as multiple flight segments, create a unique set of challenges that face regional pilots.

An obvious contributor to sleep loss is a prolonged period of continuous wakefulness. An extended duty period can create fatigue by extending wakefulness and decreasing sleep. This, in turn, can involve circadian disruption. An example of fatigue associated with sleep loss is an incident described in an ASRS report, in which both pilots of a Jetstream-32 had been on long multiple flight legs on the previous day and were restricted to a reduced rest schedule; the following day’s flight was scheduled in the morning, when both pilots were still fatigued, and they departed without takeoff clearance (ASRS Accession No. 368250).

Extended physical and mental effort over multiple flights or from a long duty day may also contribute to fatigue, as indicated in an ASRS report of two pilots in a Beech 1900 who reported that they overshot their assigned altitude by 1000 feet (ASRS Accession No. 435341).

The time available for sleep may be restricted by a variety of constraints, such as early wake-up times (e.g., to start the workday) or late nights. Busy schedules can result in lost sleep over several nights, which accumulates into a sleep debt. An example of reduced rest leading to fatigue is an incident involving two Beech 1900 pilots who reported to the ASRS that during the 38th leg, 30th flight hour, and 63rd duty hour in 5 days of flying, they were fatigued, and mixed up the flight plan causing a track deviation over 15 nm from their assigned route (ASRS Accession No. 455657).
Effect of Regional Flight Operations

- Unpredictable time for sleep (e.g., reserve status, on-demand ops)
  - Sleep loss, cumulative sleep debt
- Night flying (e.g., Continuous Duty Overnights)
  - Body programmed to be asleep
  - Window of circadian low (3–5 a.m.)
  - Daytime sleep may be difficult to obtain

A certain degree of predictability is needed for a rest period to be used efficiently. Knowing when a rest period will occur, and when duty will begin, allows individuals to plan their sleep period. For example, if a crewmember is on reserve and remains awake waiting for call, a valuable opportunity to obtain rest before a flight may be missed. Then, if called for duty late in the reserve window, the crewmember may begin a duty period with a long period of continuous wakefulness which will only get longer. Thus, if an individual is unable to plan for an adequate sleep period, sleep loss and cumulative sleep debt may result. Unpredictable schedules also characterize on-demand operations, a flight environment that presents unique challenges to flight crews with its short call outs, changing and unpredictable duty times, and a variety of other requirements. An example of this is from a Saab 340a captain (ASRS Accession No. 443263).

Night flying, like any night work, requires wakefulness when the body is programmed for sleep. CDOs, during which one or more flights are made and the crewmember remains officially on-duty throughout the night, is one example. During the window of circadian low (from about 3–5 a.m.), individuals are particularly vulnerable to low levels of alertness and performance. An ASRS report described an occurrence during a late night operation, when a Challenger CI600 crew descended below their assigned transition altitude during a vector to final approach (ASRS Accession No. 474040).

Additionally, working at night leaves the daytime for sleep, and because the body is programmed to be awake during the day, sleep may be difficult to obtain, resulting in sleep loss. It may be easier to sleep if the rest period can overlap with the circadian window of sleepiness that typically occurs between 3–5 in the afternoon.
Effect of Flight Operations on Fatigue

- Low workload/monitoring role
  - Boredom, complacency
  - Can unmask sleepiness during periods of low activity

- High workload
  - High physical or cognitive workload
  - Continuous workload

During long, continuous, or low-workload operations, pilots may experience boredom and complacency. Especially when an individual is in a passive monitoring role, for example, when auto-pilot or an automated navigation system is engaged, there is an opportunity for these factors to increase the likelihood for physiological sleepiness to emerge (e.g., the person may fall asleep). In an ASRS example, a Saab 340a crew landed without clearance after a CDO, medical emergency, and about 2.5 hr sleep prior to the incident (ASRS Accession No. 476530).

Conversely, heavy workload or extended periods without a break may contribute to fatigue. While the role of workload in fatigue is complex and has not been clearly defined, anecdotal evidence suggests that high workloads may compound fatigue, particularly over the course of a long day of flying. According to an ASRS report, increased workload combined with an early wake-up induced fatigue in the crew of a Saab 340b, which overran the runway at New York’s JFK International Airport (ASRS Accession No. 436831).
Effect of Regional Flight Operations

- Physical environment
  - Temperature, humidity, pressure
  - Noise, vibration, turbulence

- On-demand operations: specific challenges
  - Irregular schedules
  - Unpredictable schedules
  - High workload (e.g., solo flight, IMC)

Certain aspects of the flight deck environment can create discomforts that can exacerbate fatigue as well. Flight crews from various operational environments, including long-haul and short-haul commercial air transport, regional airlines, and corporate aviation have identified specific environmental factors as contributing to fatigue, such as high temperatures and dry air on the flight deck, noise, vibration, and turbulence.

Pilots who work in on-demand operations (non-scheduled Part 135) have specific challenges working irregular schedules and are required to fly in demanding flight conditions. Both management and pilots have responsibility to ensure proper scheduling and safe operations. Knowledge about sleep physiology and circadian rhythms will benefit efforts to manage the specific alertness challenges of on-demand operations.

In an example from on-demand operations, a pilot was scheduled to fly freight from Homer to Kenai, Alaska and pick up cargo bound for Homer (NTSB ID No. ANC94FA011). The flight required an early morning departure in order to get mail to the post office by 0700. The pilot was called at 0340 from his crew rest quarters by dispatch to notify him of how much cargo weight to expect on the flight. He arrived at the airport and departed approximately 0530 local time for Kenai. Cargo was exchanged in Kenai and the pilot departed for the return trip. At approximately 0640, a witness heard an aircraft pass overhead with a steady drone. As the engine noise began to fade away, the witness heard a crash followed by silence. The pilot did not survive. The NTSB concluded the probable cause to be, "The pilot's failure to maintain adequate altitude for terrain clearance. Factors that contributed to the accident were the pilot's lack of usual sleep, the night light condition and hilly terrain."
Survey of Fatigue in Regional Airline Ops

• To identify operational factors that contribute to fatigue

• 119-question survey, voluntary & anonymous

• 1,424 pilots from 26 U.S. regional airlines

The specific operational requirements of regional airlines create unique challenges regarding human fatigue. The NASA Ames Fatigue Countermeasures Group conducted a survey study to identify factors that may contribute to fatigue in regional airline operations.

A retrospective survey of 119-questions was disseminated to pilots from 26 regional carriers. The survey addressed 7 main topics: general demographics, sleep at home, flying, duty, fatigue, and work environment, with a separate 3-question section for management pilots that focused on scheduling. Participants were 1,424 regional flight crewmembers who voluntarily and anonymously completed the survey.
Survey of Fatigue in Regional Airline Ops:
Fatigue as an Issue

• 89% regional pilots considered fatigue a "moderate" or "serious" concern

• 88% reported crew fatigue common

• 92% rated fatigue a "moderate" or "serious" safety issue when it occurs

• 80% have "nodded off" in the cockpit

Overall, the regional pilots portrayed fatigue as a significant concern in their flight environment. Most subjects (89%) indicated that they considered fatigue a "moderate" or "serious" concern in regional flight operations, while 11% considered it "minor" or not a concern. Similarly, 88% described crew fatigue as a common occurrence in regional operations. Further, most (92%) indicated that, when crew fatigue occurs, it is a "moderate" or "serious" safety issue. Over three-quarters of the subjects (80%) acknowledged having nodded off during a flight at some time.
In the survey, regional pilots were asked to rate 21 factors on the extent to which each affects fatigue using a four-point scale from “not at all” to “seriously”, and to assess the frequency each factor was experienced using a five-point scale from “0 = never” to “4 = very often (5–7/wk).” The figure shows the 10 factors with highest average ratings, with the mean fatigue rating on the left axis (bars) and the mean frequency rating on the right axis (diamonds).

The 10 highest rated factors identified operational factors (multiple flight segments, severe turbulence), scheduling (company scheduling practices), environmental factors (high ambient temperatures, noise), workload factors (no auto pilot, flight in instrument conditions), and physiological factors (lack of nutritious food, dehydration).

Examining the fatigue effect rating in conjunction with the frequency of occurrence, eight of the top ten factors received frequency ratings higher than “sometimes” (only severe turbulence was rated as occurring “very rarely,” and dehydration was rated as occurring slightly less than “sometimes”).
Survey of Fatigue in Regional Airline Ops:
Scheduling Factors Identified

- Multiple flight segments
- Long duty days
- Continuous duty overnights
- Reserve status
- Early duty reports times
- Very long or short breaks between legs

Several specific issues concerning regional airline scheduling practices were identified:
Regional operations require multiple take-offs and landings each duty day, which increases the amount of time spent in critical low-altitude operations. Multiple flight segments accounted for 2 of the 10 highest rated fatigue factors.

Crewmembers reported average duty days of 11.3 hrs. Long duty days were the most frequently cited factor in their worst days of regional flying, and the second most common suggestion to reduce fatigue in regionals operations was to limit or reduce the length of duty days.

CDOs entail flying during much of the night and sleeping during the day, especially when CDOs are scheduled consecutively. Crewmember responses showed that they averaged 4.6 hours of sleep loss between consecutive CDOs.

Flying on reserve means that crewmembers must respond when called for duty, thus creating unpredictability in their schedules, which can lead to sleep loss, for example, when a call for duty occurs when a sleep period was planned. Crewmembers reported 2.3 hours of sleep loss before duty while on reserve.

Early duty report times may truncate the normal sleep period, resulting in sleep loss. The most common report times were between 0400 and 0759, according to responses. Early report times were among the 10 most frequently cited factors in the worst regional flying day.

The amount of time between flight legs also was identified as a fatigue factor. While short periods between flights may not allow for meals or breaks, extended waits between flight segments may contribute to long duty days with little flight time.
Fatigue Factors in Regional Operations:

D. Effects of Fatigue on Flight Operations

Just as flight operations have specific effects on fatigue, fatigue, in turn, can affect flight operations. The general effects of fatigue on human alertness, performance, and other parameters translate into specific results in flight operations.
How Fatigue Affects Flying

Fatigue can have a negative affect on:

- Alertness & vigilance
- Performance
- Decision-making
- Communication
- Mood
- And more

Numerous laboratory and field studies have established that fatigue can decrease alertness, degrade performance, reduce communication, worsen mood, and negatively affect virtually all aspects of human functioning.

Examples of these effects are readily found in incident and accident reports. An example of decreased alertness and degraded performance is an incident involving two Beech 1900 pilots, who descended 70 feet below the minimum descent altitude (MDA) after reduced rest and a series of long flight days (ASRS Accession No. 467525). Reduced vigilance was shown in another report when the pilots of a Canadair CL65 departed the airport without removing the nose gear pin (ASRS Accession No. 465549). Another example of the negative effects fatigue can have on many of the factors listed above is from an ASRS report from two Jetstream-31 pilots, who after flying an all-night flight, overshot the final approach 10 miles out in heavy rain, and trying to correct it, made a sloppy approach, forgot to call the tower, and landed without clearance (ASRS Accession No. 369790). Poor decision due to lack of sleep was reported by a crew who departed from an unauthorized runway (ASRS Accession No. 448082). Poor communication occurred when a Canadair CL65 crew followed a filed flight plan instead of the flight plan clearance given prior to departure by ATC (ASRS Accession No. 474264). Another incident described in an ASRS report exemplifies negative mood, when the first officer began to argue with the captain, shouting and using profanity, during the second leg of a multiple-flight day. Once on the ground, the captain repeatedly asked to discuss the conversation before the first officer apologized, explaining that he was "tired and grumpy" (ASRS Accession No. 364877). These reports exemplify how fatigue can decrease alertness, degrade performance, worsen mood, and reduce effective communication.
In the survey on fatigue in regional operations, flight crewmembers identified specific ways in which fatigue affected the performance of their duties. Consider the importance of skills such as situational awareness, perception, basic stick-and-rudder coordination, reaction time, judgment and decision-making, and communication/checklist errors to a safe flight. In an emergency, these factors could become critical.
II. Common Misconceptions

There are many misconceptions about fatigue in flight operations. Several commonly held misconceptions will be presented and then addressed using the information previously presented and additional scientific data.
The problem with having to get up earlier than usual is that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to fall asleep sufficiently early the night before to compensate (even when the duty schedule permits). It is not simply a question of discipline or motivation. The circadian clock effectively opposes falling asleep earlier than the habitual bedtime. Just as there are preferred times in the circadian cycle for falling asleep, there are also times when sleep onset is very unlikely. These times have been labeled “wake maintenance zones,” and one of them occurs just before the habitual bedtime. In addition, because the “biological day” dictated by the circadian clock tends to be longer than 24 hours, it is easier to go to sleep later than to go to sleep earlier. Going to sleep later also means staying awake longer, which allows more time for the homeostatic “sleep pressure” to build.

An example of the phenomena described above is from a NASA short-haul field study, which examined 44 pilots in the DC-9 and the B-737. The average layover was 12.5 hours. Yet, despite the fact that 12.5 hours seems an adequate amount of time for 8 or more hours of sleep, pilots slept about 1 hour less per night on trips than at home. The pilots had to wake up for duty more than 1 hour earlier than usual, and they could not fall asleep earlier to compensate for the early wake-up.
Common Misconceptions

"Scheduled rest period allows for required sleep"

- Regional survey study conclusions
  Between consecutive CDO’s, pilots reported:
  - Typical rest period of 11.5-h
  - Of that, ~8.3 h was available for sleep
  - Of that, they got ~ 3.3 h of day sleep

- Physiologically, the time available for sleep is usually less than duration of layover

The information on this slide is based on the NASA regional survey study and demonstrates the misconception that the entire rest period is available for sleep. During consecutive CDOs, crewmembers must attempt to sleep during the day. However, physiologically, humans are programmed to be awake during the day. In particular, there is a morning period of peak alertness, from about 9–11 a.m., during which it may be very difficult to fall or stay asleep. Therefore, even the portion of rest period that is logistically available for sleep (i.e., not including transportation, meals, shower, etc.) may not be available to the crewmember physiologically.

This effect is exemplified by regional pilots’ responses to a series of questions about consecutive duty overnights. Rest periods between consecutive duty overnights occur during the day. The pilots reported a typical rest period of 11.5 hours, on average. The time logistically available for sleep during the rest period was 8.3 hours. However, crewmembers reported that they were only able to obtain 3.3 hours of sleep. Compared to the usual amount of sleep they reported, this short daytime sleep translates to 4.6 hours of sleep loss. Laboratory studies have demonstrated that as little as two hours of sleep loss can significantly affect both alertness and performance.
This graph demonstrates that in three different flight environments studied, sleep loss occurred during trips. Three types of commercial flight operations are portrayed on this graph: short-haul, long-haul, and overnight cargo. Sleep was measured behaviorally with an actigraph device that effectively estimates sleep/wake patterns. The average hours of sleep obtained pre-trip are portrayed for each flight operation on the left. The middle three bars indicate the reduced sleep obtained, on average, in each type of operation during a trip schedule. The bars on the right display the average amount of sleep obtained posttrip. The principal finding is that, in most cases, any of these three types of flight operations will engender sleep loss during trip schedules.

While objective sleep measures have not been collected for regional crewmembers, there is evidence that regional flight operations may have comparable effects. In fact, several similarities are apparent between the results of the regional and short-haul studies, including number of flight segments per day (5.6 in regional vs. 5.1 in short-haul), length of duty days (11.2 hr and 10.6 hr, respectively), and daily flight times per duty day (4.4 hr vs. 4.5 hr, respectively). Regional pilots flew slightly more flight segments, had slightly longer duty days, and flew approximately the same number of hours. Regional operations also may entail challenges similar to overnight cargo operations regarding night flying. These similarities, in conjunction with results from the subjective regional survey study, suggest that regional crewmembers are also likely to experience sleep loss on trips.
Common Misconceptions

- "I know how tired I am"
- "I've lost sleep before and I did just fine"
- "I'm motivated enough to just push through it"

Why not?

- It is difficult to reliably estimate your own alertness and performance

One widely held belief is that individuals can accurately and reliably estimate their alertness and performance. Many people believe that being motivated, well-trained, and professional or having previous experience with sleep deprivation prepares them to combat the physiological consequences of sleep loss. As previously presented, individuals (especially sleepy individuals) do not reliably estimate their alertness and performance. The following data from a long-haul pilot illustrate the point.
Subjective vs Physiological Sleepiness

These data were obtained in a NASA collaborative study that examined layover sleep and waking sleepiness during layovers in international long-haul flight crews. This pilot was asked to rate his overall level of sleepiness throughout the day while simultaneously having it measured with an objective test of physiological sleepiness. The test of physiological sleepiness is called the Multiple Sleep Latency Test (MSLT) and is a laboratory standard for objective evaluation of physiological sleepiness. Essentially, the test defines sleepiness by the speed of falling asleep: the sleepier the individual, the sooner sleep onset will occur; the more alert the individual, the longer it will take for sleep onset to occur, if it does at all. Measurements of brain, eye, and muscle activity can quantify the speed of falling asleep to within half a second. Individuals have 20 minutes to fall asleep in a quiet, dark room. If they do not fall asleep, their score is 20 and they are considered very alert. If they fall asleep immediately, their score is 0 and they are considered very sleepy. This test has been used in thousands of studies involving sleep-disorder patients and sleep deprivation. Individuals who are sleep deprived experimentally or who have a sleep disorder that causes waking sleepiness will fall asleep on this test within 5 minutes on almost every opportunity. This MSLT score of 5 or less often is referred to as being in the “twilight zone.”

The pilot’s subjective sleepiness scores (SSS = Stanford Sleepiness Scale) are portrayed on the top half of the graph. The letter A indicates the point when the pilot reported his greatest level of alertness. The bottom half of the graph portrays his MSLT scores. The letter B indicates the point directly under A. At this time (when the pilot reported being most alert), his MSLT score is approaching the twilight zone, and on subsequent MSLT tests, it borders on the twilight zone. This demonstrates the discrepancy between the self-report of sleepiness and the level of physiological sleepiness. Although reporting peak levels of alertness, this pilot was approaching the twilight zone and a high level of physiological sleepiness.
It is necessary to recognize fatigue in order to address it. Because it is difficult for individuals to estimate their own alertness and fatigue levels, more objective criteria may be helpful to assessing fatigue levels in yourself or others. If you recognize these signs, fatigue may be the cause, and alertness strategies should be employed.
A misconception that must be dispelled is that there is a "magic bullet" that will cure the fatigue, jet lag, sleep loss, circadian disruption, and sleepiness engendered by flight operations. The previous sections have demonstrated clearly the complexities of the physiological systems and the diversity of effects created by the range of flight operations. Also, people are not the same, and the range of individual differences in response to these effects must also be considered.

The idea that there is no magic bullet should be remembered whenever assessing the latest "cure" for jet lag. Be skeptical and weigh the claims in consideration of the physiological information previously presented.
III. Alertness Management Strategies
Important Considerations

- The following recommendations are intended to help you apply what is currently known

- Tailor them to your own needs

- The best effects may result from combining multiple strategies rather than relying on a single strategy

It will be continually emphasized that the following strategies are only recommendations and should be tailored to an individual's particular needs and activities. You should experiment with different strategies and evaluate their effectiveness in the context of your own physiology and specific flight operations. The best effects may result from combining strategies rather than relying on an individual strategy.
Alertness Management Strategies

- Preventive strategies
  Used before duty and on layovers to reduce adverse effects of fatigue, sleep loss, and circadian disruption during flight operations

- Operational strategies
  Used in flight to maintain alertness and performance

The following is an approach to differentiating alertness management strategies. Preventive strategies focus on the underlying physiology by attempting to manage and maximize sleep and minimize the effects of circadian disruption. These strategies are used at home before a trip or during a layover. Operational strategies are in-flight measures that help to maintain alertness and performance. These strategies do not necessarily affect the underlying physiological mechanisms, but focus more on managing fatigue during operations. Primarily, these short-term strategies help to conceal or attenuate underlying physiological sleepiness.
Preventive Strategies:

Sleep Scheduling and Quantity

- At home
  - Get the best sleep possible before starting a trip

- On a trip
  - Try to get at least as much sleep per 24 hours as you would in a normal 24-hour period at home

- Trust your own physiology
  - If you feel sleepy and circumstances permit, then sleep
  - If you wake spontaneously and cannot go back to sleep within 15–30 minutes, then get up

Prior sleep loss can be a significant factor in the severity of subsequent jet lag symptoms. That is, individuals who are sleep deprived before a trip sequence can experience more difficulty than those who are well rested. Consider the previous information regarding sleep debt and the expected sleep loss associated with flight operations. An individual who begins a trip with a sleep debt, should expect that it will only worsen during the trip schedule. The recommendation is to begin a trip schedule as sleep-satiated as possible. Maximize the amount of sleep at least 1 and preferably 2 days before the schedule begins.

As indicated previously, most flight operations are characterized by sleep loss during trip schedules. Individuals should attempt to obtain at least as much sleep during a layover as they would typically during a normal 24 hours at home. Knowing that circadian and other factors will diminish the physiologically available windows for sleep, attempts should be made to maximize these opportunities.

Learn to trust your own physiology. When struggling to stay awake, take the sleepiness as a clear sign to get some sleep. Instead of fighting the sleepiness, take a brief nap or a longer sleep time. The length of that sleep period will be discussed soon. Also, if after awakening spontaneously you are unable to return to sleep within 15–30 minutes, then get out of bed. The principal message is that if your brain is giving you clear signals that you are sleepy, then sleep. If you awaken and you are alert and unable to return to sleep, get up. You can force wakefulness, to a point, but you cannot force sleep.
Preventive Strategies:
Strategic Napping

Before duty or on CDO's

• A nap can acutely improve alertness

• If immediately before a duty period, limit nap to 45 minutes

• If you sleep too long and go into deep sleep, it may take longer for you to become fully awake

• Nap can be longer at other times

• Some sleep is better than none; even a short nap will decrease the length of continuous wakefulness before a flight

Scientific literature clearly demonstrates the effectiveness of naps in improving subsequent alertness and performance. One important consideration when napping close to a duty period is to minimize the chances of going into deep NREM sleep (stages 3 and 4). If awakened out of deep sleep, an individual may continue to feel groggy, sleepy, or disoriented for 10–15 minutes. This phenomenon is called sleep inertia. Therefore, if taking a nap before a duty period, limiting its duration to 45 minutes or less will decrease the chances of having significant amounts of deep sleep.

A brief nap can be an important way to decrease the length of continuous wakefulness. It is usually much better to get some sleep than none at all.

When you nap at times other than immediately before a duty period, the nap can be longer. In this case, a nap longer than 2 hours is likely to get an individual through at least one NREM/REM cycle.

Strategic napping can be an extremely effective countermeasure in improving subsequent alertness and performance. Some individuals call these “power” naps. In flight operations, “NASA naps” have been demonstrated to be an effective acute fatigue countermeasure.
Preventive Strategies: Good Sleep Habits

- Keep a regular sleep/wake schedule; protect sleep time
- Develop and practice a regular pre-sleep routine
- Use bedroom only for sleep; avoid work, worry, exercise
- If hungry, eat a light snack; do not eat or drink heavily before bedtime
- Avoid alcohol or caffeine before going to bed
- Use physical/mental relaxation techniques as needed to fall asleep
- If you don’t fall asleep in 30 minutes, get out of bed

The following recommendations are generally considered important for maintaining good sleep habits. They apply to everyone. First, keep a regular sleep and wake schedule as much as possible. At home before trips, try to keep sleep time protected and minimize other responsibilities. A regularly practiced pre-sleep routine can be used to teach your mind and body that it is time to relax and fall asleep. A set of cues can be established to condition pre-sleep relaxation and can then be used anywhere and anytime before going to sleep. It is important to avoid work or worry in the bedroom and to prevent the association of the bed with activities contrary to relaxation and sleep.

Going to bed hungry can delay falling asleep. Eating a heavy meal also can disrupt sleep because the stomach is busy digesting food. If hungry or thirsty at bedtime, eat a light snack or have a small quantity of something to drink. As previously mentioned, alcohol should be avoided immediately before going to bed because of disruptive effects on sleep. Caffeine consumption should also be limited. Caffeine in coffee, tea, and colas can prevent sleep onset and disrupt subsequent sleep. Some individuals are sensitive to the caffeine in chocolate, and even a chocolate dessert after dinner is enough to interfere with their sleep. Many mild pain relievers also contain caffeine; read the label for ingredient information. Be sure to stop caffeine intake several hours before planned bedtime.

A variety of mental and physical relaxation techniques are proven to promote sleep onset and good sleep. Appendix B describes some of these techniques in more detail. Like any skills, these techniques can be practiced; then they can be used in a wide range of applications, essentially anywhere. If unable to fall asleep in 30 minutes, don’t lie in bed trying to fall asleep. Instead, get out of bed and engage in some activity conducive to relaxation and sleep.
Preventive Strategies:

**Good Sleep Habits**

- **Sleep environment**
  - Dark room (if necessary, use mask, heavy curtains)
  - Quiet room (turn off phone, use earplugs)
  - Comfortable temperature
  - Comfortable sleep surface

- **Lifestyle**
  - Exercise regularly (but not too near bedtime)
  - Eat a balanced diet

Sleep environment can affect both the quantity and quality of sleep obtained. In general, darkness, quiet, a relatively cool temperature, and a comfortable sleep surface have been shown to promote sleep. However, a wide range of individual differences exist concerning the preferred sleep environment. Therefore, the best environment is one that allows the sleeper the maximum amount of control. Disruptive environmental factors should be minimized.

Laboratory studies suggest that regular exercisers may have increased amounts of NREM stages 3 and 4. However, exercising too close to bedtime can disrupt subsequent sleep. Although physically tiring, exercise elevates heart and breathing rates, and is generally activating physiologically. Usually, it is not possible to immediately wind down and fall asleep after exercise. A balanced diet and regular exercise are critical components for overall good health.
Operational Strategies

• "...each required flight crewmember on flight deck duty must remain at the assigned duty station with seat belt fastened while the aircraft is taking off or landing, and while it is en route" (FAR requirement)

• What can you do in your cockpit seat?
  – Engage in conversations with others
  – Do something that involves physical action
  – Stretch

Operational countermeasures are challenged by FARs that require crewmembers to remain seated at their assigned duty stations with their seat belts fastened. This poses a challenge because one of the most successful techniques for combating sleepiness, according to the earliest sleep-deprivation experiments, is physical activity. Whenever possible, engage in physical activity, even if it is only stretching. Take regular stretch breaks and while seated, remain as active as possible—even writing helps. Engage in conversations with others and be sure to participate; don't just nod and listen.
Operational Strategies

- **Strategic caffeine consumption**
  - Use caffeine to acutely increase alertness
  - Don't use it when already alert (e.g., start of duty or after a nap)
  - Avoid caffeine near bedtime

- **Be sensible about nutrition and stay hydrated**

Caffeine, a stimulant, can be consumed strategically to acutely increase alertness. It is best not to continually consume caffeine before, during, and after a trip. Instead, determine the potential periods when caffeine could be used to combat a specific period of sleepiness (e.g., 3–5 a.m. or 3–5 p.m.). Avoid using it when already alert, for example, when just beginning a daytime duty period or immediately after a nap. Though affected by several variables (e.g., body size, previous food intake), caffeine will usually take 15–30 minutes to take effect and then last for up to 3–4 hours. Therefore, continually consuming caffeine throughout a flight could interfere with subsequent sleep on layover. Stop caffeine consumption far enough in advance of a planned bedtime so that it will no longer be active.

Be sensible about nutrition. Whenever possible, maintain a balanced diet. Obviously, flight operations can interfere with regularly scheduled, balanced meals. Try to carry appropriate snacks as needed. Drink plenty of fluids and stay hydrated. Between reduced cockpit humidity and caffeine (a diuretic), it is easy to become dehydrated.
If You Remember Nothing Else...

- Physiological mechanisms underlie fatigue
- Improve current situation — do it yourself now
- Sleepiness can have severe consequences — take it seriously
- People are different — tailor this information to your own needs
- There is no one simple answer — these are recommendations; find out what works for you

Fatigue Countermeasures Group

The critical messages to take home...
References
ASRS Reports
MEMORANDUM FOR:  Recipients of Aviation Safety Reporting System Data

SUBJECT:  Data Derived from ASRS Reports

The attached material is furnished pursuant to a request for data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Recipients of this material are reminded of the following points, which must be considered when evaluating these data.

ASRS reports are submitted voluntarily. The existence in the ASRS database of reports concerning a specific topic cannot, therefore, be used to infer the prevalence of that problem within the National Airspace System.

Reports submitted to ASRS may be amplified by further contact with the individual who submitted them, but the information provided by the reporter is not investigated further. Such information may or may not be correct in any or all respects. At best, it represents the perception of a specific individual who may or may not understand all of the factors involved in a given issue or event.

After preliminary processing, all ASRS reports are de-identified. Following de-identification, there is no way to identify the individual who submitted a report. All ASRS report processing systems are designed to protect identifying information submitted by reports, such as, names, company affiliations, and specific times of incident occurrence. There is, therefore, no way to verify information submitted in an ASRS report after it has been de-identified.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its ASRS contractor, Battelle Memorial Institute, specifically disclaim any responsibility for any interpretation which may be made by others of any material or data furnished by NASA in response to queries of the ASRS database and related materials.

Linda J. Connell, Director
Aviation Safety Reporting System
CAVEAT REGARDING STATISTICAL USE OF ASRS INFORMATION

Certain caveats apply to the use of ASRS statistical data. All ASRS reports are voluntarily submitted, and thus cannot be considered a measured random sample of the full population of like events. For example, we receive several thousand altitude deviation reports each year. This number may comprise over half of all the altitude deviations that occur, or it may be just a small fraction of total occurrences. We have no way of knowing which.

Moreover, not all pilots, controllers, air carriers, or other participants in the aviation system, are equally aware of the ASRS or equally willing to report to us. Thus, the data reflect reporting biases. These biases, which are not fully known or measurable, distort ASRS statistics. A safety problem such as near midair collisions (NMACs) may appear to be more highly concentrated in area “A” than area “B” simply because the airmen who operate in area “A” are more supportive of the ASRS program and more inclined to report to us should an NMAC occur.

Only one thing can be known for sure from ASRS statistics—they represent the lower measure of the true number of such events that are occurring. For example, if ASRS receives 881 reports of track deviations in 1999 (this number is purely hypothetical), then it can be known with certainty that at least 881 such events have occurred in 1999.

Because of these statistical limitations, we believe that the real power of ASRS lies in the report narratives. Here pilots, controllers, and others, tell us about aviation safety incidents and situations in detail. They explain what happened, and more importantly, why it happened. Using report narratives effectively requires an extra measure of study, the knowledge derived is well worth the added effort.
# ACN: 364877

**Time**
- Date: 199610
- Day: Fri
- Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

**Place**
- Locale Reference.Airport: BUR
- State Reference: CA

**Environment**
- Flight Conditions: IMC

**Aircraft / 1**
- Controlling Facilities.TRACON: LAX
- Make Model: Commercial Fixed Wing

**Person / 1**
- Function.Oversight: PIC
- Function.Flight Crew: Captain
- Experience.Flight Time.Total: 6239
- Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 201
- Experience.Flight Time.Type: 444
- ASRS Report: 364877

**Person / 2**
- Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

**Person / 3**
- Function.Controller: Departure

**Events**
- Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation: Track Or Heading Deviation
- Anomaly.Non Adherence: Clearance
- Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure
- Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: Unspecified
- Resolutory Action.Controller: Issued New Clearance
- Consequence.FAA: Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew


Narrative:

THIS SERIES OF INCIDENTS OCCURRED ON OCT XX 1996. THE FIRST WAS WHILE ON ILS FINAL APCH TO RWY 19R AT SANTA ANA, CA. I WAS FLYING WITH A PLT WHO HAD BEEN HIRED BY MY COMPANY TO PERFORM FO DUTIES FOR 1 DAY. WE WERE IN THE NEW MODEL ASTRA SPX. DURING THE COURSE OF CONCLUDING OUR SECOND LEG OF 5 SHORT FLTS PLANNED FOR THE DAY, HE BECAME ARGUMENTATIVE. HE SOON BECAME AGGRESSIVE, AND HIS ATTITUDE ESCALATED TO THE POINT THAT HE INITIATED A VERBAL OUTBURST TOWARD ME. THIS LASTED FOR OVER A MIN AND INCLUDED SEVERAL USES OF PROFANITY AND CALLING ME NAMES, ALL IN A LOUD VOICE. HE SAID THAT I WAS A LOUSY PLT, THAT HE HAD ALWAYS HATED FLYING WITH ME, AND THAT HE WOULD NEVER FLY WITH ME AGAIN. THIS WAS DONE WITH 3 PAX ON BOARD. THE PAX COULD HEAR NORMAL CONVERSATION FROM THE COCKPIT, AS WELL AS THE SHOUTING. THE PAX INCLUDED A REGIONAL SALES MGR FROM MY COMPANY AND 2 REPRESENTATIVES OF ONE OF MY COMPANY'S CUSTOMERS. I SAID FIRMLY, BUT AS CALMLY AS I COULD, 'LET'S TALK ABOUT THIS ON THE GND.' I HAD TO SAY THIS 6 TIMES BEFORE HE FINALLY STOPPED SHOUTING AT ME, AND BEGAN TO FOCUS ON HIS DUTIES AT HAND. AFTER LNDG AND AFTER OUR PAX HAD LEFT THE CABIN, I CLBED OUT THE SEAT AND WAITED FOR HIM. I SAID, 'LET'S TALK.' HE SAID HE DIDN'T WANT TO TALK TO ME. I SAID, 'I WANT TO TALK TO YOU.' WE PROCEEDED TO WALK IN FRONT OF THE ACFT 50 FT AND I TRIED TO HAVE A CONVERSATION WITH HIM. HE BEGAN TO SHOUT OBSCENITIES AT ME AGAIN AND TO CALL ME NAMES. I JUST LET HIM GO ON FOR A COUPLE OF MINS. FINALLY I SAID 'I WANT YOU TO LISTEN TO ME FOR 60 SECONDS, AND YOU TELL ME WHEN MY 60 SECONDS STARTS.' AFTER ANOTHER OUTBURST HE SAID, 'OKAY,' AND BECAME SILENT. I SAID, 'WHAT YOU JUST DID IN THAT COCKPIT WAS 100 TIMES WORSE THAN ANYTHING THAT YOU THINK I MAY BE WRONG ABOUT.' HE BECAME SILENT, LOOKED AT ME HARD AND WALKED AWAY. HE LATER CAME UP TO ME AND SAID HE WAS SORRY. HE SAID THAT HE WAS JUST TIRED AND GRUMPY. I SAID THAT HE SEEMED TO HAVE SOME UNRESOLVED ISSUES THAT WERE BOTHERING HIM AND THAT I WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO TALK THEM OUT WITH HIM, BUT NOT IN THE COCKPIT. ON A SUBSEQUENT FLT AN HR LATER, HE COPIED OUR CLRNC FROM BURBANK, CA, BACK TO SANTA ANA. AS I COMPLETED PROGRAMMING THE FMS, I ASKED HIM TO REVIEW WHAT WAS IN THE FMS AND DISPLAYED ON THE MULTI-FUNCTION DISPLAY AND TO CONFIRM THAT IT WAS ACCURATE AND COMPLETE. HE SAID THAT IT WAS, AS WE COMPLETED THE ELMOO 5 DEP FROM BURBANK. APCHING THE ELMOO TRANSITION FIX, THE AUTOPLT Commanded A R TURN TOWARD SANTA ANA, FOLLOWING THE FMS PROGRAMMING. THE SOCAL APCH CTLR CAME ON THE AIR AND TOLD US TO TURN L TO 50 DEG HDG. AND HE CONTINUED TO GIVE US VECTORS TO ILS FINAL APCH INTO SANTA ANA. THE CTLR ASKED US TO CALL A PHONE NUMBER WHEN ON THE GND. I CALLED THE CTLR AND WAS INFORMED AS TO THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE MISTAKE WHICH HAD OCCURRED. THE R TURN WOULD HAVE PUT US IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE DOWNWIND TFC INTO LAX. I SINCERELY APOLOGIZED FOR THE ERROR, AND TOLD THE CTLR THAT I HAD A COMS PROB WITH THE RENTAL PLT THAT WAS WITH ME THAT DAY. HE SUGGESTED THAT MY COMPANY TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO CORRECT THE PROB. I ASSURED HIM THAT WE WOULD. HE DECLINED TO ISSUE A VIOLATION AGAINST MY LICENSE, THOUGH I SENSED IT WAS A VERY CLOSE CALL FOR HIM. THE RENTAL PLT IN THIS CASE USED TO WORK FOR MY COMPANY. HE WAS SENIO ME WHEN I CAME TO WORK FOR THE COMPANY, 3 MONTHS PRIOR TO HIS DEP. THAT WAS 10 MONTHS PRIOR TO THIS INCIDENT. PERHAPS HE HAD DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING WHAT HIS ROLE WAS IN THIS PARTICULAR SIT. HOWEVER, NOTHING CAN EXCUSE HIS LOSS OF SELF CTL AND COMPOSURE IN THE COCKPIT. THIS WAS MADE EVEN MORE DANGEROUS AND DAMAGING BECAUSE WE WERE ON FINAL INST APCH, IN THE WX, WITH CUSTOMERS ON BOARD. ONE OF THE LESSONS THAT CAN BE GLEANED FROM THIS IS THAT WE PLTS NEED TO TAKE A MOMENT TO THINK ABOUT WHAT OUR ROLE IS FOR A GIVEN DAY, IF WE FIND OURSELVES DEALING WITH AN UNUSUAL SIT. WE MUST INSIST ON GOOD COCKPIT COMS AND COORD, REGARDLESS OF WHO IS THERE WITH US. AND I'M AFRAID WE MUST ALSO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE PLT THAT WE THINK IS THERE TO HELP US, MAY NOT HAVE THAT OBJECTIVE.

Synopsis:

HEADING TRACK POS DEV DURING A GROSS NAV ERROR IN A CORPORATE ACFT.
ACN: 368250

Time
Date: 199705
Day: Sat
Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place
Locale Reference, Airport: SBN
State Reference: IN

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft / 1
Make Model: 168.92

Person / 1
Function, Oversight: PIC
Function, Flight Crew: Captain
Experience, Flight Time, Total: 3500
Experience, Flight Time, Last 90 Days: 200
Experience, Flight Time, Type: 900
ASRS Report: 368250

Person / 2
Function, Flight Crew: First Officer
Experience, Flight Time, Total: 3623
Experience, Flight Time, Last 90 Days: 138
Experience, Flight Time, Type: 138
ASRS Report: 368155

Person / 3
Function, Controller: Local

Events
Anomaly, Incursion: Runway
Anomaly, Non Adherence: Clearance
Anomaly, Non Adherence: FAR
Independent Detector, Other, Controller A: Unspecified
Resolutory Action, None Taken: Detected After The Fact
Narrative:
SBN TWR INFORMED US THAT WE HAD DEPARTED WITHOUT TKOF CLRNC. THE FO AND I WERE (OBVIOUSLY) UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO GO. SINCE BOTH THE FO AND I ARE BOTH RESPONSIBLE, ACCOMPLISHED PLTS WITH NO HISTORY OF PREVIOUS INCIDENTS OR ACCIDENTS. I CAN ONLY ASSUME THAT FATIGUE PLAYED A ROLE IN THIS DAY'S EVENTS. I HAD BEEN SCHEDULED TO FLY 9 LEGS ON THE PREVIOUS DAY, ALL OF WHICH CONTAINED SIGNIFICANT WX FLYING, INST APCHS, AND NO AUTOPLT. THE DUTY DAY WAS ALMOST 14 HRS LONG. THE NIGHT PREVIOUS, I HAD HAD 8 HRS AND 2 MINS OF REDUCED REST WHICH WAS FURTHER REDUCED SINCE OUR CREW HOTEL IS LOCATED 20 MINS AWAY FROM THE ARPT. THE DAY OF THIS INCIDENT, I HAD RPTED FOR DUTY AT EARLY MORNING HRS AND HAD BEEN ON DUTY FOR 10 HRS WHEN THE INCIDENT OCCURRED. THERE IS NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THAT THE COMPANY'S SCHEDULING PRACTICES AND THE FAA'S REST REQUIREMENTS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS EVENT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 368155: FATIGUE WAS INVOLVED DUE TO THE PRIOR NIGHT'S REDUCED REST AFTER A LONG DUTY DAY WITH MULTIPLE FLT LEGS AND SEVERAL DIFFERENT CAPTS. THIS REDUCED REST INCLUDED 2 LONG TAXI RIDES TO AND FROM THE HOTEL. AFTER THE REDUCED REST, AGAIN I FLEW MULTIPLE FLT LEGS WITH SEVERAL DIFFERENT CAPTS, AGAIN, IN ADVERSE WX CONDITIONS.

Synopsis:
AN ACR BA32 FLC, APPARENTLY TOOK OFF WITHOUT A TKOF CLRNC FROM SBN. FLC COMPLAIN OF FATIGUE.
ACN: 369790

Time
Date: 199705
Day: Fri
Local Time Of Day: 0001 To 0600

Place
Locale Reference, Airport: DFW
State Reference: TX

Environment
Flight Conditions: IMC

Aircraft / 1
Make Model: 168.91

Aircraft / 2
Make Model: 583.60

Person / 1
Function, Oversight: PIC
Function, Flight Crew: Captain
ASRS Report: 369790

Person / 2
Function, Flight Crew: First Officer
ASRS Report: 369791

Person / 3
Function, Flight Crew: Second Officer

Person / 4
Function, Controller: Local

Events
Anomaly, Incursion: Landing Without Clearance
Anomaly, Inflight Encounter: Weather
Anomaly, Non Adherence: Clearance
Anomaly, Non Adherence: FAR
Independent Detector, Other, Flight Crew: Unspecified
Resolutory Action, None Taken: Detected After The Fact
Narrative:
FLT NORMAL UNTIL APCH. PROPER BRIEFING AND SET-UP WAS DONE FOR RWY 17R, AND I FELT PREPARED. ATIS WX ALMOST VFR, ALTHOUGH RADAR LOOKED RAINY. I WAS HAND FLYING WITH THE FLT DIRECTOR ON, AND OUR VECTOR CAUSED US TO OVERSHOOT FINAL ABOUT 10 MI OUT. AS I WAS TURNING TO CORRECT, NOW IN A FAIRLY HVY RAINSHOWER, I GOT SOME VERTIGO, AND SHOULD HAVE GIVEN IT TO THE FO, BUT I KEPT IT AND FLEW A VERY SLOPPY APCH. THE FO AND FE WERE MAKING CALLOUTS TO HELP ME GET SQUARED AWAY. WITH THIS DISTR, WE APPARENTLY DIDN'T CALL TWR AND LANDED WITHOUT CLRNC. IN THE RAIN, I SHOULD HAVE BEEN FLYING A COUPLED APCH. MORE IMPORTANT, I SHOULD HAVE GOTTEN UP AND STRETCHED A BIT ABOUT AN HR PRIOR TO LNDG AFTER THIS RATHER LONG ALL-NIGHTER. THAT MOST LIKELY WOULD HAVE AVOIDED THIS ENTIRE INCIDENT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 369791: DURING THIS VERY BUSY APCH, I CHANGED TO TWR FREQ, AS INSTRUCTED. WHILE MONITORING THE FINAL PHASE OF THE APCH, I BELIEVE I FAILED TO VERIFY THE LNDG CLRNC.

Synopsis:
DC10 CAPT MAKES A SLOPPY ILS APCH IN A RAINSHOWER AT DFW AT NIGHT. THE REST OF THE CREW IS SO BUSY MAKING CALLOUTS THAT THE FO FAILS TO CALL THE TWR FOR LNDG. FLT HAD COME FROM HNL. CAPT CITES HIS FAILURE TO GET UP AND STRETCH PRIOR TO THE APCH AS CONTRIBUTORY.
ACN: 435341

Time
Date: 199904
Day: Fri
Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: MSY.Airport
State Reference: LA
Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower: 16000
Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper: 17000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft / 1
Controlling Facilities.ARTCC: ZHU.ARTCC
Make Model: Beech 1900

Person / 1
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Total: 2900
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 250
Experience.Flight Time.Type: 1200
ASRS Report: 435341

Person / 2
Function.Oversight: PIC
Function.Flight Crew: Captain

Person / 3
Function.Controller: Radar

Events
Anomaly.Altitude Deviation: Overshoot
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 3
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1
Resolutory Action.Flight Crew: Returned To Original Clearance

Supplementary
Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance
As we were climbing up to our FLT plan alt of 16000 ft, I called out 500 ft to go passing 15500 ft -- a standard company callout. I then became distr with some end-of-the-day paperwork, as this was our 6th and final leg of a 15.5 hr duty day. A moment later, I looked up and noticed that we were level at 17000 ft. I brought it to the Capt's attn and he quickly started back down to 16000 ft. Zhu then advised us that we were level at 17000 ft. There was no other TFC out in the vicinity, and that was the end of it. I believe some major contributing factors were: the very long duty day imposed on us by the airline. The Capt himself, in that this is not an uncommon prob with him. He has a notoriously bad reputation for being a sub-par plt that slipped through the cracks. And ultimately, I blame myself for getting distr with non essential paperwork. This experience was a big reminder for me in that 1) not getting too distr with paperwork, even though we were not in a sterile environment, and 2) to be extra alert during a period when fatigue is more likely to be a factor.

Synopsis:
ACR FLC overshoots assigned alt and levels off 1000 ft high.
ACN: 436831

Time
Date: 199905
Day: Sat
Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: JFK.Airport
State Reference: NY
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: IMC

Aircraft / 1
Make Model: SF 340b

Person / 1
Function.Oversight: PIC
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Experience.Flight Time.Total: 6000
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 100
Experience.Flight Time.Type: 2500
ASRS Report: 436820

Person / 2
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer
Experience.Flight Time.Total: 2270
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 45
Experience.Flight Time.Type: 45
ASRS Report: 436831

Person / 3
Function.Controller: Approach

Events
Anomaly.Excursion: Runway
Anomaly Non Adherence: Company Policies
Anomaly Non Adherence: FAR
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB: 2
Resolutory Action.None Taken: Anomaly Accepted

Supplementary
Problem Areas: Aircraft
Problem Areas: ATC Human Performance
Problem Areas: Weather
Narrative:
WE ARRIVED AT BWI AT ABOUT XA25 (APPROX 30 MINS LATE). WE THEN TOOK THE CREW VAN TO THE HOTEL AND I WAS ASLEEP AT ABOUT XG00 WITH AN XE45 WAKE UP. WE TOOK THE XF30 CREW VAN FROM THE HOTEL THAT MORNING TO BE AT THE ARPT AND READY FOR AN XG10 DEP. WE HAD AN ON-TIME DEP. ENRTE, THE CAPT DISCUSSED WITH ME THAT HE MIGHT HAVE TO DO THE LNDG AT JFK DUE TO THE LOW VISIBILITY. I WAS RESTRICTED BECAUSE I HAD LESS THAN 100 HRS IN THAT TYPE OF ACFT (45 HRS TO BE MORE PRECISE). ONCE IN THE JFK TERMINAL AREA, WE WERE ON RADAR VECTORS TO ILS RWY 4R. WE WERE GIVEN A HEADING TO INTERCEPT THE LOC. JUST AS WE WERE INTERCEPTING, APCH CTL ANNOUNCED THAT THE VISIBILITY WAS 1400 FT RVR. THEY ASKED IF WE COULD ACCEPT THE APCH. THE CAPT RESPONDED THAT WE COULD NOT. WE WERE GIVEN HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH WERE TO HOLD AT EBBEE (FAF) 10 MI LEGS, MAINTAIN 4000 FT. AS WE NEARED EBBEE, APCH CTL ANNOUNCED THAT THE VISIBILITY WAS 1600 FT RVR THEN 1800 FT RVR. AT THIS POINT APCH CTL ASKED IF WE COULD MAKE IT FROM OUR CURRENT POS. THE CAPT REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT SO. I RETARDED THE PWR LEVERS AND INITIATED A 2000 FPM RATE OF DSCNT WITH THE AUTOPLT. AT THE SAME TIME, THE CAPT EXTENDED THE LNDG GEAR AND SAID THAT HE HAD THE ACFT. IN RETROSPECT, I BELIEVE THAT THE LACK OF REST MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR ME TO RESPOND TO THE SUDDEN CHANGE FROM THE PF TO THE PNF AND TO REACT TO THE NOW HURRIED APCH. DUE TO MY SLOW RESPONSE TO THE SIT, I MISSED SOME CALLS, WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO AN UNSTABLE APCH AND A ZERO DEG FLAP LNDG. UPON TOUCHDOWN, THE CAPT PUT THE PROP CTLS IN FULL REVERSE TO DECELERATE RAPIDLY, BUT OUR SPD WAS SUCH THAT WE PROCEEDED IN OVERRUNNING THE RWY. IN RETROSPECT TO THIS INCIDENT, I FEEL THAT FATIGUE WAS THE MAJOR FACTOR IN MY INABILITY TO MAKE THE SUDDEN XFER FROM THE PF TO THE PNF DUTIES. I TRIED TO PREPARE MYSELF FOR THIS SCHEDULE THAT THE COMPANY HAD GIVEN ME, BUT IN RETROSPECT I FEEL IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO EVER FULLY ADJUST TO SUCH A SCHEDULE. ADDITIONALLY, IN HINDSIGHT, I FEEL THAT MY TRAINING WAS INADEQUATE IN THE PHYSIOLOGY ASPECT. I WAS NEVER TAUGHT HOW TO RECOGNIZE FATIGUE AND FURTHERMORE, NEVER TOLD TO RELIEVE MYSELF FROM A TRIP DUE TO FATIGUE WITH NO CONSEQUENCES. ONE LAST ATTRIBUTING FACTOR, IN RETROSPECT, IS THAT IN ALL OF MY SIMULATOR TRAINING, ALL OF MY PNF DUTIES WERE PERFORMED FROM THE L SEAT DUE TO BEING PAIRED WITH ANOTHER FO. I FEEL THAT IF I WERE PAIRED WITH A CAPT AND SOME SCENARIOS WERE INTRODUCED WHERE HE MADE SOME MISTAKES ON APCHS WHICH I WOULD HAVE TO IDENT AND CORRECT, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE PREPARED ME TO DEAL WITH A PROB AS THE ONE DISCUSSED IN THIS STATEMENT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 436820: THE ACFT CAME TO A COMPLETE STOP AT THE END OF RWY 4R IN THE FOAM ARRESTER. I NOTIFIED THE TWR AND COMPANY OF THE SIT AND THEN ENTERED THE CABIN TO ASSIST THE FLT ATTENDANT. AFTER CONFIRMING THAT THERE WERE NO INJURIES, THE PAX WERE DEPLANED. IN RETROSPECT I BELIEVE THE CREW MAY HAVE BEEN EXCESSIVELY FATIGUED CAUSED BY THE SCHEDULING OF THESE FLTS. THE COMPANY SCHEDULES THEM AND WE PLTS TRY TO PREPARE FOR THEM BUT THE TRANSITION FROM DAY FLYING TO NIGHT AND BACK IS HARD.

Synopsis:
SAAB 340 FLC UNABLE TO STOP WITHIN RWY CONFINES UPON LNDG AT JFK.
ACN: 443263

Time
Date: 199907
Day: Tue
Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place
Locale Reference: Airport: DFW.Airport
State Reference: TX
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft / 1
Make Model: SF 340a

Person / 1
Function.Oversight: PIC
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Experience.Flight Time.Total: 6500
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 200
Experience.Flight Time.Type: 200
ASRS Report: 443263

Events
Anomaly Non Adherence: FAR
Independent Detector.Other.Flight Crew: 1

Supplementary
Problem Areas: Company
Problem Areas: FAA
AFTER SITTING ON RESERVE ALL DAY I WAS GIVEN A CONTINUOUS DUTY OVERNIGHT WITH NO PRIOR WARNING. I HAD BEEN AWAKE SINCE XA00 AM THE DAY BEFORE, FLEW TO XNA, SLEPT APPROX 4 HRS AND FLEW BACK TO DFW. THIS AMOUNTED TO 4 HRS OF SLEEP IN A 24 HR PERIOD FROM XA00 TO XX00 AM. I BELIEVE THIS TO BE VERY DANGEROUS DUE TO THE NATURE OF FLYING AND WISH TO HAVE RULES ENFORCED TO STOP PRACTICES SUCH AS THIS.

SF34 CAPT HAD FATIGUE.
ACN: 448082

Time
Date: 199909
Day: Fri
Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: HOU.Airport
State Reference: TX
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft / 1
Make Model: SAAB-SCANIA Undifferentiated or Other Model

Person / 1
Function.Oversight: PIC
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Experience.Flight Time.Total: 4100
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 225
Experience.Flight Time.Type: 3450
ASRS Report: 448082

Person / 2
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person / 3
Function.Controller: Local

Events
Anomaly.Non Adherence: Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence: FAR
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewB: 2
Resolutory Action.None Taken: Detected After The Fact

Supplementary
Problem Areas: Aircraft
Problem Areas: Airport
Problem Areas: Chart Or Publication
Problem Areas: Environmental Factor
Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance
CONFLICT AT A MULTI-RWY ARPT LED TO TAKING OFF ON A SHORT RWY THAT WE HAD NO PERFORMANCE DATA FOR. THE TKOF WAS WITHOUT INCIDENT. CONFUSION RESULTED FROM SEVERAL FACTORS. LNDG THE NIGHT BEFORE, THE TWR TRIED TO SWITCH US FROM THE R PARALLEL TO THE L WHEN WE WERE ON SHORT FINAL. I REFUSED THE SWITCH BECAUSE I WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH THE SHORT RWY, AND COULD NOT PULL OUT CHARTS. AFTER A STAND UP OVERNIGHT (ON DUTY ALL NIGHT), WE DEPARTED THE NEXT MORNING IN THE DARK, AT AN UNFAMILIAR ARPT, AND 4 HRS OF SLEEP. THE ATIS RPTED DEPS ON A LONG, FAMILIAR RWY. ON TAXI, ANOTHER ACR WAS ASSIGNED A SECOND RWY FOR DEP. WE WERE THEN ASSIGNED A THIRD RWY, DIFFERENT FROM THE ATIS RPTED RWY AND THE RWY OF THE PREVIOUS ACFT. WE WERE ASSIGNED THE PARALLEL RWYS FROM THE NIGHT BEFORE. I TAXIED TO THE LONGER PARALLEL WE HAD LANDED ON, WHICH THE FO AND TWR CONFIRMED WAS THE WRONG PARALLEL. AT THIS POINT, I TAXIED TO THE ASSIGNED PARALLEL, WHICH I ASSUMED WAS THE LONGER ONE WE HAD LANDED ON THE NIGHT BEFORE. I ASKED THE FO TO CHK THE PERFORMANCE DATA, AND HE SAID TKOF WAS ALLOWED. AFTER TKOF, I REALIZED WE HAD TAKEN OFF ON THE SHORT RWY, WHICH WE HAD NO DATA FOR. THE FO AND I HAD BOTH BEEN CONFUSED – ME WITH THE RWY, HIM WITH THE CHART. FACTORS THAT AFFECTED US: FATIGUE FROM THE STAND UP OVERNIGHT. THE TWR'S CONSTANT EFFORTS TO ASSIGN US THE SHORTEST RWY FOR TKOF AND LNDG WHEN NOT LISTED IN THE ATIS. NORMALLY, I WOULD HAVE STOPPED THE ACFT DURING TAXI AND SORTED THIS OUT. I BELIEVE FATIGUE LED ME TO NOT THINK THIS THROUGH CLRLY. AS PIC, IT IS MY SOLE RESPONSIBILITY TO SORT THIS OUT BEFORE TKOF.

Synopsis:
AN SF340 FLC DEPARTS FROM AN UNAUTH RWY AT HOU, TX.
ACN: 455657

Time
Date: 199911
Day: Thu
Local Time Of Day: 1201 To 1800

Place
State Reference: WV
Altitude MSL Single Value: 6000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft / 1
Controlling Facilities ARTCC: ZOB ARTCC
Make Model: Beech 1900

Person / 1
Function Oversight: PIC
Function Flight Crew: Captain
Experience Flight Time Total: 4500
Experience Flight Time Last 90 Days: 120
Experience Flight Time Type: 575
ASRS Report: 455657

Person / 2
Function Flight Crew: First Officer
Experience Flight Time Total: 1200
Experience Flight Time Last 90 Days: 55
Experience Flight Time Type: 25
ASRS Report: 455480

Person / 3
Function Other Personnel: Dispatcher

Person / 4
Function Controller: Radar

Events
Anomaly Other Spatial Deviation: Track Or Heading Deviation
Anomaly Non Adherence: Clearance
Independent Detector Other Controller A: 4
Resolutory Action Controller: Issued Advisory
Resolutory Action Controller: Issued New Clearance

Supplementary
Problem Areas: Company
Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance
Narrative:

CHAIN OF EVENTS: OUR PART 121 FLT WAS SCHEDULED TO DEPART MORGANTOWN MUNICIPAL ARPT (MGW) FOR CLARKSBURG/BENEDUM ARPT (CKB). WE WOULD THEN PICK UP PAX AT CKB, AND CONTINUE ON TO PARKERSBURG WOOD COUNTY WILSON ARPT (PKB). EARLIER THAT DAY, OUR FLT HAD BEEN DELAYED 1 HR FOR MAINT, SO WE ARRIVED AT MGW 1 HR BEHIND SCHEDULE. AFTER ARRIVING IN MGW, I CHKED THE PAX LOADS FOR THE NEXT LEGS TO CKB AND PKB, AND THE COMPUTER SHOWED ZERO PAX. I DISCUSSED WITH DISPATCH THE POSSIBILITY OF CANCELING THE STOP IN CKB AND GOING DIRECT TO PKB, SO THAT WE COULD HAND OFF THE ACFT TO THE NEXT CREW A LITTLE BIT CLOSER TO SCHEDULE. DISPATCH AGREED, AND SAID THEY WOULD SEND OVER A RELEASE DIRECT FROM MGW TO PKB. I RECEIVED THE RELEASE AND WE DEPARTED MGW FOR PKB. AFTER A QUICK CLB TO CRUISE ON A WESTERLY HDG FOR VOR AT PARKERSBURG (JPU VOR), ATC ASKED US WHAT OUR HDG WAS FOR CKB VOR. WE TOLD THE CTLR WE WERE TRACKING DIRECT TO JPU. HE THEN ASKED US IF WE WERE CLRED AS FILED, AND WE RESPONDED 'AFFIRMATIVE.' I THEN LOOKED AT THE FLT PLAN ON THE RELEASE AND REALIZED OUR COMPANY FILED OUR FLT RTE TO OVERFLY CKB VOR BEFORE PROCEEDING ON TO JPU VOR. CKB VOR WAS ABOUT 16 MI S OF OUR DEP POINT. I THEN IMMEDIATELY REQUESTED 'PRESENT POS DIRECT PARKERSBURG' AND APOLOGIZED TO THE CTLR FOR MISUNDERSTANDING THE CLRNC. ATC GRANTED US OUR REQUEST FOR DIRECT PKB. HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS: 1) FAILING TO VERIFY FLT RTE ON RELEASE DUE TO THE COMPELLING FEELING TO 'RUSH AND CATCH UP TO THE SCHEDULE.' 2) FO'S LACK OF EXPERIENCE AND ASSERTIVENESS. THE FO HAD BEEN ON LINE FOR ABOUT 1 MONTH AND WAS NEW. SHE DID NOT QUESTION OUR ROUTING WHEN I BRIEFED THE DEP RTE. 3) FATIGUE. THIS WAS OUR 38TH LEG, 30TH FLT HR, AND 63RD DUTY HR IN 5 DAYS OF FLYING, INCLUDING ONE REDUCED REST.

Synopsis:

B190 CREW HAD TRACK DEV.
ACN: 465549

Time
Date: 200003
Day: Sun
Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place
Locale Reference Airport: GRB Airport
State Reference: WI
Altitude.AGL.Single Value: 0
Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper: 3000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft / 1
Make Model: Regional Jet CL65, Bombardier (Canadair)

Component / 1
Aircraft Component: Landing Gear
Aircraft Reference: X
Problem: Improperly Operated

Person / 1
Function.Oversight: PIC
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Experience.Flight Time.Total: 15000
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 300
Experience.Flight Time.Type: 6000
ASRS Report: 465549

Person / 2
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person / 3
Function.Other Personnel: Vehicle Driver

Person / 4
Function.Controller: Local

Events
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem: Less Severe
Anomaly.Non Adherence: Company Policies
Anomaly.Non Adherence: Published Procedure
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA: 1

Supplementary
Problem Areas: Company
Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas: Weather

CORRECTIVE ACTION: PUT 'NOSE GEAR PIN -- REMOVED' ON THE CHKLIST.

Synopsis:
TKOF FROM GREEN BAY DURING WINTER OPS IS MADE WITH GEAR PIN INSTALLED.
ACN: 467525

Time
Date: 200003
Day: Sun
Local Time Of Day: 0001 To 0600

Place
State Reference: NJ
Altitude MSL Single Value: 480

Environment
Flight Conditions: IMC

Aircraft / 1
Make Model: Beech 1900

Person / 1
Function Oversight: PIC
Function Flight Crew: Captain
Experience Flight Time Total: 3180
Experience Flight Time Last 90 Days: 200
Experience Flight Time Type: 1700
ASRS Report: 467525

Person / 2
Function Flight Crew: First Officer

Events
Anomaly Non Adherence: FAR
Anomaly Non Adherence: Published Procedure
Consequence Other: Company Review

Supplementary
Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas: Weather
Narrative:
IT WAS THE 4TH LEG OF AN 8 LEG, 14 HR SHIFT AND THE 3RD CONSECUTIVE DAY OF 5 LEG, 14 HR SHIFTS. THIS EVENT OCCURRED ON THE 12TH INST APCH IN 2 DAYS IN LOW IFR WX WITH MODERATE TURB ON ALL APCHS. WE WERE BOTH TIRED WITH THE USUAL AFTER LUNCH COBWEBBS, BUT HAD 4 MORE LEGS TO GO BEFORE WE WOULD GET HOME. AFTER BRIEFING THE VOR 4 APCH WE RAN ALL CHKLISTS AND HAD THE ACFT CONFIGURED PRIOR TO THE FAF. I HAD MENTIONED I WAS TIRED TO THE FO A WHILE BACK, BUT THIS IS PRETTY MUCH ROUTINE ON THIS SHIFT. WE CROSSED THE FAF AND I STARTED MY DSCNT TO THE MDA OF 480 FT. I THINK THE FO WAS A LITTLE BEHIND AT THIS POINT BECAUSE I DO NOT REMEMBER HIM KEEPING UP WITH THE STANDARD CALLS, BUT THIS COULD ALSO HAVE BEEN MY NOT HEARING THEM. THE RADAR ALTIMETER CALLED 'MINIMUMS' AT 410 FT AGL AND I REMEMBER BEING SURPRISED THAT WE WERE THERE ALREADY. ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY THE TWR GAVE US 'LOW ALT' WARNING AND INSTRUCTED US TO CLB BACK TO MDA. I HAD ALREADY LEVELED OFF AND WAS INDICATING 480 FT ON MY ALTIMETER. WE WERE NOT YET AT THE MISSED APCH POINT, VISIBILITY WAS POOR IN LIGHT RAIN AND I REMEMBER FEELING VERY CONFUSED BY EVERYTHING THAT HAD JUST HAPPENED IN THE LAST 3 SECONDS. AT THAT POINT I DECIDED TO GO MISSED APCH SO WE COULD GET AWAY FROM THE GND AND REGROUP. AFTER THIS, I ELECTED TO DO THE ILS TO RWY 13. THERE WERE NO FURTHER PROBS. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) FATIGUE. 2) RELATIVELY INEXPERIENCED CREW.

Synopsis:
A BE1900D CAPT RPTED THAT DURING AN APCH TO ACY IN IMC THE CTLR WARNED HIM OF A LOW ALT. THE CAPT WENT AROUND FOR THE ILS.
ACN: 474040

Time
Date: 200005
Day: Sat
Local Time Of Day: 1801 To 2400

Place
Locale Reference.Airport: LAS.Airport
State Reference: NV
Altitude.MSL.Bound Lower: 7500
Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper: 8000

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft / 1
Controlling Facilities.TRAYON: L30 TRAYON
Make Model: Challenger CI600

Person / 1
Function.Oversight: PIC
Function.Flight Crew: Captain
Experience.Flight Time.Total: 14000
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days: 240
Experience.Flight Type: 2925
ASRS Report: 474040

Person / 2
Function.Flight Crew: First Officer

Person / 3
Function.Controller: Approach

Events
Anomaly.Altitude Deviation: Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Non Adherence: Clearance
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA: 3
Resolutory Action.None Taken: Detected After The Fact
Consequence.FAA: Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Supplementary
Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance
Narrative:
APCHING LAS JUST AFTER XA00 ON MAY/XA/00, WE WERE VECTORED TOWARD TIFFY, AN OUTER APC FIX FOR RWY 25L. CLRED FOR THE ILS AND INSTRUCTED TO MAINTAIN 8000 FT UNTIL XING TIFFY. SUBSEQUENTLY, WE RPTED THE RWY IN SIGHT AND WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL TO RWY 25L. MY FO, WHO WAS FLYING, CONTINUED A SLIGHT DSCNT. WE WERE SLIGHTLY BELOW 8000 FT AS WE CROSSED ABEAM THE TIFFY FIX, AS HE WAS ANGLING MORE DIRECTLY TO THE RWY BY NOW. THE CTLR THEN QUERIED US AS TO WHY WE HAD DSNDED BELOW 8000 FT. I'M SUBMITTING BECAUSE I'M NOT SURE IF WE WERE IN VIOLATION OF AIRSPACE. WE SHOULD HAVE CONTINUED TO REMAIN WITHIN CLASS B AIRSPACE, BY MY RECKONING, BASED ON THE DME'S OF THE SEGMENTS IN RELATION TO TIFFY. HOWEVER, AT THAT POINT IT WAS PAST X800 BY OUR BODY CLOCKS. WE HAD STARTED THE DAY IN BGR WITH A LATE EVENING DEP, BUT HADN'T BEEN ABLE TO NAP THAT AFTERNOON, AS PLANNED, DUE TO AN AEROBATIC SHOW PERFORMING RIGHT OVER THE HOTEL DURING AIR SHOW THERE AND THE HOTEL REQUESTING US TO DEPART 1 HR EARLIER THAN PLANNED DUE TO ROADS CLOGGED WITH AIR SHOW TFC. WE WERE BOTH FEELING THE EFFECTS OF NEEDING SLEEP AND POSSIBLY DID NOT RECOGNIZE THE NECESSITY TO MAINTAIN THE 8000 FT (IF, INDEED, IT WAS NECESSARY) AFTER BEING CLRED FOR THE VISUAL.

Synopsis:
FO OF A CANADAIR CL600 DSNDED BELOW ASSIGNED TRANSITION ALT DURING VECTOR TO FINAL APCH.
ACN: 474264

Time
Date: 200005
Day: Fri
Local Time Of Day: 0601 To 1200

Place
Locale Reference, ATC Facility: ZME. ARTCC
State Reference: TN

Environment
Flight Conditions: VMC

Aircraft / 1
Controlling Facilities, ARTCC: ZME ARTCC
Make Model: Regional Jet CL65, Bombardier (Canadair)

Person / 1
Function, Flight Crew: First Officer
Experience, Flight Time, Total: 2500
Experience, Flight Time, Last 90 Days: 200
Experience, Flight Time, Type: 250
ASRS Report: 474264

Person / 2
Function, Oversight: PIC
Function, Flight Crew: Captain
Experience, Flight Time, Total: 7592
Experience, Flight Time, Last 90 Days: 232
Experience, Flight Time, Type: 315
ASRS Report: 474250

Person / 3
Function, Controller: Radar

Events
Anomaly, Other Spatial Deviation: Track Or Heading Deviation
Anomaly, Non Adherence: Clearance
Independent Detector, ATC Equipment, Other ATC Equipment: RADAR
Independent Detector, Other, Controller A: 3
Resolutory Action, Controller: Issued Alert
Consequence, FAA: Reviewed Incident With Flight Crew

Supplementary
Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance
Narrative:

This was the last day of 4 straight days of flying. The previous day we flew over 7 1/2 hrs involving GND delays, INFLT dev's and holding due to TSTMS. Today we were scheduled for almost 6 hrs of flying. This was the second FLT of the day from BNA to IAD. This FLT was filed with the following RTE: BNA...HVQ...JASEN2 IAD. When CLRNC DELIVERY issued our CLRNC it was: 'CLRED THE NASHVILLE 8 DEP, AS FILED, MAINTAIN 5000 FT, DEP FREQ IS 118.4, SQUAWK XXXX.' This is what we inputted into the FMS computer and flew. There is a second RTE that we often fly, it is: BNA...SWAPP...J42...BKW...JASEN2 IAD. Once we were airborne, DEP issued several vector headings. The final one was to 'MAINTAIN...TO JOIN...' Because of fatigue, I cannot recall if he said '...TO JOIN THE JET RTE' or '...TO JOIN YOUR RTE.' I answered back verbatim what he stated, and set the heading into the FMS computer. The issued heading was a 30 deg intercept to our filed routing and looked like a good intercept heading. The FMS does not distinguish between DIRECT routing or JET routes. We were then handed off to CTR CTL. CTR acknowledged our initial call and said nothing of our pos or heading. Approx 20 mins later CTR inquired if we were on the JET RTE. I was confused by his question, but replied that we filed via DIRECT routing and CLRNC DELIVERY had stated 'CLRED as filed.' CTR then stated that we should have been on the JET routing. He gave us vectors so we did not conflict with other TFC, and stated he would have to look into this. At no time were there any conflicts or other dangers to ACFT. We continued with our direct routing with no other probs.

Synopsis:

FLC of a CANADAIR, CL65 CRJ, followed their filed FLT plan rather than the FLT plan CLRNC given prior to DEP resulting in ATC vectors to avoid other TFC.
Time
Date: 200006
Day: Wed
Local Time Of Day: 0001 To 0600

Place
State Reference: MN

Aircraft / 1
Make Model: SF 340a

Person / 1
Function. Flight Crew: First Officer
ASRS Report: 476530

Person / 2
Function. Oversight: PIC
Function. Flight Crew: Captain

Person / 3
Function. Oversight: Flight Attendant In Charge

Person / 4
Function. Controller: Approach

Events
Anomaly. Other Spatial Deviation: Controlled Flight Towards Terrain
Anomaly. Incursion: Landing Without Clearance
Anomaly. Non Adherence: FAR
Independent Detector. Other. Flight Crew B: #2
Resolutory Action. Flight Crew: Became Reoriented
Resolutory Action. None Taken: Detected After The Fact

Supplementary
Problem Areas: Cabin Crew Human Performance
Problem Areas: Company
Problem Areas: Flight Crew Human Performance
ON JUN/XNO0, OUR CREW BEGAN A 'HIGH SPD,' WHICH IS A CONTINUOUS DUTY OVERNIGHT TRIP. OUR TRIP PATTERN CALLED FOR US TO FLY FROM MSP TO MASON CITY, THEN ON TO FORT DODGE, IA. AT THAT TIME, WE ARE SCHEDULED TO GO TO THE HOTEL FOR SOME REST. HOWEVER, WE ARE STILL ON DUTY. WE WERE SCHEDULED TO DEPART AT XA00 BACK TO MASON CITY, IA, THEN ON TO MSP. AT THIS TIME, WE WERE SCHEDULED TO GO OFF DUTY IN MSP. THE PROB ON THIS TRIP BEGAN WHEN WE ARRIVED IN FT DODGE, IA. THE CAPT AND I NOTICED ON THE WAY TO THE HOTEL THAT THE FLT ATTENDANT BEGAN TO ACT STRANGELY. BY THE TIME WE ARRIVED AT THE HOTEL, THE FLT ATTENDANT HAD BECOME DISORIENTED, CONFUSED, AND BASICALLY SHOWED THE SIGNS OF AN INTOXICATED PERSON. THE CAPT AND I DECIDED THE FLT ATTENDANT NEEDED TO GO TO A HOSPITAL. THE FLT ATTENDANT, ON THE WAY TO THE HOSPITAL, PASSED OUT IN THE CAR. AT THE HOSPITAL, THE DOCTORS TOOK THE FLT ATTENDANT AND INFORMED US THAT HE HAD SIGNS OF A DIABETIC SHOCK. THIS WAS INDEED THE CASE, AS THE FLT ATTENDANT WAS A DIABETIC (NEITHER THE CAPT NOR I WERE AWARE OF THE FACT THE FLT ATTENDANT WAS A DIABETIC). BY THE TIME THE FLT ATTENDANT BEGAN TO OVERCOME HIS SHOCK AND THE CAPT AND I TALKED TO OUR COMPANY, IT HAD BECOME QUITE LATE (APPROX XB00). IT WAS DECIDED THAT THE FLT ATTENDANT WOULD BE OK AND WOULD BE DISMISSED FROM THE HOSPITAL. WE ALL RETURNED TO THE HOTEL, WHICH WAS APPROX XC30. THE COMPANY DECIDED TO HAVE THE FLT ATTENDANT STAY AT THE HOTEL TO RECOVER AND THE CAPT AND I WOULD FERRY THE ACFT BACK TO MSP AT THE REGULARLY SCHEDULED TIME AT XA00. BEFORE THIS TIME, WE DECIDED TO CLEAN UP OUR ROOMS AT APPROX XE00-XF00 AND SCHEDULED OUR WAKE-UP CALLS AT XD00 TO MAKE OUR XA00 DEP TO MSP. OBVIOUSLY, WE WERE FATIGUED ON OUR XA00 DEP TO MSP. WE ONLY HAD 2 - 2 1/2 HRS SLEEP. THE FLT TO MSP WAS UNEVENTFUL. THE PROB AROSE ON OUR ARR TO MSP. WE WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH FOR RWY 30R. WE WERE INFORMED BY THE APCH CTLR TO CONTACT THE CTL TWR ON A 5 MI FINAL. WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH ON APPROX A 10 MI BASE TO FINAL. AT THE 5 MI POINT WHERE WE SHOULD HAVE CONTACTED THE TWR FOR CLRNC TO LAND, WE NEGLECTED THIS NORMAL PROC UNKNOWINGLY. THERE WERE NO ACFT WAITING TO DEPART ON OUR LNDG. WE TAXIED THE ACFT OFF THE RWY AND WHILE I WAS SWITCHING TO GND CTL, I REALIZED THAT WE HAD NOT RECEIVED CLRNC TO LAND (WE NEVER SWITCHED TO TWR). THE GND CTLR TOLD US TO TAXI TO THE GATE, GIVING NO INDICATION TO CALL THE TWR FOR THE FACT THAT WE LANDED WITHOUT A CLRNC. AS THE FO ON THIS FLT, I FELT IT NECESSARY TO SEND IN THIS FORM FOR THIS REASON — OF NOT BEING CLRED TO LAND, BASICALLY, BECAUSE WE FORGOT TO CONTACT THE TWR. I BELIEVE THAT THE CAPT AND I FORGOT BECAUSE WE WERE QUITE FATIGUED, AND BY THE FACT WE HAD SOME TIME TO FORGET FROM WHEN WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL AND TOLD TO CONTACT THE TWR ON A 10 MI FINAL AND WHEN WE WERE ON A 5 MI FINAL. I ATTRIBUTE FATIGUE TO THE REASON WHY WE DIDN'T PERFORM A NORMAL PROC IN OBTAINING CLRNC TO LAND.

Synopsis:
PLT RPT, SF340, FOD-MSP. 1 CONTINUOUS DUTY PERIOD. CABIN ATTENDANT HAD DIABETIC SHOCK. CREW TOOK HIM TO HOSPITAL AT NIGHT, CREATING CREW FATIGUE. RESULT: PLT FORGOT TO CONTACT MSP TWR AT 5 NM FOR FINAL.
Appendix A

Brief Introduction to Sleep Disorders and Sleeping Pills

Physical Sleep Disorders

There are several physical sleep disorders that can disturb sleep and cause excessive sleepiness during wakefulness. Two examples are described that illustrate why it is important to know about the existence of these medical disorders: sleep apnea and nocturnal myoclonus. These are only two examples of sleep disorders, physiological conditions that can disrupt the quantity and quality of sleep and can have subsequent consequences during wakefulness. Sleep disorders often can exist without the knowledge of the individual sufferer and may produce waking difficulties that one would not typically relate to a sleep problem (e.g., high blood pressure, morning headaches, fighting sleep in many situations). It is imperative that health care professionals, especially accredited sleep-disorder specialists, be used to accurately determine the cause of sleep disturbances or the related waking difficulties, so that individuals receive appropriate and effective treatment.

Sleep Apnea

The sleep apnea syndrome (SAS) is a sleep disorder in which individuals cannot sleep and breathe at the same time. Apnea (a = not, pnea = breathing) is a pause in the regular pattern of breathing. Essentially, apneic individuals fall asleep and then periodically stop breathing. When this occurs, little or no oxygen is available to the brain or body. Usually, when the oxygen level in the blood drops below a certain level and carbon dioxide levels rise, the brain arouses the individual who then begins to breathe again. This awakening is often associated with a gasp for air or a snore as the individual resumes breathing. Depending on the severity of the disorder, this cycle of pauses in breathing and awakening to breathe can continue throughout the sleep period. Sleep apnea is a potentially lethal disorder—if the brain does not respond during an apnea, death can occur. There are two aspects of apneic episodes that affect the severity of the disorder: the duration of the apnea and the frequency (the number that occur during a given sleep period). Most apnea episodes usually last under 30 sec, though they can range from 15 sec up to 2 or 3 min in duration. Apneas may occur only a few times per hour of sleep or hundreds of times across a sleep period. In a very mild case, there may be only 5 or 10 apnea episodes per hour, whereas in a severe case there may be 50 to 80 per hour of sleep (i.e., 300 or 400 episodes during an average sleep period).

Many physical and behavioral problems can be caused by sleep apnea, for example, excessive sleepiness and cardiovascular difficulties such as hypertension. Currently, sleep-disorder specialists believe that a combination of frequent arousals from sleep (which also results in little or no deep sleep) and the oxygen deprivation lead to excessive sleepiness during wakefulness. Remember, the quality of sleep is an important factor in how refreshed and alert an individual feels after sleep. So, although someone with sleep apnea may sleep 8 hours, the sleep could be disturbed 300 or 400 times...
by apnea episodes, and therefore the quality of sleep can be very poor. Very often individuals with sleep apnea are completely unaware that they have the disorder. They may have high blood pressure during the day or problems staying awake because of excessive sleepiness, but they often do not relate this to a sleep problem. Thus, even persons who are awakened hundreds of times a night because of disturbed breathing may awaken the next morning and be unaware of what has happened. Frequently, a bed partner is the first to notice the repeated pauses in breathing during sleep and, depending on their duration, may become quite concerned.

Epidemiologic studies suggest that 3–4% of the general population and 10–15% of males had sleep apnea (depending on the definition used). The occurrence of the disorder and its severity appear to increase with age. The textbook sleep apnea case is an overweight, middle-aged male who snores, has high blood pressure, and has problems staying awake during the day (e.g., fighting sleep while in meetings, reading, driving a car, watching a movie or TV). There are a variety of reasons unrelated to sleep apnea that can cause people to snore, for example, colds, deviated septa (i.e., physical problems with the structure of the nose), and allergies. However, snoring is also a primary symptom associated with the occurrence of sleep apnea. Another caution is that alcohol, sleeping pills, and sleep loss can worsen the severity of sleep apnea (both the duration and frequency of apnea events). A number of options are available to effectively treat the sleep apnea syndrome. The treatment usually depends on the severity of the disorder and can range from losing weight, to the continuous administration of oxygen during sleep, to surgery. It is critical that someone concerned about sleep apnea be evaluated by an appropriate health care professional. An individual should first consult a personal physician. Also, there are now sleep-disorder specialists who perform sleep-disorder evaluations, make diagnoses, and prescribe treatments. There are also specialized sleep-disorder clinics (accredited by the American Sleep Disorders Association) throughout the United States that provide full diagnostic and treatment services for the range of sleep disorders. These clinics are located in many university and community hospitals throughout the country.

Sleep apnea is an example of a medical disorder that can disturb sleep and cause excessive sleepiness, heart and blood pressure problems, and other difficulties during wakefulness. An individual can be completely unaware of the sleep disturbances and yet every night suffer from a disorder that can cause pathological sleepiness during the daytime. Like any medical problem, sleep apnea should be evaluated and treated by qualified medical specialists, using the approaches currently accepted for successful treatment of the disorder.

**Nocturnal Myoclonus or Periodic Leg Movements**

Another physical sleep disorder that can disturb the quality of sleep is nocturnal myoclonus, or periodic leg movements during sleep. This disorder is characterized by a twitching (or muscular contraction) of the lower leg muscles during sleep (though typically found in the lower legs, the arms could also twitch). The twitch can occur in one leg or both, typically last only about 0.5 sec, and appear in periodic episodes across the sleep period. There can be several hundred twitches
during any given sleep period. Periodic leg movements constitute a sleep disorder because each muscular twitch is usually associated with either an awakening or a shift from deep to light sleep. Again, someone could be getting 8 hr of sleep but have that sleep interrupted 300 times with awakenings. This poor quality sleep can translate into complaints of non-restorative sleep, awakening unrefreshed, tired, sleepy, etc. This is another sleep disorder that can go unrecognized by the individual with the periodic leg movements and one that is often noticed first by a bed partner (often the recipient of multiple kicks during sleep!). Again, it is very important that the disorder be diagnosed and treated by a knowledgeable physician or accredited sleep-disorder specialist. Although not life-threatening like sleep apnea, periodic leg movements during sleep can result in excessive daytime sleepiness.

Medications

Alcohol

The most widely used self-treatment for disturbed sleep is alcohol. As noted in the presentation materials, alcohol is a very potent REM sleep suppressant. More than a couple of beers or glasses of wine can totally suppress REM sleep in the first half of a sleep period. During the second half of the sleep period, withdrawal effects can be seen, including awakenings, a REM rebound, and generally, very poor, disrupted sleep. Although alcohol is often used to unwind, relax, and promote the ability to get to sleep, its disruptive effects on the subsequent sleep will outweigh its usefulness in promoting the onset of sleep.

Sleeping Pills

CAUTION

The other widely used approach to treating sleep disturbances is prescription sleeping pills. The use of prescription sleeping pills close to and during duty periods is not medically allowed. However, it is acknowledged that many medications available only by prescription in the United States can be obtained over-the-counter, without prescriptions, in many overseas locations. Sleeping pills should only be used under the supervision of a knowledgeable physician. The information provided here is intended only to give a basic understanding about their effects.

There are several important characteristics of sleeping pills that should be considered. The primary purpose of a sleep medication should be to promote sleep, either by facilitating sleep onset or by helping to maintain sleep (e.g., reducing frequent or long awakenings). It should maintain this positive therapeutic effect for the duration of its use (i.e., sleep should be as good on the fifth night of use as on the first). The improvement in sleep should be associated with waking benefits (e.g., increased alertness, better mood) and, at the very least, the sleeping medication should not impair
waking function. So the optimal sleeping pill should promote sleep and improve subsequent waking function. A very important consensus statement (from physicians, sleep-disorder specialists, etc.) recommends that the safest and most beneficial use of sleeping pills is obtained when they are taken for short periods of time and at the lowest effective dose.

In the past, some of the most widely used prescription sleeping pills were in a class of drugs called barbiturates. These include medications such as pentobarbital and seconal. Scientific studies in sleep laboratories have shown that the barbiturates often lose their effectiveness to promote sleep within 7–10 days and can create tolerance to, and dependence on, the medication. It is important to keep in mind that barbiturates have been found to be factors in accidental or intentional drug overdose. The barbiturates are also potent REM sleep suppressants and, like alcohol, can disrupt the regular cycle of NREM and REM sleep, creating fragmented and poor quality sleep. Eventually, these medications can actually create an insomnia problem called drug-dependent insomnia. Only after careful tapering off and eventual withdrawal of the medication can sleep return to a more normal pattern. As prescribing physicians have learned more about these sleep laboratory findings regarding barbiturates, their use as a primary sleeping medication has rapidly declined, and they are rarely used today.

Today, the most widely prescribed sleeping pills (often called sedative/hypnotic medications) are in a class of drugs called the benzodiazepines. There are three that are commonly prescribed: Halcion (triazolam), Restoril (temazepam), and Dalmane (flurazepam). Sleep-laboratory tests of these three medications show that they promote sleep over many nights in sleep-disturbed patients. They are usually considered safer than the barbiturates because, generally, it is more difficult to accidentally or intentionally overdose with them and they can be more easily started and stopped with fewer negative effects.

The benzodiazepines, like all medications, are not without their adverse side-effects. Although the benzodiazepines do not suppress REM sleep, they can suppress NREM sleep stages 3 and 4 (the deep sleep that occurs in the first third to half of the sleep period). Reports suggest that the benzodiazepines can have side effects that affect short-term memory and, if withdrawn too rapidly, may cause a rebound anxiety or insomnia. In spite of these considerations, the benzodiazepines are widely used as safe and effective sleeping pills when prescribed by a knowledgeable physician.

There are properties of these three benzodiazepines that distinguish their effects from one another. The primary factor is their half-life, that is, the amount of time the drug continues to work in an individual’s body. Halcion is a short-acting benzodiazepine (about 2–4 hr) that helps to promote sleep onset but is no longer active by the middle to end of a sleep period. In sleep laboratory studies, Halcion has been shown to effectively improve nocturnal sleep and to be associated with improved daytime alertness. There have been several scientific studies that showed Halcion to be effective for travelers using it as an aid to improve sleep on trips that involve multiple time-zone changes. Restoril is a medium-acting benzodiazepine (about 8 hr) that helps to maintain sleep throughout a night and is no longer active by the morning awakening. Dalmane is a long-acting benzodiazepine
(about 100 hr) that effectively promotes sleep onset and maintains sleep throughout the night. However, if used over several nights, the long half-life results in an accumulation of the medication in the body that can have effects that carry over to wakefulness. Laboratory studies have shown that after several nights of administration, the build-up of Dalmane metabolites can be associated with increased sleepiness during wakefulness. It should be noted that the specific formulations of these medications can be different overseas. For example, Restoril obtained in the United Kingdom has a half-life of 5–6 hr.

Recently, a new prescription sleep medication, Ambien (a non-benzodiazepine), has been receiving attention as a safe and effective sleep aid. The main message is that the benzodiazepines can be used effectively to help get to sleep and stay asleep. They have different properties that should dictate the appropriate use of the medications for different people in different circumstances. Finally, all of these are prescription medications that should only be used under the care and guidance of a qualified and knowledgeable physician.

Note

The information provided here is intended only to provide examples of sleep disorders and some of the medications used to promote sleep. You should not use this information to diagnose, medicate, or treat yourself. If you have any questions about your health, potential sleep disorders, or medication, see your physician. As indicated, accredited sleep clinics and sleep-disorder specialists are available for evaluation, diagnosis, and treatment for the range of sleep disorders. Seek them out by contacting a local university or community hospital for a referral. The general readings in appendix E suggest other sources of information about sleep, circadian rhythms, and sleep disorders.
Appendix B

Brief Introduction to Relaxation Skills

Flight operations can involve hectic schedules, significant responsibilities, and stressful events. Outside of flight operations, many people's lives also are affected by these factors. Scientific studies have demonstrated that these "life stresses" can affect an individual's physical and mental health. People respond to the perceived demands and challenges of situations differently: some individuals will become physically tense, others will worry, and so on. There are many situations in which pilots need to "unwind" and relax after coming off duty. This is especially important when they are preparing for a layover sleep period. As previously mentioned, alcohol is sometimes used to relax after duty, but it can significantly disrupt the subsequent sleep period (see appendix A). However, there are alternatives to alcohol. Many people use exercise, hobbies, and many other strategies to physically and mentally relax. This section is not intended to cover the full range of those options; entire books have been written on the subjects of stress management and relaxation skills. However, it is intended to briefly introduce some information about relaxation skills that may be useful in your efforts to relax and promote sleep.

Relaxation skills can be powerful techniques for promoting physical and mental relaxation in almost any situation or environment. Many relaxation skills have been scientifically tested and their effectiveness demonstrated in many different areas, from eliminating physical problems (e.g., tension headaches) to decreasing worry and anxiety to promoting good sleep.

There are a wide variety of relaxation skills that are practiced and effectively used by many individuals. Some relaxation techniques are primarily cognitive (i.e., involve focusing the mind, internally repeating phrases, etc.), others are primarily physical (e.g., tensing and relaxing the major muscle groups of the body), though most involve both cognitive and physical components (e.g., after tensing and relaxing a muscle, mentally focusing on the relaxation).

Examples of techniques that are primarily cognitive include meditation, positive imagery, and autogenic training. Meditation is one of the oldest relaxation methods and involves sitting quietly, repeating a phrase (individually chosen), and focusing on deep relaxation. Positive imagery often begins with guided imagery; an individual chooses a specific, relaxing scene and is guided through the pleasant images associated with the experience. Autogenic training involves repeating standard phrases as an individual cognitively focuses on each of the major muscle groups of the body (e.g., "my right hand is heavy and warm").

Examples of techniques that involve more physical action include yoga, deep breathing, and progressive muscle relaxation. Yoga is also a very old method for relaxing the body and mind; it involves a set of standardized movements and a cognitive component. Rather than short breaths primarily involving chest breathing, relaxation through deep breathing uses long, slow breaths that use both the abdomen and chest. During the deep breathing a word or phrase associated with
relaxation is used to focus the mind and facilitate a deeper state of relaxation. Progressive muscle relaxation is a technique that has received much attention and is effectively used in a wide range of applications. It involves the systematic tensing and relaxing of the muscles, starting at the head and neck and moving all the way to the toes. The mind focuses on the difference between the tension and the relaxation associated with the release of the muscle.

It is important to think of these as relaxation skills. As skills, they can be taught, learned, and practiced. Practice is critical! Too often people try to quickly learn some technique and then use it in efforts to relax the next time they are in a highly stressful situation. Usually it does not work and the individual decides that the technique, and relaxation skills in general, are ineffective. Only after a skill has been mastered should it be applied, and even then it should be gradually tested for its effectiveness and usefulness in different situations. Eventually, relaxation skills are most effective when they are practiced on a regular basis and incorporated as a daily activity.

There are many different ways to learn relaxation skills and today many commercially produced resources are available. It is often useful to first read about a technique and a description of the specific skill. An external source (e.g., instructor, book, tape) that guides an individual through a particular technique can be useful in learning the skill and in focusing attention on the relaxation. Eventually, it is important to internalize and memorize the specifics of the skill. Once learned very well, an individual should be able to use his or her favorite, most effective relaxation skills in different situations and environments, without having to rely on an external source to help relax.

Relaxation skills can be a powerful tool to help individuals reduce physical tension, focus and relax the mind, and promote good sleep. If you decide to try some of these new skills, keep an open mind, practice, and enjoy learning to relax.

Note

There are many outrageous and unsubstantiated claims made regarding a wide range of techniques, devices, and approaches to relaxation. Please be wary! Today, many local health care facilities, hospitals, and licensed health care providers (e.g., physicians, psychologists, nurses, social workers) provide classes on relaxation skills or stress management techniques. Do some checking to be sure that reputable (e.g., accredited or licensed) practitioners are providing the services and instruction.

The following references are recommended for further reading on relaxation skills and stress management. This is not an inclusive list of available resources but it does provide some guidance for a starting point. These books should be available at your local community library, college library, or bookstores.
Recommended Readings


Appendix C
NASA Ames Fatigue Countermeasures Program

Relevant NASA Technical Memoranda Operational Summaries from the “Crew Factors in Flight Operations” Series

This appendix comprises the operational summaries of five relevant NASA Technical Memoranda (TMs) from the Fatigue Countermeasures Program.


Crew Factors in Flight Operations II: Psychophysiological Responses to Short-Haul Air Transport Operations


Operational Overview

This report is the second in a series on the physiological and psychological effects of flight operations on flight crews, and on the operational significance of these effects. This overview presents a comprehensive review and interpretation of the major findings. The supporting scientific analyses are described in detail in the rest of the text.

To document the psychophysiological effects of flying commercial short-haul air transport operations, 74 pilots from two airlines were monitored before, during, and after 3-day or 4-day trip patterns. All flights took place on the East Coast of the United States and data were collected throughout the year. Eighty-five percent of the pilots who had been awarded the trips selected for study agreed to participate. The population studied was experienced (average age 41.3 yr, average airline experience 14.6 yr) and averaged 68.6 hr of flying per month in all categories of aviation.

Subjects wore a portable biomedical monitor which recorded core-body temperature, heart rate, and wrist activity every 2 min. They also rated their fatigue and mood every 2 hr while awake, and recorded sleep episodes, naps, showers, exercise, duty times, food and fluid intake, voidings, cigarettes, medications, and medical symptoms in a daily logbook. A background questionnaire was administered which included basic demographic information, sleep and life-style habits, and four personality inventories. A cockpit observer accompanied the crews on the flight deck and kept a detailed log of operational events.

The trips studied were selected to provide information on the upper range of fatigue experienced by pilots in predominantly daytime and evening operations. Common features were early report times and long duty days with multiple flight segments (average 5.5 per day). Daily duty durations averaged 10.6 hr which included, on average, 4.5 hr of flight time. One third of all duty periods studied were longer than 12 hr. The mean rest-period duration, as defined by the pilots in their daily logs, was 12.5 hr. The mean rest-period duration calculated from the last wheels-on of one duty day to the first wheels-off of the next duty day was significantly longer (14.0 hr). Overnight layovers after successive duty days occurred progressively earlier across most trips.

On trip nights, subjects reported taking about 12 min longer to fall asleep, sleeping about 1.2 hr less, and waking about 1.4 hr earlier than on pretrip nights. They also rated their sleep on trips as lighter and poorer overall, and reported significantly more awakenings. In contrast, in the laboratory, sleep restriction results in more rapid sleep onset and more consolidated sleep. The longer sleep latencies and more frequent awakenings reported by pilots on trips may reflect the commonly
reported need to "spin down" after coming off duty and the disruptive effects of sleeping in unfamiliar environments. The fact that sleep during trips was reported not only as shorter but also as more disturbed, suggests that the effects of this sleep restriction on subsequent daytime sleepiness, performance, and mood may be greater than those reported in laboratory studies with similar levels of sleep restriction.

The effects of duty demands on subjective fatigue and mood are most clearly seen in the comparisons of ratings made pretrip, during flight segments, during layovers, and posttrip. During layovers, fatigue and negative affect were rated as highest and positive affect and activation as lowest. Positive affect was rated as highest during flight segments, even though fatigue ratings were higher than for either pretrip or posttrip. Posttrip recovery was indicated by return of fatigue levels to baseline, the lowest negative affect ratings, and the highest levels of activation. Significant time-of-day variations were found in fatigue, negative affect, and activation. Fatigue and negative affect were low in the first three ratings after awakening, and rose thereafter to reach their highest daily values in the final rating before sleep. As expected, activation showed the opposite time-of-day variation. No significant relationships were found between the timing, duration, or flight hours in a duty period and the fatigue and mood during layovers. This may well have been because of the high levels of individual variability in these ratings.

The use of tobacco did not change on trip days relative to pretrip and posttrip days. However, significantly more caffeine and alcohol were consumed on trips. Additional caffeine consumption occurred primarily in the early morning, associated with the earlier wake-up times on trips, and also around the time of the mid-afternoon peak in physiological sleepiness. The urge to fall asleep at this peak time would increase progressively with the accumulating sleep debt across trip days. The alcohol use was within FAR guidelines, however, the use of alcohol to relax before sleep is not recommended. Although alcohol may facilitate falling asleep, it has well-documented disruptive effects on sleep which can adversely affect subsequent waking alertness and performance. There were no significant changes in the use of medications, or in the number of reports of medical symptoms between trip days and pretrip or posttrip days. Similarly, the number of exercise sessions reported was no different on trip days than on pretrip or posttrip days.

The number and timing of meals on trip days was not significantly different from pretrip or posttrip days. However, more snacks were eaten, and they were eaten earlier, on trip days. This suggests that meals on trip days may have been smaller or less filling than meals on pretrip or posttrip days.

Heart rates during takeoff, descent, and landing were compared with values during mid-cruise for 72 pilots during 589 flight segments. Increases in heart rate were greater during descent and landing for the pilot flying. The difference between flying and not flying during descent was greater for first officers than for captains. Heart-rate increases were greater during takeoff and descent under instrument flight conditions than under visual flight conditions. On the basis of similar findings, the number of segments flown per day should be regulated.

A number of ways of reducing fatigue during short-haul air-transport operations are suggested by this study. First, since daily duty durations were more than twice as long as daily flight durations, and since about one third of all duty periods were longer than 12 hr, it would seem reasonable to
limit duty hours in addition to, flight hours in short-haul operations. There may also be some advantage to defining the rest period more precisely, since significant variability is possible within the present system of definition by contract negotiation. Second, the practice of requiring early report times makes it more difficult for pilots to obtain adequate sleep, even during relatively long layovers. This is because circadian rhythms impede falling sleep earlier than usual, except after major sleep loss. Third, in the trips studied, duty began progressively earlier across the days of the trip. Because of the difficulty of falling asleep earlier, this has the effect of progressively shortening the time available for sleep across the days of the trip. In addition, because the innate “physiological day” determined by the circadian system is longer than 24 hr, it adapts more readily to schedule delays than to advances. Thus, where possible, successive duty days should begin progressively later. Fourth, the widespread use of alcohol as a means of relaxing before going to sleep has deleterious effects on subsequent sleep. It thus seems likely that the quality of sleep on trips could be improved in many cases by providing pilots with information on alternative relaxation techniques which have been well-tested in the treatment of sleep disorders.
Crew Factors in Flight Operations: IV. Sleep and Wakefulness in International Aircrews


**Operational Overview**

The major goals of this research were to examine the changes in sleep associated with flights across multiple time zones and, if necessary, to suggest recommendations for improving such sleep. Flight crews were studied during the first layover after long flights crossing seven to nine time zones. The basic findings can be best described in terms of flight direction and discussed with respect to strategies used by crew members to obtain sufficient sleep before operating the return flight home.

**Westward Flights**

There was clear evidence that crew members experienced less sleep difficulties during layovers following westward flights (LHR-SFO, FRA-SFO, SFO-NRT) than after eastward flights. Following the westward flights almost all subjects went to bed soon after arrival. During the first night, sleep appeared to be of generally good quality and not unduly disturbed except for increased wakefulness during the second half of the night. In comparison with baseline, subjects generally fell asleep faster and slept essentially the same amount as at homebase. Some even reported better sleep quality.

During the next day, the increase in alertness usually seen during the late afternoon in local individuals was not observed. Instead, drowsiness continued to increase during the remainder of the wake span. By the second night, there was already some adaptation of sleep to the new time zone as indicated by even fewer awakenings occurring during the early morning hours.

Nevertheless, on the following day, the previous day's pattern of increasing drowsiness was seen in crews who were available for testing. Most crew members successfully attempted to take a preflight nap in preparation for duty that afternoon. The same findings held for the one group of subjects whose layover lasted approximately 25 hr instead of the usual 48 hr. The only major difference was that their preflight nap occurred during the first afternoon after arrival.

The strategy of taking a nap before departure after a westward layover appears important in view of the coming night flight with its prolonged period of wakefulness. Recent research suggests that such a nap will help reduce in-flight drowsiness and avoid potential performance deficits. A second aspect of planning strategies to cope with this flight schedule emphasizes the potential importance of time of the latter part of flight in relation to the crew members' circadian rhythms. Additional results obtained from some crews during the eastward return flight suggest that alertness improves as the circadian rhythms in body temperature and heart rate begin to rise. Therefore, certain schedules may
be more desirable if they facilitate a nap before night and take advantage of the circadian rise in alertness during the latter part of the flight.

Eastward Flights

Sleep patterns were much more variable and fragmented after eastward night flights (NRT-SFO, SFO-LHR, SFO-FRA) than after westward flights across an equivalent number of time zones. There appears to have been a powerful influence which fractionated sleep, probably dependent on the difficulty which individuals experienced in shortening their day. Furthermore, the consequences of sleep pattern fragmentation were reflected in subsequent measures of daytime drowsiness.

Many crew members went to bed as soon as possible after arrival and fell asleep more quickly than observed during baseline but slept a relatively short amount of time even after a long overnight flight. Subjects tended to awake spontaneously at a time corresponding to the late morning of their home time. Overall, this strategy can be beneficial; however, the onset of the next major sleep varied considerably among individuals, with some crew members from each airline delaying sleep until it coincided with their usual bedtime at home. Similar wide-ranging differences were seen in the second night's sleep and intervening sleeps. In spite of a high degree of variability, sleep duration was usually shorter than baseline and subjectively worse.

Given the usual importance attributed by flight crews to obtaining "good" sleep immediately before a flight, these data suggest that their chance of doing so could be substantially improved by adhering to a more structured sleep schedule. In order to optimize sleep during an eastward layover of 24 hr or multiples thereof. It would be important to limit sleep immediately after arrival and prolong the subsequent wakeful period to end around the normal local time for sleep. This process would increase the likelihood that the sleep immediately preceding the next duty period would be of adequate duration for these operations. It appears that proper sleep scheduling during the first 24 hr is most critical and that crew members should develop the discipline to terminate sleep even though they could sleep longer.

Several subjects attempted the strategy of trying to maintain a sleep schedule based on home time. For the schedules under study, this practice would appear to be less desirable since it would produce a substantially shorter sleep span immediately before departure; however, this approach could not be adequately evaluated due to the relatively small number of subjects who used it.

Unless layover sleep is arranged in a satisfactory manner by an appropriate sleep-wake strategy, increased drowsiness is likely to occur during the subsequent long-haul flight. Other research suggests that under acceptable operational circumstances. Limited duration naps can be a helpful strategy to provide refreshment and improve alertness for a useful period of time. Although we do not have the appropriate data to address this issue directly, flight deck napping could be an important strategy if operationally feasible.

Individual Factors

While the subjects as a whole did not exhibit serious sleep problems, certain individual crew members did experience some difficulty. Further investigation of these data is required before any
clarifying statement can be made regarding the factors responsible for this situation. Such work is currently under way.

Age is one individual factor which appears to have been important in this study. Older persons tend to experience more difficulties obtaining undisturbed sleep, and this was seen in the aircrew during baseline and layover recordings. Less restful sleep is a feature of growing older and begins to affect individuals in middle age. Surprisingly little is known about the nature and prevalence of less restful sleep over this important span of life, but the data obtained from these flight crews has highlighted the need for normative data in a similar age group of individuals who are usually involved in highly skilled and responsible occupations. These data are now being collected and may be helpful in understanding why some individuals in this age group have difficulty in adapting to unusual hours of work and rest. This issue may be relevant to the practice of occupational medicine.

Finally, in one group of pilots, preliminary analyses suggest that other individual factors may contribute to the crew member’s response to layover sleep requirements. Although this evidence is currently limited to differences in daytime sleepiness in morning- versus evening-type individuals, it underscores the potential usefulness of factors related to personality and lifestyle as predictors of individual reactions to multiple time zone flights.

Study Limitations

Although these results have direct implications for air carrier operations, they must be viewed within the context of several limitations inherent in the study design. Most important is the fact that relatively uncomplicated trip patterns were studied. All but one of these trips involved an immediate return to the home time zone after the layover. The primary data were obtained from crew members during the first layover stay following an initial outbound flight. One group of subjects provided additional data upon return to homebase.

At present, such trips are not typical of most international flight crew duty schedules, which usually involve multiple flight segments and layovers in different time zones before return home; nevertheless, the trips under examination represent an important type of schedule which is becoming more prevalent.

Although the alterations in sleep were not considered to be of operational significance in the present schedules, it is nevertheless possible that the pattern of disturbed sleep would lead to cumulative sleep loss if the schedule were longer or if complete recovery of sleep were not attained before the next trip. The latter possibility is supported, at least in part, by the observation that baseline sleep was reduced in some subjects, though this may have also been due to other factors such as early rising. Furthermore, all flights occurred during late summer or early fall, which did not permit us to examine seasonal influences, particularly the length of daylight versus darkness, which may also be an important operational factor.

Secondly, the relatively limited sample sizes may not be representative of the flight crew population as a whole. In this regard, it is clear that the groups differed considerably in age and possibly may have differed along other dimensions related to the voluntary nature of their participation. Third, spending a layover at a sleep laboratory may not be equated with staying at a crew hotel.
However, sleep log results from two participating groups of crew members suggest that sleep-wake patterns differ little under these two conditions.

Finally, a potentially more serious problem stems from the difficulty we experienced in obtaining baseline data immediately preceding the trip. Except for one airline, baseline data could only be obtained whenever the volunteers were available following at least three non-flying days. Consequently, these measurements often preceded or followed the trip by a week or more. Thus, any conclusions relating to baseline sleep must be tempered by the realization that the actual sleep obtained during the nights immediately prior to flight might have differed from that measured in the homebase laboratory and may have been confounded by the residual effect of the previous flight schedule, particularly if the preceding trip involved an eastward flight direction.

Regardless of these interpretative issues, the data revealed a high degree of similarity and consistency among the different flight crew samples despite significant differences in culture, age, and airline operational practices. Consequently, it is likely that the overall results apply to a wide spectrum of long-haul crew members and carriers.
Crew Factors in Flight Operations VI: Psychophysiological Responses to Helicopter Operations


Operational Overview

This report is the sixth in a series on the physiological and psychological effects of flight operations on flight crews, and on the operational significance of these effects. This section presents a comprehensive review of the major findings and their significance. The rest of the volume contains the complete scientific description of the work.

Thirty-two helicopter pilots (average age 34 yr) were studied before, during, and after 4- to 5-day trips providing support services from Aberdeen, Scotland, to rigs in the North Sea oil fields. Duty days began and ended in Aberdeen. Half the trips studied took place in winter/spring, and the other half in summer/autumn. Heart rate, rectal temperature, and activity of the nondominant wrist were monitored continuously by means of portable biomedical monitors. Subjects kept daily logs of sleep timing and quality, food and fluid intake, medications taken, and medical symptoms. They also rated their fatigue and mood every 2 hr while awake. For every segment flown, they rated their workload (on a modified Bedford Scale) for each phase of flight, and rated five different environmental factors assumed to influence workload, that is, functioning of the aircraft systems (on a 5-point scale from perfect to useless); and weather conditions for landing, the landing site, letdown aids, and air-traffic control (each on a 5-point scale from very favorable to very unfavorable).

On trip mornings, subjects were required to wake up about 1.5 hr earlier than on pretrip mornings (average on-duty time 0725 local time). Although they came off duty relatively early (average 1437 local time), they averaged only 6.4 hr of sleep during layovers at home that averaged almost 17 hr. The inability to fall asleep earlier than the habitual bedtime is due to properties of the physiological mechanisms controlling sleep. Subjects were thus unable to compensate for the early wake-ups, and therefore averaged about 50 min less sleep per night on trips than on pretrip. In the laboratory, 1 hr per night of sleep restriction has been shown to accumulate and to progressively increase daytime sleepiness. Sleep was rated as better overall posttrip than on trip nights and deeper posttrip than pretrip, as is typical during recovery from sleep loss. Delaying the start of on-duty times (by 1.5–2 hr on average) would be expected to produce a significant improvement in the amount of sleep pilots are able to obtain, and should be given serious consideration.

Pilots reported more fatigue on posttrip days than on pretrip days, suggesting a cumulative effect of duty-related activities and sleep loss. Fatigue and negative affect were higher, and activation lower, by the end of trip days than by the end of pretrip days. The inability to maintain subjective activation by the end of trip days was exacerbated by early on-duty times.
Pilots drank 42% more caffeine on trip days than on pretrip and posttrip days. More caffeine was consumed in the early morning, in association with the early wake-ups, and also around the time of the mid-afternoon peak in physiological sleepiness. The urge to fall asleep at this time would increase as the sleep debt accumulated across trip days.

There were twice as many complaints of headaches on trips as at home. Reports of back pain increased twelvefold, and reports of burning eyes increased fourfold. Helicopter pilots were three times more likely to report headaches, and five times more likely to report back pain than were pilots of fixed-wing aircraft on short-haul commercial flights. The physical environment on the helicopter flight deck was probably an important factor. Studies of the same operations, conducted in parallel, demonstrated that pilots often had skin temperatures outside the range of thermal comfort, and that vibration levels in all of the helicopters studied exceeded the “reduced comfort” boundary defined by the International Standards Organization (I.S.O. 263). The longer pilots remained on duty, the more negative their mood became. This situation could be improved with better seat design, including better isolation of the seat from floor vibration, and better flight-deck ventilation.

The predominant environmental factors affecting subjective workload assessments were different for different phases of flight. The quality of the aircraft systems (rated on a 5-point scale from perfect to useless) had a significant effect during preflight, taxi, climb, and cruise. Paying particular attention to aircraft maintenance, thereby minimizing failures, might be one way of reducing workload during these phases of flight. Landing weather was the major factor influencing workload ratings during descent and approach. However, the effect of adverse weather on workload was reduced with better landing sites and better letdown aids. The quality of the landing site and air-traffic control had a significant effect on workload ratings during landing. These findings confirm that improvements in landing sites, letdown aids, and air-traffic control can reduce subjective workload during descent, approach, and landing.
Crew Factors in Flight Operations VIII: Factors Influencing Sleep Timing and Subjective Sleep Quality in Commercial Long-Haul Flight Crews


Operational Overview

This report is the eighth in a series on physiological and psychological effects of flight operations on flight crews, and the operational significance of these effects. The Operational Overview is a comprehensive review of the major findings and their significance. The rest of this volume contains the complete scientific description of the work. The aim of this study was to document how flight crews organize their sleep during a variety of international trip patterns, and to elucidate how duty requirements, local time, and the circadian system (measured by the rhythm of body temperature) influence the choice of sleep times, sleep duration, and subjectively rated sleep quality. Duty requirements and local time can be viewed as environmental constraints on the time available for sleep, while the circadian system is a major physiological modulator of sleep quality and duration.

Self-reports of sleep (and nap) timing and sleep quality, and continuous records of rectal temperature were collected from 29 male flight crew members (average age 52 yr) during scheduled B-747 commercial long-haul operations. Data from four different trip patterns were combined.

Sleep/wake patterns on these trips were complex. On average, duty periods lasted about 10.3 hr and were followed by layovers of about 24.8 hr during which there were typically two subject-defined sleep episodes. The average pattern of sleep and wakefulness (disregarding naps) was 19 hr wake/5.7 hr sleep/7.4 hr wake/5.8 hr sleep. The average durations of the first- and second-sleep episodes in a layover were not significantly longer episodes of wakefulness. However, first-sleeps were rated as being of better quality, with less difficulty falling asleep and deeper sleep. Sleep-quality ratings improved as sleep duration increased, reinforcing the importance of allowing adequate time for sleep.

The circadian system appeared to have a greater influence on the timing and duration of first-sleep episodes than on second-sleep episodes in the layover, except when that level of accumulated sleep debt was high, e.g., after eastward flights crossing five or more time zones. In such cases, crew members typically went to sleep sooner after arriving at the layover destination, during the local afternoon, and woke up either about 2 hr later (if they reported a nap) or 3 hr later (if they reported a sleep episode). Otherwise, crew members tended to delay going to sleep until the local night and/or until the hours preceding the temperature minimum.
The timing of second-sleep onsets seemed to be related primarily to the amount of sleep already obtained in the layover and generally coincided with local night. The duration of second-sleeps was strongly influenced by the amount of time remaining in the layover. For both first- and second-sleeps, the circadian time of sleep onset was also a significant predictor of sleep duration. Longer sleep episodes began earlier with respect to the minimum of the circadian temperature cycle.

In summary, the relative importance of duty requirements, local time, and the circadian system in determining sleep timing and quality was different for first- and second-sleep episodes in a layover and was related to specific flight schedules. Nevertheless, there were clearly preferred times for sleep within the layover, determined by the circadian modulation of sleep propensity and the factors driving the preference to sleep during the local night (noise, light, meal availability, etc.).

Flight and duty-time regulations can be interpreted as a means of ensuring that reasonable minimum rest periods are respected. There has been a tendency on the part of regulatory authorities to view the entire time off duty as being time available for sleep, despite anecdotal evidence that the ease of falling asleep and the ability to remain asleep were not constant throughout the layover. This study clearly documents that in scheduled commercial long-haul operations, there are physiologically and environmentally determined preferred sleep times within a layover, i.e., the time available for sleep is less than the time off duty.

Evidence from this and other studies suggests that the timing and duration of the second-sleep episode in a layover is strongly linked to the amount of sleep already obtained in the layover. Particularly when the first-sleep is short, as is typical after eastward flights crossing five or more time zones, it is essential that the layover be long enough to permit an adequate second-sleep episode appropriately timed with respect to the temperature cycle and local time. The duration of any specific layover should be determined with regard to the local arrival time, and the sequence of flights preceding it in the trip pattern, which influences both the cumulative sleep loss and the phase of the circadian system.

Based on polygraphic studies of flight crew sleep after a single eastward flight crossing eight or nine time zones, Graeber et al. recommended that crew members should limit sleep immediately after arrival and prolong the subsequent wake period to end around the normal local time for sleep. This is intended to improve the quality of the subsequent sleep episode, in keeping with the anecdotal report that flight crews consider it important to have a good sleep immediately before a flight. Their study looked only at sleep during the first (24 hr) layover of a trip sequence. The present study suggests that the recommended strategy may not be optimal after eastward flights later in the sequence, when crew members may have already accumulated an important sleep debt, and when the position of their circadian timing system would be much less predictable.

Naps were also reported, both during the layovers and on the flight deck. Naps that represented the first-sleep episode in a layover were significantly longer (average duration 2.0 hr) than subsequent naps in the layover or flight-deck naps, and followed significantly longer episodes of wakefulness (14.7 versus 5.9 and 9.3 hr, respectively). Such first naps were not very common and were associated with the acute sleep debt imposed by overnight eastward flights crossing five or more time zones (67%) or the prolonged wakefulness associated with westward flights crossing five or more time zones (25%). Naps later in the layover tended to occur just before the next duty period.
and, since they reduce the duration of continuous wakefulness before the next flight, may be useful as a strategy for reducing cumulative sleep loss.

On the flight deck, crew members were observed to be napping at least 11% of the available time. The average duration of these naps was 46 min (range 10–130 min). Recent work from our group suggests that a preplanned 40-min time interval for napping on the flight deck can reduce subsequent reaction times and the number of EEG/EOG microevents during long international flights. The optimal duration of such naps is an active research issue.

This study has significantly enhanced our understanding of how the circadian system functions in this complex operational environment. The flight schedules of the trips studied forced the sleep/wake cycle to adopt a period different from that of the underlying circadian pacemaker, although the influence of the circadian system was still seen in the selection of sleep times and in sleep durations, i.e., the two systems were not completely uncoupled. However, when the accumulated sleep debt was high, the circadian rhythm in sleep propensity could be overridden, and crew members could fall asleep at unusual times in their temperature cycles. The circadian system, in turn, effectively uncoupled from the very complex patterns of environmental synchronizing stimuli experienced by crews.

There are known to be differences between individuals in (1) the periods of their circadian pacemakers, (2) their sensitivity to environmental synchronizers, and (3) their self-selected patterns of exposure to social and sunlight cues in each time zone. At least some of these factors may be associated with certain personality profiles and probably all are age-dependent. An analysis of questionnaire data from 205 of the flight crew members in our data bases concurs with other studies suggesting that the period of the circadian pacemaker shortens with age. Age-related changes in sleep are also well documented, including shorter, less efficient nocturnal sleep and increased physiological sleepiness during the day.

The timing and quality of sleep obtained by flight crews is the product of a subtle and dynamic interplay between all of these factors and cannot be captured by any simple predictive algorithm. Based on the insights gained in this and other studies, we see two particularly promising approaches to improving en route sleep for flight crews during international commercial trip patterns. The first is education, providing crew members with basic information about sleep and the functioning of the circadian system, and how their behavior can modify both. Second, expert system technology should be used to combine our understanding of the underlying physiological systems with operational knowledge acquired from flight crew members and schedulers to develop a computerized intelligent scheduling assistant.
Crew Factors in Flight Operations IX: Effects of Planned Cockpit Rest on Crew Performance and Alertness in Long-Haul Operations


Operational Overview

This report is the ninth in a series on physiological and psychological effects of flight operations on flight crews, and on the operational significance of these effects.

Long-haul flight operations often involve rapid multiple time-zone changes, sleep disturbances, circadian disruptions, and long, irregular work schedules. These factors can result in fatigue, cumulative sleep loss, decreased alertness, and decreased performance in long-haul flight crews. Thus, operational effectiveness and safety may be compromised because of pilot fatigue. One natural compensatory response to the sleepiness and fatigue experienced in long-haul operations is unplanned, spontaneous napping and nonsanctioned rest periods. That these activities occur is supported by anecdotal, observational, and subjective report data from a variety of sources. In response to this information and to concerns for maintaining flight safety, it was suggested that a planned cockpit rest period could provide a “safety valve” for the fatigue and sleepiness experienced in long-haul flying. The cockpit rest period would allow a planned opportunity to sleep, with the primary goal being to improve subsequent levels of performance and alertness, especially during critical phases of operation such as descent and landing.

This study was co-sponsored and sanctioned by the FAA and involved the voluntary participation of two commercial airlines. The primary goal was to determine the effectiveness of a planned cockpit rest period to improve performance and alertness in nonaugmented, three-person long-haul flight operations. Twenty-one volunteer pilots participated and were randomly assigned to either a rest group (N = 12) or a no-rest group (N = 9) condition. The rest group (RG) was allowed a planned 40-min rest period during the low-workload, cruise portion of flight over water. Pilots rested one at a time, on a prearranged rotation, with two crew members maintaining the flight at all times. The no-rest group (NRG) had a 40-min planned control period identified during cruise but maintained their usual flight activities during this time. The four consecutive middle legs of a regularly scheduled transpacific trip, part of a 12-day trip pattern, were studied. Two legs were westbound day flights and two legs were eastbound night flights, with generally comparable flight and duty times.

Specific procedural and safety guidelines were successfully implemented in this initial study. However, not all of these would be necessary for a general implementation of planned cockpit rest periods in long-haul flight operations: (1) it was crucial that the rest period was planned, with first choice of rest period going to the landing pilot; (2) the rest periods were scheduled during a low-workload phase of flight and ended 1 hr before descent; (3) only one crew member was scheduled to
rest at a time with a clear planned rotation established; (4) the rest opportunity was divided into an initial preparation period (3 min), followed by the 40-min rest period, followed by a recovery period (20 min) (these times might be altered to reduce the overall length of the period); (5) the rest was terminated at a preset time by a researcher, and the resting pilot was fully briefed before reentering the operational loop; and (6) it was established that the captain would be notified immediately at the first indication of any potential anomaly. The safe and normal operation of the aircraft was given the highest priority and, therefore, no cockpit rest procedure or activity was allowed to interfere with this.

Several measures were used to examine the physiological, behavioral, performance, and subjective effects of the planned cockpit nap. Continuous ambulatory recordings of brain wave and eye movement activity were conducted to determine physiologically how much sleep was obtained during the rest period, as well as the time taken to fall asleep and the stages of sleep. (These recordings allowed differentiation of non-rapid-eye-movement (NREM) sleep and its stages and rapid-eye-movement (REM) sleep). A reaction-time/sustained-attention task (psychomotor vigilance task) was used to assess performance capability. A wrist activity monitor was worn continuously before, during, and after the trip schedule. This activity monitor provided information regarding the pilots' 24-hr rest/activity pattern and was used to examine layover sleep episodes. Subjective measures collected in the study included in-flight fatigue and alertness ratings, a daily log for noting sleep periods, meals, exercise, flight and duty periods, etc., and the NASA Background Questionnaire.

The physiological data showed that on 93% of the rest period opportunities the RG pilots were able to sleep. Generally, they fell asleep quickly (average = 5.6 min) and slept for an average of 26 min. There were six factors related to sleep quantity and quality that were analyzed: total sleep time, sleep efficiency, sleep latency, percent NREM stage 1 sleep, percent NREM stage 2 sleep, and percent NREM slow wave sleep. Each of these factors was examined for effects related to trip leg, halves of the trip, day versus night, and flight position (captain, first officer, second officer). There were two significant effects that emerged from these analyses. The day flights had significantly more light sleep than night flights, and the night flights had significantly more deep sleep than day flights. An interesting finding emerged from analysis of the physiological data collected during the NRG 40-min control period. Although instructed to continue usual flight activities, four NRG pilots fell asleep (a total of five episodes) for periods lasting from several minutes to over 10 min.

There were generally consistent findings for the variety of analytical approaches used to examine the performance data. The median sustained attention/reaction time (a performance measure) for the NRG showed a greater range of average responses across flight legs and during in-flight trials than seen in the RG. After leg 1, the pilots in the NRG showed a steady increase in median reaction time across flight legs, with significant differences by the middle and end of flights. The RG pilots maintained a generally consistent level of performance both across and within flight legs, and did not show significant increases in reaction time. There were a total of 283 lapses (i.e., a response delay > 0.5 sec) for all 21 pilots (both groups combined). For in-flight trials, the NRG (with fewer subjects) had a total of 124 lapses, whereas the RG had a total of 81. There was an increase in lapses during in-flight trials 2 and 3 (after the test period) for the NRG, though this increase did not occur during in-flight trials following the nap in the RG. Both groups had more lapses before top of descent (TOD) on night-flight leg 4 than on night leg 2. However, the number of lapses in the NRG
pilots increased twice as much as in the RG pilots. Vigilance decrement functions also revealed that on night flights the NRG pilots had a level of performance that was significantly decreased relative to the RG pilots. Generally, the performance task demonstrated decrements across flight legs and within flights for the NRG, whereas the RG maintained consistent levels of performance. These findings suggest that the planned nap prevented deterioration of vigilance performance.

Changes in brain wave and eye movement activity can reflect the subtle ways that physiological alertness/sleepiness changes. An intensive critical phase analysis was conducted to examine the effects of the cockpit nap on subsequent physiological alertness. The period from 1 hr before TOD through descent and landing was analyzed for the occurrence of brain and eye movement microevents indicative of reduced physiological alertness. During approximately the last 90 min of flight, each event greater than 5-sec duration was scored for both the NRG and RG. There was at least one such microevent identified in 78% of the NRG and 50% of the RG. Overall, there were a total of 120 microevents that occurred in the NRG (with fewer subjects) and a total of 34 microevents in the RG. The NRG averaged significantly more total microevents (6.37) than the average in the RG (2.90). This supports the conclusion that the sleep obtained during the rest period was followed by increased physiological alertness in the RG relative to the NRG.

The 24-hr rest/activity patterns, in combination with the subjective logs, demonstrated that 86% of the 21 subjects accumulated a sleep debt that ranged from 4 to 22 hr and averaged approximately 9 hr by the ninth day of the duty cycle. When the entire 36-hr duty period (layover and subsequent duty cycle) is considered, the percent of layover sleep time is 28%. This is less than the average 33% sleep time spent off-duty at home, hence the cumulative sleep debt. One subject gained sleep, and two others had no change. Further analysis demonstrated that the cockpit nap did not significantly alter the cumulative sleep debt observed in the RG. Also, 77% of the layovers involved more than one sleep episode. Generally, there were two sleep episodes, and if the first one was long, then the second one was short or did not occur. Conversely, if the first sleep episode was short, then there was almost always a second one that was long. This result demonstrated that there were multiple factors operating to control sleep timing and quantity (e.g., local time, home circadian time, prior sleep loss). This study was not designed to examine the issue of layover sleep periods, though recently, the timing of layover sleep periods, including naps, in long-haul flight operations, has been addressed.

Overall, the analysis of the subjective alertness ratings demonstrated that pilots reported lower alertness on night flights than on day flights and after the rest/control period than before it (except on leg 1). The results indicated that the nap did not affect the subjective ratings of alertness, though the objective measures clearly indicated better performance and greater alertness in the RG.

The level of physiological sleepiness experienced in long-haul flight operations was demonstrated in both subject groups. The speed of falling asleep has been used as a measure of physiological sleepiness (i.e., the more sleepy an individual, the faster he or she will fall asleep). The speed of falling asleep in the RG (5.6 min) is comparable to that seen in moderately sleep deprived individuals. A diagnostic guide for excessive sleepiness in sleep disorder patients is a sleep latency of 5 min or less. Also, there were five episodes of sleep that occurred during the control period in four NRG pilots who had been instructed to continue usual flight operations. This result reinforces previous findings that pilots are poor evaluators of their level of physiological sleepiness.
Overall, the study results provide support for differentiating fatigue countermeasures into two basic approaches. Conceptually and operationally, methods to minimize or mitigate the effects of sleep loss, circadian disruption, and fatigue in flight operations can be divided into (1) preventive strategies and (2) operational countermeasures. Preventive strategies involve those approaches that result in more long-term adjustments and effects on underlying physiological sleep and circadian processes (e.g., possibilities for further research include shifting the circadian phase before multiple time-zone changes, using bright lights or exercise to rapidly readjust the circadian clock, and maximizing the quantity and quality of sleep). These preventive strategies affect underlying physiological sleep need, sleepiness, and circadian phase in a long-term and chronic fashion. Operational countermeasures are focused strategies for reducing sleepiness and improving performance and alertness during actual operations (e.g., proved strategies include judicious use of caffeine, increased physical activity, and increased interaction). These short-acting countermeasures are not intended to reduce underlying physiological sleepiness or a sleep debt, but rather to increase performance and alertness during operational tasks. One acute, short-acting operational countermeasure that can temporarily reduce physiological sleepiness is napping. The planned cockpit nap in this study is considered to be an operational countermeasure that provided an acute, short-acting improvement in performance and alertness.

It must be acknowledged that every scientific study has specific limitations that restrict the generalizability of the results. This study involved only one trip pattern on a commercial airline carrier. The study was conducted on transpacific flights to utilize the opportunity of scheduling the planned rest periods during the low-workload portion of cruise over water. The intense physiological and performance data collection occurred during a specific and restricted middle segment (four consecutive flight legs) of the trip schedule. Therefore, the initial home-to-flight-schedule transition is quantified only with log book and activity data. Also, the highest levels of accumulated fatigue, which probably occurred during the final trip legs, were not studied except for log book and activity data. This study involved B-747 aircraft flown by three-person crews; the specific application of this countermeasure to the two-person cockpit was not addressed. There were two NASA researchers on the flight deck during the in-flight data collection periods. Although they were instructed to minimize their interactions and presence, there is no question that having two extra individuals on the flight deck may have potentially altered the regular flow of cockpit conversation and interaction. It is important to remain cognizant of these limitations when attempts are made to generalize the study results to questions that extend beyond the scope of the specific scientific issues addressed here.

In conclusion, the RG pilots were able to sleep during the planned cockpit rest period, generally falling asleep quickly and sleeping efficiently. This nap was associated with improved performance and physiological alertness in the RG compared to the NRG. The benefits of the nap were observed through the critical descent and landing phases of flight. The convergence of the behavioral performance data and the physiological data to demonstrate the effectiveness of the cockpit nap lends support to the robustness of the findings. The nap did not affect layover sleep or the overall cumulative sleep debt displayed by the most of the crew members. The nap procedures were implemented with minimal disruption to usual flight operations, and there were no reported or identified concerns regarding safety.
The planned nap appeared to provide an effective, acute relief for the fatigue and sleepiness experienced in nonaugmented three-person long-haul flight operations. The strength of the current results supports the implementation of planned cockpit sleep opportunities in nonaugmented long-haul flight operations involving three-person crews. If planned cockpit sleep opportunities were sanctioned, each airline could determine the appropriate incorporation of procedures into its specific mode of operation. If implemented, we recommend that a joint NASA/FAA follow-up study be conducted within 6–12 months to examine how planned cockpit sleep opportunities have been incorporated into airline procedures. That study would examine how the procedures were implemented and their effectiveness. This might take the form of a survey or include some field data collection. The results of that follow-up study might then lend support for further refinement of procedures and future implementation in other flight environments.
Appendix D

NASA Ames Fatigue Countermeasures Group

Representative Publications


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Appendix E
Cited Literature and General Readings

Cited Literature

General Readings
Regional operations encompass a broad range of pilots and equipment. This module is intended to help all those involved in regional aviation, including pilots, schedulers, dispatchers, maintenance technicians, policy makers, and others, to understand the physiological factors underlying fatigue, how flight operations affect fatigue, and what can be done to counteract fatigue and maximize alertness and performance in their operations.

The overall purpose of this module is to promote aviation safety, performance, and productivity. It is intended to meet three specific objectives: (1) to explain the current state of knowledge about the physiological mechanisms underlying fatigue; (2) to demonstrate how this knowledge can be applied to improving flight crew sleep, performance, and alertness; and (3) to offer strategies for alertness management. Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) and National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reports are used throughout this module to demonstrate that fatigue is a safety issue in the regional operations community.

The appendixes at the end of this module include the ASRS reports used for the examples contained in this publication, brief introductions to sleep disorders and relaxation techniques, summaries of relevant NASA publications, and a list of general readings on sleep, sleep disorders, and circadian rhythms.