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# ADGS-2100 Adaptive Display and Guidance System Window Manager Analysis

*Mike W. Whalen, John D. Innis, Steven P. Miller, and Lucas G. Wagner  
Rockwell Collins, Inc., Cedar Rapids, Iowa*

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# **ADGS-2100 Adaptive Display & Guidance System**

## **Window Manager Analysis**

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### **Abstract**

Recent advances in modeling languages have made it feasible to formally specify and analyze the behavior of large system components. Synchronous data flow languages, such as Lustre, SCR, and RSML<sup>c</sup> are particularly well suited to this task, and commercial versions of these tools such as SCADE and Simulink are growing in popularity among designers of safety critical systems, largely due to their ability to automatically generate code from the models. At the same time, advances in formal analysis tools have made it practical to formally verify important properties of these models to ensure that design defects are identified and corrected early in the lifecycle. This report describes how these tools have been applied to the ADGS-2100 Adaptive Display and Guidance Window Manager being developed by Rockwell Collins Inc. The Window Manager acts as “switchboard” between display applications and physical displays. It is also responsible for ensuring that critical information is displayed to pilots even in the presence of application and hardware failures.

In this effort, the majority of the functional behavior of the window manager, with over 16,000 primitive Simulink blocks organized into over 4,000 subsystem instances, was verified against the high-level requirements expressed as 563 temporal logic properties. As a result, 98 errors in the high-level requirements and Simulink models were found and corrected. This work demonstrates how formal methods can be easily and cost-efficiently used to remove defects early in the design cycle.



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# 1. Introduction

Recent advances in modeling languages have made it feasible to formally specify and analyze the behavior of large system components. Synchronous data flow languages, such as Esterel [2], Lustre [3], [16], SCR [18], and RSML<sup>e</sup> [36] are particularly well suited to this task, and commercial versions of these tools such as SCADE [12] and Simulink [10] are growing in popularity among designers of safety critical systems, largely due to their ability to automatically generate code from the models. At the same time, advances in formal analysis tools have made it practical to formally verify important properties of these models to ensure that design defects are identified and corrected early in the lifecycle [4], [5], [6], [20], [34], [35].

Rockwell Collins is currently designing heads-down and heads-up displays and display management software for next-generation commercial aircraft. An important part of this system is ensuring that data from different displays applications is routed to the correct display, and that critical applications are displayed even in the event of display or computing resource failures. The *Window Manager* (WM) is responsible for this “switchboard” functionality, routing applications to displays in a flexible way and handling reversion in the case of component failures.

In this report, we describe what we believe is the first successful integration of formal analysis into the design cycle of a large-scale critical commercial avionics software application. This effort analyzed the majority of the WM application to a very high degree of rigor and completeness. The only portions of the WM application that were excluded were those that were considered of lower criticality and those that dealt with the hardware-software interface. Our success was predicated on understanding the needs and development processes of the systems and software engineers who were building the WM application. To meet these needs, we had to solve several challenges, including:

- Determining how to map software requirements into formal properties
- Creating translators that would allow commercial modeling tools (such as Simulink [10], [22]) to be quickly and automatically analyzed by different formal analysis tools
- Creating tools that allow analysis results (counterexamples) to be easily understood by the analysts and product engineers
- Defining methods for partitioning the application of interest into *subsystems* that can be analyzed individually
- Creating a verification process to ensure that: 1) the analysis results are sound, 2) all formal properties are traceable to software requirements, and 3) all requirements of interest are verified through one or more formal properties
- Iterating our verification process with the goal of faster turn-around between development and analysis to create a more efficient and higher quality process.

This report is a summary of how the challenges were met and overcome in the course of analyzing the WM application.

The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background information, including an brief overview of a simplified WM and descriptions of the modeling and analysis tools used in the project. Section 2.3 describes how the models are translated into the analysis tools for verification. Section 3 describes the process that was used to perform the analysis. Section 4 discusses how these techniques were applied to the WM and our analysis results. Finally, Section 5 provides concluding remarks and directions for further work.

## 2. Background

This section provides general background information, including a brief overview of a simplified Window Manager and descriptions of the modeling and verification tools used in the project.

### 2.1. Overview of the Window Manager Application

In a modern aircraft, the primary way that aircraft status information is displayed to pilots is through computerized display panels, such as the ones shown in Figure 1. These display panels are designed to replace the dozens of mechanical switches and dials found in earlier aircraft and to present a unified and straightforward interface to critical flight information. The display panels are configurable so as to allow pilots to toggle between several different kinds of information, including navigational maps, aircraft system status, flight checklists, etc. However, some information is considered critically important and should always be displayed.



Figure 1: Example Pilot Display Panels

A simplified architecture for such a system is presented in Figure 2. In this figure, two displays provide information to the pilot and copilot. These displays are connected to two redundant computing resources via a high-availability bus. Each computing resource contains several display applications and a display window manager, and is capable of managing both displays. Each display has a “preferred” computing resource that it uses if both resources are available. The user can interact with the displays through the use of a keypad and a trackball (not shown in the architectural figure). The trackball controls a cursor that is visible on the displays. The cursor can move between displays in response to a few different user actions




Figure 2: Simplified Displays Architecture

The Window Manager (WM) determines which applications should be displayed and the location of the cursor on the displays. It also has several responsibilities related to routing information to the displays. First, the WM must update which applications are being displayed in response to user selections of display applications. Second, the WM must handle reversion in case of hardware or application failures. If a display fails, the WM decides which information is most critical and moves this information to the remaining display. Another responsibility has to do with cursor management: some display applications support the cursor while others do not. It is the responsibility of the WM to ensure that the cursor does not appear on a display that contains an application that does not support the cursor. In the event of reversion, the WM must ensure that the cursor is not tasked to a dead display.

The WM is essential to the safe flight of an airplane. If a WM contains logic errors, it is possible that critical flight information will be unavailable to the flight crew.

The basic functionality of the WM application is similar to this example. However, the real WM application is much more complex and involves more displays, more computing resources, more architectural layers, more redundancy, and some additional functions that are not found in this example.

## **2.2. Modeling and Verification Tools**

This section provides an overview of the modeling and verification tools used in the verification of the WM system. The WM was modeled in Simulink® and analyzed using the NuSMV model checker. Reactis® was used in conjunction with software developed by Rockwell Collins Inc (RCI) and the University of Minnesota to translate the Simulink models into NuSMV. The PVS and SAL tools from SRI International were also investigated as possible analysis tools.

### **2.2.1. Simulink**

Simulink® [10] [22], sold by The Mathworks, is a popular platform for the modeling and simulation of dynamic systems. It provides an interactive graphical environment and a customizable set of block libraries that can be used to design, simulate, debug, implement, and test reactive systems. Users assemble a system specification by dragging and dropping blocks onto a pallet and connecting the outputs of one block to the inputs of another block. Blocks can be composed hierarchically from simpler blocks, allowing designers to organize complex system designs. New blocks can be defined by the developer and added to a reusable library. Blocks can also be parameterized. Control logic for representing system states and state transitions can be modeled with the integrated StateFlow® add-on. Simulink and StateFlow are both integrated with the MATLAB® environment, also marketed by The Mathworks, providing access to several additional tools for algorithm development, data analysis, data visualization, and numerical computation. Executable code can be generated from a Simulink model using the Real-Time Workshop® add-on. An advantage of Simulink is that it can be simulated with fixed or variable-step solvers, allowing both the control system and the plant model (for example, the airframe) to be modeled within the same framework.

### **2.2.2. SCADE**

SCADE [12] is an environment for the development of safety-critical systems similar to Simulink. Originally developed for the design of aircraft systems, similar but separate versions are now marketed by Esterel Technologies for the automotive industry (SCADE Drive™) and the avionics industry (SCADE Suite™). SCADE also provides an interactive graphical environment that allows users to assemble system specifications by dragging and dropping blocks onto a pallet and connecting the outputs of one block to the inputs of another. Control logic for representing system states and state transitions can be modeled with the integrated Safe State Machine© (SSM) add-on. Since the SCADE tools were explicitly created for the development of safety-critical software and hardware, SCADE supports only fixed step simulation. For the same reason, the features and blocks supported by SCADE and SSM are restricted to those with an unambiguous mathematical

representation. An advantage of SCADE is that its models are translated into the Lustre language, a synchronous data flow language with a precise formal semantics. C source code can be generated from SCADE using the KCG™ code generator which has been qualified as a Level A software development tool in accordance with DO178B. The SCADE Suite also includes a gateway that can import Simulink models and a model checker called Design Verifier.

### **2.2.3. Reactis**

Reactis [29] is an automated test-generation and property verification tool for Simulink/StateFlow models developed by Reactive Systems, Inc. It uses random and heuristic search to try to exercise the behavior of models up to a defined level of structural coverage. Reactis supports several different coverage metrics including state, condition, branch, boundary, and MC/DC-level coverage [7]. The result of the search process is a suite of tests which can be used both for structural testing and validation of the model.

Reactis allows properties to be specified either using a proprietary Reactis textual notation or as additional StateFlow machines, and will check whether all tests within a test suite satisfy the properties of interest. Because Reactis uses random, rather than exhaustive, search, it can be used to generate tests and attempt to verify properties of very large models that cannot be analyzed by exhaustive search tools such as model checkers. On the other hand, it is not guaranteed that Reactis will generate all tests necessary to reach a level of structural coverage. Furthermore, the generated tests are insufficient to prove that a given property always holds of a model.

### **2.2.4. NuSMV**

NuSMV [19] is a symbolic model checker developed as a joint project between the Formal Methods group in the Automated Reasoning System Division at the Instituto Trintino di Cultura (ITC) - Center for Scientific and Technological Research (IRST), the Mechanized Reasoning Groups at the University of Genova and the University of Trento in Italy, and the Model Checking group at Carnegie Mellon University in the United States. NuSMV is a re-implementation and extension of SMV, the first model checker based on Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs). NuSMV has been designed to be an open architecture for model checking that can be reliably used for the verification of industrial designs, as a core for custom verification tools, as a test bed for formal verification techniques, and applied to other research areas. Properties to be verified in NuSMV are specified using either Computation Tree Logic (CTL) or Linear Time logic (LTL).

The advantage of using a model checker such as NuSMV is that it will check all possible combinations of inputs and state to determine if a property is true. We have used the NuSMV model checker to verify properties of models with over  $10^{120}$  reachable states.

### **2.2.5. PVS**

PVS [31] is a theorem prover that has been developed at SRI International's Computer Science Laboratory. In comparison to other widely used verification systems such as HOL and ACL2, the distinguishing characteristic of PVS is that it supports a highly expressive specification language with an interactive theorem prover in which most of the


lower-level proof steps are automated. The system consists of a specification language, a parser, a type checker, and an interactive proof checker. The PVS specification language is based on higher-order logic with a richly expressive type system so that a number of semantic errors in a specification can be caught during type checking. The PVS prover consists of a powerful collection of inference steps that can be used to reduce a proof goal to simpler subgoals that can be discharged automatically by the primitive proof steps of the prover. The primitive proof steps involve, among other things, the use of arithmetic and equality decision procedures, automatic rewriting, and BDD-based Boolean simplification.

#### **2.2.6. SAL**

SAL (Symbolic Analysis Laboratory) [32] is a framework for combining different tools to analyze sequential and concurrent systems. The heart of SAL is a language, developed in collaboration with Stanford, Berkeley, and Verimag, for specifying concurrent systems in a compositional way. The SAL framework contains tools for abstraction, invariant generation, program analysis (such as slicing), theorem proving, and model checking. These tools can be used to separate different analysis concerns and calculate properties (i.e., perform symbolic analysis) of sequential and concurrent systems. SAL includes an explicit-state model checker, a BDD-based symbolic model checker, a SAT-based bounded model checker, and a SAT-based infinite bounded model checker which can symbolically analyze systems containing real numbers. SAL can also be used as an interface to the PVS theorem prover.

### **2.3. Translation of Simulink into Analysis Tools**

The translation of Simulink models into NuSMV or other analysis tools requires several steps. However, these are automated and normally completed without great difficulty. The translation process is illustrated in Figure 3.



**Figure 3 – Translator Framework**

Models are first created using MATLAB Simulink and/or StateFlow. These models then are translated into the Lustre formal specification language using one of two tool chains. In our original tool chain, Simulink/StateFlow models were imported into the SCADA Suite using the Simulink Gateway provided by Esterel Technologies. SCADA Suite is then used to translate the models into Lustre. In a recent update to our tool chain, the Simulink/StateFlow models are imported into Reactis and a Lustre file is generated using a translator developed by Rockwell Collins and the University of Minnesota (hereafter RCI-UMN).<sup>1</sup> From Lustre, the models are translated into NuSMV, PVS, or SAL using translators developed by RCI-UMN. The Lustre models can also be imported into Design Verifier, a model checker available in SCADA Suite.

The RCI-UMN translators produce highly optimized models most appropriate for the target language. For example, when translating to NuSMV, the translator produces a specification that is difficult for a human to read, but very efficient for proving properties. When translating to PVS, the resulting specification is optimized for readability and to support the development of proofs in PVS.

Since the WM model consists primarily of Boolean and enumerated types, it is very efficient to verify properties about the mode logic using a BDD-based model checker such as NuSMV. NuSMV, SAL, PVS, and Design Verifier were also investigated and found to be acceptable alternatives. However, due to the speed and ease of use of NuSMV, the bulk of the WM verification was done using it. A more detailed comparison of the pros and cons of verification using NuSMV and PVS can be found in [25].

<sup>1</sup> For analysis of the DWM, the Reactis tool chain was preferred as Esterel Technologies Simulink Gateway did not yet support release R14 of Simulink, introducing an additional step to convert Simulink R14 models into R13 when using the Simulink Gateway.

### 3. Analyzing a Large Software Model

The WM is a large application and analyzing the complete model is beyond the capability of current automated tools, even with the optimized translation tools described in Section 2.3. Therefore, we adopted several techniques to partition the model into analyzable subsystems, and use additional manual reasoning to ensure that the subsystem-level reasoning ensures that the system as a whole maintains critical safety properties. This section describes how this partitioning occurs and what steps are taken to ensure that the resulting analysis is sound. An overview of this process is shown in Figure 4.




Figure 4: Overview of Analysis Process

In Figure 4, the circles correspond to processes and the document icons correspond to the artifacts generated by these processes. The *create analysis subsystems* step splits the model into different subsystems and assigns a set of system requirements that will be analyzed on the subsystem. After the subsystems have been created, then the *analyze subsystem* step is performed on each of the subsystems. The result of the analysis process may require changes to the subsystem under analysis, to another subsystem, or to the system level requirements or environmental assumptions.

Although not shown in Figure 4, the whole process is iterative as the system evolves. We believe that significant benefits can be achieved by analyzing early iterations of systems, even when both requirements and models are incomplete. As the system evolves, the analysis subsystem boundaries may be re-drawn and additional properties are added.

### 3.1. Formal Model of a Toy Window Manager

To illustrate the different steps in the analysis of the WM application without introducing the complexity of the full WM, we have created a toy WM Simulink model that implements some of the requirements described in Section 2.1. To protect proprietary Rockwell Collins data, this example is purposely different from the real WM application, but is sufficiently representative to illustrate many of the concepts and procedures necessary to analyze a much larger model.




Figure 5: Toy WM application

The two subsystems in the application are **DU\_APPLICATION\_SELECTION** and **CURSOR\_PLACEMENT**, which manage mapping applications to display units and the location of the cursor, respectively. The inputs to the model are:

- **Left/Right DU Available:** These inputs describe whether or not the left (right) display unit is available.
- **Left/Right Switchbanks:** The pilot and copilot have three-way switches to select which application to display on a display unit. The three switch positions are EICAS, PFD, and MAP. Depending on the switch position, one of the left (right) switch bank inputs is true and the other left (right) switch bank inputs are false. When the switch is being turned, it is also possible that all of the switch bank inputs are false.
- **Left/Right Cursor Manual Requests:** The pilot or copilot can manually request that the display cursor be moved to the left display or the right display using two buttons. In these instances, the left or right manual request inputs are true.

The outputs of the model are:

- **Left/Right DU Application:** These outputs are enumerations: {0 = BLANK, 1 = EICAS, 2 = PFD, 3 = MAP} that describe what is to be displayed on a DU.
- **Cursor Location:** This output is an enumeration {0 = No Cursor, 1 = Left DU, 2 = Right DU} that describes the location of the display cursor.

### 3.2. Creating Analysis Partitions

The first step in analyzing the model is to create analysis partitions that can be automatically analyzed. An visual overview of this process is shown in Figure 6.




Figure 6: Creating Analysis Partitions

#### 3.2.1. Group Related Requirements

To create analysis partitions, we first try to group system requirements into sets that can be checked against a portion of the system Simulink model. In our experience with the WM and the FCS 5000 (explained in [24]), it is usually the case that the properties naturally partition into sets that are functionally related to one another, and that the truth or falsehood of these property sets can be determined by examining a relatively small portion of the entire Simulink model.

However, there are some system-level properties that span most or all of the entire model. In this case, we try to split the property of interest into sub-properties that can be assigned to specific subsystems, and whose truth implies the truth of the larger property. We defer this process until after we have decomposed the model into analysis subsystems (Section 3.2.2). At that point, we can attempt to factor the property into sub-properties that are parceled out to the subsystems.

For our running toy WM example, we would like to check the following requirements:

**Requirement 1:** If a DU is available, then it shall display some application.

**Requirement 2:** If a DU is unavailable, then it shall not attempt to display any application.

**Requirement 3:** The cursor shall not be displayed on a DU that is unavailable.

**Requirement 4:** The cursor shall not be displayed on a DU whose application is not MAP.

**Requirement 5:** When the MAP application is selected for a side, then the cursor shall move to that side.


**Requirement 6:** When the EICAS button is pressed, the display application shall be EICAS.

**Requirement 7:** When the PFD button is pressed, the display application shall be PFD.

**Requirement 8:** When the MAP button is pressed, the display application shall be MAP.

### **3.2.2. Decompose Model into Analysis Subsystems**

After grouping the properties, we carve up the system model into reasonably sized analysis models that are sufficient to check one or more of the requirements groups. We would like to make each subsystem small enough (currently  $< 10^{50}$  states) that it is straightforward to analyze using our BDD-based model checking tools. If a subsystem for a set of safety properties is too large to be comfortably analyzed, we use some additional techniques described in Section 3.4.1 to try to reduce it further. An example of this partitioning for the toy WM application of Section 3.1 is shown in Figure 7, in which the heavy lines indicate the boundaries of each analysis partition.



**Figure 7: Toy WM application with subsystem boundaries**

In the Toy Window Manager, the set of safety properties to be verified are clustered around the two areas of the model. The first set determines selection of an application to display on each display unit (requirements 1, 2, 6, 7, and 8). This set can be analyzed by examining the upper partition of the model, shown in solid blue. The second set determines where to locate the cursor (requirements 4 and 5). This set can be analyzed by examining the lower partition of the model shown in dashed red.

The remaining requirement (requirement 3) spans both subsystems and will have to be split into requirements over the subsystems that together entail the original requirement. We will describe how this is accomplished during formalization of requirements (Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4).

If the original Simulink system model is properly architected, then these analysis models can be generated with very little effort. In Simulink, it is possible to split an application into libraries that can be loaded into several models. As long as the subsystems to be analyzed are contained in libraries, we can very easily create new top-level models containing the subsystems. Then, as long as the subsystem interfaces remain stable, the libraries can evolve without touching the analysis models.

### 3.2.3. Formalizing Safety Requirements into Properties

The next step in analyzing the model involves formalizing the functional and safety requirements into CTL properties. For a synchronous system where the requirements are specified as “shall” statements over system inputs and outputs, this process is relatively straightforward<sup>2</sup>. In [24], [25], and [35], we described the process of translating these informal statements into safety properties in more detail.

The system requirements document is not the only source of properties to be analyzed. Properties also emerge from discussions with developers about the functionality of different subsystems, or even from a careful review of a particular implementation detail of the Simulink model. In some cases, these properties can be thought of as validity checks for particular implementation choices, but on occasion they lead to additions to the system requirements document.

For example, in the Toy WM model, the `LEFT_DU_APPLICATION` and `RIGHT_DU_APPLICATION` outputs are implemented as integers, but they are supposed to act like enumerations. Therefore, they should always be in the range 0 (BLANK) to 3 (MAP). Otherwise, the output is out-of-range. This aspect of the implementation can be easily formalized and checked.

Most of the requirements in the WM (and all of the Toy WM requirements) fall into two CTL templates. The first is simply a constraint that must be maintained by all reachable states. For example, the requirement:

*If a DU is available, then it shall display some application*

can be translated into two CTL properties (one for each side) as follows:

```
AG(LEFT_DU_AVAILABLE -> LEFT_DU_APPLICATION != BLANK )
AG(RIGHT_DU_AVAILABLE -> RIGHT_DU_APPLICATION != BLANK )
```

The AG operator states that the property must hold for all globally reachable states, and `->` is the implication operator. The formal property for the left side can be paraphrased:

*In all reachable states, if the left DU is available, then its application shall not be blank.*

The second template is a constraint over a reachable system state and all possible next states. This template is required when we are interested in observing the behavior of the system at the moment some change occurs. For example, in the requirement:

*When the MAP application is selected for a side, then the cursor shall move to that side.*

---

<sup>2</sup> Occasionally, internal variables within the analysis model are used to specify properties, but this is discouraged, because in this case the correctness of the analysis hinges on whether the internal variable was correctly computed. If internal variables are used, then additional properties must be developed and specified to ensure that the internal variable is correctly computed.

we are interested in the moment when the MAP application is selected.. This requirement can be translated into CTL (for the left side) as:

```
AG( LEFT_DU_APPLICATION != MAP ->
    AX( LEFT_DU_APPLICATION = MAP ->
        CURSOR_LOCATION = LEFT_DU ) )
```

where the AX operator encloses a property that must hold in all next states. Given these operator definitions, the property can be paraphrased:

*In any state in which LEFT\_DU\_APPLICATION is not equal to MAP, then in any next state in which LEFT\_DU\_APPLICATION is equal to MAP, the CURSOR\_LOCATION must be LEFT\_DU.*

In order to define ‘selection’, we have to describe the change in state of LEFT\_DU\_APPLICATION. The AX operator provides this ability.

Given the system inputs described in Figure 5, we can formalize the Toy WM requirements in CTL as shown in table Table 1. Most of the properties in the full WM follow these CTL forms, but occasionally additional CTL operators are used. For a complete introduction to CTL and LTL, see [9].

<b>Requirement:</b>	<b>CTL Properties:</b>
1: If a DU is available, then it shall display some application	AG(LEFT_DU_AVAILABLE -> LEFT_DU_APPLICATION != BLANK ) AG(RIGHT_DU_AVAILABLE -> RIGHT_DU_APPLICATION != BLANK )
2: If a DU is unavailable, then it shall not attempt to display any application	AG( !LEFT_DU_AVAILABLE -> LEFT_DU_APPLICATION = BLANK ) AG( !RIGHT_DU_AVAILABLE -> RIGHT_DU_APPLICATION = BLANK )
3: The cursor will not be displayed on a DU that is unavailable	AG( !LEFT_DU_AVAILABLE -> CURSOR_LOCATION != LEFT_DU ) AG( !RIGHT_DU_AVAILABLE -> CURSOR_LOCATION != RIGHT_DU )
4. The cursor shall not be displayed on a DU whose application is not MAP	AG( LEFT_DU_APPLICATION != MAP -> CURSOR_LOCATION != LEFT_DU ) AG( RIGHT_DU_APPLICATION != MAP -> CURSOR_LOCATION != RIGHT_DU )
5. When the MAP application is selected for a side, then the cursor shall move to that side	AG( LEFT_DU_APPLICATION != MAP -> AX( LEFT_DU_APPLICATION = MAP -> CURSOR_LOCATION = LEFT_DU ) ) AG( RIGHT_DU_APPLICATION != MAP -> AX( RIGHT_DU_APPLICATION = MAP -> CURSOR_LOCATION = RIGHT_DU ) )
6. When the EICAS button is pressed (SELECT_EICAS), EICAS shall be the display application	AG( LEFT_SELECT_EICAS -> LEFT_DU_APPLICATION = EICAS ) AG( RIGHT_SELECT_EICAS -> RIGHT_DU_APPLICATION = EICAS )
7. When the PFD button is pressed (SELECT_PFD), PFD shall be the display application	AG( LEFT_SELECT_PFD -> LEFT_DU_APPLICATION = PFD ) AG( RIGHT_SELECT_PFD -> RIGHT_DU_APPLICATION = PFD )
8. When the MAP button is pressed (SELECT_MAP), MAP shall be the display application	AG( LEFT_SELECT_MAP -> LEFT_DU_APPLICATION = MAP ) AG( RIGHT_SELECT_MAP -> RIGHT_DU_APPLICATION = MAP )
Each DU_APPLICATION variable shall always be assigned a value between 0 and 3.	AG( LEFT_DU_APPLICATION <= 3 & LEFT_DU_APPLICATION >= 0 ) AG( RIGHT_DU_APPLICATION <= 3 & RIGHT_DU_APPLICATION >= 0 )

**Table 1 : Formalizing Written Requirements**

### 3.2.4. Factoring System-Level Properties

There are some system-level properties that span most or all of the model. In this case, we try to split the property of interest into sub-properties that can be assigned to specific subsystems and whose truth imply the truth of the larger property. The process for factoring system level properties is shown in Figure 8.




Figure 8: Factoring System-Level Properties

This process is fairly straightforward, but requires some creativity when splitting the property into parts that can be analyzed on the analysis subsystems. Furthermore, it is the responsibility of the analyst to manually prove whether these subsystem properties entail the system-wide property.

For example, requirement #3 states that *the cursor will not be displayed on a display unit that is unavailable*. Formally, this is expressed:

```
AG( !LEFT_DU_AVAILABLE -> CURSOR_LOCATION != LEFT_DU )
AG( !RIGHT_DU_AVAILABLE -> CURSOR_LOCATION != RIGHT_DU )
```

We will examine the left side property; since the system is symmetric, this also proves the property for the right side. The property cannot be checked by examining the application placement subsystem as it does not describe the cursor location, and also cannot be checked by the cursor placement subsystem, since it does not contain inputs determining DU availability. However, it is possible to determine the validity of the property by examining the properties for requirements two and four.

Given the validity of subsystem properties two and four:

```
AG( !LEFT_DU_AVAILABLE -> LEFT_DU_APPLICATION = BLANK )           (Req. 2)
AG( LEFT_DU_APPLICATION != MAP -> CURSOR_LOCATION != LEFT_DU )    (Req 4.)
```

and an additional (trivial) property:

```
SPEC AG( LEFT_DU_APPLICATION = BLANK -> LEFT_DU_APPLICATION != MAP )
```

we can immediately determine

```
AG( !LEFT_DU_AVAILABLE -> CURSOR_LOCATION != LEFT_DU )
```

The case for the right side property is symmetric.

### 3.2.5. Determine System Invariants on Subsystem Inputs

It is often not possible to verify interesting safety properties on a large model in a completely unconstrained environment. Instead, the correctness of the controller depends on certain environmental assumptions about its environment. As part of the analysis process, we examine the environmental assumptions in the requirements document to create constraints on the possible values of inputs into the system. The constraints on inputs are specified as *invariants* in NuSMV, which restrict the states that will be visited during the model checking process. In this step, we determine and formalize the applicable environmental assumptions for each subsystem as NuSMV invariants. For reasons that are explained in the following two paragraphs, we initially use these invariants as tools to explain counterexamples rather than to restrict analysis, and we leave them commented out.

Although invariants are necessary to prove “interesting” properties over subsystems, they are also dangerous to the soundness and applicability of the analysis. If conflicting invariants are specified, then there are *no states that satisfy the invariants*, so all properties are trivially true. Similarly, if invariants restrict the set of allowed inputs so that it is a subset of the possible inputs to the real system, then our analysis will be incomplete. Finally, just because constraints are specified in the requirements document does not mean that other systems will actually obey these constraints.

Therefore, although we formalize the invariants in this step *we do not use them in our initial model checking analysis*. If the initial subsystem analyses return counterexamples, we analyze the counterexamples to see whether they are due to violations of our invariants or due to incorrect behavior within the model. Even if counterexamples are due to invariant violations, we prefer to strengthen the model behavior, when possible, to deal with abnormal environments rather than use system invariants. If it is determined that there is no good way to handle abnormal environments within the model, then we finally begin to use the invariants derived from the environmental assumptions.

## 3.3. Reducing State: Scaling, Abstraction, and Refactoring

The primary limiting factor when using the model checker is the size of the state space. In this section, we describe strategies to reduce the size of model state spaces that were used in the WM analysis.

### 3.3.1. Replacing Reals with Integers

Our current model-checking tools are unable to reason about real numbers. Fortunately, real-valued variables are not used in a substantive way for the WM application, and we have developed simple techniques to replace reals with integer subranges.

We have used a simplified version of domain reduction abstraction [8], which attempts to reduce the domain of some variable while preserving the interesting traces, i.e., the ones that can lead to a counterexample, of system behavior. The idea is to preserve enough values such that all conditions involving real numbers will be completely exercised.

In the WM, real numbers are only used in addition and subtraction by constants and comparisons between real-valued variables and constants. Therefore, it is very straightforward to preserve the behavior of these variables using a scaled range of integers. The range of the integer is determined by examining all of the relational comparisons and arithmetic operations in the model and the formal properties that involve the variable. For example, one real-valued variable in the “full” WM is the vertical position of the cursor on a display, so that when the cursor is transferred to another display, it is at the same vertical position. However, this position is never changed by the WM, and is only used to notify the “new” display when a cursor transfer occurs. Therefore, we can effectively replace the real number with a constant integer.

### **3.3.2. Scaling Integer Ranges**

In order to efficiently model-check a specification, we would like to determine the minimal range necessary to represent the behavior of each variable in the model. This is because the performance of BDD-based model checkers is directly correlated to the ranges of the variables in the model. The SMV translation tools currently allow the user to specify the default range of all integer variables within the model, which allow a gross level of control over ranges.

However, when models become large, fine-tuning the integer subranges on a variable-by-variable can have a dramatic impact on model-checking performance. Currently, this is done manually by editing the generated SMV model. In the future, we plan to add support for automatically deriving bounds for variables within the model to the translation tools.

### **3.3.3. Refactoring Simulink Models**

Design choices that lead to code-bloat or poorly cohesive systems also affect the performance of the model checker. A rule of thumb is that the larger the number of blocks within a model, the longer it will require to analyze. Therefore, model refactoring is not only a useful design activity, but often necessary to successfully analyze large subsystem models.

In our experience, we have re-factored WM models in which some piece of functionality (e.g., display application placement) is replicated (e.g., left-side and right-side display application placement) by “copy and paste reuse”. By properly packaging the functionality into subsystems, we can split the analysis task into independent parts, leading to much faster analysis.

Similarly, when creating the analysis models, it is possible to indirectly analyze subsystem coupling by examining the complexity of subsystem invariants between the

outputs of one subsystem and the inputs of another subsystem. If complex invariants are required to prove properties about a subsystem, then it is likely the case that the subsystem is tightly coupled to the subsystem that generates the outputs. These cases should be examined to determine if it is possible to refactor the design to simplify the analysis invariants.

### 3.4. Analyzing Subsystems

The next phase is to iteratively analyze the subsystems created from splitting up the system Simulink model. An overview of this process is shown in Figure 9.




Figure 9: Subsystem Analysis Process

The process consists of several stages. First, we run the RCI-UMN translators to translate the Simulink model into NuSMV syntax and merge in the properties and environmental assumptions for the subsystem. If no counterexamples are discovered, then the analysis is complete. Otherwise, we analyze the counterexample to determine how to fix the problem.

### 3.4.1. Running RCI/UMN Translators and NuSMV

The first step in the analysis process is to run the RCI-UMN translators and NuSMV. In order to facilitate this process, we have created a simple Java program to automate parts of the process shown in Figure 10.




Figure 10 : RCI/UMN translator functionality

The heart of this automated process includes testing the specification, dumping NuSMV's raw output to a simple text file, and running the RCI/UMN suite of translation applications to achieve the desired format for interpretation.

### 3.4.2. Interpreting Counterexamples

For sufficiently large systems, determining the root cause of counterexamples by examining the model checker output can be difficult and time consuming. We have created automated tools to translate NuSMV counterexamples into the input language for the SCADE and Reactis Simulink simulators (Figure 10). This capability allows us to step forward through the test case and examine the values of internal variables in the model. Reactis and SCADE both have strong simulation capabilities allowing an analyst to forward/back step through a counterexample and easily descend through different subsystems within a Simulink model. We have found this capability invaluable when trying to understand and fix complex counterexamples.

### 3.4.3. Fixing a Problem Identified by a Counterexample

When a counterexample is discovered, it is classified by its underlying cause. The cause may be one or more of the following:

- Modeling error
- Property formalization error
- Incorrect/missing invariants for the subsystem
- High-Level requirements error

The process of determining the cause of the fault is somewhat an effort in consensus building given the requirement, the formal property, the model, and the counterexample. We illustrate in the next section with a small model derived from our toy window manager.

### 3.4.4. Example: The CURSOR\_PLACEMENT Subsystem.

We will illustrate the subsystem analysis process with the CURSOR\_PLACEMENT subsystem defined in 4.4.2. This subsystem is responsible for ensuring that the cursor is placed on a display that can support it. The model consists of two subsystems and is shown in Figure 1. The first subsystem, CURSOR\_LOCATION\_AVAILABILITY, outputs whether or not the left/right DU application is equal to MAP. Recall that MAP is the DU application that supports a cursor. The CURSOR\_LOCATION\_SELECTION subsystem determines where the cursor will be placed given availability of DUs and requests.





Figure 11: CURSOR\_PLACEMENT Subsystem

The CURSOR\_LOCATION\_SELECTION subsystem is shown in Figure 12. If no DUs are available, then the cursor is placed on NULL. The logic for assignment is straightforward: The cursor is placed on a DU if the other DU is unavailable or if a request to that DU is made, provided that DU is available.



**Figure 12: CURSOR\_LOCATION\_SELECTION subsystem**

There are two requirements and four properties allocated to the CURSOR\_PLACEMENT subsystem, shown below.

4. The cursor will not be displayed on a DU whose application is not MAP	$AG(LEFT\_DU\_APPLICATION \neq MAP \rightarrow CURSOR\_LOCATION \neq LEFT\_DU)$ $AG(RIGHT\_DU\_APPLICATION \neq MAP \rightarrow CURSOR\_LOCATION \neq RIGHT\_DU)$
5. When the MAP application is selected for a side, then the cursor will move to that side	$AG(LEFT\_DU\_APPLICATION = MAP \rightarrow AX(LEFT\_DU\_APPLICATION = MAP \rightarrow CURSOR\_LOCATION = LEFT\_DU))$ $AG(RIGHT\_DU\_APPLICATION = MAP \rightarrow AX(RIGHT\_DU\_APPLICATION = MAP \rightarrow CURSOR\_LOCATION = RIGHT\_DU))$

The properties associated with requirement 4 prove immediately on the model that we presented. However, both properties associated with requirement 5 fail.

### Examining a Counterexample: Model Error

The translation tools allow counterexamples to be displayed in Microsoft Excel and also to be imported as test cases in Reactis and SCADE. An example of the excel spreadsheet generated from the counterexamples is shown in Figure 13.

	A	B	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
1	MODEL		cursur_manager						
2									
3	REQUIREMENTS								
4			AX AG (LEFT_DU_APPLICATION != MAP -> AX (LEFT_DU_APPLICATION = MAP -> CURSOR_LOCATION = LEFT_DU))			AX AG (RIGHT_DU_APPLICATION != MAP -> AX (RIGHT_DU_APPLICATION = MAP -> CURSOR_LOCATION = RIGHT_DU))			
5	TESTS		cursur_manager_counterexample_Prop 3			cursur_manager_counterexample_Prop 4			
6									
7	TIMES		1	2	3		1	2	
8									
9	INPUTS								
10	LEFT_DU_APPLICATION		3	1	3		3	3	
11	RIGHT_DU_APPLICATION		0	3	3		0	3	
12	LEFT_MANUAL_REQUEST		0	0	0		0	1	
13	RIGHT_MANUAL_REQUEST		0	0	0		0	0	
14									
15	PROPERTY VARIABLES								
16	Simulink Name								
17									
18	OUTPUTS								
19	CURSOR_LOCATION		1	2	2		1	1	
20									
21									

Figure 13: Excel Spreadsheet Generated for Counterexamples

A counterexample is a test case that shows one way in which the property of interest is violated. In the excel format, the violated properties are presented in the “requirements” section of the spreadsheet, and for each property, the counterexample associated with the property is presented below the property in the “tests” section. In Figure 13, we have two counterexamples for the properties associated with Requirement 5. Each step has four inputs and one output, matching the signature of the CURSOR\_PLACEMENT subsystem.

The first counterexample is three steps long, and describes a violation of the left-side property. To explain the counterexample, we recall the ranges for Left/Right DU application and cursor location introduced in Section 3.1:

- **Left/Right DU Application:** These outputs are enumerations: {0 = BLANK, 1 = EICAS, 2 = PFD, 3 = MAP} that describe what is to be displayed on a DU.
- **Cursor Location:** This output is an enumeration {0 = No Cursor, 1 = Left DU, 2 = Right DU} that describes the location of the display cursor.

Now we observe that in the third step (Time = 3), the left DU application changes from EICAS to MAP but the cursor location is still Right\_DU, violating the property.

After a cursory examination of our model, we realize that we have no functionality to support requirement 5: there is no behavior that moves the cursor to a DU when MAP is

selected. We add this functionality by treating a selection of the MAP application the same as a manual cursor request (recall that LEFT\_DU\_AVAILABLE is true only when LEFT\_DU\_APPLICATION is MAP) and update the model as shown in Figure 14.




Figure 14: Fixed Cursor Manager Model

Now, we can re-run the properties against the updated model.

### Examining a Counterexample: Requirements Deficiency

When we re-run the model checker, all of the properties hold except the right-side case of Requirement 5:

```
AG( RIGHT_DU_APPLICATION != MAP -> AX( RIGHT_DU_APPLICATION = MAP ->
  CURSOR_LOCATION = RIGHT_DU ) )
```

The counterexample is shown in Table 2. From examining this table, we see that if a left manual request is received at the same time as the right DU application becomes map, then the left side will take precedence.

REQUIREMENTS		
	AX AG (RIGHT_DU_APPLICATION != MAP -> AX (RIGHT_DU_APPLICATION = MAP -> CURSOR_LOCATION = RIGHT_DU))	
<b>TIMES</b>	1	2
<b>INPUTS</b>		
	LEFT_DU_APPLICATION	3
	RIGHT_DU_APPLICATION	0
	LEFT_MANUAL_REQUEST	0
	RIGHT_MANUAL_REQUEST	0
<b>OUTPUTS</b>		
	CURSOR_LOCATION	1

**Table 2 : Requirement #5 Counterexample**

In this case, we have found a deficiency in our requirements: what should occur if both sides choose the MAP application simultaneously? Currently our requirements state that when MAP is selected for a DU, then the cursor will migrate to the DU where it was selected. However, they do not state what should happen if both sides choose the MAP application *simultaneously*.

There are several ways to resolve this issue; in our case, we choose the left side DU as the default DU in case of simultaneous requests. To simplify our property, we also introduce two variables into the properties file: WHEN\_LEFT\_MAP and WHEN\_RIGHT\_MAP. These variables are true in the instant when the left/right side DU changes to MAP, and false otherwise.

5. When the MAP application is selected for a DU, the cursor will move to that DU. In case both sides are simultaneously selected, the left side DU will be chosen.	<pre>AG( WHEN_LEFT_MAP -&gt;   CURSOR_LOCATION = LEFT_DU ) AG( (WHEN_RIGHT_MAP &amp; !WHEN_LEFT_MAP) -&gt;   CURSOR_LOCATION = RIGHT_DU )</pre>
---	---

After making these changes, all of the properties associated with the cursor placement subsystem succeed.

## 4. Analysis Results on the WM Model

In the previous sections, we examined in detail the verification of a toy Window Manger in order to illustrate how modeling can be applied to such systems. In this section, we discuss the formal verification of the actual ADGS-2100 Adaptive Display & Guidance System Window Manager. Of course, details of the WM design are highly proprietary and cannot be described in detail here. However, it is possible to discuss the scope of the effort, what information is being collected, and the number and sorts of errors found to date.

## 4.1. Scope of the Effort

The actual WM is much larger and more complex than the toy window manager described in Section 2.1. It is also considered critical (DO178B Level A) to the operation of the aircraft. We are currently verifying through model-checking approximately 90% of the functional behavior of the WM application (in terms of the number of Simulink blocks). The remaining 10% of the model is in one subsystem that contains a significant number of real- and integer-valued variables. This subsystem does not contain much mode-specific behavior and is not considered a likely source of design errors. For these reasons, we have not included it in our analysis.

We currently have five analysis models that are used for analyzing the behavior of the window manager. Table 3 provides an overview of the analysis results thus far.

Subsystem	Subsystem Instances	Basic Blocks	Reachable State Space	Properties	Confirmed Errors (To Date)
GG	2,831	10,669	$9.8 \times 10^9$	43	56
PS	144	398	$4.6 \times 10^{23}$	152	10
CM	139	1,009	$1.2 \times 10^{17}$	169	10
DUF	879	2941	$1.5 \times 10^{37}$	115	8
MFD	302	1,100	$6.8 \times 10^{31}$	84	14
<b>Totals</b>	<b>4295</b>	<b>16,117</b>	<b>n/a</b>	<b>563</b>	<b>98</b>

Table 3 : WM analysis data

The first column is just the abbreviation for the subsystem. The next two columns are designed to provide a feeling for the size of the Simulink models. The *Number of Subsystem Instances* column describes the number of user-defined Simulink subsystem instances within the model. This measure is distinct (and larger than) the number of different subsystem types, since each subsystem type may have several instances. The number of basic blocks counts the number of basic Simulink operators used within the model. The reachable state space is the number of states the subsystem can visit during execution. The final two columns are the number of properties defined for each model and the number of confirmed errors found.

## 4.2. Information Collected

As errors are detected, they are each logged in a problem report and tagged with the following information:

- Date of discovery

- The individual that found it
- Subsystem the error was found in
- Brief description
- How it was found
- Proposed and actual resolution.

Errors are not only found through model checking. Sometimes, simply reading the requirements prior to modeling reveals errors. These errors are classified as being found through “Inspection”. Other errors are found while creating the Simulink model. These were classified as being found through “Modeling”. The complete list of methods by which errors are detected is given in Table 4.

<b>Classification</b>	<b>Description</b>
Inspection	Error found by manual review or inspection of the specification.
Modeling	Error found during the process of creating the Simulink model.
Simulation	Error found while executing the Simulink model.
Analysis	Error found through model checking or other analysis of the Simulink model.

**Table 4 - Classifications of Error Detection**

The other obviously desirable classification is some notion of the importance, or severity, of the error. However, this is quite difficult to do in an objective way. For example, is an error in following documentation standards that requires thousands of hours to correct a trivial or major error? Is a coding error that could violate a system safety property, but is found in the first code review and requires only one line of code to be changed, a trivial or a major error? Unlike the effort in [24], we have decided not to try to classify the errors discovered in the WM verification effort.

### **4.3. Analysis Process**


During the lifetime of the project, the analysis process underwent significant changes from the previous analysis effort described in [24]. In that effort, the translation process was performed by researchers utilizing the Simulink gateway of SCADE to translate into NuSMV. Feedback was provided to the development group by meeting on a semi-weekly basis to discuss problems found.

In this project, the process has evolved to where all the analysis is now being done by the project engineers. This evolution is outlined in Figure 15. The first iteration involved using SCADE as an intermediate tool to convert between Simulink and our analysis tools. This conversion process required a significant amount of effort because Simulink Gateway provided in the SCADE toolset did yet not support the direct translation of Simulink R14 models. Instead, we would convert R14 models into R13, which could then be imported into SCADE. Furthermore, SCADE usually required manual

annotations to models in order to successfully import them. This conversion process required a significant amount of expertise.

To address the difficulties in importing Simulink R14 models through SCADE, Rockwell Collins and the University of Minnesota developed a Reactis to Lustre translator. Reactis supports Simulink R14 and a richer subset of Simulink blocks than SCADE, and fits better into the existing development environment used by product engineers. By coincidence, the intermediate (MWI) representation of Simulink models used by Reactis is very similar to Lustre, so the translation to Lustre was very straightforward.

Moving from SCADE to the Reactis to Lustre translator resulted an immediate improvement in the round-trip analysis time, as it was possible to directly import Simulink R14 models into our tools. However, our round-trip time was still limited by whether or not researchers were available to run the tools and explain counterexamples.




**Figure 15 : Analysis process evolution**

The third iteration introduced the most significant milestone in usage of the technology to date. At this time, system developers were trained in the usage of the translation toolset, specifying properties, and interpreting counterexamples. The time from error detection to implementation of a correction was reduced from days to minutes. Previously, delays in the process were due to inability for groups to meet regularly. In Iteration 3, the delays are largely due to the time it takes to discover root causes of counterexamples, and to suggest and implement fixes. This effectively changed the role of researchers from primary analysts to consultants and allowed the product area teams to use the tools in a tight-development loop.

## 4.4. Causes of Errors Found

Many errors were discovered during analysis. Most of these errors can be attributed to several common causes. A discussion of a few of the more prevalent causes follows.

The most common type cause of error is the improper use of the rising edge detector block (shown in Figure 16). The function of this block is to detect when a signal goes from `FALSE` to `TRUE`.



**Figure 16 : Rising edge detector to detect emergency**

Figure 16 illustrates a situation where the improper use of the rising edge block can lead to undesired system states. Suppose the `EMERGENCY` condition input becomes `TRUE`. When it becomes `TRUE`, the `CHANGE_STATE` output is activated. Now suppose the `CHANGE_STATE` output is lost or not seen during transmission in the system and subsequently not processed. A situation now exists where the `EMERGENCY` condition is still `TRUE`, but the `CHANGE_STATE` input will not be issued again until the `EMERGENCY` condition is cleared and re-entered. This could lead to hazardous situations and should be avoided.

Another common cause of error is the lack of requirements to address the occurrence of multiple events. Some requirements in the system are stated, “When the `MODE_X` button is pressed, `MODE_X` will become active.” This requirement does nothing to address the situations when more than one button is pressed with the `MODE_X` button. Which mode becomes active when the `MODE_X` button and others are pressed? These concerns are often not addressed in the written requirements.

A third common source of error involves copy/paste reuse errors where a portion of a diagram is copied into another subsystem and modified to fit the requirements of the new subsystem. In this instance, a single error within the original subsystem can be propagated to several locations leading to many property violations and counterexamples. Similarly, violations often occur if the copied diagram does not precisely match the requirements of the new context. Our experience reinforces that this kind of “reuse” must be done with care.

The last common cause of error, although trivial, is incorrect connection of inputs from subsystem to subsystem. In large systems, such as the window manager, the connection of inputs can become quite confusing, and errors can be made. Signals must often be routed through several subsystem layers to reach the subsystem where they contribute to the behavior of the model, and each of these layers may be large and complex, so these errors can be difficult to find using only inspections. However, the model-checker can quickly find these errors.

## 5. Conclusions and Directions for Future Work

This report described the large-scale use of formal methods to verify the behavior of production avionics software. In this effort, we verified the correctness of the majority of the functional behavior of the ADGS-2100 window manager, analyzing over 16,000 primitive Simulink blocks organized into 4,000 Simulink subsystem instances, against high-level requirements expressed as 563 temporal logic properties. As a result, 98 errors in the high-level requirements and Simulink models were found and corrected. This effort provides a significant example of a successful and cost-efficient application of formal methods to remove defects early in the design cycle.

Our success was predicated on understanding the needs and development processes of the systems and software engineers who were building the WM application. We identified several challenges that had to be solved in order to meet these needs:

- Determining how to map software requirements into formal properties
- Creating translators that would allow commercial modeling tools (such as Simulink [10]) to be quickly and automatically analyzed by different formal analysis tools
- Creating tools that allow analysis results (counterexamples) to be easily understood by the analysts and product engineers
- Defining methods for partitioning the application of interest into *subsystems* that can be analyzed individually
- Creating a verification process to ensure that: 1) the analysis results are sound, 2) all formal properties are traceable to software requirements, and 3) all requirements of interest are verified through one or more formal properties
- Iterating our verification process with the goal of faster turn-around between development and analysis to create a more efficient and higher quality process.

By addressing these challenges, we achieved significant buy-in from the WM developers, and by the end of the project they had assumed responsibility for analyzing the models and ownership of the safety properties.

Our approach was an extension of the one detailed in [24]. In this effort we focused on improving the scalability and turnaround time of analysis and the usability of the tools. The most significant step was the introduction of the new translation path from the Reactive Systems tool, Reactis, directly to the Lustre specification language. This contributed considerably to the improvement in time required to correct errors, and cost reduction.

In the future, we will focus on extending the current technology to include analysis of systems with real variables and large-domain integers. Although our existing tools have been very effective in analyzing Boolean and enumerated models, we would like the capability to be able better address flight-critical systems in which real- and integer-valued variables play a critical role. We are continuing to add support for a larger

number of Simulink blocks, and plan to support StateFlow [23], a sub-language for specifying control logic built into Simulink, in the near future.

We also plan to improve several user interface and ease-of-use issues in the current toolset. One of the most cumbersome steps in the current process involves specifying and tweaking the valid ranges for integer variables within models. For integer variables being used as enumerations, the valid ranges of a variable can be derived from the assignment equation for the variable in the the model. This step would significantly reduce the set-up time necessary to prepare a model for analysis.

Our eventual goal is to see formal analysis tools used as part of development in the same way as a compiler or simulation tool. At the end of this project, a developer could translate an analysis model through our tool chain and analyze it in a matter of minutes. This quick turnaround allowed developers to integrate model checking into their standard “build a little, test a little” development cycle. Although our current tool suite does not yet match our ease-of-use goals, we are at a point where developers can quickly and easily check large models for critical safety properties, and we are actively working to improve the tool suite and our analysis process.

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<b>14. ABSTRACT</b> Recent advances in modeling languages have made it feasible to formally specify and analyze the behavior of large system components. Synchronous data flow languages, such as Lustre, SCR, and RSML-e are particularly well suited to this task, and commercial versions of these tools such as SCADE and Simulink are growing in popularity among designers of safety critical systems, largely due to their ability to automatically generate code from the models. At the same time, advances in formal analysis tools have made it practical to formally verify important properties of these models to ensure that design defects are identified and corrected early in the lifecycle. This report describes how these tools have been applied to the ADGS-2100 Adaptive Display and Guidance Window Manager being developed by Rockwell Collins Inc. This work demonstrates how formal methods can be easily and cost-efficiently used to remove defects early in the design cycle.					
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