

The Effectiveness of TAG or Guard-Gates in SET Suppression Using Delay and Dual-Rail Configurations at 0.35 μm

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35-WORD ABSTRACT:

We describe heavy ion test and simulation results for SEU tolerant latches using three configurations of TAG or Guard-Gates implemented in TSMC 0.35 μm process, drawing conclusions about required delay lengths and merits of each approach.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Design options for decreasing the susceptibility of integrated circuits to Single Event Upset (SEU) fall into two categories: (1) increasing the critical charge to cause an upset at a particular node, and (2) employing redundancy to mask or correct errors. With decreasing device sizes on an Integrated Circuit (IC), the amount of charge required to represent a logic state has steadily reduced. Critical charge methods such as increasing drive strength or increasing the time required to change state as in capacitive or resistive hardening or delay based approaches extract a steadily increasing penalty as a percentage of device resources and performance.

Dual redundancy is commonly assumed only to provide error detection with Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) required for correction, but less well known methods employ dual redundancy to achieve full error correction by voting two inputs with a prior state to resolve ambiguity. This requires special circuits such as the Whitaker latch [1], or the guard-gate [2] which some of us have called a Transition AND Gate (TAG) [3]. A 2-input guard gate is shown in Figure 1. It is similar to a Muller Completion Element [4] and relies on capacitance at node "out" to retain the prior state when inputs disagree, while eliminating any output buffer which would be susceptible to radiation strikes.




Figure 1: Two input Transition AND gate (TAG) or Guard-Gate

This paper experimentally compares delay based and dual rail flip-flop designs wherein both types of circuits employ guard-gates to optimize layout and performance, and draws conclusions about design criteria and suitability of each option. In both cases a design goal is protection against Single Event Transients (SET) in combinational logic as well as SEU in the storage elements. For the delay based design, it is also a goal to allow asynchronous clear or preset inputs on the storage elements, which are often not available in radiation tolerant designs.

II. CIRCUITS

Previous data from a test at $0.5\mu\text{m}$ indicated that a 3-TAG flip flop [3] as shown in Figure 2 was effective in resisting SEUs. This design should also resist SETs originating within the combinational logic. Since only a single TAG or guard gate has been proposed to resist SETs from combinational logic [2] we investigated whether a 1-TAG flip flop as shown in Figure 3 would resist SEUs as well as SETs. Input gating circuits are not shown in these figures (see [3] or our final paper for details), but since this circuit should suppress SETs originating inside or outside the storage cell, asynchronous clear is allowed and was used in these designs.




Figure 2: Storage cell using three guard gates (input gating logic not shown).




Figure 3: Storage cell modified from figure 2 using one guard gate.

In order to compare the delay based designs with a dual rail design, we included a 4-TAG flip flop (see Figure 4) also tested previously [3], separately proposed as an enhancement to the DICE cell [5] and called by some a bias coupled flip flop [6].

Delay based flip flops have long been designed without using guard gates. These designs require multi-stage delays, usually 3, so a transient arising in a delay stage can be absorbed. Similarly, delays have been used with other two input devices such as the Whitaker latch [1] to

resist SETs, usually with 5 or more inverters [7]. The guard gate allows the use of a compact low power two inverter delay [8]. Such delays would ordinarily emit unacceptably long pulses when themselves struck by radiation, but the guard gate prevents any SET originating in the delay element from ever getting out thus completely *eliminating* the SET.

The designs were fabricated in the TSMC 0.35 μm process using a 51 flip-flop test circuit [3]. The delay circuit for 1 and 3 *guard-gate* designs was constructed to yield a 1 ns delay. An on-chip pulse measurement circuit was also fabricated to characterize the SET pulse widths [9]. The latches were exposed to Argon, Copper and Xenon ions at 0° and 60° and to Gold at 60° using the heavy-ion facilities at TAMU. The resulting LET values were calculated to be 8.3, 16.6, 19.6, 39.2, 51.5, 103, and 170 $\text{MeV}/\text{mg}/\text{cm}^2$.

III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

Raw SEU data from the heavy ion test is shown in Figure 5. A subset of SET pulse width data is shown in Figure 6. These data show that there were few SETs longer than 1 ns below an LET of 50 $\text{MeV}/\text{mg}/\text{cm}^2$. This resulted in multiple upsets for the *unprotected* design, very few upsets for 1 *guard-gate* based design, and no upsets for the remaining two latch designs. At LETs of 51.5 and 103 $\text{MeV}/\text{mg}/\text{cm}^2$, about half the SETs are below 1ns (from Figure 7), which agrees well with the error rates of the 1 *guard-gate* and 3 *guard-gate* flip-flops being around half of that for the unprotected design. However, at higher LET values, the 1 *guard-gate* design becomes worse than the unprotected design. This rate of increase in the number of upsets is explained in the following section. For LET values at which the SET pulse width was more than 1 ns, the upset rate for *unprotected* and 3 *guard-gate* designs increased at similar rates. The upset rate for 4 *guard-gate* based DICE latch remains extremely low even at very high LET's.

Note that for LET of 103 and 170 the largest numbers of SETs are right around 1 ns, so in retrospect the 1ns delay appears to have been a poor choice. A predicted curve for a 3-TAG latch




Figure 4: Guard-Gate storage cell using DICE configuration (4-TAG latch)

0.35u Heavy Ion Test of TAG-protected Flip Flops




Figure 5: Heavy ion test results for 4 flip flop types and projections for a 5th type (2ns TAG).





Figure 6: SET pulse width spectra from on-chip measurement circuit.

with a 2ns delay (labeled “2nsTAG est.” in Fig. 5) was derived by computing the ratio of 3-TAG hits to number of measured SET pulses greater than 1 ns at each LET, and multiplying this ratio times the number of measured SET pulses greater than 2ns at each LET. If the guarded delays are functioning as expected, an actual 2ns flip-flop should follow closely this predicted curve.

Weibull curves were generated and MTBF for Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and geosynchronous (GEO) environments were calculated by the methods described used previously [Shuler] and are shown in Figure 7 and Table 1.



DEVICE	MTBF (YEARS) / 1000 FLIP-FLOPS	
	LEO	GEO
UNPROTECTED	0.2610	0.0190
1 TAG	0.8320	0.0620
3 TAG	1.7172	0.0938
4 TAG	N/A	N/A
2ns TAG	1583.8	79.82

Table 1: On-orbit MTBF for each device type.

Figure 7: Weibull curves for each device type.

IV. SIMULATIONS AND ANALYSIS

To see if guarded delays are functioning as expected, we turn our attention to the anomalous behavior of the 1-TAG flip flop at high LET using simulations carried out with the Cadence Spectre[®] tool suite. SE hits were modeled using double-exponential current sources at the hit node. Multiple hits were modeled by using multiple current sources. Every single node in all four latch design was hit and the resulting SET pulse along with the upset/no upset ratio of the nodes was observed.

The *unprotected* design showed the most vulnerability at low LET values as expected. In the *1 guard-gate* design, all SET pulses with less than 1 ns duration did not cause an upset. However, some of the multiple-node hits that arrived at the guard-gate consolidating such that the overall pulse width as seen by the guard-gate was more than 1 ns, caused an upset even though each individual SET pulse width was less than 1 ns. Such cases will result in an upset for LET lower than 51.5 MeV/mg/cm². Also, for the *1 guard-gate* design, the vulnerable area to a SE increases to a higher value than all other designs as a function of deposited charge (Qc) as shown in Figure 9. With the increase in number of vulnerable nodes, the increase in associated diffusion area for each node results in higher upset cross-section as evidenced by the experimental data.




Figure 9: Vulnerable drain area cross-section as a function

A partial explanation of this is that the first two parallel guard gates in the 3-TAG design constitute a self-protected dual rail inverter stage, whereas the corresponding stage in the 1-TAG design depends on the guarded delay to eliminate SETs that originate in it. However, this does not explain all of the rise in vulnerable drain area, so questions remain about the efficacy of a

single guard-gate used in conjunction with a compact delay. When single nodes at the inputs of guard-gates are vulnerable, as they showed to be in this case, something is draining off or disturbing the state holding charge at the output node of the guard gate.

Simulation results on 3 *guard-gate* design show the number of vulnerable nodes at high Q_c to be only half that of the 1 *guard-gate* design. The total diffusion area that is vulnerable to high LET particles is still lesser than that for the *unprotected* and 1 *guard-gate* design. As a result, the number of upsets for this design remains lower than the *unprotected* and 1 *guard-gate* designs. However, pulses longer than 1.2 ns do cause an upset. As with the 1 *guard-gate* case, concatenated multiple SET pulses may result in an upset for this design. We assume that the primary reason for the difference in performance of 1-TAG and 3-TAG designs is the slightly longer total loop delay in the 3-TAG.

The 4 *guard-gate* based DICE design does not show any vulnerability in simulations even for moderate values of Q_c and multiple node hits and hence have not been plotted. Simulation results showed upsets only when multiple nodes collected very high Q_c . This is validated through the experimental data obtained where only one upset was observed at an LET of 170 MeV/mg/cm².

The 4-TAG data there may also be some advantage in the 3-TAG design since one inverter stage in the flip-flop feedback loop is effectively a dual rail cross coupled pair of guard gates. This suggests the possibility of re-configuring the 1-TAG design to maximize the amount of loop stages that are in dual rail configuration, protected by the guard gate.

VI. CONCLUSION

We conclude that for highest speed and reliability in deep submicron designs, dual rail logic with storage cells such as the 4-TAG (or enhanced guard-gate DICE) latch will provide lower area and power than TMR designs, and that delay based designs will lag in clocking performance and SEU/SET tolerance. While it has been argued dual rail logic is not easily integrated into existing design tool flows, neither is TMR. If embedded in the fabric of a field programmable gate array (FPGA) dual rail implementation would be of concern only to the FPGA development not to application development, and unlike add-on TMR tools would protect both configuration logic and application logic while consuming fewer resources.

For low power high density designs, variations of guarded delay design techniques remain viable with some caveats. First, our data show the length of SETs cannot be estimated by the popular approximation that SETs are about as long as the longest inter-stage propagation delay. In our case, a 2 ns SET is about three times as long as the maximum inter-stage propagation delay in 0.35 μ m CMOS. SET length should be directly measured for the target process by a technique such as the one we used. If the upset rate for a particular delay value of the subject delay based technique is known, then the upset rate for other delay values can be estimated from the SET spectra as we have done above, and a delay design value chosen to provide the desired MTBF in the target environment.

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