Spotlight on Engineering Excellence

Guidance, Navigation & Control (GN&C)
Best Practices for Human-Rated Spacecraft Systems

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Introduction

- In 2007 the NESC completed an in-depth assessment to identify, define and document engineering considerations for the Design Development Test and Evaluation (DDT&E) of human-rated spacecraft systems
  - Requested by the Astronaut Office at JSC to help them to better understand what is required to ensure safe, robust, and reliable human-rated spacecraft systems

- The 22 GN&C engineering Best Practices described in this paper are a condensed version of what appears in the NESC Technical Report

- These Best Practices cover a broad range from fundamental system architectural considerations to more specific aspects (e.g., stability margin recommendations) of GN&C system design and development

- 15 of the Best Practices address the early phases of a GN&C System development project and the remaining 7 deal with the later phases.
  - Some of these Best Practices will cross-over between both phases.

- Recognize that this set of GN&C Best Practices will not be universally applicable to all projects and mission applications
Acknowledgements

The GN&C section of the NESC DDT&E “Considerations” Report, upon which this presentation is based, was the product of the work and inputs of several individuals in addition to the authors, including but not limited to:

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- Bruce Jackson along with other members of the NESC GN&C TDT
- James Miller and Christina Cooper (NESC/LaRC)
- Aerospace Corporation support
Motivation: Common GN&C Pitfalls
• Over the ten year period of 1996 to 2006, 21 out of the 773 launch attempts worldwide, experienced a known GN&C anomaly
  – 15 resulted in a catastrophic launch failure
• Approximately one-third (15) of all 52 catastrophic launch failures worldwide over this ten year period were GN&C-related
• Design flaws identified as largest (40%) single cause of GN&C-related catastrophic launch failures (6 out of 15)
• Avionics and Flight Software were equally large (20%) failure causes at the component level
Over the ten year period of 1996 to 2006, 38% (30 out of 79) of all NASA spacecraft experienced a known GN&C anomaly.

8% of all NASA experienced a catastrophic satellite failure over this same time period.

50% of catastrophic GN&C anomalies occurred within 10% of the satellite’s design life.

Largest contributing causes of catastrophic GN&C anomalies were:

- Design (33%)
- Software (33%)
- Operational (17%)
Motivation for The NESC Best Practices

- The primary motivation of this presentation is to provide useful guidance, in the form of these Best Practices, to the synthesis and operation of GN&C systems for NASA's future human-rated spacecraft.

- The GN&C Best Practice information contained in NESC Technical Report is also intended to provide:
  - Insights for non-GN&C engineers and managers
  - Tutorial-type guidance for fresh-out GN&C engineers
  - A useful memory aid for more experienced GN&C engineers especially as a checklist for technical evaluation and review of a GN&C system.

- A secondary motivation of this presentation is to invite feedback on this initial set of Best Practices from the NASA Program Management community
  - In particular, we solicit other specific GN&C Lessons Learned that NESC should capture based on either crewed and robotic flight system project experiences.
GN&C Interacts With and is Influenced by Virtually All Other Spacecraft Subsystems

"...we cannot do just one thing. Whether we like it or not, whatever we do has multiple effects."

Dietrich Domer, author of the Logic of Failure, commenting on the topic of complex systems

"In space systems, most dynamic problems do not occur in one isolated discipline, but are an interaction between several disciplines or subsystems”

Bob Ryan, author of “Problems Experienced and Envisioned for Dynamical Physical Systems”, commenting on his Apollo, Skylab, and Space Shuttle career experiences at NASA

Consider: How do faults in other subsystems affect GN&C?

1 NASA Document TP-2508, August 1985
Common GN&C DDT&E Pitfalls (1 of 2)

✓ Poor or Missing GN&C Requirements
✓ Failure to Stop Requirements Creep
✓ Poor Characterization of Mission Operational Regimes & Environments
✓ Unknown or Poorly Defined Interactions
✓ Unknown or Poorly Defined Interfaces
✓ Poorly Defined Coordinate Frames and System of Units
✓ Unknown and/or Incorrectly Modeled Dynamics
✓ Feedback Control System Instabilities due to Large Model Uncertainties
✓ Reliance on Any “Heritage”: in the Hardware, Software, Design Team, etc.
✓ Reliance on low Technology Readiness Level (TRL) GN&C technologies
✓ Sensor/Actuator Component Degradation & Failure
✓ Insufficient On-Board Processing Capability for GN&C Flight Software (FSW) Algorithms

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Common GN&C DDT&E Pitfalls (2 of 2)

✓ Inadequate Systems Engineering for Coordinated GN&C of Multiple Interacting Vehicles (e.g., during Rendezvous and Docking)
✓ Poor GN&C Fault Management Strategy
✓ Lack of Comprehensive Abort Strategy
✓ Inadequate “Safe Haven” capabilities
✓ Failure to “Design for Test”
✓ Failure to “Test as You Fly and Fly as You Test”
✓ Inadequate Hardware In The Loop (HITL) End-to-End Testing to Verify Proper Operations
✓ Inadequate Sensor-to-Actuator Polarity Tests (Lack of End-to-End Testing)
✓ Unresolved Test Anomalies & Discrepancies
✓ No truly independent Verification and Validation (V & V) process for GN&C
✓ Failure to Have Crew and Operations Team “Train as You Fly”
✓ Inadequate Validation/Certification of GN&C Ground Data and Tools
✓ Insufficient Telemetry for GN&C Performance Monitoring and Anomaly Resolution During Launch, Early Orbit Checkout & All Mission Critical Events
An examination of the historical record reveals that several GN&C systems have been seriously victimized by one of more of the pitfalls listed above either during their design, development, test or operational phases.

It appears that many previously established Lessons Learned must be relearned by the community.

The continued repetition of the same GN&C mistakes represents an avoidable risk to crew safety and mission success.

If rigorously followed these GN&C Best Practices will help protect against the pitfalls cited above.

Bear in mind however that these GN&C Best Practices will not be universally applicable to all projects and mission applications.

These Best Practices alone are not a substitute for sound engineering judgment, experience, expertise, attention to day-to-day details, and intellectual curiosity.
Motivation for The NESC Best Practices

Two Representative Examples Where Breakdowns in the Application of the GN&C Best Practices Occurred

X-43A / Pegasus Launch June 2, 2001

Ariane 5 Flight 501 June 4, 1996

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Some Key GN&C System Considerations for Human-Rated Spacecraft
Human Spaceflight Heritage
### Significant GN&C Related Anomalies on Crewed Spacecraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gemini 8 March 1966</td>
<td>March 1966</td>
<td>Failed &quot;On&quot; thruster causes vehicle to tumble; crew uses reentry thrusters to recover attitude.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress M-7 March 1991</td>
<td>March 1991</td>
<td>Aborted Progress docking leads to miss encounter with Mir space station due to Kurs radar damage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apollo 10 May 1969</td>
<td>May 1969</td>
<td>LM tumbles while in low lunar orbit; IMU gimbal lock narrowly avoided during attitude recovery by crew.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STS-51F July 1985</td>
<td>July 1985</td>
<td>Abort to Orbit performed following a premature SSME shutdown during ascent due to false engine overheating indications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STS-9 Nov 1983</td>
<td>November 1983</td>
<td>GPC failures during deorbit, entry and landing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soyuz 18-1 April 1975</td>
<td>April 1975</td>
<td>First high altitude abort of a crewed spacecraft when 2nd stage fails to separate from 3rd stage of booster; crew survives 20 g reentry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soyuz T-10A Sept 1983</td>
<td>September 1983</td>
<td>First pad abort of a crewed spacecraft after pad fire; crew survives 17 g Launch Escape System flight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STS-3 March 1982</td>
<td>March 1982</td>
<td>Orbiter flight control and robotic arm systems' dynamically interact causes unexpectedly high vernier thruster duty cycles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STS-1 April 1981</td>
<td>April 1981</td>
<td>Unmodeled vernier thruster plume impingement causes greatly increased duty cycles and propellant consumption.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soyuz Ballistic Re-Entries</td>
<td></td>
<td>Soyuz 33 April 1979 10 g's&lt;br&gt;Soyuz TMA-1 May 2003 8 g's&lt;br&gt;Soyuz TMA-10 Oct 2007 9 g's.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Some Observations on
Significant Human Space Flight Vehicle Failures

- Several significant GN&C anomalies have occurred on-orbit
- Anomalies can occur at any time: on the launch pad, during ascent, on-orbit, entry, decent and/or landing
- In failure cases other than ascent and reentry the crew had time to evaluate, troubleshoot, and respond to on-orbit failures (e.g., Apollo 13)
- It can be inferred that spacecraft robustness precluded a number of significant failures from becoming catastrophic
- One notable statistic: With the exception of the Apollo-1 cabin fire, the loss of human life has only occurred during ascent and reentry which are the two most dynamic phases of the mission
- During high risk/highly dynamic mission phases it is important to include response time and automation into the redundancy and backup spacecraft reliability trades
- The different aspects of all mission phases must be considered when selecting spacecraft architectures and when deciding where to buy down risks
Some Key GN&C System Considerations for Human-Rated Spacecraft

- Take time to properly architect the GN&C System(s)
  - Directly impacts crew safety, mission success, upgradeability & Life Cycle costs
  - Flowdown requirements for Rendezvous, Proximity Operations, Docking and Undocking (RPODU)
  - Carefully consider redundancy using identical vs. diverse H/W and S/W components
- Minimize complexity where possible
  - Impacts reliability, testability, and operability, as well as any potential vehicle GN&C commonality
- Have robust abort strategies and reliable Safe-Haven capabilities
  - Absolutely need a simple “Never Give Up” Safe Haven mode able to return crew safely to Earth
- Carefully evaluate the cost/benefit trade for heritage hardware and software
  - Recall Shuttle experience with tactical aircraft inertial systems, GPS receivers, and processors
- “Train as You Fly”
  - Factor in early the crew feedback on GN&C architecture, human-machine interface, and operational procedures

Flight-Like Cockpit Mockups (such as MIT/IL Apollo Hybrid Simulator) Allowed Apollo Astronauts Hands-On Training Which Influenced the GN&C Design

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NESC’s 22 GN&C Best Practices
15 for “Early Work”
7 for “Late Work”
List of the NESC 15 Early Work GN&C Best Practices

1. Early and iterative GN&C subsystem architectural development
2. Define all GN&C interdisciplinary interactions and relationships
3. Ensure implementation of comprehensive Abort/Safe Haven strategies/functions
4. Adequacy of host computer and proper selection of execution frequencies
5. Independent hardware and software for GN&C fault management
6. Establish & flowdown GN&C requirements for multi-vehicle system
7. Evaluate redundancy with identical GN&C hardware components
8. Evaluate heritage hardware and software in the GN&C architecture
9. Make certain that new GN&C technology is well qualified
10. “Design for Test” when evaluating candidate GN&C architectures
11. Define and document the coordinate frames and the system of units
12. Controller designs shall have robust stability margins
13. Understand & completely analyze the dynamics in ALL flight phases
14. All test anomalies must be understood and may need to be included in the truth model
15. Verification Truth Model must be developed independently
16 Establish a strong relationship with, and maintain close surveillance of GN&C lower-tier component-level suppliers
17 Adhere to the “Test As You Fly” philosophy
18 Conduct true end-to-end sensors-to-actuators polarity tests in all flight configurations
19 Plan and conduct sufficient GN&C hardware-in-the-loop testing to verify proper interactions
20 Carefully manage GN&C ground databases, uploads, ground application tools, and command scripts/files
21 Ensure sufficiency of GN&C engineering telemetry data
22 “Train as They Fly”: Develop a dedicated real-time GN&C simulator for the crew/operators

Reference:

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Discussion of Best Practices
vs.
Real-World Mishaps
Progress-M spacecraft is an unmanned cargo and resupply vehicle used to send equipment to Mir.

On 6/25/97 a 2nd test was performed of the manual Toru proximity docking system as a lower cost substitute for the autonomous Kurs rendezvous and docking system.

Operator on Mir had difficulty determining range and range rate with the Kurs radar switched off.

Progress went off course and collided with a solar array and radiator on the Spektr module and then the module itself.

Spektr hull was breached causing significant air loss before Spektr module could be sealed off.

Evacuation of the station was narrowly avoided.

There were three immediate causes of the crash:
- The higher than planned initial closing rate
- Late realization that closing rate was too high
- Incorrect final avoidance maneuvering
1. Range was to be determined by observing the size of a video image of Mir taken by a camera on Progress. The sole source of range rate information was the changing angular size and position of the image.
   BP #9: The rate measurement scheme was not qualified.
   BP #5: No independent way was provided to determine a fault in the rate measurement.

2. The operator continued to maneuver and aim for the docking port after noticing that the closing rate was higher than expected.
   BP #14: Failure to explain test anomalies.

3. Post crash simulations show that the rendezvous trajectory was passively safe so that if the operator had stopped maneuvering in time the collision might have been avoided.
   BP #6: Pre-test Systems Engineering did not flow down appropriate requirements to insure the safe interaction between the vehicles.

4. The operator could not realistically train and rehearse the rendezvous in advance because there were no simulation training facilities onboard Mir.
   BP #22: There was no provision to “Train as They Fly”.

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LEWIS was launched on August 23, 1997 into low Earth Orbit.

1. At launch, LEWIS was under control of the A-side processor. At first contact it had already switched to the B-side and was unable to playback SSR data.

2. After 45 hours of nadir pointing on B-side, the Ground crew switched control back to the A-side. The attitude was uncontrolled so the A-side Sun pointing mode was entered.

3. After verifying that the spacecraft had been stable in the Sun mode for four hours of operation, the Ground crew entered a nine-hour rest period and ceased operations for the day.

4. During that unattended period, the spacecraft entered a flat spin that resulted in a loss of solar power and a fatal battery discharge. Contact with the spacecraft was lost on August 26.

5. The spacecraft re-entered the atmosphere and was destroyed on 28 September 1997.
1. Safe mode was adapted from the TOMS spacecraft which had its X-axis normal to the solar array. X was the major axis of inertia on TOMS but it was the intermediate axis of inertia on Lewis.
   - BP #8: Over-reliance/Over-Confidence on TOMS heritage.
   - BP #1: GN&C Safe mode architectural was not iterated.
2. X-axis spin rate was not sensed and could not be controlled.
   - BP #3: Ensure implementation of comprehensive Abort/Safe Haven strategies/functions.
3. The Ground crew failed to adequately monitor spacecraft health and safety during the critical initial mission phase.
   - BP #21: Ensure sufficiency of GN&C engineering telemetry data.
4. X-axis rate produced disturbance torques in other axes resulting in excessive thruster firings which led to autonomous shutdown of thrusters.
   - BP #13: Understand & completely analyze the dynamics in ALL flight phases.
5. In the absence of control, the spacecraft dynamics transferred spin from the X to the Z axis with the solar array edge on to the Sun.
   - BP #15: Independent Truth Model should have identified un-modeled effects.
The X-31 program demonstrated the value of Thrust Vector Control (TVC) coupled with advanced flight control systems, to provide controlled flight during close-in air combat at very high angles of attack.

- The final flight of the X-31A was through atmospheric conditions conducive to icing.
- The flight went as planned until an ice buildup blocked the pitot tube.
- The Flight Computer used invalid air speed data to generate attitude control commands.
- Inappropriate commands resulted in uncontrollable/ divergent pitch oscillations.
- The pilot ejected at 18,000 ft. and parachuted to the ground.
- A NASA mishap-investigation board concluded that an accumulation of ice in or on the unheated pitot-static system was the proximate cause of the crash.

Underlying Issues included:
- Incomplete/improper interpretation of hazards analysis
- Breakdown in configuration management and change documentation
- Failure to impose proper ops controls and take preventative action

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1. The decision to install a new airspeed probe without a heater assumed that no flights would be made through conditions conducive to icing. The test pilot was unaware that the pitot heater switch was not working.
   BP #10: Failure to design for test.
   BP #20: Failure to coordinate information on potential hazard due to change in configuration.

2. Spurious air speed readings were noticed as ice built up and pilot switched ON the inoperative heater. Control room debated and finally replied that heater “...may not be hooked up” 9 seconds before warning tone and master caution light came on.
   BP #14: Failure to explain test anomalies.

3. When the Flight control computers received erroneous airspeed inputs, flight control gains changed so drastically that the pilot could not maintain control.
   BP #12: Insufficient control system stability margins.
   CP #13: Lack of parametric uncertainty analysis for control system.

4. ‘Fall-back’ fixed gain reversion modes were available for such situations, but had not been practiced and the pilot had not been briefed on their potential use in the event of unreliable airspeed data.
   BP #3: Abort/Safe Haven strategy (Reversion Mode) was not utilized.

5. Data from alternate air speed indicator that used a different pitot tube was ignored.
   BP #7: Independent air speed sensor data was available but not utilized.
The maiden flight of the Ariane 5 launcher on June 4, 1996 relied on identical GN&C hardware and software for redundancy.

- 39 seconds into the flight the primary Inertial Reference Unit (SRI-1) stopped sending correct attitude data due to a software exception.
- The On-Board Computer (OBC) switched to the backup inertial unit, but SRI-2 also failed due to its independently determined (but identical) software exception.
- The OBC could not switch back to SRI-1 so it took data that was actually part of a diagnostic message written to the bus by SRI-2. This data was interpreted as flight data and used for thrust vector control.
- The sudden swivelling of both solid booster nozzles up to the limit caused the launcher to tilt sharply giving rise to intense aerodynamic loads leading to destruction of the vehicle.
1. Primary Inertial Reference Unit, SRI-1, stopped sending correct attitude data due to a software exception.
   
   **BP #2:** *Interactions between S/W and GN&C were not defined with enough care.*
   
   **BP #8:** *Heritage software for Ariane-4 was inappropriate for Ariane-5.*
   
   **BP #20:** *Database confusion over reference trajectories.*
   
   **BP #17:** *Failure to adhere to "Test as You Fly" approach.*

2. Switchover to the backup unit was accomplished, but SRI-2 immediately failed in the same way as SRI-1.
   
   **BP #7:** *Evaluate if redundancy using identical GN&C components increases or decreases reliability.*

3. The OBC could not switch back to SRI-1 so it accepted SRI-2 diagnostic data as attitude data and generated improper TVC commands.

   **BP #3:** *Ensure that Abort/Safe Haven strategies/functions are properly implemented. Ariane-5 was lacking a simple and reliable "Never Give Up" flight control capability.*
Observations & Summary
Observations

- Complex space systems can produce flight articles that have a high sensitivity to parameter variations and reduced margins of stability and safety.

- The ways humans approach complex design and/or operational problems, and fail to solve them, is often because of an inability to think systemically.

- This is critically important for the GN&C subsystem which interacts with virtually all the other subsystems on the flight article.

- Lessons are being documented but not being "learned".

- One needs to not only carefully design/test all the new system capabilities functions but also make sure the previously established capabilities are implemented correctly.
Summary

- This presentation has introduced the initial set of the NESC GN&C Best Practices for review and comment by the Program Management community.

- The NESC GN&C Technical Discipline Team (TDT) is initiating a “GN&C Guidelines Project” to:
  - expand and build upon the work done to date
  - to more formally document and distribute a comprehensive set of Agency-wide GN&C System development guidelines

- We welcome and solicit constructive feedback from the Program Management community as we go forward with this activity.

- Call Neil Dennehy at NASA/GSFC on 301-286-5696 (or e-mail at cornelius.j.dennehy@nasa.gov) with your:
  - Comments
  - Questions
  - Experiences
  - Inputs
Backup
Top-Level Summary of the X-43A Mishap

The HXLV (Pegasus) was used to accelerate the Hyper-X Research Vehicle (HXRV) to the required Mach number and operational altitude for demonstration.

- The trajectory that was selected to achieve the mission was at a lower altitude (i.e. a higher dynamic pressure) than a typical Pegasus trajectory.
- Flight went as planned after B-52 drop until pitch-up maneuver.
- Diverging roll oscillation at 2.5-Hz frequency occurred during pitch-up.
- Roll oscillation continued to diverge until about 13 seconds into flight.
- Rudder electro-mechanical actuator stalled & ceased to respond to autopilot at that point causing loss of yaw control.
- Loss of yaw control caused X-43A stack sideslip to diverge rapidly to over 8°.
- Structural overload of starboard elevon occurred at 13.5 sec.
- Loss of control caused X-43A stack to deviate significantly from planned trajectory.
- Vehicle terminated by range control about 49 sec. after release.
1. The vehicle control system design was deficient for the trajectory flown due to inaccurate analytical models which overestimated design margins.
   BP #8: Over-reliance/Over-Confidence on Pegasus heritage.
   BP #17: Failure to adhere to “Test as You Fly” approach.
2. Failure triggered by divergent roll oscillatory motion at 2.5 Hz, caused by excessive control system gain.
   BP #12: Insufficient control system stability margins.
3. Modeling inaccuracies in fin actuation system & aerodynamics. Insufficient variations of modeling parameters.
   BP #13: Lacking parametric uncertainty analysis for control system.
4. Rudder actuator stall occurred as consequence of divergent roll which accelerated loss of control.
   BP #14: Inadequate dynamic modeling.
5. Flight failure was only reproduced when all modeling inaccuracies with uncertainty variations were incorporated in system-level linear analysis model & nonlinear simulation model.
   BP #15: Independent Truth Model should have identified un-modeled effects.
The Thermosphere, Ionosphere, Mesosphere, Energetics and Dynamics (TIMED) spacecraft was launched on 7 December 2001 into low Earth orbit. There were 4 separate GN&C anomalies early in the mission:

1. Shortly after separation there was a steady increase in spacecraft system momentum.

2. Coming out of eclipse and seeing the Sun for the first time in Sun Pointing Mode, the spacecraft pointed an incorrect axis toward the Sun.

3. The Nadir Pointing Mode, which is used for science observations, had an unanticipated 2.1 Hz oscillation.

4. Momentum dumping occurred 10 times/day rather than the expected once/day.
1. There was a Sign Error in the Momentum Unloading Control Logic.
   BP #18: *True end-to-end sensors-to-actuators polarity tests not conducted.*

2. Two of the Sun Sensors were not in the flight configuration during ACS polarity test.
   BP #17: *“Test As You Fly” philosophy was not enforced.*

3. There was a Controls-Structures Interaction (CSI) with the Solar Array Flex Mode which varied from 2.0-2.6 Hz depending on array orientation.
   BP #2: *Interactions between GN&C, Power, and Structures were not well defined.*
   BP #12: *Stability margins were not robust to parameter variations.*

4. The Spacecraft had a 10 A-m² Residual Magnetic Dipole.
   BP #2: *Residual dipole requirement was not specified.*
   BP #17: *Residual dipole was not measured in ground test.*