System Architectural Considerations on Reliable Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) for Constellation Program (CxP) Spacecraft

Cornelius J. Dennehy/NESC
Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Maryland
Since its founding, NASA has been dedicated to the advancement of aeronautics and space science. The NASA scientific and technical information (STI) program plays a key part in helping NASA maintain this important role.

The NASA STI program operates under the auspices of the Agency Chief Information Officer. It collects, organizes, provides for archiving, and disseminates NASA’s STI. The NASA STI program provides access to the NASA Aeronautics and Space Database and its public interface, the NASA Technical Report Server, thus providing one of the largest collections of aeronautical and space science STI in the world. Results are published in both non-NASA channels and by NASA in the NASA STI Report Series, which includes the following report types:

- **TECHNICAL PUBLICATION.** Reports of completed research or a major significant phase of research that present the results of NASA programs and include extensive data or theoretical analysis. Includes compilations of significant scientific and technical data and information deemed to be of continuing reference value. NASA counterpart of peer-reviewed formal professional papers, but having less stringent limitations on manuscript length and extent of graphic presentations.

- **TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM.** Scientific and technical findings that are preliminary or of specialized interest, e.g., quick release reports, working papers, and bibliographies that contain minimal annotation. Does not contain extensive analysis.

- **CONTRACTOR REPORT.** Scientific and technical findings by NASA-sponsored contractors and grantees.

- **CONFERENCE PUBLICATION.** Collected papers from scientific and technical conferences, symposia, seminars, or other meetings sponsored or co-sponsored by NASA.

- **SPECIAL PUBLICATION.** Scientific, technical, or historical information from NASA programs, projects, and missions, often concerned with subjects having substantial public interest.

- **TECHNICAL TRANSLATION.** English-language translations of foreign scientific and technical material pertinent to NASA’s mission.

Specialized services also include creating custom thesauri, building customized databases, and organizing and publishing research results.

For more information about the NASA STI program, see the following:

- Access the NASA STI program home page at [http://www.sti.nasa.gov](http://www.sti.nasa.gov)
- E-mail your question via the Internet to help@sti.nasa.gov
- Fax your question to the NASA STI Help Desk at 443-757-5803
- Phone the NASA STI Help Desk at 443-757-5802
- Write to:
  NASA STI Help Desk
  NASA Center for AeroSpace Information
  7115 Standard Drive
  Hanover, MD 21076-1320
System Architectural Considerations on Reliable Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) for Constellation Program (CxP) Spacecraft

Cornelius J. Dennehy/NESC
Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Maryland
The use of trademarks or names of manufacturers in the report is for accurate reporting and does not constitute an official endorsement, either expressed or implied, of such products or manufacturers by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
System Architectural Considerations on Reliable Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) for Constellation Program (CxP) Spacecraft

October 22, 2009
System Architectural Considerations on Reliable Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) for Constellation Program (CxP) Spacecraft

Report Approval and Revision History

Approval and Document Revision History

NOTE: This document was approved at the October 22, 2009, NRB. This document was submitted to the NESC Director on December 8, 2009, for configuration control.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approved Version</th>
<th>Original Signature on File</th>
<th>12/9/09</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0 NESC</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Version</th>
<th>Description of Revision</th>
<th>Office of Primary Responsibility</th>
<th>Effective Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
# System Architectural Considerations on Reliable Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) for Constellation Program (CxP) Spacecraft

## Table of Contents

**Volume I: Technical Assessment Report**

1.0 Notification and Authorization ................................................................. 5

2.0 Signature Page .................................................................................................. 6

3.0 Team List ......................................................................................................... 7

4.0 Executive Summary .......................................................................................... 8

5.0 Assessment Plan .............................................................................................. 11

5.1 Background ...................................................................................................... 11

5.2 Scope .................................................................................................................. 12

6.0 Problem Description, Proposed Solutions, and Risk Assessment ...................... 12

6.1 Description of the Problem .............................................................................. 12

7.0 Data Analysis .................................................................................................... 13

7.1 The 2 x 2 GN&C System .................................................................................. 13

7.2 Details on the 2 x 2 OPN Model ....................................................................... 15

7.3 Details on the 3 x 2 OPN Model ....................................................................... 19

7.4 Results .............................................................................................................. 26

7.5 Concluding Remarks ....................................................................................... 39

8.0 Findings and Recommendations ..................................................................... 40

8.1 Findings ............................................................................................................ 40

8.2 Recommendations ........................................................................................... 41

9.0 Alternate Viewpoints ....................................................................................... 42

10.0 Other Deliverables ......................................................................................... 42

11.0 Lessons Learned ............................................................................................ 42

12.0 Definition of Terms ....................................................................................... 42

13.0 Acronyms List ............................................................................................... 43

14.0 References ...................................................................................................... 44
List of Figures

Figure 7.1-1. Three Possible 2 x 2 Systems ................................................................. 13
Figure 7.2-1. 2 x 2 OPN Decision Tree ............................................................................. 17
Figure 7.3-1. Determination of Duplicate Architectures .................................................... 20
Figure 7.3-2. Finding Representative Architectures .......................................................... 21
Figure 7.3-3. Using Representative Architectures to Find Duplicates ............................... 22
Figure 7.3-4. Example of Manually-Drawn Architectures ............................................... 23
Figure 7.3-5. Example of Rule Based on a Manually Drawn Architecture ......................... 25
Figure 7.4-1. Architecture Pareto Plots ........................................................................... 28
Figure 7.4-2. Architecture Pareto Plots ........................................................................... 29
Figure 7.4-3. Architecture Pareto Plots ........................................................................... 31
Figure 7.4-4. Architecture Pareto Plots ........................................................................... 32
Figure 7.4-5. The Architectures Described in Table 7.4-1 ................................................. 36
Figure 7.4-6. The Architectures Described in Table 7.4-2 ................................................. 38

List of Tables

Table 7.1-1. Reliability Expressions for the 2 x 2 Systems in Figure 7.1-1 ......................... 14
Table 7.1-2. Indicator for the Channelized and Hybrid 2 x 2 Systems in Figure 7.1-1 ........ 14
Table 7.2-1. Component Properties For Sensor Types A, B, and C .................................... 18
Table 7.2-2. Component Properties For Computer Types A, B, and C .............................. 18
Table 7.2-3. Connection Reliabilities, Connection Weights, and Dissimilar Component
    Penalties for Each OPN Scenario Run ........................................................................ 19
Table 7.4-1. Reliabilities and Weights for the 1- through 9- Connection Architectures Closest
    the Utopia Point .................................................................................................... 35
Table 7.4-2. Reliabilities and Weights for the 1- through 9- Connection Architectures Closest
    the Utopia Point .................................................................................................... 37

Volume II: Appendices

Appendix A. A Comparison of GN&C Architectural Approaches for Robotic and Human-
    Rated Spacecraft ................................................................................................. 46
Appendix B. A Comparison of Fault-Tolerant GN&C System Architectures Using the Object
    Process Network (OPN) Modeling Language ........................................................ 47
Appendix C. Study Summary Presentation ........................................................................ 68
Volume I: Technical Assessment Report

1.0 Notification and Authorization

A NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) out-of-board assessment was approved on October 5, 2006. Mr. Cornelius Dennehy, NASA Technical Fellow for Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) was selected to lead this assessment. The Assessment Plan was presented and approved by the NESC Review Board (NRB) on April 19, 2007. The Study Kickoff meeting was held at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) on April 20, 2007. Interim research project progress and status reviews were held at MIT in July 2007, in December 2007 and in March 2008. An Initial Summary was presented to the NRB on December 19, 2008. The Final Report was presented for approval to the NRB on October 22, 2009.

The key stakeholders for this assessment are Mr. Frank Bauer, Chief Engineer for the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD); Dr. Brian Muirhead, Constellation Program (CxP) Chief System Engineer; Mr. Howard Hu, Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) GN&C lead; Mr. Scott Tamblyn, CEV GN&C Engineering; and Mr. William Othon, CEV GN&C Engineering.

The NESC, MIT, and Draper Laboratory team performed an independent and systematic study on the problem of optimizing the reliability of GN&C architectures with common avionic units.
System Architectural Considerations on Reliable Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) for Constellation Program (CxP) Spacecraft

2.0 Signature Page

Submitted by:
Original Signature on File – 3/30/10

Mr. Cornelius J. Dennehy Date

Significant Contributors:

Dr. Gregor Z. Hanuschak Date

Dr. Edward F. Crawley Date

Dr. Steven R. Hall Date

Dr. Nicholas A. Harrison Date

Mr. John J. West Date

Dr. Alejandro D. Domínguez-García Date

Signatories declare the findings and observations complied in the report are factually based from data extracted from Program/Project documents, contractor reports, and open literature, and/or generated from independently conducted tests, analysis, and inspections.
# System Architectural Considerations on Reliable Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) for Constellation Program (CxP) Spacecraft

## 3.0 Team List

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Discipline</th>
<th>Organization/Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Core Team</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornelius Dennehy</td>
<td>NESC Lead/NASA Technical Fellow for Guidance, Navigation, and Control NESC/GSFC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John West</td>
<td>Fault Tolerant Space Systems Draper</td>
<td>Laboratory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Study Team</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Crawley</td>
<td>MIT Study Lead (System Engineering)</td>
<td>MIT Aeronautics and Astronautics Engineering Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steven Hall</td>
<td>MIT Study Co-Lead (GN&amp;C Avionics Systems)</td>
<td>MIT Aeronautics and Astronautics Engineering Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gregor Hanuschak</td>
<td>Fault Tolerance and System Reliability</td>
<td>MIT Aeronautics and Astronautics Engineering Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicholas. Harrison</td>
<td>Fault Tolerant GN&amp;C Systems Draper</td>
<td>Laboratory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alejandro Dominguez-Garcia</td>
<td>Fault Tolerance and System Reliability</td>
<td>University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Administrative Support</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roy Savage</td>
<td>MTSO Program Analyst</td>
<td>LaRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donna Gilchrist</td>
<td>Planning and Control Analyst ATK,</td>
<td>LaRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christina Cooper</td>
<td>Technical Writer</td>
<td>ATK, LaRC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NESC Request No.:06-074-I
4.0 Executive Summary

This final report summarizes the results of a comparative assessment of the fault tolerance and reliability of different Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) architectural approaches. This study was proactively performed by a combined Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Draper Laboratory team as a GN&C “Discipline-Advancing” activity sponsored by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC). This systematic comparative assessment of GN&C system architectural approaches was undertaken as a fundamental step towards understanding the opportunities for, and limitations of, architecting highly reliable and fault tolerant GN&C systems composed of common avionic components. The primary goal of this study was to obtain architectural ‘rules of thumb’ that could positively influence future designs in the direction of an optimized (i.e., most reliable and cost-efficient) GN&C system. A secondary goal was to demonstrate the application and the utility of a systematic modeling approach that maps the entire possible architecture solution space.

The NESC team implemented a systematic approach for modeling, enumerating, and comparing simplified GN&C architectures using basic metrics. GN&C systems were decomposed into simple ‘building block’ subunits of Sensors, Computers, and Actuators, and various forms of subunit interconnection were defined for investigation. The resulting subunit/interconnection construct was used as a top-level abstraction for building candidate GN&C system architectures. This model was implemented using MIT’s Object Process Network (OPN) modeling language to more easily enumerate possible architectures, and ultimately identify which of these architectures have optimal properties. Dual and triple redundant GN&C system architectures, employing different reliability classes of components, were modeled using the OPN language. For the purpose of simplicity, it will be assumed that there are only three different types of GN&C avionic components possible for each component class. For example, the model incorporated three different types of GN&C Sensor components generically labeled Type A, Type B, and Type C, but understood to be representative of a low reliability/lightweight/low accuracy Sun Sensor; a medium reliability/medium weight/low-to-medium accuracy star tracker; and a high reliability/high weight/high accuracy Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU). The team assessed the avionic components typically used to implement recent space system GN&C architectures. Based upon this assessment, the team made a critical modeling assumption that the more reliable GN&C components tended to be heavier, more costly, and/or more complex. The team realized there are other modeling assumptions that could have been made, such as the GN&C avionic component with the smallest part count is a more reliable (and probably lower mass) unit than one with a higher part count. However, that alternate model construct did not fit either the team’s desire to keep the model simple and tractable, or the attributes of the GN&C avionic component inventory/technology base.
For the purposes of this study, reliability is defined as the probability that a given item will perform its intended function for a given time under a given set of flight conditions. This is most often expressed in terms of an average or mean life, such as Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF). Individual component reliabilities are dependent upon the component failure rate and desired operational time. The reliability relationships used in the model were exponential and governed by the equation \( R = e^{-\lambda t} \), where \( \lambda \) is the failure rate and \( t \) is the operational time. Operational time is a user-defined parameter and based on the length of the space exploration mission. An operational time of \( t = 10 \) years was assumed in the models developed. It should be noted that the model assumed perfect coverage – 100-percent – accuracy in detecting and isolating a failure.

All enumerated architectures were evaluated based on two specific metrics: reliability and weight. In this study, the team elected to assume weight as a surrogate indicator of system cost and complexity. The team acknowledges that in some cases system cost can be driven by the complexity factor alone. However to keep the model simple for this top-level study, the assumption made was that weight is a good first-order approximation for system complexity and cost.

The team used an interconnection construct as a top-level abstraction for building a preliminary model of GN&C system architectures. This model was implemented using the OPN modeling language in order to more easily enumerate possible architectures and ultimately identify which architectures have optimal properties. Partial 2 x 2 systems (i.e., systems with up to dual redundancy per component class for two component classes) and 3 x 2 systems (i.e., systems with up to triple redundancy per component class for two component classes) were modeled in OPN. Within the constraints of these models, all possible architectures were rigorously enumerated and the weight/reliability trade-offs of cross-strapping components and using more than one type of component was assessed.

It was found that more reliable components are only beneficial in single string systems, or systems with single point failures. The key finding of this study was that most optimal GN&C system architectures employing component redundancy can be produced from generic connections and the least reliable type of avionic component from each component class. The analysis of the identified optimal architectures show that it is possible to produce nearly all potentially optimal architectures using only the Type A light weight/low-reliability Sensors, Type A light weight/low-reliability Computers, and generic connections. The identified optimal architectures reveal a preference to increase GN&C system redundancy of lighter, less reliable components rather than using smaller numbers of more reliable, heavy components.
The NESC team concluded there is merit in mapping the entire possible system architecture solution space. By showing where similar classes of solutions fall within the entire set, it allows one to quantitatively see how certain solution features affect Figure-of-Merit (FOM) performance and derive architecture ‘rules of thumb’. It also allows one to see the optimal system architecture solution boundary (the Pareto Front) and understand how one FOM can be exchanged for another.

The approach documented in this report provides insight into a potential limitation of the ‘Minimum Functionality/Minimum Implementation’ system architecting methodology also known as the ‘Iterative Risk Driven Design Approach’ as described in [ref.6] which uses as its starting point a single-string non-redundant system architecture. This method involves performing iterative trades to improve system safety until the mass margin is exhausted. It is not apparent that this stepwise optimization of a single design can ever achieve the boundary of optimal solutions (the Pareto Front). Even if it somehow did reach the optimal boundary, it is not clear the system architects will have access to and be able to visualize the whole range of optimal solutions. System architects using the ‘Minimum Functionality/Minimum Implementation’ approach should be aware of the technique described in this report and consider using it for comparison.

The team also concluded that with some enhancements, the systematic GN&C/Avionics “building block” OPN modeling techniques employed would serve as an excellent tool for evaluating competing GN&C system architectures for future spacecraft. This OPN-based approach, or other similar modeling tools, would perform the extremely useful up-front function of identifying the most attractive (lowest weight and overall “cost”) GN&C architectural options that satisfy a prescribed set of spacecraft fault tolerance, reliability, and performance requirements. Although less likely, but worth observing, is that such “building block” models could be used to identify the optimal (highest reliability/lowest weight) architectural options for a prescribed number and configuration of connections between adjacent GN&C components.
5.0 Assessment Plan

5.1 Background

Historically, the United States (US) human spaceflight programs have had thorough GN&C analysis and design early in their lifecycles, evaluating various GN&C architectural concepts within the trade space of their individual mission goals, constraints, and risk postures. The selected GN&C architectures have been tailored for each program, which is not surprising given the very different mission concepts. The Constellation Program (CxP) will be no different, but top level program requirements drivers for reliability and affordability may flow down to influence GN&C architectural considerations, such as fault tolerance, in ways never before encountered in the US space program.

Accomplishing the objectives of the CxP requires reliable GN&C for multiple spacecraft, both crewed and robotic. The up-front “architecting-in” of reliability is an integral part of the early steps of the GN&C Systems Engineering process. Substandard architectures may not only be unreliable but are typically difficult to fabricate, test, operate, support, service, and upgrade. These architectures can also be prohibitively costly to adapt to evolving mission scenarios as the system lifecycle extends beyond the anticipated time frame of service.

The operators of systems with substandard architectures can have protracted development schedules and high recurring operational costs as a result of not fully informed design decisions made early in a project’s development cycle. Therefore, it was important that a major system development project not prematurely shift its focus to the challenges of implementation before fully defining the appropriate architecture. There is benefit to allocating the time and devoting sufficient attention to defining the optimum system architecture over the lifecycle by producing the maximum return for a given level of risk and resources.

With some of these considerations in mind a comparative assessment activity focused on investigating the fault tolerance and reliability trades between different GN&C architectural approaches was formulated by the NASA Technical Fellow for GN&C. This led to a proactive study being performed by a combined MIT and Draper Laboratory team as a GN&C “Discipline-Advancing” activity sponsored by the NESC. The motivation for performing this study was the observation, both on the part of NESC and MIT, that GN&C systems for exploration prominently stand out among all the future spacecraft systems, as a potential “sweet spot” area where having flight hardware commonality might be of greatest benefit. This systematic comparative assessment of GN&C system architectural approaches was undertaken as a fundamental step towards understanding the opportunities for and limitations of architecting highly reliable and fault tolerant GN&C systems composed of common GN&C avionic...
components. The primary goal of this study was to obtain architectural ‘rules of thumb’ which could positively influence and drive future designs in the direction of the most reliable and cost-efficient GN&C systems possible. A secondary goal was to demonstrate the application and utility of a systematic modeling approach that maps the entire possible architecture solution space.

5.2 Scope

The proposed work was a systematic GN&C architecture comparative study performed by an integrated MIT/Draper Laboratory study team under the leadership of Dr. Edward Crawley of the MIT Aeronautics and Astronautics Engineering Department.

This study leveraged analytical methods developed at MIT as part of their program in Technical System Architecture, and their specialized analysis tools/methods used to support the NASA Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) Concept Exploration and Refinement (CE&R) study. The MIT tools and methods were extended and applied to the problem of optimum GN&C system architectures. The existing MIT systematic architecture analysis capability, under Dr. Edward Crawley, was used to execute this task. Dr. Steven Hall, formerly of the Draper Laboratory, actively participated in this assessment as the Co-Lead and as the principal researcher on the assessment and evaluation of reliable GN&C avionic architectures.

MIT’s capabilities in system architecting methods were grounded in long-term research studies and benchmarking of best practice in space, automotive, electronics, and oil exploration industries. Historical work included methods developed in support of NASA’s Advanced Planning and Integration office, the creation and continuous refinement of a graduate-level class in Technical System Architecture, and through participation in multiple previous studies supporting NASA’s ESMD.

6.0 Problem Description, Proposed Solutions, and Risk Assessment

6.1 Description of the Problem

Sensors, Computers, and Actuators will be defined as “component classes”. The terminology “I x J OPN model” will be used to describe a model with up to “I” redundancy per component class and up to “J” component classes. For example, J = 2 could designate a model which only has Sensors or which has Sensors and Computers. J = 3 could designate a model with: Sensors; Sensors and Computers; or Sensors, Computers, and Actuators. If J = 3 and I = 2, this could designate a system with up to 2 Sensors, 2 Computers, and 2 Actuators. This paper will discuss the OPN 2 x 2 and 3 x 2 models and their applicability to a 3 x 3 model.
For the purpose of simplicity, it will be assumed that there are only three different types of components possible for each component class. In reality, three Sensor Types might include a Sun Sensor, star tracker, and an IMU. However, to be more generic, Types will instead be referred to as Type A, Type B, and Type C.

As a first pass, all enumerated architectures were evaluated based on two specific metrics: reliability and weight. In this study, the team elected to use weight as a surrogate indicator of system cost and complexity. The team did observe and understand that in some cases system cost can be driven by the complexity factor alone. However to keep the model simple for this top-level study the assumption made was that weight is a good first order approximation for system complexity and cost.

7.0 Data Analysis

Section 7.1 will discuss the design of the simple 2 x 2 model, Section 7.2 will give further details on the model, and Section 7.3 will discuss the design of the more complicated 3 x 2 model. Section 7.4 will examine the application of reliability and weight metrics to the enumerated architectures. Finally, Section 7.5 will provide some general concluding remarks.

7.1 The 2 x 2 GN&C System

This section begins the discussion of the design of the 2 x 2 model. Even with just four components (2 Sensors and 2 Computers), numerous architectures can be defined for a 2 x 2 system based on how the components are inter-connected. Each of these architectures will have different total weight and reliability.

![Figure 7.1-1. Three Possible 2 x 2 Systems](image)

Figure 7.1-1 depicts three possible 2 x 2 architectures. The reliability, $R$, of the three models is shown in Table 7-1.1, where $s_j$ is the reliability of Sensor $j$, and $c_k$ is the reliability of Computer $k$. 
It is important to note that no matter what the architecture, the reliability of any 2 x 2 model can be generated by taking the cross-strapped expression for R and then eliminating terms from the expression for connections which do not exist and therefore do not contribute to system reliability. Additional indicator variables are added to the cross-strapped reliability expression to specify which terms to eliminate. These indicator variables were correlated with the interconnections between components. A nonzero indicator variable represented a connection, whereas an indicator variable equal to zero represents a missing connection.

Using the methodology described, the following general expression for R is obtained:

\[
R = s_1 i_{11} c_1 + s_1 i_{12} c_2 - s_1 i_{11} i_{12} c_1 c_2 + s_2 i_{21} c_1 + s_2 i_{22} c_2 - s_2 i_{21} i_{22} c_1 c_2 - s_1 s_2 i_{11} i_{21} c_1 - s_1 s_2 i_{11} i_{22} c_1 c_2 - s_1 s_2 i_{12} i_{21} c_1 c_2 + s_1 s_2 i_{11} i_{12} i_{21} c_1 c_2 + s_1 s_2 i_{11} i_{21} i_{22} c_1 c_2 - s_1 s_2 i_{12} i_{22} c_2 + s_1 s_2 i_{11} i_{12} i_{22} c_1 c_2
\]

Where \( i_{jk} \) is the reliability of the connection between Sensor j and Computer k, if such a connection exists and 0 otherwise.

As a sanity check, the reliability expressions for the channelized and hybrid architectures can be derived from the general expression. Assuming perfect connection reliability (i.e., \( i_{jk} = 1 \) for all connections in the architecture) the channelized and hybrid architectures would be represented by the indicator variables in Table 7.1-2. Plugging these indicator variables into the general expression gives the same reliability expressions in Table 7.1-1.

### Table 7.1-2. Indicator for the Channelized and Hybrid 2 x 2 Systems in Figure 7.1-1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Architecture</th>
<th>i_{11}</th>
<th>i_{12}</th>
<th>i_{21}</th>
<th>i_{22}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Channelized</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hybrid</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.2 Details on the 2 x 2 OPN Model

Like the previously mentioned 3 x 2 and 3 x 3 models, the 2 x 2 OPN model was viewed as a sophisticated Petri net model. In a Petri net model, information-storing tokens move via directed arcs from transitions to and from places to transitions. Note that there may be more than one directed arc feeding from or to a transition or place. Upon arrival at a transition a token is consumed and then processing is completed, and, if appropriate, new tokens were introduced in the places dictated by the directed arcs leading from the transition.

The sequence of transitions in any of the discussed OPN models is a sequence of decision points. At each decision point, a token is replicated with multiplicity equal to the number of possible decisions. The information stored in each token represents a unique possible architecture. Taken together, the tokens enumerate all possible architectures given an initial set of constraints. All tokens are collected when they completely propagate through the model for analysis.

Figure 7.2-1 is a visual representation of the OPN decision tree for the 2 x 2 model and the following questions are the decision points:

- How many Sensors?
  - 1 or 2
- Type assignment for Sensors?
  - If only one Sensor, then choose Sensor A, Sensor B, or Sensor C
  - If two Sensors, then choose two of the same Type of Sensor or one of each of two Types (i.e., the possible combinations would be: AA, AB, AC, BB, BC, and CC)
- How many Computers?
  - 1 or 2
- Type assignment for Computers?
  - If only one Computer, then choose Computer A, Computer B, or Computer C
  - If two Computers, then choose two of the same Type of Computer or one of each of two Types (i.e., the possible combinations would be: AA, AB, AC, BB, BC, and CC)
- Which Sensors are connected to Computer 1?
  - Just Sensor 1
  - Just Sensor 2 (if Sensor 2 exists)
System Architectural Considerations on Reliable Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) for Constellation Program (CxP) Spacecraft

- Both Sensor 1 and 2 (if Sensor 2 exists)
- If Computer 2 exists, which Sensors are connected to Computer 2?
  - Just Sensor 1
  - Just Sensor 2 (if Sensor 2 exists)
  - Both Sensor 1 and 2 (if Sensor 2 exists)
During the process of token propagation, the number of components, component types, and connections were continuously updated for later use in reliability calculations. In addition, the current weight of the system was updated at execution time. Each component type was given its
own unique reliability and weight based on the specific make and model of the component. These values were based on real components, but modified slightly to facilitate analysis. Reliabilities are dependent upon the failure rate of the component and the desired operational time for the component. The relationship is governed by the equation $R = e^{-\lambda t}$, where $\lambda$ is the failure rate and $t$ is the operational time. Operational time is user defined and based on the length of the proposed mission. An operational time of $t = 10$ years was used in the models discussed in this paper. Other component properties are illustrated in Table 7.2-1 and Table 7.2-2.

**Table 7.2-1. Component Properties For Sensor Types A, B, and C**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sensor Type</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Failure Rate, $\lambda$ (/year)</td>
<td>0.00015</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliability, $R$</td>
<td>0.9985</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>0.9995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weight (dimensionless)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 7.2-2. Component Properties For Computer Types A, B, and C**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Computer Type</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Failure Rate, $\lambda$ (/year)</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
<td>0.00002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliability, $R$</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>0.9996</td>
<td>0.9998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weight (dimensionless)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two additional weights and one reliability were also included in the model. A “connection weight” and a “dissimilar component penalty” were included to ensure that weight continues to approximate complexity and cost. Cross-strapping components may not add significant weight to the overall system, but adds to the system complexity and cost. Similarly, dealing with more than one Type of Sensor and/or Computer also increases complexity and cost. Hence, adding these additional weights where appropriate worked as a first step toward simulating an operational system.

The weights associated with connections and dissimilar components were chosen to be consistent with the weights of Sensors and Computers. To do so, assumptions were made and the connections were considered to be, at most, 1/3 of the complexity of the average Computer. In addition, the weight penalty for dissimilar components was set such that it was not larger than the heaviest Sensor or Computer.

These assumptions dictated a certain range of weight values used for connections and dissimilar component parameters. However, rather than presuppose exact values for these weights, multiple OPN runs were executed varying one of the parameters each time. Assuming the
connection reliability would be greater than that of a Computer, the nine OPN scenarios are illustrated in Table 7.2-3.

**Table 7.2-3. Connection Reliabilities, Connection Weights, and Dissimilar Component Penalties for Each OPN Scenario Run**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPN Scenario</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Connection Reliability</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.99995</td>
<td>0.99995</td>
<td>0.99995</td>
<td>0.9999</td>
<td>0.9999</td>
<td>0.9999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connection Weight (dimensionless)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>5 / 3</td>
<td>5 / 3</td>
<td>5 / 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissimilar Component Penalty (dimensionless)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 7.3 Details on the 3 x 2 OPN Model

Implementation of the 3 x 2 OPN model is similar to that of the 2 x 2 model with two notable exceptions. These exceptions relate to the overall system reliability formula and the removal of duplicate architectures to minimize the computer memory required to run the model. The reliability formula was more complicated for the larger models and was handled differently. Although reliability is calculated after the OPN completes execution, it can no longer be easily manually calculated for implementation in Microsoft® Excel®. Instead, symbolic MATLAB® was used to calculate the formula and a MATLAB® script was used to insert the correct “i” indicator values where appropriate. Only after this manipulation was performed could the reliability values be imported into Excel® for implementation.

In addition, care had to be taken to ensure no architecture was represented more than once in the model. Running a larger 3 x 2 OPN model would take an inordinate amount of time and computer memory. It was found that certain architectures could be represented in multiple configurations and this was not taken into account by the 2 x 2 model. By producing tokens for all possible configurations of the same architecture, the model required significantly longer run times and used substantial memory.

---

1 The 2 x 2 model is smaller than the 3 x 2 model. As a result, there were no memory issues and duplicate architectures were removed in post-processing (i.e., they did not have to be removed in OPN).
An example of duplicate architecture is shown in Figure 7.3-1. A1 and A2 represent the same architecture, in both cases one Sensor of Type A is connected to a Computer of Type A, the other Sensor A is connected to a Computer A and a Computer B, and a Sensor of Type B is connected to a Computer of Type C. A3 represents a different architecture, however, since both Sensors of Type A are connected to a Computer of Type B.

The process of eliminating duplicate architectures began by choosing a representative set of Sensor Types and Computer Types. Ten possibilities were chosen as representative orderings of the three Sensor Types and also the three Computer Types: AAA, AAB, AAC, ABB, ACC, ABC, BBB, BBC, BCC, and CCC.

A1 in Figure 7.3-1 represents a connection pattern between three adjacent components. This connection pattern has four connections: Sensor 1 to Computer 1, Sensor 2 to both Computer 1 and Computer 2, and Sensor 3 to Computer 3. Keeping this connection pattern fixed, the team gave a “Type” identity to the three Sensors based on the 10 possible orderings. For each possible ordering of the Sensor Types, there were 10 possible orderings of the Computer Types, each of which defines a unique architecture. In other words, for any given connection pattern such as A1, there are $10 \times 10 = 100$ possible architectures. The OPN model iterates through all possible connection patterns and finds all 100 possible architectures.

Note that orderings such as ABA and BAA are not taken to be representative orderings. When all possible connection patterns are taken into account, these additional orderings will fail to produce any architecture that cannot be produced by AAB. This is because ABA, BAA, and AAB are equivalent (i.e., all represent two components of Type A and one of Type B). It does not matter in what order the Types are described as long as the case is represented.

Searching for duplicate architectures in the OPN does not require checking 100 possible architectures for each connection pattern. The 100 possibilities for each connection pattern can be represented by 16 representative architectures. As illustrated in Figure 7.3-2, the 10 Sensor Type combinations and the 10 Computer Type combinations can be abstracted to just four...
representative combinations per component. First, AAA, BBB, and CCC represent the case where all three components are of the same type. Next, AAB, AAC, and BBC represent the case where the first two components were of the same Type and the third component was of a different Type. Furthermore, ABB, ACC, and BCC represent the case where the second and third components are of the same Type, but the first component is of a different Type. Finally, ABC represents the case where all three components were of a different Type.

Figure 7.3-2. Finding Representative Architectures
Figure 7.3-3 helps demonstrate why these representative architectures work for finding duplicate architectures. To use representative architectures to find duplicates is to claim that if architecture A1 is equivalent to architecture A2, but not A3, then architecture B1 is equivalent to B2, but not B3.

As previously discussed, A1 and A2 represent the same architecture even though they have different connection patterns. It is arbitrary which form of architecture is chosen as the primary form and which is a duplicate (i.e., either A1 or A2 could be considered the duplicate).

The study team implemented duplicate detection into the model, which was an involved manual process. The assessment had a finite schedule allocation and the development time necessary for automating the duplicate detection process was uncertain. It was therefore decided that a manual (i.e., brute force) method should be used to implement duplicate detection. All possible representative architectures were manually drawn and duplicate architectures were identified. In all, over 100 pages of architectures were drawn and compared. An example of manually drawn architectures is shown in Figure 7.3-4.
Figure 7.3-4. Example of Manually-Drawn Architectures

Based on the circled representative architectures, rules were created and inserted into the OPN to keep any tokens that will produce duplicate architectures from propagating. Note that all rules are in the form of Boolean expressions starting with “not if” instead of “if”. Although all work was double-checked, it is conceivable that an incorrect rule was entered due to human error. By using “not if” instead of “if”, the default is to pass the token. It was assessed that it is better to retain a duplicate architecture rather than exclude a potentially optimal architecture.
The Boolean rules are inserted into the OPN model on the transitions from:

- Which Sensors are connected to Computer 1?
- If Computer 2 exists, which Sensors are connected to Computer 2?
- If Computer 3 exists, which Sensors are connected to Computer 3?

To the places:

- Just Sensor 1
- Just Sensor 2 (if Sensor 2 exists)
- Just Sensor 3 (if Sensor 3 exists)
- Just Sensors 1 and 2 (if Sensor 2 exists)
- Just Sensors 1 and 3 (if Sensor 3 exists)
- Just Sensors 2 and 3 (if Sensor 3 exists)
- Sensors 1, 2, and 3 (if Sensor 3 exists)

Trivial rules govern which Sensors are connected to Computer 1. If a particular token represents an architecture with only two Sensors, it is not possible to make a connection to a Computer from a nonexistent Sensor 3. Therefore, in the two Sensor case, no new tokens are introduced into the places representing, “just Sensor 3”, “just Sensors 1 and 3”, “just Sensors 2 and 3”, or “Sensors 1, 2, and 3”. Similarly, if a particular token represents an architecture with only one Sensor, no new tokens are introduced into the places representing, “just Sensor 2”, “just Sensor 3”, “just Sensors 1 and 2”, “just Sensors 1 and 3”, “just Sensors 2 and 3”, or “Sensors 1, 2, and 3”.

Rules governing connections to Computer 2 and 3 are more complicated. If a token represents an architecture with only two Computers, the final system architecture will be evident after creating the Sensor connections to the second Computer. If a token represents an architecture with three Computers, it is known that there will be a final system architecture after creating the Sensor connections to the third Computer. Connections that will form duplicate (circled) architectures should not be allowed to propagate. Hence rules are followed to block introduction of these tokens.

Figure 7.3-5 shows an example of a rule based on a manually drawn architecture. This rule determines whether a connection should be made between Sensor 3 and Computer 3. Note that, by the time a token reaches the given rule, the connections between Sensor 1 and Computer 2, and between Sensor 2 and Computer 1 have already been defined. No connection should be made if the type definitions for the Sensors and Computers match those represented by the circled architectures (i.e., such tokens will result in the formation of duplicate architectures). In other words, the connection between Sensor 3 and Computer 3 should not be made if Sensor
1’s Type is the same as Sensor 2’s Type, or Computer 1’s Type is the same as Computer 2’s Type.

```plaintext
!(Computer Redundancy < 3) &&
!(Sensor Redundancy < 3) &&
{ (i11 == 0 && i12 == 0) ||
(Sensor Redundancy > 1 && i21 == 0 && i22 == 0) ||
{ (i11 == 0 && i12 > 0 && i21 > 0 && i22 == 0 && i31 == 0 && i32 == 0) &&
  (Sensor1_Type == Sensor2_Type) ||
  (Computer1_Type == Computer2_Type)
  }
}
```

*Figure 7.3-5. Example of Rule Based on a Manually Drawn Architecture*

Eliminating duplicate architectures in the 3 x 2 OPN model significantly reduced the number of tokens produced from 51,902 to 9,795 tokens.
7.4 Results

Despite eliminating the unnecessary duplicate architectures from the model, attempts to run a 3 x 3 model still resulted in a memory shortage. Although it is unfortunate that the larger OPN model could not be completed, it is important to note that results from the 3 x 2 model can be applied to the 3 x 3 case.

By taking a top-level view of a GN&C system, the interaction between adjacent Sensor and Computer components is identical to the interaction between adjacent Computer and Actuator components. Similar to the Sensors and Computers, there are different Types of Actuators, each with a unique set of properties. A system architect will be able to choose different redundancies for each of these Types. Furthermore, the connection patterns already found between Sensors and Computers are the same as those between Computers and Actuators. Finally, the metrics of weight and reliability can be calculated in the same way.

There were nine scenarios outlined in this section, each scenario was run and Pareto plots were produced for each. Representative plots for the nine scenarios are reproduced in Figures 7.4-1 through 7.4-4. In each scenario, the architectures that simultaneously had both lowest weight and highest reliability were identified. These architectures are “on the Pareto front.” The identified Pareto architectures were found by zooming in on the “utopia point” at the lower right hand corner of the plot\(^2\). Note that in most cases, there are multiple identified architectures for each scenario since it is somewhat subjective which architectures are closer to the utopia point. For example: Is an architecture with weight = 17 and reliability = 0.999999596912468 (six “9”s) better than an architecture with weight = 18 and reliability = 0.999999995634079 (eight “9”s)?

The answers to such questions are made clear in the mission requirements context. For a human-rated mission, perhaps a reliability of 0.9999999 (seven “9”s) is required for safety. If this were the case, the architecture with weight = 18 would be better, since the architecture with weight = 17 does not meet the seven “9”s requirement of this example.

In the zoomed out (top) plot of each of the nine scenarios, there appear to be six clusters of architecture data points. The architectures in each cluster have nearly identical reliabilities. Looking from left to right, the first five clusters (i.e., the five clusters with the lowest reliability) are driven by single point failures of any of the six component Types. For example, in an architecture that contains one Sensor and two Computers, or an architecture that contains one Sensor and three Computers, the single Sensor present in the architecture must remain viable in order for the overall system to remain reliable. Sensor Type A has a reliability of 0.9985.

\(^2\) The utopia point represents the ideal architecture which is 100 percent reliable with weight = 0.
Therefore, a one-Sensor two-Computer or one-Sensor three-Computer architecture that contains Sensor A can have a maximum reliability of 0.9985. Architectures that have a single point failure at Sensor A, define the first (least reliable) cluster of data points. Both Sensor Type B and Computer Type A have the same reliability of 0.999. Therefore, architectures that have a single point failure at a Sensor of Type B, or a single point failure at a Computer of Type A, will fall into the second cluster. Similarly, Sensor Type C’s reliability of 0.9995 defines the third cluster, Computer Type B’s reliability of 0.9996 defines the fourth cluster, and Computer Type C’s reliability of 0.9998 defines the fifth cluster.

The sixth and final (most reliable) cluster contains all other architectures (i.e., architectures free from single point failures). The additional points that do not fall into any of the six clusters are single-string architectures (i.e., architectures that contain one Sensor and one Computer). These architectures contain not one, but two single point failures and are therefore significantly less reliable than an identical architecture with additional Computers or additional Sensors.
Figure 7.4-1. Architecture Pareto Plots

Note: (Top) Pareto plot with added details for number of connections between Sensors and Computers, (Middle) zoomed in version of the same plot, (Bottom) potential optimal architectures for this scenario: (From left to right) Architecture 1 has weight = 12 and reliability = 0.9999967, architecture 2 has weight = 15 and reliability = 0.9999989, architecture 3 has weight = 17 and reliability = 0.99999959, and architecture 4 has weight = 18 and reliability = 0.9999999956
Figure 7.4-2. Architecture Pareto Plots
Figure 7.4-2. Concluded

Note: (Top) Pareto plot with added details for both number of Sensors and number of Computers, (Middle) zoomed in version of the same plot, (Bottom) potential optimal architectures for this scenario: (From left to right) Architecture 1 has weight = 12 and reliability = 0.99999675437371, architecture 2 has weight = 15 and reliability = 0.999998997632005, and architecture 3 has weight = 18 and reliability = 0.99999995634079
Figure 7.4-3. Architecture Pareto Plots

Note: (Top) Pareto Plot with Added Details for Both Number and Types of Computers, (Middle) Zoomed in version of the same plot, (Bottom) potential optimal architectures for this scenario: (From left to right) Architecture 1 has weight = 14 and reliability = 0.999996754062388, architecture 2 has weight = 17 and reliability = 0.999998992620742, architecture 3 has weight = 19 and reliability = 0.999999593334442, and architecture 4 has weight = 19.5 and reliability = 0.999999983481890
Figure 7.4-4. Architecture Pareto Plots

Note: (Top) Pareto plot with added details for both number and Types of Sensors, (Middle) zoomed in version of the same plot, (Bottom) Potential optimal architectures for this scenario: (From left to right) Architecture 1 has weight = 15.333 and reliability = 0.999993257523472, architecture 2 has weight = 17 and reliability = 0.99999501059889, architecture 3 has weight = 18.667 and reliability = 0.999996753726173, architecture 4 has weight = 20 and reliability = 0.999997398039817, architecture 5 has weight = 21.667 and reliability = 0.999998992071849, and architecture 6 has weight = 23 and reliability = 0.999999983481890
The ideal case would be that there is no penalty for connection weight or using dissimilar components, which can be seen in Figure 7.4-1. In this scenario, all identified architectures are fully cross-strapped. This is to be expected since additional connections increase reliability yet cost nothing. Figure 7.4-1 also demonstrates that the weight of an architecture’s component plays a major role in determining the optimality of the architecture. Recall that components of Type A are the lightest and least reliable, and that components of Type C are the heaviest and most reliable. Even though components of Type A is the least reliable, Sensors of Type A and Computers of Type A are by far the most prevalent component Types in all the optimal architectures. In addition, although components of Type C are the most reliable, no components of this type appear in any of the optimal architectures. Furthermore, there were no Sensors of Type B in the optimal architectures. Architecture three contains a Computer of Type B, but this architecture is no longer optimal once the “dissimilar components penalty” is increased from penalty = 0 to penalty = 6 (see Figure 7.4-2). Since the optimal architectures for penalty = 6 contain no dissimilar components, increasing the penalty to = 9 results in no further changes to the optimal architectures.

Figure 7.4-3 provides a baseline for what can be considered a realistic system. In this scenario, there are no longer perfect connection reliabilities of 100 percent and there is a cost for producing connections (i.e., connection reliability = 0.99995 and connection weight = 0.5). As a result of the 0.5 connection weight, only one fully cross-strapped architecture (Architecture 1) is among the optimal architectures. The other optimal architectures have 3 or 4 connections. Among these, Architectures 2 and 3 are the most interesting. Each has three Sensors and two Computers with two of the Sensors having one connection to a Computer and the last having two connections.

The scenario in which connection weight = 0.5 is similar with the connection weight = 0 scenario. Once again, the component types in the optimal architectures are predominantly of Type A and never of Type C. Only one optimal architecture (Architecture 3) contains a component of Type B (Computer). This architecture is not optimal when the dissimilar components penalty is increased to penalty = 6. There is no change in optimal architectures for connection weight = 0.5 when this penalty is increased from penalty = 6 to = 9.

Figure 7.4-4 depicts the first scenario where connection reliability = 0.9999 and connection weight = 5/3. This scenario produces similar optimal architectures to the connection weight = 0.5 scenario, but with notable exceptions.

Even with the dissimilar components penalty set to penalty = 0, connection weight = 5/3 is sufficiently high as to eliminate any architecture that contains a component type heavier than
Type A. This means that Architecture 3 from Figure 7.4-3 is the only connection weight = 0.5 architecture which contains a component of Type B, and is not an optimal architecture for connection weight = 5/3. This also means that the optimal architectures for connection weight = 5/3 will not change if the dissimilar components penalty is increased to penalty = 6 or = 9.

A connection weight of 5/3 makes it more desirable to have architectures with fewer connections. Although Architectures 1, 2, and 4 from Figure 7.4-3 are still optimal architectures when the connection weight is increased to 5/3, the value of these architectures was diminished with the heavier connection weight. As a result, these architectures are no longer closer to the utopia point than Architectures 1, 2, and 4 from Figure 7.4-4.

The six potentially optimal architectures for connection weight = 5/3 produce an interesting set. All legal architectures with four or fewer connections that contain two to three Sensors of Type A and two Computers of Type A are optimal architectures for this scenario. In effect, a system architect is directly trading an increase in weight for additional reliability when connection weight = 5/3.

By reviewing a subset of the possible architectures, specifically a subset in which all members have the same number of connections, the effect of the dissimilar components penalty on the optimal architectures is nearly identical to the penalty’s effect on the optimal architectures of the superset. Figures 7.4-5 and 7.4-6 depict the optimal architectures for 3 x 2 systems with 1 through 9 connections when the connection reliability equals one and connection weight equals zero. The reliabilities and weights for these architectures can be found in Tables 7.4-1 and 7.4-2. Again, as the penalty is increased from penalty = 0 to 6, nearly all architectures containing Sensor Type B or Computer Type B cease to be optimal. For architectures with the same number of connections, the same architectures which are optimal for penalty = 0 will be optimal no matter what the connection weight. Similarly, architectures which are optimal for penalty = 6 or 9 remained optimal no matter what the connection weight. Although the overall system weight of any subset member will change if the connection weight is modified, this change will be identical to the transformation seen by any of the other systems in this subset. This is because all systems in each subset have, by definition, the same number of connections. Therefore, among architectures with the same number of connections, the architectures closest to the utopia point will remain closest to the utopia point regardless of the change to the connection weight.
### Table 7.4-1. Reliabilities and Weights for the 1- through 9- Connection Architectures Closest the Utopia Point

Note: Assuming a 3 X 2 System with Connection Reliability = 1, Connection Weight = 0, and No Penalty for Dissimilar Components

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Connections</th>
<th>Reliability</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>On Pareto front?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 0.99</td>
<td>9100405</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>9300245</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 0.99</td>
<td>9993766</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>9995260</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>9996397</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>9997344</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>9997754</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>9998292</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>9998741</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 0.99</td>
<td>9995260</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>9996756</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>9997499</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>9998996</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>9999984</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 0.99</td>
<td>9996754</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>9998993</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>9999594</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>9999998</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 0.99</td>
<td>9998995</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>9999596</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>9999992</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 0.99</td>
<td>9998998</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>9999997</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>9999996</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 0.99</td>
<td>9999994</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 0.99</td>
<td>9999996</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 0.99</td>
<td>9999996</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 7.4-5. Architectures Described in Table 7.4-1
**Table 7.4-2. Reliabilities and Weights for the 1- through 9- Connection Architectures Closest the Utopia Point**

Note: Assuming a 3 X 2 System with Connection Reliability = 1, Connection Weight = 0, and Penalty = 6 for Dissimilar Components

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Connections Reliability</th>
<th>Reliability</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>On Pareto front?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 0</td>
<td>.999100405</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>.999300245</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 0</td>
<td>.999993766</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>.999996397</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 0</td>
<td>.999995260</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>.999997499</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 0</td>
<td>.999996754</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>.999998993</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>.999999984</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 0</td>
<td>.999998995</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>.999999992</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 0</td>
<td>.999998998</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>.999999996</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 0</td>
<td>.999999994</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 0</td>
<td>.999999996</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 0</td>
<td>.999999996</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 7.4-6. Architectures Described in Table 7.4-2
7.5 Concluding Remarks

There is merit in mapping the entire possible solution space. By showing where similar classes of solutions fall within the entire set, it allows one to see ‘and how certain solution features effect FOM performance and derive architecture ‘rules of thumb’. It also allows one to see the optimal solution boundary (the Pareto Front) and understand how one FOM can be exchanged for another.

This approach provides insight into a potential limitation of the ‘Minimum Functionality/Minimum Implementation’ system architecting methodology [ref.6] which uses as its starting point a single-string non-redundant system architecture which lies somewhere in the interior of the solution trade space. The method involves performing one trade at a time to improve system safety until the mass margin is gone. It is not clear that this stepwise optimization of a single design can ever get to the boundary of optimal solutions (the Pareto Front). Even if it somehow did reach the optimal boundary it is not clear the system architects will have access to and be able to visualize the whole range of optimal solutions. System architects using the ‘Minimum Functionality/Minimum Implementation’ approach should at least be aware that the technique described in this report is available and they should consider using it to explore the entire system trade space and to provide some comparative outputs for cross-check their results.

With some enhancements the systematic GN&C/Avionics “building block” OPN modeling techniques employed by the MIT/Draper Laboratory would serve as an excellent tool for evaluating competing GN&C system architectures for future NASA spacecraft. This OPN-based approach, or other similar modeling tools, would perform the extremely useful up-front function of identifying the most attractive (lowest weight and overall “cost”) GN&C architectural options that satisfy a prescribed set of spacecraft fault tolerance, reliability and performance requirements. Although less likely, but worth observing, is the fact that such “building block” models could be used to identify the optimal highest reliability/lowest weight architectural options for a prescribed number and configuration of connections between adjacent GN&C components.

On-board GN&C flight software was, by design, not included in this GN&C system modeling and analysis study. Since there are potential for achieving flight software commonality across multiple spacecraft this aspect of the system architecture should be considered in future work.
8.0 Findings and NESC Recommendations

8.1 Findings

The following NESC/MIT/Draper Laboratory study team findings were identified:

F-1. Most optimal architectures can be created by using the lowest reliability and lightest components.
   • The analysis of the identified optimal architectures show that it is possible to produce nearly all potentially optimal architectures using only the Type A light weight/low-reliability Sensors, Type A light weight/low-reliability computers, and generic connections.

F-2. It is preferable to increase the redundancy of lighter, less reliable components rather than to use smaller numbers of more reliable, heavy components.

F-3. There are diminishing returns to adding redundancy, connections, or components with greater reliability.
   • The system will experience only minimal increases in overall reliability for the large gains in system weight.

F-4. For the optimal architectures in each scenario, the number of connections drops dramatically as the connection weight penalty is increased.

F-5. The impact of the dissimilar components penalty is more subtle than that for connectors, but is still apparent.
   • Some architectures containing both Computer Type A and Computer Type B were identified as potentially optimal when the penalty = 0. However, when the penalty is increased to = 6, these architectures no longer appear to be better than other architectures.

F-6. The OPN-based modeling approach employed required a time-consuming manual process for eliminating architectural duplicates.

F-7. The OPN-based modeling approach employed was top-level only.

F-8. In addition to the reliability metric, the existing OPN model could be modified to identify the optimal GN&C /Avionics architectural options for satisfying other driving
system metrics, such as fault tolerance constraints, avionics power consumption, and/or attitude control performance.

8.2 NESC Recommendations

The following NESC recommendations were identified and directed to the ESMD Chief Engineer, the CxP Program System Engineering organization, and the Orion and Altair GN&C/Avionics Subsystem designers:

R-1. Consider the fundamental findings of the NESC/MIT/Draper Laboratory study team to determine, given their reliability modeling assumptions, if the trends identified can be applied to architecting future CxP spacecraft GN&C/Avionics subsystems. (*F-1, F-2, F-3, F-4, and F-5*)

R-2. Comprehensive investigate, using the OPN-based model described in this report (or using similar GN&C/Avionics modeling tools and methods) both the pros and cons of incorporating dissimilar GN&C Sensor, Computer, and Actuator components in the GN&C architectures. Study how a small set of crew/flight safety critical GN&C functions can be synthesized/implemented in a backup manner with a limited complement of dissimilar hardware and software components. (*F-5*)

R-3. Future work in on reliable GN&C should include the following enhancements of the GN&C/Avionics system modeling approach (*F-6, F-7, F-8, and F-9*):

a) Improve the efficiency of the OPN model processing and its memory management.

b) Incorporate provisions to model more than three Types of GN&C Sensors, Computers, and Actuators into the model.

c) Include additional intrinsic descriptive details for each component beyond reliability and weight.

d) Support expanded GN&C/Avionics architectural layouts in which the component redundancy for any component can be greater than three. For example the enhanced model should be capable of evaluating an architecture consisting of four Sensors, three Computers, and two Actuators.

e) Automate the process for eliminating architectural duplicates and for creating rules.

R-4. Future work on reliable GN&C should include the addition of the following metrics for higher-fidelity analysis and evaluation of GN&C/Avionics system architectural robustness, reliability, mass, power, volume, and performance (*F-9*):
a) The fault tolerance requirements/rules for the specific spacecraft application being modeled. Metrics on the cost of any analytical redundancy (i.e., the redundancy management software) needed to detect and isolate faults should be provided for evaluation.

b) The impact of common mode hardware failures. The metric could be either the incremental benefit of dissimilar redundancy or the incremental risk of similar redundancy.

c) The values for Sensor, Computer, and Actuator component Mass, Volume, and Power (MVP).

d) The 6-DOF spacecraft attitude and position control/knowledge performance metrics.

9.0 Alternate Viewpoints

There were no alternate viewpoints or minority opinions expressed by the members of the NESC/MIT/Draper Laboratory study team.

10.0 Other Deliverables

There are no other deliverables at this time.

11.0 Lessons Learned

There were no lessons learned.

12.0 Definition of Terms

Corrective Actions: Changes to design processes, work instructions, workmanship practices, training, inspections, tests, procedures, specifications, drawings, tools, equipment, facilities, resources, or material that result in preventing, minimizing, or limiting the potential for recurrence of a problem.

Finding: A conclusion based on facts established by the investigating authority.

Lessons Learned: Knowledge or understanding gained by experience. The experience may be positive, as in a successful test or mission, or negative, as in a mishap or failure. A lesson must be significant in that it has real or assumed impact on operations; valid in that it is factually and technically correct; and applicable in that it identifies a specific design, process, or decision.
that reduces or limits the potential for failures and mishaps, or reinforces a positive result.

Observation
A factor, event, or circumstance identified during the assessment that did not contribute to the problem, but if left uncorrected has the potential to cause a mishap, injury, or increase the severity should a mishap occur. Alternatively, an observation could be a positive acknowledgement of a Center/Program/Project/Organization’s operational structure, tools, and/or support provided.

Problem
The subject of the independent technical assessment/inspection.

Proximate Cause
The event(s) that occurred, including any condition(s) that existed immediately before the undesired outcome, directly resulted in its occurrence and, if eliminated or modified, would have prevented the undesired outcome.

Recommendation
An action identified by the assessment team to correct a root cause or deficiency identified during the investigation. The recommendations may be used by the responsible Center/Program/Project/Organization in the preparation of a corrective action plan.

Root Cause
One of multiple factors (events, conditions, or organizational factors) that contributed to or created the proximate cause and subsequent undesired outcome and, if eliminated or modified, would have prevented the undesired outcome. Typically, multiple root causes contribute to an undesired outcome.

13.0 Acronyms List

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CaLV</td>
<td>Cargo Launch Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CE&amp;R</td>
<td>Concept Exploration and Refinement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEV</td>
<td>Crew Exploration Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLV</td>
<td>Crew Launch Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cx</td>
<td>Constellation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CxP</td>
<td>Constellation Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOF</td>
<td>Degree of Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDS</td>
<td>Earth Departure Stage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESMD</td>
<td>Exploration Systems Mission Directorate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
System Architectural Considerations on Reliable Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) for Constellation Program (CxP) Spacecraft

14.0 References


Volume II: Appendices

Appendix A. A Comparison of GN&C Architectural Approaches for Robotic and Human-Rated Spacecraft (A copy of this report is available through AIAA)

Appendix B. A Comparison of Fault-Tolerant GN&C System Architectures Using the Object Process Network (OPN) Modeling Language

Appendix C. NESC Stakeholder Outbrief
Appendix A. A Comparison of GN&C Architectural Approaches for Robotic and Human-Rated Spacecraft
(A copy of this report is available through AIAA)

A Comparison of GN&C Architectural Approaches for Robotic and Human-Rated Spacecraft

Alejandro D. Domínguez-García*, Gregor Z. Hanuschak†, Steven R. Hall‡ and Edward F. Crawley§
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, 02139, USA

* Corresponding Author:
alejandro.dominguez@mit.edu

† Present address:
NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA, USA

‡ Present address:
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, MD, USA

§ Present address:
NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, CA, USA
Appendix B. A Comparison of Fault-Tolerant GN&C System Architectures Using the Object Process Network (OPN) Modeling Language

This paper summarizes the final results of a study analyzing different Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) architectural approaches for fault tolerance in National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) crewed and robotic exploration space systems. GN&C systems were decomposed into simple building block subunits of sensors, computers, and actuators and various forms of subunit interconnection were defined for investigation. The resulting subunit/interconnection construct was used as a top-level abstraction for building candidate GN&C system architectures. This model was implemented using Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s (MIT’s) Object Process Network (OPN) modeling language in order to more easily enumerate possible architectures and ultimately identify which of these architectures have optimal properties. Dual and triple redundant GN&C system architectures, employing different classes of components, were modeled using the OPN language. The model assumed perfect coverage – 100-percent accuracy in detecting and isolating a failure. Within the constraints of the model, all possible architectures were rigorously enumerated and the weight/reliability trade-offs of cross-strapping components and using more than one type of component were assessed. The study results indicate it is possible to produce nearly all potentially optimal GN&C architectures using generic connections between low-reliability components. The identified optimal architectures reveal a preference to increase GN&C system redundancy of lighter, less reliable components rather than using smaller numbers of more reliable, heavy components.

Gregor Z. Hanuschak
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139

Nicholas A. Harrison
Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, Cambridge, MA 02139-4807

Edward F. Crawley and Steven R. Hall
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139

Alejandro D. Dominguez-Garcia
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL 61801

John J. West
Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, Cambridge, MA 02139-4807

and

Cornelius J. Dennehy
NASA Engineering & Safety Center, Greenbelt, MD, 20771
Nomenclature

- CEV = Crew Exploration Vehicle
- CLV = Crew Launch Vehicle
- CxP = Constellation Program
- GN&C = Guidance, Navigation and Control
- IMU = Inertial Measurement Unit
- MIT = Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- NASA = National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- NESC = NASA Engineering and Safety Center
- OPN = Object Process Network

I. Background

At the core of NASA’s future space exploration is a return to the Moon, where we will build a sustainable long-term human presence. As the Space Shuttle approaches retirement and the International Space Station nears completion, NASA’s Constellation Program (CxP) is designing and developing the next fleet of American space-faring vehicles to bring astronauts back to the Moon, and possibly to Mars and beyond. In order to meet their exploration goals, NASA’s CxP will have to acquire and operate a number of new human-rated systems, such as the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), the Ares-I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV), and the Altair Lunar Lander, along with other elements for crew transportation (e.g., in-space propulsion stages), lunar habitation, and mobility. Robotic systems will include lunar robotic orbiter vehicles and robotic lunar landers. Commonality in exploration system hardware, and software elements offers the opportunity to significantly increase sustainability by reducing, both nonrecurring and recurring cost and/or risk. In particular the potential benefit of common GN&C avionics and flight software is considerable, not only in the initial development effort, but in validation and verification, and more importantly in the ongoing maintenance efforts and incremental upgrades that will occur over the life cycle of these exploration spacecraft. With commonality of the onboard components of this system, there is more likelihood that ground control and communications systems could be made more common, yielding a multiplier effect. This paper summarizes the final results of a comparative assessment of robotic and human-rated GN&C system architectural approaches. This study was performed by a combined MIT and Draper Laboratory team as part of a project sponsored by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC).

This study effort was primarily driven by the observation, both on the part of NESC and MIT, that GN&C systems for exploration prominently stand out among all the future spacecraft systems, as an area where commonality might be of greatest benefit. This comparative assessment of robotic and human-rated GN&C system architectural approaches was undertaken as a fundamental step towards understanding the opportunities and limitations of GN&C commonality across the CxP flight elements.

II. Introduction

CxP has created a need to develop new robotic and human-rated space systems. In an attempt to influence the design of the most collectively reliable and cost-efficient systems possible, the NESC sponsored a commonality study for GN&C systems through the MIT and Draper Laboratories. By modeling, enumerating, and comparing simplified GN&C architectures using simple metrics, this resulting paper presents sound reasoning for making certain architectural choices which, when implemented, would further these reliability and cost-efficiency goals.

In the 2007 AIAA paper, “A Comparison of GN&C Architectural Approaches for Robotic and Human-Rated Spacecraft” (Ref. 2), different architectural approaches for fault tolerance in guidance, navigation, and control (GN&C) systems were analyzed at the topmost level. The study broke down the GN&C systems into simple subunits, i.e., sensors, computers, and actuators, and analyzed how the components were interconnected. This paper expands upon the previous 2007 paper written by the authors. It uses the previous paper’s submit/interconnection construct as a top-level abstraction for building a preliminary model of GN&C system architectures.
System Architectural Considerations on Reliable Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) for Constellation Program (CxP) Spacecraft

Although never before used to model GN&C system architectures, the OPN modeling language was used with great success to model mission and hardware architectures (see Ref. 3 and Ref. 5 for details). OPN is a visual and computable meta-language that assists with systems architecture tasks. OPN is typically used to describe and partition the space of architectural alternatives, generate and enumerate the set of instances of feasible system models, and then simulate and evaluate the performance metrics of each model. This language combines visual representation on Pareto plots with mathematical modeling and provides a modeling framework in which it is relatively easy to add new options to understand the effect of new technologies and different configurations. Moreover, as proven in this study, the OPN language is applicable to many "levels" of a given architecture.

Candidate GN&C system architecture models were implemented using the OPN modeling language in order to more easily enumerate possible architectures and ultimately identify which architectures have optimal properties. Following the basic procedure employed in the above references and using Ref. 2 to provide the background for the top-level abstraction used in the model, OPN was successfully employed in the models described in this paper.

Partial 2 x 2 systems (i.e., systems with up to dual redundancy per component class for two component classes) and 3 x 2 systems (systems with up to triple redundancy per component class for two component classes) were modeled in OPN. Within the constraints of these models, all possible architectures were rigorously enumerated and the weight/reliability trade-offs of cross-stripping components and using more than one type of component were assessed.

The described models assume perfect coverage – 100-percent accuracy in detecting and isolating a failure. The models also assume that more reliable components tend to be heavier, more costly, and/or more complicated to deal with. Given these assumptions, it was found that more reliable components are only beneficial in single string systems or systems with single point failures. All optimal architectures employing component redundancy could be produced from generic connections and the least reliable type of component from each component class.

According to Ref. 2, a GN&C system can be represented with sensors, computers, actuators, and how these components are interconnected. Given this abstraction, the completed OPN model discussed in this paper represents all possible GN&C architectures within a given set of constraints. The constraints are defined as the number of component classes, the maximum component redundancy in each component class, and the number of component types for each class.

In this paper, sensors, computers, and actuators will be defined as "component classes." The terminology "J x J OPN model" will be used to describe a model with up to "J" redundancy per component class and up to "J" component classes. In other words, J = 2 could designate a model which only has sensors or which has both sensors and computers. J = 3 could designate a model with sensors, with sensors and computers, or with sensors, computers, and actuators. If J = 3 and I = 2, this could designate a system with up to two sensors, two computers, and two actuators. This paper will discuss OPN 2 x 2 and 3 x 2 models and touch on their applicability to a 3 x 3 model.

For the purpose of simplicity, it will be assumed that there are only three different types of components possible for each component class. In reality, three sensor types might include a sun sensor, star tracker, and an inertial measurement unit (IMU). However, to be more generic, types will not be designated so specifically – they will instead be referred to as type A, type B, and type C.

As a first pass, all enumerated architectures are evaluated based on two specific metrics: reliability and weight. Note that, with some exceptions, both complexity and cost increase as weight increases; thus, weight is a good first order approximation for these metrics.

Section III of this paper will discuss the design of the simple 2 x 2 model, section IV will give further details on the model, and Section V will discuss the design of the more complicated 3 x 2 model. Section VI will examine the application of reliability and weight metrics to the enumerated architectures. Finally, Section VII concludes and describes the model's future iterations.

III. A “2 x 2” GN&C System

This section begins the discussion of the design of the 2 x 2 model. Even with just four components (two sensors and two computers), many architectures can be defined for a 2 x 2 system based on how the components are interconnected. Each of these architectures will have different total weight and different total reliability.
Figure 1. Three possible $2 \times 2$ systems.

Figure 1 depicts three possible $2 \times 2$ architectures. The reliability $R$ of the three models is shown in Table 1 where $s_j$ is the reliability of sensor $j$ and $c_k$ is the reliability of computer $k$.

Table 1. Reliability expressions for the $2 \times 2$ systems in Figure 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Architecture</th>
<th>Reliability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Channelized</td>
<td>$R = s_1c_1 + s_2c_2 - s_1s_2c_1c_2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hybrid</td>
<td>$R = s_1c_1 + s_2c_2 - s_1s_2c_1c_2 - s_1s_2c_1c_2 + 2s_1s_2c_1c_2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-Strapped</td>
<td>$R = s_1c_1 + s_2c_2 + s_1c_1 + s_2c_2 - s_1s_2c_1c_2 - 2s_1s_2c_1c_2$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is important to note that, no matter what the architecture, the reliability of any $2 \times 2$ model can be generated by taking the cross-strapped expression for $R$ and then eliminating terms from the expression for connections which do not exist and therefore do not contribute to system reliability.

Additional indicator variables are added to the cross-strapped reliability expression to specify which terms to eliminate. These indicator variables are correlated with the interconnections between components. A nonzero indicator variable represents a connection whereas an indicator variable equal to zero represents a missing connection.

Using the methodology described, the following general expression for $R$ is obtained:

$$R = s_1c_1 + s_2c_2 - s_1s_2c_1c_2 - s_1s_2c_1c_2 - s_1s_2c_1c_2 - s_1s_2c_1c_2 - s_1s_2c_1c_2 - s_1s_2c_1c_2 - s_1s_2c_1c_2 - s_1s_2c_1c_2 - s_1s_2c_1c_2 - s_1s_2c_1c_2 - s_1s_2c_1c_2 - s_1s_2c_1c_2 - s_1s_2c_1c_2$$

where $i_k$ is the reliability of the connection between sensor $j$ and computer $k$ if such a connection exists and is 0 otherwise.

As a sanity check, the reliability expressions for the channelized and hybrid architectures above can be derived from the general expression. Assuming perfect connection reliability, i.e., $i_k = 1$ for all connections in the architecture, the channelized and hybrid architectures would be represented by the indicator variables in Table 2. Plugging these indicator variables into the general expression gives the same reliability expressions in Table 1.

Table 2. Indicator for the channelized and hybrid $2 \times 2$ systems in Figure 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Architecture</th>
<th>$i_{11}$</th>
<th>$i_{12}$</th>
<th>$i_{21}$</th>
<th>$i_{22}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Channelized</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hybrid</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IV. Details on the Model

This section gives further detail on the $2 \times 2$ model. Like the previously mentioned $3 \times 2$ and $3 \times 3$ models, the $2 \times 2$ OPN model can be viewed as a sophisticated Petri net model. In a Petri net model, information-storing tokens move via directed arcs from transitions to places and from places to transitions. Note that there may be more than one directed arc feeding from or to a transition or place. Upon arrival at a transition, a token is consumed, some processing is done, and, if appropriate, new tokens are introduced in the places dictated by the directed arcs leading from the transition.

The sequence of transitions in any of the discussed OPN models is a sequence of decision points. At each decision point, a token is replicated with multiplicity equal to the number of possible decisions. The information stored in each token represents a unique possible architecture. Taken together, the tokens enumerate all possible
architectures given an initial set of constraints. All tokens are collected when they completely propagate through the model for analysis.

Figure 2 is a visual representation of the OPN decision tree for the 2 x 2 model and the following questions are the decision points:

- How many sensors?
  - 1 or 2
- Type assignment for sensors?
  - If only one sensor, choose SensorA, SensorB, or SensorC
  - If two sensors, choose two of the same type of sensor or one of each of two types (possible combinations: AA, AB, AC, BB, BC, and CC)
- How many computers?
  - 1 or 2
- Type assignment for computers?
  - If only one computer, choose ComputerA, ComputerB, or ComputerC
  - If two computers, choose two of the same type of computer or one of each of two types (possible combinations: AA, AB, AC, BB, BC, and CC)
- Which sensors are connected to computer 1?
  - Just sensor 1
  - Just sensor 2 (if sensor 2 exists)
  - Both sensor 1 and 2 (if sensor 2 exists)
- If computer 2 exists, which sensors are connected to computer 2?
  - Just sensor 1
  - Just sensor 2 (if sensor 2 exists)
  - Both sensor 1 and 2 (if sensor 2 exists)
During the process of token propagation, the number of components, component types, and connections are continuously updated for later use in reliability calculations. In addition, the current weight of the system is updated at execution time.

Each component type is given its own unique reliability and weight based on the specific make and model of the component. These values were based on real components, but modified slightly to facilitate analysis.

Reliabilities are dependent upon the failure rate of the component and the desired operational time for the component. The relationship is governed by the equation $R = e^{-\lambda t}$, where $\lambda$ is the failure rate and $t$ is the operational time. Operational time is user defined and based on the length of the proposed mission. An operational time of $t = 10$ years was used in the models discussed in this paper. Other component properties are illustrated in Table 3 and Table 4.
Table 3. Component properties for sensor types A, B, and C.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sensor Type</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Failure Rate λ (year)</td>
<td>0.00015</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.00005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliability R</td>
<td>0.9985</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>0.9995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weight (dimensionless)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Component properties for computer types A, B, and C.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Computer Type</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Failure Rate λ (year)</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.00004</td>
<td>0.00002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliability R</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>0.9996</td>
<td>0.9998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weight (dimensionless)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two additional weights and one additional reliability were also included in the model. A “connection weight” and a “dissimilar component penalty” were included to ensure that weights contribute to approximate complexity and cost. Cross-stamping components may not add much physical weight to the overall system, but it surely adds to the complexity and cost of the system. Similarly, dealing with more than one type of sensor and/or computer also increases complexity and cost. Hence, adding these additional weights where appropriate worked as a first step toward reality.

The weights associated with connections and dissimilar components were chosen to be consistent with the weights of sensors and computers. To do so, assumptions had to be made. Connections were considered to be, at most, one-third of the complexity of the average computer. In addition, the weight penalty for dissimilar components was set such that it was not larger than the heaviest sensor or the heaviest computer.

These logical assumptions dictated a certain range of weight values used for connections and dissimilar component parameters. However, rather than presuppose exact values for these weights, multiple OPN runs were executed varying one of the parameters each time. Assuming the connection reliability would be greater than that of a computer, the nine OPN scenarios are illustrated in Table 5.

Table 5. Connection reliabilities, connection weights, and dissimilar component penalties for each OPN scenario run.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPN Scenario</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Connection Reliability</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.99995</td>
<td>0.99995</td>
<td>0.99995</td>
<td>0.9999</td>
<td>0.9999</td>
<td>0.9999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connection Weight (dimensionless)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>5/3</td>
<td>5/3</td>
<td>5/3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissimilar Component Penalty (dimensionless)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V. A “3 x 2” GN&C System

This section discusses the design of the 3 x 2 model. Implementation of the 3 x 2 OPN model is very similar to that of the 2 x 2 model with two notable exceptions. These exceptions relate to the reliability formula for the overall system and the removal of duplicate architectures to conserve memory.

The reliability formula is much more complicated for these larger models and must be handled differently. Although reliability is still calculated after OPN completes execution, it can no longer be easily calculated by hand for implementation in Excel. Instead, symbolic MATLAB was used to multiply out the formula and a MATLAB script was used to insert the correct “1” indicator values where appropriate. Only after this manipulation was performed could the reliability be imported back into Excel for implementation.

In addition, care had to be taken to ensure no architecture was represented more than once in the model. Running a larger 3 x 2 OPN model would take an inordinate amount of time and computer memory. It was found that certain architectures could be represented in multiple configurations and this was not taken into account by the 2 x 2
model. By producing tokens for all possible configurations of the same architecture, the model took much more time and used much more memory than necessary.

An example of a duplicate architecture is shown in Figure 3. A1 and A2 represent the same architecture since, in both cases, one sensor of type A is connected to a computer of type A, the other sensor A is connected to a computer B and a computer D, and a sensor of type B is connected to a computer of type C. A3 represents a different architecture, however, since both sensors of type A are connected to a computer of type B.

A1
A   | Sensor 1 | Computer 1 |
A   | Sensor 2 | Computer 2 |
B   | Sensor 3 | Computer 3 |

A2
A   | Sensor 1 | Computer 1 |
A   | Sensor 2 | Computer 2 |
B   | Sensor 3 | Computer 3 |

A3
A   | Sensor 1 | Computer 1 |
A   | Sensor 2 | Computer 2 |
C   | Sensor 3 | Computer 3 |

Figure 3. Determination of duplicate architectures.

The process of eliminating duplicate architectures begins by choosing a representative set of sensor types and computer types. Ten possibilities were chosen as representative orderings of the three sensor types and also the three computer types: AAA, AAB, AAC, ABB, ACC, ABC, BBB, BBC, and CCC.

A1 in Figure 3 represents a connection pattern between three adjacent components. This connection pattern has four connections: Sensor 1 is connected to computer 1, sensor 2 is connected to both computer 1 and computer 2, and sensor 3 is connected to computer 3. Keeping this connection pattern fixed, we can give a "type" identity to the three sensors based on the ten possible orderings. For each possible ordering of the sensor types, there are ten possible orderings of the computer types, each of which defines a unique architecture. In other words, for any given connection pattern such as A1, there are 10 x 10 = 100 possible architectures. The OPN model iterates through all possible connection patterns and finds all 100 possible architectures for each one.

Note that orderings such as ABA and BAA are not taken to be representative orderings. When all possible connection patterns are taken into account, these additional orderings fail to produce any architecture that cannot be produced by AAB. This is because ABA, BAA, and BAA are all equivalent – all represent two components of type A and one of type B. It does not matter in what order the letters are written as long as the case is represented.

Luckily, searching for duplicate architectures in OPN does not require checking 100 possible architectures for each connection pattern. The 100 possibilities for each connection pattern can be represented by just 16 representative architectures. As illustrated in Figure 4, the ten sensor type combinations and the ten computer type combinations can be further abstracted to just four representative combinations per component. First, AAA, BBB, and CCC all represent the case where all three components are of the same type. Next, AAB, AAC, and BBC all represent the case where the first two components are of the same type and the third component is of a different type. Furthermore, ABB, ACC, and BCC all represent the case where the second and third components are of the same type, but the first component is of a different type. Finally, ABC represents the case where all three components are of a different type.

---

8 The 2 x 2 model is much smaller than the 3 x 2 model. As a result, there were no memory issues and duplicate architectures could be removed in post-processing—they did not have to be removed in OPN.
Figure 4. Finding representative architectures.

Figure 5 helps demonstrate why these representative architectures work for finding duplicate architectures. To use representative architectures to find duplicates is to claim that if architecture A1 is equivalent to architecture A2, but not A3, then architecture B1 is equivalent to B2, but not B3. This is clearly the case.

As previously discussed, A1 and A2 represent the same architecture even though they have different connection patterns. It is arbitrary which form of an architecture is chosen as the primary form and which is a duplicate – either A1 or A2 could be considered the duplicate.

Implementing duplicate detection into the model turned out to be a very involved process. The project had a limited time horizon and the development time necessary for automating the duplicate detection process was uncertain. It was therefore decided that a surefire yet brute force method would be used to implement duplicate detection. All possible representative architectures were drawn by hand and duplicate architectures were circled. In all, over 100 pages of architectures were drawn and compared.
Figure 6. One page of hand-drawn architectures.

Based on the circled representative architectures, rules were created and inserted into OPN to keep any tokens that will produce duplicate architectures from propagating. Note that all rules are in the form of Boolean expressions starting with “not if” instead of “if”. Although all work was double-checked, it is conceivable that an incorrect rule was entered due to human error. By using “not if” instead of “if”, the default is to pass the token. It is better to retain a duplicate architecture rather than exclude a potentially optimal architecture.

The Boolean rules are inserted into the OPN model on the transitions from:
- Which sensors are connected to computer 1?
- If computer 2 exists, which sensors are connected to computer 2?
- If computer 3 exists, which sensors are connected to computer 3?

To the places:
- O Just sensor 1
- O Just sensor 2 (if sensor 2 exists)
- O Just sensor 3 (if sensor 3 exists)
- O Just sensors 1 and 2 (if sensor 2 exists)
- O Just sensors 1 and 3 (if sensor 3 exists)
- O Just sensors 2 and 3 (if sensor 3 exists)
- O Sensors 1, 2, and 3 (if sensor 3 exists)
Trivial rules govern which sensors are connected to computer 1. If a particular token represents an architecture with only 2 sensors, it is not possible to make a connection to a computer from a nonexistent sensor 3. Therefore, in the 2-sensor case, no new tokens are introduced into the places representing “just sensor 3,” “just sensors 1 and 3,” “just sensors 2 and 3,” or “sensors 1, 2, and 3.” Similarly, if a particular token represents an architecture with only 1 sensor, no new tokens are introduced into the places representing “just sensor 2,” “just sensor 3,” “just sensors 1 and 2,” “just sensors 1 and 3,” “just sensors 2 and 3,” or “sensors 1, 2, and 3.”

Rules governing connections to computer 2 and computer 3 are more complicated. If a token represents an architecture with only two computers, it is known what the final system architecture will be after creating the sensor connections to the second computer. If a token represents an architecture with three computers, it is known what the final system architecture will be after creating the sensor connections to the third computer. Connections that will form duplicate (circled) architectures should not be allowed to propagate. Hence rules are put in place to block introduction of these tokens.

Figure 7 shows an example rule based on a hand-drawn architecture. This rule determines whether or not a connection should be made between sensor 3 and computer 3. Note that, by the time a token reaches the given rule, the connections between sensor 1 and computer 2 as well as between sensor 2 and computer 1 have already been defined. No connection should be made if the type definitions for the sensors and computers match those represented by the circled architectures — such tokens will result in the formation of duplicate architectures. In other words, the connection between sensor 3 and computer 3 should not be made if sensor 1’s type is the same as sensor 2’s type or computer 1’s type is the same as computer 2’s type.

```
! (Computer_Redundancy < 3) &&
! (Sensor_Redundancy < 3) &&
{
  (111 == 0 && 112 == 0) ||
  (Sensor_Redundancy > 1 && 121 == 0 && 122 == 0) ||
  {
    (111 == 0 && 112 > 0 && 121 > 0 && 122 == 0 && 131 == 0 && 132 == 0) &&
    (Sensor1_Type == Sensor2_Type) ||
    (Computer1_Type == Computer2_Type)
  }
}
```

Figure 7. An example rule based on a hand-drawn architecture.

Eliminating duplicate architectures in the 3 x 2 model significantly reduced the number of tokens produced. Before duplicates were removed, the OPN produced 51,902 tokens. After duplicates were removed, the model produced only 9,795 tokens.
VI. Results

Despite eliminating the unnecessary duplicate architectures from the model, attempts to run a 3 x 3 model still resulted in a memory shortage. Although it is unfortunate that the larger model could not complete, it is important to note that results from the 3 x 2 model can still be applied to the 3 x 3 case.

Taking such a top-level view of a GN&C system, the interaction between adjacent sensor and computer components is identical to the interaction between adjacent computer and actuator components. Just like sensors and computers, there are different types of actuators, each with a unique set of properties, and a system architect can choose different redundancies for each of these types. Furthermore, the connection patterns already found between sensors and computers are the same as those between computers and actuators. Finally, the metrics of weight and reliability can be calculated in exactly the same way.

The nine scenarios outlined in section IV were run and Pareto plots were produced for each. Representative plots for each of the nine scenarios are reproduced in Figures 8 – 11. In each scenario, the architectures that simultaneously had both lowest weight and highest reliability were identified. These architectures are “on the Pareto front.” The identified Pareto-front architectures for each scenario are reproduced in figures 8 – 11 as well. These architectures were found by zooming in on the “utopia point” at the lower right hand corner of the plot.\footnote{The utopia point represents the ideal architecture which has 100 percent reliable with weight = 0.} Note that, in most cases, there are multiple identified architectures for each scenario since it is somewhat subjective which architectures are closer to the utopia point. Is an architecture with weight = 17 and reliability = 0.99999995912468 (six “9”s) better than an architecture with weight = 18 and reliability = 0.99999995634078 (eight “9”s)? The answers to such questions would be made clear in a mission requirements context. For a human-rated mission, perhaps a reliability of 0.9999999 (seven “9”s) is required for safety. If this were the case, the architecture with weight = 18 would clearly be better, since the one with weight = 17 does not meet the requirement.

In the zoomed out (top) plot of each of the nine scenarios, there appear to be six clusters of architecture data points. Although the clusters appear to be columns of data points, they are not; the architectures in each cluster have nearly identical, but not completely identical reliabilities. Looking from left to right, the first five clusters are the five clusters with the lowest reliability — are driven by single point failures of any of the six component types. For example, in an architecture that contains one sensor and two computers or an architecture that contains one sensor and three computers, the single sensor present in the architecture must remain reliable in order for the overall system to remain reliable. Sensor type A has a reliability of 0.9985. Therefore, a one-sensor two-computer or one-sensor three-computer architecture that contains sensor A can have a maximum reliability of 0.9985. Such architectures, which have a single point failure at sensor A, define the first (least reliable) cluster of data points. Both sensor type B and computer type A have the same reliability: 0.999. Therefore, architectures that have a single point failure at a sensor of type B or a single point failure at a computer of type A will both fall into the second cluster. Similarly, sensor type C’s reliability of 0.9995 defines the third cluster, computer type B’s reliability of 0.9996 defines the fourth cluster, and computer type C’s reliability of 0.9998 defines the fifth cluster.

The sixth and final (most reliable) cluster contains all other architectures — architectures free from single point failures. The few additional points that do not fall into any of the six clusters are single-string architectures, i.e., architectures that contain just one sensor and one computer. These architectures contain not one, but two single point failures and are therefore significantly less reliable than an identical architecture with additional computers or additional sensors.
System Architectural Considerations on Reliable Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) for Constellation Program (CxP) Spacecraft

Figure 8. (Top) Pareto plot with added details for number of connections between sensors and computers, (Middle) zoomed in version of the same plot, (Bottom) potential optimal architectures for this scenario: (From left to right) Architecture 1 has weight = 12 and reliability = 0.99999675437371 (five 9s), architecture 2 has weight = 15 and reliability = 0.9999989763201 (five 9s), architecture 3 has weight = 17 and reliability = 0.9999995931247 (six 9s), and architecture 4 has weight = 18 and reliability = 0.9999999563408 (eight 9s).
Figure 9. (Top) Pareto plot with added details for both number of sensors and number of computers, (Middle) zoomed in version of the same plot, (Bottom) potential optimal architectures for this scenario: (From left to right) Architecture 1 has weight = 12 and reliability = 0.99999675437371 (five 9s), architecture 2 has weight = 15 and reliability = 0.99999899763201 (five 9s), and architecture 3 has weight = 18 and reliability = 0.9999999563408 (eight 9s).
System Architectural Considerations on Reliable Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) for Constellation Program (CxP) Spacecraft

Figure 10. (Top) Pareto plot with added details for both number and types of computers. (Middle) zoomed in version of the same plot. (Bottom) potential optimal architectures for this scenario: (From left to right) Architecture 1 has weight = 14 and reliability = 0.9999996754062385 (five 9s), architecture 2 has weight = 17 and reliability = 0.999998991260747 (five 9s), architecture 3 has weight = 19 and reliability = 0.999999293344442 (six 9s), and architecture 4 has weight = 19.5 and reliability = 0.999999984381890 (seven 9s).
Figure 11. (Top) Pareto plot with added details for both number and types of sensors, (Middle) zoomed in version of the same plot, (Bottom) Potential optimal architectures for this scenario: (From left to right) Architecture 1 has weight = 15.333 and reliability = 0.999993257523472 (five 9s), architecture 2 has weight = 17 and reliability = 0.99999501059889 (five 9s), architecture 3 has weight = 18.667 and reliability = 0.99999675376173 (five 9s), architecture 4 has weight = 20 and reliability = 0.999997598039817 (five 9s), architecture 5 has weight = 21.667 and reliability = 0.99999892071849 (five 9s), and architecture 6 has weight = 22 and reliability = 0.99999983481880 (seven 9s).
Many interesting aspects can be found in Figure 8, the ideal case where there is no penalty for connection weight or using dissimilar components. In this scenario, all identified architectures are fully cross-strapped. This is to be expected since additional connections increase reliability yet cost nothing. Figure 8 also demonstrates that the weights of an architecture’s component plays a major role in determining the optimality of the architecture. Recall that components of type “A” are the lightest and least reliable, and that components of type “C” are the heaviest and most reliable. Even though components of type “A” are the least reliable, sensors of type A and computers of type A are by far the most prevalent component types in all the optimal architectures. In addition, although components of type “C” are the most reliable, no components of this type appear in any of the optimal architectures. Furthermore, there are not even any sensors of type B in the optimal architectures. Architecture 3 contains a computer of type B, but this architecture is no longer optimal once the “dissimilar components penalty” is increased from penalty = 0 to penalty = 6 (see Figure 9, bottom). Since the optimal architectures for penalty = 6 contain no dissimilar components, increasing the penalty again to penalty = 9 results in no further changes to the optimal architectures.

Figure 10 gives a baseline for what is realistic. In this scenario, there are no longer perfect connection reliabilities of 100 percent and there is an actual cost for producing connections. Now, the connection reliability = 0.99995 and the connection weight = 0.5. As a result of the 0.5 connection weight, only one fully cross-strapped architecture (architecture 1) is among the optimal architectures—much different than the scenario where connection weight = 0. The other optimal architectures have just three or four connections. From these, architectures 2 and 3 are the most interesting. Each has three sensors and two computers with two of the sensors having one connection to a computer and the last having two.

The connection weight = 0.5 scenario still has quite a bit in common with the connection weight = 0 scenario. Once again, the component types in the optimal architectures are predominantly of type A and never of type C. Only one optimal architecture (architecture 3) contains a component of type B and this component is again a computer. This architecture is no longer optimal when the dissimilar components penalty is increased to penalty = 6. There is no change in optimal architectures for connection weight = 0.5 when this penalty is increased from penalty = 6 to penalty = 9.

Figure 11 depicts the first scenario where connection reliability = 0.99999 and connection weight = 0.5. This scenario produces very similar optimal architectures to the connection weight = 0.5 scenario, but there are some notable exceptions.

Even with the dissimilar components penalty set to penalty = 0, connection weight = 0.5 is sufficiently high as to eliminate any architecture that contains a component type heavier than type A. This means that architecture 3 from Figure 10, the only connection weight = 0.5 architecture which contains a component of type B, is not an optimal architecture for connection weight = 0.5. This also means that the optimal architectures for connection weight = 0.5 will not change if the dissimilar components penalty is increased to penalty = 6 or penalty = 9.

A connection weight of 0.5 also makes it significantly more desirable to have architectures with even fewer connections. Although optimal architectures 1, 2, and 4 from Figure 10 are still optimal architectures when the connection weight is increased to 0.5, the value of these architectures is diminished with the heavier connection weight. As a result, these architectures are no longer significantly closer to the utopia point than architectures 1, 2, and 4 from Figure 11.

The six potentially optimal architectures for connection weight = 0.5 produce an interesting set. All legal architectures with four or fewer connections that contain two to three sensors of type A and two computers of type A are optimal architectures for this scenario. In effect, a system architect is directly trading an increase in weight for additional reliability when connection weight = 0.5.

When reviewing a subset of all the possible architectures, specifically a subset in which all members have the same number of connections, the effect of the dissimilar components penalty on the optimal architectures of the subset is nearly identical to the penalty’s effect on the optimal architectures of the super set. Figures 12 and 13 depict the optimal architectures for 3 x 2 systems with 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 connections when connection reliability = 1 and connection weight = 0 (the reliabilities and weights for these architectures can be found in Tables 6 through 8). Again, as the penalty is increased from penalty = 0 to penalty = 6, nearly all architectures containing sensor type B or computer type B cease to be optimal. Note that, for architectures with the same number of connections, the exact same architectures which are optimal for penalty = 0 will be optimal no matter what the connection weight. Similarly, architectures which are optimal for penalty = 6 or penalty = 9 will also remain optimal no matter what the connection weight. The reasoning goes as follows. Although the overall system weight of any member of a subset will change if the connection weight is changed, this change will be identical to the change seen by any of the other systems in this subset. This is because all systems in each subset have, by definition, the same number of
connections. Therefore, among architectures with the same number of connections, the architectures closest to the utopia point will remain closest to the utopia point no matter what change is made to the connection weight.

Table 6. The reliabilities and weights for the 1-, 2-, 3-, 4-, 5-, 6-, 7-, 8-, and 9-connection architectures closest the utopia point given a 3 x 2 system with connection reliability = 1, connection weight = 0, and no penalty for dissimilar components.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Connections</th>
<th>Reliability</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>On Pareto Front?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9999904055</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.9999902435</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.999993766</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.999995260</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.999996397</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.999997344</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.999997754</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.999998292</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.999998741</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.999995240</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.999996476</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.999997499</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.999998996</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.999999984</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.999996754</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.999996936</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.999996954</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.999996984</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.999998995</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.999999596</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.999999992</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.999998998</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.999999957</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.999999996</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.999999994</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.999999996</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.999999996</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 12. The architectures described in Table 6.

Table 7. The reliabilities and weights for the 1-, 2-, 3-, 4-, 5-, 6-, 7-, 8-, and 9-connection architectures closest the utopia point given a 3 x 2 system with connection reliability = 1, connection weight = 0, and penalty = 6 for dissimilar components.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Connections</th>
<th>Reliability</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>On Pareto front?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.999900405</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.999900245</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.999993766</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.999996397</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.999995260</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.999997499</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.999999984</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.999996754</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.999998993</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.999999988</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.999998995</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.999999992</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.999998998</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.999999996</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.999999994</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.999999996</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.999999996</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VII. Conclusion

If the only materials on hand were sensors of low-reliability type A, computers of low-reliability type A, and generic connections, it is still possible to produce nearly all potentially optimal architectures. The identified optimal architectures show this and, more generally, that it is preferable to increase redundancy of lighter, less reliable components rather than to use smaller numbers of more reliable, heavy components.

Due to the extremely lightweight nature of “sensor A” and “computer A”, these component types appeared in the optimal architectures in every scenario and almost always with redundancy $\geq 2$. Furthermore, the very heavy yet very reliable “sensor C” and “computer C” never appeared as an optimal architecture in any scenario, not even with redundancy $= 1$. 
At a certain point, there are diminishing returns to adding redundancy, connections, or components with greater reliability—the system starts to experience only minimal increases in overall reliability for the large gains in weight. This fact becomes more apparent through the use of the connection weight penalty. Looking at the optimal architectures in each scenario, the number of connections drops dramatically as the connection weight penalty is increased from connection weight = 0 to connection weight = 0.5. When connection weight = 0, there are, as expected, optimal architectures with as many as nine connections. When connection weight increases to 0.5 however, this number drops to three or four.

The impact of the “dissimilar components penalty” is more subtle, but still apparent. In the scenarios where connection weight = 0 and connection weight = 0.5, architectures containing both computer type A and computer type B were identified as potentially optimal when the penalty = 0. However, when the penalty is increased to penalty = 6, these architectures no longer appear to be better than other architectures.

The created OPN models the building blocks of a GN&C system. Now that the base model is complete, more detail can gradually be added until the entire system is encapsulated. First, the OPN language should be made more efficient so that it does not run out of memory when trying to run the 3 x 3 model. Next, other architectural layouts should be investigated in which the component redundancy for any component can be greater than three. In order to do so, however, the process of eliminating duplicates and creating rules (which was done by hand) should be automated. Also, it is important that more than three types of sensors, computers, and actuators be incorporated into the model and that further details be included for each component. For example, requirements might suggest that a system needs six degrees-of-freedom of attitude and position knowledge. This requirement cannot be addressed without the current top-level mentality. Finally, further metrics besides reliability and weight should be implemented in the model.

Having such a model in place in OPN would serve as an excellent tool for system design. System requirements may dictate a given reliability and such a model would easily be able to find the lowest weight/lowest cost option for that reliability. Although less likely, if, rather than overall reliability, the system requirement called for a certain number of connections between adjacent components, the OPN model could easily find the optimal high reliability/low weight option for this architecture as well.

In addition to reliability, OPN can be made to find the best option for satisfying other metrics as these metrics are added to the model. As additional component redundancy and component types are added to the model, all possible architectures could eventually be both enumerated and evaluated by OPN.

A detailed consideration of the findings in this paper could be extremely beneficial to the development of the CxP’s robotic and human-rated systems; clearly exploring commonality in GN&C components can reduce both nonrecurring and recurring cost and risk.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank their colleagues at MIT, Draper Laboratory, and NASA for their support, technical insights, and help in reviewing this paper. Ralph Roe and the NASA Engineering and Safety Center management team are also to be acknowledged for their support and sponsorship of this GN&C discipline advancing activity.

References


Appendix C. Study Summary Presentation

All work was performed under NASA contracts: NNG10CR13C and NNX07AE12A
System Architectural Considerations on Reliable Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) for Constellation Program (CxP) Spacecraft

All work was performed under NASA contracts: NNG10CR13C and NNX07AE12A

Study Summary Presentation:
Using OPN for Comparing Fault-Tolerant GN&C System Architectures

Gregor Z. Hanuschak (MIT)
Nick Harrison (Draper Laboratory)
Ed Crawley (MIT)
Task Description

- Analyze different architectural approaches for fault tolerance in Lunar GN&C systems

- Determine if performance goals can be met for different levels of reliability by combining like components in different architectures

- Implementing this model in the Object Process Network (OPN) modeling language in order to:
  - More easily enumerate and evaluate all possible architectures
  - Ultimately find those architectures that are most optimal in terms of architecture, performance and proxy for development cost
What is OPN?

- OPN is a visual and computable meta-language that assists with systems architecting tasks.

- OPN is used to:
  - Describe and Partition space of architectural alternatives.
  - Generate and Enumerate the set of instances of feasible system models.
  - Simulate and Order the performance metrics of each model.

- OPN is a network (a directed graph) of objects and processes connected by relationships
**Motivation for the Use of OPN**

- OPN allows an engineer to systematically explore the architecture space
  - Gives confidence, as entire space is mapped
  - Modeling process often provides insights
  - Allows team to keep options open: no need to trim decision tree early
- Combines visual representation on Pareto plot with mathematical modeling
- Easy to add new options to understand the effect of new technologies, different configurations

![Pareto plot diagram](image)

- Applicable to many “levels” of architecture
  - Fleet architecture of ships, aircraft, radars, missiles
  - Missile architecture of propulsion modules, seeker heads, data
  - Propulsion architecture of propellants, staging, sizing
Systems Architecture via OPN

- Systems architecting using OPN is a three-step process:
  - Define a set of rules to generate a valid architecture (encoding)
  - Enumerate all possible system architectures (enumerating)
  - Evaluate the performance of these architectures in terms of metrics (evaluating)

![Diagram showing steps of encoding, enumerating, and evaluating]
1) Encoding

- GN&C systems can be broken down into simple subunits:
  - Sensors
  - Computers
  - Actuators
  - Interconnections between components

RULES FOR ARCHITECTURE GENERATION:
- Use 3 kinds of elements (sensors, computers and/or actuators)
- Use up to 3 sensors / computers / actuators
- Use 3 different types of sensors, computers and actuators: A, B, C
- Use all the feasible interconnections between these elements
2) Enumerating

– How many possibilities for sensors? $CR_{4(A,B,C)}^3 - 1 = 20 - 1 = 19$ : 
  \{A,B,C,AA,BB,CC,AB,AC,BC,AAA, AAB, AAC, …, CCC\}

– Obviously the same possibilities for computers: 19

– How many possible interconnections between sensors and computers?
  » Sensor i can be connected to: \{C1; C2; C3; C1 and C2; C2 and C3; 
     C1 and C3; or C1, C2 and C3\} THEN $7 \times 7 \times 7 = 243$

– 19x19x243 = 87,723 possible architectures for the 3x2 system

– 19x243x19x243x19 = 405,017,091 possible architectures for the 3x3 system!

– Not all of these architectures are feasible, as some components are not connected, and some patterns are duplicates. Rules have been developed to eliminate these cases.
3) Evaluating

- Two metrics were used for evaluating performance in this study:
  - **Reliability** as a performance metrics (benefit)
  - **Mass** as a first order approximation to development cost, and to recurring and launch cost

- The reliability is calculated taking into account the reliabilities of the elements (sensors, computers and interconnections) and how they are connected.

- The mass of the architecture is calculated as the sum of the masses of all its elements (sensors, computers and interconnections)

- Additional “mass” penalties were assessed for use of dissimilar components for actuators, sensors and processors

- The use of OPN allows automatic evaluation of each enumerated architecture, which helps the architect identify the most optimal ones.
3) Evaluating

Reliability of a component (sensor, computer):
\[ R = \text{Prob (0 fails of component in } t \text{ years)} = e^{-\lambda t} = s_1 c_1 \text{ or } i_1 \text{ (Poisson distribution)} \]

Reliability of a sensor-computer link:
\[ R_1 = \text{Prob (0 fails of sensor AND 0 fails of interconnection AND 0 fails of computer in } t \text{ years)} = s_1 i_1 c_1 \]

Reliability of a 2x2 system (channelized):
\[ R = s_1 i_{11} c_1 + s_1 i_{12} c_2 - s_1 i_{11} i_{12} c_1 c_2 + s_2 i_{12} c_1 + s_2 i_{22} c_2 - s_2 i_{12} i_{22} c_1 c_2 - s_1 i_{11} i_{12} c_1 c_2 - s_1 i_{11} i_{22} c_1 c_2 - s_1 i_{11} i_{12} i_{22} c_1 c_2 - s_1 i_{11} i_{12} i_{22} c_1 c_2 - s_1 i_{11} i_{22} i_{12} c_1 c_2 - s_1 i_{11} i_{22} i_{12} c_1 c_2 - s_1 i_{11} i_{22} i_{12} i_{22} c_1 c_2 - s_1 i_{11} i_{22} i_{12} i_{22} c_1 c_2 - s_1 i_{11} i_{22} i_{12} i_{22} c_1 c_2 - s_1 i_{11} i_{22} i_{12} i_{22} c_1 c_2 \]

Reliability of a 2x2 system (cross-strapped):
\[ R = s_1 i_{11} c_1 + s_1 i_{12} c_2 - s_1 i_{11} i_{12} c_1 c_2 + s_2 i_{12} c_1 + s_2 i_{22} c_2 - s_2 i_{12} i_{22} c_1 c_2 - s_1 i_{11} i_{12} c_1 c_2 - s_1 i_{11} i_{22} c_1 c_2 - s_1 i_{11} i_{12} i_{22} c_1 c_2 - s_1 i_{11} i_{12} i_{22} c_1 c_2 - s_1 i_{11} i_{22} i_{12} c_1 c_2 - s_1 i_{11} i_{22} i_{12} c_1 c_2 - s_1 i_{11} i_{22} i_{12} i_{22} c_1 c_2 - s_1 i_{11} i_{22} i_{12} i_{22} c_1 c_2 - s_1 i_{11} i_{22} i_{12} i_{22} c_1 c_2 - s_1 i_{11} i_{22} i_{12} i_{22} c_1 c_2 \]

Diagram:

```
  S1 ---- C1 ---- S2
     |         |     \\
     |         |     \\
  S2 ---- C2 ---- S1
```

```
  S1 ---- C1 ---- S1
     |         |     \\
     |         |     \\
  S2 ---- C2 ---- S2
```
Values used for analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sensor Type</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Failure Rate λ (year⁻¹)</td>
<td>0.00015</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.00005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliability R</td>
<td>0.9985</td>
<td>0.990</td>
<td>0.9995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weight (dimensionless)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Computer Type</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Failure Rate λ (year⁻¹)</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.00004</td>
<td>0.00002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliability R</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>0.9996</td>
<td>0.9998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weight (dimensionless)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPN Scenario</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Connection Reliability</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.99995</td>
<td>0.99995</td>
<td>0.99995</td>
<td>0.9999</td>
<td>0.99999</td>
<td>0.99999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connection Weight (dimensionless)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>5/3</td>
<td>5/3</td>
<td>5/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissimilar Component Penalty (dimensionless)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Results for the ideal case 
\((i_{jk}=1, CW=0, DCP=0)\)

Architectures on the Pareto frontier

Arch 1  Arch 2  Arch 3  Arch 4
Subset Overview of Results

- For the case shown on the previous chart:
  - The connection reliability is 1
  - The connection mass (CW) is zero
  - The dissimilar component penalty (DCP) is zero
- All identified desirable architectures are fully cross-strapped
  - Additional connections increase reliability yet cost nothing (in terms for added weight)
- Component weights play a major role in determining the optimality of the architecture
  - Even though components of type “A” are the least reliable, sensors of type B and computers of type A are by far the most prevalent component types in all the optimal architectures
  - Components of type “C” are the most reliable, yet no components of this type appear in any of the optimal architectures
  - Architecture 3 contains a computer of type B, but this architecture is no longer optimal once the “dissimilar components penalty” (DCP) is increased from penalty = 0 to penalty = 6
System Architectural Considerations on Reliable Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) for Constellation Program (CxP) Spacecraft

Results for a realistic case
\((ijk = 0.99995, CW = 0.5, DCP = 6)\)

Architectures on the Pareto frontier
Results for More Realistic Case

- The case on the previous chart now has finite reliability of connections, finite mass for connections, and a penalty for dissimilar components.
- The effect of the dissimilar components penalty on the optimal architectures of specific connection reliabilities and weights is nearly identical to the penalty’s effect on the optimal architectures of the superset.
- As the penalty is increased from penalty = 0 to penalty = 6, nearly all architectures containing sensor type B or computer type B cease to be optimal.
- For architectures with the same number of connections, the exact same architectures which are optimal for penalty = 0 will be optimal no matter what the connection weight.
- For architectures which are optimal for penalty = 6 will also remain optimal no matter what the connection weight.
- Although the overall system weight of any member of a subset will change if the connection weight is changed, this change will be identical to the change seen by any of the other systems in this subset.
Conclusions

- A systematic method of evaluating the architectures of GNC systems composed of a limited set of common components and connections has been developed.

- Based on the values chosen in this representative calculation:
  - Most optimal architectures can be created by using only the lightest, lowest reliably components
  - It is preferable to increase redundancy of lighter, less reliable components rather than to use smaller numbers of more reliable, heavy components
  - There are diminishing returns to adding redundancy, connections, or components with greater reliability – the system starts to experience only minimal increases in overall reliability for the large gains in weight
  - For optimal architectures in each scenario, the number of connections drops dramatically as the connection weight penalty is increased
  - Dissimilar component penalty has a strong effect of homogenizing the architecture
Recommendations for Future Investigation/Assessment

- Find a more efficient method of determining the reliability of a complex architecture

- Look at other GN&C architectural layouts: 4 sensor, 3 computer, 2 actuators (for example)

- Include more metrics in the analysis: performance, cost, power, degrees of freedom control and sensing, etc
Backup Charts
3) Evaluating

- The goal is to model cost and complexity through weight.
- The complexity (and the cost) of the system is higher when it has many interconnections but this relationship is not linear. A correction factor was included to take into account the increase of complexity due to the number of connections \( \text{connection weight (CW)} \). A \( CW = 0 \) means that connections can be added without any impact on the global cost and complexity.
- The weights associated with connections were chosen to be consistent with the weights of sensors and computers:
  \[ CW \leq \frac{1}{3} \text{ weight of the average computer} \]
- Analogously, a correction factor was included to take into account the increase of complexity when components of different types are used \( \text{dissimilar component penalty} \). A \( DCP = 0 \) means that different types of components can be used without any impact on the global cost and complexity.
  \[
  W = \text{weight \{sensors\}} + \text{weight \{computers\}} + N \times CW + B \times DCP
  \]
  where:  
  \( N \) is the number of connections  
  \( CW \) is the connection weight  
  \( B \) is 0 if all the elements are of the same type and 1 otherwise  
  \( DCP \) is the dissimilar component penalty
- The weights associated with \( DCP \) were chosen to be consistent with the weights of sensors and computers:
  \[ CW \leq \text{max weight \{sensors, computers\}} \]
A View of Systems Architecting:

- Systems Architecting starts with “Goals” and end with a “Set of Good Solutions”
  - “good” depends on what’s important to you
- 1st: Decompose the problem
  - Come up with an abstraction that is an stable representation of the system
  - This defines the architecture!
  - In this step, one should figure out the abstract processes and objects that are always part of the system
    » List the range of specific solutions for each object and process
    » This should be kept to a relatively small discrete set to start.
A View of Systems Architecting:

- 2nd: Composing
  - How do the objects and processes interact?
  - Specifically, what combinations of specific objects and processes make up a valid system?

- 3rd: Evaluation
  - What are the system metrics?
    » What makes this system “good” for you?
  - Metrics should be a function of the objects and processes in your decomposition

- The other “step”: revision
  - As you proceed down this concept of architecting, expect to revise the previous steps.
This final report summarizes the results of a comparative assessment of the fault tolerance and reliability of different Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) architectural approaches. This study was proactively performed by a combined Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Draper Laboratory team as a GN&C "Discipline-Advancing" activity sponsored by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC). This systematic comparative assessment of GN&C system architectural approaches was undertaken as a fundamental step towards understanding the opportunities for, and limitations of, architecting highly reliable and fault tolerant GN&C systems composed of common avionic components. The primary goal of this study was to obtain architectural ‘rules of thumb’ that could positively influence future designs in the direction of an optimized (i.e., most reliable and cost-efficient) GN&C system. A secondary goal was to demonstrate the application and the utility of a systematic modeling approach that maps the entire possible architecture solution space.

14. ABSTRACT

This final report summarizes the results of a comparative assessment of the fault tolerance and reliability of different Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) architectural approaches. This study was proactively performed by a combined Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Draper Laboratory team as a GN&C "Discipline-Advancing" activity sponsored by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC). This systematic comparative assessment of GN&C system architectural approaches was undertaken as a fundamental step towards understanding the opportunities for, and limitations of, architecting highly reliable and fault tolerant GN&C systems composed of common avionic components. The primary goal of this study was to obtain architectural ‘rules of thumb’ that could positively influence future designs in the direction of an optimized (i.e., most reliable and cost-efficient) GN&C system. A secondary goal was to demonstrate the application and the utility of a systematic modeling approach that maps the entire possible architecture solution space.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Avionics; Constellation Program; Crew Exploration Vehicle; Guidance, Navigation and Control