Final Report: Fire Prevention, Detection, and Suppression Project

Exploration Technology Development Program

Gary A. Ruff
Glenn Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio

September 2011
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Acknowledgments

The implementation of the Fire Prevention, Detection, and Suppression project described in this report required the dedication and hard work of numerous technologists and project management personnel. Most notably, the researchers in the Microgravity Combustion and Reacting Systems Branch and Instrumentation and Sensors Branch at NASA John H. Glenn Research Center are acknowledged for their contributions to this project and the advancement of fire safety technology for human spaceflight.

Level of Review: This material has been technically reviewed by technical management.
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Final Report: Fire Prevention, Detection, and Suppression Project
Exploration Technology Development Program

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Abstract

The Fire Prevention, Detection, and Suppression (FPDS) project is a technology development effort within the Exploration Technology Development Program of the Exploration System Missions Directorate (ESMD) that addresses all aspects of fire safety aboard manned exploration systems. The overarching goal for work in the FPDS area is to develop technologies that will ensure crew health and safety on exploration missions by reducing the likelihood of a fire, or, if one does occur, minimizing the risk to the crew, mission, or system. This is accomplished by addressing the areas of (1) fire prevention and material flammability, (2) fire signatures and detection, and (3) fire suppression and response. This report describes the outcomes of this project from the formation of the Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) in October 2005 to September 31, 2010 when the Exploration Technology Development Program was replaced by the Enabling Technology Development and Demonstration Program. NASA’s fire safety work will continue under this new program and will build upon the accomplishments described herein.

1.0 Project Overview

1.1 Introduction

The Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) announced by President George W. Bush on January 14, 2004 directed NASA to achieve the long-term goal of sending humans back to the Moon and then on to Mars. The amount of knowledge that must be gained and the number of technologies that must be developed before such missions can occur are certainly formidable. The performance standards required for these technologies are, in many cases, well beyond those used on the International Space Station and the Space Shuttle and will stretch our current knowledge of living and working in space. A large number of the challenges are related to ensuring the health and safety of the crew during the exploration mission.

The Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) was initiated in 2005 to address the technologies required for the successful completion of the planned exploration missions. This program, led by the Exploration Technology Development Program Office (ETDPO) at NASA Langley Research Center, consisted of 22 projects (at its conclusion) each addressing a required technology development area required by the Constellation Program (CxP). The ETDPO organization chart in Figure 1 shows the projects, lead center, and project manager for each project. Direct oversight, both project management and technical implementation of the Fire Prevention, Detection, and Suppression project was conducted at the NASA Glenn Research Center. This project addressed all aspects of fire safety aboard manned exploration systems.

The overarching goal for work in the FPDS project is to develop technologies that will ensure crew health and safety on exploration missions by reducing the likelihood of a fire, or, if one does occur, minimizing the risk to the crew, mission, or system. This is accomplished by addressing the areas of (1) fire prevention and material flammability, (2) fire signatures and detection, and (3) fire suppression and response. Deliverables from the tasks conducted within the FPDS project could be hardware, design requirements, data for trade studies, test procedures, data libraries, or recommendations for fire response procedures, depending on the area. To realize these deliverables, the project drew on expertise in the
disciplines of combustion science, fire safety engineering, risk assessment, failure analysis and systems engineering. The tasks to be conducted take place in normal-gravity test facilities and ground-based microgravity facilities. The successful implementation of this project also depended on results obtained from several experiments to be conducted on the ISS, specifically, the Smoke Aerosol Measurement Experiment (SAME) and the Flame Extinguishment Experiment (FLEX). These projects are being conducted under the ISS Research Project but, while conducted through a different ETDP project, FPDS personnel were responsible for the interpretation and infusion of the data from these experiments into their appropriate technological area in spacecraft fire safety.

1.2 Objectives

The objective of the Fire Prevention, Detection, and Suppression (FPDS) technology development area is to develop hardware, design rules and requirements, and procedures in the three distinct topical areas within FPDS. These include the general areas of (1) Fire Prevention and Material Flammability, (2) Fire Signatures and Detection, and (3) Fire Suppression and Response. Each of these areas has products that will be delivered to exploration systems to ensure crew health and safety. The specific objectives of the tasks in each of these areas are described in the following sections.
Figure 1.—Projects, Project Managers, and Organization of the Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP).
1.2.1 Fire Prevention and Material Flammability—Low-g Oxygen Thresholds

The screening of materials to be used on spacecraft to determine their flammability is an integral part of NASA’s fire protection strategy. With CxP, NASA took a new approach for the selection of materials in that they are determining the oxygen threshold for a set of important spacecraft materials, identified by NASA Materials and Processes (M&P) personnel, based on standard 1-g flammability tests. However, the oxygen threshold has been shown to be lower in reduced-gravity and is a function of the local convective velocity. Therefore, the objective of this task was to determine the oxygen flammability threshold in reduced-gravity for materials identified by NASA Materials and Processes personnel and quantify the difference from thresholds determined in normal gravity.

1.2.2 Fire Signatures and Detection

Constellation vehicles and habitats will require assured fire detection throughout their operational lifetimes. Developments in sensor technology have increased the reliability of fire detection not only by increasing sensor lifetime but decreasing the mass, volume, and power and the rate of nuisance alarms. However, advanced sensors require knowledge of the fire signatures, i.e., the gaseous species and particulate properties produced by a fire that provide the quickest and most reliable detection. Assured fire detection also depends on knowledge of where a fire detector should located and the associated time to detection. (In spacecraft, unlike in terrestrial applications, fire detection is not achieved simply placing a detector on the ceiling and letting the smoke rise!) The objective of this task was to conduct normal-gravity testing to identify suitable fire signatures, test prototype fire detectors in this normal gravity facility, and model smoke and gaseous contaminant transport in a low-g forced convective environment.

1.2.3 Fire Detector Development and Testing

Accompanying the task to determine relevant signatures from spacecraft materials and the modeling of smoke transport is the task to develop sensors for fire detection and conduct relevant tests to characterize and verify the performance of the advanced fire detection system. This data is required to conduct trade studies for every CxP vehicle and habitat that will be developed. These trade studies are needed to select a fire detection strategy and appropriate technology that is compatible with the other requirements of the environmental control and life support system. Within the FPDS project, the objective of this task is to develop and perform tests of candidate particulate and gaseous sensors, improving their performance with each design and test iteration. When appropriate, we will also incorporate them into fire detector suite and conduct tests at GRC, JSC, or WSTF to evaluate the fire detection and post-fire monitoring characteristics. A correlated objective of this portion of the FPDS project is to collect and evaluate data from any candidate fire detection or post-fire monitoring system so that a reliable comparison of their performance is available to perform these trades.

1.2.4 Fire Suppression

As work on the Constellation Program progressed and the designs for the Orion and Altair vehicles matured, contractor and NASA project teams completed independent trade studies of candidate fire suppression systems. Similar to the trade study completed by FPDS personnel in October 2007, they concluded that there was insufficient information to conduct a quantitative trade study of existing fire suppression systems for spacecraft. FPDS personnel developed a plan to obtain this data. Since then fine water mist has become a prime candidate for the portable fire extinguisher on Orion and Altair even though the technology is still being developed. The objective of this task is to continue to implement the fire suppression test plan to provide data on candidate fire suppression techniques, focusing on water mist fire suppression.
1.2.5 Post-Fire Monitoring and Response

Fire suppression is intimately linked to post-fire response because not only must the crew clean-up the cabin atmosphere from any smoke or gaseous combustion products, they must also clean-up any fire suppression agent that was discharged. They must do so while probably wearing breathing apparatus or filtering respirators which must be sized to provide protection for the duration of the clean-up process. The connectivity between these procedures and systems requires an integrated approach that includes crew response to the fire alarm, fire suppression, clean-up, and monitoring of the event. The FPDS project has been involved with researchers and engineers from NASA JSC and WSTF to develop a test for the rational evaluation of post-fire monitoring and clean-up equipment and instrumentation. The objective of this task is to support the development of the post-fire test and of suitable clean-up procedures and monitoring instruments. FPDS technologists will also continue to support the testing and evaluation of instruments for post-fire monitoring that were previously developed from FPDS technologies and are candidates for post-fire monitoring on CxP vehicles.

2.0 Summary of the Technical Accomplishments

During the implementation of the FPDS project, the primary mechanism to document technical results was through the publication of technical papers in conference proceedings and archival journals. Many of these documents are listed in the bibliography. However, the project also documented programmatic plans and overviewed the technical results through numerous presentations to ETDPO as well as to GRC management and other organizations. In July 2010, a presentation was made to representatives of the ETDPO and personnel from the program that was replacing it, the Enabling Technology Development and Demonstration (ETDD) Program. The purpose of these “transition face-to-face” presentations was to summarize the accomplishments of each project in ETDP, status each technology being developed in terms of Technology Readiness Level (TRL), review outstanding technical risks, and document lessons learned during the implementation of the project. The presentation delivered by the FPDS Project Manager is shown in this section.

2.1 FPDS Transition Face-to-Face Presentation

This slides shown in this section was delivered at NASA John H. Glenn Research Center on July 21, 2010 to representatives of the ETDP and ETDD program offices.
Fire Prevention, Detection, and Suppression

Face-to-Face Transition Meeting

Gary A. Ruff
NASA John H. Glenn Research Center
Cleveland, OH

July 21, 2010
Background

- Prior to 2001, NASA’s emphasis on technology development for spacecraft fire safety was through:
  - Justifications for science-based ground-based and flight projects funded by NRA’s and the Microgravity Combustion Science Program
  - International collaborations
  - Various groups within NASA

- In 2001, NASA initiated the Bioastronautics Initiative provided funds to allow researchers in the Microgravity Combustion Science Program to transition from basic research to applied fire safety investigations
  - Through the peer-reviewed NASA Research Announcement (NRA) process

- Announcement of the VSE continued the transition towards a technology development projects with a stand-alone fire safety technology development project being formed shortly thereafter
  - Fire Prevention, Detection, and Suppression (FPDS) project within the Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP)
FPDS Overview

- The overarching goal for the FPDS project is to develop technologies that will ensure crew health and safety on exploration missions by reducing the likelihood of a fire, or, if one does occur, minimizing the risk to the crew, mission, or system.

- Accomplished by addressing the areas of:
  1) fire prevention and material flammability
  2) fire signatures and detection,
  3) fire suppression, and
  4) post-fire response

- The Fire Prevention, Detection, and Suppression project is NASA’s primary activity for the development of spacecraft fire safety technology
  - This is an on-going project (and process) that advances fire safety knowledge and technologies in distinct phases

- During operation of any spacecraft, fire safety issues continuously arise
  - Validity of material flammability testing at off-nominal conditions
  - Analysis of false (nuisance) alarms on fire detection strategy
  - Other combustion-related events
FPDS Overview

- When vehicles are not being developed, we pursue lower TRL activities
  - Understanding ignition, flame spread, and fire suppression in low-g
  - Development of new flammability test methods
  - Advancement of sensor technology

- During times of vehicle development, higher TRL work is emphasized
  - Definition of operational atmospheres (material flammability)
  - Fire suppression strategies and equipment
  - Post-fire response
    - Development of technologies and relevant testing environments

- Time frame for the delivery of fire safety product spans from 1-2 years before System Requirements Review to Critical Design Review
  - In many respects, we were late on technology development when CxP was initiated.

➢ The implementation of this project as a technology supplier to the Constellation Program has allowed us to formulate a technology development process for spacecraft fire safety.
Constellation requirements driving fire safety

Documents
- Constellation Architecture Requirements Document (CXP-70000, Revision C, Change 001, March 5, 2009)
- Human-System Integration Requirements (CXP-70024, Revision C, Change 001, March 6, 2009)

What they say
- Need a fire detection and suppression system
- Specify pressure and %O₂ combinations permitted in the habitable volume
- Identify the gaseous combustion products that are to be monitored
- Clean-up after a fire and return the cabin to a habitable condition

What they don’t say
- Details of the fire detection and suppression systems
  - Required response time
  - Smoke/gas concentrations to detect
  - Clean-up requirements of limitations
  - Fire suppressant type and characteristics
  - Type or size of design fire
- Uniformity of fire response equipment across CXP vehicles
  - Differences in oxygen concentrations, ambient pressures, gravity levels, and consumables in different mission phases
## Customer Needs - FY08 TPP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Customer</th>
<th>Criticality</th>
<th>TPP #: Technology</th>
<th>TPP Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orion</td>
<td>Highly Desirable</td>
<td>125: Fire Detection</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altair</td>
<td>Highly Desirable</td>
<td>478: Fire Detection</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lunar Surf Sys</td>
<td>Highly Desirable</td>
<td>707 &amp; 481: Fire Detection</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lunar Surf Sys</td>
<td>Highly Desirable</td>
<td>688: Partial Gravity Fire Suppression</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lunar Surf Sys</td>
<td>Highly Desirable</td>
<td>705: Low-g Material Flammability Test</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altair</td>
<td>Critical</td>
<td>102: Post-fire Cleanup Monitor</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lunar Surf Sys</td>
<td>Critical</td>
<td>630 &amp; 474: Post-fire Cleanup Monitor</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lunar Surf Sys</td>
<td>Desirable</td>
<td>716: Low Flammability, Low Toxicity Multicolor Textiles</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orion</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Low-g Material Flammability Oxygen Thresholds</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Fire detection is highly desirable for Orion, Altair, and LSS.
- Fire suppression only ranked by LSS but Orion has an active tech development program.
- Post-fire cleanup monitor was critical for Altair and LSS.
  - Orion has an active technology development program.
- CxP-wide material flammability issues were not ranked.
## Key Performance Parameters (FY08)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Customer Requirements/Needs</th>
<th>Key Performance Parameters</th>
<th>State-of-the-Art</th>
<th>Performance Target (Full Success)</th>
<th>Performance Target (Minimal Success)</th>
<th>Validation Method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Develop normal gravity test method to evaluate reduced gravity material flammability</td>
<td>Characterization of low-g flammability</td>
<td>Screen materials using 1-g test; apply barriers as directed by M&amp;P</td>
<td>Test(s) to fully describe low-g flammability characteristics and eliminate use of fire barriers</td>
<td>Test(s) to evaluate a single critical low-g flammability parameter (ignition delay, flame spread rate, heat release rate, etc.)</td>
<td>Normal gravity testing; testing in ground based low-g facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantitative evaluation of NASA-STD-6001 Test 1</td>
<td>Risk of fire (both probability and severity)</td>
<td>NASA-STD-6001 Test 1</td>
<td>New NASA flammability test to replace NASA-STD-6001 Test 1 that quantifies risk of fires in low-g</td>
<td>Methods to extract quantitative data from NASA-STD-6001 Test 1 to assess relative risk of fires in low-g</td>
<td>Normal gravity testing; testing in ground based low-g facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design rules for suppressant system including effectiveness of suppressants, required concentrations, and dispersion methods</td>
<td>Mass of fire suppression system</td>
<td>Current ISS</td>
<td>10% reduction in mass</td>
<td>5% reduction in mass</td>
<td>Testing and trade studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mass of suppressant mass released per event</td>
<td>ISS Portable fire extinguishers</td>
<td>20% reduction in mass of suppressant released</td>
<td>no reduction in mass of suppressant released</td>
<td>Testing and analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mass of consumables required for clean-up/return</td>
<td>Current ISS</td>
<td>No additional consumables for fire clean-up/recovery</td>
<td>Consumables required specifically for post-fire clean-up and recovery</td>
<td>Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Replenishment of suppressant</td>
<td>Not currently available</td>
<td>Suppression system rechargeable to pre-use level</td>
<td>Partially rechargeable fire suppression system</td>
<td>Testing and analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis and simulation of spacecraft fire scenarios</td>
<td>Decrease response time to fire</td>
<td>Current ISS training</td>
<td>30% decrease in response time</td>
<td>10% decrease in response time</td>
<td>Analysis and simulation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Flammability and Fire Detection Key Performance Parameters (FY10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Customer Requirements/Needs</th>
<th>Key Performance Parameters</th>
<th>State-of-the-Art</th>
<th>Performance Target (Full Success)</th>
<th>Performance Target (Minimal Success)</th>
<th>Validation Method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Determine oxygen flammability thresholds in low-gravity for relevant CoP materials</td>
<td>Low-gravity oxygen thresholds (Δ %O₂)</td>
<td>Oxygen flammability thresholds as determined by NASA-STD-3001 Test 1 (normal gravity)</td>
<td>Quantification of the difference in oxygen thresholds to within ±1% O₂ by volume for thin materials (expt); extrapolation to thick and &quot;real&quot; materials through modeling</td>
<td>Quantification of difference in oxygen thresholds to within ±1% O₂ by volume for thin CoP materials</td>
<td>Experimental verification of oxygen flammability thresholds; modeling of materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced fire detection</td>
<td>CO monitoring</td>
<td>CO monitoring not used on ISS or STS for fire detection</td>
<td>Sensitivity to 1 ppm</td>
<td>Sensitivity to 3 ppm</td>
<td>JSC Toxicology/ Lab ventilation or CO sensitivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Particulate monitoring</td>
<td>ISS and STS smoke detectors</td>
<td>Responds to particles in the range 0.5 to 4 microns; ignore larger particles (dust)</td>
<td>Responds to particles only in the sub-micron range</td>
<td>Characterization against a standard particle source at GRC and/or NIST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sensor lifetime</td>
<td>ISS and STS smoke detectors, ISS CSA-CP</td>
<td>Calibrations stable for at least two cycles of being on continuously for 1 month and idle (unpowered) for 6 months</td>
<td>Correctable calibrations for at least two cycles of being on continuously for 1 month and idle (unpowered) for 6 months</td>
<td>Lifetime testing at two locations (JSC, Engineering, GRC, or JSC)</td>
</tr>
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## Fire Suppression Key Performance Parameters (FY10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Customer Requirements Needs</th>
<th>Key Performance Parameters</th>
<th>State-of-the-Art</th>
<th>Performance Target (Minimal Success)</th>
<th>Performance Target (Full Success)</th>
<th>Validation Method</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spacecraft fire suppression</td>
<td></td>
<td>No adverse impact on ECLSS</td>
<td>Non-conductive</td>
<td>Design and testing</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Halon incompatible with SS/TCCS</td>
<td>Russian foam extinguishers are not to be used on US modules of ISS</td>
<td>Testing at GRC/GSC</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low conductivity</td>
<td>STS terminate mission, ISS-Russian: wipe equipment, ISS-US CO removal</td>
<td>Testing at GRC, analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Clean-up</td>
<td>Rechargeable (ISS only)</td>
<td>Design and testing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Extinguishers are not rechargeable</td>
<td>Testing at GRC or WSTF</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Extinguish test fire with 30 sec discharge</td>
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## Fire Prevention, Detection, and Suppression (FPDS) Master Schedule

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<td>Shuttle &amp; ISS</td>
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<td>Q4</td>
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<td>Q2</td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td>Q4</td>
<td>Q1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constellation Milestones</td>
<td>Retire Shuttle</td>
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<tr>
<td>Orion</td>
<td>PDR</td>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Initial Capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>Altair</td>
<td>SRR</td>
<td>PDR</td>
<td>Q1 2016 CDR</td>
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<td>Lunar Surface Systems</td>
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<td>SRR</td>
<td>SDR</td>
<td>Tech Inf</td>
<td>PDR</td>
<td>Q2 2016 CDR</td>
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### 5.0 Fire Suppression and Response

#### 5.1 Quantification of fire extinguisher characteristics
- **5.1.1** Fine water mist
- **5.1.2** Flight-protoype (Orion) extinguisher characteristics

#### 5.2 Hot-fire test for portable fire suppression

#### 5.3 Evaluation of Orion PFE for Altair

### 6.0 Post-fire Response

#### 6.1 Particulate measurement system

#### 6.2 LD-PAS acid gas and CO assessment

#### 6.3 AEMC post-fire monitor
## Fire Prevention, Detection, and Suppression (FPDS) Master Schedule

### Lunar Surface Systems

#### 2.0 Fire Prevention and Material Flammability

- **2.1 Material Flammability**
  - Oxygen Thresholds/Normoxic Curve Flammability

- **2.2 Forced Ignition and Flame Spread Test**
- **2.3 Modeling of Upward Flame Spread**

#### 3.0 Fire Signatures and Detection

- **3.1 Modeling of Smoke/Contaminant Transport**

#### 4.0 Fire Detector Development

- **4.1 Sensor Development**
  - 4.1.1 Particulate Sensor Dev
  - 4.1.2 Gaseous Sensor Dev

- **4.2 Fire Detector Evaluation**
  - Fire detection/post-fire evaluations (annual test coordinated with customers)

#### Constellation Milestones

- **Orion**
  - PDR
  - CDR

- **Altair**
  - SRR
  - PDR

#### Shuttle & ISS

- Retire Shuttle

### Timeline

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<td>Q3</td>
<td>Q4</td>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>Q2</td>
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<td>Q4</td>
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<td>Q3</td>
<td>Q4</td>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>Q2</td>
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<td>Q1</td>
<td>Q2</td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td>Q4</td>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>Q2</td>
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</table>

*Initial Capability: Q1 2016 CDR*
### FPDS Risks

#### Risks as of October FY09

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trend</th>
<th>Risk ID and Open Date</th>
<th>Risk Title</th>
<th>Risk Statement (MBUIEUSE - &quot;Given that there is a possibility&quot;):</th>
<th>L</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>Affinity Group</th>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Owner Interface</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Mitigation 1</th>
<th>Estimated Start Date</th>
<th>Estimated End Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>F1 (10/1/2009)</td>
<td>Low-Flammability Task Termination</td>
<td>Given that the current FY10 PDR is in a draft state, there is a possibility that we will be unable to deploy sufficient low oxygen threshold data to the G-2017 framework.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Performance</td>
<td>GAV</td>
<td>W, M</td>
<td>The difference between the maximum oxygen concentration and the atmospheric NOx concentration determines whether fire detection and suppression are required.</td>
<td>This work remains out of scope for FY10. We conducted the non-LED test using the LED framework and will conduct tests as the oxygen concentration becomes available. We will continue to work with customers on issues of low-flammability issues and advocate for future funding as necessary.</td>
<td>1-Oct-08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>F2 (10/1/2009)</td>
<td>Loss of Key Personnel - Drop Tower</td>
<td>Given that there is no FY09 funding for material, there is a possibility that personnel will be lost to other projects.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Performance, Cost</td>
<td>GAV</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>There is unique experience required for the operation of low-gravity test facilities and analysis of the data. No training personnel will become increasingly difficult as the experience base evolves.</td>
<td>Drop tower tests are currently being reassigned to other facilities as the use of the Zero-Gravity Facility has significantly decreased. Occasional tests have been conducted using the LED framework and have been granted with considerable personnel on the ground and in the field.</td>
<td>1-Oct-08</td>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>D1 (10/1/2009)</td>
<td>Acid Gas Fire Detection</td>
<td>Given that the detection of acid gases, such as H₂O and HCl, is a standard fire detection method, there is a possibility that the fire detection approach will not prove suitable for spacecraft fire detection.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Performance</td>
<td>GAV</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>The detection of acid gases such as H₂O and HCl is required for fire detection monitoring. Verification of these species at the detection level could allow the same instrument to be used for both fire detection and monitoring.</td>
<td>We will mitigate this risk by conducting tests to evaluate the performance of these gases in the laboratory and during a typical spacecraft fire. Also, we will pursue the development of CO₂ and particulate sensors that are more established for fire detection.</td>
<td>1-Aug-08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>D2 (10/1/2009)</td>
<td>Low-concentration CO Detection</td>
<td>Given that the FY10 low-concentration CO sensor demonstrated increased noise in a practical fire environment, it is a possibility that these sensors will prove not to be viable.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Performance</td>
<td>GAV</td>
<td>W, M</td>
<td>The level of CO required for fire detection is substantially lower than those required for fire detection, one sensor that could operate in both regimes would satisfy both requirements.</td>
<td>Continued development of sensors has been limited due to performance issues and another set of tests will be performed in October. Other technologies for monitoring CO have been tested in small-scale applications.</td>
<td>1-Oct-08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>D3 (10/1/2009)</td>
<td>Unavailability of Fusion Testing Opportunities</td>
<td>Given that the FPDS project does not support the post-flight testing conducted at VISTE (i.e., the Smoke Eater Tests), there is a possibility that these tests will not be conducted or conducted at acceptable levels to satisfy FPDS milestones.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Schedule</td>
<td>GAV</td>
<td>W, M</td>
<td>The VISTE tests have been conducted each of the past two years, generally in the spring or summer. No tests have been conducted in FY10. These tests have been conducted to support the development of the FPDS project requirements.</td>
<td>We have been assigned a new facility at VISTE that is dedicated to these experiments and monitoring of post-flight clean-up. Because there is a need for more tests by FPDS and the project has insufficient funds to conduct our own tests, we will continue to schedule tests around other's schedules.</td>
<td>1-Oct-08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>D4 (11/1/2009)</td>
<td>Loss of Key Personnel - Particulate Monitor</td>
<td>Given that highly experienced technicians are required to manufacture components for the advanced particulate monitor, there is a possibility that these personnel may not be available in this project.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Schedule, Performance</td>
<td>GAV</td>
<td>W, M</td>
<td>FPDS and several other technology projects at SRC have supported technicians who have very limited experience with the requirements of each task. Funding reductions have forced all but one to be eliminated. We have received requests from customers to support our work. However, we will be in a different location and it will be more difficult to schedule additional work. We will continue to watch this issue to assess and predict impacts to the FPDS tasks.</td>
<td>We have requested at least 25% of the technician's time to support our work. However, we will be in another location and it will be more difficult to schedule additional work. We will continue to watch this issue to assess and predict impacts to the FPDS tasks.</td>
<td>1-Jan-09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>S1 (10/1/2009)</td>
<td>Fire Suppression Development</td>
<td>Given that a desire for common usage of the fire suppression system is not flexible with the system, there is a possibility that the fire suppression system may not be suitable for other GAV vehicles.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Performance, Cost</td>
<td>GAV</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Fire extinguishers on current space vehicles are generally not compatible with the system, to which they are attached. Using incomplete data in the extinguishing system design increases the likelihood that the fire threat will continue through GAV.</td>
<td>We will mitigate this risk by conducting tests to determine the required system for candidate suppression agents. However, the threat still exists that there will be insufficient funds to complete the planned test program.</td>
<td>1-Aug-08</td>
<td></td>
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## FPDS Risks

### Risks as of October FY10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Risk ID and Open Date</th>
<th>Risk Title/WES</th>
<th>Risk Statement (MUST USE: “Given that...there is a possibility.”)</th>
<th>L</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>Affinity Group (Budget, Performance, Cost, Schedule)</th>
<th>Owner/Initiator</th>
<th>Approach (M/W/A/R)</th>
<th>Status/Context</th>
<th>Mitigation 1</th>
<th>Estimated Start Date</th>
<th>Estimated End Date</th>
<th>Mitigation 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>F1 (10/1/2008)</td>
<td>Low-g Flammability Task Termination (34497.04 01.03)</td>
<td>Given the current FY10 PFPE in guide submits, there is a possibility that we will be unable to supply sufficient low oxygen threshold data to CIP MWP to incorporate low safety margins into the FPDS strategy for Orion/Altair.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Performance</td>
<td>DAR</td>
<td>W. M</td>
<td>The difference between the maximum oxygen concentration and the atmospheric %O2 determines whether fire detection and suppression are required.</td>
<td>This work remains out of scope for FY10. We will continue to interact with customers on issues of low-g material flammability and develop test protocols. Testing will assume in FY11 but by June 2011 (TBD), we will either have the needed data or it will be too late for Orion/Altair.</td>
<td>1-Oct-08</td>
<td>30-Jun-11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>F2 (10/1/2008)</td>
<td>Loss of Key Personnel - Drop Tower (34497.04 01.03)</td>
<td>Given that there is no FY10 funding for material flammability, there is a possibility that key personnel will be lost to other projects.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Performance</td>
<td>DAR</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>There is a critical need for the operation of low-gravity test facilities and analysis of the data. In-space training personnel will become increasingly difficult as the experience base erodes.</td>
<td>Drop tower test areas are currently being reassigned to other facilities as the use of the Zero-Gravity Facility has significantly decreased. Occasional test have been conducted using non-FPDS funds and the maintained capability and workforce (9/15/09)</td>
<td>1-Oct-08</td>
<td>30-Sep-10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>D1 (10/1/2008)</td>
<td>Low-concentration CO Detection</td>
<td>Given that the FY12 low-concentration CO sensor demonstrated increased noise in a typical pre-flight environment, there is a possibility that these sensors will prove not to be viable.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Performance</td>
<td>DAR</td>
<td>W. M</td>
<td>The levels of CO required for positive monitoring are substantially less than those required for fire detection. One sensor that could span both regimes would satisfy both applications.</td>
<td>Continued development of sensors has continued to improve performance and another set of tests will be performed in October 2009. Other technologies for monitoring CO have tested well in post-flight applications (9/15/09)</td>
<td>1-Oct-08</td>
<td>30-Sep-09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>D2 (10/1/2008)</td>
<td>Unavailability of Ground Testing Opportunities (34497.04 03.03)</td>
<td>Given that the FPDS project does not fund the post-flight clean-up tests conducted at WSST in the Smoke Water Tests, there is a possibility that these tests will not be conducted or conducted at suitable timing to satisfy FPDS milestones.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Schedule</td>
<td>DAR</td>
<td>W. M</td>
<td>The Smoke Water tests have been conducted each of the past two years, generally in the late spring or summer. While the original purpose was to determine post-flight air cleanup equipment, they have been used to demonstrate post-flight monitoring requirements. However, the tests conducted in FY01 did not match FPDS planned development, resulting in no post-gravity tests for the FY02 products.</td>
<td>Tests have begun in a new facility at WSST. The tests are dedicated to the evaluation and monitoring of post-flight cleanup. Because there is a need for more tests by FY03 and the project has insufficient funds to conduct our own tests, we will continue to schedule our tests around others’ schedules. By Sept 2010, we will reassess risks relative to Orion’s plans for post-flight regression</td>
<td>1-Oct-08</td>
<td>30-Sep-10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>D3 (1/16/2009)</td>
<td>Loss of Key Personnel - Particulate Monitor (34497.04 03.03)</td>
<td>Given that highly skilled machinists and technicians are required to manufacture components for the advanced particulate detector and FPDS cannot fully support these personnel, there is a possibility that they will be reassigned and be unable to complete this project.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Schedule</td>
<td>DAR</td>
<td>W. M</td>
<td>FPDS has several other technology projects at GRC supported several technicians who were highly skilled and very familiar with the requirements of each task. Funding reductions have forced all of them to be relocated. This will directly impact the particulate sensor development task.</td>
<td>We have requested an appropriate number of the technician’s time to support our work. However, availability when needed may be an issue. We will continue to watch this issue to assess and predict impacts to the FPDS tasks.</td>
<td>1-Jan-09</td>
<td>30-Sep-11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>B1 (10/1/2008)</td>
<td>Fire Suppression Development (34497.04 04.03)</td>
<td>Given that there is a desire for common span cabin fire suppression across the CIP architecture and that insufficient information is available on candidate suppressants to perform suitable trades, there is a possibility that a suppression agent selected for one vehicle may not be suitable for other CIP vehicles.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Performance</td>
<td>DAR</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Fire extinguishers on current space vehicles are generally compatible with the systems to which they are attached. However, the lack of complete data on extinguisher performance during tests and design increases the likelihood that the new system will not be fire-qualified for CIP.</td>
<td>We will mitigate this risk by conducting tests to obtain the required data on candidate suppression agents. However, it is possible that there will be insufficient funds to complete the planned test program by the time decisions are made</td>
<td>1-Aug-09</td>
<td>30-Sep-10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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## FPDS Risks

- **Risks as of July 2010**

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<th>Trend</th>
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<th>Risk Title/WBS</th>
<th>Risk Statement (MUST USE: “Given that...there is a possibility...”)</th>
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<th>C</th>
<th>Affinity Group (Budget, Performance, Cost, Schedule)</th>
<th>Owner/Initiator</th>
<th>Approach (M,W,A,R)</th>
<th>Status/Context</th>
<th>Mitigation 1</th>
<th>Estimated Start Date</th>
<th>Estimated End Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓</td>
<td>D3 (1/12/2009)</td>
<td>Loss of Key Personnel - Pesticide Monitor (34497.04.03.01)</td>
<td>Given that highly skilled machinists and technicians are required to manufacture components for the advanced particulate detector and FPDS cannot fully support these personnel, there is a possibility that they will be reassigned and be unavailable to this project.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Performance</td>
<td>GAR</td>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓</td>
<td>D4 (11/30/2009)</td>
<td>Low-concentration CO Detector</td>
<td>Given that the FY08 and FY09 low-concentration CO sensor demonstrated anomalous behavior in a practical prefire environment, there is a possibility that the Pt-Rhene type sensors will prove not to be viable.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Performance</td>
<td>GAR</td>
<td>W, M</td>
<td>The levels of CO required for post-fire monitoring are substantially less than those required for fire detection. One sensor that could span both regimes would satisfy both applications.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓</td>
<td>D2 (19/12/2008)</td>
<td>Unavailability of Sensor Testing Opportunities (34497.04.03.01)</td>
<td>Given that the FPDS project does not fund the post-fire cleanup tests conducted at WSTF (e.g., the Smoke Eater Tours), there is a possibility that these tests will not be conducted or conducted at suitable times to satisfy FPDS milestones.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Schedule</td>
<td>GAR</td>
<td>W, M</td>
<td>The Smoke Eater tests have been conducted each of the past two years, generally in the late spring or summer. While the original purpose was to evaluate postfire cleaning equipment, they have been useful to demonstrate post-fire monitoring instruments. However, the tests conducted in FY09 did not match FPDS planned development, resulting in no post-fire tests for the FY09 products.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✓</td>
<td>D1 (10/12/2008)</td>
<td>Low-Flammability Task Termination (34497.04.01.03)</td>
<td>Given the current FY10 FFPE in-use status, there is a possibility that we will be unable to supply sufficient low-oxygen threshold data to CoP and M&amp;P to incorporate low-oxygen safety margins into the FFPE strategy for general use.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Performance</td>
<td>GAR</td>
<td>W, M</td>
<td>The difference between the maximum oxygen concentration and the atmospheric %O2 determines whether fire detection and suppression are required.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- **By end of FY10, testing could remove Risk D4: Low-concentration CO Detector.**
  - Issues could then be calibration
  - Laser spectroscopic technologies are alternatives
- **Other risks could remain relevant but will be re-evaluated in the new program**
FPDS Major Accomplishments

- Low-g Maximum Oxygen Concentration tests
  - For the first time, quantifies the difference between 0-g, Lunar-g and 1-g MOC for relevant materials
- Flammability correlations as functions of pressure, velocity, and %O₂
  - What is the impact on material flammability as you trade oxygen concentration and pressure?
- Ignitability of materials increases as pressure decreases
- Fire Detection
  - Interpretation of results for the Smoke Aerosol Measurement Experiment (SAME) and SAME-R (Reflight)
  - Development of the Multiparameter Aerosol Scattering Spectrometer
  - Simulation of smoke detector activation
- Water mist fire extinguisher
  - Sufficiently raised TRL for extinguisher to warrant a change in Orion baseline
- Post-fire Clean-up
  - Development of a standard challenge
  - Suite of instrumentation (from SBIRs)
Low-g Oxygen Flammability Threshold Tests

Objective

- Quantify the low-g flammability thresholds for typical spacecraft materials and compare results with thresholds determined in normal gravity

Ultem 1000

- Tests conducted in Zero Gravity Facility at NASA-GRC for Ultem 1000, Nomex, and Mylar
  - 5.2-sec limits samples to thin materials
Lunar-g Maximum Oxygen Concentration

- Centrifuge drop rig being prepared for a drop in the Zero Gravity Facility.
- Fuel sample is 5 cm wide by 6 cm long.
Zero-g and Lunar-g MOC Results

- Tests were conducted at WSTF (normal-g) and GRC (Lunar-g) to quantify changes in the MOC for Nomex, Mylar, and Ultem.

- Conditions run in Lunar-g burned at both the normal gravity MOC and at the zero-g convective MOC:
  - Lunar-g flammability appears more like zero-g rather than 1-g.
  - Cessation of ventilation flow is not effective.

- Significant impact on a fire safety strategy, especially if the need for fire detection and suppression is dictated by the difference between the MOC and atmosphere of use.

➢ How large can a fire get and how long will it take a fire to get that large?
FPDS Major Accomplishments

- Low-g Maximum Oxygen Concentration tests
  - For the first time, quantifies the difference between 0-g, Lunar-g and 1-g MOC for relevant materials
- Flammability correlations as functions of pressure, velocity, and %O\textsubscript{2}
  - What is the impact on material flammability as you trade oxygen concentration and pressure?
- Ignitability of materials increases as pressure decreases
- Fire Detection
  - Interpretation of results for the Smoke Aerosol Measurement Experiment (and Reflight)
  - Development of the Multiparameter Aerosol Scattering Spectrometer
  - Simulation of smoke detector activation
- Water mist fire extinguisher
  - Sufficiently raised TRL for extinguisher to warrant a change in Orion baseline
- Post-fire Clean-up
  - Development of a standard challenge
  - Suite of instrumentation (from SBIRs)
Spacecraft Habitable Atmosphere Trades

- In 2005, the Exploration Atmospheres Working Group performed a detailed trade study of potential atmospheres for exploration missions
  - Experts in space medicine and physiology, mission operations, and vehicle and habitat systems
- Traded against decompression sickness (pre-breathe time), hypoxia and material flammability
- What is the quantitative effect of elevated mole fractions of oxygen and reduced ambient pressure on material flammability in low- and partial-gravity?
  
  or

- How large can a fire get and how long will it take a fire to get that large?
Flame spread data for Kimwipes, fit to an oxygen-pressure correlation [Magee and McAlevy, 1971] for opposed flow under a variety of atmospheric and gravitational conditions.
Concurrent Flow Flame Spread Correlation

\[ V_f \]

\[
\text{flame spread rate, cm/s} = \text{O}_2(\text{mole fraction}) \times \text{flow (cm/s)} \times P(\text{atm})^{0.5}
\]
Predicted vs Measured Trends in Flammability

- MOC values from NASA Test 1 resemble opposed spread trends
Ignition in Spacecraft Atmospheres

- Tests by researchers at University of California at Berkeley have shown that the time required for a material to ignite after it has been exposed to an external heat flux (ignition delay time) decreases with decreasing pressure and increasing oxygen concentration.
  - ignition is easier at low pressures and increased oxygen concentrations
- If a low-g spacecraft fire ignites easier and has a lower oxygen flammability limit ...

➢ How large can a fire get and how long will it take a fire to get that large?
FPDS Major Accomplishments

- Low-g Maximum Oxygen Concentration tests
  - For the first time, quantifies the difference between 0-g, Lunar-g and 1-g MOC for relevant materials
- Flammability correlations as functions of pressure, velocity, and %O₂
  - What is the impact on material flammability as you trade oxygen concentration and pressure?
- Ignitability of materials increases as pressure decreases
- Fire Detection
  - Interpretation of results for the Smoke Aerosol Measurement Experiment (SAME) and SAME-R (Reflight)
  - Development of the Multiparameter Aerosol Scattering Spectrometer (MPASS)
  - Simulation of smoke detector activation
- Water mist fire extinguisher
  - Sufficiently raised TRL for extinguisher to warrant a change in Orion baseline
- Post-fire Clean-up
  - Development of a standard challenge
  - Suite of instrumentation (from SBIRs)
SAME Operations

- SAME launched on STS-118 in August 2007
- Operated in the Microgravity Science Glovebox in September and October 2007 by Expedition 15
- 30 Samples of 5 Materials Distributed in 5 Carousels
  - Silicone Rubber
  - Teflon
  - Kapton
  - Lampwick (cellulose)
  - Dibutyl phthalate (DBP)
- 47 total test points
- Samples and TEM grids were returned on STS-120
Summary of SAME results

- Lampwick and silicone produced pyrolysis aerosols similar to those associated with terrestrial early warning fire signatures.
  - After a 720 second aging period, the CMDs increased significantly
- Teflon samples produced somewhat smaller particles than lampwick and silicone and similar evolution with aging
  - not significantly differed from particulate observed terrestrially
  - somewhat inconsistent with the larger particle sizes that were qualitatively observed in the CSD experiment
- Kapton aerosols were relatively small, roughly a third of the nominal value for terrestrial signatures (190 nanometers)
  - even after aging, the CMD remained roughly 20% smaller than this value

➢ Based on the SAME results, possible fire signatures occur in both large and small particle size regimes
  - Problematic for conventional ionization and optical scattering fire detectors
➢ Size selective smoke detection will improve reliability and false alarm rejection.
  - Classifying the particles or by measuring multiple moments
Motivation for an Improved Smoke Detector

- With increased knowledge of low-g smokes, we have the opportunity to create smoke detectors having increased capabilities.
- Reliable and prompt identification of evolving fire hazards requires sensors of adequate sensitivity,
  - provisions to exclude false events with high probability
- The inclusion of additional sensors, such as gas-phase composition, may prove to be an important component
  - An alternate approach is to maximize the information available from the particulate aerosol.
- The current detector development makes use of optical scattering due to the richness of information available from particle-light interactions
  - Supported in part by the Fire Prevention, Detection, and Suppression (FPDS) project within Exploration Tech Development Program (ETDP)
- A re-flight of the SAME experiment (SAME-R) presents the opportunity to demonstrate additional diagnostic instruments.
- The resulting capability could augment the science return of SAME by providing additional characterization of the test aerosols.
Construction of MPASS Sensor

SAME-R flight sensor

- Laser diode driver
- Solid-state detector/preamplifiers
- Integrated optics block
- Laser diode source
- Controller and analog electronics assembly
- In the SAME hardware, the MPASS mimics a TSI DustTrak
  - physical size, connections, and communication
Smoke Transport and Detector Activation in Orion

Objective

- Apply tools developed to simulate smoke transport and fire spread in terrestrial systems to exploration systems
- Understand how fire detector activation times are affected by: sensor location, size of fire, ventilation flows, and obstructions
- Fire Dynamic Simulator (FDS) developed and supported by NIST
  - Has become a widely-used tool for fire analysis
  - Developers have a grant to verify the large-eddy simulation capabilities of this tool for low-g

Procedure

- Smoke originates from a cable interface
- Transported to detector via module air flow
- Calculate time-to-alarm for various fire locations
Smoke Transport and Detector Activation in Orion

- Simulations run for 5 minutes computational time (or until smoke detector alarms)
  - Requires over 100 hours clock time
- Smoke sources on forward bulkhead are detected within no more than 120 sec
- Sources behind ECLSS wall require 160 sec (minimum) to alarm

How fast does a low-g fire grow and how big does it get?
Multiparameter Fire Detection System

- System features include:
  - Four chemical sensors: CO, H₂/HC, CO₂
  - Particulate sensor: IMS cell or two-moment optical scattering sensor
  - Two environmental sensors: humidity and pressure
  - Small pump for air flow
  - Core hardware for power, acquisition, analysis
  - Battery operation and wireless transmission possible

➢ Recent work has focused on the low-concentration CO sensor

![Comparison of aeronautics fire detector (10” x 10” x 4.5”) to FPDS fire detector (7” x 5.9” x 2.1”)](image1)

![Miniaturized multiparameter fire detection system](image2)
Advanced Fire Detection Technologies

- **Low-concentration (< 5 ppm) CO sensor**
  - Solid State: OSU/Makel/GRC
  - LD-PAS: SBIR Phase III - Vista Photonics
  - Integrated VCSEL-WMS: SBIR Phase II – Vista Photonics
  - QCL absorption: SBIR Phase I – Maxion, Inc.
    - absorption measurement at 4.610-μm

- **HF, HCN, HCl sensor**
  - LD-PAS: SBIR Phase III - Vista Photonics
  - Solid state sensors – GRC and Makel Engineering

- **Evaluation of post-fire environments and sensors will determine applicability for post-fire monitoring**
FPDS Major Accomplishments

- Low-g Maximum Oxygen Concentration tests
  - For the first time, quantifies the difference between 0-g, Lunar-g and 1-g MOC for relevant materials
- Flammability correlations as functions of pressure, velocity, and \( \%O_2 \)
  - What is the impact on material flammability as you trade oxygen concentration and pressure?
- Ignitability of materials increases as pressure decreases
- Fire Detection
  - Interpretation of results for the Smoke Aerosol Measurement Experiment (SAME) and SAME-R (Refight)
  - Development of the Multiparameter Aerosol Scattering Spectrometer
  - Simulation of smoke detector activation
- Water mist fire extinguisher
  - Sufficiently raised TRL for extinguisher to warrant a change in Orion baseline
- Post-fire Clean-up
  - Development of a standard challenge
  - Suite of instrumentation (from SBIRs)
Fire Extinguisher Development

**Issue**
- Even though fine water mist was recognized as having beneficial characteristics for spacecraft fire suppression, it was not baselined by contractor trade studies because of the lower TRL (relative to the presumed TRL of COTS extinguishers).
- Received some FTE from CxP, supplemented by ETDP to advance TRL.
- Worked with JSC Orion and ADA Technologies, Inc.

**Fine Water Mist Fire Extinguisher**
- Cylinder is 5.25" diameter, 14.25" tall.
- Charge with 1000 psi N₂.
- Holds ~900 cc water.
- Produces water droplets 20-50 μm in diameter.
Fine Water Mist Fire Extinguisher

- Nozzle has six jets
  - Three central jets
  - Three outer jets
Steady Flow Water/Gas Supply Cart

- System developed for long discharge times and constant pressure operation
  - Good for measuring droplet diameter and velocity, mass flow rate as a function of system pressure
- Use 5 gal (18.9 L) tank containing water and nitrogen
  - Holds enough water for four minutes of use
- Connects to hand piece (valve, nozzle) similar to hand extinguisher
  - Cart uses shop-air driven piston instead of hand lever to open valve
Droplet Diameter and Velocity Measurements

- Use Dantec Dynamics PDA system to make measurements
  - System reports individual measurements, we calculate ensemble values
  - Velocity
    - Mean and standard deviation
  - Droplet diameter
    - Mean, standard deviation, second and third moments, Sauter diameter
- Mount nozzle on three-axis translation stage
- Current measurements made along axial centerline and radially at 28 cm below nozzle
Droplet Size and Dispersion Pattern

- **SBIR Prototype Extinguisher**

- Center orifice
- 28 cm downstream of the nozzle
- 6.5 MPa
Fine Water Mist Fire Extinguisher

- Worked with JSC Engineering and ADA Technologies, Inc. to develop a flight prototype fire extinguisher (funded by JSC)
- Fire tests at ADA Tech/Colorado School of Mines are on-going
- Prototype will then come to GRC for drop size characterization and dispersion testing
- Develop Product Specification Document

➤ How large a fire does a spacecraft extinguisher have to put out?

ADA Technologies, Inc. Flight Prototype Water Mist Fire Extinguisher
FPDS Major Accomplishments

- Low-g Maximum Oxygen Concentration tests
  - For the first time, quantifies the difference between 0-g, Lunar-g and 1-g MOC for relevant materials
- Flammability correlations as functions of pressure, velocity, and %O₂
  - What is the impact on material flammability as you trade oxygen concentration and pressure?
- Ignitability of materials increases as pressure decreases
- Fire Detection
  - Interpretation of results for the Smoke Aerosol Measurement Experiment (SAME) and SAME-R (Refight)
  - Development of the Multiparameter Aerosol Scattering Spectrometer
  - Simulation of smoke detector activation
- Water mist fire extinguisher
  - Sufficiently raised TRL for extinguisher to warrant a change in Orion baseline
- Post-fire Clean-up
  - Development of a standard challenge
  - Suite of instrumentation (in-house and SBIR Program)
Post-Fire Cleanup

- The most important requirement in developing a post-fire cleanup process is to specify the state of the atmosphere to be scrubbed
  - pressure, temperature, and composition
- With WSTF, FPDS personnel helped develop a suitable post-fire challenge

### Sample Composition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polymer</th>
<th>Percent Composition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Silicone</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epoxy</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polypropylene</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polycarbonate</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTFE</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polymide</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polyvinylchloride</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polyurethane</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polyphenylene Oxide</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phenol formaldehyde</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polysulfone</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polyester</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Pelletized fuel sample](image1.png)

![Sample heated](image2.png)
Post-Fire Cleanup Test Protocol

- Post-fire test conducted in a glovebox facility at WSTF
  - evaluate smoke and contaminant scrubbing
  - mask filters
  - evaluate CO and acid gas monitoring technologies

*Typical Spacecraft Mix*
Low Visibility, significant smoke produced

Does this represent a realistic post-fire environment?
Status of FPDS Technologies

Technology Readiness Level

TRL 1  Basic principles observed and reported
TRL 2  Technology concept and/or application formulated
TRL 3  Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof-of-concept
TRL 4  Component and/or breadboard validation in laboratory environment
TRL 5  Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant environment
TRL 6  System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a relevant environment (ground or space)
TRL 7  System prototype demonstration in a space environment
TRL 8  Actual system completed and "flight qualified" through test and demonstration (ground or space)
TRL 9  Actual system "flight proven" through successful mission operations
Status of FPDS Technologies

Capability Readiness Level

- A Capability is defined as a set of systems (or system of systems) with associated technologies & knowledge that enable NASA to perform a function (e.g. scientific measurements) required to accomplish the NASA mission.
- A Capability needs to be demonstrated and qualified, just as a technology does, in both laboratory and relevant environments.
  - The infrastructure and knowledge (process, procedures, training, facilities) of the Capability needs to be
  - demonstrated and qualified in both laboratory and relevant environments and
  - available to support the Capability in order for it to be considered mission-ready.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability Operational Readiness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Integrated Capability Demonstration in
Operational Environment
Integrated Capability Demonstration in
Relevant Environment
Sub-Capabilities* Demonstrated in Relevant Environment
Concept of Use defined, Capability, Constituent
Sub-capabilities* and Requirements Specified

* Sub-capabilities include technologies, infrastructure, and knowledge (process, procedures, training, facilities)
# Status of FPDS Technologies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technology</th>
<th>Responsible Party</th>
<th>TRL/CRL</th>
<th>Assessment and Future Plans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Material Flammability (capability to use low-g material flammability as acceptance criteria)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum Oxygen Concentration</td>
<td>GRC</td>
<td>CRL 2</td>
<td>More materials need to be tested. Need to verify at larger length and time scales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect of pressure and %O₂ on flammability and ignition</td>
<td>GRC</td>
<td>CRL 2</td>
<td>More materials need to be tested. Need to verify at larger length and time scales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fire Detection</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiparameter Aerosol Scattering Spectrometer</td>
<td>GRC</td>
<td>TRL 5-6</td>
<td>Flight instrument has been produced, experiments ongoing with results TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solid-state multiparameter gas sensors</td>
<td>GRC/Maket Engineering</td>
<td>TRL 5</td>
<td>Fire detection is mature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smoke detector activation modeling</td>
<td>GRC</td>
<td>CRL 3</td>
<td>Capability demonstrated but not used/verified in an operational environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fire Suppression</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water mist fire extinguisher</td>
<td>ADA Technologies, Inc.</td>
<td>TRL 5-6</td>
<td>Tests are ongoing. Will be TRL 6 when characterization for Product Specification Document is complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Post-fire Cleanup</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-fire test facility</td>
<td>WSTF/JSC/GRC</td>
<td>CRL 3</td>
<td>Tests have been conducted. Environment must be characterized and verified against a spacecraft post-fire environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low-concentration CO</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solid-state sensors</td>
<td>GRC/Maket Engineering</td>
<td>TRL 3-4</td>
<td>Rounds of testing and improvements of prototype</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LD-PAS: SBIR Phase III</td>
<td>Vista Photonics, Inc.</td>
<td>TRL 5</td>
<td>Successfully evaluated in post-fire test facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated VCSEL-WMS: SBIR Phase II</td>
<td>Vista Photonics, Inc.</td>
<td>TRL 4</td>
<td>Successfully evaluated in JSC Toxicology Lab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QCL absorption: SBIR Phase I</td>
<td>Maxion Technology</td>
<td>TRL 2</td>
<td>Phase I ending July 31 with promising results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HF, HCl, HCN</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LD-PAS: SBIR Phase III</td>
<td>Vista Photonics, Inc.</td>
<td>TRL 5</td>
<td>Evaluated in post-fire test facility. Questions about presence of gases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solid-state sensors</td>
<td>GRC/Maket Engineering</td>
<td>TRL 3-4</td>
<td>Prototypes evaluated in laboratory. Under development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To be Completed in FY10

- Testing of post-fire sensor suite at WSTF (week of August 16)
  - VCSEL-WMS for CO
  - HF via integrating sphere
  - LD-PAS for HCN and HCl

- Characterization of drop sizes and spray dispersion from ADA Technologies, Inc. flight prototype water mist fire extinguisher (end of August)

- Accumulation of documents on ETDP close-out checklist
  - Technical papers
  - Risk disposition and status
Lessons Learned

- Technology assessments are required throughout the project/program lifetime
  - “Who’s doing what” changes after several years of implementation
  - Assessment of relevance and consistency is needed across customers’ programs
- Timing is important and needs to be taken into account
  - Information about fire safety technologies is needed at System Requirements Review or shortly thereafter
    - Consistent data is needed for early trade studies
    - Hardware could be as late as CDR
- Consider development time/window in prioritization
  - Balance between near-term needs and far-term needs
- When rated against other life support systems, FDS will always rate lower
  - But it will be on the vehicle and the technology will impact other systems
- Within ETDP, we’ve had a chance to develop integrated fire safety technology development within NASA
Spacecraft Fire Prevention, Detection, and Suppression Design Processes

- Habitable atmosphere (pressure and %O₂)
- Maximum Oxygen Concentration

Material flammability

- Advanced fire detectors
- Simulation of fire detector activation
- Collateral impacts and damage

Post-fire cleanup

- Post-fire challenge
- Advanced monitoring technologies
- Filters and masks

How large can a spacecraft fire get and how long does it take?

Fire Detection

Fire Suppression

- Suppression agent characteristics
- Effectiveness
- Mass and volume
Large-Scale Fire Demonstration Experiment

- Utilize/recycle the current automated servicing vehicles as a platform for fundamental research free-flyer tests and large scale fire tests
- After vehicle is loaded with trash, install other free flyer payloads or, in the case of a fire experiment, igniters and fire sensors.
  - Allow the free flyer experiment to complete its testing and then trigger the fire event after the vehicle has performed its deorbit burn
- Technical issues involve size of experiment, telemetry, and safety
Relative size of ATV, Progress, and Apollo
ATV interior
Fire Prevention, Detection, and Suppression

Summary

- Implementation of the CxP has focused many of the fire safety technology development efforts directly onto the hardware that will be needed for exploration spacecraft
- FPDS has implemented an integrated approach to fire safety
  - Addressed areas where uncertainties have been identified
  - Brought ground-based fire safety technologies and processes to bear on spacecraft
- New knowledge and technology have been rapidly infused into CxP requirements and even baselined in spacecraft designs
  - Critical design and development of flight hardware to follow
- Future emphasis will be on flammability, detector development, and post-fire
- Many of the design trades have identified a knowledge gap of what a spacecraft fire will look like
  - How large is it?, How rapidly does it grow?
  - Combustion products as a function of what is burning?
- A large-scale fire demonstration experiment is a logical "next step"
  - Material flammability, fire detection, and fire suppression are possible
3.0 Closure

Protecting spacecraft from fire has been of critical importance to NASA since the beginning of the human spaceflight program. During the design of new spacecraft, trade studies for fire detection, fire suppression, and post-fire cleanup and monitoring systems are conducted using the most recent knowledge regarding spacecraft fires. The design and implementation of these systems has evolved with succeeding vehicle as new data and hardware technologies have become available. Because of the specialized nature of fire protection in spacecraft operating in low- or partial-gravity, commercial off-the-shelf terrestrial fire safety technologies are seldom relevant. While current terrestrial fire safety technologies have developed over more than a century of fighting fires, spacecraft fire safety technology has only been studied for a little over 30 years with varying emphasis. The Fire Prevention, Detection, and Suppression technology development effort was the first concerted effort within NASA to advance spacecraft fire safety technologies and incorporate that technology into the design of crewed space vehicles and habitats. No matter what destination astronauts from the United States will eventually be directed, the implementation of a robust spacecraft fire safety technology development program between now and then will provide the best methods for them to respond to a fire, recover the vehicle, and continue with their mission. Crew safety has been and will continue to be the primary objective of NASA’s spacecraft fire safety technology development effort.
4.0 Selected Bibliography

The major publications and presentations prepared by FPDS personnel from 2004 to 2010 are listed in this section. They are categorized into the topical areas of material flammability, fire detection, and fire suppression as well as several programmatic overview papers. Because technology development work in spacecraft fire safety will continue after the ETDP Fire Prevention, Detection, and Suppression project transitions to the ETDD program, this list of publications represents a “snap-shot” of the publications and will undoubtedly increase.

Programmatic


Material Flammability


Fire Detection


Presentation to NASA HQ, September 24, 2008.

Smoke Particulate Size under Low-Gravity Conditions,” SAE Paper No. 2008-01-2089, 38th


Ward, B.J., “CEV Combustion Product Monitoring,” Makel Engineering, Inc. Report MEI-

Fire Suppression

SAE Paper No. 2008-01-2040, 38th International Conference on Environmental Systems,

SAE Paper No. 2009-01-2511, 39th International Conference on Environmental Systems,

Gravity Environments,” SAE Paper No. 2008-01-2087, 38th International Conference on


AIAA–2010–6242, 40th International Conference on Environmental Systems, Barcelona, Spain,

Partially Premixed Flames Under Normal and Microgravity,” Combustion and Flame, Vol. 143,


14. ABSTRACT
The Fire Prevention, Detection, and Suppression (FPDS) project is a technology development effort within the Exploration Technology Development Program of the Exploration System Missions Directorate (ESMD) that addresses all aspects of fire safety aboard manned exploration systems. The overarching goal for work in the FPDS area is to develop technologies that will ensure crew health and safety on exploration missions by reducing the likelihood of a fire, or, if one does occur, minimizing the risk to the crew, mission, or system. This is accomplished by addressing the areas of (1) fire prevention and material flammability, (2) fire signatures and detection, and (3) fire suppression and response. This report describes the outcomes of this project from the formation of the Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) in October 2005 to September 31, 2010 when the Exploration Technology Development Program was replaced by the Enabling Technology Development and Demonstration Program. NASA’s fire safety work will continue under this new program and will build upon the accomplishments described herein.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Fire prevention; Smoke detection; Fire detection; Fire extinguishers; Safety