Single Event Analysis and Fault Injection Techniques Targeting Complex Designs Implemented in Xilinx-Virtex Family Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) Devices

Melanie Berg, AS&D Inc. in support of NASA/GSFC

Melanie.D.Berg@NASA.gov

Kenneth Label: NASA/GSFC

Hak Kim: AS&D Inc. in support of NASA/GSFC

List of Acronyms

- Configuration logic block (CLB)
- Device under test (DUT)
- Edge-triggered Flip-Flop (DFF)
- Fault Injection (FI)
- Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)
- Linear Energy Transfer (LET)
- Lookup table (LUT)
- Number of configuration bits (NT)
- Single Event Effects (SEEs)
- Single Event Transient (SET)
- Single Event Upset (SEU)
- Static random access memory (SRAM)
- Total number of configuration bits for one fault injection campaign (\#Bit_{FI,inj})
- Time for total fault injection (T_{fl,total})
- Time to flip one configuration bit (t_{FI,inj})
- Time to wait for error response (t_{wait})
- Time to correct the inverted configuration bit (t_{corr})
- Time to reset functionality (t_{rst})
Abstract

• Informative session regarding SRAM FPGA basics.
• Presenting a framework for fault injection techniques applied to Xilinx FPGAs.
• Introducing an overlooked time component that illustrates fault injection is impractical for most real-designs as a stand-alone characterization tool.
• Demonstrating procedures that benefit from fault injection error analysis.

Question: Why are you performing fault injection?…
Single Event Upset Analysis

- We define error-event stimuli as sources applied to internal DUT structures that can potentially cause DUT malfunction; e.g.:
  - Ionizing particles,
  - Laser pulses, or
  - Forced logic-state inversion (fault injection (FI)).
Application of Error Stimuli

- Involves a variety of considerations such as:
  - Invoking a large enough event space for proper statistics,
  - Avoiding unrealistic fault accumulation, and
  - Respecting the amount of time required for an error event to reach an observable test point.

- In this presentation, we focus on:
  - The application of error-event stimuli to Xilinx Virtex FPGA devices in the form of fault injection.
General Xilinx Virtex FPGA Architecture

**Functional Logic**

**Lookup Table (LUT)**

<table>
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**Configuration Logic Block: CLB**

- **DFF**

SRAM-Based FPGAs: SEUs and Fault Injection (FI)

• SRAM-based FPGAs can incur SEUs in:
  – Configuration bits,
  – Functional logic (data path transistors – combinatorial logic and flip-flops (DFFs)),
  – Global routes, or
  – Hidden logic structures (inaccessible to the user).

• Although all internal structures to the FPGA have a susceptibility to SEUs, we limit the scope of this study to fault injection in the configuration memory only.

We study how configuration-bit SEUs affect associated Xilinx components.
SRAM-Based Configuration FPGA FI

- SRAM-based Configuration fault injection:
  - Flip the state of a configuration bit.
  - Wait and attempt to detect if an error occurs after the configuration bit-state is changed (not all configuration bits are used – not all flips will cause an error response).
Goals of SRAM-based Configuration FPGA FI

• Determine which configuration bits can affect circuit behavior (sensitive configuration bits).
• Investigate Potential Error Responses.

Configuration-bit FI does not determine error rates.
Determining Sensitive Configuration Bits

• Not all configuration bits are used by a design.
• Used and un-used configuration bits can affect a design when upset.
• Impossible to determine every bit that can affect a design because of:
  – number of configuration bits,
  – state space complexity, and
  – time to perform injection.
Investigating Potential Error Responses

- FI is analogous to turning a knob and waiting to see if an error occurs per knob turn:
  - Real design – the wait time after the knob is turned can be significant (complex state-space).
  - Many knobs to turn… impossible to turn every one for a real-design. So must pick a subset.

- Hence, not all error responses can be observed.

**FI Flow Diagram**

- $t_{rst}$: clock-cycle time to seconds (s).
- $t_{FI\_inj}$: microseconds (μs) to s.
- $t_{wait}$: μs to days.
- $t_{corr}$: μs to s.

**More configuration bits to inject**

**Finished with Configuration bits**

**Stop**
State Space Complexity and Wait time

• When a configuration bit is flipped:
  – The associated circuitry must be turned on (active) in order to determine if the inverted configuration bit will affect operation.
  – Depending on the state of circuitry usage during FI, error responses can differ.

• Examples of complex state space and design operation:
  – Design Startup process will be different than normal operation.
  – On-off states.
FI and The Design Startup Phase of Operation

• What happens during the beginning of operation… real-design versus test-circuit?
  – **Real-designs**: Built-in-self-test, computer boot-up, register loading, Communication set-up/adjustments, etc,…
  – **Test-circuits**: usually straight forward and there is little to no special start-up sequencing… but there can be.

• FI during set-up will not reflect most true error responses because real operation has not begun.

User must be aware of which states are operating when the configuration bit is inverted
Time Required for SRAM-Based FPGA FI

- We define the total number of configuration bits for one fault injection campaign as \( \#\text{Bit}_{FI\_inj} \).
  \[
  \#\text{Bit}_{FI\_inj} < NT
  \]
- The total time required \( (T_{fl\_total}) \) for a fault injection campaign is:
  \[
  T_{fl\_total} = \#\text{Bit}_{FI\_inj} \text{ millions} \times (t_{FI\_inj} \mu s - s + t_{\text{wait}} \mu s - \text{days} + t_{\text{corr}} \mu s - s + t_{\text{rst}} \text{clock cycle- s})
  \]
- The fault injection tool can control \( t_{FI\_inj} \) and \( t_{\text{corr}} \).
- However \( t_{\text{wait}} \) and \( t_{\text{rst}} \) are design dependent.
- In real-designs \( t_{\text{wait}} \) can be days. As an example: think about a test campaign for designs with no errors injected – can take days to find a design flaw. State space exploration takes time.
Understanding Configuration FI Error Responses

- Inverting the state of a configuration bit can have a variety of error responses:
  - Stuck state (broken route or incorrect function definition),
  - Incorrect logic behavior
  - Oscillations (global routes).

- Most injections will cause broken routes, i.e., stuck faults

- Problem with stuck faults:
  - It is not known which configuration bit controls which portion of the design.
  - If each Configuration bit FI is not held long enough, error responses will not be observed.
Why Are You Performing FI?

- Do you want to know which configuration bits will affect your design if in error? (i.e., used configuration bits – or unused configuration bits that can cause contention upon SEU)

- If so, finding these “sensitive” configuration bits can be very time consuming:
  - In most real-designs, it will be impossible to find every sensitive configuration bit.
  - Test-designs generally have simple state spaces and can easily be fault injected.
  - However, keep in mind that all error responses of test circuits will not reflect an actual design
Example of Fault Injecting a Counter (1)

- Table is an example of a 4-bit counter:
  - “4-bit counter” refers to 4 DFFs, combinatorial logic, and a clock. The number of associated configuration bits is unknown
  - $2^4 = 16$ states.
- With a 100MHz clock, it would take $16 \times 10^{\text{ns}} = 160\text{ns}$ to span the entire 4-bit counter’s state space.
- 32-bit counter: $2^{32}$ states = 4294967296 states.
- With a 100MHz clock, it would require approximately $43\text{ s}$ to span the entire 32-bit counter’s state space.
Example of Fault Injecting a Counter (2)

- The frequency that a bit inverts its state for a counter reduces by 2 as the bit order increases:
  - Least significant bit ($b_0$) flips state every clock cycle
  - Next bit ($b_1$) flips state every two clock cycle, etc...

- Bits that flip frequently are easy to test, i.e., we can determine if they are stuck in a logic state quickly
Example of Fault Injecting a Counter (3)

- The most significant bit is in a static state for half of the state space traversal time.
- Hence, with a 100MHz clock, the most significant bit of the 32-bit counter is expected to stay at a logic ‘0’ or stay at a logic ‘1’ for approximately 22.5 s.
- You will need to wait this long to determine if a configuration SEU has caused the DFF-bit to be stuck at ‘0’.
Time Required for 32-bit Counter Fault Injection

- The total time required ($T_{fl\_total}$) for a fault injection campaign is:

$$T_{fl\_total} = \#Bit_{Fl\_inj} \times (t_{Fl\_inj} + t_{wait} + t_{corr} + t_{rst})$$

- $T_{fl\_total}$ is roughly **2100 days (5.7 years)** for fault injecting a 32-bit counter.
- 32-bit counters (and larger) are common in many designs.
- Structures such as multipliers or dividers are exponentially more complex.
- Configuration fault injection of a full design is impractical.

8-million 1ms 22.5s 1ms 10ns
Benefits of FI

- Investigation of a portion of error responses (but not all possibilities can be covered).
- Evaluation of how DUT errors can affect a system, e.g., how faults can affect other devices.
- Validation of test equipment (however, with the understanding that not all cases can be covered).
Conclusions (1)

• No tool is available that lists all configuration bits that can affect a design (sensitive bits).
• When performing FI, SRAM-based FPGAs can have millions of configuration bits to inject.
• The combination of the number of configuration bits and $t_{\text{wait}}$, make FI impractical for developing a full characterization for DUT SEU error responses.
• SRAM-based configuration FI will not provide error rates. It provides a glimpse into a DUT’s various error responses.
• Benefits of FI are: DUT and system level error response investigation.
Conclusions (2)
Putting Things into Perspective

• A study that suggests that it can fault inject a design in seconds or hours:
  – Is not covering the entire space of the design and will have a limited view of error responses, and/or
  – Will not be able to determine all configuration bits that can affect design operation upon an SEU, and/or
  – Is not implementing $t_{\text{wait}}$.

• A study that states that via SRAM-based fault injection they will provide an error rate:
  – This type of injection cannot calculate error rates. You force a bit to flip, you know it will flip. Hence, no rate is calculated. Only error responses are observed if the FI is held long enough.