Prevented Mortality and Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Historical and Projected Nuclear Power

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Supporting Information

ABSTRACT: In the aftermath of the March 2011 accident at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, the future contribution of nuclear power to the global energy supply has become somewhat uncertain. Because nuclear power is an abundant, low-carbon source of base-load power, it could make a large contribution to mitigation of global climate change and air pollution. Using historical production data, we calculate that global nuclear power has prevented an average of 1.84 million air pollution-related deaths and 64 gigatonnes of CO2-equivalent (GtCO2-eq) greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that would have resulted from fossil fuel burning. On the basis of global projection data that take into account the effects of the Fukushima accident, we find that nuclear power could additionally prevent an average of 420 000−7.04 million deaths and 80−240 GtCO2-eq emissions due to fossil fuels by midcentury, depending on which fuel it replaces. By contrast, we assess that large-scale expansion of unconstrained natural gas use would not mitigate the climate problem and would cause far more deaths than expansion of nuclear power.

INTRODUCTION
It has become increasingly clear that impacts of unchecked anthropogenic climate change due to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from burning of fossil fuels could be catastrophic for both human society and natural ecosystems (in ref 1, see Figures SPM.2 and 4.4) and that the key time frame for mitigating the climate crisis is the next decade or so.2,3 Likewise, during the past decade, outdoor air pollution due largely to fossil fuel burning is estimated to have caused over 1 million deaths annually worldwide.4 Nuclear energy (and other low-carbon/carbon-free energy sources) could help to mitigate both of these major problems.5

The future of global nuclear power will depend largely on choices made by major energy-using countries in the next decade or so.6 While most of the highly nuclear-dependent countries have affirmed their plans to continue development of nuclear power after the Fukushima accident, several have announced that they will either temporarily suspend plans for new plants or completely phase out existing plants.7 Serious questions remain about safety, proliferation, and disposal of radioactive waste, which we have discussed in some detail elsewhere.7

Here, we examine the historical and potential future role of nuclear power with respect to prevention of air pollution-related mortality as well as GHG emissions on multiple spatial scales. Previous studies have quantified global-scale avoided GHG emissions due to nuclear power (e.g., refs 5 and 8−10), however, the issue of avoided human deaths remains largely unexplored. We focus on the world as a whole, OECD Europe, and the five countries with the highest annual CO2 emissions in the last several years. In order, these top five CO2 emitters are China, the United States, India, Russia, and Japan, accounting for 56% of global emissions from 2009 to 2011.11 To estimate historically prevented deaths and GHG emissions, we start with data for global annual electricity generation by energy source from 1971 to 2009 (Figure 1). We then apply mortality and GHG emissions factors, defined respectively as deaths and emissions per unit electric energy generated, for relevant electricity sources (Table 1). For the projection period 2010−2050, we base our estimates on recent (post-Fukushima) nuclear power trajectories given by the UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).6

METHODS
Calculation of Prevented Mortality and GHG Impacts. For the historical period 1971−2009, we assume that all nuclear power supply in a given country and year would instead have been delivered by fossil fuels (specifically coal and natural gas), given their worldwide dominance and the very small contribution of nonhydro renewables to world electricity thus far (Figure 1). There are of course numerous complications involved in trying to design such a replacement scenario (e.g., evolving technological and socioeconomic conditions), and the
We then assume that each of the 441 reactors listed in Table 14 of ref 12 has a CF of greater than 65%. We then calculate \( f_i(x) \), the CF-weighted proportion of generated power by each reactor:

\[
f_i(x) = \frac{P_i(x)}{\sum_j P_j(x)}
\]

Next, we calculate \( F_j(x) \), the total proportion of generated nuclear power replaced by power from fossil fuel \( j \):

\[
F_j(x) = \sum_i f_i(x)
\]

where \( f_i(x) \) simply denotes grouping of all the \( f_i \) values by replacement fuel \( j \). For reference, on the global scale, this yields about 95% replacement by coal and 5% by gas in our baseline historical scenario, which we suggest is plausible for the reasons given in the Results and Discussion section. Lastly, we calculate \( I(x, t) \), the annual net prevented impacts (mortality or GHG emissions) from nuclear power in country \( x \) and year \( t \) as follows:

\[
I(x, t) = \sum [IF \times F_j(x) \times n(x, t)] - IF_{nuc} \times n(x, t)
\]

where \( IF_i \) is the impact factor for fossil fuel \( j \) (from Table 1), \( IF_{nuc} \) is the nuclear power generation (in energy units; from refs 6 and 14), and \( IF_{nuc} \) is the impact factor for nuclear power (from Table 1). Note that the first term in eq 4 reflects gross avoided impacts, while the second reflects direct impacts of nuclear power.

For the projection period 2010–2050, using eq 4, we calculate human deaths and GHG emissions that could result if all projected nuclear power production is canceled and again replaced only by fossil fuels. Of course, some or most of this hypothetically canceled nuclear power could be replaced by power from renewables, which have generally similar impact factors as nuclear (e.g., see Figure 2 of ref 7). Thus, our results for the projection period should ultimately be viewed as upper limits on potentially prevented impacts from future nuclear power.

We project annual nuclear power production in the regions containing the top five CO₂-emitting countries and Western Europe based on the regional decadal projections in Table 4 of ref 6, which we linearly interpolate to an annual scale. To set \( F_j(x) \) in eq 4, we consider two simplified cases for both the global and regional scales. In the first (“all coal”), \( F_j(x) \) is fixed at 100% coal, and in the second (“all gas”), it is fixed at 100% gas. This approach yields the full range of potentially prevented impacts from future nuclear power. It is taken here because of the lack of country-specific projections in ref 6 as well as the large uncertainty in determining which fossil fuel(s) could replace future nuclear power, given recent trends in electricity production (Figure 1, Figure S3 [Supporting Information], and ref 14).

**Methodological Limitations.** The projections for nuclear power by IAEA assume essentially no climate-change mitigation measures in the low-end case and aggressive mitigation measures in the high-end case. It is unclear which path the world will follow; however, these IAEA projections do take into account the effects of the Fukushima accident. It seems that, except possibly for Japan, the top five CO₂-emitting countries are not planning a phase-down of pre-Fukushima plans for future nuclear power. For instance, China, India, and

For each country \( x \), we first calculate \( P_i(x) \), the power (not energy) generated by each reactor \( i \):

\[
P_i(x) = CF_i(x) \times C_i(x)
\]

where \( CF_i \) and \( C_i \) denote the reactor capacity factor and net capacity, respectively, listed in Table 14 of ref 12. We then calculate \( f_i(x) \), the CF-weighted proportion of generated power by each reactor:

\[
f_i(x) = \frac{P_i(x)}{\sum_j P_j(x)}
\]

Next, we calculate \( F_j(x) \), the total proportion of generated nuclear power replaced by power from fossil fuel \( j \):

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I(x, t) = \sum [IF \times F_j(x) \times n(x, t)] - IF_{nuc} \times n(x, t)
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Russia have affirmed plans to increase their current nuclear capacity by greater than 3-fold, greater than 12-fold, and 2-fold, respectively (see Table 12.2 of ref 2). In Japan, the future of nuclear power now seems unclear; in the fiscal year following the Fukushima accident, nuclear power generation in Japan decreased by 63%, while fossil fuel power generation increased by 26% (ref 15), thereby almost certainly increasing Japan’s CO2 emissions.

Although our analysis reflects mortality from all stages of the fuel cycle for each energy source, it excludes serious illnesses, including respiratory and cerebrovascular hospitalizations, chronic bronchitis, congestive heart failure, nonfatal cancers, and hereditary effects. For fossil fuels, such illnesses are estimated to be approximately 10 times higher than the mortality factors in Table 1, while fossil fuel power generation increased by 26% (ref 15), thereby almost certainly increasing Japan’s CO2 emissions.

Our estimated human deaths caused by nuclear power from 1971 to 2009 are far lower than the avoided deaths. Globally, we calculate 4900 such deaths, or about 370 times lower than our result for avoided deaths. Regionally, we calculate approximately 1800 deaths in OECD Europe, 540 in Japan, 460 in Russia (includes all 15 former Soviet Union countries), 40 in China, and 20 in India. About 25% of these deaths are due to occupational accidents, and about 70% are due to air pollution-related effects such a transition are unlikely to be sufficient to minimize the risk of dangerous anthropogenic climate change (unless the resulting emissions are captured and stored), as discussed in the next section.

### RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

#### Mortality

We calculate a mean value of 1.84 million human deaths prevented by world nuclear power production from 1971 to 2009 (see Figure 2a for full range), with an average of 76 000 prevented deaths/year from 2000 to 2009 (range 19 000–300 000). Estimates for the top five CO2 emitters, along with full estimate ranges for all regions in our baseline historical scenario, are also shown in Figure 2a. For perspective, results for upper and lower bound scenarios are shown in Figure S1 (Supporting Information). In Germany, which has announced plans to shut down all reactors by 2022 (ref 2), we calculate that nuclear power has prevented an average of over 117 000 deaths from 1971 to 2009 (range 29 000–470 000). The large ranges stem directly from the ranges given in Table 1 for the mortality factors.
(presumably fatal cancers from radiation fallout; see Table 2 of ref 16).

However, empirical evidence indicates that the April 1986 Chernobyl accident was the world’s only source of fatalities from nuclear power plant radiation fallout. According to the latest assessment by the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), 43 deaths are conclusively attributable to radiation from Chernobyl as of 2006 (28 were plant staff/first responders and 15 were from the 6000 diagnosed cases of thyroid cancer). UNSCEAR also states that reports of an increase in leukemia among recovery workers who received higher doses are inconclusive, although cataract development was clinically significant in that group; otherwise, for these workers as well as the general population, “there has been no persuasive evidence of any other health effect” attributable to radiation exposure.17

Furthermore, no deaths have been conclusively attributed (in a scientifically valid manner) to radiation from the other two major accidents, namely, Three Mile Island in March 1979, for which a 20 year comprehensive scientific health assessment was done,18 and the March 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident. While it is too soon to meaningfully assess the health impacts of the latter accident, one early analysis indicated that annual radiation doses in nearby areas were much lower than the generally accepted 100 mSv threshold for fatal disease development. In any case, our calculated value for global deaths caused by historical nuclear power (4900) could be a major overestimate relative to the empirical value (by 2 orders of magnitude). The absence of evidence of large mortality from past nuclear accidents is consistent with recent findings that the “linear no-threshold” model used to derive the nuclear mortality factor in Table 1 (see ref 22) might not be valid for the relatively low radiation doses that the public was exposed to from nuclear power plant accidents.

For the projection period 2010−2050, we find that, in the all coal case (see the Methods section), an average of 4.39 million and 7.04 million deaths are prevented globally by nuclear power production for the low-end and high-end projections of IAEA, respectively. In the all gas case, an average of 420 000 and 680 000 deaths are prevented globally (see Figure 2b,c for full ranges). Regional results are also shown in Figure 2b,c. The Far East and North America have particularly high values, given that they are projected to be the biggest nuclear power producers (Figure S2, Supporting Information). As in the historical period, calculated deaths caused by nuclear power in our projection cases are far lower (2 orders of magnitude) than the avoided deaths, even taking the nuclear mortality factor in Table 1 at face value (despite the discrepancy with empirical data discussed above for the historical period).

The substantially lower deaths in the projected all gas case follow simply from the fact that gas is estimated to have a mortality factor an order of magnitude lower than coal (Table 1). However, this does not necessarily provide a valid argument for such large-scale “fuel switching” for mitigation of either climate change or air pollution, for several reasons. First, it is important to bear in mind that our results for prevented mortality are likely conservative, because the mortality factors in Table 1 do not incorporate impacts of ongoing or future anthropogenic climate change. These impacts are likely to become devastating for both human health and ecosystems if recent global GHG emission trends continue. Also, potential global natural gas resources are enormous; published estimates for technically recoverable unconventional gas resources suggest a carbon content ranging from greater than 700 GtCO₂ (based on refs 23 and 24) to greater than 17 000 GtCO₂ (based on refs 24 and 25). While we acknowledge that natural gas might play an important role as a “transition” fuel to a clean-energy era due to its lower mortality (and emission) factor relative to coal, we stress that long-term, widespread use...
of natural gas (without accompanying carbon capture and storage) could lead to unabated GHG emissions for many decades, given the typically multidecadal lifetime of energy infrastructure, thereby greatly complicating climate change mitigation efforts.

**GHG Emissions.** We calculate that world nuclear power generation prevented an average of 64 gigatonnes of CO$_2$-equivalent (GtCO$_2$-eq), or 17 Gt-C-eq, cumulative emissions from 1971 to 2009 (Figure 3a; see full range therein), with an average of 2.6 GtCO$_2$-eq/year prevented annual emissions from 2000 to 2009 (range 2.4−2.8 GtCO$_2$/year). Regional results are also shown in Figure 3a. Our global results are 7−14% lower than previous estimates, that, among other differences, assumed all historical nuclear power would have been replaced only by coal, and 34% higher than in another study, in which the methodology is not explained clearly enough to infer the basis for the differences. Given that cumulative and annual global fossil fuel CO$_2$ emissions during the above periods were 840 GtCO$_2$ and 27 GtCO$_2$-eq/year, respectively, our mean estimate for cumulative prevented emissions may not appear substantial; however, it is instructive to look at other quantitative comparisons.

For instance, 64 GtCO$_2$-eq amounts to the cumulative CO$_2$ emissions from coal burning over approximately the past 35 years in the United States, 17 years in China, or 7 years in the top five CO$_2$ emitters. Also, since a 500 MW coal-fired power plant typically emits 3 MtCO$_2$/year, 64 GtCO$_2$-eq is equivalent to the cumulative lifetime emissions from almost 430 such plants, assuming an average plant lifetime of 50 years. It is therefore evident that, without global nuclear power generation in recent decades, near-term mitigation of anthropogenic climate change would pose a much greater challenge.

For the projection period 2010−2050, in the all coal case, an average of 150 and 240 GtCO$_2$-eq cumulative global emissions are prevented by nuclear power for the low-end and high-end projections of IAEA, respectively. In the all gas case, an average of 80 and 130 GtCO$_2$-eq emissions are prevented (see Figure 3b,c for full ranges). Regional results are also shown in Figure 3b,c. These results also differ substantially from previous studies, largely due to differences in nuclear power projections (see the Supporting Information).

To put our calculated overall mean estimate (80−240 GtCO$_2$-eq) of potentially prevented future emissions in perspective, note that, to achieve a 350 ppm CO$_2$ target near the end of this century, cumulative “allowable” fossil CO$_2$ emissions from 2012 to 2050 are at most ∼500 GtCO$_2$ (ref 3). Thus, projected nuclear power could reduce the climate-change mitigation burden by 16−48% over the next few decades (derived by dividing 80 and 240 by 500).

**Uncertainties.** Our results contain various uncertainties, primarily stemming from our impact factors (Table 1) and our assumed replacement scenarios for nuclear power. In reality, the impact factors are not likely to remain static, as we (implicitly) assumed; for instance, emission factors depend heavily on the particular mix of energy sources. Because our impact factors neglect ongoing or projected climate impacts as well as the significant disparity in pollution between developed and developing countries, our results for both avoided GHG emissions and avoided mortality could be substantial underestimates. For example, in China, where coal burning accounts for over 75% of electricity generation in recent decades (ref 14; Figure S3, Supporting Information), some coal-fired power plants that meet domestic environmental standards have a mortality factor almost 3 times higher than the mean global value (Table 1). These differences related to development status will become increasingly important as fossil fuel use and GHG emissions of developing countries continue to outpace those of developed countries.11

On the other hand, if coal would not have been as dominant a replacement for nuclear as assumed in our baseline historical scenario, then our avoided historical impacts could be overestimated, since coal causes much larger impacts than gas (Table 1). However, there are several reasons this is unlikely. Key characteristics of coal plants (e.g., plant capacity, capacity factor, and total production costs) are historically much more similar to nuclear plants than are those of natural gas plants.13 Also, the vast majority of existing nuclear plants were built before 1990, but advanced gas plants that would be suitable replacements for base-load nuclear plants (i.e., combined-cycle gas turbines) have only become available since the early 1990s. Furthermore, coal resources are highly abundant and widespread, and coal fuel and total production costs have long been relatively low, unlike historically available gas resources and production costs. Thus, it is not surprising that coal has been by far the dominant source of global electricity thus far (Figure 1). We therefore assess that our baseline historical replacement scenario is plausible and that it is not as significant an uncertainty source as the impact factors; that is, our avoided historical impacts are more likely underestimates, as discussed in the above paragraph.

**Implications.** More broadly, our results underscore the importance of avoiding a false and counterproductive dichotomy between reducing air pollution and stabilizing the climate, as elaborated by others.27−29 If near-term air pollution abatement trumps the goal of long-term climate protection, governments might decide to carry out future electric fuel switching in even more climate-impacting ways than we have examined here. For instance, they might start large-scale production and use of gas derived from coal (“syngas”), as coal is by far the most abundant of the three conventional fossil fuels. While this could reduce the very high pollution-related deaths from coal power (Figure 2), the GHG emissions factor for syngas is substantially higher (between ∼5% and 90%) than for coal, thereby entailing even higher electricity sector GHG emissions in the long term.

In conclusion, it is clear that nuclear power has provided a large contribution to the reduction of global mortality and GHG emissions due to fossil fuel use. If the role of nuclear power significantly declines in the next few decades, the International Energy Agency asserts that achieving a target atmospheric GHG level of 450 ppm CO$_2$-eq would require “heroic achievements in the deployment of emerging low-carbon technologies, which have yet to be proven. Countries that rely heavily on nuclear power would find it particularly challenging and significantly more costly to meet their targeted levels of emissions.” Our analysis herein and a prior one strongly support this conclusion. Indeed, on the basis of combined evidence from paleoclimate data, observed ongoing climate impacts, and the measured planetary energy imbalance, it appears increasingly clear that the commonly discussed targets of 450 ppm and 2 °C global temperature rise (above preindustrial levels) are insufficient to avoid devastating climate impacts; we have suggested elsewhere that more appropriate targets are less than 350 ppm and 1 °C (refs 3 and 31−33). Aiming for these targets emphasizes the importance of retaining...
and the role of nuclear power, as well as energy efficiency improvements and renewables, in the near-term global energy supply.

ASSOCIATED CONTENT

Supporting Information

Comparison with avoided GHG emissions in projection periods of prior studies; figures showing upper and lower bounds for prevented deaths and GHG emissions assuming nuclear power replaces fossil fuels from 1971–2009, projections of nuclear power production by region, and total electricity production from 1971–2009 by fuel source for the top five CO2-emitting countries and OECD Europe. This material is available free of charge via the Internet at http://pubs.acs.org.

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Author Contributions

P.K. designed the study with input from J.H.; P.K. performed the calculations and analysis and wrote the paper with feedback from J.H.

Notes

The authors declare no competing financial interest.

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REFERENCES


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6 pages
3 figures
Additional discussion and references
Comparison with avoided GHG emissions in projection periods of prior studies

As discussed in the main text, our results for avoided GHG emissions for the projection period differ significantly from previous studies¹,², due primarily to differences in assumed nuclear power trajectories, and secondarily to assumed GHG emission factors.

Lenzen et al.¹ start with electricity demand projections from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and assume that a certain energy supply mix will fill that demand. They also assume dynamic emission factors (see their Table 7). Their global nuclear power production trajectory is similar to our low-end case until 2030 but by 2050 it slightly exceeds our high-end case (compare our Figure S2 with their Table 11). Consequently, the mean avoided emissions in our All Coal case are roughly 20% higher (low-end case) to 91% higher (high-end case) than theirs, while for our All Gas case avoided emissions are 34% lower (low-end case) to 5% higher (high-end case). By contrast, Coleman et al.² use nuclear power projections from an earlier version of the IAEA report we used³. The projected mean global avoided emissions in our All Coal case are 36% higher (low-end case) and 40% higher (high-end case) than theirs. In our All Gas case, mean avoided emissions are 23% lower (low-end case) and 21% lower (high-end case).
**Figure S1.** Upper and lower bounds for prevented deaths (top panel) and GHG emissions (bottom panel) assuming nuclear power replaces fossil fuels for the historical period in our study (1971-2009). Each panel shows results for two cases in each region that bound the baseline replacement scenario presented in the main text. The larger column in each region denotes the All Coal case, while the smaller column denotes the All Gas case, in which all historical nuclear power is replaced by coal and gas, respectively. The labels reflect the mean values for each region. In the top panel, only the values for the All Coal cases are labeled, simply because the values for the All Gas cases are a factor of ~10 lower (except for China), as a direct result of the ~10-fold difference between the mortality factors for coal and gas in Table 1 of the main text. (For China the difference is a factor of ~30 because of that country’s relatively large mortality factor for coal – again, see Table 1.) Although there are many uncertainties involved in determining the specific substitution, our baseline historical scenario (95% replacement by coal and 5% by gas) is much more realistic than the All Gas case, for the reasons discussed in the main text.
Figure S2. Projections of nuclear power production by region (linearly interpolated to annual values based on Table 4 of ref 3). Upper and lower curves in each panel are used for our high-end and low-end projections, respectively. As discussed in IAEA\textsuperscript{3}, the high-end projections assume aggressive climate change mitigation policies. Western Europe is the only region in which the low-end curve shows a downward trend. In the global projections (top left panel), cumulative nuclear power generated in the high-end trajectory is 60\% greater than in the low-end trajectory. South Asia (bottom left panel) shows the highest disparity in cumulative power – the high-end is more than double the low-end.
Figure S3. Total electricity production from 1971-2009 by fuel source for the top five CO₂-emitting countries and OECD Europe (data from ref 4). Global data are shown in main text Figure 1. Note the dominance of coal in China, USA, and India, as well as Russia’s heavy reliance on (domestically supplied) gas. Gas use has risen sharply in USA and OECD Europe since ~1990, and both gas and coal show upward trends in Japan. Oil use shows downward trends in each area and for the world overall (main text Figure 1). Non-hydro renewable use has risen significantly only in OECD Europe (mainly over the past decade), although gas use has risen faster there.
SI References