Standards for Radiation Effects Testing: Ensuring Scientific Rigor in the Face of Budget Realities and Modern Device Challenges

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Outline

• Space Radiation Environment
• Radiation Effects
• Test Standards & Guidelines
  – Drivers for and against change
• Examples
• Conclusions
Part I:

THE SPACE RADIATION ENVIRONMENT AND EFFECTS
• Deep-space missions may also see neutrons and gamma rays from background or radioisotope sources
Radiation Effects

• Destructive SEE—Poisson process, constant rate, affect single die; redundancy effective as mitigation but very costly
  – SEL—Single-Event Latchup (Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor-CMOS)
  – SEGR—Single-Event Gate Rupture (High-field MOS devices)
  – SEB—Single-Event Burnout in discrete transistors and diodes
  – Others—Stuck Bits, Snapback (Silicon on Insulator), Single-Event Dielectric Rupture

• Nondestructive SEE—Poisson process, const. rate, single die, recoverable
  – SEU—Single-Event Upset in digital device (or portion of device)
  – MBU/MCU—Multibit/Multi-Cell Upset in digital device (or portion)
  – SET—Single-Event Transient in digital or analog device
  – SEFI—Single-Event Functional Interrupt (full or partial loss of functionality)

• Degradation Mechanisms—cumulative, end-of-life, affect most die as mission approaches mean failure dose; redundancy ineffective
  • TID—Total Ionizing Dose (degradation due to charge trapped in device oxides)
  • DDD—Displacement Damage Dose (degradation from damage to semiconductor)

*SEE: Single-event effect*
Part II:

TEST STANDARDS
## Key Space Radiation Test Standards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standard</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JEDEC JESD57</td>
<td>Test Procedures for the Measurement of SEE in Semiconductor Devices from Heavy-Ion Irradiation</td>
<td>1996</td>
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<tr>
<td>JEDEC JESD234</td>
<td>Test Standard for the Measurement of Proton Radiation SEE in Electronic Devices</td>
<td>2013</td>
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<td>TM 1017: Neutron irradiation</td>
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<td>TM 1019: Steady-state total dose irradiation procedure</td>
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<td>TM 1080: SEB and SEGR</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIL-STD-883</td>
<td>Microcircuits</td>
<td>2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESA-ESCC-25100</td>
<td>SEE Test Method and Guidelines</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESA-ESCC-22900</td>
<td>Total Dose Steady-state Irradiation Test Method</td>
<td>2010</td>
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(Prompt dose and terrestrial radiation standards not included)

*TM = Test Method*
# Space Radiation Test Guidelines

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<td>ASTM F1190</td>
<td>Practice for the Neutron Irradiation of Unbiased Electronic Components</td>
<td>2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIL-HDBK-814</td>
<td>Ionizing Dose and Neutron Hardness Assurance Guidelines for Microcircuits and Semiconductor Devices</td>
<td>1994</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAND 2008-6983P</td>
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<td>SAND 2008-6851P</td>
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<tr>
<td>NASA/ DTRA</td>
<td>Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) Single Event Effect (SEE) Radiation Testing</td>
<td>2012</td>
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<td>(See ASTM website for additional guidelines)</td>
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Standard Rationale

• Standards & Guidelines are developed/revised to:
  – Ensure tests follow best practices
  – Ensure results from different vendors/testers are comparable
  – Minimize and bound systematic and random errors

Data must be meaningful and must facilitate part selection and risk analysis

Best practices must be disseminated to new members of the test community
The Time Lag

- Test standards & guidelines can (and often do) take years to develop or revise
  - Widespread compliance can take additional years
- Technology & research continuously evolve

**The time lag is both useful and problematic**
Balancing Act

• 4 drivers of development/revision:
  – New technologies requiring new methods for testing
  – New failure mechanisms or new research on known mechanisms
  – New radiation hardness assurance methods
  – New applications of existing technology

• 4 counterbalances to change:
  – Cost (time and money)
  – Consensus/weight of evidence
  – Device complexity (note: can push both ways)
  – Pre-existing products and designs

Update  Reaffirm

Standards Tug-of-War
Example 1: ELDRS

- ELDRS = Enhanced Low Dose Rate Sensitivity
  - Amount of total dose degradation at a given total dose is greater at low dose rates (LDR) than at high dose rates (HDR)

- Low dose rate enhancement factor (LDR EF)
  \[ \text{LDR EF} = \frac{\Delta \text{Parameter Low Dose Rate}}{\Delta \text{Parameter High Dose Rate}} \]

- MIL-STD-883G TM 1019: part is ELDRS susceptible if LDR EF \( \geq 1.5 \) and parameter is above pre-irradiation specification limits

\( I_{B+} \) vs. Total Dose for LM111 Voltage Comparators

Example 1: ELDRS in LM117

- **History:** LM117 deemed “ELDRS free” under MIL-STD-883 TM1019 Condition D:
  - ≤ 10 mrad(Si)/s dose rate for bipolar or BiCMOS linear or mixed-signal devices

- **Driver for change:** new research on known mechanisms
  - Exhibits increasing degradation with decreasing dose rates < 10 mrad(Si)/s
  - “Ultra ELDRS” : parameter out of spec at LDR ≤ 1 mrad(Si)/s

www.ti.com

Example 1: ELDRS cont’d

- Ultra-ELDRS is not isolated to LM117:

![Graph showing dose rate vs. LDREF for different types of devices](image)

*From Pease, R.L., IEEE TNS, 2009*

Should the test standard be revised?
Example 1: ELDRS cont’d

• Challenges for hardness assurance
  – Applying a constant overtest factor to the specification dose for a 10 mrad(Si)/s irradiation test may not bound the degradation for all parts
    • No easy solution
  – Test at the mission required dose rate?
  – Test at a dose rate lower than 10 mrad(Si)/s?

• Counterbalance:
  – Cost: Already takes 2 months for 50 krad(Si) at 10 mrad(Si)/s
  – Consensus: Significance of risk still under debate
  – Pre-existing products and designs:
    • Retest/requal costs,
    • Ability to track lot-lot variations lost until history developed under new test conditions
Example 2: More ELDRS

- MIL-STD-750-1 TM1019: No “Condition D” low dose rate req’ts
- History: Discrete bipolar junction transistors (BJTs) do not exhibit ELDRS
- Driver for change: new research on known mechanisms
  - Some discrete BJTs demonstrate ELDRS of current gain degradation

- Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA) challenge: ELDRS for BJTs of similar process technology varies widely
- Counterbalance: Cost, consensus, and pre-existing devices
  - How widespread is the susceptibility?

Example 3: SEGR

- **SEGR = Single event gate rupture:**
  - In power MOSFETs, ion energy, species, and angle of incidence affect device susceptibility
    - Not a simple cross section vs. linear energy transfer (LET) problem

- **History:** Characterization of a “safe operating area” (SOA) for off-state voltages in terms of LET

**SEGR in a typical planar vertical power MOSFET (VDMOS)**

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**Example “Safe operating area”**

MOSFET = metal oxide semiconductor field effect transistor

To be presented by Jean-Marie Lauenstein at the Hardened Electronics and Radiation Technology (HEART) 2015 Conference, Chantilly, VA, April 21-24, 2015
Example 3: SEGR cont’d

• **Driver for change: new research on known mechanisms**
  – 1996: ion penetration range (energy) affects susceptibility
  – 2001: worst-case energy for given ion defined

• **MIL-STD-750E (2006) incorporates this effect:**
  
  “Data points are taken to describe the response of the discrete MOSFET as a function of $V_{GS}$ and/or $V_{DS}$ over the operating range of the device and/or over a range of LET values.”

Later in the test procedure: “Also, note that the energy of the ion beam has been shown to influence the SEGR failure thresholds. Therefore, determination of the worst case test condition can require multiple irradiations with the same ion at different energies.”

**Impact to pre-existing devices:**
  – “SOA” relabeled as “Single Event Effect Response Curve” for a given beam condition.
  – **Worst-case test condition still not adopted due to cost of re-qual**
Example 3: SEGR cont’d

- **Driver for further change: Multiple manufacturers**
  - Different device geometries demand true worst-case beam conditions for cross-manufacturer comparisons

- **MIL-STD-750-1 (2012) incorporates worst-case conditions:**
  “For SEGR, the worst-case test condition for the ion occurs when the ion fully penetrates the epitaxial layer(s) with maximum energy deposition through the entire epitaxial layer(s).”

  “NOTE 23: SEGR characterization curves may be better expressed as a function of ion species (atomic number) instead as a function of LET. Ion beam characteristics shall be included with the response curves (ion LET at die surface, ion species, and ion energy).

- **Impact to pre-existing devices:**
  - Requalification
  - Oldest generation no longer advertised for space applications

- **JESD57 (1996) still LET-based**
  - Under revision

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Worst-case ion energy: Beam 2


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Example 4: more SEGR

- **Driver:** New application of existing technology
  - Demand for rate estimation when risk avoidance not possible
    - e.g. high-performance applications or commercial boards
- **Counterbalance:** Lack of consensus on failure rate prediction methods
  - 6 proposed methods in the literature – none validated
  - Require different kinds of test data

**Operating Outside the “SOA”**
**Requires Failure Rate Estimation**

![Graph](image)

Lauenstein, et al., IEEE NSREC 2014

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Example 5: Advanced Electronics

- **History:** SEE test guidelines and standards geared toward simpler devices/circuits

- **Driver for change:** New technologies, failure modes, & research
  - Proton direct-ionization induced SEE
  - Variation of susceptibility with roll angle in addition to tilt angle
  - Expansion of single-event functional interrupt definition
  - High-speed applications (require high-speed test capability)
  - Increasing number of modes of operation of complex devices
  - ....

**Low-energy protons upset 65 nm Silicon-on-Insulator SRAM**


*SRAM = static random-access memory

**Effective LET not effective for 90 nm CMOS latch**

Example 5: Advanced Electronics

• Counterbalance: Cost, complexity

• How do we incorporate advanced electronics SEE testing into SEE test standards?
  – Proton SEE test standard (JESD234) released
  – Revision of JESD57 is an opportunity for inclusion of more established methods for testing advanced electronics
  – Highly complex technologies will benefit from specific guidelines
    • ex/ NASA FPGA test guideline
  – Complex devices incorporate many modes and functions
    • Test results depend on how we test the device
    • The bleeding edge of testing is generalizing application specific test results to bound flight performance at all stages of the mission

High-Speed Test Fixture

Photo credit: J. A. Pellish, NASA GSFC, 2013
Summary

• Because radiation hardness assurance is dynamic, test standards and guidelines will always be “behind the times”

• Continued development of test standard/guideline updates facilitates technical rigor and mission confidence and success

But…

• Test standards are a compromise between technical rigor and economic realities
  – The goal is to be good enough to ensure success and cheap enough that the standards & guidelines will actually be used