The Leading Human Factors Deficiencies in Unmanned Aircraft Systems

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Scope of Discussion

• **What:** Explore the top human factors deficiencies in unmanned aircraft systems *from a user’s perspective*

• **Why?** To educate/encourage UAS designers & testers on:
  – the importance of “good design” for increased safety and mission success (no matter how that’s defined by the operator/user).

**Today’s Roadmap:**

• Why do you care?
• Background (“The Problem”)
• Top Human Factors Deficiencies
• Conclusions/Takeaways

“I'm a lot more interested in people than I used to be. I used to be most interested in abstract ideas, and people were an afterthought, but that's changed a bit.” -- Malcolm Gladwell
Why Care? (Designers/Testers/Users)

Because Good Human Factors means...

** Less user errors due to interface confusion, info overload, poor ergonomics & interface, automation confusion

Which translates into...

- *Increases* likelihood of “mission” success
  - Reliable & capable of getting from A to B; & accomplish tasks within desired parameters
- *Enables* safe integration into the National Airspace
  - Protect lives & property; build/maintain public confidence & trust in UASs
- **Your UAS’s success = future “mission” opportunities**
  - FAA trusts it; public accepts it; customer wants more

Is this relevant today?

- Yes → rapid growth of UAS sales, use, and certification.
Background / Perspective

- **Me:** 4,100 hrs flight time (USAF operational; test; NASA)
  - 1800 hrs Manned Flying (900+ hrs F-15C/D)
  - 2300 hrs Unmanned Flying (MQ-1, MQ-9, RQ-4, X-56)
  - Flying unmanned aircraft since 2002
- **Survey:** Small sample of current military operators, testers, & former UAS manufacturer pilots
  - Slanted towards med-to-large UAS’s with cockpit/console style ground control stations (GCSs)
  - Applies to any UAS with some autonomy and a pilot.
What is Human Factors (HF) & Human-Machine Interaction/Interface (HMI)?

- **HF (FAA)** – multidisciplinary study of human capabilities and limitations...
- ...applied to equipment, systems, facilities, procedures, jobs, environments, training, staffing, and personnel management...
- for safe, comfortable, and effective human performance
- **HMI** – “doing” requires interaction (human & hardware)
  - The Interface: the interactive surface of that hardware

"The Problem" = Rapid development of the machine ... Forgetting the operator in the design ... Over-reliance on automation
Automation & Complex Modern Cockpit displays:

• **Pros** -- Safety: decrease stress/fatigue; increase thinking/monitoring; reduce human error

• **Cons**
  - False security (overreliance); Insecurity during failures (what’s it doing?); Critical info missed (Fixation on peripheral info)
  - Increased reaction time when out of the loop (should I intervene?); Complacency; Confusing info during failures
UAS Design:

• **Areas of Concern** (from FAA, Test Community, etc)
  – Human-automation interaction (*trust; mode awareness; disengagement behavior*);
  – Pilot-centric GCS design (*displays; sensory deficit*);
  – Traffic information (*separation assurance*);
  – Contingency management (*lost link status*);
  – Disengagement Behavior;
  – **General over-reliance on automation**

Now – on to the specific **deficiencies**......
Top UAS Human Factors Deficiencies

Overview

1. Lack of a design standard (ground station HMI)

2. Inadequate command interfaces in "highly-autonomous" UASs

3. Limitations to See & Avoid capability (& visual nav & recognition)

4. Lack of seat-of-the-pants & audio sensory cues

5. Lack of depth perception (for landing or other proximity-critical tasks)
• Historically, aircraft were/are required to conform to industry standard aviation HMI design elements (sticks, yokes, throttles, flight instruments, heads up displays, seats, visibility (out the window).

• UASs came on the scene – many manufacturers; no rules

• We can't dive into this one without first talking about the basics of Human Factors in Design...
Cockpit design (ergonomics, anthropometrics, information) is important for all sorts of HF reasons:

- **Fatigue** – “mission tasks” and duration should drive design & layout of control station
  - display monitors and graphics design template and environmental lighting (eye fatigue)
  - physical layout and reach considerations
  - seat comfort/adjustability
  - environmental controls (temp)
- **Audio/Aural** – good audio enables good communication
  - selectable feeds; adjustable
• **Visual** – many aspects
  – Camera FOV; refresh rate of video link & flight parameters
  – Limited bandwidth - determining critical high-rate parameters vs non critical low-sample data
  – Contrast/color/design scheme of buttons and symbols and switches (software and hardware)
  – Location of critical vs. non critical info (central 30 deg critical visual cone vs peripheral areas); design-eye height of horizon line in plane with pilot's eye (assumes vertical adjustment of seat or displays).
  – **Latency** (delay between input and desired output); due to processing, signal path, servo speed – Large latency leads to PIO (pilot induced oscillation)

• **Anthropometrics** - accessible to a range of physical body types based on intended pool of pilots
• **Cognitive** - info in the right places, understandable, actionable
  
  – Standard units? Useful scale? Presentation of values (dials, tapes, raw numbers, bars/sliders; how many?; groupings; density; location/arrangement).
  
  – Buttons/switches **organized** by a familiar (aviation) scheme
    
    • By context? (Landing checklist; Lost-Link Emergency)
    • By system? (Fuel, Electrical, Link, Navigation, etc)
  
  – Avoid information overload (too many parameters)
    
    • Key info - easy to locate; top layer (not buried)
    • Intelligently bring up the right info at the right time
Importance of Cockpit Design (cont.)

- “Information Overload” … Uniqueness = Unfamiliarity
  • Typical manned pilot - trained in traditional aircraft (FAA-certified standard inceptors, gages, flight displays)
  • Unique UAS GCS designs seem foreign… require experience/much practice to gain safe proficiency.
- Displayed info should simple, without diluting/sacrificing key decision-making info: aircraft state, change (rate of change), command/feedback, environment/surroundings, emergency interfaces.
Importance of Cockpit Design (cont.)

- Emergencies
  - Upon detection, emergency info should be prioritized, highlighted, and displayed
  - Only essential info to understand the problem and resolve the emergency (buttons/dialogues)
  - Include airspace awareness to get to safe landing site.
  - Critical “emergency-only” switches should normally be “guarded” with 2-step actuation, but quickly/intelligently accessible.
  - Increases pilot's capacity to respond to the EP
  - Pilot involvement in design is critical for it to be relevant & effective.

Now, on to the list…
1. Lack of a Design Standard (GCS)

- FAA airworthiness certification standards (UAS) lag the rapid growth and arrival of UAS into the NAS structure...

- **Wide range of GCS designs, from various designers** (some with little aviation experience; or failing to involve aviators in the design process)... resulting in **designs shaped by**:
  - Incorrect/underdeveloped mission requirements
  - Marketing novelty
  - Rough edges of very new Tech
  - Misapplied manned cockpit traditions
  - Divergence from aviation standards (video game/smartphone)
  - Detrimental modifications (hasty/no pilot involvement)
1. Lack of a Design Standard (cont.)

- **Impact** = huge variety in interface configs and very non-standard flight control inceptors.

- **Consequence of non-standard, poor HMI:** pilot confusion, fatigue, errors, damage/loss of UAS.
  - Pilot misperceives UAS’s status in emergency...
  - Maybe critical info is not currently in view... *ie. “Battery - Low! Land within 5 minutes!”*
  - Misprioritizes actions, incorrectly responds to emergency ... leads to unexpected vehicle behavior, & maybe loss of mission, airspace violation, or damage / loss of vehicle.
2. Inadequate Command Interfaces

• (Particularly for "Highly autonomous" UAS)
  – “Highly” (not fully): operator has command of only higher levels of automation (*autopilot commands; mission routing; transponder; radio*)

• Poor Interface(s) - Can lead to pilot input errors & unintended aircraft responses.

• GCS Configurations
  – Commonly configured w/ stick & throttle; sometimes also keyboard/mouse
  – Highly-autonomous UAS may only have keyboard/mouse since automation does not require pilot inputs to pitch/roll/yaw/throttle (i.e. RQ-4)
Highly Autonomous UAS HMI
- Programmed with many autonomous outcome decision trees; (pilot more of a mission manager than operator)
- Interface - Commands entered into dialogue boxes/sliders/etc, via mouse/keys/touchscreen
  - altitude, orbit/loiter mode, airspeed, heading override, etc.

Problem with simple text entry is two-fold:
- Text entry fields can look identical (critical vs routine).
  - Highlight and/or “Guard” (2-step) critical inputs (prevent accidental activation).
- No tactile interface with a text box; Place cursor in the proper field; Eyes jump from keyboard to text field (and back) to verify entry; opportunity for errors!
  - A knob may have 3 discrete positions (entries)... a text field may have 100s of possibilities.
3. Limitations to See & Avoid Capability

- (includes navigation and feature recognition)
- **Due to video technology limitations (cost, bandwidth, size), remote pilots’ eye receives less visual information than the airborne pilot's human eye.**
  - Lack of Depth perception (mono-vision)
  - Limited in higher contrast settings (sunrise, sunset, sun/lights in camera FOV); Low light environments.
  - Wide FOV vs human peripheral vision, & Zoomed FOV vs human focal vision; Auto-focus
  - Bandwidth / framerate / latency / (cost)
  - Video quality dependent on data link quality
    - *Graceful degradation vs. sudden loss*
  - Resolution / Acuity - as displayed in GCS
  - Tracking - human eye capability coupled with head motion (fast, precise, integral, stable, always ON).
UAS Advantages: Zoom, multispectral (IR), image processing (de-haze), info overlay (lat/long, elevation, shape recognition, other aircraft location)... *multiple cameras*

- **Less info = difficulty noticing:** traffic, weather changes, distant landing airfields, small terrain references, obstructions on the runway/taxiway, or things obscured by the sun.

- **Cameras**
  - **FOV Trade off:** Zoomed detail vs. peripheral info vs. “displayed” FOV (i.e. wrap-around monitors)
  - **Fixed (landing) camera:** stable/known
    - aligned with aircraft's flightpath
  - **Slewable camera:** find, track targets, clear the way
4. Lack of Sensory Cues

- Specifically, Seat-of-the-pants & Audio cues
- Lack of cues limits pilot's ability to easily/immediately understand the aircraft's state or changing state(s).
- SOTP + Audio are 2 significant senses missing from UAS flying
  - Engine vibration (normal/abnormal)
  - Engine noise changes
  - G-force changes (turns/vertical maneuvers; turbulence; aircraft configuration changes--flaps, CG shift, etc)
  - Airframe vibrations/oscillations (flutter; mech failures)
- Requires “replacement” cues: other sensing & cueing relayed or synthesized to the GCS pilot
  - Can be real (relayed) or synthetic (simulated) stimuli
    - *Aircraft sensors*: Engine noise (rpm); wind noise (high airspeed); rumbling/buffeting (near stall speed)
Lack of Sensory Cues (cont.)

– Adequate sensory “feed” vs. available link bandwidth
– Cues must be intuitive, low-latency, and distinguishable even under higher pilot workload
  • Visual displays, heads-up cues, audio, seat-rumble, stick shaker, other physical cueing)
– More is not always better (saturation) – *Balance!*
  • Don’t overuse Visual: Lights, symbols, gages & numbers
  • Audio considerations: freq; warble; pulse; repetition; pattern; variation (approaching limits); or even voice.
    – Bad: too many; not intuitive; emergency similar to normal tones; voice not clear
  • Seat "knocker" (gear/touchdown)
  • Stick shaker (command received; approaching limit)
  • Less critical cues - able to be silenced/decluttered
  • Tolerable/comfortable for duration of the mission
5. Lack of Depth Perception

- (for landing or other proximity-critical tasks)
- **Landing is more challenging without depth perception (stereo vision)**
  - Inaccurate height estimation for touchdown (ground-rush)... causes inconsistent timing of landing flare maneuver
    - Manned landing *relies* on the senses -- a memorized, repeatable 3D "sight picture" of runway shape, distance, location in windshield, & closure rate; **plus** G-forces, engine vibration, wind noise, & stick/throttle position
  - GCS pilot needs these translated into useful cues!
    - When to start the flare; How much to correct?
    - Replacement Cues - Laser Altimeter; Heads-up symbology; speed/throttle position aids; Rate of descent cues (symbols, tones)
5. Lack of Depth Perception

- Depth perception is critical for ground operations too!
  - Landing roll – Speed vs. required braking vs. runway remaining (critical for larger/heavier UAS)
  - Taxi, turns, identifying taxiway/crossings/parking spot
  - Obstacles - light poles, fences, overhangs, gates, powerlines – requires “replacement” mitigation (i.e. distance cues; proximity/closure rate; HD video; obstacle/shape recognition; line-following guidance).

- Ultimately lack of depth perception is “less info”
  - Results in delayed pilot decisions & inputs.
Conclusion/Recommendations

• Instead of burying important data or switches ... Make an intuitive, easy to navigate operator menu hierarchy
• Instead of wasting valuable hardware/screen real estate with unneeded data ... Organize & prioritize important info/switches, to be accessible without hiding important info... smart/intuitive.
• Instead of pilot's video being an afterthought, pursue quality new technologies (video and bandwidth) that are mission-enhancing
• Don't underestimate the "missing" senses; consider ways to incorporate other sensory cues in the design
• Don't underestimate importance of safety surrounding takeoff & landing phases; design for it, & incorporate pilot design inputs.
• Pursue further info/education on standard (best) design practices (source material for design guidelines)
Conclusion/Recommendations (cont.)

• Instead of overreliance on autonomy and making design for Highly autonomous UAS GCSs an afterthought, use intuitive Command Input means (displays, buttons, layouts) & ensure special critical buttons are guarded.
• To compensate for challenges with video and monovision,
  – use new/reliable tech such as stereovision
  – miniaturized ultra HD video
  – automated modes for finding/tracking traffic or points of interest (360° camera; head-tracking device; etc.)
  – Develop depth-perception aids - stereoscopic vision, sensors, displays with enhanced cues & heads up info.

**Success Criteria?**

– **Video Goal** = No measurable difference between the system and a pilot's eye while conducting relevant flight tasks.
– **Overall Goal** = UAS should be equal or better at conducting the mission than a manned aircraft 

........*Obtainable?*

........*Obtainable!*
Making it intuitive… means anticipating what the user will think, need, & do in any situation

- Know the Mission – team together (engineers, designers, pilots) to understand what/how to accomplish the mission.
- Rely on industry standards/styles, new tech, common (best) design practices… to design the UAS & GCS around a well-thought out set of mission requirements.

BE CREATIVE!  AND IMPLEMENT IT THE RIGHT WAY
Suggested Reading:

• Role of Human Factors in the FAA (FAA)
• Human Factors Considerations in the Design and Evaluation of Flight Deck Displays and Controls (FAA)
• Human Factors Design Guidelines for Multifunction Displays (FAA, 2001)
• GAMA Pub #12 – Recommended Practices and Guidelines for an Integrated Cockpit/Flightdeck in a 14 CFR Part 23 Certificated Airplane
• Integration of Civil UAS in the NAS Roadmap (FAA, 2013)
• FAA Human Factors Policy (Order 9550.8)
• FAR Part 23 & Part 25 – Airworthiness Standards; Subpart F
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