Characterization of System Level Single Event Upset (SEU) Responses using SEU Data, Classical Reliability Models, and Space Environment Data

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Acronyms

- Combinatorial logic (CL)
- Commercial off the shelf (COTS)
- Complementary metal-oxide semiconductor (CMOS)
- Device under test (DUT)
- Edge-triggered flip-flops (DFFs)
- Error rate (\(\lambda\))
- Error rate per bit (\(\lambda_{\text{bit}}\))
- Error rate per system (\(\lambda_{\text{system}}\))
- Field programmable gate array (FPGA)
- Global triple modular redundancy (GTMR)
- Hardware description language (HDL)
- Input – output (I/O)
- Intellectual Property (IP)
- Linear energy transfer (LET)
- Mean fluence to failure (MFTF)
- Mean time to failure (MTTF)
- Number of used bits (#Usedbits)
- Operational frequency (fs)
- Personal Computer (PC)

- Probability of configuration upsets (\(P_{\text{configuration}}\))
- Probability of Functional Logic upsets (\(P_{\text{functionalLogic}}\))
- Probability of single event functional interrupt (\(P_{\text{SEFI}}\))
- Probability of system failure (\(P_{\text{system}}\))
- Processor (PC)
- Radiation Effects and Analysis Group (REAG)
- Reliability over time (\(R(t)\))
- Reliability over fluence (\(R(\Phi)\))
- Single event effect (SEE)
- Single event functional interrupt (SEFI)
- Single event latch-up (SEL)
- Single event transient (SET)
- Single event upset (SEU)
- Single event upset cross-section (\(\sigma_{\text{SEU}}\))
- System on a chip (SoC)
- Xilinx Virtex 5 field programmable gate array (V5)
- Xilinx Virtex 5 field programmable gate array radiation hardened (V5QV)
Problem Statement

• Conventional methods of applying single event upset (SEU) data to complex systems need improvement.

• The problem boils down to extrapolation and application of SEU data to characterize system performance in radiation environments.
Abstract – Impact to Community

• We are investigating the application of classical reliability performance metrics combined with standard SEU analysis data.
• We expect to relate SEU behavior to system performance requirements…
  – Should we characterize systems by upset rates? Is that sufficient? What does it even mean?
  – Our proposed methodology will provide better prediction of SEU responses in harsh radiation environments.
SEU System Analysis Is Not Simple Algebra

- When a system is targeted for space, single event effect (SEE) data is obtained for all devices that make up that system.
- Combining all the data is not simple addition.
- Co-dependent susceptibilities exist and must be handled accordingly.
- The scope of this presentation will be System on a Chip (SoC) field programmable gate array analysis.
- Future presentations will expand to address Systems at the box level.
Background

FPGA SEU Susceptibility
Measured in SEU Cross Section ($\sigma_{SEU}$)

- $\sigma_{SEUs}$ (per category) are calculated from SEU test and analysis.
- $\sigma_{SEUs}$ are calculated with particles that vary in linear energy transfer (LET).
- FPGA architectures vary and so do their SEU responses.
- Most believe the dominant $\sigma_{SEUs}$ are per bit (configuration or functional logic). However, global routes are also significant.

For a system, should $\sigma_{SEUs}$ be measured by bit????

$$P\left(\mathcal{F}_S\right)_{\text{system}} \propto P_{\text{Configuration}} + P\left(\mathcal{F}_S\right)_{\text{Functional Logic}} + P_{\text{SEFI}}$$

- $P_{\text{Configuration}}$: Configuration $\sigma_{SEU}$
- $P\left(\mathcal{F}_S\right)_{\text{Functional Logic}}$: Functional logic $\sigma_{SEU}$
- $P_{\text{SEFI}}$: SEFI $\sigma_{SEU}$

$\sigma_{SEUs}$ are measured by bit

Sequential and Combinatorial logic (CL) in data path

Global Routes and Hidden Logic

To be presented by Melanie Berg at the NASA Electronics Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Electronics Technology Workshop (ETW), Greenbelt, MD, June 26–29, 2017
Background

Conventional Goal: Convert SEU cross-sections ($\sigma_{SEU}$: cm$^2$/particles) to error rates ($\lambda$) for complex systems

- Perform SEU accelerated radiation testing across ions with different linear energy transfers (LETs) to calculate $\sigma_{SEU}$s per LET.
- **Bottom-Up approach** (transistor level):
  - Given $\sigma_{SEU}$ (per bit) use an error rate calculator (such as CRÈME96) to obtain an error rate per bit ($\lambda_{bit}$).
  - Multiply $\lambda_{bit}$ by the dominant number of used memory bits (#UsedBits) in the target design to attain a system error rate ($\lambda_{system}$).
- **Top-Down approach** (system level):
  - Given $\sigma_{SEU}$ (per system) use an error rate calculator (such as CRÈME96) to obtain an error rate per bit ($\lambda_{system}$).

\[
\sigma_{SEU} = \text{#errors/fluence} \\
\lambda_{system} = \text{#errors/time}
\]

LET: Linear energy transfer
Technical Problems with Current Methods of Error Rate Calculation

- For submission to CRÈME96, $\sigma_{SEU}$ data (across LET) are fitted to a Weibull curve.
  - The two main parameters for curve fitting are a shape factor and a slope factor.
  - During the curve fitting process, a large amount of error can be introduced.
  - Consequently, it is possible for resultant error rates (for the same design) to vary by decades.
- Because of the error rate calculation process, $\sigma_{SEU}$ data is blended together and it is nearly impossible to hone in on the problem spots. This can become important for mitigation insertion.
Technical Problems with Bottom-Up Analysis Method (1)

- Multiplying each bit within a design by $\lambda_{bit}$ is not an efficient method of system error rate prediction.
  - Works well with memory structures… but…complex systems do not operate like memories.
  - If an SEU affects a bit, and the bit is either inactive, disabled, or masked, a system malfunction might not occur.
    - Using the same multiplication factor across DFFs will produce extreme over-estimates.
    - To this date, there is no accurate method to predict DFF activity for complex systems.
    - Fault injection or simulation will not determine frequency of activity.

$$\lambda_{system} < \lambda_{bit} \times \#UsedBits$$
Technical Problems with Bottom-Up Analysis Method (2)

- There are a variety of components that are susceptible to SEUs (clocks, resets, combinatorial logic, flip-flops (DFFs, etc...)).
  - Various component susceptibilities are not accurately characterized at a per bit level.
  - Design topology makes a significant difference in susceptibility and is not characterized in error rate calculators (e.g., CREME96).

Error rates calculated at the transistor-bit level are estimated at too small of granularity for proper extrapolation to complex systems.
Let’s Not Reinvent The Wheel… A Proven Solution Can Be Found in Classical Reliability Analysis

- Classical reliability models have been used as a standard metric for complex system performance.
- The analysis provides a more in depth interpretation of system behavior over time by using system-level MTTF data for system performance metrics.

\[ R(t) = e^{-t/MTTF} \quad \text{or} \quad R(t) = e^{-\lambda t} \]

Theory is already developed, proven, and should be in our hands!
Weibull Failure Rate ($\lambda(T)$) Bathtub Curve

- Early Life: (failure rate decreases w/ time)
- Useful Life: (failure rate approx. constant)
- Wearout Life: (failure rate increases w/ time)

We will focus on the “Useful Life” of the bathtub curve for this analysis.

Independent events
Mapping Classical Reliability Models from The Time Domain To The Fluence Domain

• The exponential model that relates reliability to MTTF assumes that during useful-lifetime:
  – Failures are independent. \( R(t)=e^{-t/MTTF} \) or \( R(t)=e^{-\lambda t} \)
  – Error rate is constant.
  – MTTF = \( 1/\lambda \).
• For a given LET (across fluence):
  – SEUs are independent.
  – \( \sigma_{SEU} \) is constant.
  – MFTF = \( 1/\sigma_{SEU} \).
• Hence, mapping from the time domain to the fluence domain (per LET) is straight forward:
  – \( t \leftrightarrow \Phi \)
  – MTTF \( \leftrightarrow \) MFTF
  – \( \lambda \leftrightarrow \sigma_{SEU} \)

\( R(t)=e^{-t/MTTF} \) \( \Leftrightarrow \) \( R(\Phi)=e^{\Phi/MFTF} \)

Parallel between time and fluence.

\( \sigma_{SEU} = \text{#errors/fluence} \)

\( \lambda_{system} = \text{#errors/time} \)
Creating Reliability Curves from $\sigma_{\text{SEU}}$s

- $\sigma_{\text{SEU}}$ data is system level.
- A histogram of environment data is created. Bins are determined by LET values at each $\sigma_{\text{SEU}}$ data point.
- For each data point at a given LET, a combination of binned environment data and upper-bound $\sigma_{\text{SEU}}$ data are used to determine system reliability performance.
- A piecemeal approach is performed per data point to determine the weakest points of system performance.

Example of Proposed Methodology

Application

- **Mission requirements:**
  - The FPGA shall contain an embedded microprocessor.
  - Selection shall be made between a Xilinx V5QV (very expensive device) or a Xilinx V5 with embedded PowerPC (relatively cheap device).
  - FPGA operation shall have reliability of 3-nines (99.9%) within a 10 minute window at Geosynchronous Equatorial Orbit (GEO).

- **Proposed methodology:**
  - Create a histogram of particle flux versus LET for a 10-minute window of time for your target environment.
  - Calculate MFTF per LET (obtain SEU data).
  - Graph \( R(\Phi) \) for a variety of LET values and their associated MFTFs. \( R(\Phi) = e^{\Phi/MFTF} \)
  - For selected ranges of LETs, use an upper bound of particle flux (number of particles/cm\(^2\)•10-minutes), to determine if the system will meet the mission’s reliability requirements.
Flux versus LET Histogram for A 10-minute Window

Geosynchronous Equatorial Orbit (GEO) 100-mils shielding

Bins are selected based on $\sigma_{SEU}$ data points.

We will analyze system reliability for each bin.
MFTF versus LET for the Xilinx V5 Embedded PowerPC Core and the Xilinx V5QV MicroBlaze Soft Processor Core

- **V5QV**: no system errors were observed below LET=1.8MeV•cm²/mg. Total fluence > 5.0×10⁸ particles/cm².

- **PowerPC**:
  - No system errors were observed below LET=0.07MeV•cm²/mg with total fluence = 1.0×10⁸ particles/cm².
  - Hence, at 0.07, we will assume an upper-bound MFTF = 1.0×10⁸ particles/cm².
  - More tests would increase the MFTF for this bin.

\[
\text{MFTF} = \frac{1}{\sigma_{\text{SEU}}}
\]
Reliability across Fluence up to LET=0.07 MeV•cm²/mg – Low Bound Analysis

Binned GEO Environment data shows approximately **3000** particles/(cm²•10-minutes), in the range of 0.0MeV•cm²/mg to 0.07MeV•cm²/mg. We are using MFTF for 0.07MeV•cm²/mg to upper bound this bin.

Reliability at 3000 particles/(cm²•10-minutes) > 99.99% for the PowerPC design implementation. “9’s” could be increased with more tests.

\[ R(\Phi) = e^{\Phi/1.0 \times 10^8} \]

*Used MFTF= 1.0\times10^8 because that was the maximum fluence for tests (no errors observed)*

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Reliability across Fluence up to \(\text{LET}=0.14\text{MeV} \cdot \text{cm}^2/\text{mg}\)

Binned GEO Environment data shows approximately 11 particles/(cm\(^2\)•10-minutes), in the range of 0.07MeV•cm\(^2\)/mg to 0.14MeV•cm\(^2\)/mg. We are using MFTF for 0.1MeV•cm\(^2\)/mg to upper bound this bin.

Reliability at 5 particles/(cm\(^2\)•10-minutes) > 99.999% for the V5QV PowerPC design implementation.

\[
R(\Phi) = e^{\Phi/5.0 \times 10^6}
\]

**Fluence (particles/cm\(^2\))**

\[
\text{Reliability} = 9.999990 \times 10^{-1}
\]

\[
\text{Fluence (particles/cm}^2\text{)} = 0, 2.5, 5, 7.5, 10, 12.5, 15, 17.5, 20, 22.5
\]
Reliability across Fluence up to LET=1.8 MeV\textperiodcentered cm^2/mg

Binned GEO Environment data shows approximately 9 particles/(cm^2\textperiodcentered 10-minutes), in the range of 0.14MeV\textperiodcentered cm^2/mg to 1.8MeV\textperiodcentered cm^2/mg. We are using MFTF for 1.8MeV\textperiodcentered cm^2/mg to upper bound this bin.

\[ R(\Phi) = e^{\Phi/6.0 \times 10^4} \]

Reliability at 9 particles/(cm^2\textperiodcentered 10-minutes) > 99.9% for the PowerPC design implementation. This is the most susceptible bin for the system.
Reliability across Fluence up to LET=3.6MeV•cm²/mg

Binned GEO Environment data shows approximately 0.23 particles/(cm²•10-minutes), in the range of 1.8MeV•cm²/mg to 3.6MeV•cm²/mg.

Within this LET range, reliability at 0.23 particles/(cm²•10-minutes) > 99.999% for both design implementations.
Reliability across Fluence at LET=40MeVcm²/mg

Binned GEO environment data shows approximately 0.07 particles/(cm²•10-minutes), in the range of 3.6MeV•cm²/mg to 40.0MeV•cm²/mg.

\[ R(\Phi) = e^{\Phi/2.0 \times 10^4} \]
\[ R(\Phi) = e^{\Phi/2.8 \times 10^2} \]

We fall below 99.99% at approximately 0.02 particles/cm²!

Within this LET range, reliability at 0.07 particles/(cm²•10-minutes) > 99.9% for both design implementations. We can refine by analyzing smaller bins.
Example Conclusion

• Using the proposed methodology, the commercial Xilinx V5 device will meet project requirements.
• In this case, the project is able to save money by selecting the significantly cheaper FPGA device and gain performance because of the embedded PowerPC.
Conclusions

• This study transforms proven classical reliability models into the SEU particle fluence domain. The intent is to better characterize SEU responses for complex systems.

• The method for reliability-model application is as follows:
  – SEU data are obtained as MFTF.
  – Reliability curves (in the fluence domain) are calculated using MFTF; and are analyzed with a piecemeal approach.
  – Environment data are then used to determine particle flux exposure within required windows of mission operation.

• The proposed method does not rely on data-fitting and hence removes a significant source of error.

• The proposed method provides information for highly SEU-susceptible scenarios; hence enables a better choice of mitigation strategy.

• This is preliminary work. There is more to come.

This methodology expresses SEU behavior and response in terms that missions understand via classical reliability metrics.
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