Optimizing Processes to Minimize Risk

NASA, like the other hazardous industries, has suffered very catastrophic losses.

Human error will likely never be completely eliminated as a factor in our failures.

When you can’t eliminate risk, focus on mitigating the worst consequences and recovering operations.

Bolstering processes to emphasize the role of integration and problem solving is key to success.

Building an effective Safety Culture bolsters skill-based performance that minimizes risk and encourages successful engagement.
Optimizing Processes to Minimize Risk
NASA’s Risk Management Culture

David Loyd
Johnson Space Center
Safety & Test Operations

June 27, 2017
“It can only be attributable to human error.”

-- HAL 9000 (2001: A Space Odyssey)
Optimizing Processes to Minimize Risk

• NASA’s Losses in Space and on the Ground
  – Failure is not an option we choose, but it is a reality we must face....

• Safety & Mission Assurance in the Project Life-Cycle
  – The Unique Role of the “Integration Engineer” and “Chief SMA Officer”

• Accommodating Human Error
  – Acknowledging human frailty and modeling error probabilities.

• NASA’s Safety Culture – Minimizing the Risk Environment
  – Reducing error by cultivating skill-based behavior.
  – Bolstering trust throughout operations.
  – Measuring safety culture growth.
NASA’s Losses

Recent Mission Mishaps

**Columbia STS-107, February 1, 2003:**
- 7 fatalities;
- $3 Billion vehicle loss;
- 2.5 year mission impact.

**NOAA N-Prime, September 6, 2003:**
- $135 Million vehicle damage;
- 5.5 year mission impact.

**Genesis, September 8, 2004:**
- Some sample retrieval materials lost.

**DART, April 16, 2005:**
- Proximity operations mission objectives lost.

**OCO, February 24, 2009:**
- $280 Million vehicle loss;
- 5+ year mission impact.

**Glory, March 4, 2011:**
- $424 Million vehicle loss;
- ??? mission impact.
NASA’s Losses

Recent Institutional Mishaps

KSC Roofing Fatality, March 17, 2006
- Subcontractor died from head injuries suffered due to fall.

MSFC Freedom Star Tow-wire Injury, December 12, 2006
- Hospitalization due to internal injuries from impact with SRB tow-wire.

JSC Chamber B Asphyxiation, July 28, 2010
- Shoulder injury due to asphyxiation and fall.

WFF CNC Injury, October 28, 2010
- Sub-dermal tissue damage due to impact from machine tool shrapnel.
# Safety & Mission Assurance in the Project Life-Cycle

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<th>Key Milestones</th>
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<th>Subject Matter Experts, Mission Planners, System Engineers</th>
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<td>Integration Engineers, Quality Engineers, Analysts, Inspectors</td>
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Independent Technical Authority – Chief SMA Officer

June 27, 2017

[Diagram showing Key Milestones and Major Tasks across different phases of the project life-cycle, including System Requirements Review, Preliminary Design Review, Critical Design Review, Test Readiness Review(s), Qualification Testing, Acceptance Testing, Delivery & Activation, Performance Review(s), Project Closeout, System/Facility Decommission, and major tasks for each phase.]
The Role of the Integration Engineer

- Facilitates multi-discipline problem resolution.
- Resolves conflicts between compliance and functional objectives.
- Consolidates mission assurance objectives between component, assembly, subsystem, and mission objectives.
- Identifies potential waiver/deviation opportunities.
- Performs material review actions for acceptance of form, fit, or function.
- Researches data and validates risk assessment parameters.
The Role of the Chief SMA Officer (CSO)

- Formulates SMA position on significant technical issues or design trades across the Program.
- Dispositions assigned changes, waivers, deviations, and exceptions to program technical requirements.
- Accepts equivalent alternatives to applied requirements.
- Evaluates, approves or recommends the feasibility or modification of policies, requirements or systems.
- Performs technical SMA assessment in support of the Certificate of Flight Readiness (CoFR) endorsement.
- Leads independent assessments of Program-related process integrity impacts, anomalies, or unique failures.
Accommodating Human Error...

As much as we’d like to be able to predict error and eliminate it, the reality is that we must be prepared to accommodate it – measure known performance characteristics to identify vulnerabilities, mitigate greatest risk, and enable prudent response to the next accident.
## High Risk Occupations vs. Space Flight

### Person-Fatality Risk Per Year

<table>
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<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Probability</th>
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<tr>
<td>Timber Cutting and Logging</td>
<td>1:998</td>
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<tr>
<td>Airline Pilot</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alaskan Commuter Pilot</td>
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<td>Construction Worker</td>
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<td>Commercial Fishing</td>
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<td>Alaskan Commercial Fishing</td>
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<td>Northeast Multispecies Groundfish Fishing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shuttle Astronaut</td>
<td>1:218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mt. Everest Climber</td>
<td>1:70</td>
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- Miner risk does not include fatalities due to chronic illnesses like “black lung.”
- Risk increases as “drill down” into smaller and smaller groups that drive the risk.
- Shuttle Astronaut risk is a very small group that has high risk.
Human Performance Shaping Factors (PSF) Integration with Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)

- PSFs impact human performance in a variety of ways, such as intelligence, expertise, emotion, harsh conditions, conflicting orders, etc.
- PSFs are incorporated into PRA error modeling, accommodating anticipated human interaction with critical tasking.
- We work to minimize the affects of PSFs, but our expectation of performance must acknowledge their potential impact to operations.
Minimizing Human Error and Cultivating a Reduced Risk Environment

Rasmussen’s 3 Human Responses to Operator Information Processing

1. **Skill-based**: requires little or no cognitive effort.
2. **Rule-based**: driven by procedures or rules.
3. **Knowledge-based**: requires problem solving/decision making.

“The fewer rules a coach has, the fewer rules there are for players to break.”

John Madden

“Successful design is not the achievement of perfection but the minimization and accommodation of imperfection.”

Henry Petroski
By advocating a pervasive Safety Culture, we can provide our workforce with:
- Clear emphasis on continuous learning;
- Encouragement to develop intuitive personal values;
- Guidelines for decision-making behavior that focuses on long-term success;
- Reinforcement to build trust by reporting and communicating concerns and ideas.

Practicing an effective Safety Culture:
- Builds Skill-based response mechanisms;
- Sharpens and shares Knowledge-based response mechanisms where flexibility is necessary;
- Reduces the emphasis on Rule-based response;
- And breaks down barriers to Trust.
NASA’s Safety/Risk Culture Model

“An environment characterized by safe attitudes and behaviors modeled by leaders and embraced by all that fosters an atmosphere of open communication, mutual trust, shared safety values and lessons, and confidence that we will balance challenges and risks consistent with our core value of safety to successfully accomplish our mission.”

An effective safety culture is characterized by the following subcomponents:

**Reporting** Culture - We report our concerns

**Just** Culture - We have a sense of fairness

**Flexible** Culture - We change to meet new demands

**Learning** Culture - We learn from our successes and mistakes

**Engaged** Culture - Everyone does his or her part
Apollo 1 – January 27, 1967

**Reporting Culture** – Procedures were subjected to last-minute changes that were not effectively tracked, recorded or communicated.

**Just Culture** – Poor morale and process discipline were evident in Command Module contractor performance prior to the incident.

**Flexible Culture** – Willingness to change course on design issues was weak in the presence of compelling important information.

**Learning Culture** – Test planning failed to appreciate the significant hazards of a 100% oxygen environment.

**Engaged Culture** – NASA provided insufficient surveillance over management functions.
Catastrophic Event Impact

Using the Safety Culture Model to Analyze NASA's History.

Columbia – February 1, 2003

Challenger – January 28, 1986

**Reporting** – With both tragedies, launch process deficiencies, such as O-ring susceptibility in cold temperatures (Challenger) and foam shedding (Columbia), were passively reported problems, yet were not considered serious hazards.

**Just** – Some engineers were reluctant to raise concerns when faced with a return of an “in God we trust - all others bring data” attitude.

**Flexible** – With both incidents, the Shuttle Program was experiencing schedule pressure challenges.

**Learning** – With “normalization of deviance,” O-ring burn-through and foam impact had become classified as “in-family” and as a negligible risk.

**Engaged** – NASA management lacked involvement in critical discussions.
Deepwater Horizon – April 20, 2010

**Reporting** – Procedures were subjected to last-minute distribution, last minute decision.

**Just** – Concerns of rig workers regarding test results were muted, not heeded or explored.

**Flexible** – All involved seemed prepared to exercise flexibility, but this may be indicative of insufficient process discipline.

**Learning** – Invalid confidence in new slurry, vents from Mud-Gas Separator (MGS) allowed gas to enter rig spaces, insufficient planning for contingencies.

**Engaged** – Incorrect reading of pressure tests, lack of recognition or timely control action related to kicks, diverted flow through MGS instead of overboard, reluctance to activate Blow-Out Preventer (BOP), reluctance to activate the Emergency Disconnect System, BOP testing and maintenance.
Measuring Safety Culture

2015 Safety Culture Survey Results

JSC R1 through R3 Comment Quality Analysis

“Quality” is equivalent to Likert Value associated with received comments. “Engagement” is the average number of comments per SCS participant.

Comment Temperature Perspectives

**HOT**
“Eliminate the recalcitrant dinosaur dictators”

**WARM**
“Emphasis on purpose of safety measures, not just filling out a form or checking a box.”

**TEPID**
“Watch out for everyone”
“Communication”

**COOL**
“Keep doing what you are doing. We are constantly being reminded of Safety and its importance.”

June 27, 2017
David T. Loyd
The Path to a Reduced Risk Environment

• NASA, like the other hazardous industries, has suffered very catastrophic losses.
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Backup Charts
Columbia STS-107, February 1, 2003:
7 fatalities;
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2.5 year mission impact.

Kalpana Chawla
Rick D. Husband
Laurel B. Clark
Ilan Ramon
Michael P. Anderson
David M. Brown
William C. McCool
NOAA N-Prime, September 6, 2003:
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