Static Analysis using Abstract Interpretation

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Syllabus

1 Introduction
   - Software development
   - Safety properties
   - Abstract Interpretation

2 IKOS

3 Analyses

4 Miscellaneous

5 Conclusion
Software development

- Software represent more than half of the development cost of an aircraft
- Regulated by international standards (DO-178 rev. B/C)
Software development

- Software represent more than half of the development cost of an aircraft
- Regulated by international standards (DO-178 rev. B/C)
- Tests
  - Expensive because run on a special hardware
  - Can miss bugs
  - Slow
Software represent more than half of the development cost of an aircraft

Regulated by international standards (DO-178 rev. B/C)

Tests
  - Expensive because run on a special hardware
  - Can miss bugs
  - Slow

Solution: use static analysis

NASA V&V program
Main objectives: no runtime errors
- buffer overflow
- null dereference
- division by zero
- integer overflow

Harder objectives:
- assertions (pre/post invariants)
- termination

certified $\Rightarrow$ soundness is required
abstract interpretation is a good candidate
runtime errors can be security vulnerabilities!
Abstract Interpretation

- based on the concrete semantics of your program
- automatic formal proof
- sound approximation of reachable states
Abstract Interpretation

\[ x(t) \]

\[ semantics(P) \]
Forbiden zone

specification(P)
Abstract Interpretation

$$\text{semantics}(P) \subseteq \text{specification}(P)$$
Tests

Using testing

Forbidden zone

Error !!!

Test of a few trajectories

Possible trajectories

Using testing
Abstract Interpretation

Abstraction of the trajectories

$\text{abstraction}(P)$
Abstract Interpretation

\[
\text{abstraction}(P) \subseteq \text{specification}(P)
\]
Abstract Interpretation

Forbidden zone

Abstraction of the trajectories

\[ \text{semantics}(P) \subseteq \text{abstraction}(P) \subseteq \text{specification}(P) \]
Thank you Pierre Loïc Garoche
1 Introduction

2 IKOS
   - Project
   - Toolchain
   - Demo
   - Results

3 Analyses

4 Miscellaneous

5 Conclusion
The IKOS project

- Inference Kernel for Open Static Analyzers
- C++ library for abstract interpretation
- C/C++ static analyzer
- Target embedded systems
- Analyses:
  - Buffer overflow
  - Division by zero
  - Null dereference
  - Uninitialized variables
  - Prover
- https://ti.arc.nasa.gov/opensource/ikos/
Toolchain

**Tool Chain Execution Flow**

- **C/C++ code**
- **clang**
- **LLVM IR**

**ikos-pp**
- Ikos-pp is an executable that embeds the LLVM opt command. It applies several LLVM built-in optimizations + our own optimization passes to produce an intermediate optimized LLVM IR. Using the optimized LLVM IR, we run LLVM opt command with `-arbos` option to translate the optimized LLVM IR to AR
  - ikos-pp does at least the following optimizations before translating to AR: `-mem2reg`, `-loweratomic`, `-lowsmt`, and `-instname`

**LLVM opt command + AR pass (-arbos)**
- **AR in s-expr**

**AR Plugin Analyzers**
- **BOA** - buffer overflow analysis
- **DBZ** - Intra-procedural integer division-by-zero analysis
- **UVA** - Inter-procedural uninitialized variable + array analysis
- **NullPtr** - Inter-procedural null dereference pointer analysis

**ARBOS**
- (AR parser, analysis plugin framework)

**Analysis results**

**IKOS**

- **Abstract Domains**
  - Interval
  - Constants
  - Discrete
  - Congruence
  - Interval + Congruence
  - Octagons
  - Difference Bounds Matrix
  - Pointer Analysis

**Analysis results**

- Outputs reports to console
- **IKOSView**: desktop GUI that queries results stored in SQLite3 database
  - Integrated into web services (such as continuous build + bug tracking systems)
    - SonarQube – using sonar_runner
    - CodeDX – import results in cppcheck XML format
    - SWAMP – used in cybersecurity
LLVM

- Low Level Virtual Machine
- Compiler Infrastructure
- Generic assembly language
- Allow language independent optimization
LLVM

- Low Level Virtual Machine
- Compiler Infrastructure
- Generic assembly language
- Allow language independent optimization

LLVM bitcode

C C++ Fortran Ada

x86 PowerPC ARM AR
$ cat test.c

#include <stdio.h>

int main(int argc, char** argv) {
    int a[10];
    int i;
    for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
        a[i] = i;
    }
    printf("%d\n", a[i - 1]);
    printf("%d\n", a[0]);
    return 0;
}
$ clang -c -emit-llvm -O1 -o test.bc test.c
$ opt -S test.bc

define i32 @main(i32, i8** nocapture readnone) local_unnamed_addr #0 {
    %3 = alloca [10 x i32], align 16
    %4 = bitcast [10 x i32]* %3 to i8*
    call void @llvm.lifetime.start(i64 40, i8* %4) #3
    br label %5

    ; <label>:5: ; preds = %5, %2
    %6 = phi i64 [ 0, %2 ], [ %9, %5 ]
    %7 = getelementptr inbounds [10 x i32], [10 x i32]* %3, i64 0, i64 %6
    %8 = trunc i64 %6 to i32
    store i32 %8, i32* %7, align 4
    %9 = add nuw nsw i64 %6, 1
    %10 = icmp eq i64 %9, 10
    br i1 %10, label %11, label %5

    ; <label>:11: ; preds = %5
    %12 = getelementptr inbounds [10 x i32], [10 x i32]* %3, i64 0, i64 9
    %13 = load i32, i32* %12, align 4
    %14 = tail call i32 (i32, i8*, ...) @__printf_chk(i32 1,
        i8* getelementptr inbounds ([4 x i8], [4 x i8]* @.str, i64 0, i64 0), i32 %13) #3
    %15 = getelementptr inbounds [10 x i32], [10 x i32]* %3, i64 0, i64 0
    %16 = load i32, i32* %15, align 16
    %17 = tail call i32 (i32, i8*, ...) @__printf_chk(i32 1,
        i8* getelementptr inbounds ([4 x i8], [4 x i8]* @.str, i64 0, i64 0), i32 %16) #3
    call void @llvm.lifetime.end(i64 40, i8* nonnull %4) #3
    ret i32 0
}
%2:
%3 = alloca [10 x i32], align 16
%4 = bitcast [10 x i32]* %3 to i8*
call void @llvm.lifetime.start(i64 40, i8* %4) #3
br label %5

%5:
%6 = phi i64 [ 0, %2 ], [ %9, %5 ]
%7 = getelementptr inbounds [10 x i32], [10 x i32]* %3, i64 0, i64 %6
%8 = trunc i64 %6 to i32
store i32 %8, i32* %7, align 4, !tbaa !3
%9 = add nuw nsw i64 %6, 1
%10 = icmp eq i64 %9, 10
br i1 %10, label %11, label %5

%11:
%12 = getelementptr inbounds [10 x i32], [10 x i32]* %3, i64 0, i64 9
%13 = load i32, i32* %12, align 4, !tbaa !3
%14 = tail call i32 (i32, i8*, ...) @__printf_chk(i32 1, i8* getelementptr...
inbounds ([4 x i8], [4 x i8]* @.str, i64 0, i64 0), i32 %13) #3
%15 = getelementptr inbounds [10 x i32], [10 x i32]* %3, i64 0, i64 0
%16 = load i32, i32* %15, align 16, !tbaa !3
%17 = tail call i32 (i32, i8*, ...) @__printf_chk(i32 1, i8* getelementptr...
inbounds ([4 x i8], [4 x i8]* @.str, i64 0, i64 0), i32 %16) #3
call void @llvm.lifetime.end(i64 40, i8* nonnull %4) #3
ret i32 0
IKOS pre-processor

Run llvm optimization passes :
- mem2reg : SSA Form
- globaldce : Dead Code Elimination
- globalopt : Global Variable Optimizer
- simplifycfg : Control Flow Graph Optimizer
- scalarrepl : Scalar Replacement of Aggregates
- sccp : Sparse Conditional Constant Propagation
- loop-simplify : Canonical Form for Loops
- lcssa : Loop Closed SSA Form
- loop-deletion : Dead Loop Elimination
- lowerinvoke : Lower Invoke Instructions
- lowerswitch : Lower Switch Instructions

Run home made llvm passes :
- Lower Global Variable Initialization
- Lower Constant Expressions
- Lower Select Instructions
- Name Values
Abstract Representation

Major differences with llvm:
- Branching instructions are translated into assertions
- Memory instructions are byte oriented
- Some instructions are removed

Translation from llvm to AR using a llvm pass

Text representation using s-expressions
($function
 ($name ($main)) ($ty (!8))
 ($params ($p ($name ($main.arg_1)) ($ty (!9))) ($p ($name ($main.arg_2)) ($ty (!10))))
 ($local_vars ($local_var ($var ($name ($main._1)) ($ty (!11))))
 ($code
 ($entry ($bb_1)) ($exit ($bb_5)) ($unreachable) ($ehresume)
 ($basicblocks
 ($basicblock ($name ($bb_1))
 ($instructions
 ($allocate ($dest ($cst ($localvariableref ($name ($main._1)) ($ty (!11)))))
 ($alloca_ty (!12)) ($array_size ($cst ($constantint ($val (#1)) ($ty (!9))))
 ($debug ($srcloc ($line (#-1)) ($col (#-1)) ($file (!2))))
 )
 )
 ($basicblock ($name ($*in_bb_1_to_bb_2_phi))
 ($instructions
 ($assign ($lhs ($var ($name ($main.i.0)) ($ty (!9))))
 ($rhs ($cst ($constantint ($val (#0)) ($ty (!9))))
 ($debug ($srcloc ($line (#6)) ($col (#10)) ($file (!13))))
 )
 )
 [...]})
 ($trans
 ($edge ($bb_1) ($*in_bb_1_to_bb_2_phi))
 ($edge ($*in_bb_1_to_bb_2_phi) ($bb_2))
 ($edge ($bb_2) ($*out_bb_2_to_bb_3_icmp_true))
 ($edge ($bb_2) ($*out_bb_2_to_bb_5_icmp_false))
 ($edge ($*in_bb_4_to_bb_2_phi) ($bb_2))
 [...]}
)
bb_4:
main._14 = add(main.i.0, 1)

bb_1:
main._1 = allocate(1, [10 x i32])

*in_bb_4_to_bb_2_phi:
main.i.0 = main._14

bb_2:

*in_bb_1_to_bb_2_phi:
main.i.0 = 0

*out_bb_2_to_bb_3_icmp_true:
main.i.0 slt 10
main._8 = -1

*out_bb_2_to_bb_5_icmp_false:
main.i.0 sge 10
main._8 = 0

bb_3:
main._10 = sext main.i.0
__v:7 = mul(4, main._10)
main._11 = ptr_shift(main._1, __v:7)
memory[main._11] = main.i.0

bb_4:
main._14 = add(main.i.0, 1)

*in_bb_4_to_bb_2_phi:
main.i.0 = main._14

bb_5:
main._17 = sub(main.i.0, 1)
main._18 = sext main._17
__v:10 = mul(4, main._18)
main._19 = ptr_shift(main._1, __v:10)
main._20 = memory[main._19]
main._21 = ptr_shift(.str, 0)
main._22 = call printf(main._21, main._20)
main._24 = memory[main._1]
main._25 = ptr_shift(.str, 0)
main._26 = call printf(main._25, main._24)
return 0
Load an Abstract Representation file (.ar) and apply passes
Similar to llvm opt command
IKOS passes:
- ps-opt: Optimize pointer shift statements
- branching-opt: Optimize the Control Flow Graph
- inline-init-gv: Inline initialization of global variables in main
- unify-exit-nodes: Unify exit nodes
- analyzer: Analyzer pass
bb 4:
main.14 = add(main.i.0, 1)
main.i.0 = main.14

*out_bb_2_to_bb_3_icmp_true:
main.i.0 slt 10
main._8 = -1

bb 3:
main.10 = sext main.i.0
__v:7 = mul(4, main.10)
main.11 = ptr_shift(main.1, __v:7)
memory[main.11] = main.i.0

bb 1:
main.1 = allocate(1, [10 x i32])
main.i.0 = 0
main.i.0 slt 10
main._8 = -1

*out_bb_2_to_bb_5_icmp_false:
main.i.0 sge 10
main._8 = 0

bb 5:
main.17 = sub(main.i.0, 1)
main.18 = sext main.17
__v:10 = mul(4, main.18)
main.19 = ptr_shift(main.1, __v:10)
main.20 = memory[main.19]
main.21 = ptr_shift(.str, 0)
main.22 = call printf(main.21, main.20)
main.24 = memory[main.1]
main.25 = ptr_shift(.str, 0)
main.26 = call printf(main.25, main.24)
return 0
Liveness analysis

Pointer analysis

Memory analysis combining:
  - Numerical analysis
  - Pointer analysis
  - Uninitialized variable analysis
  - Null pointer analysis

Checkers:
  - buffer overflow
  - division by zero
  - null dereference
  - uninitialized variables
  - assertion prover

Store results in a SQLite database
The toolchain is launched via a python script

Generate reports in different formats:
- Console (gcc style)
- JSON
- XML
- etc.

Output database reusable (using *ikos-render*)
Toolchain

C/C++ code
clang
LLVM IR

ikos-pp
Optimized LLVM IR

LLVM opt command + AR pass (-arbos)
AR in s-expr

ARBOS
{AR parser, analysis plugin framework}

Analysis results

Abstract Domains
- Interval
- Constants
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- Congruence
- Interval + Congruence
- Octagons
- Difference Bounds Matrix
- Pointer Analysis

IKOS

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- ikos-pp does at least the following optimizations before translating to AR: \texttt{-mem2reg, -loweratomic, -lowerswitch, and -instnamer}

AR Plugin Analyzers
- BOA - buffer overflow analysis
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Analysis results
- Outputs reports to console
- IKOSView: desktop GUI that queries results stored in SQLite3 database
- Integrated into web services (such as continuous build + bug tracking systems)
  - SonarQube – using sonar_runner
  - Codex – import results in cppcheck XML format
  - SWAMP – used in cybersecurity
Demo.
Aeroquad - The Open Source Quadcopter

- **Code size**:
  - lines of code: 167k
  - bitcode instructions: 4634

- **Time stats**:
  - arbos: 1 min 51.888 sec
  - ikos-pp: 0.126 sec
  - llvm-to-ar: 0.898 sec

- **Summary**:
  - number of checks: 2908
  - number of unreachable checks: 46 (1.6%)
  - number of safe checks: 2688 (92.4%)
  - number of definite unsafe checks: 0
  - number of warnings: 174 (5.9%)
Aeroquad - The Open Source Quadcopter

- Writes at specific addresses:
  
  ```
  *(0x42) = x;
  ```

- False positives on loops with casts:
  
  ```
  for (byte axis = 0; axis < 3; axis++) {
    accelSample[axis] = 0;
  }
  ```

- Tricky array indexing:
  
  ```
  static byte receiverPin[6] =
  {2, 5, 6, 4, 7, 8};
  pinData[receiverPin[channel]].edge = FALLING_EDGE;
  ```
Paparazzi - Autopilot System for UAV

- **Code size:**
  - lines of code: 23k
  - bitcode instructions: 4436

- **Time stats:**
  - arbos: 1 min 2.930 sec
  - ikos-pp: 0.132 sec
  - llvm-to-ar: 1.111 sec

- **Summary:**
  - number of checks: 2372
  - number of unreachable checks: 352 (14.8%)
  - number of safe checks: 2020 (85.2%)
  - number of definite unsafe checks: 0
  - number of warnings: 0
Results

GEN2

- Code size:
  - lines of code: 13k
  - bitcode instructions: 5340

- Time stats:
  - arbos: 2 min 16.161 sec
  - ikos-pp: 0.199 sec
  - llvm-to-ar: 1.358 sec

- Summary:
  - number of checks: 3121
  - number of unreachable checks: 0
  - number of safe checks: 3028 (97.1%)
  - number of definite unsafe checks: 0
  - number of warnings: 93 (2.9%)
Results

MNAV

- **Code size:**
  - lines of code: 159k
  - bitcode instructions: 2145

- **Time stats:**
  - arbos: 12.950 sec
  - ikos-pp: 0.056 sec
  - llvm-to-ar: 0.468 sec

- **Summary:**
  - number of checks: 430
  - number of unreachable checks: 17 (3.9%)
  - number of safe checks: 330 (76.7%)
  - number of definite unsafe checks: 0
  - number of warnings: 83 (19.3%)
CASS

- **Time stats:**
  - arbos : 1 day 2 hour 17.463 sec
  - ikos-pp : 13.234 sec
  - llvm-to-ar : 24.431 sec

- **Summary:**
  - number of checks : 254452
  - number of unreachable checks : 33300 (13.0%)
  - number of safe checks : 172521 (67.8%)
  - number of definite unsafe checks : 0
  - number of warnings : 48631 (19.1%)
FLTz - flight simulator with OpenGL displays

- **Code size:**
  - lines of code: 91k
  - bitcode instructions: 14501

- **Time stats:**
  - arbos: 5 day 9 hour 27 min 41.459 sec
  - ikos-pp: 25.211 sec
  - llvm-to-ar: 1 min 2.661 sec

- **Summary:**
  - number of checks: 1302470
  - number of unreachable checks: 72409 (5.5%)
  - number of safe checks: 153312 (11.7%)
  - number of definite unsafe checks: 19 (0.001%)
  - number of warnings: 1076730 (82.6%)
Syllabus

1 Introduction

2 IKOS

3 Analyses
   - Liveness analysis
   - Pointer analysis
   - Memory analysis
   - Property checking

4 Miscellaneous

5 Conclusion
Liveness analysis

- Mark *live* and *dead* variables after each basic block
- Dataflow analysis
- Used to clean up variables in the abstract domain
- Problem for relationnal domains
- Kill - Gen algorithm
- $GEN[b]$ : set of variables used in $b$ before any assignment
- $KILL[b]$ : set of variables that are assigned in $b$
Liveness analysis - Algorithm

- Kill - Gen algorithm
- $GEN[b]$ : set of variables used in $b$ before any assignment
- $KILL[b]$ : set of variables that are assigned in $b$

- $GEN[stmt : y \leftarrow f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)] = \{x_1, \ldots, x_n\}$
- $KILL[stmt : y \leftarrow f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)] = \{y\}$
Liveness analysis - Algorithm

- **Kill - Gen algorithm**
- **GEN[b]**: set of variables used in \( b \) before any assignment
- **KILL[b]**: set of variables that are assigned in \( b \)

\[
\text{GEN[stmt : } y \leftarrow f(x_1, \cdots, x_n)] = \{x_1, \ldots, x_n\}
\]

\[
\text{KILL[stmt : } y \leftarrow f(x_1, \cdots, x_n)] = \{y\}
\]

\[
\text{LIVE}_{in}[b] = \text{GEN}[b] \cup (\text{LIVE}_{out}[b] \setminus \text{KILL}[b])
\]

\[
\text{LIVE}_{out}[b] = \bigcup_{p \in \text{succ}[b]} \text{LIVE}_{in}[p]
\]

\[
\text{LIVE}_{out}[\text{final}] = \emptyset
\]
Liveness analysis - Example

bb_4:
main._14 = add(main.i.0, 1)
main.i.0 = main._14

*out_bb_2_to_bb_3_icmp_true:
main.i.0 slt 10
main._8 = -1

bb_3:
main._10 = sext main.i.0
_v:7 = mul(4, main._10)
main._11 = ptr_shift(main.1, _v:7)
memory[main._11] = main.i.0

bb_1:
main._1 = allocate(1, [10 x i32])
main.i.0 = 0
main.i.0 slt 10
main._8 = -1

*out_bb_2_to_bb_5_icmp_false:
main.i.0 sge 10
main._8 = 0

bb_5:
return 0
• Pointer analysis: What memory locations can a pointer expression refer to?
• Alias analysis: Are two pointers referring to the same locations?
• Intraprocedural vs Interprocedural
• Flow sensitive vs Flow insensitive
• Context sensitive vs Context insensitive
• How to model memory locations?
  • Global variables: use symbolic names (e.g., $g$)
  • Local variables: use symbolic names (e.g., $main.x$)
  • Dynamically allocated memory: use symbolic names?
    • Problem: potentially unbounded locations (think about a loop)
    • Solution: use symbolic names with an instruction counter (e.g., $blk(l, \lambda)$)
Andersen’s pointer analysis

For each pointer $p$, we call $T_p$ the set of memory locations pointed by $p$

Goal: find $T_p$ for each pointer $p$

Idea: view pointer assignments as subset constraints

Complexity: $O(n^3)$, worst case $O(n^4)$
Andersen’s pointer analysis

For each pointer \( p \), we call \( T_p \) the set of memory locations pointed by \( p \)

Goal: find \( T_p \) for each pointer \( p \)

Idea: view pointer assignments as subset constraints

Complexity: \( O(n^3) \), worst case \( O(n^4) \)

\[
\begin{align*}
    p = &x &\iff T_p \supseteq \{x\} \\
p = q + o &\iff T_p \supseteq T_q \\
p = *q &\iff T_p \supseteq *T_q \iff \forall x \in T_q, T_p \supseteq O(x) \\
*p = q &\iff *T_p \supseteq T_q \iff \forall x \in T_p, O(x) \supseteq T_q
\end{align*}
\]
Andersen’s pointer analysis

For each pointer $p$, we call $T_p$ the set of memory locations pointed by $p$

Goal: find $T_p$ for each pointer $p$

Idea: view pointer assignments as subset constraints

Complexity: $O(n^3)$, worst case $O(n^4)$

$p = \& x \iff T_p \supseteq \{x\}$

$p = q + o \iff T_p \supseteq T_q$

$p = *q \iff T_p \supseteq *T_q \iff \forall x \in T_q, T_p \supseteq O(x)$

$*p = q \iff *T_p \supseteq T_q \iff \forall x \in T_p, O(x) \supseteq T_q$

How to solve the constraints system? A fix point, of course!
Example:

- $p = \&a$
- $q = \&b$
- $*p = q$
- $r = \&c$
- $s = p$
- $t = *p$
- $*s = r$
Example:

- \( p = \& a \iff T_p \supseteq \{a\} \)
- \( q = \& b \iff T_q \supseteq \{b\} \)
- \( *p = q \iff *T_p \supseteq T_q \)
- \( r = \& c \iff T_r \supseteq \{c\} \)
- \( s = p \iff T_s \supseteq T_p \)
- \( t = *p \iff T_t \supseteq *T_p \)
- \( *s = r \iff *T_s \supseteq T_r \)

Exercice: solve it!
Solution:

- $T_p = \{a\}$
- $T_q = \{b\}$
- $T_r = \{c\}$
- $T_s = \{a\}$
- $T_t = \{b, c\}$
- $O(a) = \{b, c\}$
- $O(b) = \emptyset$
- $O(c) = \emptyset$
Steensgaard’s pointer analysis
Idea: view pointer assignments as equality constraints
Pointer analysis - Steensgaard’s algorithm

- Steensgaard’s pointer analysis
- Idea: view pointer assignments as equality constraints

- \( p = &x \iff T_p \supseteq \{x\} \)
- \( p = q + o \iff T_p = T_q \)
- \( p = *q \iff T_p = *T_q \iff \forall x \in T_q, T_p = O(x) \)
- \( *p = q \iff *T_p = T_q \iff \forall x \in T_p, O(x) = T_q \)

Question: Is it more or less precise? Why?

Question: Complexity?
Steensgaard’s pointer analysis

Idea: view pointer assignments as equality constraints

- \( p = \& x \iff T_p \supseteq \{ x \} \)
- \( p = q + o \iff T_p = T_q \)
- \( p = *q \iff T_p = *T_q \iff \forall x \in T_q, T_p = O(x) \)
- \( *p = q \iff *T_p = T_q \iff \forall x \in T_p, O(x) = T_q \)

Question: Is it more or less precise? Why?

Question: Complexity?
- Steensgaard is less precise than Andersen’s algorithm
- Each equality constraint is equivalent to 2 inclusion constraints
- Steensgaard’s constraints system include Andersen’s constraints
- Think fix point: once you reached Andersen’s system fix point solution, you will keep growing to satisfy equality constraints
- Complexity: $O(n \log(n))$ (process each constraint once using union-find)
Solution:

- $T_p = T_s = \{a\}$
- $T_q = T_t = T_r = O(a) = \{b, c\}$
- $O(b) = \emptyset$
- $O(c) = \emptyset$
IKOS uses Andersen’s approach

Based on Arnaud Venet’s paper: «A Scalable Nonuniform Pointer Analysis for Embedded Programs», SAS 2004

Compute points-to set (Andersen) and offset (Intervals) for each pointer

\[ \mathbb{D}^\# = P \rightarrow (\mathbb{A} \cup \{ T \}) \times \mathbb{I} \]

- Interprocedural
- Flow insensitive
- Context insensitive
Memory analysis (also called Value analysis) based on a reduced domain product of:

- Numerical domain for integers (by default, intervals)
- Pointer domain
- Null pointer domain
- Uninitialized variable domain
- Floating points are currently ignored

Based on Antoine Mine’s paper: « Field-Sensitive Value Analysis of Embedded C Programs with Union Types and Pointer Arithmetics », LCTES’06

- Interprocedural
- Context sensitive
- Pointer abstract domain
- $\mathbb{D}^\#_p = V \rightarrow (A \cup \{T\}) \times I$
- Pointwise order $\sqsubseteq^\#_p$, Pointwise union $\sqcup^\#_p$
- $(\mathbb{D}^\#_p, \sqsubseteq^\#_p, \sqcup^\#_p)$ is a lattice
- Galois connection $(\alpha_p, \gamma_p)$ with the concrete semantics
- Reduction with the previous flow-insensitive pointer analysis
Abstract operations:

- \([p = \& x] \# (\rho) = \rho [p \rightarrow (\{x\}, [0, 0])]\)
- \([p = q + o] \# (\rho) = \rho [p \rightarrow (\text{addresses}(\rho(q)), \text{offsets}(\rho(q)) + o)\]
- \([*p = q] \# (\rho) = \rho\)
- \([p = *q] \# (\rho) = \rho [p \rightarrow (\top, ]-\infty, +\infty[)]\)
Abstract operations:

- $[p = \&x]#(\rho) = \rho \ [p \rightarrow (\{x\}, [0, 0])]$
- $[p = q + o]#(\rho) = \rho \ [p \rightarrow (\text{addresses}(\rho(q)), \text{offsets}(\rho(q)) + o)]$
- $[*p = q]#(\rho) = \rho$
- $[p = *q]#(\rho) = \rho \ [p \rightarrow (\top, ]-\infty, +\infty[)]$

Questions:

- $[p == q]#(\rho) = ?$
- $[p \neq q]#(\rho) = ?$
Null pointer abstract domain

\[ D_n = \{ \bot, \text{Null}, \text{NonNull}, \top \} \]

\[ D_n^{\#} = \mathbb{V} \rightarrow D_n \]

\[ \bot \sqsubseteq_n \text{Null}, \ bot \sqsubseteq_n \text{NonNull}, \ NULL \sqsubseteq_n \top, \ NonNull \sqsubseteq_n \top \]

\[ \text{Null} \sqcup_n \text{NonNull} = \top \]

\[ (D_n^{\#}, \sqsubseteq_n, \sqcup_n) \text{ is a lattice} \]

Galois connection \((\alpha_n, \gamma_n)\) with the concrete semantics
• Uninitialized variable abstract domain
• $D_u = \{\bot, \text{Init}, \text{Uninit}, \top\}$
• $\mathbb{D}_u^\# = \mathbb{V} \to D_u$
• $\bot \sqsubseteq_u^{\#} \text{Init}, \bot \sqsubseteq_u^{\#} \text{Uninit}, \text{Init} \sqsubseteq_u^{\#} \top, \text{Uninit} \sqsubseteq_u^{\#} \top$
• $\text{Init} \sqcup_u^{\#} \text{Uninit} = \top$
• $(\mathbb{D}_u^\#, \sqsubseteq_u^{\#}, \sqcup_u^{\#})$ is a lattice
• Galois connection $(\alpha_u, \gamma_u)$ with the concrete semantics
Question: how to model the memory?

- LLVM is low level, a byte representation is necessary
- The C language is not type safe and is very permissive on casts

```c
uint64_t x = 1;
uint32_t* p = (uint32_t*)&x;
p += 1;
uint32_t y = *p;
```

By the way, what is $y$'s value?
Question: how to model the memory?

LLVM is low level, a byte representation is necessary.

The C language is not type safe and is very permissive on casts.

We need to model correctly the following code:

```c
uint64_t x = 1;
uint32_t* p = (uint32_t*) &x;
p += 1;
uint32_t y = *p;
```

By the way, what is y’s value?
Memory model from « Formalizing the LLVM Intermediate Representation for Verified Program Transformations », POPL 2012

Memory cell mc = | \text{mb}(\text{size}, \text{byte}) |
\text{mptr}(\text{blk}, \text{offset}, \text{index}) |
\text{muinit}

- Memory state = (N, B, C)
- N : next block id
- B = \mathbb{Z}^+ \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}^+ : block id to block size (bytes)
- C = \mathbb{Z}^+ \times \mathbb{Z}^+ \rightarrow \text{MC} : (block id, offset in bytes) to memory cell
Example:

```c
int* p = (int*) malloc(sizeof(int) + sizeof(int*));
*p = 0x01020304;
int** q = (int**)(p + 1);
*q = p + 2;
```
Example:

```c
int* p = (int*) malloc(sizeof(int) + sizeof(int*));
*p = 0x01020304;
int** q = (int**) (p + 1);
*q = p + 2;
```

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>blk id</th>
<th>offset</th>
<th>memory cell</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>mb(32, 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>mb(32, 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>mb(32, 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>mb(32, 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>mptr(l, 8, 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>mptr(l, 8, 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>mptr(l, 8, 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>mptr(l, 8, 3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By the way, what architecture could it be?
Memory analysis - Memory abstract domain

- Memory abstract domain
- Based on Antoine Mine’s paper: « Field-Sensitive Value Analysis of Embedded C Programs with Union Types and Pointer Arithmetics », LCTES’06
- Idea: abstract memory using cells: $C(\text{address}, \text{offset}, \text{size})$
- Each cell is considered as a variable in the underlying abstract domain
- Cells may overlap
- $C = A \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}^+ \times \mathbb{Z}^+$
- $D_{\text{mem}}^\# = C \times D_{\text{underlying}}^\#$
- In IKOS, $D_{\text{underlying}}^\# = D_{\text{num}}^\# \times D_{\text{ptr}}^\# \times D_{\text{null}}^\# \times D_{\text{unini}}^\#$
- Pointwise partial order, Pointwise union
Abstract operations: forward to $D^\#_{\text{underlying}}$, except memory read and write.

Memory write:
- set to $\perp$ if $p$ is null or uninitialized
- $(\text{points} \_\text{to}, \text{offset}) = \rho(p)$
- $\text{cells} = \text{realize} \_\text{write}(\text{points} \_\text{to}, \text{offset})$
- $\forall c \in \text{cells}, \text{strong} \_\text{update}(c, \text{rhs}) \text{ or } \text{weak} \_\text{update}(c, \text{rhs})$

Memory read:
- set to $\perp$ if $p$ is null or uninitialized
- $(\text{points} \_\text{to}, \text{offset}) = \rho(p)$
- $\text{cells} = \text{realize} \_\text{read}(\text{points} \_\text{to}, \text{offset})$
- $\forall c \in \text{cells}, \text{strong} \_\text{update}(\text{lhs}, c) \text{ or } \text{weak} \_\text{update}(\text{lhs}, c)$
Example:

```c
int* p = (int*) malloc(sizeof(int) + sizeof(int*));
*p = 0x01020304;
int** q = (int**)(p + 1);
*q = p + 2;
```
Memory analysis - Memory abstract domain

Example:

```c
int* p = (int*) malloc(sizeof(int) + sizeof(int*));
*p = 0x01020304;
int** q = (int**)(p + 1);
*q = p + 2;
```

Abstract value at the end:

\[
(malloc \rightarrow \{\{0, 4\}, \{4, 4\}\})
\]

\[
(C(malloc, 0, 4) \rightarrow [0x01020304, 0x01020304])
\]

\[
(C(malloc, 4, 4) \rightarrow (malloc, [8, 8]),
    p \rightarrow (malloc, [0, 0]),
    q \rightarrow (malloc, [4, 4]))
\]

\[
(C(malloc, 4, 4) \rightarrow NonNull, p \rightarrow NonNull, q \rightarrow NonNull)
\]

\[
(C(malloc, 0, 4) \rightarrow Init, C(malloc, 4, 4) \rightarrow Init, p \rightarrow Init, q \rightarrow Init))
\]
static union {
    struct { uint8 al, ah, bl, bh, ... } b;
    struct { uint16 ax, bx, ... } w;
} regs;
regs.w.ax = X; // (1)
if (!regs.b.ah) { // (2)
    regs.b.bl = regs.b.al; // (3)
} else { // (4)
    regs.b.bh = regs.b.al; // (5)
}
// (6)
regs.b.al = X; // (7)
Last step: check for properties at each statement location

Checkers:

- buffer overflow: \( 0 \leq offset \) and \( offset + read\_size \leq buffer\_size \)
- division by zero: \( divisor \neq 0 \)
- null dereference: \( p \neq Null \)
- uninitialized variable: \( v \neq Uninit \)
- prover: \( v \neq 0 \)
Syllabus

1. Introduction
2. IKOS
3. Analyses
4. Miscellaneous
   - Abstract domains implementation
   - Analyzing C++
   - Exception handling
   - Relational abstract domains
   - Function summarization
   - Integer overflow
5. Conclusion
Abstract domains implementation

- Separate domain \((V \rightarrow D)\) are implemented with patricia trees
- Insertion and removal in \(O(\log(n))\)
- Merge in \(O(n)\)
- Transformation in \(O(n)\)
- Very cheap union!
Analyzing C++ is very tricky:

- Heavy chains of function calls because of templates
- The libc++ needs to be modeled
- Need to be precise on pointers for virtual method calls
- Handle exceptions
Analyzing C++ is very tricky:

- Heavy chains of function calls because of templates
- The libc++ needs to be modeled
- Need to be precise on pointers for virtual method calls
- Handle exceptions

Work in progress!
Exception handling

bb_1:
memory[x] = 9
_Z1fv._2 = call __Z14__ikos_unkownv()

*out_bb_1_to_bb_2_icmp_true:
_Z1fv._2 ne 0
_Z1fv._3 = -1

*out_bb_1_to_bb_3_icmp_false:
_Z1fv._2 eq 0
_Z1fv._3 = 0

bb_2:
_Z1fv._5 = call _cxa_allocate_exception(8)
_Z1fv._6 = bitcast _Z1fv._5
memory[_Z1fv._6] = $null
_Z1fv._8 = bitcast _ZTIDn
__v:6 = call _cxa_throw(_Z1fv._5, _Z1fv._8, $null)
unreachable

bb_3:
memory[x] = 0
return

_unified_exit:
Exception handling

bb_8:
main_17 = memory[y]

*_bb_8_split_icmp_false:
main_17 ne 0
main_18 = 0

*_bb_8_split_icmp_true:
main_17 eq 0
main_18 = -1

*out bb_8_merge_icmp:
__v:17 = invoke __Z13__kos_assertb(main_18)

bb_10:
landingpad(main_21)
__v:18 = 0
__v:18 = add(__v:18, 0)
main_22 = extract_elem(main_21, __v:18)
__v:19 = 0
__v:19 = add(__v:19, 8)
main_23 = extract_elem(main_21, __v:19)

bb_11:
main_25 = bitcast _ZTIPv
main_26 = call llvm.eh.typeid_for(main_25)

bb_9:
\[\mathcal{D}_{\text{exc}}^\# = \mathcal{D}^\# \times \mathcal{D}^\#\]

\[\llbracket \text{throw}(e) \rrbracket^\#(N, E) = (\bot, N \cup E)\]

\[\llbracket \text{landingpad}(e) \rrbracket^\#(N, E) = (E, \bot)\]

\[\llbracket v = x \rrbracket^\#(N, E) = (\llbracket v = x \rrbracket^\#(N), E)\]

\[(N_1, E_1) \sqcup^\# (N_2, E_2) = (N_1 \cup N_2, E_1 \cup E_2)\]
Intervals are very imprecise for loops with a non-deterministic bound.

Solution: use a weakly-relational domain, such as the DBM domain.

Difference-Bound Matrices

- Difference-Bound Matrices
- Weakly-relational abstract domain

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
0 & m_{0,1} & m_{0,2} & \cdots & m_{0,n} \\
m_{1,0} & 0 & m_{1,2} & \cdots & m_{1,n} \\
m_{2,0} & m_{2,1} & 0 & \cdots & m_{2,n} \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
m_{n,0} & m_{n,1} & m_{n,2} & \cdots & 0
\end{bmatrix}
\]

- \( m_{i,j} \in \mathbb{Z} \cup \{+\infty\} \)
- \( v_i - v_j \leq m_{j,i} \)
- \( v_0 = 0 \), thus \( v_i \in [-m_{i,0}, m_{0,i}] \)
- Abstract operations require normalization
  - normalization:
    - \( v_i - v_k \leq m_{k,i} \) and
    - \( v_k - v_j \leq m_{j,k} \) \( \Rightarrow \)
    - \( v_i - v_j \leq m_{k,i} + m_{j,k} \)
- cost \( O(n^3) \), \( n \) number of variables
Idea: keep a list of DBMs, where each DBM contains variables that are related to each other.

Union-Find structure to dynamically infer relations among variables

Normalization cost $O(n)$, $n$ number of DBMs
- Idea: keep a list of DBMs, where each DBM contains variables that are related to each other.
- Union-Find structure to dynamically infer relations among variables
- Normalization cost $O(n)$, $n$ number of DBMs
Pointer analysis using function summarization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File</th>
<th>DBMs</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Var Packing</th>
<th>Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>astree-ex</td>
<td>1.01s</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.13s</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>test-1</td>
<td>0.13s</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.03s</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>test-1-unsafe</td>
<td>0.13s</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.02s</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>test-10</td>
<td>0.03s</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.02s</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>test-10-unsafe</td>
<td>0.03s</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.02s</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paparazzi-microjet</td>
<td>3241.14s</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>158.50s</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gen2</td>
<td>&gt; 5h</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>7817.42s</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aeroquad-servo</td>
<td>78.12s</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>1.33s</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aeroquad-new</td>
<td>86.18s</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0.76s</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cornell</td>
<td>447.06s</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>2.64s</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sporesate2-spore-pl</td>
<td>895.45s</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>10.29s</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Other ideas

- Group variables depending on heuristics
- Use the gauge domain
Other ideas

- Group variables depending on heuristics
- Use the gauge domain

Work in progress!
IKOS uses dynamic inlining

Idea: analyse each function only once to build a summary
Problem: call graph cycle

Diagram:
- `main` calls `f`
- `f` calls `g`
- There is a cycle between `g` and `h`, and another cycle between `h` and `w`
Problem: call graph cycle

- Strongly connected component analysis
- Topological order
- Bottom-up analysis (from the leaves to the root)
- Top-down analysis (from the root to the leaves)
Function summarization: Memory analysis

- Need a way to express the effect of a function call on the memory
- More particularly on global variables and pointer parameters
- Relation between the input memory state and the output memory state
- Idea: Introduce *input cells* and *output cells*

\[ x = x + 1 \iff \text{Cell}\{x, 0, 4, Out\} = \text{Cell}\{x, 0, 4, In\} + 1 \]
Buffer overflow analysis using function summarization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File</th>
<th>Inlining</th>
<th>Summaries</th>
<th>Warnings</th>
<th>Errors</th>
<th>Lines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>astree-ex</td>
<td>0.36s</td>
<td>0.57s</td>
<td>2/2</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>22 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>test-1</td>
<td>0.14s</td>
<td>0.16s</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>22 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>test-1-unsafe</td>
<td>0.13s</td>
<td>0.18s</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>2/2</td>
<td>22 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>test-10</td>
<td>0.10s</td>
<td>0.13s</td>
<td>0/2</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>20 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paparazzi</td>
<td>154.03s</td>
<td>110.09s</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>24650 (199)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gen2</td>
<td>307.66s</td>
<td>&gt; 3h</td>
<td>195/?</td>
<td>0/?</td>
<td>22030 (82)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Problem: LLVM integer types are signedness agnostic

Because most instructions are signedness agnostic: add, sub, mul, etc.

How to be sound and precise?

- Intervals with infinite precision: imprecise or unsound
- Suppose integers are unsigned: imprecise
- Suppose integers are signed: imprecise
- Wrapped intervals: Jorge Navas’s paper «Signedness-Agnostic Program Analysis: Precise Integer Bounds for Low-Level Code»
- Domain product: unsigned and signed
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Thank you. Questions?