Static Analysis using Abstract Interpretation

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1 Introduction
   - Software development
   - Safety properties
   - Abstract Interpretation

2 IKOS

3 Analyses

4 Miscellaneous

5 Conclusion
Software development

- Software represent more than half of the development cost of an aircraft
- Regulated by international standards (DO-178 rev. B/C)
Software development

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- Tests
  - Expensive because run on a special hardware
  - Can miss bugs
  - Slow
Software development

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- Regulated by international standards (DO-178 rev. B/C)
- Tests
  - Expensive because run on a special hardware
  - Can miss bugs
  - Slow
- Solution : use static analysis
- NASA V&V program
Safety properties

- **Main objectives**: no runtime errors
  - buffer overflow
  - null dereference
  - division by zero
  - integer overflow

- **Harder objectives**:
  - assertions (pre/post invariants)
  - termination

- certified $\Rightarrow$ soundness is required

- abstract interpretation is a good candidate

- runtime errors can be security vulnerabilities!
Abstract Interpretation

- based on the concrete semantics of your program
- automatic formal proof
- sound approximation of reachable states
Abstract Interpretation

\[ x(t) \]

\[ \text{semantics}(P) \]

Possible trajectories
Abstract Interpretation

Forbidden zone

specification($P$)
Abstract Interpretation

\[ x(t) \]

Forbidden zone

\[ \text{semantics}(P) \subseteq \text{specification}(P) \]
Tests

Using testing

Forbidden zone
Error !!!

Test of a few trajectories

Possible trajectories

Using testing
Abstract Interpretation

Abstraction of the trajectories

\textit{abstraction}(P)
Abstract Interpretation

Forbidden zone

Abstraction of the trajectories

\[
\text{abstraction}(P) \subseteq \text{specification}(P)
\]
Abstract Interpretation

Forbidden zone

Abstraction of the trajectories

\[ \text{semantics}(P) \subseteq \text{abstraction}(P) \subseteq \text{specification}(P) \]
Thank you Pierre Loïc Garoche
Syllabus

1 Introduction

2 IKOS
   - Project
   - Toolchain
   - Demo
   - Results

3 Analyses

4 Miscellaneous

5 Conclusion
The IKOS project

- Inference Kernel for Open Static Analyzers
- C++ library for abstract interpretation
- C/C++ static analyzer
- Target embedded systems
- Analyses:
  - Buffer overflow
  - Division by zero
  - Null dereference
  - Uninitialized variables
  - Prover

https://ti.arc.nasa.gov/opensource/ikos/
Toolchain

- C/C++ code
- clang
- LLVM IR
- ikos-pp
- Optimized LLVM IR
- LLVM opt command + AR pass (-arbos)
- AR in s-expr

IKOS

- Abstract Domains
  - Interval
  - Constants
  - Discrete
  - Congruence
  - Interval + Congruence
  - Octagons
  - Difference Bounds Matrix
  - Pointer Analysis

ikos-pp

- Ikos-pp is an executable that embeds the LLVM opt command. It applies several LLVM built-in optimizations + our own optimization passes to produce an intermediate optimized LLVM IR. Using the optimized LLVM IR, we run LLVM opt command with \texttt{-arbos} option to translate the optimized LLVM IR to AR
- ikos-pp does at least the following optimizations before translating to AR: \texttt{--mem2reg}, \texttt{--loweratomic}, \texttt{--lowerswitch}, and \texttt{--instnamer}

AR Plugin Analyzers

- BOA - buffer overflow analysis
- DBZ - Intra-procedural integer division-by-zero analysis
- UVA - Inter-procedural uninitialized variable + array analysis
- NullPtr - Inter-procedural null dereference pointer analysis

ARBOS

{AR parser, analysis plugin framework}

- Outputs reports to console
- IKOSView: desktop GUI that queries results stored in SQLite3 database
- Integrated into web services (such as continuous build + bug tracking systems)
  - SonarQube – using sonar_runner
  - CodeDX – import results in cppcheck XML format
  - SWAMP – used in cybersecurity

Analysis results
- Low Level Virtual Machine
- Compiler Infrastructure
- Generic assembly language
- Allow language independent optimization
Low Level Virtual Machine
Compiler Infrastructure
Generic assembly language
Allow language independent optimization

C C++ Fortran Ada
x86 ARM PowerPC

llvm bitcode
$ cat test.c

#include <stdio.h>

int main(int argc, char** argv) {
    int a[10];
    int i;
    for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
        a[i] = i;
    }
    printf("%d\n", a[i - 1]);
    printf("%d\n", a[0]);
    return 0;
}
$ clang -c -emit-llvm -O1 -o test.bc test.c
$ opt -S test.bc

define i32 @main(i32, i8** nocapture readnone) local_unnamed_addr #0 {
    %3 = alloca [10 x i32], align 16
    %4 = bitcast [10 x i32]* %3 to i8*
call void @llvm.lifetime.start(i64 40, i8* %4) #3
    br label %5

; <label>:5: ; preds = %5, %2
    %6 = phi i64 [ 0, %2 ], [ %9, %5 ]
    %7 = getelementptr inbounds [10 x i32], [10 x i32]* %3, i64 0, i64 %6
    %8 = trunc i64 %6 to i32
    store i32 %8, i32* %7, align 4
    %9 = add nuw nsw i64 %6, 1
    %10 = icmp eq i64 %9, 10
    br i1 %10, label %11, label %5

; <label>:11: ; preds = %5
    %12 = getelementptr inbounds [10 x i32], [10 x i32]* %3, i64 0, i64 9
    %13 = load i32, i32* %12, align 4
    %14 = tail call i32 (i32, i8*, ...) @__printf_chk(i32 1, i8* getelementptr inbounds ([4 x i8], [4 x i8]* @.str, i64 0, i64 0), i32 %13) #3
    %15 = getelementptr inbounds [10 x i32], [10 x i32]* %3, i64 0, i64 0
    %16 = load i32, i32* %15, align 16
    %17 = tail call i32 (i32, i8*, ...) @__printf_chk(i32 1, i8* getelementptr inbounds ([4 x i8], [4 x i8]* @.str, i64 0, i64 0), i32 %16) #3
call void @llvm.lifetime.end(i64 40, i8* nonnull %4) #3
    ret i32 0
}
%2:
%3 = alloca [10 x i32], align 16
%4 = bitcast [10 x i32]* %3 to i8*
call void @llvm.lifetime.start(i64 40, i8* %4) #3
br label %5

%5:
%6 = phi i64 [ 0, %2 ], [ %9, %5 ]
%7 = getelementptr inbounds [10 x i32], [10 x i32]* %3, i64 0, i64 %6
%8 = trunc i64 %6 to i32
store i32 %8, i32* %7, align 4, !tbaa !3
%9 = add nuw nsw i64 %6, 1
%10 = icmp eq i64 %9, 10
br i1 %10, label %11, label %5

%11:
%12 = getelementptr inbounds [10 x i32], [10 x i32]* %3, i64 0, i64 9
%13 = load i32, i32* %12, align 4, !tbaa !3
%14 = tail call i32 (i32, i8*, ...) @__printf_chk(i32 1, i8* getelementptr...
inbounds ([4 x i8], [4 x i8]* @.str, i64 0, i64 0), i32 %13) #3
%15 = getelementptr inbounds [10 x i32], [10 x i32]* %3, i64 0, i64 0
%16 = load i32, i32* %15, align 16, !tbaa !3
%17 = tail call i32 (i32, i8*, ...) @__printf_chk(i32 1, i8* getelementptr...
inbounds ([4 x i8], [4 x i8]* @.str, i64 0, i64 0), i32 %16) #3
call void @llvm.lifetime.end(i64 40, i8* nonnull %4) #3
ret i32 0
IKOS pre-processor

Run llvm optimization passes:
- mem2reg : SSA Form
- globaldce : Dead Code Elimination
- globalopt : Global Variable Optimizer
- simplifycfg : Control Flow Graph Optimizer
- scalarrepl : Scalar Replacement of Aggregates
- sccp : Sparse Conditional Constant Propagation
- loop-simplify : Canonical Form for Loops
- lcssa : Loop Closed SSA Form
- loop-deletion : Dead Loop Elimination
- lowerinvoke : Lower Invoke Instructions
- lowerswitch : Lower Switch Instructions

Run home made llvm passes:
- Lower Global Variable Initialization
- Lower Constant Expressions
- Lower Select Instructions
- Name Values
Abstract Representation

Major differences with llvm:
- Branching instructions are translated into assertions
- Memory instructions are byte oriented
- Some instructions are removed

Translation from llvm to AR using a llvm pass

Text representation using s-expressions
Load an Abstract Representation file (.ar) and apply passes
Similar to llvm opt command
IKOS passes :
- ps-opt : Optimize pointer shift statements
- branching-opt : Optimize the Control Flow Graph
- inline-init-gv : Inline initialization of global variables in main
- unify-exit-nodes : Unify exit nodes
- analyzer : Analyzer pass
bb 1:
main. 1 = allocate(1, [10 x i32])
main.i.0 = 0
main.i.0 slt 10
main._8 = -1

*out_bb_2_to_bb_3_icmp_true:
main.i.0 slt 10
main._8 = -1

bb 3:
main. 10 = sext main.i.0
__v:7 = mul(4, main. 10)
main. 11 = ptr_shift(main. 1, __v:7)
memory[main. 11] = main.i.0

bb 4:
main. 14 = add(main.i.0, 1)
main.i.0 = main. 14

*out_bb_2_to_bb_5_icmp_false:
main.i.0 sge 10
main. 8 = 0

bb 5:
main. 17 = sub(main.i.0, 1)
main. 18 = sext main. 17
__v:10 = mul(4, main. 18)
main. 19 = ptr_shift(main. 1, __v:10)
main. 20 = memory[main. 19]
main. 21 = ptr_shift(.str, 0)
main. 22 = call printf(main. 21, main. 20)
main. 24 = memory[main. 1]
main. 25 = ptr_shift(.str, 0)
main. 26 = call printf(main. 25, main. 24)
return 0
Liveness analysis

Pointer analysis

Memory analysis combining:
  - Numerical analysis
  - Pointer analysis
  - Uninitialized variable analysis
  - Null pointer analysis

Checkers:
  - buffer overflow
  - division by zero
  - null dereference
  - uninitialized variables
  - assertion prover

Store results in a SQLite database
- The toolchain is launched via a python script
- Generate reports in different formats:
  - Console (gcc style)
  - JSON
  - XML
  - etc.
- Output database reusable (using *ikos-render*)
Toolchain

- **C/C++ code**
- **clang**
- **LLVM IR**

ikos-pp

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- ikos-pp does at least the following optimizations before translating to AR: `-mem2reg`, `-loweratomic`, `-lowerswitch`, and `-instnamer`

**IKOS**

- Abstract Domains
  - Interval
  - Constants
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  - Interval + Congruence
  - Octagons
  - Difference Bounds Matrix
  - Pointer Analysis

**AR Plugin Analyzers**

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**ARBOS**

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**Tool Chain Execution Flow**

- Optimized LLVM IR
- **LLVM opt command + AR pass (-arbos)**
- **AR in s-expr**
- **Analysis results**
Demo.
Results

Aeroquad - The Open Source Quadcopter

- **Code size:**
  - lines of code: 167k
  - bitcode instructions: 4634

- **Time stats:**
  - arbos: 1 min 51.888 sec
  - ikos-pp: 0.126 sec
  - llvm-to-ar: 0.898 sec

- **Summary:**
  - number of checks: 2908
  - number of unreachable checks: 46 (1.6%)
  - number of safe checks: 2688 (92.4%)
  - number of definite unsafe checks: 0
  - number of warnings: 174 (5.9%)
Aeroquad - The Open Source Quadcopter

- Writes at specific addresses:
  
  `*(0x42) = x;`

- False positives on loops with casts:
  
  ```
  for (byte axis = 0; axis < 3; axis++) {
      accelSample[axis] = 0;
  }
  ```

- Tricky array indexing:
  
  ```
  static byte receiverPin[6] =
  {2, 5, 6, 4, 7, 8};
  pinData[receiverPin[channel]].edge = FALLING_EDGE;
  ```
Results

Paparazzi - Autopilot System for UAV

- Code size:
  - lines of code: 23k
  - bitcode instructions: 4436

- Time stats:
  - arbos: 1 min 2.930 sec
  - ikos-pp: 0.132 sec
  - llvm-to-ar: 1.111 sec

- Summary:
  - number of checks: 2372
  - number of unreachable checks: 352 (14.8%)
  - number of safe checks: 2020 (85.2%)
  - number of definite unsafe checks: 0
  - number of warnings: 0
Results

GEN2

- Code size:
  - lines of code: 13k
  - bitcode instructions: 5340

- Time stats:
  - arbos: 2 min 16.161 sec
  - ikos-pp: 0.199 sec
  - llvm-to-ar: 1.358 sec

- Summary:
  - number of checks: 3121
  - number of unreachable checks: 0
  - number of safe checks: 3028 (97.1%)
  - number of definite unsafe checks: 0
  - number of warnings: 93 (2.9%)
MNAV

- **Code size:**
  - lines of code: 159k
  - bitcode instructions: 2145

- **Time stats:**
  - arbos: 12.950 sec
  - ikos-pp: 0.056 sec
  - llvm-to-ar: 0.468 sec

- **Summary:**
  - number of checks: 430
  - number of unreachable checks: 17 (3.9%)
  - number of safe checks: 330 (76.7%)
  - number of definite unsafe checks: 0
  - number of warnings: 83 (19.3%)
CASS

- **Time stats**:  
  - arbos: 1 day 2 hour 17.463 sec  
  - ikos-pp: 13.234 sec  
  - llvm-to-ar: 24.431 sec

- **Summary**:  
  - number of checks: 254452  
  - number of unreachable checks: 33300 (13.0%)  
  - number of safe checks: 172521 (67.8%)  
  - number of definite unsafe checks: 0  
  - number of warnings: 48631 (19.1%)
FLTz - flight simulator with OpenGL displays

- **Code size:**
  - lines of code: 91k
  - bitcode instructions: 14501

- **Time stats:**
  - arbos: 5 day 9 hour 27 min 41.459 sec
  - ikos-pp: 25.211 sec
  - llvm-to-ar: 1 min 2.661 sec

- **Summary:**
  - number of checks: 1302470
  - number of unreachable checks: 72409 (5.5%)
  - number of safe checks: 153312 (11.7%)
  - number of definite unsafe checks: 19 (0.001%)
  - number of warnings: 1076730 (82.6%)
1 Introduction

2 IKOS

3 Analyses
   - Liveness analysis
   - Pointer analysis
   - Memory analysis
   - Property checking

4 Miscellaneous

5 Conclusion
Liveness analysis

- Mark *live* and *dead* variables after each basic block
- Dataflow analysis
- Used to clean up variables in the abstract domain
- Problem for relationnal domains
Liveness analysis - Algorithm

- **Kill - Gen algorithm**
- $GEN[b]$ : set of variables used in $b$ before any assignment
- $KILL[b]$ : set of variables that are assigned in $b$
Liveness analysis - Algorithm

- Kill - Gen algorithm
- $GEN[b]$ : set of variables used in $b$ before any assignment
- $KILL[b]$ : set of variables that are assigned in $b$

- $GEN[stmt : y \leftarrow f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)] = \{x_1, \ldots, x_n\}$
- $KILL[stmt : y \leftarrow f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)] = \{y\}$
Liveness analysis - Algorithm

- **Kill - Gen algorithm**
- $GEN[b]$ : set of variables used in $b$ before any assignment
- $KILL[b]$ : set of variables that are assigned in $b$

- $GEN[stmt : y \leftarrow f(x_1, \cdots, x_n)] = \{x_1, \ldots, x_n\}$
- $KILL[stmt : y \leftarrow f(x_1, \cdots, x_n)] = \{y\}$

- $LIVE_{in}[b] = GEN[b] \cup (LIVE_{out}[b] - KILL[b])$
- $LIVE_{out}[b] = \bigcup_{p \in succ[b]} LIVE_{in}[p]$
- $LIVE_{out}[final] = \emptyset$
Liveness analysis - Example

bb 4:
main. 14 = add(main.i.0, 1)
main.i.0 = main. 14

out_bb_2_to_bb_3_icmp_true:
main.i.0 slt 10
main._8 = -1

bb 3:
main. 10 = sext main.i.0
_v:7 = mul(4, main. 10)
main. 11 = ptr_shift(main. 1, _v:7)
memory<main. 11> = main.i.0

bb 1:
main. 1 = allocate(1, [10 x i32])
main.i.0 = 0
main.i.0 slt 10
main._8 = -1

out_bb_2_to_bb_5_icmp_false:
main.i.0 sge 10
main._8 = 0

bb 5:
return 0
- Pointer analysis: What memory locations can a pointer expression refer to?
- Alias analysis: Are two pointers referring to the same locations?
- Intraprocedural vs Interprocedural
- Flow sensitive vs Flow insensitive
- Context sensitive vs Context insensitive
- How to model memory locations?
- Global variables: use symbolic names (e.g., $g$)
- Local variables: use symbolic names (e.g., $main.x$)
- Dynamically allocated memory: use symbolic names?
  - Problem: potentially unbounded locations (think about a loop)
  - Solution: use symbolic names with an instruction counter (e.g., $blk(l, \lambda)$)
Andersen’s pointer analysis

For each pointer $p$, we call $T_p$ the set of memory locations pointed by $p$

Goal: find $T_p$ for each pointer $p$

Idea: view pointer assignments as subset constraints

Complexity: $O(n^3)$, worst case $O(n^4)$
Andersen’s pointer analysis

For each pointer $p$, we call $T_p$ the set of memory locations pointed by $p$

Goal: find $T_p$ for each pointer $p$

Idea: view pointer assignments as subset constraints

Complexity: $O(n^3)$, worst case $O(n^4)$

- $p = \& x \iff T_p \supseteq \{x\}$
- $p = q + o \iff T_p \supseteq T_q$
- $p = *q \iff T_p \supseteq *T_q \iff \forall x \in T_q, T_p \supseteq O(x)$
- $*p = q \iff *T_p \supseteq T_q \iff \forall x \in T_p, O(x) \supseteq T_q$
Andersen’s pointer analysis

For each pointer \( p \), we call \( T_p \) the set of memory locations pointed by \( p \)

Goal: find \( T_p \) for each pointer \( p \)

Idea: view pointer assignments as subset constraints

Complexity: \( O(n^3) \), worst case \( O(n^4) \)

\[
\begin{align*}
  p = \& x & \iff T_p \supseteq \{x\} \\
  p = q + o & \iff T_p \supseteq T_q \\
  p = *q & \iff T_p \supseteq *T_q \iff \forall x \in T_q, \ T_p \supseteq O(x) \\
  *p = q & \iff *T_p \supseteq T_q \iff \forall x \in T_p, O(x) \supseteq T_q
\end{align*}
\]

How to solve the constraints system? A fix point, of course!
Example:

- $p = &a$
- $q = &b$
- $*p = q$
- $r = &c$
- $s = p$
- $t = *p$
- $*s = r$
Example:

- $p = \& a \iff T_p \supseteq \{a\}$
- $q = \& b \iff T_q \supseteq \{b\}$
- $*p = q \iff *T_p \supseteq T_q$
- $r = \& c \iff T_r \supseteq \{c\}$
- $s = p \iff T_s \supseteq T_p$
- $t = *p \iff T_t \supseteq *T_p$
- $*s = r \iff *T_s \supseteq T_r$

Exercice: solve it!
Solution:

- $T_p = \{a\}$
- $T_q = \{b\}$
- $T_r = \{c\}$
- $T_s = \{a\}$
- $T_t = \{b, c\}$
- $O(a) = \{b, c\}$
- $O(b) = \emptyset$
- $O(c) = \emptyset$
Steensgaard’s pointer analysis

Idea: view pointer assignments as equality constraints
Steensgaard’s pointer analysis
Idea: view pointer assignments as equality constraints

- $p = \& x \iff T_p \supseteq \{x\}$
- $p = q + o \iff T_p = T_q$
- $p = \ast q \iff T_p = \ast T_q \iff \forall x \in T_q, T_p = O(x)$
- $\ast p = q \iff \ast T_p = T_q \iff \forall x \in T_p, O(x) = T_q$
Steensgaard’s pointer analysis

Idea: view pointer assignments as equality constraints

- $p = \& x \iff T_p \supseteq \{x\}$
- $p = q + o \iff T_p = T_q$
- $p = *q \iff T_p = *T_q \iff \forall x \in T_q, T_p = O(x)$
- $*p = q \iff *T_p = T_q \iff \forall x \in T_p, O(x) = T_q$

Question: Is it more or less precise? Why?

Question: Complexity?
Steensgaard is less precise than Andersen’s algorithm
Each equality constraint is equivalent to 2 inclusion constraints
Steensgaard’s constraints system include Andersen’s constraints
Think fix point: once you reached Andersen’s system fix point solution, you will keep growing to satisfy equality constraints
Complexity: $O(n \log(n))$ (process each constraint once using union-find)
Solution:

- $T_p = T_s = \{ a \}$
- $T_q = T_t = T_r = O(a) = \{ b, c \}$
- $O(b) = \emptyset$
- $O(c) = \emptyset$
IKOS uses Andersen’s approach

Based on Arnaud Venet’s paper: « A Scalable Nonuniform Pointer Analysis for Embedded Programs », SAS 2004

Compute points-to set (Andersen) and offset (Intervals) for each pointer

\[ D^# = \mathcal{P} \rightarrow (\mathbb{A} \cup \{T\}) \times I \]

- Interprocedural
- Flow insensitive
- Context insensitive
Memory analysis (also called Value analysis) based on a reduced domain product of:

- Numerical domain for integers (by default, intervals)
- Pointer domain
- Null pointer domain
- Uninitialized variable domain
- Floating points are currently ignored

Based on Antoine Mine’s paper: « Field-Sensitive Value Analysis of Embedded C Programs with Union Types and Pointer Arithmetics », LCTES’06

- Interprocedural
- Context sensitive
Memory analysis - Pointer domain

- Pointer abstract domain
- $\mathbb{D}_p^\# = V \rightarrow (A \cup \{T\}) \times I$
- Pointwise order $\sqsubseteq_p^\#$, Pointwise union $\sqcup_p^\#$
- $(\mathbb{D}_p^\#, \sqsubseteq_p^\#, \sqcup_p^\#)$ is a lattice
- Galois connection $(\alpha_p, \gamma_p)$ with the concrete semantics
- Reduction with the previous flow-insensitive pointer analysis
Abstract operations:

- $\llbracket p = \& x \rrbracket \#(\rho) = \rho \ [p \rightarrow (\{x\}, [0, 0])]$
- $\llbracket p = q + o \rrbracket \#(\rho) = \rho \ [p \rightarrow (\text{addresses}(\rho(q)), \text{offsets}(\rho(q)) + o)]$
- $\llbracket *p = q \rrbracket \#(\rho) = \rho$
- $\llbracket p = *q \rrbracket \#(\rho) = \rho \ [p \rightarrow (\top, ]-\infty, +\infty[)]$
Abstract operations:

- \([p = \&x]^\#(\rho) = \rho \ [p \rightarrow (\{x\}, [0, 0])]\)
- \([p = q + o]^\#(\rho) = \rho \ [p \rightarrow (\text{addresses}(\rho(q)), \text{offsets}(\rho(q)) + o)]\)
- \([*p = q]^\#(\rho) = \rho\)
- \([p = *q]^\#(\rho) = \rho \ [p \rightarrow (\top, ]-\infty, +\infty[)]\)

Question: \([p == q]^\#(\rho) = ?\)

Question: \([p \neq q]^\#(\rho) = ?\)
Null pointer abstract domain

- $D_n = \{ \bot, \text{Null}, \text{NonNull}, \top \}$
- $\mathbb{D}_n^\# = \mathbb{V} \to D_n$
- $\bot \sqsubseteq_n \text{Null}, \bot \sqsubseteq_n \text{NonNull}, \text{Null} \sqsubseteq_n \top, \text{NonNull} \sqsubseteq_n \top$
- $\text{Null} \sqcup_n \text{NonNull} = \top$
- $(\mathbb{D}_n^\#, \sqsubseteq_n, \sqcup_n)$ is a lattice
- Galois connection $(\alpha_n, \gamma_n)$ with the concrete semantics
• Uninitialized variable abstract domain

• \( D_u = \{ \bot, \text{Init}, \text{Uninit}, \top \} \)

• \( \mathbb{D}_u^\# = \mathbb{V} \rightarrow D_u \)

• \( \bot \sqsubseteq_u \text{Init}, \bot \sqsubseteq_u \text{Uninit}, \text{Init} \sqsubseteq_u \top, \text{Uninit} \sqsubseteq_u \top \)

• \( \text{Init} \sqcup_u \text{Uninit} = \top \)

• \( (\mathbb{D}_u^\#, \sqsubseteq_u, \sqcup_u^\#) \) is a lattice

• Galois connection \( (\alpha_u, \gamma_u) \) with the concrete semantics
Question: how to model the memory?

- LLVM is low level, a byte representation is necessary.
- The C language is not type safe and is very permissive on casts.

By the way, what is y's value?
Question: how to model the memory?

- LLVM is low level, a byte representation is necessary
- The C language is not type safe and is very permissive on casts

We need to model correctly the following code:

```c
uint64_t x = 1;
uint32_t* p = (uint32_t*) &x;
p += 1;
uint32_t y = *p;
```

By the way, what is y’s value?
Memory model from « Formalizing the LLVM Intermediate Representation for Verified Program Transformations », POPL 2012

Memory cell \( mc = \) | \( mb(\text{size}, \text{byte}) \) |
| \( mptr(\text{blk}, \text{offset}, \text{index}) \) |
| \( \text{muinit} \)

- Memory state = \((N, B, C)\)
- \( N \) : next block id
- \( B = \mathbb{Z}^+ \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}^+ \) : block id to block size (bytes)
- \( C = \mathbb{Z}^+ \times \mathbb{Z}^+ \rightarrow \mathcal{MC} \) : (block id, offset in bytes) to memory cell
Example:

```c
int* p = (int*) malloc(sizeof(int) + sizeof(int*));
*p = 0x01020304;
int** q = (int**)(p + 1);
*q = p + 2;
```
Memory analysis - Memory model

Example:

```c
int* p = (int*) malloc(sizeof(int) + sizeof(int*));
*p = 0x01020304;
int** q = (int**)(p + 1);
*q = p + 2;
```

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>blk id</th>
<th>offset</th>
<th>memory cell</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>mb(32, 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>mb(32, 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>mb(32, 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>mb(32, 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>mptr(l, 8, 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>mptr(l, 8, 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>mptr(l, 8, 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>mptr(l, 8, 3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By the way, what architecture could it be?
Memory abstract domain

Based on Antoine Mine’s paper: « Field-Sensitive Value Analysis of Embedded C Programs with Union Types and Pointer Arithmetics », LCTES’06

Idea: abstract memory using cells: $C(\text{address}, \text{offset}, \text{size})$

Each cell is considered as a variable in the underlying abstract domain

Cells may overlap

$C = A \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}^+ \times \mathbb{Z}^+$

$D^\#_{\text{mem}} = C \times D^\#_{\text{underlying}}$

In IKOS, $D^\#_{\text{underlying}} = D^\#_{\text{num}} \times D^\#_{\text{ptr}} \times D^\#_{\text{null}} \times D^\#_{\text{unini}}$

Pointwise partial order, Pointwise union
Abstract operations: forward to $\mathbb{D}^\#_{\text{underlying}}$, except memory read and write.

Memory write:
- set to $\bot$ if $p$ is null or uninitialized
- $(\text{points\_to}, \text{offset}) = \rho(p)$
- $\text{cells} = \text{realize\_write}(\text{points\_to}, \text{offset})$
- $\forall c \in \text{cells}, \text{strong\_update}(c, \text{rhs})$ or $\text{weak\_update}(c, \text{rhs})$

Memory read:
- set to $\bot$ if $p$ is null or uninitialized
- $(\text{points\_to}, \text{offset}) = \rho(p)$
- $\text{cells} = \text{realize\_read}(\text{points\_to}, \text{offset})$
- $\forall c \in \text{cells}, \text{strong\_update}(\text{lhs}, c)$ or $\text{weak\_update}(\text{lhs}, c)$
Example:

```c
int* p = (int*) malloc(sizeof(int) + sizeof(int*));
*p = 0x01020304;
int** q = (int**)(p + 1);
*q = p + 2;
```
Example:

```c
int* p = (int*) malloc(sizeof(int) + sizeof(int*));
*p = 0x01020304;
int** q = (int**)(p + 1);
*q = p + 2;
```

Abstract value at the end:

- `(malloc → {{0, 4}, {4, 4}})`
- `(C(malloc, 0, 4) → [0x01020304, 0x01020304])`  
- `(C(malloc, 4, 4) → (malloc, [8, 8]), p → (malloc, [0, 0]), q → (malloc, [4, 4]))`
- `(C(malloc, 4, 4) → NonNull, p → NonNull, q → NonNull)`
- `(C(malloc, 0, 4) → Init, C(malloc, 4, 4) → Init, p → Init, q → Init))`
static union {
    struct { uint8 al, ah, bl, bh, ... } b;
    struct { uint16 ax, bx, ... } w;
} regs;
regs.w.ax = X; // (1)
if (!regs.b.ah) { // (2)
    regs.b.bl = regs.b.al; // (3)
} else { // (4)
    regs.b.bh = regs.b.al; // (5)
}
// (6)
regs.b.al = X; // (7)
Memory analysis - Memory abstract domain

1. (1) 
   - ax
   - 0 1 2 3

2. (2)

3. (3)
   - ax
   - al ah bl
   - 0 1 2 3

4. (4)
   - ah
   - 0 1 2 3

5. (5)
   - ax
   - al ah bh
   - 0 1 2 3

6. (6)
   - ax
   - al ah bl bh
   - 0 1 2 3

7. (7)
   - al ah bl bh
   - 0 1 2 3
Last step: check for properties at each statement location

Checkers:
- buffer overflow: \( 0 \leq offset \) and \( offset + read\_size \leq buffer\_size \)
- division by zero: \( divisor \neq 0 \)
- null dereference: \( p \neq Null \)
- uninitialized variable: \( v \neq Uninit \)
- prover: \( v \neq 0 \)
1 Introduction

2 IKOS

3 Analyses

4 Miscellaneous
   • Abstract domains implementation
   • Analyzing C++
   • Exception handling
   • Relational abstract domains
   • Function summarization
   • Integer overflow

5 Conclusion
Abstract domains implementation

- Separate domain \((\mathbb{V} \rightarrow \mathbb{D})\) are implemented with patricia trees
- Insertion and removal in \(O(\log(n))\)
- Merge in \(O(n)\)
- Transformation in \(O(n)\)
- Very cheap union!
Analyzing C++ is very tricky:

- Heavy chains of function calls because of templates
- The libc++ needs to be modeled
- Need to be precise on pointers for virtual method calls
- Handle exceptions
Analyzing C++ is very tricky:

- Heavy chains of function calls because of templates
- The libc++ needs to be modeled
- Need to be precise on pointers for virtual method calls
- Handle exceptions

Work in progress!
Exception handling

bb_1:
memory[x] = 9
_Z1fv._2 = call _Z14__ikos_unknownv()

*out_bb_1_to_bb_2_icmp_true:
_Z1fv._2 ne 0
_Z1fv._3 = -1

*out_bb_1_to_bb_3_icmp_false:
_Z1fv._2 eq 0
_Z1fv._3 = 0

bb_2:
_Z1fv._5 = call __cxa_allocate_exception(8)
_Z1fv._6 = bitcast _Z1fv._5
memory[_Z1fv._6] = $null
_Z1fv._8 = bitcast _ZTIDn
__v:6 = call __cxa_throw(_Z1fv._5, _Z1fv._8, $null)
unreachable

bb_3:
memory[x] = 0
return

_unified_exit:

- $D_{\text{exc}}^\# = D^\# \times D^\#$
- $\llbracket \text{throw}(e) \rrbracket^\#(N, E) = (\bot, N \cup E)$
- $\llbracket \text{landingpad}(e) \rrbracket^\#(N, E) = (E, \bot)$
- $\llbracket v = x \rrbracket^\#(N, E) = (\llbracket v = x \rrbracket^\#(N), E)$
- $(N_1, E_1) \sqcup^\# (N_2, E_2) = (N_1 \cup N_2, E_1 \cup E_2)$
Intervals are very imprecise for loops with a non-deterministic bound

Solution: use a weakly-relational domain, such as the DBM domain

Difference-Bound Matrices

- Difference-Bound Matrices
- Weakly-relational abstract domain

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
0 & m_{0,1} & m_{0,2} & \ldots & m_{0,n} \\
m_{1,0} & 0 & m_{1,2} & \ldots & m_{1,n} \\
m_{2,0} & m_{2,1} & 0 & \ldots & m_{2,n} \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
m_{n,0} & m_{n,1} & m_{n,2} & \ldots & 0
\end{bmatrix}
\]

- \( m_{i,j} \in \mathbb{Z} \cup \{+\infty\} \)
- \( v_i - v_j \leq m_{j,i} \)
- \( v_0 = 0 \), thus \( v_i \in [-m_{i,0}, m_{0,i}] \)
- Abstract operations require normalization
  - normalization:
    - \( v_i - v_k \leq m_{k,i} \) and
    - \( v_k - v_j \leq m_{j,k} \Rightarrow v_i - v_j \leq m_{k,i} + m_{j,k} \)
    - cost \( O(n^3) \), \( n \) number of variables
- Idea: keep a list of DBMs, where each DBM contains variables that are related to each other.
- Union-Find structure to dynamically infer relations among variables.
- Normalization cost $O(n)$, $n$ number of DBMs.
- Idea: keep a list of DBMs, where each DBM contains variables that are related to each other.
- Union-Find structure to dynamically infer relations among variables
- Normalization cost $O(n)$, $n$ number of DBMs

```
DBM 4
{x, y, u, v, w}

DBM 2
{z}
```

Diagram:

```
x
<p>| |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|   |  y
|   |  u
|   |  w
|   |  v
|   |  z
```
Pointer analysis using function summarization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File</th>
<th>DBMs</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Var Packing</th>
<th>Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>astree-ex</td>
<td>1.01s</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.13s</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>test-1</td>
<td>0.13s</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.03s</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>test-1-unsafe</td>
<td>0.13s</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.02s</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>test-10</td>
<td>0.03s</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.02s</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>test-10-unsafe</td>
<td>0.03s</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.02s</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paparazzi-microjet</td>
<td>3241.14s</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>158.50s</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gen2</td>
<td>&gt; 5h</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>7817.42s</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aeroquad-servo</td>
<td>78.12s</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>1.33s</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aeroquad-new</td>
<td>86.18s</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0.76s</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cornell</td>
<td>447.06s</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>2.64s</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sporesate2-spore-pl</td>
<td>895.45s</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>10.29s</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Other ideas

- Group variables depending on heuristics
- Use the gauge domain
Other ideas

- Group variables depending on heuristics
- Use the gauge domain

Work in progress!
IKOS uses dynamic inlining

Idea: analyse each function only once to build a summary
Problem: call graph cycle

```
main
f  g
h  w
```
- Problem: call graph cycle

- Strongly connected component analysis
- Topological order
- Bottom-up analysis (from the leaves to the root)
- Top-down analysis (from the root to the leaves)
Need a way to express the effect of a function call on the memory
More particularly on global variables and pointer parameters
Relation between the input memory state and the output memory state
Idea: Introduce \textit{input cells} and \textit{output cells}

\[ x = x + 1 \Longleftrightarrow \text{Cell}\{x, 0, 4, Out\} = \text{Cell}\{x, 0, 4, In\} + 1 \]
Buffer overflow analysis using function summarization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>File</th>
<th>Inlining</th>
<th>Summaries</th>
<th>Warnings</th>
<th>Errors</th>
<th>Lines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>astree-ex</td>
<td>0.36s</td>
<td>0.57s</td>
<td>2/2</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>22 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>test-1</td>
<td>0.14s</td>
<td>0.16s</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>22 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>test-1-unsafe</td>
<td>0.13s</td>
<td>0.18s</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>2/2</td>
<td>22 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>test-10</td>
<td>0.10s</td>
<td>0.13s</td>
<td>0/2</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>20 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paparazzi</td>
<td>154.03s</td>
<td>110.09s</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>24650 (199)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gen2</td>
<td>307.66s</td>
<td>&gt; 3h</td>
<td>195/?</td>
<td>0/?</td>
<td>22030 (82)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Problem: LLVM integer types are signedness agnostic.

Because most instructions are signedness agnostic: add, sub, mul, etc.

How to be sound and precise?

- Intervals with infinite precision: imprecise or unsound
- Suppose integers are unsigned: imprecise
- Suppose integers are signed: imprecise
- Wrapped intervals: Jorge Navas’s paper « Signedness-Agnostic Program Analysis: Precise Integer Bounds for Low-Level Code »
- Domain product: unsigned and signed
1. Introduction

2. IKOS

3. Analyses

4. Miscellaneous

5. Conclusion
Thank you. Questions?