Radiation Effects: Overview for Space Environment Specialists

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# Key to Abbreviations and Symbols

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>DSEE</td>
<td>Destructive single-event effect</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCR</td>
<td>Galactic cosmic ray</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPU</td>
<td>Graphics processing unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>Integrated circuit</td>
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<tr>
<td>I/O</td>
<td>Input/output</td>
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<tr>
<td>LET</td>
<td>Linear energy transfer</td>
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<tr>
<td>p⁺</td>
<td>Proton</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEB</td>
<td>Single-event burnout</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEE</td>
<td>Single-event effect</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEGR</td>
<td>Single-event gate rupture</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEL</td>
<td>Single-event latchup</td>
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<tr>
<td>SV</td>
<td>Sensitive volume</td>
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<tr>
<td>VDS</td>
<td>Drain-source voltage</td>
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<tr>
<td>WC</td>
<td>Worst case</td>
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<tr>
<td>xstr</td>
<td>Transistor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Z</td>
<td>Ion atomic number</td>
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Radiation Effects and the Space Environment

• Motivation: Mike Xapsos 2016 NSREC paper proposed replacing conventional margin-based RHA approach w/ choice of environment confidence +success probability for part
  • Issue: Margin covers a lot of sins in addition to uncertainty on the environment
  • What are implications for TID and SEE testing and analysis of an idea that makes sense?

• Types of Radiation Effects and Environments Important for Them
  • Cumulative—Total Ionizing Dose (TID) and Displacement Damage Dose (DDD)
  • Single-Event Effects (SEE)
    • Destructive SEE
    • Nondestructive SEE

• Sources of Error
  • Cumulative Effects
  • SEE

• Hardness Assurance Methodologies
  • TID and DDD
  • SEE

One Slide: Cumulative Effects of Radiation Environments

- Main particles of concern are protons and electrons
  - Trapped proton, Cumulative Solar Protons
  - Trapped electrons (Earth, Jovian...)
  - GCR, solar heavy ion fluxes too low to worry about
  - Transported environment important

- Cumulative effect, so short-term fluctuations not a concern except for short missions (<2 years)

- Greater concern on longer missions

- Hardness Assurance Approach
  - Test sample representative of flight lot w/ x/γ rays
  - Looks like wear-out (failure rate increases w/ dose)
    - Overtest and RDM effective mitigations by ensuring failure rate remains low
  - Redundancy ineffective as a mitigation

- Affects mainly minority-carrier devices

- Main concern: protons + electrons for some devices
  - Trapped proton, Cumulative Solar Protons
  - Trapped electrons (Earth, Jovian...)
  - GCR, solar heavy ion fluxes too low to worry about

- Cumulative effect, so short-term fluctuations not a concern except for short missions (<2 years)

- Greater concern on longer missions

- Hardness Assurance approach similar to TID
  - Less dependence on bias, dose rate, etc
  - Less part-to-part variation...usually

One Slide: Single-Event Effects (SEE)

- SEE caused by ionizing particle traversing device SV
  - Direct ionization—particle from mission environment
    - GCR heavy-ion, solar heavy-ion environments
    - Charge depends on linear energy transfer (LET) and path length
  - Indirect ionization—secondary particle produced by particle (usually proton) from mission environment
    - Solar and Trapped proton environments
  - Low-energy proton (direct ionization)
    - Transported environment for deep-submicron CMOS
    - Multiple scattering important for mechanism
  - Poisson process, so constant probability (per ion)

- Consequences of SEE
  - Momentary disturbance of device output (SET)
  - Corruption of one or more bits of data (SEU)
  - Corruption of large amounts of data (block error)
  - Permanent corruption of data bit (stuck bit)
  - Recoverable loss of device functionality (SEFI)
  - Catastrophic failure

- RHA approach: Any SEE can happen any time—Need to test to expose susceptibilities, not to the environment
  - $10^7$ ions/cm$^2$ ~913 years at ISS (LET>1 MeVcm$^2$/mg)
  - ~347 years at GEO (LET>1 MeVcm$^2$/mg)

- Constant failure rate → redundancy is effective mitigation
  - Need worst case (e.g. WC SPE) SEE rates as well as mean rates
    - CRÈME-96 has used October ‘89 SPE
    - Ability to get Solar Event LET spectra vs. confidence to feed into CRÈME-96 would be interesting
  - Redundancy implemented at all levels—cell to spacecraft
    - Must pay in currency of the realm—bits for bits, functional parts to maintain availability, cold spares to improve survivability

RHA is About Error Sources and Control

• Space Environment
  • Models only good if data underlying them is representative of current conditions
  • Environment is constantly fluctuating—not reflected in all models
  • Goodness of models depends on mission duration, shielding, etc.

• Sample Variation (part-to-part, lot-to-lot, part-type-to-part-type)
  • Basic question: Is test sample sufficiently representative of flight parts?
  • Quandary: Sample size must be large enough to define distribution…but…size required to define distribution depends on what the distribution is
  • Pathological distribution (e.g. multiple modes) require binomial sampling

• Other Statistical Errors
  • Poisson errors on event counts determining SEE cross sections
  • Sampling errors on time-dependent, intermittent or rare errors/failures

• Systematic errors
  • “Mistakes” in measurement, test procedure, etc.
  • Incorrect assumptions in analysis (e.g. assuming incorrect distribution form).
Environment is only one source of error
- Mainly issue for short missions
- Binomial sampling errors may dominate
  - 5 parts → 41% CL that \( P_s \geq 0.9 \), 83% CL \( P_s > 0.7 \)
- Valid even for multimodal distributions
- Margin does not help—only looks at proportions above and below test level—not how much

Most TID RHA assumes failure distributions well behaved
- Parameter estimates converge rapidly w/ sample size
- Much higher confidence and \( P_s \) possible w/ smaller samples
- Overtest, design margin effective strategies to avoid failure

But...trade confidence + \( P_s \) for possibility of systematic error
- How common are pathological failure distributions?
- How likely is a small sample-size test to detect pathology?
- What should we look for? (technology? data characteristics?)

TID RHA: Pathological Distributions Do Occur

• Many parts known to exhibit pathological TID response (ADI OP484, OP400, AD590, National LM111, many discretes, commercial parts such as SDRAMs)

• Bimodal distributions (e.g. OP484), thick tailed distributions (2N5019 JFET)

• What to do?
  • Similarity is not a reliable indicator—several ADI bipolar devices show anomalies; most do not
  • Test larger samples
  • Look for “outliers”
  • Combine lots to see if “outliers” resolve into thick tails or multiple modes

Conventional RHA Approach Uses Radiation Design Margin (RDM)

What is WCFL?
- Mean, Median and Mode of failure distribution are not appropriate—failure probability too high

1) Worst performing part in TID lot test
   - Advantage—has an empirical basis—does not assume a statistical model
   - Disadvantage—Odd statistical properties—testing more parts improves knowledge of failure distribution, but WCFL gets worse with sample size

2) $P_s=X\%,\ CL=Y\%$ one-sided tolerance limit (KTL)
   - $\mu \pm KTL(n,Ps,CL)\sigma$ (Example 99/90 limit)
   - Advantage—good statistical properties
   - Disadvantage—assumes normal or lognormal distribution

3) Worst performing part for all lots of part tested
   - Advantage—Empirical and more conservative than 1); well suited to high-volume qualification program
   - Disadvantage—still has same odd statistical properties as 1)—more lots tested gives more conservative value

- 2) best in most cases; or 3) in high-production operations or if normality in doubt

Max Dose = “Worst-Case” TID Failure Level/RDM

Not where you want to be.

- Conventional approach to TID RHA defines part TID capability or failure level for a part type (WCFL)
- Radiation Design Margin (RDM) defined by project requirements
- Maximum allowed dose for part type =WCFL/RDM
Radiation Design Margin vs. Confidence and Success Probability

• Xapsos proposed replacing RDM with requirement at success probability exceed X% in Y% CL environment
  • Offers improved flexibility and ability to combine radiation and reliability +it is really what we want to know
  • Need to understand why current system works (mostly) to assess impact of change.

• So, why does a fixed 2x-4x RDM work as well as it does?
  • For short missions:
    • Environmental uncertainty is higher—less margin available for uncertainty in TID failure distribution
    • But, TID is lower, so fewer parts to worry about failing
  • For longer mission:
    • Higher TID means more parts prone to failure
    • Lower environmental uncertainty—more margin available for uncertainty in TID failure distribution

• Any approach must reflect uncertainties in failure distribution as well as radiation environment

• Part-to-part, lot-to-lot and part-type-to-part-type variation also require statistical treatment
  • Confidence level applies to inference of WCFL from data
  • What does 90% CL on failure distribution in a 90% WC environment mean?
    • Note: Same question also applied when dealing with RDM—it was just more hidden

• And as with any method assuming a distribution, how do we deal with the risk of systematic errors?
SEE Hardness Assurance

• Goals of SEE Hardness Assurance
  1) Identify all SEE modes to which part is susceptible
     a) Spatial coverage—ions/cm² or ions per device (transistor, gate, etc.)
     b) Temporal and Logic masking also affect coverage
  2) Map out dependence of SEE modes vs. collected charge/LET/(Z, energy, angle)
  3) Estimate SEE rate using above information (if possible)
     a) Use CRÈME-96 and $\sigma$ vs. LET curve if
        i. Sensitive Volume (SV) is rectangular parallelepiped
        ii. Susceptibility depends only on LET (or effective LET)—no nuclear/secondary processes
        iii. LET in SV~constant
     b) Otherwise, use Monte Carlo SEE rate estimation (CRÈME-MC, MRED) and $\sigma$ vs. Ion energy, species, angle..., or
     c) Bound using lethal-ion type calculation (SEGR and SEB)
     d) Assess implications for mitigation strategies

• What environments are interesting?
  • Background Environment to answer: “Will the device be able to perform its function in the environment?”
    • GCR + Average Solar and trapped protons
  • “Peak” Environment to answer: Will redundancy mitigation be compromised by peak environment?
    • SPE Heavy-ion + proton environments (but which SPE?)

Spatial Coverage: How Much is Enough?

Simulated Ion Strikes in 60x70 µm² portion of 512 Mbit SDRAM

1E10 200 MeV protons/cm²  1E7 heavy ions/cm²

- If fluence too low, SEE modes go undiscovered—mode could be seen on orbit even if not seen in test
- "Good enough" depends on device feature sizes, device complexity, application, but also on track size and how often susceptible features repeated within device
  - Measure of device complexity may be total # of transistors, or transistors/µm², although function (e.g. processor, memory, FPGA...) also an indicator
  - More on track size later.

What Makes a Good SEE Test?

- **A Good SEE Test**
  - # of LET values ≥ 6; 12 values reduces errors ~60%
  - # events per cross section enough to make error bars negligible
  - Both # events and # LET values improve fit
- **Errors on rate scale** ~square of errors on \( \sigma_0 \) or width
  - Worse for very small limiting cross sections
- **Errors on rate scale** ~linearly w/ error on \( \sigma_{lim} \)
  - Again, worse for very small \( \sigma_{lim} \)
- **Typical test**
  - ≥2 parts
  - >>6-12 runs at different LET values
  - ≥ 1 low-LET run w/ fluence >10⁷ ions/cm² to find \( \sigma_0 \)
  - ≥ 1 high-LET run w/ fluence >10⁷ ions/cm² to preclude presence of undetected destructive/disruptive SEE modes
- **Total coverage of typical SEE test** usually ≥10⁸ ions/cm² for all ions of all Z, energy, angle

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How Good Are SEE Rates?

• Statistical errors for SEE can be controlled, so accurate SEE rate estimation should be possible

• Ed Petersen found on-orbit rates agreed with predicted rates within ~2x (CRÈME-96 and AP8)

• SDRAMs (Ladbury-2009 and Miller-2009) agree w/in ~3-5x if knowledge of shielding, statistics adequate
  • Rates for disruptive errors (SEFI, block errors, etc) due to poor statistics
  • Rates for parts in Van Allen Belts sensitive to shielding
  • Fabricated in CMOS processes w/ feature sizes down to ~130 nm, so CRÈME-96 can be adequate to this level

• For smaller feature sizes, situation is more muddled
  • Expect departures from RPP, but rate estimation also more sensitive to errors on fit

• Above indicates errors due to environment over long term <~2x

• So, we’re good, right?

• Multiple Sources of Systematic Error
  • Nuclear Effects
    • Scattering of high-Z nuclei by light nuclei
    • p + Au fission events

• Departures from LET
  • High-energy ion tracks have more energetic delta rays
    • More MBUs
    • Ultra-high energy events
    • Multi-node upsets in hardened logic

• Proton upset via direct ionization
  • Low-energy proton environment variable and uncertain
  • Detailed shielding model essential to determine low-energy proton flux in the device SV
  • Multiple scattering plays critical role in mechanism

• CRÈME-96 won’t work for these mechanisms
• Monte Carlo methods can work, but we’re still figuring out how to use them.
Track Structure: Wild Card of the Future (and always will be?)

- Track structure has always been a wild card
  - Up to now a wild card with few consequences
- Transistors now have dimensions ~100 µm
  - Energy deposition not uniform @ high energy
  - δ ray can traverse dozens of transistors
  - δ ray multiple scattering important
  - Implications for MBU and SEE hardening

28 GeV Fe ion (500 MeV/u)  
280 MeV Fe ion (5 MeV/u)
Conclusions: TID and DDD

• Different environments important for different missions
  • TID: All ionizing particles contribute—solar and trapped protons and electrons dominate
    • Long missions—average environment dominates
    • Short missions—one large solar particle event can dominate TID for missions <1-2 years
  • DDD: Massive, energetic particles—protons (trapped and solar) usually the main contributors, also electrons
    • Situation similar to TID—long missions dominated by average; short missions can be dominated by SPE
    • Jupiter—electrons energetic and plentiful...can contribute to DDD

• Environmental uncertainty is only one source of error; usually not dominant
  • TID: Part-to-part variation usually the dominant source of error
    • Very large sample sizes required to have high confidence of high success probability
      • Binomial sampling has to work for even pathological distributions
      • Increased Radiation Design margin does not help
    • Assuming well behaved distribution allows reduced sample size for higher Ps at higher confidence
      • Replaces sampling error with systematic error if distribution is pathological—which can occur
      • Important to look for signs of pathology
      • Going to environmental confidence + success probability may force more rigorous treatment of variability and pathologies

• Displacement damage somewhat more tractable
  • Pathological distributions less common; fewer application conditions

Conclusions: Single-Event Effects

• Important fact about SEE—can happen any time, regardless of probability
  • First goal of testing is to identify SEE susceptibilities, NOT to bound relevant environments
  • Second goal: Rate estimation combines device susceptibilities + Environment Models

• Environments important for Single-event effects: GCR+ solar heavy ions + protons + trapped protons
  • Average environment important for ensuring part meets its requirements
  • Peak environment (for given confidence) important because redundancy is the predominant mitigation for SEE
    • SEE rate for a redundant system scales as a power of particle flux, rather than linearly
  • Low-energy protons highly variable, uncertain, and role of multiple scattering makes mechanism “fuzzy”
  • Electrons starting to cause SEE as well—multiple scattering even more important (no Bragg peak)

• Many sources of error other than environment
  • Poisson errors on cross section can dominate for small event counts (especially for DSEE, SEFI, disruptive errors)
  • Deviations from CRÈME-96 model assumptions (constant LET in single RPP SV, no nuclear/secondary effects)
    • Monte Carlo with accurate physics needed if deviations significant.

• Track structure effects may assume greater importance as devices continue to shrink
  • Less containment of ionization within any given track radius
  • Process more random
  • Mostly important for multi-node effects (MBU and upset of cells hardened by redundant nodes)