Ground System Architectures Workshop
Tutorial I

Reducing the Software Risk in
Ground Systems
February 26, 2018
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NASA’s IV&V Program
Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) Office
Information Assurance/Cybersecurity Support
http://www.nasa.gov/centers/ivv
• **Tutorial I Outline:**
  – Getting on the Same Page with Ground Systems
  – Threat Landscape
  – What is SW in a Ground System?
  – SW Security is Required but Barriers Exist
  – What about NIST?
  – Approach for Secure and Resilient Software
    • System Threat Modeling
    • Sample Process for Developing Secure Software
    • Software Threat Modeling
    • Alphabet Soup - VA, SCA, OA, CWE, CVE, CWSS
  – Ground Software Example: FEPs
  – Near Team Goals and What to do Now?
  – Trends and Lessons Learned
Spacecraft Ground Systems encompasses the entire system, beginning with issuing the command from the MOC up until it emits from the antenna to the reception of radio signals down at the antenna to displaying telemetry on the MOC computer.
Defining “Ground Systems”
...in the Military World

http://www.cyberdefensereview.org/2015/12/10/mission-command-primer/
Are the Threats Real?

It’s making the news....

Hacked in Space: Are Satellites Cybersecurity Battleground?

By Alyssa Newcomb

So many of the mundane, earthly things we rely on, from GPS to making a credit card transaction, are made possible by satellites orbiting beyond that blue sky, thousands of miles outside of Earth.

Space may feel like an untouchable realm, but as the systems we have in place get older, they’re becoming even more vulnerable to cybersecurity threats, according to experts.

It’s something that needs to be addressed, said Jeff Matthews, director of venture strategy and research at the Space Frontier Foundation, a space advocacy nonprofit.

Related: The New Race to Build a Space-Based Internet

“Space allows for some very unique business-use cases and opportunities, and when done right, can really go a long way to protecting communication interests and national infrastructure,” Matthews told NBC News.

“However, we do have to be aware of the information security side up in space and down here.”

A recent report from Chatham House, an international think tank, said the intersection of space security and cybersecurity is not a new problem, but it has remained largely unrecognized as a potentially significant vulnerability.

Old Systems Face New Threats

Since its introduction into the mainstream more than three decades ago, GPS has now made its way into almost everything, from our phones and cars and watches.

And we now have greater access to global positioning in 1973, after American Air Force satellite launched in 1971.

Space Safety Magazine Feb 2014

(Help://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/aerospace-engineering/cyber-security/cyber-crime-cyber-space-outer-space/)

NBC NEWS Oct 3, 2016

(Help://www.nbcsnews.com/tech/security/hacked-space-are-satellites-next-cybersecurity-battleground-n658231)

Homeland Security September, 2016

(Help://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20160822-space-cybersecurity-a-final-frontier)
“Attacks on the ground infrastructure, such as satellite control centres, the associated networks and data centres, leading to potential global impacts (for example on weather forecasting systems, which use large quantities of space-derived data).”

The vulnerabilities of satellites to cyberattack include attacks that are aimed at ground stations. Most satellites launched in recent years rely on computers that are installed in the satellite themselves and that require regular upgrades through remote access.

As a result, the technology installed in them and in some ground systems can become obsolete, creating serious legacy problems.

The pace at which technology evolves makes it hard, or even impossible, to devise a timely response to space cyberthreats.

Two US government satellites fell victim to cyber-attacks in 2007 and 2008, claims report highlighting control systems' vulnerability. The report, warns: "Access to a satellite's controls could allow an attacker to damage or destroy the satellite. " The Landsat 7 satellite saw 12 minutes of "interference" in October 2007; the Terra then suffered two minutes in June 2008. In July 2008 the Landsat 7 had another 12 minutes' interference. Finally in October 2008 the Terra was affected for nine minutes.

Evolving Threatscape for Space Missions

Threats are both becoming more frequent and more malicious

Past:
- Known vulnerabilities and attack vectors
- Out of box security

Current:
- Emerging threats
- Phishing
- Insider threat
- Advanced persistent threats (APT)
- Zero-day threats

Current/Future:
- Unknown vulnerability and/or threat
- Vulnerability at creation
- Supply chain
- Others...

Satellite System vulnerabilities to threats
- Custom software located throughout the system present potential vulnerabilities to software threats
  - Spacecraft
  - Mission Operations Center (MOC)
  - Mission planning area
  - Software development environment
- Software interfaces throughout the system, present potential vulnerabilities – both insider and external threats
- Software resiliency to vulnerabilities and weaknesses
  - Security architecture
  - Software controls against credible threats
  - Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs)
  - Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tier</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Skills</th>
<th>Maliciousness</th>
<th>Motivation</th>
<th>Methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Script Kiddies</td>
<td>Very low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Boredom, thrill seeking</td>
<td>Download and run already-written hacking scripts known as “toolkits”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Hackers for Hire</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Prestige, personal gain, thrill seeking</td>
<td>Write own scripts, engage in malicious acts, brag about exploits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Small Hacker Teams, Non-State Actors OR Disorganized/Non-</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Power, prestige, intellectual gain, respect</td>
<td>Write scripts and automated tools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Advanced State Actors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Large, Well-Organized Teams, Criminal, Non-State, or</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Personal gain, greed, revenge</td>
<td>Sophisticated attacks by criminal/thieves, may be “guns for hire” or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State Actors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>involved in organized crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Highly-Capable State Actors</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>Ideology, politics, espionage</td>
<td>State sponsored, well-funded cyber-attacks against enemy nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Most Capable State Actors</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Space Systems ARE Vulnerable!

Satellites and other space assets are vulnerable to Cyber attacks

Space communication ALSO depends on “traditional” IT assets = Vulnerable to common software based attacks
Back to the Basics

• In Ground Systems....What is Software?
  
  A. Custom developed?
  B. Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS) Software?
  C. Government-off-the-Shelf (GOTS) Software?
  D. Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) ?
  E. Industrial Control System (ICS) Software

  **Answer: All of the Above**

• In Ground Systems....Where is Software Used?
Scope for this Discussion...

Interacts with ground software (combo of COTS/GOTS/FOSS)

Operating System (Windows, Linux, etc.)

FEPs (RT Logic, Amergint, Avtec etc.)

Command and Control (C2)

FEP

Modem

Interacts with ground software (combo of COTS/GOTS/FOSS)
Software Security

• Why
  – SW controls mission critical activities such as command sequencing, scheduling, satellite tracking, launch control and payload operations

• What
  – With any system or system of systems, the software is a critical component and the security of said software is equally important

• How
  – Designing in security (e.g. threat modeling) and using secure coding practices (e.g. coding standards and tools)
But Where are the Requirements?

FISMA requires each agency to use a risk-based approach to develop, document, and implement an agency wide security program for the information and information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency, including those provided or managed by another agency, contractor, or other source.

- OMB-130 -- “Security of Federal Automated Information Systems”
- Executive Order 13800, *Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure*,
- Federal agency directives (DoD 8510.01, NASA NPR 2810, etc.)
- DoDI 5000.02 and DoDI 5200.39
- ...
• How do these directives, EOs, policies, etc. prevent software weaknesses and vulnerabilities (e.g. buffer overflows and unsanitized input)?
  – SW developers do not develop to these requirements which is a barrier
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barrier</th>
<th>Detail</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security as a Technical (Systems Engineering) function</td>
<td>Programs/Systems may choose to comply with baseline controls in the NIST 800 series compared to performing the mission security analysis using risks and threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evolving Threatscape</td>
<td>The evolving threatscape entails full understanding of current and future threats that can exploit system vulnerabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security is more than IT</td>
<td>The perception that Information Technology (IT) protects (e.g. border firewalls) a mission environment is no longer adequate in the evolving threatscape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complex Supply Chains</td>
<td>System complexity leads to large supply chains, including delivery of various products using varying processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief “This will not happen to me”</td>
<td>Given the history of success of NASA/DoD missions, a cavalier attitude is possible. This is not secure, given the evolving threatscape. Hope is not the security strategy, any more than it is for Safety.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Other Barriers to Reducing SW Risk

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barrier</th>
<th>Detail</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Culture of Openness</strong></td>
<td>Security control of information is counter to some cultures of openness and sharing with International Partners and the Public (e.g. NASA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Traditional Systems Engineering approach led to stovepipe elements</strong></td>
<td>The top-down elaboration and allocation process has successfully led to complex systems being developed, including infrastructure and legacy systems. The advent of security has a unique architecture view to traditional systems engineering approaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security as a Priority</strong></td>
<td>The priority of security must be emphasized at an Agency, Program, Center/Installation, and Project level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governance and Organizations</strong></td>
<td>To achieve an appropriate security posture, organizations such as the Protection Programs, Chief Information Officers, System Engineers, Operators, Institutional Systems, Programs, and SMA need to work together.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Terminology</strong></td>
<td>An outcome of the multiple organizations is that each may have slightly unique vernacular. Arriving at a common terminology enables a shared strategy, implementation and operation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NIST Can Help....

• If implemented and governed properly NIST can help but usually NIST is thought to be “compliance” only

• The security control structure is made up of the following sections:
  – Control section
  – Supplemental guidance section
  – Control enhancements section
  – References section
  – Priority and baseline allocation section

• Remember! NIST provides guidance not requirements

• NIST intentionally presents controls written at a very high level of abstraction
  – System Specification Requirements:
    • Developed by translating the abstract controls into specific requirements
      – These would be further decomposed from the system level
Example: SI-10 (NIST 800-53 Rev 4)

SI-10 INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION

Control: The information system checks the validity of [Assignment: organization-defined information inputs].

Supplemental Guidance: Checking the valid syntax and semantics of information system inputs (e.g., character set, length, numerical range, and acceptable values) verifies that inputs match specified definitions for format and content. Software applications typically follow well-defined protocols that use structured messages (i.e., commands or queries) to communicate between software modules or system components. Structured messages can contain raw or unstructured data interspersed with metadata or control information. If software applications use attacker-supplied inputs to construct structured messages without properly encoding such messages, then the attacker could insert malicious commands or special characters that can cause the data to be interpreted as control information or metadata. Consequently, the module or component that receives the tainted output will perform the wrong operations or otherwise interpret the data incorrectly. Prescreening inputs prior to passing to interpreters prevents the content from being unintentionally interpreted as commands. Input validation helps to ensure accurate and correct inputs and prevent attacks such as cross-site scripting and a variety of injection attacks.

Control Enhancements:

1. ....

2. ....

3. INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION | PREDICTABLE BEHAVIOR

   The information system behaves in a predictable and documented manner that reflects organizational and system objectives when invalid inputs are received.

   Supplemental Guidance: A common vulnerability in organizational information systems is unpredictable behavior when invalid inputs are received. This control enhancement ensures that there is predictable behavior in the face of invalid inputs by specifying information system responses that facilitate transitioning the system to known states without adverse, unintended side effects.

4. ....

5. ....

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>P1</th>
<th>LOW Not Selected</th>
<th>MOD SI-10</th>
<th>HIGH SI-10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
NIST Security Controls that Apply to Software

- Compiled an initial selection of NIST 800-53r4 controls that relate to software or software control
- 113 of 343 “High” Baseline controls and enhancements implemented by software

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>FAMILY</th>
<th>Relates to software</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>Audit and Accountability</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>CM</td>
<td>Configuration Management</td>
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<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>IA</td>
<td>Identification and Authentication</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Media Protection</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA</td>
<td>Risk Assessment</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>System and Communications Protection</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>System and Information Integrity</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Note: Additional controls or enhancements may be brought into focus while following the evidence in support of an analysis finding
• NIST can be too high level and abstract for SW developers
• Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) prevention is a more implementable “requirement”
• For the same SI-10 NIST Control the following CWEs apply
  – 77, 134, 22, 23, 20, 73, 79, 78, 119, 787, 805, 131, 170
• Whatever your method, requirements need to be clear and understood
  – Requirement to have “secure code” is not good enough
  – Requirement to implement and be compliant with NIST is not good enough without thorough technical governance
An Approach for Secure & Resilient SW

• Not “the” approach but “an” approach to help solve this problem
  – We do agree a problem exists, right?
• Need secure designs and secure code
  – Is their a difference?
  – CWE prevention != Secure Design & vice versa
• “An” approach to secure design = Threat Modeling (system and code level)
• “An” approach to secure code = CWE prevention (oh….and don’t forget CVE prevention either)
System Level Threat Modeling

Threats Environment

- Sources
  - Malicious (Intentional)
  - Non-Malicious (Unintentional)
  - Environmental

Threat Scenarios

- Events
  - Attacks
  - Accidents
  - Failures
  - Environment Hazards
  - Multiple simultaneous events/scenarios

Risk Management / Reduction

Impact Assessment

- Protection Strategies
- System Architecture/Design
- Security Architecture/Design
- System Security Plan (SSP)
- Requirements
- Implementation

Vulnerabilities

- Findings
- Risks

Generic Threats

Credible Threats

Compliance Coverage

Threat Mitigations

Systems & Security Engineering Analysis

Threat Analysis
Generalized Process to Develop Secure Software

- Systems Engineering Process to design out security risk
- Establish credible threats and vulnerabilities, and designs in software controls, following NIST guidelines
- Once security implementation approach is established (System Security Plan), development proceeds

Part 1: Assess Mission for Credible Threats, and Vulnerabilities
- Credible threats based on situational environment
- Vulnerabilities assessed by establishing security risk to system
- Preliminary @ KDP 0 (~SRR); Baseline @ KDP 1 (~SDR)

Part 2: Develop Security Strategy
- Develop security architecture and ConOps
- Capture in Project Protection Plan
- Preliminary @ SDR; Baseline @ PDR

Part 3: Select and Tailor Security Controls
- Many controls software based
- Preliminary @ SDR; Baseline @ PDR

Part 4: Implement and Test Security Strategy and Controls
- Defined controls become basis for system and software requirements
- Implement in accordance with traditional lifecycle development
- System level tests consider threat scenarios

Products: Verified and Validated Secure Software

Lifecycle development occurs based on the SSP and secure coding practices
Part 1: System Security Threat Understanding

- Development of the Project Protection Plans (PPP) require an understanding of credible threats.
- Developing credible threats for identified mission:
  - General information in CCSDS green book.
  - Leverage all intel sources at all levels.
  - Threat Summary can be classified Top Secret.
- The key project inputs for the threat summary process are:
  - Mission overview
  - Lifecycle phase
  - CONOPS
  - Communication links.
- Evolving Threat Summary process – work with all stakeholders and other agencies to identify credible threats in order to develop the PPP.
The key elements of the Project Protection Plan (PPP):

- **Vulnerabilities Analysis**
  - What will prevent the system from reaching mission requirements due to threats causing vulnerabilities?

- **Risk Analysis**
  - Sufficient detail must be documented in the risk analysis for senior decision makers to approve the project at key decision points (KDPs). The risk analysis must answer all the vulnerabilities driven by the threat and potential countermeasures and mitigations.
  - Also in the risk analysis, document what risks will not be addressed and the rationale behind that decision.
  - Consider Defense in Depth, Evolving Threatscape

- Likely a classified document and should have information
Part 3: The System Security Plan

- In order to select controls, begin by specifying and documenting the information system’s...
  - Categorization per FIPS-199
  - Information types
  - Security impact levels for
    - Confidentiality
    - Integrity
    - Availability
  - Security boundary and interfaces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INFORMATION TYPE</th>
<th>D11 – Transportation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INFORMATION SUB-TYPE</td>
<td>D11.4 – Space Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidentiality Impact Level</td>
<td>NIST: Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrity Impact Level</td>
<td>NIST: High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability Impact Level</td>
<td>NIST: High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Justification for any deviation from the NIST recommended impact level: Business functions involve proprietary information

- Each information system has its own SSP (multiple per mission) per the strategy provided in the Project Protection Plan. Risk assessment captured in companion document, Risk Assessment Report (RAR).
  - NIST = National Institute of Standards and Technology
  - FIPS = Federal Information Processing Standard
  - FIPS Publications are standards issued by NIST after approval
Part 3: Select and Tailor Security Controls

To select **security controls**, engineers must:

- **Select** all the security controls based on the security categorization process
- **Tailor** by applying scoping, parameterization, and compensating control guidance
- **Supplement** with Agency supplemental security controls for selected controls
- **Document** in the SSP
- **Specify** the minimum control requirements
- **Identify** from this set which of the security controls are common controls or controlled by another organization

**System Security Plan**
- Information types
- Security impact levels for Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability
- Security boundary and interfaces
  - Security controls

**Part 1: Assess Mission for Credible Threats, and Vulnerabilities**
- Credible threats based on situational environment
- Vulnerabilities assessed by establishing security risk to system

**Part 2: Develop Security Strategy**
- Develop security architecture and ContOps
- Capture in Project Protection Plan

**Part 3: Select and Tailor Security Controls in System Security Plan (SSP)**
- Many controls software based

- Risk based process
- Engineering Analysis
- Iterative in nature
- Continuous monitoring
Part 3: Security Controls Families (NIST 800-53)

Within a Control Family, analyze controls based on
1) Required controls, based on FIPS-199 classification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>FAMILY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Access Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>Awareness and Training</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>Audit and Accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Security Assessment and Authorization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>Configuration Management</td>
</tr>
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<td>CP</td>
<td>Contingency Planning</td>
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<td>Identification and Authentication</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>Incident Response</td>
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<td>MA</td>
<td>Maintenance</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Media Protection</td>
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<td>Physical and Environmental Protection</td>
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<td>Planning</td>
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<td>PS</td>
<td>Personnel Security</td>
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<td>RA</td>
<td>Risk Assessment</td>
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<td>SA</td>
<td>System and Services Acquisition</td>
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<td>System and Communications Protection</td>
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<td>SI</td>
<td>System and Information Integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Program Management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2) Evaluation of supplemental controls, enhancements that are not explicitly specified

Example SI-10 (3)

**SI-10 Information Input Validation.**

**Enhancement (3) Information input validation | Predictable behavior**  The information system behaves in a predictable and documented manner that reflects organizational and system objectives when invalid inputs are received.

**Supplemental Guidance:** ...This control enhancement ensures that there is predictable behavior in the face of invalid inputs by specifying information system responses that facilitate transitioning the system to known states without adverse, unintended side effects.
Part 4: Secure Software Development

Software Threats Description (CCSDS Green Book, Section 3.4.9)

Users, system operators, and programmers often make mistakes that can result in security problems. Users or administrators can install unauthorized or un-vetted software, which might contain bugs, viruses, spyware, or which might simply result in system instability. System operators might configure a system incorrectly resulting in security weaknesses. Programmers may introduce logic or implementation errors which could result in system vulnerabilities or instability.

Mitigations/Controls

- Unauthorized/Un-Vetted SW: Provide appropriate focus on Supply Chain risks
- Logic/Implementation Errors: Utilize Coding Standards and integrate tools into development environment (e.g. VA, OA, SCA, Threat Modeling)
- Plan for Defense in Depth and secure the development environment

Example Supply Chain Risks

- Undefined security requirements, policies, and practices limiting overarching security considerations
- Insecure software delivery mechanisms, leading to theft or malware injection
- Code and design defects that lead to vulnerable software
- Integration of insecure 3rd party libraries.

Complexity of satellite development supply chains pose vulnerabilities
Software Threat Modeling

• Microsoft Threat Modeling Process
  – Who
    • The adversary does a good job so maybe we should try it
  – What
    • Repeatable process to find & address all threats to SW
  – When
    • Earlier the better, gives more time to fix
  – Why
    • Find problems earlier and ensures more secure SW
  – How

https://download.microsoft.com/download/9/3/5/935520EC-D9E2-413E-BEA7-0B865A79B18C/Introduction_to_Threat_Modeling.ppsx
Some Key Features

• Identify threats to the SW as a whole to include the security features and attack surfaces
• Enables improving SW design by to effectively find security problems early in the process

• STRIDE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Property we want</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spoofing</td>
<td>Authentication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tampering</td>
<td>Integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repudiation</td>
<td>Nonrepudiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Disclosure</td>
<td>Confidentiality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denial of Service</td>
<td>Availability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elevation of Privilege</td>
<td>Authorization</td>
</tr>
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</table>
# Standard Mitigations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Issue</th>
<th>Mitigation</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spoofing</td>
<td>Authentication</td>
<td>To authenticate principals:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Cookie authentication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Kerberos authentication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- PKI systems such as SSL/TLS and certificates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>To authenticate code or data:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Digital signatures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tampering</td>
<td>Integrity</td>
<td>- Windows Vista Mandatory Integrity Controls</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- ACLs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Digital signatures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repudiation</td>
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<td>- Privilege ownership</td>
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<td>- Input validation</td>
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Resources

Threat Modeling Learning Resources

**MSDN Magazine**
Reinvigorate your Threat Modeling Process

Threat Modeling: Uncover Security Design Flaws Using The STRIDE Approach

**SDL Blog**
All threat modeling posts

**Books**
(Howard, Lipner, 2006) “Threat Modeling” chapter

**Article**
Experiences Threat Modeling at Microsoft
Secure Software Development Tools: VA vs SCA vs OA

• Vulnerability Assessment (VA)
  – Running of tool(s) to identify known vulnerabilities and/or configuration settings that could lead to an impact to confidentiality, integrity or availability. VA identifies Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) or non-compliance with compliance regulations (e.g. STIGs).

• Static Code Analysis (SCA)
  – Running of tools that attempt to highlight possible weaknesses within 'static' (non-running) source code by using techniques such as taint analysis and data flow analysis. SCA identifies Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs).

• Origin Analysis (OA)
  – OA fingerprints the binaries and folder structures, which discovers the third-party components used by the developer of the software, and creates a “bill of materials”. Based on each identified component and its version, the tool then crosschecks its database for known vulnerabilities and software licenses associated with the component and categorize each as potential security or operational risks respectively. OA identifies Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) and risks with open source license usage.
We “should” be doing this already!

- The requirements for security testing software are present in existing guidance (e.g. NIST Control RA-5)
  - Knowledge, tool availability, oversight and governance could be improved which puts government at risk
  - Credentialed vulnerability scanning, static code analysis, origin analysis and dynamic analysis of software is needed to adequately reduce software risk
Secure and Resilient Code

**Common Weakness Enumerations (CWE):**
Serves as a common language for describing software security weaknesses in architecture, design, or code. Protection is important for Ground SW, less vulnerabilities/threats for Flight SW. Originated by MITRE.
- Standard measuring stick for software security tools targeting these weaknesses
- Common baseline standard for weakness identification, mitigation, and prevention efforts
- Utilize CWE to better understand, identify, fix, and prevent weaknesses and vulnerabilities

with

**Common Weakness Scoring System (CWSS) of CWEs**
- High impact within *our system*
- Values will be different for flight and ground (system dependent)

**Assess CWEs against common attack pattern enumeration and classification (CAPEC):**
- Community-developed list of common attack patterns
- Comprehensive schema and classification taxonomy
- International in scope

**Assess SW against Common Vulnerabilities and exposure (CVE):**
- Identifies publicly known information security vulnerabilities and assign them a CVE_ID.
- Scored 1 to 10 on CVSS scale
- Operating Systems, Applications, FOSS, etc.

CWEs may already be addressed through good coding practices including use of static code analyzers with appropriate checkers (e.g. buffer overflow), coding standards, code walkthroughs, etc.
Let’s Break that Down...

• In order to provide assurance from a secure code perspective we need to establish:
  – The weaknesses in the software we deem most important within the context of the system
    • These could in turn be “requirements”
  – A link between the tools used for analysis and the most important weaknesses
  – Create a plan to maximize coverage with respect to static code analysis coverage
CWE Rack and Stack

• Source of weaknesses
  – Common Weakness Enumeration
    • Ex: CWE 20: Improper Input Validation
    • Weakness parents / children
    • Impacts to CIA
    • Examples

• Which ones do we care most about?
  – High impact within our system
  – Broad attack surface (many patterns, low technical barrier)
  – Evidence of real world exploitation
• Will have to use a combination of objective and subjective inputs
CWSS evaluation

- CWSS can help determine the CWEs with high impact within our system
  - [https://cwe.mitre.org/cwss/cwss_v1.0.1.html](https://cwe.mitre.org/cwss/cwss_v1.0.1.html)

Each factor in the category is assigned a value. These values are converted to associated weights and a category sub-score is calculated. The three sub-scores are multiplied together, which produces a Common Weakness Scoring System (CWSS) score. Higher the score, higher it ranks.

- Values will be different for each system (e.g. spacecraft and ground)
  - Realistically this should be performed on a per mission/system basis
Let’s Add in CAPEC

• Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
  – [https://capec.mitre.org](https://capec.mitre.org)

• Community-developed list of common attack patterns

• Comprehensive schema and classification taxonomy

• International in scope

• Taking into account attack pattern and any other factors to generate list of CWEs that are critical.
Combining it All

• Calculates Scoring based on CWSS
  – CWSS = \textit{BaseFindingScore} \times \textit{AttackSurfaceScore} \times \textit{EnvironmentScore}
  – Subjective due to system dependability

• Maintain ranking of CAPEC scores
  – Will have to use your own ranking system
  – More objectivity

• Maintain relationship between tools used and CWEs
  – Easily demonstrate which CWEs are covered
  – Can be used to develop future tools (Config generators, etc.)

• Process = Near complete picture of the top CWEs

• Subjective and Objective measures
  – Subjective - CWSS
  – Objective - CVE
  – Hybrid - CAPEC
= Using mapping from tool vendors on their CWE coverage. Verification and Validation has not been performed!

Research being performed at SAMATE & CMU-SEI to help with this problem.

*Rapid Expansion of Classification Models to Prioritize Static Analysis Alerts for C*

https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/asset_files/Presentation/2017_017_001_506534.pdf
Results

• Peer reviewed most dangerous list of CWEs for system
  – Perfect ? **No**
  – Good enough ? **Yes**
  – Better than blindly accepting tool vendor criticality? **Yes**

• A link between the tools available and the most important weaknesses
  – Associate tool checks with CWEs
  – Mapped to secure coding standards/guidelines

Know what you are trying to prevent before selecting coding standards and tools
CWE 311: Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data
– Btw also NIST SC-8 Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity

• Adhere CERT Rules
  – MSC00-J
  – MSC18-C
  – WIN04-C

• Fortify has checkers for this which can reduce likelihood of being in code
Simple Use Case #2

CWE 119: Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
– Btw also NIST SI-10 Information Input Validation

• Adhere CERT Rules

• Fortify does not have a checker mapped to this
  – But Klockwork does
    • ABV.ANY_SIZE_ARRAY, ABV.GENERAL, ABV.ITERATOR, ABV.STACK, ABV.TAINTED, NNTS.MIGHT, NNTS.MUST, SV.STRBO.BOUND_SPRINTF, SV.STRBO.UNBOUND_COPY, SV.STRBO.UNBOUND_SPRINTF, SV.TAINTED.LOOP_BOUND
Takeaway

• One SCA tool is not going to ensure code is secure
• For real security assurance, must know what you want to prevent
  – What risk am I reducing in my system/software
• Now pick the rules/guidelines and tools to help reduce that risk
• Great resource for identifying tools
  – Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) Report | Spreadsheet
  – NASA also maintains matrix for mapping Top CWEs to tools to CERT rules
Real World Example

- 5.5 million lines of ground SW analyzed
- Klocwork and Fortify executed

- Surprised?
  - Not surprising given that the tools only have a 22% overlap in the ability to detect the same defects from NASA’s most dangerous CWE list

Overlap of defects was 15%
• Of the 49 most dangerous CWEs in ground systems
  – Klocwork against C/C++ = 47% coverage
  – Adding HP Fortify increases coverage by almost 35%
  – Giving the ability to detect 82% of the CWEs in C/C++

• Similarly, if HP Fortify is the only tool used then the tool only has the ability to detect 57% in C/C++, but by adding Klocwork an increase of 25% is realized, resulting in 82% coverage
Targeted Metrics

• NASA’s Most Dangerous Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs) were used as a basis for evaluation as an additional overlay to what the tools report as Critical/High/Medium
  – NASA’s most dangerous CWEs is a list published by NASA’s Secure Coding Portal (SCP) team, which classifies the most dangerous weaknesses for ground software (similar to SANS Top 25 software errors)
  – Subset of weakness that mapped to the most dangerous ground system CWEs
Takeaway

• If a program’s security approach was simply to execute one SCA tool, that would be a good start but not good enough

• Could result in a false sense of security

• In the previous example, if one tool was used there’s a risk that ~ 50% of the dangerous CWEs would be in the SW
But Wait There’s More

• Don’t forget….
  – Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)

• Two flavors to worry about
  – COTS CVEs (Windows, Linux, Intel, etc.)
    • Installed on end points
  – FOSS CVEs (Struts, Xerces, Apache, etc.)
    • Embedded within custom code or installed on end points

• Different tools for detection
  – Vulnerability Assessment vs Origin Analysis
Origin Analysis: Secure SW Supply Chain

• From Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) SOAR Report – “Origin analyzers are tools that analyze source code, bytecode, or binary code to determine their origins (e.g., pedigree and version).”

• Origin Analysis can be used to reduce the software supply chain risk
  – Identifies CVEs that may be present in re-used open source libraries/code
  – Also identifies potentially licensing issues

• Examples of tools
  – Sonatype
    • Binary scanner; Works best on JAVA
  – Black Duck HUB
    • Provides binary and source tree scanning; Support C/C++ as well has JAVA
  – OWASP Dependency Check
    • Currently Java, .NET, Ruby, Node.js, and Python projects are supported; additionally, limited support for C/C++ projects is available for projects using CMake or autoconf.
### Vulnerabilities and Mitigations

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<tr>
<th>Vulnerability</th>
<th>Affected File</th>
<th>Mitigation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CVE-2014-0003: Allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary Java methods via a crafted message.</td>
<td>camel-core-1.5.4.0-fuse.jar</td>
<td>Upgrade Jar file to 2.11.4 or newer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVE-2009-4611: Allow remote attackers to modify a window’s title, or possibly execute arbitrary commands or overwrite files, via an HTTP request</td>
<td>jetty-6.1.14.jar; jetty-util-6.1.14.jar</td>
<td>Upgrade Jar file to 6.1.25 or newer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVE-2011-2730: Allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information</td>
<td>spring-web-2.5.5.jar</td>
<td>Upgrade Jar file to 3.2.9 or newer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVE-2014-0107: Allows remote attackers to bypass expected restrictions and load arbitrary classes or access external resources via a crafted messages</td>
<td>xslt.jar; xalan.jar</td>
<td>Upgrade Jar file to 2.7.2 or newer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVE-2013-4002: Allows remote attackers to affect availability via unknown vectors.</td>
<td>Xerces2.6.2_xercesimpl.jar; xercesimpl.jar</td>
<td>N/A (new contain implement (i.e., IP detection, implement host based restrictions (i.e., IP tables, file integrity detection, Host based IDS))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVE-2010-1244: Allows remote attackers to hijack the authentication of unspecified victims</td>
<td>activemq-web-5.2.0.2-fuse.jar</td>
<td>Upgrade Jar file to 5.9.0 or newer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Real World Example

• Analyzed ~5.5 million line of custom developed ground software using the OA tools
  – Mostly C/C++ and Java

  » Identified 350 (7%) out of 5,000 third party components contained a combined 2,000 CVEs in addition to some risky open source licenses.
Vulnerability Assessment/Scanning

- Vulnerability scanning uses tools like Nessus, Foundstone, AlienVault, OpenVAS, Retina, SCAP, CIS Benchmarks
  - Don’t confuse VA tools for SCA or OA tools
  - Identifies CVEs, misconfigurations, and compliance issues
  - Must be credentialed!!!!

Example

The version of HP Data Protector installed on the remote host is 7.0x prior to 7.03 build 108, 8.1x prior to 8.15, or 9.0x prior to 9.08. It is, therefore, affected by the following vulnerabilities:

- A security feature bypass vulnerability exists, known as 'Bar Mitzvah', due to improper combination of state data with key data by the RC4 cipher algorithm during the initialization phase. A man-in-the-middle attacker can exploit this via a brute-force attack using 128 values, to decrypt the traffic. (CVE-2015-2808)

- A flaw exists due to a failure to authenticate users, even with Encrypted Control Communications enabled. An unauthenticated, remote attacker can exploit this to execute arbitrary code. (CVE-2016-2004)

Upgrade to HP Data Protector 7.03 build 108 (7.03_108) / 8.15 / 9.08 or later per the vendor advisory.
Real Life Example

Front End Processors

Unsecure Design Example
Scope for this Example

Command and Control (C2) -> FEP

FEPs (RT Logic, Amergint, Avtec etc.)

Modem

CMD -> TLM

TLM -> CMD

CMD -> TLM

TLM -> CMD

ECHO
FEP: Commanding & Telemetry

• Commanding
  – Command and Control (C2) Systems automate user processes:
    • Send command sequences
    • Translate mnemonics to binary commands
    • Set limits on commanding
    • Store logs of commands sent and telemetry received
  – C2 controls the FEP
  – Modem converts digital signal to analog signal (modulation)
  – Transmitter amplifies and transmits RF signal

• Telemetry
  – Receiver collects and amplifies RF signal.
  – Modem converts analog signal to digital signal (demodulation)
  – Command and Control (C2) Systems automate user processes:
    • Translate frames/sub frames of telemetry into calibrated data (decomm)
    • Set limits on telemetry
    • Store logs of commands sent and telemetry received
FEP Providers

• RT Logic (1997, Colorado Springs, CO)
  – T501 Front-End Processor

• Amergint (2008, Colorado Springs, CO)
  – SoftFEP

• Avtec (1990, Fairfax, VA)/Ingenicomm (2010, Chantilly, VA)
  – Programmable Telemetry Processor

• GDP Space Systems
  – Components

• Acromamatics Telemetry Systems (1971, Santa Barbara, CA) /Delta Information Systems, Inc. (1976, Horsham, PA)
  – Model 2900AP PCI Telemetry System
  – Model 2900AP - Lightweight Rackmount PCI Telemetry System
  – Model 3022P - "Lunchbox" PCI Telemetry Data Processing System
  – Model 4000 - Compact "quick-look" Telemetry System

• Aventas Inc. (2002, Richardson, TX)
• Threats
  – The connectivity between a FEP and a modem varies between programs. It potentially contains many media and signal conversions.
  – Isolating issues to a FEP or the related infrastructure can be difficult.
  – The FEP and the related infrastructure is complex and functionality becomes prioritized over change management.
  – Defense of a FEP is expected on the boundaries, so they tend to have minimal end-point protection.
  – Testing of FEPs centers on functionality and requirements verification, not resiliency or reliability.

• Mitigations
  – Basic hardening produces significant gains in security posture.
  – FEPs have a relatively regular operations, meaning anomalous behavior should be relatively easy to recognize.
  – FEPs and the related infrastructure have a lot of redundancy and sparing.
Sample Attack #1 during PenTest

The software performs actions in the server’s operating system using calls built in the “Python” scripting language. Several scripts exist in the URLs that execute tasks in the OS and return the output to the application.

The calls performed by these scripts are passed to the OS without the use of input validation or any authentication at the application/OS level. The use of these scripts creates a semi-shell environment where a user can execute many OS commands through the web browser.

NIST SI-10

NIST IA-3

Input Validation & Lack of Authentication Vulnerabilities

Command and Control (C2)  FEP  Modem

CMD  CMD  CMD  CMD

TLM  TLM  TLM  TLM
Sample Attack #2 during PenTest

FEP intended design.... “Just write the message to the socket, and read the reply. In fact, if you are so inclined, you can telnet to port xxxxx and enter the messages directly.”

Therefore, anyone with access to the network has the capability to send commands to these ports and reconfigure the FEP unauthenticated. If used as an attack vector, it affects the availability and integrity of the FEP system.

Unsecure Design = Lack of Authentication Vulnerabilities
Near Term Goals

• You can’t boil the ocean
  – Threat modeling takes time
  – Classifying CWEs takes time
    • Free to use NASA’s list as a starter, NASA can share their customizable Access DB
  – Procuring VA, SCA, & OA tools takes time

• Discussion has been geared around how to reduce risk staring from inception of system
  – What about existing systems? Let’s discuss....
• Promote Defense-in-Depth

Services Provided, Received
• Software runs on a Host
• Hosts are interconnected via the Network
• Developers code the software builds, updates, and patches in a non-operational environment
• Operators use the Hosts to interact with the Network and Software appropriately
• Administrators manage the Hosts and Networks while installing/configuring Software

Additionally:
• Software handles Data
• Mission runs within an Enterprise
Defense in Depth (DiD)

- Secure software development is extremely important but DiD is key to protecting mission assets
- In space mission environments, DiD can be difficult
  - Older architectures/technology
    - Unsupported operating systems, older hardware, etc.
  - Shared architectures/technology
    - Mission X doesn’t own all layers of the defense
- Sometimes vulnerable software depends on something that is out of their control to protect it
  - Do you trust the Network Engineers? Should you?
  - Do you control the host level configuration?
• Work with Network Engineers to implement enclaves/network zoning and/or encryption
  – Migrate to a “zero trust” architecture
    • Vulnerabilities injected by Mission X may affect Mission Y
• Understand and eliminate pivot points
  – From networking perspective, software security perspective, host level security
• Increase attack depth or eliminate all together

Utilize tools like RedSeal Networks, Skybox, etc. to understand network topology and threat exposures
This example will depict how vulnerability on non-critical (trusted) asset within a network can potentially impact critical mission assets.
Sample Exposure

Demonstrates that a pathway exists from the VPN Landing Zone, Internet, Or “Untrusted” to a vulnerable asset in non-zero trust network.

Vulnerability (trusted asset)

VPN Landing Zone, Internet, Or “Untrusted”
Sample Exposure

Demonstrates all outbound access paths (Pivoting) from the vulnerable asset.
Sample Exposure

Mission Control that “wasn’t” network accessible from VPN, Untrusted, Etc.
Attack Depth = 1

Vulnerable Asset “Pivot Point”

Demonstrates potential vulnerabilities that could be exploited from this server
What To Do Now?

• In space mission environments (esp. mission with extended ops) you may not be able to patch code; therefore for vulnerable code that can’t be fixed the “host” owner can
  – Harden the servers and hosts by disabling all ports, protocols and services that are not explicitly required for operations
  – Install file integrity software (i.e., TripWire, Aide) to alert to changes made to the file system
  – Install and finely tune a host-based IDS that will alert to any anomalous traffic
  – Utilize IP tables/IPFilters to limit data flow to specific IP addresses, ports, protocols and services
What To Do Now?

• To prevent future deployments of vulnerable code
  – Participate in secure code training
    • Educate developers, PMs, Authorizing Officials, Security Personnel (ISSO, ISO, etc.) on the importance of eliminating vulnerable code from architecture
  – Pick the **low hanging fruit** (see backup slides)
  – Utilize Best Practices and Secure Coding Standards
    • Ex: [Best Practices](#) from NASA’s Secure Coding Portal
    • Ex: Coding Standards (Ex. CERT C, C++ or JAVA Stds.)
    • Apply the tools within the development activity (i.e., as an add-on to the developer's Integrated Development Environment (IDE)) as well as in the Independent Test and Evaluation (IT&E) activities
    • Classify most dangerous CWEs for Ground Systems
      – Use NASA’s or create you own based on your mission and threats
Current Trends in the Field

• Lack of Defense in Depth (DiD) – Layered Security
  – Border protection (i.e. Firewalls) is depended on too much
• Network management and insight is insufficient
  – Lack of ground-truth topology
  – Lack of monitoring, alerting and knowing what is required or “normal”
• Industrial Control Systems are Vulnerable
  – Not designed or operated with cyber resiliency in mind
• Patching and Security Testing is not a Priority
  – Mission trumps all and patching/testing is delayed or never done
  – Lack of vulnerability scanning, code analysis, & dynamic analysis
  • Vulnerable COTS, Open Source, and Custom Code on networks
• Limited Staffing Investment
  – Lacking appropriate training on technology/tools and knowledge
  – Staff is overtasked with non cyber activities
• Programs are waiting for Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) Phases 1 – 3 deployment to provide “security”
## IA/Cyber Lessons Learned in Space Systems

### Overall Approach
- Adding security to in-process developments
- Incorporating security into existing processes
- Newness of artifacts to Development process, variations in artifact quality

**Potential Solutions:**
- Work together to incorporate as part of engineering and risk process

### SSP
- Using FIPS categorization to baseline control set without supplementation for mission-specific threats
- Defining customizations based on as-is design vs. identifying control substitutions or other mitigating factors—identification / documentation of residual risk
- Definition of SSPs around development of the ground segment (e.g. workstations, servers) instead of system/mission
- Sometime there are no SSPs for the spacecraft system

**Potential Solutions:**
- Projects ensure that asset protection is part of the engineering process, with results captured in the SSP. Promote best practices and lessons learned across projects

### Security Allocation to Requirements
- Security is not a distinct domain
- Requirements defined prior to availability of SSP, PPP, or Threat Summary

**Potential Solutions:**
- Ensure a top-down approach to addressing security
Backup Slides
References / Links

- **Zero Trust**

- **NIST 800-53**

- **Space Security**
  - [http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/hacked-space-are-satellites-next-cybersecurity-battleground-n658231](http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/hacked-space-are-satellites-next-cybersecurity-battleground-n658231)
  - Security Threats: [https://public.ccsds.org/Pubs/350x1g2.pdf](https://public.ccsds.org/Pubs/350x1g2.pdf)

- **Misc.:**
  - CIS Top 20: [https://www.sans.org/media/critical-security-controls/SANS_CSC_Poster.pdf](https://www.sans.org/media/critical-security-controls/SANS_CSC_Poster.pdf)
CCSDS
- major space agencies of the world: http://public.ccsds.org/participation/member_agencies.aspx
- multi-national forum: http://cwe.ccsds.org/

Policies and such
- 2810: http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/N_PR_2810_001A_/N_PR_2810_001A_.pdf
- 7120.5E: https://foiaelibrary.gsfc.nasa.gov/_assets/doclibBidder/tech_docs/1. N_PR_7120_005E_.pdf
- Security Quality Requirements Engineering (SQUARE): http://www.cert.org/cybersecurity-engineering/products-services/square.cfm?

SCA/OA
- C: https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/display/c/SEI+CERT+C+Coding+Standard
- C++: https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=637
- JAVA: https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/display/java/SEI+CERT+Oracle+Coding+Standard+for+Java
- CodeSonar: http://www.grammatech.com/codesonar
- Sonatype: http://www.sonatype.com/
- BlackDuck: https://www.blackducksoftware.com/products/black-duck-hub
- Spreadsheet: http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/docs/P-5061-AppendixE-soar-sw-matrix-v9-mobility.xlsx

Info and Training
- Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE): https://cwe.mitre.org/
- Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE): https://cve.mitre.org/
- Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC): https://capec.mitre.org/
- FedVTE: https://fedvte.usalearning.gov/
- SAFECode: https://training.safecode.org/
- Secure Coding and Standards Tutorial: https://www.safaribooksonline.com/self-registration/nasatutorials/
- Cigital: https://www.cigital.com/services/training/elearning/
- Pluralsight: https://www.pluralsight.com/search?q=security&categories=course
• Stack Overflow Post - http://stackoverflow.com/questions/6747995/a-complete-list-of-unsafe-string-handling-functions-and-their-safer-replacements
• Flawfinder - http://www.dwheeler.com/flawfinder/
• Cppcheck - http://cppcheck.sourceforge.net/
• Rosecheckers - http://sourceforge.net/projects/rosecheckers/
• Splint - http://www.splint.org
• RATS - https://code.google.com/p/rough-auditing-tool-for-security
• Flawfinder - http://www.dwheeler.com/flawfinder
• SWAMP - https://continuousassurance.org
• Find Bugs - http://findbugs.sourceforge.net/

Mitre Links
• CWE - https://cwe.mitre.org/
• CVE - https://cve.mitre.org/
• CAPEC - https://capec.mitre.org/

Tools
• Sonatype - http://www.sonatype.com/
• Black Duck HUB - https://www.blackducksoftware.com/products/black-duck-hub
• OWASP Dependency Check - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Dependency_Check
IDA Work

- **matrix** - http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/docs/P-5061-AppendixE-soar-sw-matrix-v9-mobility.xlsx

Standards

- **C** - https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/display/c/SEI+CERT+C+Coding+Standard
- **C++** - https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=637
- **JAVA** - https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/display/java/SEI+CERT+Oracle+Coding+Standard+for+Java
<table>
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<td>National Institute for Standards and Technology</td>
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<td>DiD</td>
<td>Defense in Depth</td>
<td>SIEM</td>
<td>Security Incident and Event Manager</td>
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<td>DLP</td>
<td>Data Loss Prevention</td>
<td>SPAN</td>
<td>Switch Port for Analysis</td>
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<td>DMZ</td>
<td>Demilitarized Zone</td>
<td>SSH</td>
<td>Secure Shell</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDS</td>
<td>Intrusion Detection System</td>
<td>SW</td>
<td>Software</td>
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<tr>
<td>IONet</td>
<td>Internet Protocol Operation Network</td>
<td>TAP</td>
<td>Test Access Point</td>
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<td>IP</td>
<td>Internet Protocol</td>
<td>TC</td>
<td>Telecommands</td>
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<td>Intrusion Protection System</td>
<td>TM</td>
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<td>Information Technology</td>
<td>VPN</td>
<td>Virtual Private Network</td>
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<td>Mission Operations Center</td>
<td>WSC</td>
<td>White Sands Complex</td>
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<tr>
<td>NASA</td>
<td>National Aeronautics and Space Administration</td>
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</table>
Low Hanging Fruit
Unsafe Functions

• Stop using known unsafe functions and always do bounds checking if you are copying to a buffer
  – Even if you think you know what you are copying from and it’s limited, defensive coding is best.

• Some samples of unsafe functions due to allowed writing with no regard to buffer size
  – strncpy, _iota, sscanf, & wcslen have safer _s varieties (ex. _iota_s) that require a buffer size to be specified
    • Resource: Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) Banned Function Calls
    • Resource: Stack Overflow Post

• Most of these are unsafe due to allowed writing with no regard to buffer size
  – memset, memcpy, strcat, strcmp, strcpy, strlen, sprintf, strncpy, _iota, sscanf, wcslen

• Free tool to help find unsafe functions - Flawfinder
Low Hanging Fruit
CERT Rules

• For legacy code:
  – MSC00-C. Compile cleanly at high warning levels
    • The process of fixing compiler warnings will probably quash some other vulnerabilities.
  – ERR33-C. Detect and handle standard library errors
    • Include any program functions that give some kind of error indication
      – If a function returns some special value on error, such as NULL, your calls to that function should always check its return value
Low Hanging Fruit
CERT Rules (cont.)

• For new code
  – ERR00-C. Adopt and implement a consistent and comprehensive error-handling policy
    • This is where programs fail the most easily. They fail to check for errors because the developers
don't know what to do if an unexpected error occurs.
  – MEM00-C. Allocate and free memory in the same module, at the same level of
    abstraction
    • A design issue, but not following it will get your code into hot water quickly.
  – MEM12-C. Consider using a goto chain when leaving a function on error when using and
    releasing resources
    • More specifically, make sure your code frees resources even if errors occur.

• For both new and existing code: execute static code analysis tools to determine weaknesses
  • Free ones are a good place to start; See slide 14 for commercial ones

  – Cppcheck
  – Rosecheckers
  – Splint
  – Find Bugs
  – RATS
  – Flawfinder
  – SWAMP ✭
Some Secure Coding Best Practices

1. **Validate input.** Validate input from all untrusted data sources. Proper input validation can eliminate the vast majority of software vulnerabilities. Be suspicious of most external data sources, including command line arguments, network interfaces, environmental variables, and user controlled files.

2. **Heed compiler warnings.** Compile code using the highest warning level available for your compiler and eliminate warnings by modifying the code.

3. **Use Code Analysis Tools.** Use static and dynamic analysis tools to detect and eliminate additional security flaws. Dynamic analysis is the testing and evaluation of an application during runtime. Static analysis is the testing and evaluation of an application by examining the code without executing the application. Many software defects that cause memory and threading errors can be detected both dynamically and statically. The two approaches are complementary because no single approach can find every error. The primary advantage of dynamic analysis: It reveals subtle defects or vulnerabilities whose cause is too complex to be discovered by static analysis. Dynamic analysis can play a role in security assurance, but its primary goal is finding and debugging errors. The primary advantage of static analysis: It examines all possible execution paths and variable values, not just those invoked during execution. Thus static analysis can reveal errors that may not manifest themselves until weeks, months or years after release. This aspect of static analysis is especially valuable in security assurance, because security attacks often exercise an application in unforeseen and untested ways.

4. **Use Binary Analysis Tools.** Binary analysis creates a behavioral model by analyzing an application's control and data flow through executable machine code – the way an attacker sees it. Unlike source code tools, this approach accurately detects issues in the core application and extends coverage to vulnerabilities found in 3rd party libraries, pre-packaged components, and code introduced by compiler or platform specific interpretations.
Some Secure Coding Best Practices

5. **Architect and design for security policies.** Create software architecture and design your software to implement and enforce security policies. For example, if your system requires different privileges at different times, consider dividing the system into distinct intercommunicating subsystems, each with an appropriate privilege set.

6. **Keep it simple.** Keep the design as simple and small as possible. Complex designs increase the likelihood that errors will be made in their implementation, configuration, and use. Additionally, the effort required to achieve an appropriate level of assurance increases dramatically as security mechanisms become more complex.

7. **Default deny.** Base access decisions on permission rather than exclusion. This means that, by default, access is denied and the protection scheme identifies conditions under which access is permitted.

8. **Adhere to the principle of least privilege.** Every process should execute with the least set of privileges necessary to complete the job. Any elevated permission should be held for a minimum time. This approach reduces the opportunities an attacker has to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges.

9. **Sanitize data sent to other systems.** Sanitize all data passed to complex subsystems such as command shells, relational databases, and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components. Attackers may be able to invoke unused functionality in these components through the use of SQL, command, or other injection attacks. This is not necessarily an input validation problem because the complex subsystem being invoked does not understand the context in which the call is made. Because the calling process understands the context, it is responsible for sanitizing the data before invoking the subsystem.

10. **Practice defense in depth.** Manage risk with multiple defensive strategies, so that if one layer of defense turns out to be inadequate, another layer of defense can prevent a security flaw from becoming an exploitable vulnerability and/or limit the consequences of a successful exploit. For example, combining secure programming techniques with secure runtime environments should reduce the likelihood that vulnerabilities remaining in the code at deployment time can be exploited in the operational environment.
Some Secure Coding Best Practices

11. **Use effective quality assurance techniques.** Good quality assurance techniques can be effective in identifying and eliminating vulnerabilities. Fuzz testing, penetration testing, and source code audits should all be incorporated as part of an effective quality assurance program. Independent security reviews can lead to more secure systems. External reviewers bring an independent perspective; for example, in identifying and correcting invalid assumptions.

12. **Adopt a secure coding standard.** Develop and/or apply a secure coding standard for your target development language and platform.

13. **Define security requirements.** Identify and document security requirements early in the development life cycle and make sure that subsequent development artifacts are evaluated for compliance with those requirements. When security requirements are not defined, the security of the resulting system cannot be effectively evaluated.

14. **Model threats.** Use threat modeling to anticipate the threats to which the software will be subjected. Threat modeling involves identifying key assets, decomposing the application, identifying and categorizing the threats to each asset or component, rating the threats based on a risk ranking, and then developing threat mitigation strategies that are implemented in designs, code, and test cases.

15. **Don't trust services.** Many organizations utilize the processing capabilities of third party partners, who more than likely have differing security policies and posture than you. It is unlikely that you can influence or control any external third party, whether they are home users or major suppliers or partners. Therefore, implicit trust of externally run systems is not warranted. All external systems should be treated in a similar fashion.
16. **Separation of duties.** A key fraud control is separation of duties. For example, someone who requests a computer cannot also sign for it, nor should they directly receive the computer. This prevents the user from requesting many computers, and claiming they never arrived. Certain roles have different levels of trust than normal users. In particular, administrators are different to normal users. In general, administrators should not be users of the application.

17. **Software Supply Chain.** IT managers should create and preserve a bill of materials, or a list of ingredients, for the components used in a given piece of software. The complexities and interdependencies of the IT ecosystem require software suppliers to not only be able to demonstrate the security of products they produce, but also evaluate the integrity of products they acquire and use. Ultimately this should lead to greater confidence through integrity checks incorporated in a defined secure development lifecycle.

18. **Avoid security by obscurity.** Security through obscurity is a weak security control, and nearly always fails when it is the only control. This is not to say that keeping secrets is a bad idea, it simply means that the security of key systems should not be reliant upon keeping details hidden. For example, the security of an application should not rely upon knowledge of the source code being kept secret. The security should rely upon many other factors, including reasonable password policies, defense in depth, business transaction limits, solid network architecture, and fraud and audit controls. A practical example is Linux. Linux's source code is widely available, and yet when properly secured, Linux is a hardy, secure and robust operating system.

19. **Fix security issues correctly.** Once a security issue has been identified, it is important to develop a test for it, and to understand the root cause of the issue. When design patterns are used, it is likely that the security issue is widespread amongst all code bases, so developing the right fix without introducing regressions is essential.
• Document credible threat environment, identify vulnerabilities

- Credible threat environment (notional)
  - Satellite
  - Mission Ops
  - Science Ops

- Three types of threat groups identified
  - Communication paths
  - Ground elements
  - Satellite

- Establish risk using Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability
  - Assess that communications paths and ground elements pose high risk
  - Assess that satellite poses low-moderate risk (assuming other system aspects are secure)
Example Security Analysis (Part 2)

Security Strategy

- Project survivability strategy against credible threats, vulnerabilities, and acknowledge evolving threat environment
- Strategy defined in terms of interfaces and information types (establish security perimeters and how strong they need to be)

- Security strategy is at element level and at system level to arrive at acceptable risk posture
  - For example, if the Mission Ops and command interface into a spacecraft is secure, perhaps less security is needed within the satellite

- **Candidate security strategy for SC FSW**
  - Protect the commanding path
  - Perform command authentication
  - Command traffic analysis
  - Provide satellite software resiliency to common weakness enumerations
**Example Security Analysis (Part 3)**

### Security Controls

- Once threats, perimeters (interfaces and information types established), engineering process to select controls and tailor accordingly

#### Candidate SC FSW Threats, Perimeters

- **Satellite Threats**
- **Communication Path Threats**

#### Candidate security controls based on planned strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Candidate Security Control</th>
<th>SW</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command Path</td>
<td>Encryption</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cmd Authentication</td>
<td>Protocol</td>
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<tr>
<td>Software Resiliency</td>
<td>Coding Standards</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Establish security categorization**
- **Select Controls**, based on 800-53 analysis, system specific tailoring
  - **Required Controls**
  - **Supplemental Controls**
- **Consider**
  - Data in Motion, Data at Rest, Data in Use
  - Strength of the control, pervasiveness of threats
- **Hints**:
  - Sometimes one control addresses multiple threats, collateral security
  - For spacecraft software, SC and SI are the most relevant control families
  - Controls may already be addressed through design or fault management (e.g., SI-10(3)), e.g. applying a robust set of security controls may simply require taking credit for what is already being done
Governance / Relationships Between Expected Artifacts / Decomposition of Security Requirements

Policy and Directives
Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), EOs, etc.

Threat Summary
Threat environment that the mission is most likely encounter as it reaches operational capability

Project Protection Plan (PPP)
Mission survivability strategies in addressing the threats

“System” Security Plan(s) (SSP(s))
One or more plans that specify and allocate security controls across program elements to implement the protection strategies described in the PPP.

Software Requirements & Design
FSW   GSW

Software Products & COTS Customizations
FSW   GSW

Project Controls (Dev. Facilities & Processes, etc.)

Agency / Center Infrastructure, External Networks, Intl. Partners, etc.

NIST 800-53
Catalog of controls with a process for selecting and tailoring the controls to meet mission / system security needs. (Provides more of the “what to do.”)

Mandatory for terrestrial networks and IT systems (to include ground systems)—advisable for space systems (space system “overlay” available).

The number and organization of these plans are not as important as the coverage for the PPP strategies, the completeness of the control selections, and traceability to software requirements (where applicable).
The project has a Threat Summary—or the PPP contains information—that indicates the project has taken into account the full range of threats appropriate to its mission type, capabilities, and assets.

System-level plans fully integrate the protection strategies from the PPP and are traceable to control selection, allocation, and tailoring decisions at all levels of the system design along with any corresponding system specifications. Additionally, these decisions are based on an appropriate categorization of the specific data and assets being protected in each instance ensuring risk is mitigated to a level consistent with the project’s risk tolerance (as defined in the PPP).

The PPP contains a comprehensive set of project survivability and protection strategies addressing the full range of threats and vulnerabilities that exist or are likely to exist throughout its lifecycle. Also, it contains an assessment of risk showing how the strategies mitigate the project’s risk to an acceptable level.

“System” Security Plan(s) (SSP(s))
One or more plans that specify and allocate security controls across program elements to implement the protection strategies described in the PPP.

Project Protection Plan (PPP)
Mission survivability strategies in addressing the threats

Threat Summary
Threat environment that the mission is most likely to encounter as it reaches operational capability

Use of outside systems, networks, and controls are fully described with supplemental controls applied as needed to mitigate risk.

Controls allocated to software are traceable down to specific software modules and completely and correctly specify the control.

Controls implemented in software perform as specified. Software products are robust and free from:
- Defects that many induce additional vulnerabilities or bypass controls (CWEs)
- Undocumented / unspecified functionality

Plans and specifications for programmatic controls such as secure development and acquisition processes, physical and personnel security, change control, and routine plan maintenance are complete and consistent with PPP project protection strategies and risk tolerance.