Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the backup flight system

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Backup Flight System (BFS) hardware. The BFS hardware consists of one General Purpose Computer (GPC) loaded with backup flight software and the components used to engage/disengage that unique GPC. Specifically, the BFS hardware includes the following: DDU (Display Driver Unit), BFC (Backup Flight Controller), GPC (General Purpose Computer), switches (engage, disengage, GPC, CRT), and circuit protectors (fuses, circuit breakers). The IOA analysis process utilized available BFS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Of the failure modes analyzed, 19 could potentially result in a loss of life and/or loss of vehicle.