Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Ulysses Mission (Tier 2)

This Final (Tier 2) Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) addresses the environmental impacts which may be caused by implementation of the Ulysses mission, a space flight mission to observe the polar regions of the Sun. The proposed action is completion of preparation and operation of the Ulysses spacecraft, including its planned launch at the earliest available launch opportunity on the Space Transportation System (STS) Shuttle in October 1990 or in the backup opportunity in November 1991. The alternative is canceling further work on the mission. The Tier 1 EIS included a delay alternative which considered the Titan 4 launch vehicle as an alternative booster stage for launch in 1991 or later. This alternative was further evaluated and eliminated from consideration when, in November 1988, the U.S. Air Force, which procures the Titan 4, notified that it could not provide a Titan 4 vehicle for the 1991 launch opportunity because of high priority Department of Defense requirements. The Titan 4 launch vehicle is no longer a feasible alternative to the STS/Inertial Upper Stage (IUS)/Payload Assist Module-Special (PAM-S) for the November 1991 launch opportunity. The only expected environment effects of the proposed action are associated with normal launch vehicle operation and are treated elsewhere. The environmental impacts of normal Shuttle launches were addressed in existing NEPA documentation and are briefly summarized. These impacts are limited largely to the near-field at the launch pad, except for temporary stratospheric ozone effects during launch and occasional sonic boom effects near the landing site. These effects were judged insufficient to preclude Shuttle launches. There could also be environmental impacts associated with the accidental release of radiological material during launch, deployment, or interplanetary trajectory injection of the Ulysses spacecraft. Intensive analysis indicates that the probability of release is small. There are no environmental impacts in the no-action alternative; however, the U.S. Government and the European Space Agency would suffer adverse fiscal and programmatic impacts if this alternative were adopted. The scientific benefits of the mission would be delayed and possibly lost. There could be significant impacts on the ability of the U.S. to negotiate international agreements for cooperative space activities.